THE

ROMAN HISTORY,

FROM THE

Building of *Rome* to the Ruin of the *Commonwealth*.

Illuſtrated with MAPS and other Plates.

VOL. II.

By N. HOOKE, Eſq;

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MDCCLVI.

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

HUGH, Earl of MARCHMONT.

MY LORD,

PERMIT me to lay hold of this fair occaſion, publickly to congratulate your Lordſhip, upon that *true* Glory, *the conſenting praiſe of the honeſt and the wiſe*, which you have ſo early acquired. 'When men have 'performed any *virtuous* actions, or ſuch as 'ſit eaſy upon their memories, it is a *reaſon-'able* pleaſure (ſays a philoſophical* Writer, who ſpeaks contemptuouſly enough of Renown after death) 'to have the teſtimony of 'the world added to that of their own con-'ſciences, that they have done well.' My Lord, you have not only this pleaſure, but another, no leſs reaſonable, and more exquiſite, attending a character like yours, The being able to do much good to others. To thoſe whom you diſtinguiſh by particular marks of your good opinion you give repu-

* Mr. *Wollaſton.*

tation; and I have happily experienced, that reputation, ſo derived, is not meer air and fruitleſs. Through that warmth of good will which your Lordſhip, on all occaſions, expreſſes for me, I have profited, greatly profited, by *your* glory. You, my Lord, can be no ſtranger to this truth; yet I truſt, you will forgive me, if, to draw ſtill more advantage from your fame, I here take the liberty to tell your Lordſhip, *in print*, for the information of others, what you knew before: As a Player, when alone on the ſtage, ſpeaks aloud to himſelf, that he may be heard by thoſe who fill the Theatre. I would, by this dedication of my Book to your Lordſhip, publiſh, as far as by ſuch means I can, that You, my Lord, are my Patron and my Friend; and that I am, with the greateſt reſpect, eſteem and gratitude,

My Lord,

Your Lordſhip's

Moſt faithful, and

Moſt Humble Servant,

N. HOOKE.

THE

Roman Hiſtory.

FOURTH BOOK.

From the Beginning of the First Punic War in the Year of *Rome* 489, to the End of the Second in 552.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAP. I.

The occaſion of the Firſt Punic War.

CERTAIN Italian *ſoldiers, called* Mamertines, *who had been mercenaries in the ſervice of* Agathocles *King of* Sicily, *and had, after his death, treacherouſly ſeized upon* Meſſina, *being reduced to extremities by the arms of* Hiero *King of* Syracuſe, *one part of them puts the citadel into the hands of the* Carthaginians, *and the other ſends Embaſſadors to the* Romans, *offering them the poſſeſſion of the city, and imploring their protection. The people of* Rome *order the Conſul* Appius Claudius *to go with an army to the relief of the* Mamertines; *who, in the mean time, rid themſelves of the* Carthaginians, *that had been admitted into the citadel.* HIERO, K. of Syracuſe. Y. of *R.* 489.

CHAP. II.

Firſt, ſecond, and third years of the War.

The Carthaginians, *in conjunction with* Hiero *King of* Syracuſe, *who had entered into a league with them, beſiege* Meſſina. Appius Claudius *lands in* Sicily, *defeats the allies, and forces them to raiſe the ſiege. The next year* Hiero, *for a hundred talents of ſilver, purchaſes a Peace with* Rome, *and the year following aſſiſts the* Romans *in taking* Agrigentum *from the* Carthaginians. 490. 491.

CHAP. III.
The fourth and fifth years of the War.

492. *In the Conſulſhip of* L. Valerius *and* T. Otacilius, Rome *fits out a fleet of a hundred* Quinqueremes *and twenty* Triremes, *in order to diſpute with*
493. *the* Carthaginians *the dominion of the ſea. One of the Conſuls of the next year,* Cornelius Aſina, *falls into the enemy's hands, together with ſeventeen*
DUILIUS. *of his galleys; but the other Conſul,* C. Duilius, *gains a memorable victory over the* Carthaginian *fleet, near* Mylæ, *chiefly by means of a new invented engine for grappling and boarding the enemy's ſhips.*

CHAP. IV.
The ſixth, ſeventh, and eighth years of the War.

494. *Four thouſand* Samnites *conſpire with certain diſcontented ſlaves to plunder and burn* Rome, *but are ſeaſonably diſcovered, and puniſhed. The* Romans *invade* Corſica *and* Sardinia *with ſucceſs. A quarrel in* Sicily *between the* Roman *army and their* Sicilian *auxiliaries, gives the enemy ſome ad-*
495. *vantages in that iſland. Next year ſeveral towns there ſurrender to one of the Conſuls; and the other ſurprizes the enemy's fleet in a port of* Sardinia, *and takes many of the ſhips; whereupon the* Carthaginian *ſailors mutiny, and*
496. *crucify their Admiral. The* Romans *are again conquerors in an engagement at ſea near the* Tyndaris.

CHAP. V.
The ninth year of the War.

To oblige Garthage *to recal her armies from* Sicily, Rome *under-*
497. *takes to transfer the war into* Africa. *In this view both the Conſuls are ſent out with a fleet of* 330 *ſhips of war, and an army of near* 140,000 *men. They gain a complete victory over the enemy's fleet near* Ecnomus, *and afterwards land in* Africa. *One of the Conſuls returns to* Italy *with*
REGULUS. *the greater part of the fleet and the army, leaving his collegue* Regulus *to purſue the war. The* Roman *General, after taking ſeveral towns, routs the land-forces of the* Carthaginians *near* Adis, *and then offers peace to the Republic, but upon conditions that are rejected with indignation.*

CHAP. VI.

XANTIPPUS. *The Senate of* Carthage *entruſt* Xantippus, *a* Lacedæmonian, *with the command of their army. By his excellent conduct he totally defeats the* Romans *in a pitch'd battle, and takes* Regulus *priſoner.*

CHAP. VII.

From the ninth to the fourteenth year of the War.

Rome *diſpatches her new Conſuls into* Africa, *with a great fleet, to bring off the remains of* Regulus's *army, which after the late battle had taken refuge in* Clypea. *The Conſuls gain a victory over the* Carthaginian *fleet, near the promontory of* Mercury; *they land at* Clypea, *and take the legionaries on board; but in their paſſage home meet with ſo terrible a ſtorm, that, of above four hundred veſſels, only fourſcore eſcape deſtruction.* 498.

The Romans *fit out a new fleet, with which the ſucceeding Conſuls paſs into* Sicily, *and there reduce ſome towns.* 499.

Next year 150 Roman *ſhips periſhing by tempeſt, the Republic gives over all thoughts of naval enterprizes, and reſolves to depend entirely upon her land-forces; but thoſe are ſo much afraid of the* Carthaginian *elephants, that for two years together they dare not face the enemy in battle, or even appear in the plain field.* 500. 501, 502.

This terror among the legions, and the advantage which the enemy had of being able, at pleaſure, to ſupply their maritime towns with recruits and proviſions, make the Roman *Senate reſolve to try once more the fortune of* Rome *at ſea. In the mean time, the* Roman *General in* Sicily *draws the* Carthaginians *into a ſnare, routs their whole army, and kills or takes all the elephants.* 503.

CHAP. VIII.

Carthage *diſheartened by her loſſes ſends Embaſſadors to* Rome, *and, together with them, the captive* Regulus, *to treat of a peace.* Regulus *diſſuades the Senate from hearkening to the overture, and even from conſenting to an exchange of priſoners. In performance of his word given he returns to* Carthage, *and there, ſoon after, dies.*

CHAP. IX.

From the fourteenth to the eighteenth year of the War.

The Conſuls ſet ſail with the fleet for Sicily, *and lay ſiege to* Lilybæum. Himilco, *the* Carthaginian *Commander in the city, makes a vigorous defence.* 503.

In the mean time a ſquadron of ſhips from Africa *paſſes through the* Roman *navy, and lands* 10000 *men in the town; which being afterwards ſtraitly ſhut up, one* Hannibal, *a* Rhodian, *undertakes to go thither with a ſingle galley, and bring intelligence to the Senate of* Carthage *of the condition of the beſieged; and he ſucceeds.* Hannibal the Rhodian.

The gariſon in a ſally burn all the towers and engines employ'd againſt their town; after which the Romans *turn the ſiege into a blockade. Next year the Conſul* Claudius Pulcher, 504.

Claudius Pulcher. *attempting to ſurprize* Drepanum, *is by the governor of the place defeated at ſea, and loſes the greateſt part of his fleet. The reſt of the* Roman *navy, under the other Conſul and his Quæſtors, is, by the* Carthaginian *Admiral, forced upon the ſouth coaſt of* Sicily, *where every one of the ſhips periſhing by ſtorm,* Rome *once more renounces the empire of the ſeas. Her General in*
505. Sicily *gets poſſeſſion of the city of* Eryx. *The following year produces no remarkable action between the contending parties. The* Carthaginian *army, for want of pay, mutiny againſt their General. He is recalled home, and ſucceeded in the command by* Amilcar Barcha, *father of the famous* Hannibal.

CHAP. X.

From the eighteenth year of the war to the end of it, in the twenty-third or twenty-fourth year after its commencement.

Amilcar Barcha. Amilcar, *after quieting the diſcontents of the army, and making a ſucceſsful expedition on the coaſt of* Italy, *encamps on a mountain between* Panormus *and* Eryx *in* Sicily, *and there maintains his poſt againſt all the efforts*
506, 507, *of the* Romans *for almoſt three years. At length (in* 508.*) he finds means*
508. *to ſeize upon the city of* Eryx, *ſituated on the ſide of a high mountain; and*
509, 510. *though hard preſſed by a* Roman *gariſon at the top of the mountain, and a* Roman *army at the foot of it, yet in two years time they are not able to diſlodge him. The Senate of* Rome *finding it impoſſible to complete the conqueſt of* Sicily *without a naval ſtrength, a conſiderable fleet is fitted out at the expence of private citizens, the public treaſury being exhauſted. This new*
511. *fleet, under the conduct of* Lutatius Catulus, *obtaining a complete victory over*
Lutatius Catulus. *that of the enemy, near the* Ægates, *the* Carthaginians *are conſtrained to yield to the* Romans, *by a treaty of peace, the whole iſland of* Sicily; *which, except the little kingdom of* Syracuſe, *is reduced to the form of a*
512. *province. At* Rome *the tribes are augmented to* thirty-five, *which number*
35. Tribes. *they never after exceeded.*

CHAP. XI.

The Faliſci, *a people of* Hetruria, *rebel againſt the* Romans, *but in a few days are forced to ſubmit.* Carthage *is reduced to great extremities in a war, which for more than three years is carried on againſt her, by her foreign Mercenaries in conjunction with her* African *ſubjects. The conduct of the* Romans *upon this occaſion.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

For three years the Romans, *having no war to maintain, employ themselves in eſtabliſhing good order in* Italy, *and planting colonies in the neighbourhood of the* Gauls *and* Ligurians. *The Republic deſires to aſſiſt* Ptolemy *king of* Egypt *againſt* Antiochus *of* Syria; *but the* Egyptian *civilly declines the offer. At length the* Boian Gauls *breaking the peace with* Rome, *and the* Ligurians *being in motion, the* Romans *take the field. The Conſul* Valerius *is vanquiſhed in a battle with the* Boian Gauls. *He afterwards defeats them, while his collegue obtains a victory over the* Ligurians. *Next year the* Romans *act entirely on the defenſive againſt the* Boians; *but offenſively againſt the* Ligurians, *and with ſucceſs. At* Rome *the Secular Games are celebrated. The new Conſuls march againſt the* Boians *and* Ligurians, *who having called in to their aſſiſtance an army of* Tranſalpine Gauls, *take umbrage at their numbers, fall upon them, and put them to flight. The conquerors weakened by their victory are obliged to make peace with the* Romans. *The* Corſicans *in the mean time rebel, with whom* Claudius Glycias, *being ſent againſt them, enters into a treaty, on terms diſhonourable to the Republic. She refuſes to adhere to the treaty, delivers up* Claudius *to the reſentment of the* Corſicans, *and then ſubdues them by force of arms. The* Corſicans, *in conjunction with* Carthage, *ſtir up the* Sardinians *to revolt. Hereupon* Rome *threatens the* African *Republic with a war, but is diverted from it by an Embaſſy from* Carthage: *And* Sardinia *being eaſily reduced the next year, the temple of* Janus *is ſhut for the firſt time ſince the reign of* Numa Pompilius. *A few months after, the* Ligurians, Corſicans, *and* Sardinians *take arms again. The firſt inſtance of a divorce at* Rome. *Marriage ſettlements introduced.* Fabius Maximus *the Conſul ſubdues the* Ligurians; *his collegue triumphs for his exploits againſt the* Sardinians. *At the motion of* Ætutius, *a Tribune of the people, the judicature of the* Centumvirs *is erected. The following year* Flaminius, *another Tribune of the people, propoſes a law for dividing amongſt the poor citizens of* Rome *ſome lands lately taken from the* Gauls. *In obedience to his father he deſiſts from his enterprize; but one of his collegues carries it on, and ſucceeds, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of the Senate.* Sardinia *and* Corſica, *now entirely ſubdued, are reduced to the form of a* Roman *province; and the conqueror of this latter iſland being refuſed a triumph, gives the firſt example of aſſuming that honour againſt the will of the Senate.*

512, 513, 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. Centumvirs. 521. 522.

CHAP. XIII.

The firſt Illyrian War.

The Romans *ſend embaſſadors to* Teuta, *Queen of a part of* Illyricum, *to complain of the piracies of her ſubjects.* Teuta, *offended at the haughty behaviour of one of the embaſſadors, cauſes them all to be murdered in their*

523.

524. *return home. To revenge this inſult,* Rome *employs both her Conſuls, who, aſſiſted by* Demetrius *of* Pharos, *ſucceſsfully begin the war; which is finiſh-*
525. *ed in the following year by a treaty of peace, dictated by the Republic. Her acquaintance with the* Greeks *commences at this time.*

CHAP. XIV.

526. *The* Gauls *on both ſides the* Po *take arms. To oppoſe theſe formidable*
527. *enemies, the* Romans *make extraordinary preparations; and the next year obtain a complete victory over them. Yet the following Conſuls make no pro-*
528. *greſs in the war. Their ſucceſſors, though* Rome, *terrify'd by prodigies,*
529. *had ordered them to return to the city, hazard a pitch'd battle, and gain the*
530. *victory.* Claudius Marcellus *vanquiſhes in ſingle combat the General of the*
531. Gauls, *who diſcouraged by his death, are put to flight.* Inſubria *and* Liguria *ſubmit, and are made one province, which takes the name of* Ciſalpine
532. Gaul. Iſtria *on the* Adriatick *is ſubdued by the Republic.*

CHAP. XV.

The ſecond Illyrian War.

Demetrius *of* Pharos, *whom* Rome *had appointed guardian to the young* Illyrian *King, deſpiſes her orders, and attacks her allies. The preſent Conſuls being obliged to abdicate their office, and the ſeaſon being too far ad-*
533. *vanced for their ſucceſſors to begin a new war,* Æmilius Paullus, *and his*
534. *collegue* Livius Salinator, *go the next year with an army into* Illyricum. Demetrius *flies for protection to the court of* Philip *of* Macedon. Livius, *on his return to* Rome, *is condemned by the tribes, for having apply'd part of the ſpoil to his own uſe.* Roman *colonies are planted at* Placentia *and* Cremona, *in the territories of the* Gauls.

CHAP. XVI.

The ſecond *Punic* War, or the War of *Hannibal.*
Its cauſes and commencement.

THE *ſpirit of revenge with which* Amilcar *left* Sicily, *and which he communicated to his ſon* Hannibal, *is reckoned the* Firſt Cauſe *of the ſecond* Punic *war. The unjuſt ſeizure of* Sardinia *by the* Romans, the Second and principal Cauſe. *The ſucceſſive victories of* Amilcar, Aſdrubal, *and* Hannibal *in* Spain, *the* Third Cauſe.

HANNIBAL. Hannibal *attacks the* Saguntines, *a people in alliance with* Rome, *and the only* Spaniards *who, on the ſouth of the* Iberus, *remain unſubdued to the* Carthaginian *dominion. He reduces* Saguntum, *after a ſiege of eight months.*
535. *The* Romans *order* Sempronius, *one of their Conſuls, into* Africa, *and* P. Cornelius

Cornelius Scipio *the other Conſul, into* Spain, *and at the ſame time ſend an embaſſy to* Carthage, *demanding that* Hannibal *ſhould be delivered up to them, to be puniſhed for his unjuſt infraction of the peace between the two Republics: This being refuſed, and war denounced on both ſides, the* Carthaginian *General ſettles the Affairs of* Spain, *leaves his brother* Aſdrubal *to command on the ſouth ſide of the* Iberus, *and croſſes that river with a great army.*

CHAP. XVII.

Hannibal, *after ſubduing all the country between the* Iberus *and the* Pyrenees, *paſſes thoſe mountains with his army, in his way to* Italy. *He proceeds to the banks of the* Rhone *without moleſtation. There the* Gauls *in vain oppoſe his paſſage; nor can the Conſul* Scipio, *who, arriving at the mouth of the* Rhone, *gets notice of the place where* Hannibal *is, advance expeditiouſly enough to ſtop him.* Scipio *reimbarks his forces, ſends the major part of them forward to* Spain, *but returns himſelf to* Italy, *that he may meet* Hannibal *at his deſcent from the* Alps. *The* Carthaginians *with great danger and fatigue paſs thoſe mountains, lay ſiege to* Turin *and take it. The* Romans, *aſtoniſhed at the news of* Hannibal's *being in* Italy, *whom they thought to have confined to* Spain, *diſpatch orders to the Conſul* Sempronius, *now at* Lilybæum, *to haſten to the defence of his country.* Scipio, *in the mean time, croſſes the* Po, *and advances to meet the enemy.*

CHAP. XVIII.

The Roman *horſe and light-arm'd infantry under* Scipio *are defeated at the* Ticin *by the* Carthaginian *cavalry. The Conſul retires to the neighbourhood of* Placentia: Hannibal *follows him, and offers battle; which the* Roman *declines.* Scipio *diſtruſting the* Gauls, *ſome of whom had gone over to the enemy, removes to the high grounds near the* Trebia, *and there waits the arrival of his collegue.* Battle of the Ticin.

CHAP. XIX.

Sempronius *having join'd* Scipio, *and being encouraged by a ſlight advantage he had gained over a party of the enemy, ventures, notwithſtanding the remonſtrances of his collegue, to fight a pitch'd battle with them at the* Trebia. *The* Roman *army is totally defeated, and all the nations of the* Gauls *declare for* Hannibal. *The Senate make vigorous preparations to ſupport the war.* Cn. Servilius *and* C. Flaminius *are raiſed to the Conſulate,* 536. *and the affairs of the Republic proſper in* Spain, *under the direction of* Cn. Scipio. Hannibal *to gain friends in* Italy, *diſmiſſes, without ranſom, all thoſe of his priſoners who are of the* Roman *allies. Dreading the levity of the* Gauls, *he croſſes the* Apennines, *and enters* Hetruria *through the marſhes, where his army ſuffers extremely, and he himſelf loſes one of his eyes.* The Trebia.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.
The second year of the War.

The Lake THRASYMENUS.

Flaminius, *raiſed to the Conſulſhip by the favour of the people, fears leſt the Augurs ſhould declare his election invalid. Neglecting therefore the uſual ceremonies of religion, he haſtens to* Ariminum, *where he takes upon him the command of the forces, and from thence, at the head of four legions, marches to* Aretium *in* Hetruria. Hannibal *lays an ambuſh for him on the banks of* THE LAKE THRASYMENUS, *and routs his whole army. The Conſul himſelf is ſlain in the action; and, a few days after, a body of four thouſand horſe, that had been ſent to his aſſiſtance, fall into the hands of the Enemy.* Rome, *terrify'd at theſe misfortunes, names* Q. Fabius Maximus *to be Pro-dictator, and appoints* Minucius Rufus *to be his General of the horſe.* Hannibal, *in the mean time, ravages* Italy *quite to* Apulia. *Thither* Fabius *follows him, but keeps on the hills, and declines a general engagement. The* Carthaginian, *to provoke him to fight, pillages the fine country of* Campania. Hannibal, *by a ſtratagem, deceives* Fabius, *who imagined that the* Carthaginian *would not be able to get out of* Campania, *a country ſurrounded partly by high mountains and partly by the ſea. The cautious circumſpective conduct of* Fabius *giving offence at* Rome, *the Comitia divide the command of the army between him and his General of the horſe.* Minucius, *now at the head of half the troops, and proud of an advantage he had gained in an encounter with the enemy, deſcends into the plain, hazards a battle with* Hannibal, *and is on the point of being totally routed; but* Fabius *reſcues him from danger. The two brothers* Publius *and* Cneius Scipio, *in the mean time, carry on the war with ſucceſs in* Spain, *where the hoſtages which* Carthage *had obliged the* Spaniards *to give her, are betray'd into the hands of the* Romans.

CHAP. XXI.
Third year of the War.

537. C. Terentius Varro, *by the intrigues of a Tribune of the people, is raiſed to the Conſulſhip, and* L. Æmilius Paullus *is appointed his collegue.* Rome, *weary of dilatory arts, ſends both her Conſuls, at the head of a mighty army, to diſpute once more with* Hannibal *the ſuperiority in the field. The armies approach each other in a plain country near* CANNÆ *in* Apulia. CANNÆ. Æmilius, *diſliking the ground, adviſes his collegue not to fight, but* Varro, *on a day when it is his turn to command, gives battle to the enemy, and is totally defeated with the ſlaughter of almoſt all his troops. Many of the allies of* Rome *go over to the conqueror.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Some young Romans *of diſtinction reſolving, in deſpair, to forſake* Italy, Scipio *(afterwards ſurnamed* Africanus*) obliges them to take an Oath never to abandon the Republic. And while the people of* Rome *are in the utmoſt conſternation and deſpondency, the Senate preſerve their courage, and make all poſſible preparations for the Defence of their country. They even ſolemnly give thanks to* Varro, for that he had not deſpaired of the Commonwealth. *A DICTATOR is named to govern the State; levies are made with all diligence; the ſlaves are enliſted for the ſervice; all ranks of men bring their gold and ſilver into the public treaſury, and the ſilver coin is now firſt alloy'd with copper. In the mean time, by the permiſſion of* Hannibal, *a deputation from the* Roman *priſoners in his camp, arrives at* Rome, *and petitions the Senate to ranſom the captives. The Conſcript Fathers deny the requeſt.* Capua, *reſolving to ſhake off the* Roman *yoke, demands of the Republic that* Rome *and* Capua *ſhould, for the future, be upon a perfect equality; this propoſal being rejected with diſdain, the* Capuans *deliver up their city to* Hannibal. *The* Carthaginian *diſpatches his brother* Mago *to* Carthage, *with an account of his ſucceſs; the Senate vote him a ſupply of men and money, but are very dilatory in ſending it. The* Roman *Dictator takes the field with a conſiderable army, and* Hannibal, *after making ſome fruitleſs attempts upon* Naples *and* Nola, *lays ſiege to* Caſilinum; *the gariſon of which place, after a ſtout defence, at length capitulates.* Rome *not being in a condition to provide for the fleets and armies in* Sicily *and* Sardinia, *her allies in thoſe iſlands aſſiſt her by their contributions. The Senate having loſt a great number of their members in the war, a Dictator is choſen for the ſole buſineſs of filling the vacant places. He names* 177 *new Senators.*

CHAP. XXIII.

Fourth year of the War.

Sempronius Gracchus *and* Poſthumius Albinus *are raiſed to the Conſulſhip. The latter being cut off, together with all his army, by the* Gauls, *the Senate reſolve to ſend no more armies into* Gaul. Fabius Cunctator *is choſen in the room of the late Conſul.* Hannibal *enters into a treaty with King* Philip *of* Macedon, *whoſe Embaſſadors, in their return home, are taken at ſea, and carry'd to* Rome. *The Senate reſolve to keep the* Macedonian *out of* Italy, *by making war upon him in his own country. The Campaign in* Italy *paſſes in expeditions of no great importance, and the* Romans, *though they have many armies in the field, never hazard a general action againſt* Hannibal. *Their arms proſper in* Sardinia *and* Spain. *In* Sicily, *King* Hiero *being dead, his grandſon and ſucceſſor* Hieronymus *makes an alliance with* Carthage, *and is ſoon after aſſaſſinated by his own ſubjects.*

538.

FABIUS CUNCTATOR.

PHILIP of Macedon.

CHAP. XXIV.
Fifth year of the War.

539. MARCELLUS. *When the Comitia at* Rome *were going to raiſe* T. Otacilius *to the Conſulate*, Fabius, *the preſident of the aſſembly, knowing the inſufficiency of the candidate, hinders his election, and is himſelf choſen, together with* Claudius Marcellus. *The* Roman *citizens remarkably ſhew their zeal for the Republic. The ſoldiers ſerve without pay, and fleets are equip'd at the expence of private men.* Sempronius *is ſaid to have defeated an army of* Carthaginians *under* Hanno, *and* Marcellus *to have gained an advantage over* Hannibal. Fabius *beſieges and takes* Caſilinum, *while the Prætor* Lævinus *begins the war in* Greece *againſt King* Philip.

CHAP. XXV.

ARCHIMEDES. Hippocrates *and* Epicydes, *two of* Hannibal's *Agents in* Sicily, *get themſelves, by intrigue, choſen Prætors of* Syracuſe; *yet the inhabitants of that city enter ſoon after into a league with* Marcellus, *then commander of the* Roman *army in the iſland. The* Hannibaliſts, *going to* Leontini, *perſuade the* Leontines *to a rupture with the* Romans; Marcellus *takes the place at the firſt aſſault: Neverthleſs the* Hannibaliſts *not only make their eſcape, but by artifice and ſingular boldneſs find means to return to* Syracuſe, *with an army under their command. They are re-elected Prætors, and become abſolute maſters of the city.* Marcellus *lays cloſe ſiege to it, but by the wonderful engines of* Archimedes *is conſtrained to turn the ſiege into a blockade.*

CHAP. XXVI.
Sixth year of the War.

540. *The following year, the* Romans *take ſome towns from the* Carthaginians *in* Italy. Hanno *routs a Præfect of the Allies in* Bruttium, *and cuts off almoſt all his army. In* Spain *the two* Scipios *make conſiderable progreſs. They alſo engage* Syphax, *a* Numidian *King, to commence a War with the* Carthaginians *in* Africa. *The latter, in conjunction with* Gala (*another* Numidian *King*) *fall upon* Syphax, *and defeat him with great ſlaughter.* Marcellus *continues the blockade of* Syracuſe, *and with part of his forces reduces ſeveral towns, while many others declare for* Carthage.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVII.

Seventh and eighth years of the War.

Hannibal, *by means of intelligence with ſome of the inhabitants of* Tarentum, *gets poſſeſſion of the city. The* Roman *gariſon retires into the citadel.* Hanno, *whom the* Carthaginian *General had ſent to ſupply* Capua *with corn, is defeated by the Conſul* Fulvius. Thurium, *and the* Metapontines, *ſubmit to* Hannibal's *officers. The Conſuls propoſing to beſiege* Capua, *ſend for* Sempronius Gracchus *to aſſiſt them. In his way he is betray'd into the hands of the enemy, and ſlain.* Hannibal *advances to the defence of* Capua, *and begins a battle with the Conſuls, which an accident puts an end to. The* Roman *Generals decamp in the night*; Hannibal *follows one of them, but miſſing him, attacks another commander,* Centenius Pænula, *and deſtroys almoſt his whole army. After this he falls upon the Prætor* Fulvius, *cuts off* 16000 *of his men, and takes his camp. In the mean time the Conſuls, in conjunction with the forces of* Claudius Nero, *beſiege* Capua *in form.* 541.

During theſe tranſactions, Marcellus *makes himſelf maſter of a part of* Syracuſe, *and encamps within the walls. An army of* Carthaginians *and* Sicilians *come to the relief of the* Syracuſians. *A plague makes great havock in both camps.* Hippocrates *and all the* Carthaginian *ſoldiers are carried off by it*; *and the* Sicilians *disband themſelves.* Epicydes *deſerts* Syracuſe, *and the inhabitants begin a treaty with* Marcellus; *during the courſe of which, a* Spaniſh *officer, corrupted by the* Roman *General, betrays* Ortygia *to him*; *whereupon the* Syracuſians *immediately ſurrender to him* Achradina, *and he gives both up to be plunder'd.* Archimedes *is ſlain.* *Syracuſe taken.*

In the Conſulſhip of P. Sulpicius Galba *and* Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, Hannibal *marches to the relief of* Capua, *now greatly diſtreſs'd for want of proviſions. After ſome vain efforts to draw the* Romans *to a battle, or break into the town, he ſuddenly marches away, and appears before the walls of* Rome, *in hopes the army before* Capua, *or part of it, would haſten to the defence of the Capital. The Conſuls iſſue out of the city to oppoſe him, but keep to the high grounds.* Hannibal *marches back towards* Capua; *but finding that none of the beſiegers had ſtirr'd, he turns upon the Conſuls, who were following him, and forces their camp in the night, with great ſlaughter. Deſpairing of being able to raiſe the ſiege of* Capua, *he with wonderful rapidity traverſes* Apulia, Lucania, *and* Bruttium, *in the view of ſurprizing* Rhegium, *and is very near ſucceeding in his deſign.* Capua *ſurrenders to the* Romans, *and is treated with extreme rigour. In* Greece, Lævinus *draws the* Ætolians, *and ſeveral other States, into a confederacy againſt* Philip *of* Macedon. 542.

CHAP. XXVIII.
Ninth year of the War.

543. T. Lævinus *and* Marcellus *are promoted to the Conſulſhip. The latter is accuſed by the* Syracuſians *of cruelty and injuſtice, before the Senate, who acquit him. The* Campanians *in vain complain of the rigorous proceedings of* Fulvius Flaccus. Salapia *in* Apulia *is betrayed to* Marcellus, *who takes two more cities in* Samnium. Fulvius Centumalus *venturing a battle with* Hannibal, *is totally defeated. The Conſul* Lævinus, *in the mean time, finiſhes the reduction of* Sicily.

CHAP. XXIX.
Tenth year of the War.

544. *Twelve* Roman *Colonies refuſing to pay their contingents of men and money, the Republic does not think it adviſable to attempt compulſion; and to ſupply the deficiencies, ſhe has recourſe to a treaſure long hoarded up in the Exchequer, and farms the lands of* Campania *for the benefit of the public.* Marcellus *is ſaid to have fought three general battles with* Hannibal, *in three days time: in the firſt, the victory inclines to neither ſide, in the ſecond the* Carthaginians *are conquerors, and in the third the* Romans. Marcellus, *nevertheleſs, is unable to keep the field while* Hannibal *ravages* Italy, *and takes priſoners a body of the enemy's troops that were beſieging* Caulonia. Tarentum *is betray'd into the hands of the Conſul* Fabius, *who maſſacres all the inhabitants of the town.*

CHAP. XXX.
Eleventh year of the War.

545. *The Conſul* Marcellus *is ſlain in an ambuſh by the* Numidians, *and his collegue* Criſpinus *mortally wounded.* Hannibal *miſcarries in his attempt upon* Salapia, *but forces the enemy to raiſe the ſiege of* Locri. Lævinus *makes a deſcent on* Africa *with ſucceſs, and defeats a* Carthaginian *fleet off* Clypea. *The Prætor* Sulpicius *carries on the war againſt* Philip *in* Greece.

CHAP. XXXI.

Aſdrubal, *Brother of* Hannibal. *The* Romans *are alarmed by the approach of* Aſdrubal *(the brother of* Hannibal) *with an army from* Spain. *A ſummary account of the* Roman *affairs in that country, from the firſt landing of the* Scipios *there, to the time of* Aſdrubal's *leaving it.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

Twelfth and thirteenth years of the War.

The Conſul Livius Salinator *is ſent to oppoſe* Aſdrubal, *while the Conſul,* Claudius Nero, *acts againſt* Hannibal. Nero, *underſtanding, by ſome intercepted letters, that* Aſdrubal *is marching into* Umbria, *haſtens with a detachment of his troops to join* Livius. *The* Carthaginian, *miſled by his guides, is forced to hazard a battle at the* Metaurus, *where his whole army is routed, and he himſelf ſlain in the action.* Hannibal *finding it impoſſible to preſerve all his conqueſts in* Italy, *retires into* Bruttium *with all his forces, where he ſtill appears terrible to the* Romans, *and gains ſome advantages over the new Conſuls.* 546. *Battle of the* Metaurus.

CHAP. XXXIII.

In Spain, *where* Scipio (*afterwards* Africanus) *commands the* Roman *forces, one of his officers defeats two* Carthaginian *Generals, and he himſelf routs a great army of the enemy. He then ſails to* Africa, *to perſuade* Syphax *to break his treaty with* Carthage. *Falling ſick, at his return to* Spain, *a report of his death encourages part of his army to mutiny, and ſome of the* Spaniards *to rebel.* Scipio *recovers, quiets the ſedition, and puniſhes the rebels.* Maſiniſſa, *a* Numidian *King, enters into a treaty with the Proconſul. The* Carthaginians *abandon* Spain; *and, there being now no open enemies to the* Romans *in that country,* Scipio *returns to* Rome. *He is no ſooner gone than ſeveral of the* Spaniſh *nations take up arms again, but are quelled on the loſs of a battle.* Scipio. Syphax. Masinissa.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Fourteenth year of the War.

Scipio, *now Conſul, has* Sicily *aſſigned him for his province, but is extremely deſirous of having a commiſſion immediately to tranſport an army into* Africa. Fabius Maximus *ſtrenuouſly oppoſes his requeſt. The Conſcript Fathers, after a long debate, give him permiſſion to carry the War into* Africa, *if he ſhall think it for the intereſt of the Republic. He equips a fleet with great expedition, embarks a body of Volunteers, and ſets ſail for* Sicily. *In the mean time,* Mago, *the brother of* Hannibal, *lands an army in* Italy, *takes* Genoa, *and gathers great numbers of the* Gauls *about him. Two* Roman *Generals march againſt him, but no action of moment happens. Nor is any thing of importance done in* Bruttium, *the plague raging in the* Roman *and* Carthaginian *camps.* Scipio *ſends* Lælius *to make a deſcent upon* Africa, *and* Pleminius *to take poſſeſſion of* Locri, *which the inhabitants had promiſed to betray to the* Romans. Pleminius *ſucceeds in his enterprize, but* 548.

exerciſes unheard-of cruelties upon the Locrians. *The* Romans, *terrify'd by prodigies, ſend in great devotion to fetch the goddeſs* Cybele *from* Phrygia, *who works a miracle as ſoon as ſhe lands.*

CHAP. XXXV.

Fifteenth year of the War.

549. *The* Romans *conclude a treaty of peace with* Philip *of* Macedon *and his allies.* Scipio, *now continued in his former command, is accuſed in the Senate, by his Quæſtor* Cato, *of profuſeneſs and idleneſs; and, by the* Locrians, *of partiality to the cruel* Pleminius. *Commiſſioners are appointed to enquire into his conduct. Theſe making a favourable report of the condition of his army, the Conſcript Fathers paſs a decree, that he ſhall immediately go into* Africa.

SOPHONISBA. Syphax *is drawn off from the* Roman *intereſt, by means of his wife* Sophoniſba, *the daughter of* Aſdrubal, *the* Carthaginian *General, and enters into an alliance with* Carthage. *At length* Scipio *arrives with his army in*

MASINISSA. Africa, *where he is joined by* Maſiniſſa, *who had been twice ſtript of his dominions by* Syphax. *After ſome exploits of little importance, the* Roman *General lays ſiege to* Utica, *but upon the approach of* Aſdrubal *and* Syphax *with two great armies, retires to a promontory near his fleet, and there entrenches himſelf. In* Italy *the campaign produces no remarkable exploit that is well vouched. The Cenſors* Livius Salinator *and* Claudius Nero *quarrel, and behave themſelves extravagantly.*

CHAP. XXXVI.

Sixteenth year of the War.

550. Scipio, *having under pretence of negotiating a treaty of peace, got perfect intelligence of the ſtate and diſpoſition of the* Carthaginian *and* Numidian *camps, ſets fire to them in the night, and deſtroys the armies of* Aſdrubal *and* Syphax. *The King and the* Carthaginians *again take the field with new forces, and are defeated in a pitch'd battle.* Carthage *diſpatches meſſengers into* Italy, *to order* Hannibal *and* Mago *to the defence of their native country. In the mean time,* Maſiniſſa *and* Lælius *purſue* Syphax *into the heart of his dominions, vanquiſh him in battle, and take him priſoner.* Cyrtha, *the capital of his kingdom, ſurrenders to* Maſiniſſa, *who, captivated by the charms of* Sophoniſba, *promiſes her protection againſt the* Romans; *and, as the beſt means to perform his promiſe, marries her immediately.* Syphax, *being brought in chains to* Scipio's *camp, inſinuates to the General, that* Sophoniſba's *power over her new Huſband would ſoon make him regardleſs of his engagements with the Republic. The* Roman *therefore inſiſts upon* Maſiniſſa's *delivering up his wife, as the captive of the people of* Rome; *and the* Numidian, *ſeeing no way to protect her, ſends her a cup*

a cup of poiſon, which ſhe reſolutely drinks off. Carthage, *to gain time for* Hannibal *and* Mago *to arrive in* Africa, *propoſes a treaty of peace with* Scipio, *and conſents to the articles he dictates. Two* Roman *Generals, uniting their forces, obtain a victory over* Mago *in* Inſubria, *who being wounded in the action, dies at ſea, in his voyage to* Africa. Hannibal, *receiving a command from* Carthage *to return home, leaves* Italy *with great reluctance*; *and the* Romans *order public thankſgivings to the Gods, for his departure. The Senate approves the conditions of peace propoſed by* Scipio. *During the truce, the* Carthaginians *plunder ſome* Roman *ſhips, driven by ſtreſs of weather upon their coaſt*; *and afterwards offer violence to certain Embaſſadors whom* Scipio *had ſent to demand ſatisfaction. In the mean time,* Hannibal *arrives ſafely in* Africa. Hannibal leaves Italy.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Seventeenth year of the War.

While Scipio, *provoked at the perfidiouſneſs of the* Carthaginians, *purſues the war with uncommon fury,* Hannibal *approaches with his army, and encamps near* Zama. *There having aſked and obtained a conference with the* Roman *General, he propoſes terms of peace, which* Scipio *rejects. Next day a deciſive battle is fought, wherein victory declares for the* Romans. Carthage *makes humble ſupplications to* Scipio *for peace, and, by the advice of* Hannibal, *ſubmits to the conditions propoſed, which, after ſeveral debates, are the next year agreed to by the Senate of* Rome. Scipio *having, in concert with ten commiſſioners, ſettled the affairs of* Africa, *returns home, has a magnificent triumph, and acquires the ſurname of* Africanus. 551. Battle of Zama. 552.

FIFTH BOOK.

From the End of the SECOND PUNIC WAR in the Year of *Rome* 552, to the End of the THIRD in 607.

First Macedonian War.

CHAP. I.

ROME, *having broke the power of* Carthage, *begins to think of extending her domination to the Eaſt, and with this view ſeeks matter of quarrel againſt* Philip *of* Macedon. *On pretence that he had attack'd her allies in* Greece *and* Aſia, *and aſſiſted her enemies in* Africa, *ſhe declares war againſt him, and appoints the Conſul* Sulpicius *to conduct it. King* Philip, *in the mean time, croſſes the* Helleſpont, *and beſieges* Abydos. *There he has.* 553.

has a conference with ſome Roman *Embaſſadors, which ends without any proſpect of an accommodation. After the reduction of* Abydos, *he returns to* Greece, *where the* Romans *had pillaged* Chalcis. *He makes a fruitleſs attempt upon* Athens, *and vainly endeavours to engage the* Achæans *in his intereſt.*

In Italy, *the Prætor* Fulvius *defeats an army of* Gauls, *commanded by* Hamilcar, *a* Carthaginian *whom* Mago *had left in that country.* Maſiniſſa *and* Carthage *make preſents to* Rome; *and* Vermina, *the ſon of* Syphax, *is received into the favour of the Republic.*

CHAP. II.

554. *The* Ætolians *decline taking part in the War between* Rome *and* Macedon. *After ſome ſkirmiſhes,* Philip *is defeated in battle near* Octolophum, *by* Sulpicius, *who then reſigns his command to the Conſul* Villius. Philip

555. *gains a victory over the* Ætolians, *who had now declared for the* Romans. *The King of* Syria, *at the requeſt of the Senate of* Rome, *deſiſts from the war he was carrying on againſt the King of* Pergamus. Philip, *after a fruitleſs conference with* Flamininus (*the ſucceſſor of* Villius) *is driven from his camp by the* Romans; *who, after this victory, make themſelves maſters of ſeveral towns in* Theſſaly. *The* Achæans *enter into an alliance with* Rome, *on a promiſe of having* Corinth *re-united to their State.*

556. *It is agreed between* Philip, Flamininus, *and the chiefs of the* Roman *allies, to refer all differences to the arbitration of the* Roman *Senate. The*

Flamininus. *Fathers, not ſatisfied with* Philip's *Embaſſadors, give full powers to* Flamininus *to purſue the war, or make peace, as he ſhall think proper, and the war is continued.* Philip, *to ſecure* Argos, *which the year before had ſurrendered to* Philocles, *one of his Generals, gives it up to* Nabis, *tyrant of* Lacedæmon, *upon condition of its being reſtored to him, in caſe he ſhould be conqueror in the war. The Tyrant, to maintain himſelf in poſſeſſion of the town, immediately enters into a treaty with* Flamininus. *This General, by a fraud, ſeizes upon* Thebes, *where the* Bœotian *Diet is aſſembled; upon which they are obliged to enter into an alliance with* Rome. Attalus, *King*

Battle of Cynocephalæ. *of* Pergamus, *dies.* Philip *being defeated at* Cynocephalæ, *offers to ſubmit to whatever conditions of peace the* Roman *Senate ſhall pleaſe to impoſe.*

The Republic carries on a war with ſucceſs in Gaul; *but in* Spain *her army is routed, and the Prætor who commanded it killed in the action.*

557. *The Senate grant a peace to* Philip, *on conditions diſpleaſing to the* Ætolians. *Liberty to* Greece *is ſoon after proclaimed, by order of* Flamininus, *at the* Iſthmian *Games.*

CHAP. III.

Antiochus *the* Great. Antiochus the Great, *King of* Syria, *enters* Thrace *with an army, purpoſing to erect a kingdom there for one of his ſons. The* Romans *take*

umbrage

umbrage at the proceedings of the Syrian, *and ſend ſome Embaſſadors to order him to quit* Europe.

The Roman *Ladies take infinite pains to get a Repeal of the* Oppian Law *which limited the finery of their dreſs and equipage.* Cato *ſtrenuouſly oppoſes them, yet they carry their point, by the aſſiſtance of two* Tribunes of the people. 558. Oppian Law *repealed.*

Cato *embarks for* Spain, *and conducts the war with ſucceſs in that country.* Cato, the Elder.

Hannibal *having diſobliged ſome of the* Carthaginian *Nobles, by certain new regulations beneficial to the ſtate, is, by thoſe Nobles, accuſed at* Rome, *of holding correſpondence with* Antiochus. *The* Romans *ſend Embaſſadors to* Carthage, *to procure the death of the accuſed; but he eſcapes the danger by flying his country, and taking refuge in the* Syrian *court.* Hannibal *eſcapes from* Carthage *to* K. Antiochus.

Preparations are begun at Rome *for a war againſt* Antiochus; *and, leſt* Nabis *of* Lacedæmon *ſhould join him,* Flamininus *has permiſſion to turn the* Roman *arms againſt* Nabis. *All the* Greek *States, except the* Ætolians, *agree to aſſiſt* Flamininus *in this war; the chief pretence for which is, to reſtore freedom to* Argos. Flamininus *marches to* Lacedæmon, *and beſieges it.* Nabis *at length ſubmits to the conditions of peace dictated by the* Roman *General; and, to the diſſatisfaction of the* Ætolians *and* Achæans, *is ſuffered to continue maſter of* Lacedæmon. (Argos *had recovered its liberty, by an inſurrection of its inhabitants.*) Flamininus *leaves* Greece *and returns to* Rome, *where he is honoured with a triumph.* 559. *Embaſſadors from the King of* Syria *arrive at* Rome, *to aſk an alliance with the Republic.* 560. *Their negotiation does not ſucceed; the Senate diſpatches to* Antiochus *the ſame Embaſſadors who had been with him in* Thrace. Hannibal *adviſes him to attack the* Romans *in* Italy, *and endeavours to draw the* Carthaginians *into the war. The latter complain at* Rome *of the encroachments of* Maſiniſſa. *The injuſtice of the* Romans *with regard to* Carthage.

CHAP. IV.

The Ætolians *and* Nabis *raiſe commotions in* Greece. Antiochus, *after ſome fruitleſs conferences with the* Roman *Embaſſadors, calls a council, in order to deliberate about a war with* Rome. Hannibal, *on account of his familiar intercourſe with the* Roman *Embaſſadors, being ſuſpected of favouring their cauſe, is not conſulted. He endeavours to clear himſelf in a ſpeech to the King. The Council determine for war.* 561. *In* Greece, Philopœmen, *at the head of the* Achæans, *makes war with ſucceſs againſt the Tyrant* Nabis. *The* Ætolians *paſs a decree, inviting* Antiochus *to come into* Europe. *They ſeize upon* Demetrias, *and aſſaſſinate* Nabis. Antiochus *lands in* Greece *with a ſmall army; and endeavours, without ſucceſs, to bring over* Chalcis *and the* Achæans *to his party. He reduces* Eubœa; *and the* Bœotians *ſubmit to him.* Hannibal's *advice with regard to the method of carrying on the war.* Philip *of* Macedon *declares for the* Romans. Antiochus *marries the daughter of his hoſt, and paſſes the winter at* Chalcis *in feaſting and diverſions.* Philopœmen.

CHAP. V.
War with Antiochus the Great.

562. Rome *declares war againſt* Antiochus. *The Conſul* Acilius *routs the* Syrians *at* Thermopylæ, *drives their King into* Aſia, *and reduces the* Ætolians *to great extremities.* Flamininus *takes the iſland* Zacynthus *from the* Achæans. Philip *recovers many places he had loſt in his war with the* Romans. *The* Ætolians *obtain leave of the Conſul, to ſend deputies to* Rome, *to treat of peace.* Livius, *the* Roman *Admiral, obtains a victory over the* Syrian *fleet. The* Ætolians *refuſe to ſubmit to the conditions pro-*
563. *poſed by the Conſcript Fathers.* Lucius Scipio *the Conſul, aſſiſted by his brother* Africanus, *is appointed to act againſt* Antiochus *in* Aſia.

CHAP. VI.

Antiochus *invades* Pergamus, *but on the news of* Scipio's *approach, aſks a peace of the* Roman *Admiral. His petition is rejected.* Hannibal, *with a ſquadron of ſhips under his command, is blocked up in a port of* Pamphylia *by the* Rhodians. Antiochus, *after a vain attempt to engage* Pruſias *King of* Bithynia *in his quarrel, orders* Polyxenidas, *the* Syrian *Admiral, to attack the* Roman *fleet. The* Syrians *are totally defeated; and the King, in a fright, withdraws his gariſons from* Lyſimachia *in* Thrace, *and from* Abydos, *which commanded the* Helleſpont. *The Conſular army having paſſed into* Aſia *without oppoſition,* Antiochus *immediately ſends to* Scipio *propoſals of peace. Not ſucceeding in this negotiation, he ventures a battle with the enemy, is vanquiſhed, and ſubmits to the conditions impoſed by the Conſul.*

CHAP. VII.

364. *The* Ætolians *raiſe new troubles in* Greece. Eumenes *of* Pergamus *aſks of the Conſcript Fathers, all the countries they had taken from* Antiochus. *The* Rhodians *oppoſe his requeſt. It is reſolved that the conquered countries ſhall be divided between him and them. A peace is at length granted to the* Ætolians. *The Conſul* Manlius *reduces the* Gallo-Greeks *in*
365. Aſia. Philopœmen *forces the* Lacedæmonians *to renounce the laws of* Lycurgus, *and ſubject themſelves to thoſe of* Achaia. *Ten Commiſſioners from* Rome, *in conjunction with the Proconſul* Manlius, *finiſh the treaty with* Antiochus, *and ſettle affairs in* Aſia. Manlius, *in his return home, is attacked by a body of* Thracians, *and loſes great part of the booty he had taken from the* Gallo-Greeks.

CHAP. VIII.

566. Scipio Africanus, *and his brother* Lucius, *are ſucceſſively accuſed, before the* Roman *people, of taking bribes from* Antiochus, *and embezzling the*

public

public money. Africanus *refuſes to anſwer, and at length retires to* Liternum, *where he dies.* Lucius *is condemn'd; and, on his refuſing to pay the fine impoſed, all his effects are confiſcated. A ſociety of debauchees formed at* Rome, *and calling themſelves* Bacchanalians, *is ſuppreſſed and puniſhed.* Scipio *retires from* Rome *in diſguſt.* 567.

CHAP. IX.

The Romans, *jealous of the growing power of* Philip *of* Macedon, *ſend Embaſſadors into* Greece, *to take cognizance of his proceedings. They ſtrip him of all the towns he had recovered from the* Greeks, *in the war with* Antiochus, *and order him to evacuate* Ænus *and* Maronæa, *which* Eumenes *claimed as appendages of* Cherſoneſus *and* Lyſimachia, *granted to him by the Senate.* Philip, *to revenge himſelf on the people of* Maronæa, *who had complained of his tyranny, contrives to have a body of* Thracians *admitted into the town, where they exerciſe all the cruelties of war. The* Romans *expreſſing much diſſatisfaction with the King's conduct, he reſolves to employ his ſon* Demetrius, *to ſooth the Conſcript Fathers, with whom the young prince had acquired much favour when a hoſtage at* Rome. Appius Claudius, *the* Roman *Embaſſador, treats the* Achæans *with great haughtineſs, in relation to ſome complaints made againſt them by the* Lacedæmonians. 568. 569.

CHAP. X.

Cato, *after great oppoſition by the Nobles, is choſen* Cenſor. *His conduct in that office.* Cato choſen *Cenſor.*

CHAP. XI.

Many complaints are brought to Rome *againſt* Philip *of* Macedon. *His ſon* Demetrius *pleads for him in the Senate; and, out of regard to the young Prince, the Fathers ſend an Embaſſador into* Macedon, *to ſettle affairs with the King in an amicable manner. The* Meſſenians *break off from the* Achæan *aſſociation, and take up arms.* Philopœmen, *in a ſkirmiſh with them, is made priſoner, and afterwards put to death.* Flamininus, *the* Roman *Embaſſador to* Pruſias *of* Bithynia, *demands of the King to give up* Hannibal, *who had taken refuge in his court. The* Carthaginian, *to avoid falling into the hands of the* Romans, *puts an end to his own life, by poiſon.* 570. Hannibal *kills himſelf.*

CHAP. XII.

The Achæan *Embaſſadors having demanded of the* Roman *Senate aſſiſtance againſt the* Meſſenians, *receive a rough anſwer; but are civilly treated, on the news that* Lycortas, *the ſucceſſor of* Philopœmen, *has reduced the* Meſſenians *to ſurrender at diſcretion. While* Philip *of* Macedon *is buſy in forming projects for ſtrengthening his kingdom; there breaks out, between his two ſons* Perſes *and* Demetrius, *a quarrel, which at length proves fatal to the latter.* 571.

CHAP. XIII.

Tranſactions of the Romans, *from the year* 572 *to* 578.

CHAP. XIV.

PERSES K. *of* Macedon.

After the death of Philip, *his ſon* Perſes *ſucceeds him in the throne. He renews the treaty with* Rome, *is recognized King by the* Roman *Senate, and applies himſelf to gain the good will of the* Greeks. *The* Baſtarnæ, *a nation on the* Danube, *who had been invited into* Macedon *by* Philip, *enter* Dardania. *The* Romans, *on this occaſion, diſcover their jealouſy of* Perſes. *He makes a journey into* Greece, *and endeavours to renew the antient friendſhip between the* Macedonians *and* Achæans.

578. 579.

CHAP. XV.

580. 581.

The Conſul Popillius *vanquiſhes the* Statelliates, *a people of* Liguria, *and treats them with great cruelty.* Eumenes, *King of* Pergamus, *accuſes* Perſes, *in the Senate of* Rome, *of deſigns againſt the Republic. Aſſaſſins, hired by* Perſes, *attempt to murder the* Pergamenian *in his return home.* Perſes *is accuſed of plotting to take off by poiſon certain* Roman *Generals and Embaſſadors. The* Carthaginians *make new complaints at* Rome *of* Maſiniſſa's *uſurpations. Some* Roman *Embaſſadors report to the Senate the ill reception they had met with at the court of* Macedon.

EUMENES K. *of* Pergamus.

CHAP. XVI.

Second Macedonian War.

582.

Rome *declares war againſt* Perſes. *The diſpoſitions of the* Greek *and* Aſiatick *States at this time. At the election of Centurions for the army deſigned againſt* Macedon, *twenty-three of them refuſe to ſerve, and appeal to the Tribunes of the people; but afterwards one of the appellants drops his appeal, and perſuades the reſt to follow his example. Embaſſadors from* Perſes *ſue in vain to the Conſcript Fathers for peace. The* Macedonian *aſks a conference with* Marcius *the* Roman *Embaſſador in* Greece, *who artfully grants the King a truce, in order to gain time till the Conſul ſhould arrive with his army. It is agreed, that* Perſes *ſhall ſend Embaſſadors to* Rome, *to negotiate a peace.* Marcius *contrives to diſſolve the* Bœotian *league. The* Rhodians *declare for the* Romans. *The Senate will hearken to no overtures from* Perſes's *Embaſſadors.*

CHAP. XVII.

Perſes *draws together his forces, enters* Theſſaly, *takes ſome towns, and ſecures the paſs of* Tempe; *while the Conſul* Licinius *advances thro'* Athamania

mania *to oppoſe him.* *The King having gained a victory over the* Roman *cavalry and auxiliaries,* Licinius, *thro' fear, decamps in the night, and poſts himſelf behind the river* Peneus; *yet he refuſes a peace to the* Macedonian, *on any terms but his ſurrendering himſelf and his kingdom at diſcretion.* M. Lucretius *robs* Gentius (*an* Illyrian *king*) *of his fleet.* *The* Roman *Admiral makes himſelf maſter of* Haliartus *in* Bœotia. Caſſius *the Conſul, attempting to make his way from* Gaul *into* Macedon, *is recalled by the Senate.* *During the winter,* Perſes *defeats the* Thracians. Epirus, *or great part of it, revolts to him.* *The new Conſul* Hoſtilius *makes two unſucceſsful attempts to penetrate into* Macedon. Appius Claudius *is twice defeated in* Illyricum. *The people of* Alabanda *deify the city of* Rome. 583. ROME *made a Goddeſs.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Q. Marcius, *the* Roman *Conſul, having penetrated into* Macedon, Perſes *in a fright abandons* Dium, *withdraws his gariſons from* Tempe, *and his guards from the paſſes into* Macedon, *orders his treaſures at* Pella *to be thrown into the ſea, and his naval ſtores at* Theſſalonica *to be burnt.* *The* Roman *General, for want of proviſions, leaves his new conqueſt, but poſſeſſes himſelf of the fortreſſes of* Tempe. *Hereupon* Perſes *returns to* Dium, *repairs its fortifications, and ſtrongly entrenches himſelf on the banks of the* Enipeus. Polybius, *at the deſire of* Marcius, *hinders the* Achæans *from ſending a ſupply of ſoldiers to* Appius Claudius *in* Illyricum. 584. POLYBIUS.

CHAP. XIX.

L. Æmilius Paullus *is choſen Conſul at* Rome, *and has the conduct of the war in* Macedon *aſſigned to him.* Eumenes *being diſſatisfied with the* Romans, Perſes *endeavours to draw him from their alliance.* *The* Pergamenian *propoſes, for a certain ſum of money, to ſtand neuter; and, for a greater ſum, to procure the* Macedonian *a peace.* *But, the two Kings ſuſpecting each other of diſhoneſty, the negotiation breaks off.* Perſes *engages King* Gentius *of* Illyricum *to begin a war with* Rome, *and then defrauds him of a ſum of money he had promiſed him.* *The* Macedonian *refuſing to fulfil his engagements with the* Baſtarnæ, *whom he had invited to his aid, they return into their own country.* 585.

CHAP. XX.

In thirty days time, the Prætor Anicius *finiſhes the war in* Illyricum. Gentius *ſurrenders himſelf, and his dominions at diſcretion.* Æmilius Paullus *forces* Perſes *to abandon the* Enipeus, *and ſoon after defeats him in battle at* Pydna. *The King, deſerted by his ſubjects, takes refuge in the Iſle of* Samothrace; *and the whole kingdom of* Macedon *ſubmits to the conqueror.* Perſes, *after an attempt to eſcape from* Samothrace, *ſurrenders himſelf to the Prætor* Octavius, *who ſends him priſoner to the Conſul.* ÆMILIUS PAULLUS. *Battle of* PYDNA.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Certain Embaſſadors, whom the Rhodians, *in the view of mediating a peace between* Perſes *and the* Romans, *had ſent to* Rome, *are admitted to audience after the news of the victory at* Pydna, *and roughly treated by the Senate.* Antiochus Epiphanes, *at the command of the Senate, intimated to him by their Embaſſador* Popilius, *retires from* Egypt, *when juſt upon the point of finiſhing the conqueſt of it. The Kings of* Syria, Egypt, *and* Numidia, *congratulate the* Romans *on their victory over* Perſes. Anicius *reduces* Epirus, *and, in conjunction with five Commiſſioners from* Rome, *ſettles the government of* Illyricum. *The Proconſul* Æmilius, *aſſiſted by ten Commiſſioners, divides the kingdom of* Macedon *into four cantons, independent of each other, and makes them tributary to* Rome. *Five hundred and fifty* Ætolians *being inhumanly maſſacred by ſome of their countrymen, the murderers are acquitted by* Æmilius *and his collegues. Many of the* Ætolians, Acarnanians, Epirots, *and* Bœotians, *and above a thouſand of the principal men of* Achaia, *being ſuſpected of diſaffection to the* Romans, *are ſummoned to take their trial at* Rome. Æmilius *diſpatches his ſon* Fabius, *and* Scipio Naſica, *to ravage the country of the* Illyrians; *and, in one day, by treachery, plunders ſeventy towns of the* Epirots, *and reduces* 150,000 *of the inhabitants to ſlavery. At his return to* Rome, *his own ſoldiers oppoſe his having a triumph; which, however, is at length granted him.* Perſes *is ſent priſoner to* Alba (*in the country of the* Marſi) *where he dies. The Senate of* Rome *reſtore to* Cotys, *King of the* Odryſians *in* Thrace, *his ſon, who had been a hoſtage in* Macedon, *and taken priſoner by* Æmilius.

Antiochus Epiphanes. 586.

CHAP. XXII.

Attalus, *Embaſſador at* Rome *from his brother* Eumenes, *is incited by ſome of the Fathers to aſk of the Senate a part of his brother's kingdom, but is diverted from this project by one of his attendants, and thereby incurs the anger of the Senate. Though the* Rhodians *had condemned to death all of their countrymen who had been convicted of having done or ſaid any thing in favour of* Perſes, *yet the Senate of* Rome *refuſe to give audience to their Embaſſadors; and the Prætor makes a motion to the people, to have war declared againſt* Rhodes. *Peace, however, is granted her; but the Senate take from her* Lycia *and* Caria, Caunus *and* Stratonicea. *Some years after, ſhe is admitted into an alliance with the* Romans, *a favour which, till the overthrow of the kingdom of* Macedon, *ſhe had neither aſked nor coveted.* Pruſias *ſervilely flatters the Senate, who are the more gracious to him on that account. The Fathers to avoid receiving the compliments of* Eumenes, *who is on his way to pay them in perſon, paſs a decree forbidding all Kings to come to* Rome.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Conſuls obtain ſome advantage in the war againſt the Gauls *and* Ligurians. *On complaints from* Pruſias *and the* Galatians *againſt* Eumenes, 587.
a Roman *Embaſſador is ſent to* Pergamus, *who invites all the King's ſubjects to bring what accuſations they pleaſe againſt their ſovereign.* Antiochus Eupator, *a child of nine years old, ſucceeds his father* Epiphanes *in the throne of* Syria. Demetrius (*the ſon of* Seleucus, *the late King's elder brother*) *now a hoſtage at* Rome, *aſks leave of the Senate to return home, and take poſſeſſion of the kingdom of* Syria. *His requeſt is refuſed. The Fathers ſend* Cn. Octavius *to aſſume the adminiſtration of the government there; and order him to burn the* Syrian *ſhips and diſable the elephants. While he is executing his commiſſion, he is aſſaſſinated at* Laodicea. Demetrius, *after being a ſecond time refuſed leave to return home, makes his eſcape from* Rome, *arrives in* Syria, *and, being declared King, puts to death* Eupator, *and his tutor* Lyſias. *A treaty is concluded between the* Romans *and the* Jews, *in the time of* Judas Maccabæus. Demetrius *having expelled* Ariarathes *from his kingdom of* Cappadocia, *and ſet up, in his room,* Holophernes, *a ſuppoſititious ſon of the late King of that country,* Ariarathes *flies to* Rome *for protection. The Conſcript Fathers divide* Cappadocia *between him and his competitor.* 588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
596.

CHAP. XXIV.

Cato, *on his return from an embaſſy into* Africa, *whither he had been ſent to terminate ſome diſputes between the* Carthaginians *and* Maſiniſſa, *reports to the Senate, that* Carthage *is in a very flouriſhing condition, and exhorts them to deſtroy it.* Scipio Naſica *oppoſes him. The Conſul* Marcius Figulus *begins a war with the* Dalmatians, *which is finiſhed to the advantage of the* Romans *by his ſucceſſor* Scipio Naſica. *Three eminent Orators being ſent by the* Athenians *on an embaſſy to* Rome, *and the* Roman *youth flocking to hear their diſcourſes,* Cato *prevails with the Senate to give the Embaſſadors a ſpeedy anſwer, and diſmiſs them.* Pruſias *having, on the death of* Eumenes, *invaded* Pergamus, *the Senate of* Rome *oblige him to make good the damage he had done, and to pay a fine.* 597.
598.
The Roman *armies paſs the* Alps *for the firſt time, and ſubdue the* Oxybii *and the* Deciatæ. *The long quarrels between the two* Ptolomies *of* Egypt *are terminated by the victories and the clemency of the elder. On occaſion of ſome commotions in* Spain, *the Conſuls at* Rome *enter upon their office on the firſt of* January. Alexander Balas, *an impoſtor, pretending to be the ſon of* Antiochus Epiphanes, *ſets himſelf up againſt* Demetrius *King of* Syria, *and is countenanced by the* Romans. Demetrius *is ſlain in battle, and the impoſtor is recognized king.* 599.
600.
601.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

602. *The* Carthaginians *are reduced very low by the arms of* Maſiniſſa; Utica *withdraws herſelf from their obedience; and* Rome *lays hold of the oppor-*
603. *tunity of their diſtreſſes to declare war againſt them.*

CHAP. XXVI.

Third Punic War.

Firſt and Second years of the War.

604. *The* Carthaginians, *by their Embaſſadors, ſurrender themſelves to the* Roman *Senate at diſcretion, and are promiſed to be continued in poſſeſſion of their liberty, laws, territories and effects; on condition of their giving* 300 *hoſtages, and obeying the orders of the Conſuls, then in* Sicily *in their way to* Africa. *Theſe Conſuls having, in* Sicily, *received the hoſtages, paſs into* Africa. *They require of the* Carthaginians *to deliver up all their arms; and when this demand is comply'd with, ſignify to them, that they muſt abandon the city of* Carthage, *which* Rome *is determined to demoliſh. Upon notice of this cruel injunction, the inhabitants ſhut their gates, and reſolve to ſuſtain a ſiege. By indefatigable diligence they furniſh themſelves with new arms; and, when attacked, repulſe the* Romans.

605. Maſiniſſa *dying, leaves his kingdom to be divided among his ſons at the pleaſure of* Scipio Æmilianus.

The Romans *make no progreſs in the ſiege of* Carthage.

Philip *the Impoſtor.* *One* Andriſcus *appears in* Macedon, *calls himſelf the ſon of* Perſes, *takes the name of* Philip, *and is acknowledged King by the* Macedonians. *He defeats the* Roman *Prætor* Juventius Thalna, *but is himſelf defeated by* Metellus, *and forced to fly into* Thrace, *where one of the petty Kings delivers him up to the enemy. A ſecond impoſtor, pretending alſo to be a ſon of* Perſes, *is driven by* Metellus *into* Dardania.

CHAP. XXVII.

Third and Fourth years of the War.

606. Scipio Æmilianus *is ſent Conſul into* Africa. *He reſtores diſcipline among*
Scipio Æmilianus. *the ſoldiers. The greater part of* Africa *ſubmits to him, and* Carthage *is ſtraitned for want of proviſions.* Aſdrubal, *who commands in the town,*
607. *propoſes conditions of peace, which are rejected.* Carthage *is taken, the*
Carthage *taken and deſtroyed.* *people ſold for ſlaves, and the town demoliſhed.* Scipio, *in conjunction with ten Commiſſioners from* Rome, *orders all the towns which had taken part with the enemy to be razed, and reduces the dominions of the* African *Republic into the form of a Prætorian province.*

CHAP.

SIXTH BOOK.

From the end of the THIRD PUNIC WAR, in the year of *Rome* 607, when *Carthage* was deſtroyed, and the ROMAN POWER became irreſiſtible, to the death of the *younger* GRACCHUS, in 632, the true date of the deſtruction of ROMAN LIBERTY.

CHAP. I.

THE imprudent behaviour of the Achæans *draws upon them a war with* Rome. *They are defeated in battle by* Metellus, *and afterwards by* Mummius, *who demoliſhes* Corinth, Chalcis, *and* Thebes. Greece *is reduced into the form of a* Roman *province.*

CHAP. II.

A ſummary account of the actions of the Romans *in* Spain, *from the year* 558 *to the year* 600. *The* Roman *Senate forbid the* Segedenſes, *a people of* Celtiberia, *to enlarge their town, and, they not obeying, a Conſular army under* Fulvius Nobilior *is ſent againſt them; whereupon they take refuge among the* Arvaci, *another people of* Celtiberia, *whoſe capital was* Numantia. *The two nations jointly carry on the war with advantage. The Conſul* Marcellus [*in* 601.] *permits the* Arvaci *to ſend deputies to* Rome *to aſk a peace; and, tho' their petition is rejected by the Senate, yet he concludes a treaty with them. His ſucceſſor* Lucullus, *without any provocation, invades the country of the* Vaccæi, *and there behaves himſelf cruelly and perfidiouſly. In* FURTHER SPAIN *the* Luſitanians [*in* 602.] *rout the forces of the* Roman *Prætor* Galba. *He afterwards treacherouſly maſſacres many thouſands of them, who had ſubmitted to him on conditions.* Vetilius, *the ſucceſſor of* Galba, [*in* 604.] *having gained ſome advantage over the* Luſitanians, *and forced them into a place whence they could not eaſily retreat,* Viriatus, *then a private ſoldier, ſaves them by a ſtratagem, and is declared their General. He ſoon after defeats* Vetilius, *who is taken priſoner and ſlain.* Viriatus *is victorious over the* Roman *Generals, in every action, for three years ſucceſſively.* VIRIATUS.

CHAP. III.

The Conſul Fabius (*Brother to* Scipio Æmilianus) *being ſent into* Further Spain, *leaves his Quæſtor to diſcipline the army, and makes a journey of devotion to* Gades. *In the mean time,* Viriatus *vanquiſhes the* Romans *in battle.* 608.

A regulation is made at Rome, *that the ſix Prætors ſhall continue in the city during the year of their office; two of them to take cognizance of civil cauſes, as formerly; and the other four, to try criminal cauſes: and that after the expiration of their year they ſhall repair to their reſpective provinces abroad.* 609.

Fabius *obtains a victory over* Viriatus; *who afterwards defeats* Quinctius *the ſucceſſor of* Fabius. 610.

The Conſul Appius Claudius *contrives to kindle a war with the* Salaſſi, *and gains a victory; but having loſt a battle before, the Senate refuſe him a triumph. He nevertheleſs triumphs, and during the proceſſion his daughter, a Veſtal, protects him from being inſulted by a Tribune.*

His collegue Metellus *renews the war in* Celtiberia. *Next year, by a re-*
611. *markable act of humanity, he engages ſeveral towns to ſubmit to the* Romans.
The Conſul Servilianus *loſes a battle againſt* Viriatus *in* Further Spain.
A third Macedonian *impoſtor prevails with the people of that country to take arms in his cauſe.* Tremellius, *a* Roman *Quæſtor, by one victory finiſhes the war.*

CHAP. IV.

612. *The Conſul* Pompeius, *in* Hither Spain, *ſucceſſively beſieges* Numantia
Numantia. *and* Termantia, *but quits both enterprizes with loſs and diſhonour.*
In the Further Province, Servilianus, *now Proconſul, concludes a treaty of*
613. *peace with* Viriatus, *which is confirmed at* Rome. Servilius Cæpio, *one of the Conſuls of the next year, obtains leave of the Senate to break this peace, and afterwards hires aſſaſſins to murder* Viriatus. *They diſpatch him in his ſleep. The* Luſitanians *chuſe another general, but he is ſoon obliged to yield up himſelf and his army to the Conſul.*

CHAP. V.

Pompeius, *having again laid ſiege to* Numantia *with no better ſucceſs than before, concludes a peace with the* Numantines, *but afterwards denies the fact.*
614. *The matter being brought before the Senate of* Rome, *they reſolve to continue the war.*
Gabinius, *a Tribune of the people, gets a law paſſed for balloting in the election of magiſtrates; a method of voting, that was afterwards introduced in civil and criminal cauſes, and in making and repealing laws.*
615. *The* Romans, *under the Pro-conſul* Popillius, *are routed by the* Numan-
616. tines. *Theſe, the next year, gain a ſignal victory over the Conſul* Mancinus, *who, to ſave the remains of his army, enters into a treaty with the enemy. The Conſcript Fathers refuſe to adhere to the treaty, and order* Man-
617. cinus *to be delivered up to the* Numantines, *by way of ſatisfaction.*
Brutus, *who had come into* Further Spain *in* 615, *reduces ſeveral nations of the* Luſitanians, *and afterwards the* Gallæci. *He joins his forces to thoſe of* Æmilius, *the ſucceſſor of* Mancinus. *Both armies are defeated by*
618. *the* Palantines. *The Conſuls* Furius *and* Calpurnius, *who are ſucceſſively ſent againſt the* Numantines, *perform nothing memorable.* Fulvius *ſubdues the* Ardæans *a maritime people of* Illyricum.

CHAP. VI.

619. Scipio Æmilianus (*a ſecond time Conſul*) *commands the army in* Spain, *and*
620. *brings it under good diſcipline. The next year he inveſts* Numantia. *The beſieged, reduced to the utmoſt extremities by famine, ſet fire to their town, and deſtroy their wives, their children, and themſelves.*

CHAP. VII.

The Agrarian *law of* Licinius Stolo, *forbidding any* Roman *to poſſeſs more than five hundred acres of the publick lands, being fallen into neglect, to the*
Tiberius Gracchus. *great detriment of the Commonwealth,* Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, *a Tribune of the Commons, undertakes to cure the evil by a new law. His deſign, tho' approved by ſome of the moſt virtuous men in* Rome, *is much diſliked by the generality of the great and the rich, who prevail upon* M. Octavius, *one of*

the Tribunes, to oppoſe the proceeding of his collegue. The people, at the inſtigation of Tiberius, *depoſe* Octavius *from his office, and then paſs the new law. Triumvirs are appointed to make the diſtribution of the lands in queſtion. The* Romans, *in conſequence of the laſt will of* Attalus Philometor, *king of* Pergamus, *having laid claim to his dominions,* Tiberius *propoſes, that the King's treaſures be divided amongſt the poorer citizens of* Rome, *and declares, that his towns and territories ſhall be diſpoſed of by the Comitia. In a ſpeech to the people, he vindicates his proceedings againſt* Octavius. *He ſtands candidate for a ſecond tribuneſhip. On the day of election,* Scipio Naſica *and the Senate, in a body, followed by a multitude of clients and ſlaves, armed with clubs, fall furiouſly upon the Tribune and his adherents. He is ſlain in the tumult, together with above three hundred of his followers. Their dead bodies are thrown into the* Tiber; *many of the friends of* Tiberius *are baniſhed, and many put to death without a trial. The Senate, to pacify the people, permit* Caius Gracchus's *father in law to be choſen one of the triumvirs for dividing the lands, in the room of* Tiberius. *To ſcreen* Naſica *from a trial before the people, they ſend him into* Aſia, *where he dies. Some reflections on the conduct of* Tiberius Gracchus.

CHAP. VIII.

The ſlaves in Sicily, *having broke out into rebellion, vanquiſh ſeveral* Roman *Prætors, but are routed by the Conſul* Calpurnius Piſo, *whoſe ſucceſſor,* Rupilius, *finiſhes the war with the deſtruction of the rebels.* P. Licinius Craſſus *Conſul and* Pontifex Maximus *is ſent into* Aſia, *againſt* Ariſtonicus (*a baſtard brother of* Attalus *the late King*) *who had taken poſſeſſion of the throne of* Pergamus. *Two plebeians are choſen Cenſors for the firſt time.* Craſſus *is defeated, falls alive into the hands of the enemy, and is killed by a* Thracian *ſoldier. Next year, the Conſul* Perperna *vanquiſhes* Ariſtonicus, *takes him priſoner, and ſends him to* Rome. Atinius Labeo, *a Tribune of the people, makes an outragious attempt upon the perſon of the Cenſor,* Metellus Macedonicus. *The ſame* Atinius *procures a law ordaining, that the Tribunes of the people ſhall be Senators.* M. Aquilius, *by the baſeſt methods, finiſhes the conqueſt of* Pergamus, *after which, in conjunction with ten commiſſioners, he reduces it into the form of a province.*

Servile War in Sicily. 621. 622. 623. 624.

CHAP. IX.

The Roman *Senate, at the motion of* Scipio Æmilianus, *takes from the Triumvirs the right of judging in cauſes, relating to the reſumption of the public lands, and transfers it to the Conſul* Sempronius; *who ſoon after leaves the city on pretence of a rebellion in* Iapidia *a canton of* Illyricum. Scipio *dies* ſuddenly, *which occaſions ſurmiſes about the cauſe of his death. The Conſul is vanquiſhed in battle by the* Iapidians, *but afterwards obtains a victory over them, for which he triumphs. Nothing very remarkable happens at* Rome *in the two ſucceeding years.*

In 627 Caius Gracchus *goes Quæſtor into* Sardinia *with the Conſul* Aurelius, *who is ſent thither to quell a revolt.* Caius *perſuades the allied cities in that iſland to furniſh clothes for the* Roman *army, though the Senate, at their requeſt, had*

Scipio Æmil. dies. 625. 626. 627.

628. *had freed them from that burden.* Fulvius Flaccus, *a friend of* Caius, *being raiſed to the Conſulſhip, propoſes a law for granting the rights of* Roman *citizenſhip to the* Italian *allies, but drops his enterprize to undertake an expedition againſt the* Saluvii, *a nation of* Tranſalpine Gaul, *who had made incurſions into the territory of* Marſeilles. *The Prætor* L. Opimius *raſes the town of* Fregellæ, *to puniſh the inhabitants for a plot they had formed to ſhake off the* Roman *yoke.*

629. Caius Gracchus *returns to* Rome *from* Sardinia, *is accuſed before the*
630. *Cenſors of a miſdemeanor, in leaving his General, and is acquitted. Being*
CAIUS GRACCHUS. *choſen Tribune, he, to the great mortification of the nobility, obtains ſeveral laws advantageous to the Commons. In the mean time the Conſul* Metellus *ſubdues the inhabitants of the* Baleares. Sextius Calvinus, *one of the Conſuls for the laſt year, having reduced the* Saluvii, *builds* Aquæ Sextiæ (*now* Aix *in* Provence) *and there eſtabliſhes a* Roman *colony.*

CHAP. X.

Caius Gracchus *is choſen Tribune a ſecond time, and by his credit with the*
631. *people, obtains the Conſulſhip for* C. Fannius Strabo, *in oppoſition to* L. Opimius. *The Tribune transfers the right of judicature, from the Senators to the* Roman *knights; ordains that the Senate ſhall, before every election of chief magiſtrates, determine what provinces ſhall be Conſular and what Prætorian; plants new colonies; and gives the freedom of* Rome *to the* Italian *allies.* Druſus, *one of his Collegues, being gained over to the party of the Senate, endeavours by unworthy methods to make them gracious among the people, and to ſupplant* Caius *in their eſteem. The latter goes into* Africa, *at the head of a colony, in order to rebuild* Carthage. *On his return to* Rome *he propoſes ſeveral new laws. Many of the* Italians *flocking to the city to give their votes, the Conſul* Fannius *publiſhes an edict, forbidding any of the allies to appear within five miles of* Rome, *till the Comitia ſhall have determined concerning the laws in queſtion.* Caius *ſtands candidate for the Tribuneſhip a third time, and loſes his election.* L. Opimius *being raiſed to the Conſulſhip, purpoſes to get ſeveral of* Caius's *laws repealed.* Antyllius, *one of the Conſul's Lictors, is*
632. *ſlain, by ſome of the followers of* Fulvius Flaccus, *one of the Triumvirs, a warm oppoſer of the meaſures of* Opimius. *The Senate, as if the commonwealth were in the utmoſt danger, veſt* Opimius *with a dictatorial power. He commands the Senators and knights to take arms. Next morning* Fulvius *and his party poſſeſs themſelves of the* Aventine *hill.* Caius *perſuades them to ſend to the Conſul, and propoſe an accommodation.* Opimius *diſdains to treat, and advancing with his troops, diſperſes the followers of* Caius *and* Fulvius. *Theſe two* Romans, *with many others, are ſlain, and their dead bodies thrown into the* Tiber. Opimius *builds a temple to* Concord: *the people raiſe ſtatues to the* Gracchi, *and worſhip before them. The* Agrarian *law is repealed; and the rich get poſſeſſion of the public lands.*

THE

A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

CREDIBILITY of the HISTORY of the first 500 years of ROME.

THE famous *Turenne*, (as we learn from the hiſtory of his life) when he was about 12 years old, ſent a challenge to an officer, who had affronted him, by ſaying, that *Quintus Curtius*'s hiſtory of *Alexander the Great* was a mere romance. I do not wiſh, that our young gentlemen, who have begun to delight themſelves in the Roman Hiſtory, ſhould carry their reſentments ſo far againſt M. de *Beaufort*, author of a work, intitled, *Diſſertation ſur l'Incertitude des cinq premiers ſiecles de l'Hiſtoire Romaine* [a]: yet I think they may reaſonably look upon him as an enemy, who ſeeks to deprive them of a conſiderable part of their pleaſures; and that they ought to be upon their guard againſt him. And, for my own part, I cannot readily conſent to have my grave remarks upon certain paſſages of the hiſtory reduced to the importance of thoſe, by which ſome induſtrious chronologer ſhould fix the preciſe year when *Noah*'s grand-daughter *Ceſara* fled into *Ireland* to eſcape the deluge. For the ſake therefore of us Romaniſts, I once purpoſed to have gone through the whole of M. de *B.*'s Diſſertation, and to have attempted to ſhew the inſufficiency of his citations and his reaſonings for diſcrediting the Roman Hiſtory of the firſt 500 years, as to the *main* and *fundamentals* of it: For much of the *embroidery* and *flouriſhing* may be given up without parting with the *ground-work* [b]. But the execution of that deſign would ſtretch this Diſcourſe to too great a length;

Ramſay's life of the Viſcount de *Turenne.*

Topog. Hibern. p. 135, 136. apud M. de Pouilli.

[a] A Diſſertation on the uncertainty of the hiſtory of the firſt five ages of *Rome.*

[b] That the *Romans* had, with the neighbouring ſtates, the ſucceſſive wars which *Livy* has recorded; that theſe wars followed one another in the order given them by *Livy*, and had the *final* events which he has mentioned, may ſurely be admitted by a reader, not over credulous, and who at the ſame time will, in his own mind, naturally abate ſomewhat of the complete victories and numerous triumphs, with which *Livy* has adorned his hiſtory, in compliance with the *vanity* of his countrymen. For, that the *Roman* vanity has now and then prevailed to the miſrepreſentation of facts, is too manifeſt, from ſeveral paſſages in the Latine Hiſtorian, ſome regarding the earlier, ſome the later ages of *Rome.* The fortunate effect of the unſucceſsful enterprize of *Mucius* againſt *Porſenna*'s life, and the marvellous exploit of *Camillus* againſt the *Gauls*, when, at the foot of the Capitol, they were ſelling a peace to the *Romans*, are remarkable inſtances of the power of this vanity. And that it had its influence in *Livy*'s relations of the war of *Hannibal*, and the *Spaniſh* war, is ſhewn in the ſecond part of this Hiſtory.

and I conceive, that to thoſe who have peruſed M. *L'Abbé Sallier*'s [a] Defence of the hiſtory againſt the attacks of M. de *Pouilli*, any further defence is unneceſſary. However, as the diſcourſes of that able champion of our cauſe have, I think, neither been printed apart from the other pieces in the *Memoires de Litterature*, nor tranſlated into *Engliſh*, and therefore may not have fallen into the hands of many perſons, who may have met with M. de *B.*'s Diſſertation, which is tranſlated, I ſhall juſt mention ſome particulars, in which I apprehend the chief ſtrength of M. *L'Abbé Sallier*'s arguments to be couched; and then make ſome brief remarks on M. de *B.*'s *principal poſitions* in his attempt to refute thoſe arguments.

M. L'Abbé *Sallier* 1ſt and 3d Diſc.

1. It is beyond all belief, that *Varro* [b], the moſt learned *Roman* of the moſt learned age of *Rome*, ſhould employ his ſtudies and his labours upon the antiquities of his country, in order to diſpel the obſcurity caſt upon the hiſtory of the earlieſt ages, unleſs there were means of attaining to certainty, or a high degree of probability, with regard to many things that paſſed in thoſe ages.

2. It is no leſs incredible, that *Cicero* ſhould [c] *deſign*, and *Livy undertake*

See *Memoires de Litterature* &c. Tom. 8. edit. *Amſterd.*

[a] It was the controverſy [in 1722, 23, 24, 25] between theſe two very learned and very eloquent gentlemen, members of *the Royal French Academy of Inſcriptions and Belles Lettres*, which gave occaſion to M. de *Beaufort*'s *Diſſertation ſur l'Incertitude des cinq premiers ſiecles de l'hiſtoire Romaine*, Not content with the efforts made by M. de *Pouilli*, who, he thinks, *has treated a little too ſuperficially a matter which deſerved to be examined to the Bottom*, he without neglecting M. de *Pouilli*'s arguments, endeavours to ſupply his deficiencies, and to prove, even to *Demonſtration*, the *Uncertainty* &c. [Je crois avoir *demontré*, d'une maniere tres claire, l'incertitude qui regne ſur *le tems lequel a precedé la priſe de Rome* par les Gaulois, et la deſtruction de ſes monumens, qui en fut une ſuite naturelle. Il eſt vrai, que cela ne prouve rien à l'egard du *ſiecle ſuivant*, *ſur lequel j'ai cru pouvoir etendre cette incertitude*, à cauſe de la confuſion, qui regne encore par rapport à divers evenemens.] In 1738 M. de *Beaufort* gave the firſt edition of his Diſſertation; an Engliſh tranſlation of which was publiſhed in 1740. His ſecond edition of it *reviſed*, *corrected*, and *conſiderably augmented*, bears date 1750. 'Tis to the pages of the latter the references are made.

Pref. p. vii.

N. B. M. de *Beaufort* gives up one argument, in which M. de *Pouilli* expatiates, drawn from the work called, *The Parallels of* Plutarch, a work of which M. l'Abbé *Sallier* has totally deſtroyed the credit.

[b] Of *Varro Cicero* thus writes.

Nos in noſtra urbe peregrinantes errantesque tanquam hoſpites, tui libri quaſi domum deduxerunt, ut poſſemus aliquando qui, et ubi eſſemus agnoſcere; tu ætatem patriæ, tu deſcriptiones temporum, ſedem locorum, tu ſacrorum jura, tu domeſticam, tu bellicam diſciplinam, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, cauſas aperuiſti. Acad. 1. c. 3.

[c] *Cicero*, ſays Dr. *Middleton*, was meditating *a general hiſtory* of *Rome*, to which he was frequently urged by his friends, as the only man capable of adding that glory to his country, of excelling the Greeks in a ſpecies of writing, which, of all others, was at that time the leaſt cultivated by the *Romans*. But he never found leiſure to execute ſo great a taſk; yet has ſketched out a plan of it, which, ſhort as it is, ſeems to be the beſt, that can be formed, for the deſign of a perfect hiſtory.

He declares it to be the firſt and fundamental law of hiſtory, that it ſhould neither dare to ſay any thing that was falſe, nor fear to ſay any thing that was true, nor give any juſt ſuſpicion either of favour or diſaffection: that in the relation of things, the writer ſhould obſerve the order of time, and add alſo the deſcription of places: That in all great and memorable tranſactions, he ſhould firſt explain

take [a] a hiſtory of the earlieſt ages of *Rome*, if they had no authentic records, no ſolid materials for their ground work; and this in an age, of which *Cicero* ſays [b], that it was too knowing, too much enlightened to be impoſed upon by fictions and perſuaded to believe abſurdities.

3. *Cicero* in ſix books which he wrote concerning the *commonwealth*, gave a particular and circumſtantial [c] account of the cuſtoms and maxims of antient *Rome*, *à primo urbis ortu*, its domeſtic and military diſcipline.

4. We have the expreſs teſtimony of *Cicero* for the exiſtence, in his time, of the PONTIFICAL ANNALS [d], which were begun almoſt as early as the birth of the ſtate, and continued to the time of *P. Mucius*, the High Prieſt, who lived in the 7th century of *Rome*. *Varro*, in his books concerning the Latin tongue, gives us many fragments of theſe annals.

5. Since it was the cuſtom in the *latter* times of the republic to record the *acts of the ſenate* and *of the magiſtrates*; it is *probable* that the ſame cuſtom was obſerved in the *former*. And it ſeems unqueſtionable from a

L. 12. Ep. 25. ad Cornif.
L. 11. Ep. 25. ad Brut.

plain the councils, then the acts, laſtly the events: that in the councils he ſhould interpoſe his own judgment on the merit of them: in the acts, ſhould relate not only what was done, but how it was done: in the events, ſhould ſhew, what ſhare chance, or raſhneſs, or prudence had in them: that in regard to perſons, he ſhould deſcribe, not only their particular actions, but the lives and characters of all thoſe, who bear an eminent part in the ſtory. That he ſhould illuſtrate the whole in a clear, eaſy, natural ſtile; flowing with a perpetual ſmoothneſs, and equability; free from the affectation of points and ſentences, or the roughneſs of judicial pleadings. *De Orator.* 2. 15. *Middleton*'s Life of *Cicero*, Vol. 2. p. 528.

[a] *Res immenſi operis, ut quæ ſupra ſeptingenteſimum annum repetatur*, &c. Liv. Pref.

[b] *Ut jam doctis hominibus, ac temporibus ipſis eruditis ad fingendum vix quicquam eſſet loci. Antiquitas enim recipit fabulas, fictas etiam nonnunquam incondite: hæc ætas autem jam exculta præſertim et erudita omne quod fieri non poteſt reſpuit.* Frag. Lib. 3. de Repub.

[c] *Nec enim hic locus eſt ut de moribus, inſtitutiſque majorum, et diſciplina ac temperatione civitatis loquamur: aliis hæc locis accuratè ſatis dicta ſunt, maximèque in his ſex libris quos de republica ſcripſimus.* Lib. 4. Tuſc. c. 1.

[d] *Erat* * *enim hiſtoria nihil aliud niſi annalium confectio. Cujus rei memoriæque publicæ retinendæ cauſa, ab initio rerum Romanarum uſque ad Publium Mucium Pontificem Maximum res omnes ſingulorum annorum litteris mandabat P. Maximus, referebatque in album, et proponebat tabulam domi ut eſſet poteſtas populo cognoſcendi, ii qui etiam nunc* annales maximi *nominantur. Hanc ſimilitudinem ſcribendi multi ſecuti ſunt qui ſine ullis ornamentis monumenta ſolum temporum hominum locorum, geſtarumque rerum reliquerunt. Itaque qualis apud Græcos, Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acuſilaus fuit, aliique permulti; talis noſter Cato, et Pictor, et Piſo, qui neque tenent, quibus rebus ornatur oratio (modo enim huc iſta ſunt importata) et dum intelligatur, quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant eſſe, brevitatem.*

Abeſt enim hiſtoria litteris noſtris, ut et ipſe intelligo, et ex te perſæpe audio. Potes autem tu profectò ſatisfacere in ea, quippè cum ſit opus, ut tibi quidem videri ſolet, unum hoc oratorium maximè. Quamobrem aggredere, quæſumus, et ſume ad hanc rem tempus, quæ eſt a noſtris hominibus adhuc aut ignorata, aut relicta. Nam poſt annales pontificum maximorum, quibus nihil poteſt eſſe * jucundius: *ſi aut ad Fabium, aut ad eum, qui tibi ſemper in ore eſt, Catonem, aut ad Piſonem, aut ad Fannium, aut ad Vennonium venias: quamquam ex his alius alio plus habet virium, tamen quid tam exile, quam iſti omnes.*

Unde autem facilius quam ex annalium monumentis *aut res bellica, aut omnis reipublicæ diſciplina cognoſcitur? Unde ad agendum aut dicendum copia depromi major graviſſimorum exemplorum, quaſi* incorruptorum teſtimoniorum *poteſt?* Frag. Cic. in Hortenſ.

De leg. Lib. 1. c. 2.

* *Doubtleſs* jejunius. *See* Taylor's Elem. of Civ. Law. p. 79.

* Lib. 2. de Orat. 12.

paſſage [a] in *Suetonius* [Vit. Veſp. 8.] not only that the acts of the ſenate, and of the people, in the earlieſt ages, uſed to be recorded; but that many of thoſe records were preſerved from the flames, when the *Gauls* burnt the city.

6. *Dionyſius* ſpeaks of the *memorials* [b], *commentaries* or *tables* of the *cenſors* preſerved in families which had been honoured with the cenſorſhip, *pieces* which he conſulted, and in which he found, that a poll of the people had been taken *two years before the burning of Rome*, in the conſulſhip of *Valerius* and *Manlius*.

c. 17. 7. *Cenſorinus*, in his book *de die natali*, inſinuates, that the *memorials* of the *duumvirs* and *decemvirs* were antient monuments that uſed to be conſulted, long after the firſt ages of *Rome*.

Libri Lintei. 8. *Livy* frequently cites the *Linnen books*; which ſeem to have been of great uſe for diſcovering the ſucceſſion of the conſuls and other magiſtrates.

9. It appears from the hiſtorians, that many *treaties* with foreign ſtates were preſerved from the flames which conſumed the city.

10. *The laws of the twelve tables* were unqueſtionably preſerved, and theſe would give a thorough inſight into the conſtitution of the ſtate.

Liv. Lib. 1. Macr. Lib. 3. c. 9. Aul. Gell. L. 16. c. 4. 11. In *Livy*, *Macrobius* and *A. Gellius* we have the antient invariable *forms* that were uſed by the *Roman heralds*, when employed to *demand ſatisfaction* for an injury done to the State; *declare war*; *invite the gods* to forſake a city beſieged; and, before a battle, *load with curſes* the army of the enemy.

12. The *Rituals* and *Calendars* were of uſe to hiſtory. The very name of a feſtival is often a brief relation of the fact which gave occaſion to its inſtitution.

13. Antient *pillars*, *ſtatues* and *inſcriptions* [c] immortalized the memory of ſeveral great men of the early times, and bore teſtimony to their exploits.

Therefore, though *Livy* complains of the ſcarcity of men of letters in the early times [*raræ per ea tempora litteræ*] and of the loſs of *a great part*, or the *greater part* [d] of the pontifical annals, and other hiſtorical monuments, both public and private, in the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*,

[a] Speaking of *Veſpaſian*'s reſtoring the capitol which had been demoliſhed in the Vitellian ſedition. *Ipſe* [Veſpaſianus] *ærearum tabularum tria millia, quæ ſimul conflagraverant, reſtituenda ſuſcepit, undique inveſtigatis exemplaribus, inſtrumentum imperii pulcherrimum ac vetuſtiſſimum confecit; quo continebantur* penè ab exordio urbis ſenatus conſulta, plebiſcita *de ſocietate, et fœdere, ac privilegio cuicunque conceſſis.*

[b] Δηλοῦται δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ τῶν καλουμένων τιμητικῶν ὑπομνημάτων, &c. *D. Hal.* p. 59. Edit. Oxon.

[c] *Suorum vero clypeos in ſacro vel publico, privatim dicare primus inſtituit (ut reperio) Appius Claudius, qui conſul cum Servilio fuit anno urbis* 259. *poſuit enim in Bellonæ æde majores ſuos; placuitque in excelſo ſpectari et titulos honorum legi.—Quales clypeos nemo non gaudens, favenſque aſpicit. Pliny* L. 35. c. 3.

[d] *Quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliiſque publicis, privatiſque erant monumentis incenſâ urbe pleraque interiere.* L. 6. c. 1.

yet

yet there remained good memorials and original pieces ſufficient for compoſing a credible hiſtory [a] of the earlieſt ages of *Rome*.

14. *Tradition* alone was ſufficient whereon to found a reaſonable and full belief of many facts in the Roman ſtory; ſuch, for example, as *the ſhameful defeat* of the *Romans* near the *Caudine Forks*; and the ſeditions and *ſeceſſions* of the *Plebeians* on occaſion of the cruelties exerciſed by the rich towards the poor. [This is a conceſſion made by M. de *Pouilli*.]

15. The fables which are found interſperſed in the writings of the Roman hiſtorians ought not to ruin the credit of the hiſtory of the firſt ages of *Rome*, as to the eſſentials of it; though the hiſtorians ſhould ſeem to have adopted thoſe fables for facts. *Livy* [b] warns us not to be over credulous with regard to ſeveral old ſtories of the *marvellous* kind, and *Cicero* ridicules them. L. 2. de Divin. & L. 1. de leg.

16. And *Atticus* [c] had ſucceſsfully laboured to rectify the miſtakes in ſome family-memoirs, concerning the ſucceſſion of the magiſtrates, and the origins of families, miſtakes occaſioned by ignorance or vanity; and he could have had no ſucceſs in ſuch an attempt, had he been deſtitute of all ſure guides to the truth.

If any reader deſires to ſee theſe, and ſeveral other particulars, relating to the ſame ſubject, learnedly and ingeniouſly diſcuſſed, I ſhall refer him to the diſcourſes at large of M. *L'Abbé Sallier* in the *Memoires de Litterature*.

BEFORE I take notice of M. de *Beaufort*'s poſitions, I muſt frankly confeſs that I am not well qualified to diſpute againſt his opinion, concerning the Roman Hiſtory; becauſe I cannot, by his Diſſertation, diſcover with *certainty* what his opinion is.

I know not whether, in his judgment, we may reaſonably *reject the* WHOLE [d] hiſtory of the firſt 500 years of *Rome* as groundleſs and fabulous.

Or

[a] *Quæ ab conditâ urbe ad captam eandem urbem Romani ſub regibus primùm, conſulibus deinde ac dictatoribus, decemviriſque ac tribunis conſularibus geſſere foris bella, domi ſeditiones, quinque libris expoſui.* L. 6. c. 1.

[b] —— *Omnis expers curæ, quæ ſcribentis animum, etſi* non flectere à vero, *ſollicitum tamen efficere poſſit. Quæ ante conditam, condendamve urbem,* poeticis *magis* decora fabulis, *quam incorruptis rerum geſtarum monumentis traduntur,* ea nec affirmare nec refellere *in animo eſt.* Liv. in Præf.

Speaking of the *Curtian Lake, and how it came to be ſo called. Cura non deeſſet, ſi qua ad verum via inquirentem ferret; nunc fama rerum ſtandum eſt, ubi certam derogat vetuſtas fidem,* Liv. Lib. 7. c. 6.

[c] *Laborem nobis Attici noſtri levavit labor; ſic familiarum originem ſubtexuit, ut ex eo clarorum virorum propagines poſſimus cognoſcere,* Cic. in Orat. et Corn. Nep. in Attic.

[d] Attendu le peu de ſoin qu'on a eu de tranſmettre à la poſterite la memoire des evenemens, dans le tems, qu'ils arrivoient, nous ſommes fondès, en voiant une hiſtoire ſuivie de quatre ſiecles, de *rejetter* LE TOUT, ou du moins *la plus grande partie comme forgée à plaiſir.*

Ce n'eſt pas que je veuille *revoquer en doute* generalement tous les evenemens de ce ſiecle [le cinquieme,] pour quelques traits fabuleux dont ils ſe trouvent accompagnés, ou parce qu'il y en a pluſieurs qui ſont manifeſtement faux. Mon intention eſt ſeulement de faire voir, que *divers faits* des plus marqués, et des plus importans, *ſe trouvant faux*, et le fruit de la vaine gloire des Romains, *les autres doivent nous etre ſuſpects.* J'en tire encore de nouveaux motifs de douter de *l'Hiſtoire des ſiecles precedens, laquelle,* à plus forte raiſon, *doit paroitre fabuleuſe et forgée apres coup.* p. 359.

Ces

Or ſhould reject only *almoſt all.*

Or may ſtop when we have rejected *the greater part.*

Or, rejecting ſome paſſages of the hiſtory as utterly falſe, ſhould *call in queſtion, doubt of, ſuſpect all the reſt:* [le revoquer en queſtion, en douter, le tenir pour ſuſpect.]

This laſt, from a great number of paſſages [a] in his Diſſertation, one would imagine to be his real opinion. And yet now and then he ſeems to ſlide into *belief*, and even into *certainty*, without being aware of it. He has great faith in what *Polybius* relates of the *Romans* in the early times of the Republic; and admits, as indubitable, ſeveral facts, for which the other hiſtorians are his only vouchers. Thus, for example,

Diſſert. p. 299. "It is *certain* [b] that *Servius* [*Tullius*] augmented the number of the "Tribes."

p. 329. "*Certain* it is, that from this time *Porſenna* did not treat the *Romans* "as enemies, but as old allies or as good ſubjects."

And M. de *B.*'s arguments for diſbelieving ſome facts in the *Roman* ſtory, or doubting of them, are frequently drawn from the *certainty* of others, particularly of the *Treaties*.

See p. 33.

Diſſert. part 2. ch. 10. I cannot but take notice, that, with regard to the ſtory of King *Brennus* the *Gaul*, M. de *B.* ſeems not to doubt of theſe facts. 1. That the *Gauls* totally routed the *Roman* army in the field. 2. That they preſently after poſſeſſed themſelves of *Rome*. 3. That they burnt the city. 4. That the old hiſtorical records and monuments were moſt of them conſumed in the flames. 5. That the capitol was ſaved. 6. That ſeveral antient monuments, being there depoſited, were preſerved with it. 7. That the *Gauls* ſold a peace to the *Romans*, and departed without loſs. Here are then, in the hiſtory of this one affair, ſeven important facts which M. de *B.* ſeems fully to believe. And what is it he objects to? Why, to *Livy*'s

Ces caracteres de fauſſeté ſuffiroient à bien des gens pour leur faire *rejetter cette Hiſtoire*, ſans plus d'examen; mais je ne veux pas me prevaloir de cet avantage. Ce n'eſt que ſur l'autorité des ecrivains les plus celebres, et les plus accredités que je veux m'appuier pour *en douter*. Et, afin qu'on ne m'accuſe pas d'en douter trop legerement, je me retranche à ne trouver cette hiſtoire *obſcure* et *incertaine*, que parce qu'ils la trouvent telle eux-memes. p. 10.

[a] De-là je conclus——que nous ſommes fondes à *tenir pour fort ſuſpect* TOUT *ce qu'on nous raconte des quatre ou cinq premiers ſiécles de Rome.*

La ſeconde partie ſera deſtinée à l'examen de certain faits des plus marqués, et qui figurent le plus dans l'Hiſtoire Romaine: l'incertitude ou la fauſſeté deſquels, étant bien prouvée, donnera une nouvelle force aux raiſons que l'on a de *revoquer en doute* TOUTE *cette Hiſtoire*,——je me flatte, que ceux qui ſe dépouilleront de leurs préjugés conviendront qu'il n'y *a rien de plus incertain que* TOUT *ce corps d'Hiſtoire des prémiers ſiécles de Rome.* p. 11, 12.

Il faut abſolument, qu'on en vienne a dire, que ces traittés ſont ſuppoſés, ce qu'on ne peut faire ſans de fortes raiſons (et je ne vois pas qu'on ait aucune pour douter de leur autenticité) ou que l'on convienne de bonne foi, que TOUT ce qu'on nous debite dans l'Hiſtoire Romaine n'eſt qu'incertitude, et *qu'on n'y peut compter ſur rien.* p. 43.

[b] Il eſt *ſur* que Servius en augmenta le nombre [des tribus.]

Ce qu'il y a de *ſur*, c'eſt que, dès lors, Porſena n'en uſa plus avec les Romains, comme avec des ennemis, et qu'au contraire il les traitta en anciens alliés, ou en bons ſujets.

relation of *Camillus*'s wonderful arrival in the critical moment to ſave the *Romans* from the diſgrace of living on the foot of a ranſomed people; and his deſtroying the whole army of the *Gauls*. But this relation, romantic in the air of it, and diſcovered by *Polybius*'s account to be a mere fiction of Roman vanity, can never be thought a good reaſon for queſtioning the truth of every thing that *Livy* has related of the earlieſt ages of *Rome*; and much leſs for regarding the whole Roman Hiſtory of the firſt 500 years, as fabulous or *uncertain*. For when M. de *B*. ſpeaks of the *uncertainty of the* Roman Hiſtory, I ſuppoſe he means, or ought to mean, *the uncertainty of the beſt and leaſt exceptionable accounts of the Roman affairs, that can be collected from the ſeveral antient writers who have treated the ſubject.*

We ſhall preſently ſee, that one of M. de *B*.'s reaſons for his incredulity is, that the Roman Hiſtorians (the earlieſt of whom lived in the ſixth century from the building of *Rome*) *wanted means to know the truth.* Yet he gives credit to *Polybius*'s relation of the wars between the *Romans* and *Gauls*, from the time of *Brennus*, to that of *Pyrrhus*; and if he thinks it reaſonable to believe *Polybius* on this part of the Roman Hiſtory, he muſt allow that there were means of coming at the truth of it, whether *Livy*, and the prior hiſtorians whom he followed, made uſe of them or not.

But whatever be the real opinion of M. de *B*. concerning the *Roman* Hiſtory of the firſt 500 years, he has advanced (if I miſtake him not) the following propoſitions.

I. "The Romans were an obſcure people, confined, *during four cen-* Diſſer. p. 6.
"*turies*, to a little corner of *Italy*; and the continual exerciſe of arms,
"and huſbandry (the only ſciences they profeſſed) *hindered them from*
"*having the* [a] *Thought of tranſmitting the memory of events to poſterity.*"

II. "And, if they had thought of perpetuating the memory of what
"paſſed among them, they were univerſally ſo illiterate, that *no body* p. 15.
"*was capable* of writing hiſtory, or *tranſmitting the events to poſterity by*
"*ſure and exact memorials* [b]." Perſonne n'etoit capable, *&c.*

"III. The

[a] —*l'empecha de ſonger à tranſmettre à la poſterité des evenemens*, qui dans le fond, ne ſont devenus intereſſans, que par le haut degré de gloire, auquel ſes deſcendans ſe ſont elevés par leurs conquêtes.

[b] M. de * *B*. cites a paſſage from *Livy*, (B. vii. c. 3.) to prove that even *in the end of the 4th century*, Writing was *very little in uſe*. "Raræ per ea tempora litteræ, *on faiſoit* "*peu d'uſage de l'ecriture* dit Tite Live "en parlant *de la fin du quatrieme ſiecle.*" M. de *B*. adds, "Indeed they muſt have "been very little ſolicitous *in thoſe times* "to preſerve the memory of events, ſince, "*inſtead of all other Annals*, they were "content with *driving a nail every year* in- "to the wall of the temple of *Jupiter Ca-* "*pitolinus*; and this was *the ſole expedient* "*they could have for fixing the chronology*, "[c'etoit là toute la reſſource qu'on pouvoit "avoir pour fixer la chronologie] *as the* "*ſame hiſtorian informs us in the ſame place.*"
He proceeds; "Had this been prac- "tiſed from the foundation of *Rome*, it "might have been of great uſe for ſet- "tling the true Æra of the city. But the "practice could not *commence* before the "temple was dedicated, which was not "till after the expulſion of *Tarquin*; and "it had ſuffer'd a long interruption. It "was *renew'd* in the end of the fourth "century of *Rome*, *not becauſe they found* "*it*

* p. 16.

On the Credibility of the HISTORY

p. 10, 56.

III. "THE PONTIFICAL ANNALS, *or hiſtorical part of the pontifical books,* "*and the other monuments publick and private,* which could have given *ſome* "*certain* "*it mention'd in any record or ritual,* (for "they made ſo little uſe of letters, that "*they had neither books nor records*) but "on account of a tradition almoſt for-"gotten, *ex ſeniorum memoriâ repetitum.*" [*it was recall'd to mind by ſome old men,* &c.]

As great uſe is made of the paſſage in *Livy*, referr'd to by M. de *B.* for proving the extremely illiterate ſtate of the *Romans*, during many years after the commencement of the Republic, I ſhall here tranſcribe the paſſage at length. The hiſtorian is ſpeaking of the year 392 (or, according to the Capitoline Marbles, 390) when *Rome* was grievouſly afflicted with the plague.

Cn. Genucio, L. Æmilio Mamercino ſecundum conſulibus, quum piaculorum magis conquiſitio animos quam corpora morbi afficerent, repetitum ex ſeniorum memoria dicitur, peſtilentiam quondam clavo ab dictatore fixo ſedatam. Ea religione adductus Senatus, dictatorem clavi figendi cauſa dici juſſit. Dictus L. Manlius Imperioſus, L. Pinarium Magiſtratum Equitum dixit. LEX vetuſta eſt priſcis litteris, verbiſque ſcripta, ut qui Prætor Maximus ſit, Idibus Septembribus clavum pangat. Fixus [*moſt of the manuſcripts have* fixa *] fuit dextro lateri ædis Jovis optimi maximi, ea ex parte qua Minervæ templum eſt. Eum clavum, quia raræ per ea tempora litteræ erant, notam numeri annorum fuiſſe *ferunt:* eoque Minervæ Templo dicatam legem, quia Numerus Minervæ inventum ſit. Volſiniis quoque clavos indices numeri annorum, fixos in templo Nortiæ Etruſcæ Deæ, comparere, diligens talium monimentorum auctor Cincius affirmat. M. Horatius CONSUL, ex LEGE Templum Jovis optimi maximi dedicavit, anno poſt reges exactos: à CONSULIBUS *poſtea* ad DICTATORES, quia majus imperium erat, ſolenne clavi figendi tranſlatum eſt. Intermiſſo deinde more, digna etiam per ſe viſa eſt res, propter quam dictator crearetur. Liv. B. vii. c. 3.

* Crevier.

NOW I conceive that M. de *B.* has, through inattention, made no leſs than four miſtakes in his comment upon this paſſage.

FOR I. Firſt of all, *Livy* does not ſpeak of THE END OF THE FOURTH CENTURY, when he ſays, *ſome report, that the* Nail *was to mark the number of years, becauſe* Letters *were rare in* THOSE DAYS, *per ea tempora*; but of *the time, when the Practice* of driving a nail in the Wall of the Temple of *Jupiter*, COMMENCED, in purſuance of a LAW directing that it ſhould be done annually, on THE IDES OF SEPTEMBER, by the Chief Prætor, [i. e. by the Chief Magiſtrate. The CONSULS were, at firſt, ſtiled PRÆTORS.] That this Practice commenced long before *the end of the fourth century* is evident, from the inſtance *then* called to mind by the old men, of a Dictator's doing it, and from the words *intermiſſo deinde more*. And it ſeems highly probable from *Livy*'s words, that the LAW *was made, and the* PRACTICE *commenced in the firſt year of the Republic, and that* HORATIUS, *when he dedicated the Temple, ſtruck the Firſt nail into the wall*; and that it was a part of the Ceremony, at the Dedication, and performed in conformity to the Law abovementioned. "There is an old Law, (ſays "*Livy*) written in antique characters, and "antique words, importing, that the Chief "Prætor ſhould, on the Ides of September, "*drive the Nail, clavum pangat.* The Nail "[or the Law] was fixed on the right ſide of "the Temple of *Jupiter*, in that part where "the Fane of Minerva is." What follows is all Parentheſis, till he thus goes on: "The "CONSUL Marcus Horatius, ACCORDING TO "THE LAW, *dedicated* the Temple of *Ju-*"*piter*, the year after the expulſion of the "Kings: AFTERWARDS, *the fixing the Nail* "was transferred from the CONSULS to "the DICTATORS, becauſe theſe were Ma-"giſtrates of greater power and dignity" [agreeably to the Spirit of the Law, expreſſed in theſe words, Qui Prætor Maximus ſit.] Whoever attends to *Livy*'s words muſt ſurely ſee, that, when he ſays, the CONSUL Horatius dedicated the Temple EX LEGE, he refers to the LAW, where it was enjoined, that the Chief Magiſtrate ſhould drive a Nail annually on the Ides of September; and means to tell us, that this CONSUL *drove the firſt Nail*, purſuant to that Law, *when he dedicated the Temple*; (which DEDICATION was on *the Ides of September*, as Plutarch informs us.) If *Livy* did not mean to ſay that HORATIUS *drove the Nail, when he dedicated the Temple*, what connexion between the former and latter part of this period? The "CONSUL Horatius dedicated the Temple "the year after the Regifuge; AFTERWARDS, "*the fixing the Nail* was transferred from "the CONSULS to the DICTATORS."

II. THERE

" *certainty* to hiſtory, were ALL [a] *deſtroy'd* by the flames which con-
" ſumed the city, after the *Gauls* had taken it [in 363.]"

How to reconcile this *third* aſſertion with the *ſecond*, or with the *latter part of* the *firſt*, ſeems ſomewhat difficult; nor ſeems it very eaſy to reconcile it with the following enumeration of the antient monuments which M. de *B.* ſuppoſes to have eſcaped the flames:

" SOME LAWS of the KINGS. p. 13.

" ALL the LAWS of the *Twelve Tables, by which might be known the* p. 32.
" *conſtitution of the antient government.*

" SOME of the PONTIFFS BOOKS, *which diſcovered the origin of ſeveral* 46, 47.
" *religious cuſtoms or ceremonies.*" (Under the name of the *Pontiffs*
" *books*, M. de *B.* comprehends all the books in general, which treated
" of the religious ceremonies and traditions of the *Romans*, as the books
" of the *Augurs* and *Haruſpices*, the verſes or hymns of the *Salii*, the
" *Saturnian* verſes, and a great number of books of that kind.)

" SOME of the *books* [b] which contain'd the *muſters* and *polls* taken of 103.
" the *Roman* citizens, *which books might be of uſe to hiſtory.*

" A

II. THERE is not one word in the paſſage referr'd to, importing that the *Romans* had no *annals* except *nails*. And the *written law* itſelf is a proof, that the nails were not uſed becauſe *no body could write* or becauſe theſe nails were *the only expedient they could have to fix the chronology*. And, for the ſame reaſon, they, of whom *Livy* ſays *ferunt*, cannot be ſuppoſed to have meant, that the nails were uſed, becauſe no body could mark the years by words or figures, but becauſe the generality of people could not *read* what ſome could *write*; as was the caſe in theſe countries not many hundred years ago. And the *interruption* of the practice of *driving nails* [*intermiſſo deinde more*] if it proves any thing, proves only, that the common people were become leſs illiterate, and that the nails were not wanted to inſtruct them in chronology.

III. It appears from the paſſage referr'd to, that, in the end of the fourth Century, the *Romans* had a monument or record *mentioning the cuſtom* of driving a *nail*, &c. They had *a written law* enjoining it; *lex vetuſta eſt priſcis litteris verbiſque ſcripta, ut qui Prætor Maximus ſit, Idibus Septembribus clavum pangat:* In conformity to which Law the Act of *fixing the nail* had been transferred from the Conſuls to the Dictators. And this ſhews that both the Law and the Practice were anterior to the Inſtitution of Dictators.

IV. THE *thing ſaid to be remember'd by the old men*, was not *the cuſtom of driving a nail into the wall of the Temple*, but a particular inſtance of *the plague's being ſtopt* by a Dictator's driving a nail, &c. *repetitum ex ſeniorum memoria dicitur, peſtilentiam quondam clavo ab dictatore fixo ſedatam.*

[a] C'eſt de ces ecrivains, que j'apprens, que TOUS *les monumens publics*, qui auroient pû donner quelque certitude à l'Hiſtoire, *perirent par le feu*, lorſque les Gaulois eurent pris Rome. p. 10.

Il eſt ſur que la partie hiſtorique des livres des Pontifes, ou leurs *Annales* perirent dans la deſtruction de Rome par les Gaulois. Tite Live eſt ſi exprés là deſſus, qu'il nous ote tout ſujet d'en douter,—— lorſque ſe plaignant de la peine qu'il a eue—parceque TOUS les memoires, conſervez dans les Archives, *qui etoient entre les mains des particuliers*, ou *qui faiſoient partie des livres des Pontifes*, avoient été enveloppés dans la ruine de la ville. *Et quod etiamſi quæ in commentariis Pontificum, aliisque publicis privatiſque erant monumentis, incenſâ urbe* PLERÆQUE interiere. p. 56.

N. B. In this place, *Pleræque*, with M. de *B.*, imports *Tous*; in p. 5. 18. *Preſque tout*; in p. 20, 27. *La plus part*; in p. 19. *Grande partie.*

[b] Quoique les anciens Hiſtoriens omettent quelques *luſtres*, et quelque fois les noms des cenſeurs, ainſi que le nombre des citoiens, qui s'etoit trouvé dans chaque denom-

42. " A *conſiderable number* of the *Treaties* which *Rome* had made with " the neighbouring ſtates. Il eſt a preſumer qu'ils ſauverent un aſſez " bon nombre de ces derniers [les traittés] parce qu'ils etoient gardez " dans le temple de Jupiter au capitole, qui demeura a l'abri de la fu-
33. " reur des Gaulois. *And treaties of peace are the moſt authentic ma-* " *terials for hiſtory.* Les traittés de paix ſont les materiaux les plus au- " thentiques pour l'hiſtoire, et on ne peut former aucun doute raiſonable " ſur des faits appuiés de pareilles preuves."

145. IV. " THERE was, at *Rome*, no book, *no writing* prior to *Pyrrhus*'s com-
70. " ing into *Italy*; *no* [a] *piece* that could be *of uſe to hiſtory*, anterior to the " end of the fifth century."

How to make this agree with the foregoing enumeration of *pieces preſerved* from the flames, I do not readily perceive.

6, 7. V. " THE LATER hiſtorians of *Rome did but copy* [b] the *earlier* with re- " gard to the times preceding the *earlier*."

This ſeems to be a haſty aſſertion; ſince both *Livy* and *Dionyſius* ſpeak ſo frequently of the diſagreeing accounts given by the authors they cite, with regard to the times anterior to the firſt hiſtorians. And *Livy*, in his preface, ſays, that each new writer thinks *either to produce ſomething more certain with regard to facts* than his predeceſſors have done, or to excel them in language and ſtyle. *Novi ſemper ſcriptores, aut* in rebus certius aliquid allaturos ſe, *aut ſcribendi arte rudem vetuſtatem ſuperaturos credunt.*

p. 11. VI. " THOSE records or monuments which eſcaped the flames (when " *Rome* was burnt by the *Gauls*) were of little uſe for compoſing a hiſ-

denombrement, *je ſerois aſſez porté à croire, ſur ce qui nous reſte de ces revues generales des citoiens de Rome, que c'etoit un des monumens le mieux conſervé, et que les hiſtoriens avoient le moins negligé de conſulter.* Ce que Denis d'Halicarnaſſe en cite remonte juſqu' au premier cens ſous Servius Tullius. On ſeroit un peu mieux fondé, ſi on nous alléguoit de pareilles pieces en faveur de l'hiſtoire Romaine. Car, ſi ce que les hiſtoriens nous diſent des differens cens, où denombremens, qui ſe ſont faits à Rome, eſt fondé ſur le temoignage de ces monumens, qui ſe gardoient dans les Archives, *on ne peut diſconvenir*, qu'ils n'aient echapé aux flammes, du moins en partie, et *qu'ils n'aient été de quelque uſage pour l'hiſtoire.* p. 102, 103.

[a] J'ai deja prouvé que ces Annales des Pontifes n'exiſtoient point: et je prouverai bientôt, *qu'il n'y avoit aucune piece qui pût ſervir à l'Hiſtoire laquelle fut anterieure à la fin du cinquieme ſiecle de Rome.* p. 70.

[b] On reconnoitra facilement que ceux qui ont ecrit l'Hiſtoire Romaine *n'ont fait que ſe copier les uns les autres* pour ce qui regardoit les tems anterieurs. p. 7.

Fabius Pictor et ceux qui le ſuivirent de près avoient ignoré, &c. On *n'avoit fait depuis que les copier* ſans autre examen. p. 45.

Ils ont ete plus de cinq ſiecles ſans avoir d'Hiſtoriens—*les premiers* qu'ils ont eus ont fort mal reüſſi deſtitués comme ils l'etoient de monumens anciens et de memoires ſurs qui leur puſſent ſervir de guides—*les Hiſtoriens, qui depuis ont entrepris* de fournir la même carriere, *ſe ſont contentés de s'appuier de l' autorité de leurs Predeceſſeurs et de les donner peur garans des faits qu'ils rapportoient*—ils ſe ſont peu mis en peine *d'examiner à la rigueur la verité des faits.* p. 6.

N. B. Unleſs with regard to *abſurd* fictions, it is hard to gueſs by what teſt the *later* hiſtorians, if there were no *antient monuments*, no authentic *memorials*, could examine the truth of the facts related by the *earlier* hiſtorians.

" tory. And the *firſt* hiſtorians did not reſt upon ſuch monuments, but
" *founded themſelves* WHOLLY upon *traditions and vulgar ſtories*, as the moſt
" celebrated and moſt eſteemed writers inform us, [a] who nevertheleſs
" *took all their accounts* from thoſe *firſt* hiſtorians.

" What we have of the *Roman* hiſtory [of the firſt 500 years] was p. 142.
" taken out of *family-memoirs*. Deſtitute of all other monuments, it 143. &
" was to theſe pieces, that the hiſtorians, towards the middle of the ſixth 435.
" century, [i. e. the firſt hiſtorians] were obliged to have recourſe, and 151.
" *from no other ſources could they have drawn* what they related of thoſe 152.
" times which, as *they* [b] *themſelves* confeſs, were cover'd with thick dark-
" neſs, and of which there was no ſpeaking with any certainty." [c]

To explain, and, as much as poſſible, *reconcile* theſe two paragraphs, we ſhall have recourſe to another paſſage in the Diſſertation.

" *The moſt antient piece* known at *Rome* in *Cicero*'s time [d], was the ſpeech 150.
" of *Appius Claudius, the blind*, pronounced in the ſenate to diſſuade
" them from accepting the terms of peace propoſed by *Pyrrhus* in 474.
" Indeed there were, beſide that, ſome *funeral orations*; but *tradition* muſt
" have ſupplied the reſt: ſo that the truth of the hiſtory of the firſt five
" centuries had no other ſupport but theſe two witneſſes, *funeral orations*
" and *tradition*."

" Perhaps to theſe we may add, ſome ſongs or hymns, compoſed in
" honour of the heroes and illuſtrious men, — pieces not proper to in-
" ſtruct us in the truth of facts."

THE CASE then was this; there were no *written* family-traditions nor any

[a] Je recherche ce qui a pu échaper à cet incendie—je trouve que ce qui en echapa fut de peu d'utilité pour la compoſition de l'Hiſtoire. Ce ſont eux memes [*les ecrivains les plus celebres et les plus accreditès*] qui m'apprennent, que ce n'eſt point ſur de pareils monumens, que *les premiers Hiſtoriens* ſe ſont appuiés, et que *ceux qui les ont ſuivi* (en avouant, que ceux qui les avoient precedés dans cette carriere, *ne s'etoient fondés que ſur des traditions, et ſur des bruits populaires*, que d'ailleurs ils n'avoient aporté ni jugement, ni exactitude, dans la compoſition de leurs hiſtoires, et dans ce qu'ils diſoient des premiers ſiecles de Rome) *n'ont pas laiſſé de reconnoitre que c'etoit d'eux qu'ils tiroient* TOUT *ce qu'ils en rapportoient* [i. e. *tout* ce qu'ils rapportoient des premiers ſiecles de Rome.] p. 10. 11. Les hiſtoriens, qui ont vecu dans des ſiecles plus polis, et où l'on n'ignoroit aucune des loix de l'Hiſtoire, n'aiant point eu d'autres ſources où puiſer que ces mêmes hiſtoires, *qui n'etoient fondées que ſur la tradition*, il's n'ont pû donner plus de certitude à ce qu'ils rapportoient des premiers ſiecles de Rome. p. 204.

[b] By *they themſelves*, I preſume M. de *B.* means the later hiſtorians; for they are the only writers he cites as complaining of darkneſs.

[c] C'eſt des *Memoires des Familles*, qu'eſt tiré ce que nous avons de l'Hiſtoire Romaine. p. 142.

Deſtitués de tous autres monumens, ce fut à ces pieces [Memoires des Familles] que les hiſtoriens, vers le milieu du ſixieme ſiecle, furent obligez d'avoir recours. p. 435.

Dans quelle ſource ont-ils puisé ce qu'ils ont dit ſur des tems, que ſelon eux-memes couvroient d'epaiſſes tenebres, et dont on ne pouvoient parler avec aucune certitude? *Ce n'a pû être* que dans ces *Traditions des Familles* puiſqu'il n'y avoit point d'autre monument auquel ils puſſent avoir recours. p. 152.

[d] I am not aware that M. de *B.* has any ſupport for this, but a miſtake of his own (through inattention) in interpreting a

any other [hiſtorical] *writings*, aucun livre, aucun ecrit, before the year 474. Between this time and the year 550 (when *Fabius Pictor* became an hiſtorian) *funeral orations* were *written*. And from theſe *written orations* and from *oral tradition*, the *firſt hiſtorians* compiled their works.

p. 150. But then we are aground again, by reaſon of an unlucky paſſage, cited by M. de *B.* from *Dionyſius*, who tells us, that *Fabius* [whom all the following hiſtorians are ſaid to have copied] compiled his hiſtory of the firſt 500 years from tradition, from *hear-ſay*, *wholly* from hear-ſay; on

p. 164. voit que ce qu'il en diſoit n'etoit appuié que ſur ce qu'il en avoit oui dire: ἐξ ὧν ἤκουσε, D. H. Lib. 7. p. 475. *Fabius* then did not make uſe of the *funeral orations*, nor of any *written* family-traditions, (family-memoirs:) Neither were theſe, according to M. de *B.*, form'd upon *hear-ſay*. The matter of them was *invented* by the vanity of private men. And not only the matter of them was invented, but the greater number of the

p. 154. *pieces themſelves* were *forgeries*; [a] i. e. they were not contemporary with the authors to whom they were aſcribed, but forged after their time. And if *Fabius* took his hiſtorical accounts from *forged funeral orations*, theſe forgeries muſt have been *almoſt all* made in his own time, and *all* in the ſpace of 76 years; ſuppoſing it true, that there were no *writings* of earlier date than the year 474. And then we ſhall be at a loſs to gueſs how it was poſſible to impoſe theſe forgeries upon *Fabius* for genuine pieces.

But is it not ſtrange that M. de *B.*, who, by admitting that the public monuments and private memorials of the *Romans* were burnt by the *Gauls*, admits that the *Romans* had both ability and diſpoſition to write *before*

paſſage of *Cicero*'s *Brutus* [c. 16.] *Nec verò habeo quenquam antiquiorem* cujus quidem ſcripta proferenda putem, *niſi Appii Cæci oratio hæc ipſa de Pyrrhò, et nonnullæ mortuorum laudationes, fortè delectant: et Hercule, hæ quidem extant.* *Cicero* is diſcourſing, not of authors in general, nor of hiſtorians, but of *Orators*, and the laſt he mentions is *Cato* the Cenſor: and he adds, that " he is ac- " quainted with none more antient, *whoſe* " *writings he thinks worth ſpeaking of*; un- " leſs the *oration* of *Appius Claudius* con- " cerning *Pyrrhus*, and ſome *funeral ora-* " *tions* may happen to pleaſe. Of theſe " there are indeed enough." Had *Cicero* been ſpeaking of Roman hiſtorians, or authors in general, he certainly would not have ſaid, that he knew none more antient than *Cato*, that were worth mentioning; becauſe *Fabius* and *Cincius* and ſeveral other hiſtorians, much eſteemed, were prior to *Cato*. Yet on the authority of this paſſage M. de *B.* (p. 145.) writes thus, " On ne pourra pas douter " de la verité de ce que j'avance, dés que " j'aurai fait voir, qu'on n'avoit a Rome " aucun livre, *aucun ecrit*, qui fût *anterieur* " *à la venuë de Pyrrhus en Italie*, evene- " ment, qui ne ſe place que vers la fin du " cinquieme ſiecle de Rome. Pour *des* " HISTORIENS, on ſait qu'ils ne parurent " que dans le ſiecle ſuivant. Ciceron, *par-* " *lant de ce qu'on avoit de plus ancien de ſon* " *tems*, dit que Caton, qui etoit mort il " n' y avoit pas plus d'un ſiecle, etoit con- " ſideré comme *un Auteur* fort ancien *eum* " *nos perveterem habemus.* Certes ajoute " t-il, je n'en connois point de plus ancien " dont *je puiſſe vous citer les ecrits*, à moins " que l'on ne trouve du gout à la harangue " d'Appius Claudius ſur Pyrrhus, et à quel- " ques oraiſons funebres."

[a] L'on peut aſſûrer ſans temerité que l'Hiſtoire Romaine, pour la plus grande partie, à été forgée ſur ces *Traditions des Familles*, et ſur des *oraiſons funebres*, qui *pour la pluſpart* n'etoient que des *pieces ſuppoſées, que des fauſſaires avoient forgées* pour favoriſer les pretenſions, que quelques familles formoient à une genealogie illuſtre.

that time, ſhould yet ſuppoſe, that they had neither the one nor the other, for above 100 years *after* that time?

And there is another difficulty ariſing from another paſſage cited by M. de *B.* from *Dionyſius* [Lib. 1. p. 59.] who there ſays, that the earlieſt *Roman* hiſtorians took all their accounts of the birth of *Romulus* and the building of *Rome*, from *the antique narratives in the* SACRED BOOKS, ἐν ἱεραῖς βίβλοις. p. 162.

And what makes theſe difficulties the greater is, that M. de *B.* is of opinion, we [a] ought to give full credit to *Dionyſius* in what he ſays concerning the works and merit of the hiſtorians who preceded him.

BUT, not to dwell any longer on the *ſeeming* repugnancies in the argumentation of our ingenious Critic againſt the credibility of the hiſtory of the five firſt centuries, let us now conſider what *Livy* ſays concerning his own hiſtory of the times anterior to the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*.

" I have, in five books, ſet forth what, from the building of the city " to it's being taken, was done by the *Romans*, firſt under the Kings, then " under the Conſuls, Dictators, Decemvirs, and Military Tribunes with " conſular power; the foreign wars and domeſtic ſeditions; matters very " obſcure, *by reaſon of their antiquity*, (like objects, that at a great diſtance, " are hardly diſcerned.) For it is only by *writings*, that the tranſactions " and events of remote times can be clearly and faithfully tranſmitted; " and in thoſe days there were few *writers*; and the greater part of the " commentaries of the High Prieſts, and of the other records, publick " and private, periſhed in the burning of *Rome* [b]. Henceforward, mat- " ters more clear and certain will be related; the civil affairs and military " acts of the *Romans*, after the rebuilding of their city [c]."

Now what is the obvious ſenſe of this paſſage?

" The foregoing part of my hiſtory, (ſays *Livy*) is full of obſcurity " and uncertainty; becauſe the matters, there treated of, are of too anti- " ent date to have been tranſmitted with *faithfulneſs* and *exactneſs* by *oral* " *tradition*, and becauſe the contemporary writers were few, and the " greater part of their writings periſhed in the fire that conſumed the city. " But the tranſactions and events after that time, are things more clear " and

[a] Denis d'Halicarnaſſe, aiant entrepris l'Hiſtoire des cinq premiers ſiecles de Rome, doit etre conſideré comme juge competent de ceux qui l'ont precedé dans la meme carriere. p. 168. L'on ne riſque rien en s'en rapportant à ce qu'il en dit. p. 163.

I cannot poſſibly be of M. de *B.*'s opinion in this particular. *Dionyſius* ſeems, of all writers, to be the man who deſerves the leaſt credit when he ſpeaks of the merit of other writers. For (Lib. 1. p. 5.) he ſays of *Polybius*, " that he wrote little concern- " ing the *Romans*, and that the little he " did write was without any care or accu- " racy, and *wholly founded upon idle reports.*" Nor could even *Thucydides* pleaſe *Dionyſius:* but, as to what he ſays by way of cenſure on *Thucydides*, Mr. *Hobbes* remarks, " that there was never written ſo much " abſurdity in ſo few lines."

[b] It ſeems pretty plain from what *Livy* here ſays of the deſtruction of public and private Monuments or Records, that he knew nothing of the *peu d'uſage de l'ecriture*, for which M. de *B.* contends.

[c] Quæ ab condita urbe Roma ad captam eandem L. 6. Cap. 1.

" and certain, *clariora & certiora:*" *How ſo?* " Becauſe with reſpect to " theſe, there are not the ſame cauſes of obſcurity and uncertainty. The " times not being ſo remote, the *traditions* concerning them are more to " be depended on; contemporary writers were leſs rare; and there has not " been a like deſtruction of their writings."

This is ſurely the plain meaning of his words, and it ought to be obſerved to his credit, that his hiſtory of the earlieſt times, is proportioned, for length, to the ſcarcity of materials he complains of; for notwithſtanding his *circumſtantial*, and, perhaps in his own opinion, fabulous account of the rape of the *Sabine* women, with the conſequences of it; and notwithſtanding the frequent diſplay of his ſkill in adorning a ſtory, as in his deſcription of the combat between the *Horatii* and *Curiatii*, and in ſeveral other inſtances, his whole hiſtory of the ſeven kings, who are ſuppoſed to have reigned 244 years, hardly fills ſeventy pages in Le *Clerc*'s ſmall edition; and, of theſe, twenty are taken up with the reigns of *Servius Tullius*, and his ſucceſſor *Tarquin the Proud*. Now, the inſtitutions of *Servius*, which were his moſt important acts, and were the plan, whereon, after the expulſion of *Tarquin*, the new government was eſtabliſhed and maintained, cannot eaſily be called in queſtion; nor, I believe, will any body queſtion the truth of the moſt material things, related of *Tarquin*'s tyranny, which gave occaſion to the revolt from him, and the abolition of kingly government. The obſcurity and uncertainty therefore, of which *Livy* ſpeaks, muſt chiefly regard the circumſtances with which ſome facts are accompanied in his relations, and not the principal facts and events contained in the hiſtory of the early times.

Certainly M. de *B.* had not duly attended to the accounts given by the
p. 6. antients, of the regal ſtate of *Rome*, when he ventured to ſay, " It is ſur- " priſing to find a continued hiſtory of five centuries, in which there is " ſcarce any *void*, any year, that is not *diſtinguiſhed* by ſome conſidera- " ble event:" For very few of the 244 years of the kings are *diſtinguiſhed* by any event whatſoever.

It may be further remarked, that *Livy*'s hiſtory of the 119 years, from the expulſion of *Tarquin* to the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*, is above four times as long as his hiſtory of the 244 years of the kings; and his hiſtory of thoſe 119 years is no longer than his hiſtory of the 95 years that follow the rebuilding of *Rome*, and reach to the year 460, with which his tenth book ends. And the next ten books (which are loſt) contain'd but the hiſtory of 73 years. Now the reaſon of theſe differences in the length of his accounts of the different periods is very obvious, and is contained in the paſſage above cited.

eandem urbem Romani ſub regibus primum, conſulibus deinde ac dictatoribus decemviriſque ac tribunis conſularibus geſſere, foris bella, domi ſeditiones, quinque libris expoſui; res quum vetuſtate nimia obſcuras, veluti quæ magno ex intervallo loci vix cernuntur: tum quod et raræ per eadem tempora litteræ fuere, una cuſtodia fidelis memoriæ rerum geſtarum: et, quod etiam ſi quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliiſque publicis privatiſque erant monumentis, incenſa urbe pleræque interiere. Clariora deinceps *certioraque* ab ſecunda origine, velut ab ſtirpibus lætius, feraciuſque renatæ urbis, geſta domi militiæque, exponentur.

I pro-

I proceed now to say something of the value of those *materials*, which the first *Roman* historians may reasonably be supposed to have had for composing their histories. Without entering into any discussion of the antiquity or contents of the *linnen books*, the *books of the magistrates*, the *tables* and *memorials* of the *censors*, the *books of the Decemvirs and Duumvirs*, or the *inscriptions* on pillars, statues or shields, (from all which, it cannot be questioned but many things, useful to history, might be drawn) I shall confine myself to speak of the other sources of historical matter, that were open to the first historians.

1. The Annals or Commentaries of the High Priests, called the *Great Annals*.

That it was the constant custom from the earliest times, for the High Priests to record in writing the events of each year, and that *antient Annals*, composed by the *High Priests*, [a] existed, either entire or in part in *Cicero*'s time, is unquestionable from his express testimony.

And from the complaint which *Livy* makes of the loss of the *greater part* of the Pontifical Annals, anterior to the burning of *Rome* [*incensa urbe* Pleræque [b] *interiere*] it is evident that some *pieces* of *those* Annals were preserved from that fire. His words import this: and his chief ground for saying that the *greater part* perished, was doubtless the preservation of the *smaller*. L. 6. c. 1.

Rome was burnt by the *Gauls* about the year 363, i. e. about 119 years after the commencement of the republic. The *Romans*, we are told, were very industrious in collecting what monuments or records had escaped the fire: and it is natural to suppose that endeavours were used to supply by *memory* (as far as memory could supply) the defects of what remained of the Pontifical Annals. "Before the use of *letters* (says Sir *Isaac Newton*) the names and actions of men could scarce be remembered above "80 or 100 years after their deaths: and therefore I admit of no chronology of things done in *Europe* above 80 years before *Cadmus* brought "letters into *Europe*." It seems here to be admitted by this great man, that the names and actions of men, and even the chronology of things done 80 years back, might be preserved by *memory*, and without written records. The defects of the *Great Annals* might therefore, with certainty enough, be supplied, by the help of *memory alone*, as to the principal events during the far greater part of the time, between the beginning of the Republic and the burning of *Rome*. And with regard not only to that time but to the earlier times, is it to be supposed, that those persons, who had read the Annals before they were in part destroyed, remembered nothing of what they had read? *Short* Chron. p. 7.

These Annals, thus repaired, would doubtless be very brief and very

[a] ——*Ab initio rerum*——*Res omnes singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus*——*ii qui etiam nunc* Annales Maximi *vocantur*, *De orat. Lib.* 2. *c.* 12. *Servius ad Virg. Æneid. Lib.* 1. *v.* 377. and *Vopiscus* in *Tacito cap.* 1. speak to the same effect, as M. de *B.* observes.

[b] *M. L'Abbé Sallier* considers *Livy*'s *Pleræque* as a word of exaggeration, to magnify his own labour in compiling a general history of his country.

imperfect,

imperfect, but not uſeleſs to hiſtory. The great events and the order of them would there be found. And as to the Annals, written after the burning of *Rome* (for the practice was continued) we read of no deſtruction happening to theſe either in whole or in part. It muſt be granted however, that even theſe, through ſome accident or neglect, were not entire and perfect in the days of *Livy* or of the prior hiſtorians. If there had been no chaſms, no interruptions in them, how could the hiſtorians have been ſo much at a loſs, as we find they ſometimes were, concerning the ſucceſſion of the magiſtrates?

But granting the Pontifical Annals, mentioned by *Cicero*, to have been very imperfect, and even ſuppoſing, that his words, *ab initio rerum*, regard the time when the practice of writing Annals began, and not the *Epoch* whence the relations, contained in thoſe which he had read, commenced; yet (as I ſaid before) certain it is from his teſtimony, that *antient Records*, called *the Annals of the High Prieſts*, or *the Great Annals*, did exiſt in his time: and therefore the ſilence of *Livy* and *Dionyſius*, if they are ſilent, (as M. de *B.* imagines) concerning theſe Annals, will not prove what M. de *B.* would infer from it, the non-exiſtence of them in their time. If they did not *then* exiſt, they muſt have been loſt in the few years between the time when *Cicero* wrote, and the time when *Livy* and *Dionyſius* compoſed their hiſtories; and of this there is no where any hint. *Livy* would doubtleſs have complained of ſuch a loſs, had it really happened, ſince he complains of the earlier loſs ſuffered by the burning of *Rome*. And for theſe ſeveral conſiderations it is reaſonable to believe, that the *old Annals*, of which *Livy* frequently ſpeaks, and the ἱεραι Δέλτοι, mentioned by *Dionyſius* as hiſtorical monuments, were *the Great Annals* deſcribed by *Cicero:* And I think it may be reaſonably aſked, How could *Cicero* well know (and he ſpeaks with confidence) that the cuſtom of writing Annals commenced *ab initio rerum*, but from the actual exiſtence, in his time, of fragments of Annals, written in the earlieſt times; or from their being cited by the firſt hiſtorians as exiſting in their time?

TO PROVE the non-exiſtence of any Annals, or parts of Annals written before the burning of *Rome*, M. de *B.* makes great uſe of the authority of one CLODIUS cited by *Plutarch*, and repreſents this *Clodius* as ſpeaking thus: "ALL *the* ANTIENT MONUMENTS *were burnt when the* Gauls *ſacked* "Rome, *and thoſe which the* Romans *now have are forgeries.*"

In Numa. Diſſert. p. 20.

M. de *B.* goes on: "And *Plutarch* himſelf, *or whoever was the author* "*of the treatiſe* OF THE FORTUNE OF THE ROMANS * after ſpeaking of "ſome *marvellous* events of thoſe early times,—adds, *To what purpoſe* "*ſhould we dwell upon times which have nothing clear, nothing certain, ſince,* "*as* Livy *aſſures us, the Roman hiſtory was corrupted, and its monuments de-* "*ſtroyed?*"

* De Fortuna Romanorum. p. 21.

Then immediately, (taking for granted, that *Plutarch* was the author of that treatiſe) he adds, "What *Plutarch* ſays, upon the teſtimonies of "*Clodius* and *Livy*, of the deſtruction of *thoſe monuments*, gets an addi-

"tional

" tional force in the mouth of *ſo grave* an author as he. For ſince he " does not contradict them, he ſupports what they ſay by his ſuffrage. " The teſtimony of theſe authors is very expreſs, &c."

Again, " *Livy*, *Clodius* and *Plutarch depoſe* that the *monuments*, by p. 26.
" which the truth of the *Roman* Hiſtory might have been aſcertained, " and which alone could give it the requiſite certainty, were deſtroyed " in the ſacking of *Rome*."

And again, " It is *certain*, that the *hiſtorical part* of the books of the p. 56.
" Pontiffs or their ANNALS, *if*[a] *they ever exiſted*, periſhed in the deſtruc- " tion of *Rome* by the *Gauls*. *Livy* is ſo expreſs upon this, that he " leaves us no room to doubt of it."——For he ſays, " *that* ALL *the* " *memorials (kept in the Archives) that were in private hands, or that made* " *part of the books of the Pontiffs, were involved in the ruin of the city.*" But where does *Livy* ſay this? Why, [in B. 6. c. 1.] where he tells us, that *a great part* or *the greater* part of what was contained in the High Prieſts commentaries, and in other public and private monuments, periſhed in the burning of *Rome*: *Et quod etiam ſi quæ in commentariis Pontificum, aliiſque publicis privatiſque erant monumentis incensâ urbe* pleræque *interiere.*

NOW as to CLODIUS, *Plutarch* writes thus: Though the *pedigrees* of *Nu-* " *ma*'s family from its beginning to this day, be ſet forth in very nice or- " der, there is much diſpute concerning the time when he lived. One *Clo-* " *dius*, in a work entiled ἔλεγχος χρόνων, aſſerts that the antient writings *of* " *that ſort* [τὰς ἀρχαίας ΕΚΕΙΝΑΣ ἀναγραφὰς] were loſt, when the *Gauls* de- " ſtroyed *Rome*, and that thoſe which now appear were framed by flatter- " ers to pleaſe the vanity of ſome private families, who would needs be " thought deſcended from the moſt illuſtrious origins, to which they had " in truth no relation." We ſee, that *Clodius* ſpeaks only of genealogical tables, and not of any other hiſtorical monuments. Had he aſſerted that ALL the antient monuments or records were loſt, he would have aſſerted what was not true, by the conceſſion of M. de *B.*, who allows, that many treaties of peace, the laws of the twelve tables, and ſeveral other pieces of antiquity, eſcaped the flames.

M. *L'Abbé Sallier* thinks, that *Plutarch* was not the author of the trea-

[a] *If they ever exiſted.* Had *Livy* uſed theſe words in this place, he would have ſpoken like a certain gentleman, who, in giving a bad character of a perſon deceaſed, after many ſevere accuſations, went on thus, *And he was a very cruel father to moſt of his children —if he had any.*

That *Livy* did not intend to expreſs a doubt whether any Pontifical Annals exiſted before the burning of *Rome*, is pretty evident from a paſſage (in his 4th book c. 3.) cited by M. de *B.*

The hiſtorian is writing of the year 310, and he puts theſe words into the mouth of a Tribune, " If we are not admitted to the " *Faſti*, nor to the COMMENTARIES of the " *High Prieſts*, are we therefore ignorant of " thoſe things which are known even by all " ſtrangers? *That the Conſuls ſucceeded in* " *the place of the kings, and have no rights* " *or prerogatives which the kings had not be-* " *fore?*" Si non ad Faſtos, non ad COMMENTARIOS PONTIFICUM admittimur: ne ea quidem ſcimus, quæ omnes peregrini etiam ſciunt: Conſules in locum Regum ſucceſſiſſe: nec aut juris, aut majeſtatis quicquam habere, quod non in Regibus ante fuerit?

tiſe *de Fortuna Romanorum*; and indeed, if he were, he muſt, how *grave* ſoever, have been a very idle man, and condemned by himſelf in the above-cited paſſage from that treatiſe, to ſpend his time in writing the lives of *Romulus*, *Numa*, *Poplicola* and *Camillus*, without any materials, but what he believed to be forgeries and romance.

But can it be imagined, that either *he* or *Livy* or *Dionyſius* believed nothing of what they have written of the firſt ages of *Rome*, or that they looked upon *all* as *uncertain?* Though *Livy*, in ſome inſtances doubts, yet he often ſays, *it is evident*, *it is certain*, conſtat, certum eſt; and, in his preface, he warns us, with regard to what he is going to write, to diſtinguiſh between the ſtories adorned with fiction, and the traditions ſupported by authentic monuments.

And it was very ſingular, and not a little marvellous, if, when *Rome* was burnt by the *Gauls*, the fire did ſo piouſly diſtinguiſh between ſacred writings and prophane. It ſpared that part of the Pontiffs BOOKS which regarded public worſhip, and likewiſe the treaties of peace, and the laws of the twelve tables, treaties and laws being *religiones* *, religious matters, deemed ſo on account of the religious ceremonies performed at their making; but it deſtroyed *entirely* the *hiſtorical part* of the Pontifical Books, their *Annals*; it ſpared no writing that was wholly prophane, nothing hiſtorical, if not ſomehow under the protection of religion.

* *Livy*, L. 6. c. 1.

II. THE Firſt *Roman* Hiſtorians had, among the materials for their works, not only ſome parts of the High Prieſts Annals, written before the burning of *Rome*, but ſome parts of OTHER *public hiſtorical monuments* or memorials, preſerved from that fire. *Quæ in Commentariis Pontificum* ALIIS*que publicis monumentis erant* PLERÆQUE *interiere:* the greater part, not all, periſhed.

What thoſe OTHER *public monuments* were, I will not pretend to ſay. Perhaps they were the *linnen books*, the *books of the magiſtrates*, the *memorials* or *tables* of the *Cenſors*, and ſome other antient pieces referred to by the hiſtorians.

p. 98. M. de *B.* obſerves, that *Livy*, who cites the *linnen books* pretty often, from *Licinius Macer*, during the ſpace of about ten years, does not cite them for any thing after that time, or before it. Now ſuppoſing this to be a proof that the *linnen books*, which *Licinius* had conſulted, contained nothing but what related to thoſe ten years; yet, as thoſe years were prior to the burning of *Rome*, we may reaſonably believe, that the books in queſtion were part of an old public record, a fragment preſerved from that fire. And we may reaſonably think the ſame of thoſe parts of the *books of the magiſtrates*, and of the *Cenſors books*, which are cited in atteſtation of matters anterior to the deſtruction of *Rome* by the *Gauls*. The very imperfection of theſe pieces carries with it ſome proof of their antiquity, and of the miſchief they had ſuffered.

III. ORIGINAL Records of many treaties which the *Romans* had made with the neighbouring nations, before the burning of the city. And theſe

muſt have been of excellent uſe to the firſt hiſtorians, both for facts and dates in their accounts of the early times. And as to the treaties, after the rebuilding of *Rome*, there is no queſtion of their preſervation.

IV. The Acts of the *Senate* and of the *Comitia*, and the Laws *of the Twelve Tables*, which fully laying open the conſtitution of the ſtate, the cuſtoms and manners of the *Romans*, the rights of the people, and the powers of the magiſtrates, were a ſure guide to the hiſtorians in many particulars of their accounts.

V. Whatever could be aſcertained by antient annals or records, preſerved in the other cities of *Italy*, that were fallen under the power of the *Romans*, when *Fabius* and his ſucceſſors undertook to write hiſtory. Why ſhould we ſuppoſe, that theſe were totally neglected by the firſt hiſtorians? That the neighbouring nations had books and records is evident from *Liv.* L. 10. c. 38, where we find, that, in the year 459 of *Rome*, the *Samnites* had [a] recourſe to their *linnen books* for direction in forming that legion which they called *legio linteata*.

That treaty with *Porſenna*, (mentioned by *Pliny*) of which M. de *B.* takes advantage to diſcredit the *Roman* Hiſtory, was doubtleſs found at *Cluſium*, or ſome other city of *Hetruria*, not at *Rome*.

Livy, in citing the prior hiſtorians, does not always tell us from whence they took their matter, yet often enough to make us know, that they cited authorities for what they delivered. And it is evident that they had recourſe to the archives of the conquered cities. From the paſſage in *Livy*, (L. 7. c. 3.) before referred to, we learn that *Cincius* having examined into the antiquities of *Volſinii*, a town in *Hetruria*, had found it to have been formerly a cuſtom there to mark the number of the years by nails fixed in a temple dedicated to *Nortia*, an *Hetruſcan* Goddeſs; and that *Cincius* was a diligent enquirer into ſuch antiquities, *diligens talium monimentorum auctor Cincius*.

VI. Family-memorials, and Funeral-orations.

M. de *B.* cites [b] the authorities of *Cicero* and *Pliny* to prove, that it was the general cuſtom at *Rome* for each noble family to preſerve *memorials* recording the ſervices which the members of it had done the ſtate in the diſcharge of thoſe offices, with which they had been intruſted. "If theſe "*memorials*, ſays M. de *B.*, had been faithfully written, they would have "been of infinite uſe to hiſtory. Should we admit that all the other mo- "numents were loſt, we muſt likewiſe admit, that the loſs might have "been ſupplied by theſe memorials. They were ſo many hiſtories of the

p. 104. & ſeq.

[a] M. *L'Abbé Sallier*, in his firſt diſcourſe, makes this obſervation; and he adds, Les nations Voiſines pouvoient donc offrir des monumens aux recherches des hiſtoriens. On pourroit rapporter bien d'autres preuves, que les peuples Voiſins des Romains n'etoient pas ſans monumens & ſans hiſtoires. Varron, cité par Cenſorin et Feſtus, en pluſieurs endroits, fourniroit de bons temoignage pour ce que je dis icy.

[b] Cic. in Brut. c. 16. *Plin.* L. 35. c. 2.

" lives of particular men, and contained the principal affairs of the ſtate,
" in the conduct of which thoſe men had had a ſhare. But unhappily,
" in the compoſition of theſe hiſtories, much leſs regard was had to truth
" than to heightening the luſtre of families. There were ſo many falſifica-
" tions, the truth of facts was ſo frequently corrupted in theſe memorials,
" that *no uſe could be made of them without great precaution.*"

To PROVE the unfaithfulneſs of the *Family-memorials*, M. de *B.* inſiſts
p. 107, 108. chiefly on a paſſage in *Cicero*, and another in *Livy*, charging ſome *Funeral-orations* with containing falſe facts invented to gratify the vanity of private families. From which it would ſeem that he conſiders the *Family-memorials* as conſiſting *wholly* of *Funeral-orations*. Yet, as he ranges cer-
p. 105. 100. tain *records of the Cenſors*, (called by *Dionyſius* τιμητικὰ ὑπομνήματα) among the *Family-memorials*, and is inclined to think that the *linen books* ought to be placed there too, he manifeſtly admits, that *funeral-orations* were not the *whole* of the *Family-memorials*.

NOW if the practice of writing *Family-memorials* began early, and theſe pieces were preſerved, and tranſmitted from generation to generation, they muſt have been of excellent uſe to the firſt *Roman* hiſtorians: For how much ſoever thoſe pieces might abound in panegyrical exaggeration, and falſe colourings, they would furniſh good evidence of the truth of thoſe *facts*, in which they agreed, and with which the ſeveral writers of thoſe pieces were contemporary.

But as it does not appear, at what time the cuſtom of writing *Family-memorials began*, I ſhall here leave this matter, and conſider what is ſaid of *Funeral-orations*.

DIONYSIUS, ſpeaking of the *Funeral-oration* which *Poplicola* pronounced on his deceaſed collegue *Brutus*, tells us, it is uncertain whether *Poplicola* introduced this cuſtom among the *Romans*, or found it already eſtabliſhed by the kings. Be that as it will, there is no doubt of it's being the conſtant practice from the beginning of the Republic, to honour the memory of great men by *Funeral-panegyrics*. And, as theſe were premeditated ſpeeches, and as the glory of the orator was no leſs concerned in the compoſition, than the glory of the deceaſed, it is highly reaſonable to believe that the orator wrote down what he purpoſed to ſay, and by reviſing and correcting his ſpeech, put it into the beſt form he could, before he delivered it. I ſay it is natural to ſuppoſe, that this method was for the moſt part, if not univerſally, obſerved by the ſpeakers of *Funeral-orations*. Nor can any thing be more probable, than that the families, concerned in theſe orations, would be very deſirous to preſerve them.

And indeed there ſeems to be ſufficient ground to conjecture, that from theſe Funeral Orations were taken, into the Hiſtory of the earlieſt times of the Republic, many particulars, not to be learnt from Tradition, or the High Prieſts Annals, or any other public Memorials. But then,

for an authentic account of what paſſed among the *Romans*, I would aſk, What better materials could an Hiſtorian have to work upon, than a ſeries of ſuch Orations? For though in a Funeral Panegyric, the Orator may well enough be ſuppoſed to overrate the private virtues of the deceaſed, diſguiſe or refine the motives of his actions, aſcribe to his remote anceſtors exploits which they had not performed, nay give him noble anceſtors from whom he was not really deſcended; yet, as to the high offices which the perſon himſelf had filled, and the public acts he had done in thoſe offices, whether civil or military, we can hardly imagine the Orator would attempt to impoſe upon an audience, who, having been eye-witneſſes of the truth, were not capable of being deceived: For the ſphere of action, in which the *Romans* moved during more than 200 years after the erection of the Commonwealth, was ſo very narrow, that nothing conſiderable, of a public concern, could paſs either in peace or in war, but what muſt be known to almoſt every individual of the State. The *Roman* citizens were all ſoldiers, all went to the war in their turns, and they could not, therefore, be impoſed upon with regard to the ſucceſs of the enterprizes formed by their Generals: And the ſame ſoldier-citizens were parties in all the civil commotions and ſtruggles, and had a ſhare in eſtabliſhing thoſe uſeful laws and regulations, which their magiſtrates had the merit of contriving and propoſing. So that a ſeries of *Funeral Orations* on the great men of *Rome* would contain moſt authentic Memorials of all the principal tranſactions and events both at home and abroad. It was the buſineſs of the Hiſtorian, who employed theſe materials for his work, to ſeparate the *ſolid* from the *light* and *unſure*; and certainly no taſk could be more eaſy.

It does not ſeem probable, that, during the *Regal State*, Funeral Panegyrics were in uſe, unleſs we may ſuppoſe that this honour was done to the Kings upon their demiſe, who, while *Rome* was governed by Kings, had the glory of all victories in war, and all prudent inſtitutions in peace. But certain it is, that the practice prevailed from the very commencement of the Republic. And though much the greater number of theſe Funeral Orations were unqueſtionably loſt, when *Fabius*, about 300 years after the expulſion of *Tarquin*, undertook a general Hiſtory of *Rome*, yet, that many of them were preſerved, and eſpecially of thoſe poſterior to the rebuilding of the City, there ſeems no reaſon to doubt. What could *Livy* mean by the *Privata Monumenta*, of which, he ſays, the greater part was deſtroyed by the *Gauls*, but theſe Funeral Orations and other Family Memorials? For he ſpeaks of them as Pieces that would have been uſeful towards a general and clear Hiſtory of thoſe times. And indeed we cannot imagine, that private families, in the earlieſt times of the Republic, were chargeable with that vanity, which [a] *Cicero* and *Livy* complain

[a] Nec verò habeo quemquam antiquiorem [Catone Cenſore] cujus quidem ſcripta proferenda putem, niſi quem Appii Cæci Oratio hæc ipſa de Pyrrho, et nonnullæ *Mortuorum Laudationes* fortè delectant: et Hercules, hæ quidem extant. Ipſæ enim familiæ ſua quaſi ornamenta, et monumenta ſervabant, & ad uſum, ſiquis ejuſdem generis occidiſſet,

complain of, as the ſource of many inventions in Funeral Panegyrics of the later ages. Till ſome families could with *Truth* boaſt of their antiquity, and the long glories of a line of anceſtors from whom they were deſcended, there was no temptation, no opportunity for vain men *falſely* to claim that kind of nobility, and invent pedigrees to do themſelves honour. And ſhould we ſuppoſe, that at the renovation of the State, upon the departure of the *Gauls*, (*i. e.* about 119 years after the birth of the Commonwealth) the loſs of many monuments public and private, might give both temptation and opportunity for fiction in ſome degree, yet this could reach to nothing very conſiderable; and it is hardly credible that the Orator at a Funeral would, to raiſe the glory of the deceaſed and his family, hazard invented facts, which derogated from the glory of other families, and could be contradicted by the memory of perſons living. And when in later times (the brevity and imperfection of the Pontifical Annals and the other public monuments, and the loſs of many private ones, through the extinction or decay of families, giving large ſcope to inventive vanity) Conſulſhips and Triumphs were falſely aſcribed, in Funeral Orations, to the remote anceſtors of thoſe whoſe obſequies were then ſolemnized; ſtill the accounts, given in thoſe Orations, of what they themſelves had performed in the high offices they had filled, would be materials which an Hiſtorian might confidently and ſafely employ.

Livy's complaint ſufficiently proves, that he thought the firſt Hiſtorians had made uſe of Funeral Orations in compiling their Hiſtories, and that ſome of thoſe writers had very injudiciouſly adopted what they found delivered in ſuch Orations, concerning the remote anceſtors of the perſons, in whoſe honour they were ſpoken. But neither he nor Cicero charges thoſe Orations, with containing falſe accounts of facts contemporary with the Orators, nor do they ſpeak of thoſe pieces as *forgeries*. I am not aware of any the leaſt ground M. de *B.* has for thinking, that the Funeral Orations of which *Livy* and *Cicero* complain, were *pieces ſuppoſées que des fauſſaires avoient forgées*.

It is in writing of the year 432 of the City (*i. e.* the 188th of the Republic) that *Livy* is at a loſs to know, whether the Dictator *Cornelius*, or the Conſuls of the year conducted the war againſt the *Samnites* and had a Triumph for the ſucceſs. The Authors, he conſulted, differed on this point, all agreeing however in Cornelius being then Dictator: they had therefore ſome unqueſtionable authority for this particular. Their differences, in relation to the perſons who obtained the Victory and Triumph, he imputes to the differing accounts in Funeral Orations and In-

occidiſſet, et ad memoriam laudum domeſticarum, et ad illuſtrandam nobilitatem ſuam. Quamquam his laudationibus Hiſtoria rerum noſtrarum eſt facta mendoſior. Multa enim ſcripta ſunt in eis, quæ facta non ſunt, falſi triumphi, plures Conſulatus, genera etiam falſa, et ad Plebem Tranſitiones, cùm homines humiliores in alienum ejuſdem nominis infunderentur genus: ut ſi ego me à M. Tullio eſſe dicerem, qui patricius cum Servio Sulpicio Conſule, anno decimo poſt Reges exactos fuit. Cic. in Brut. c. 16.

ſcriptions

ſcriptions on Images, made long after the time, and by which he ſuppoſes the diſagreeing Hiſtorians to have been reſpectively guided. "It is "my opinion, ſays he, that the truth of hiſtory has been corrupted by "Funeral Orations, and lying Inſcriptions on Images, each family, by "plauſible fictions, aſſuming to itſelf the honour of great exploits. Hence, "(that is, from this arrogant vanity) it has doubtleſs happened, that the "actions of particular men are confounded (thoſe of one man aſcribed "to another) and the *Public monuments* are likewiſe in confuſion (diſ-"agree, contradict one another.) Nor is there any contemporary writer "(contemporary with the Dictator and Conſuls of the year 432) *extant*, "by whoſe authority the truth of the matter in queſtion can be ſufficient-"ly aſcertained."

What *Livy* means by *Public Monuments* in this place, I will not pretend to ſay; probably they were the Inſcriptions on Statues, *erected in the later times*, in temples and other public places, which Inſcriptions, contradicting one another, had occaſioned a diſagreement among the Hiſtorians, who employed them in their own compoſitions. That he does not ſpeak of the *High Prieſts Annals*, as confounded or made inconſiſtent, is evident from Cicero's account of thoſe Pieces. The High Prieſt's buſineſs was not to record the tranſactions that paſſed two or three hundred years before, but the tranſactions of the preſent, or immediately preceding year. No Funeral Orations nor Inſcriptions on Images, made in after times, could confound thoſe Annals. Contradict them they might, but not make them inconſiſtent with themſelves.

The ſame may be ſaid of any other monuments, contemporary with the facts recorded in them; no poſterior Orations nor Inſcriptions could throw them into confuſion.

It muſt indeed be admitted, upon the Credit of [a] *Livy*'s words, that, in his time, no authentic record of any ſort, contemporary with the Magiſtrates he is writing of, was extant, *by which the particular point in queſtion could be cleared up:* For otherwiſe the differences among the prior Hiſtorians would not have perplexed him. But he does not ſay, that *Rome* had no writers ſo early as the year 432, or that no writing of ſo early date was extant in his time. His words rather import the contrary, That there were Writers in thoſe days, and that ſome of their writings were extant, but none whereby the matter in doubt could with ſufficient certainty be determined. Nec quiſquam æqualis temporibus illis ſcriptor EXSTAT, quo *ſatis certo auctore* ſtetur.

DEMONSTRATION, or ſatisfactory proof is not aimed at, by any thing, or by all that is ſaid above, in favour of the Roman Hiſtory of the five firſt centuries; but only probability. The ſum is this. It ſeems from many paſſages in *Cicero*, *Livy* and other antient writers, that the firſt

[a] Vitiatam memoriam funebribus laudibus reor, falſiſque imaginum titulis, dum familia ad ſe quæque famam rerum geſtarum, honorumque fallente mendacio trahunt. Inde certè et ſingulorum geſta, et publica monimenta rerum confuſa. Nec quiſquam æqualis temporibus illis ſcriptor exſtat, quo ſatis certo auctore ſtetur. Lib. 8. c. 40.

Roman

Roman Hiſtorians had a great variety of antient and genuine pieces for the foundation of their Hiſtories; *The High Prieſts Annals*; *The Acts of the Senate, and of the Comitia*; *Records of the ſucceſſion of the Magiſtrates*; *The Cenſors Books*; *Treaties of Peace and Alliance*; *Family Memorials and Funeral Orations.*

Of no one ſort of theſe pieces was there an uninterrupted ſeries, but only parts and fragments. The whole ſtock of materials was inſufficient for a continued thread of Hiſtory; and accordingly, the Hiſtory is broken and imperfect; there are many chaſms in it; ſome things are delivered as uncertain, ſome as fabulous; and many things in it are fabulous or uncertain, which are not delivered as ſuch. *Fabius Pictor* and his neareſt followers adopted traditional ſtories which pleaſed the national vanity, and of which thoſe Hiſtorians had no deſire to deſtroy the belief, even when they could have done it by the means of authentic Monuments; and in many inſtances they were deſtitute of thoſe means. The *Circumſtantial* Accounts of the exploits of particular men, I conjecture to have been taken from Family Memorials and Funeral Orations; becauſe I cannot conceive from what other ſource the Hiſtorians could have them. For *the Great Annals*, according to the deſcription of them by *Cicero*, muſt have been too brief, to deſcend often to *Circumſtances* of Actions; and *Tradition* (as M. de *Pouilly* obſerves) never informs us of Circumſtances any more than of dates. When fiction or uncertainty is apparent in the accounts given us of the heroic deeds of this or that great man, I apprehend, that thoſe accounts were taken from Family Memorials and Funeral Orations, of *low date*, when, the power of the *Romans* growing conſiderable, and their vanity keeping pace with it, Genealogies became a matter of great moment to private Families.

But as to the moſt memorable of the *National Affairs*, the civil conteſts and the important changes produced by thoſe conteſts in the conſtitution of the government, the foreign wars in which the *Romans* engaged, and the final ſucceſs of their ſtruggles with each of the neighbouring ſtates, the truth of theſe events might be aſſured by Tradition alone; and the very dates of moſt of them would be aſcertained by the Laws and the Treaties, that were carefully preſerved; the laws conſequent to the commotions and the treaties conſequent to the wars. And we may well preſume that the memory of much more than theſe principal events was tranſmitted by the High Prieſts Annals and the other public Monuments, contemporary with the facts they recorded. Family Memorials and Funeral Orations, compoſed in the earlieſt times of the Republic, would be excellent materials for an Hiſtorian; and even thoſe of later date, where truth was mingled with fiction, would be good authority with regard not only to contemporary facts, but to facts much earlier than thoſe Pieces, if many of thoſe Pieces agreed in the ſame accounts.

M. de *B.* begins the ſecond part of his Diſſertation with theſe words. "I have given the reaſons which make me call in queſtion the Hiſtory "of the firſt five centuries of *Rome*. They are founded on the want "of

" of contemporary Monuments and Hiſtorians. So that the firſt Hiſto-
" rians which *Rome* produced, could have nothing whereon to ground
" their relations but *Tradition*, which is apt to corrupt very much the
" truth of facts. [a]"

Now, granting that *the very ſhort account* of the 244 years of the Kings, contained in *Livy*'s *firſt Book*, was *chiefly* taken from *Tradition*, yet ſurely it is quite incredible, that ſuch a variety of matter, ſo many particulars (with that degree of order which they have) as fill the *nine* preſerved Books of *Livy* that follow the *firſt*, and filled *ſeven* [b] Books more that are loſt, could all be collected from Tradition *alone*. Tradition is not ſo copious and methodical. The earlier Hiſtorians, therefore, from whom *Livy* drew the matter of his Hiſtory of *Rome*, from the Expulſion of *Tarquin* to the end of the 5th Century, muſt have had written Records and Memorials of ſome ſort to work upon; and from theſe they muſt have taken *the greater part* of what they related; unleſs we will ſuppoſe that their Hiſtories were romances of their own invention, which is not very probable; there being no indication whatſoever of thoſe writers being great wits. It is probable, that, after *Fabius Pictor* and ſome others had compoſed General Hiſtories of their Country, moſt of the private Memorials, which had ſerved them, in many particulars, for guides and vouchers, were neglected and loſt; as was the fate of *Fabius*, and all the Hiſtorians prior to *Livy*, after he had publiſhed a better written and more entertaining Hiſtory, comprehending the ſubſtance of all that they had collected.

M. de *B.*, in the ſecond part of his Diſſertation, produces from the *Roman* ſtory, ſeveral facts, which he calls *Principal Events*, and which, from the diſagreement among the Antients, in their accounts of them, he conſiders as wholly uncertain; and from the uncertainty of theſe *Principal Events* he infers the uncertainty of all the reſt. I ſhall not enter into a particular conſideration of the facts referred to; Becauſe, firſt of all, ſome of them are ſpoken of by the Antients as uncertain; and nobody pretends to certainty where they diſclaim it. In the next place, becauſe I conceive that very few of the facts mentioned have a title to be called *Principal Events*; and laſtly becauſe, if diſagreement in ſome things, among Hiſtorians who write of the ſame People and times, be a ſufficient ground for refuſing credit to every thing they relate, there is no Hiſtory which may not with good reaſon be utterly rejected; and I am not concerned in the defence of Hiſtory in general.

But, in the firſt part of the Diſſertation, there is one particular, which being ſtrenuouſly inſiſted upon by the ingenious author, and ſeeming very much to his purpoſe of diſcrediting the accounts, given us by *Livy*

[a] J'ai rapporté les raiſons qui me font revoquer en doute l'Hiſtoire des cinq premiers Siecles de Rome. Elles ſont fondées ſur la diſette de Monumens, et d'Hiſtoriens contemporains; de ſorte que les premiers Hiſtoriens ne purent fonder leurs relations, que ſur la Tradition, ſujette à alterer beaucoup la verité des faits. p. 205.

[b] *Livy*'s 17th Book ended with the year 495.

and *Dionyſius*, of the early times of the Republic, ought not to be paſſed over unconſidered: I mean THE TREATY which *Polybius* ſays, was concluded between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* in the *firſt year after the expulſion of* Tarquin; *Lucius Junius Brutus*, and *Marcus Horatius being Conſuls*. The Reader may find this *piece* in the 7th Chap. of B. 3. of this Hiſtory. If the treaty be genuine, and there be no miſtake in the *date* which *Polybius* aſſigns to it, it ſtands in oppoſition to many things related by the two other Hiſtorians.

Diſſert. p. 35. I. IT APPEARS by this treaty (ſays M. de *B.*) "That *Brutus* and *Horatius* were *collegues* in the conſulſhip; which, according to *Livy* and "*Dionyſius*, and all the *Roman Faſti*, they were not:" and he adds, "that every thing the hiſtorians tell us of the events of this year, being "partly founded on the names of the Conſuls, nothing of the whole is, "in his opinion, much worthy of credit." [a]

He obſerves, "that Mr. *Dodwell*, (de cyclis Rom. Diſſ. x. p. 104.) "and *Rycquius* (de capitol. Rom. c. 11.) chuſe rather to accuſe *Polybius* "of falſifying this treaty, than admit the uncertainty which it throws upon "antient hiſtory: and that *Perizonius* † has endeavoured to reconcile *Po-* † Diſſert. vii. N. 8. "*lybius* with the *Roman Faſti*, by conjecturing, That *Polybius* found only "the name of *Horatius* in the original of the treaty, and added, of his own "head, the name of *Brutus*, the better to denote the true date of this "piece; and, as the name of *Horatius* alone had been put on the "temple of the capitol, ſo that name alone had been put to this treaty. "This conjecture [ſays M. de *B.*] I would let paſs, if it removed "the other difficulties raiſed by the piece in queſtion, and reconciled it "with the accounts given by the other Hiſtorians: yet I think *Polybius* "*too well verſed* in the Roman Hiſtory, to have given *Horatius* a col-"legue, who never was his collegue; and too exact and ſcrupulous to "have added any thing of his own to an original piece."

THAT it is not probable, *Polybius* would *falſify a Treaty, add any thing of his own to an Original Piece*, I readily grant; and that *Perizonius*'s conjecture, if admitted, would leave the main difficulties in their full force. But I ſhould be curious to know, what *Roman Hiſtory* that was, which M. de *B.* ſuppoſes *Polybius ſo well verſed in*, and in which he ſuppoſes him to have found, that *Brutus* and *Horatius* were collegues in the conſulſhip. If, in the days of *Polybius*, there were *authentic annals* exiſting, which recorded the tranſactions of the earlieſt times of the Republic, M. de *B.*'s main poſition in his Diſſertation is overthrown. If he ſuppoſes that *Polybius*'s ſole authority for joining *Brutus* and *Horatius* in the conſulſhip (contrary to report of the older hiſtorians and annaliſts, whom *Livy* and *Dionyſius* are ſaid to have copied) was the piece in queſtion, I would aſk, how it appears that

[a] *Je crois qu'il faut avouer de bonne foi, que tout ce que les Hiſtoriens nous diſent des evenemens de cette année, etant en partie fondé ſur les noms de conſuls, eſt peu digne de creance.*

the names of *Brutus* and *Horatius* were *certainly* at the head or tail of that antient monument? It is plain they were not in the body of it. When *Livy* and *Dionyſius* contradict *Polybius* upon any particular hiſtorical fact, I believe there are very few readers who will not be inclined to ſide with the laſt, provided there be no reaſon not to do ſo, but barely his being contradicted upon *that fact*, by thoſe two hiſtorians. But this is not the preſent caſe. The fact reported by *him* is highly improbable; and it is inconſiſtent with a ſeries of not improbable facts, reported by *them*; facts, in regard to which we cannot conceive any temptation they had to *invent*, *conceal*, or *diſguiſe*: and, in what *Polybius* himſelf ſays, there ſeems to be good ground for ſuſpecting that he was deceived in relation to the piece in queſtion. He introduces his tranſlation of it with theſe words: "The firſt treaty between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* was made in the conſulſhip of *Lucius Junius Brutus*, and *Marcus Horatius* the firſt Conſuls after the *Regifuge*, *by whom alſo was conſecrated the temple of* Jupiter Capitolinus, 28 years before the paſſing of *Xerxes* into *Greece*. Below, you will find the words of the treaty, *interpreted in the beſt manner I was able to do it*. For *the antient* Latin *is ſo different from that now in uſe, that the moſt ſkilful are frequently at a loſs, even after cloſe application, to explain it.*"—And (in c. 26.) after giving us two ſubſequent treaties, he ſays, "It is no wonder that *Philinus* knew nothing of theſe [all the 3] treaties, (though engraven on braſs, and preſerved in the temple of *Jupiter*, under the cuſtody of the *Ædiles*) for even in my time, the oldeſt men, both *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, thoſe who were thought the beſt acquainted with public affairs, were ignorant of theſe treaties." L. 3. c. 22.

NOW, granting that ſome Conſuls names were *really* found at the beginning or end of the old record in queſtion, yet no body will ſuppoſe, that the Conſuls were *there deſcribed* in the manner *Polybius* deſcribes them. The *deſcription* is all his own. And (by the way) when he ſays, that the temple of *Jupiter Capitolinus* was conſecrated by *Brutus* and *Horatius*; Who can prefer his authority, *in this particular*, to that of *Livy*, or of the moſt antient Latin hiſtorians whom doubtleſs *Livy* followed herein; and to the very inſcription itſelf on the temple, where *Horatius* was named as the only conſecrator? What motive can we imagine the Roman Hiſtorians to have had for denying *Brutus* a ſhare in that honour, if he had any title to it? Beſides, it ſeems pretty evident from many paſſages in *Livy*, that it was not the cuſtom, in the dedication of any temple, for more than one perſon to perform that ceremony. L. 2. c. 8. L. 4. c. 29. L. 9. c. 46.

FURTHER; not only the *deſcription* of the Conſuls, but their very NAMES, *as* Polybius *gives them*, cannot well be ſuppoſed to have been annexed to this record, *Lucius Junius* with his ſurname *Brutus*, and *Marcus Horatius* without his ſurname *Pulvillus*. If the names were *entire* and *legible*, we muſt believe that the hiſtorian has either omitted or added ſomething. And ſuppoſing, that to this record were found both *entire* and *legible*, the names of ſome Conſuls; yet why is it ſo difficult to believe, that *Polybius* may have been deceived, concerning thoſe names, by the perſons to

whom he applied himſelf, for aſſiſtance in his attempt to explain a record in old Latin? For it is not to be ſuppoſed that he, a ſtranger, would undertake without aſſiſtance to tranſlate a piece ſo difficult to be tranſlated, even by the moſt ſkilful of the natives. He may have given us a falſe account of the date of this treaty without being guilty of forgery.

AND why may we not ſuppoſe, that time had effaced ſome parts of the Conſuls names, and that the defects were ſupply'd by conjecture? The Roman vanity might have a ſhare too in the conjecture; it might prompt the aſſiſtants of our hiſtorian to fill up [a] the chaſms in ſuch a manner as to form an evidence, that the Roman ſtate was conſiderable enough, in the firſt year of the Republic, to have a treaty with the *Carthaginians*.

BUT perhaps there is ſome reaſon to doubt, whether any date, or Conſuls names were *really* found at the beginning or end of this old record. For it is remarkable, that *Polybius*, who gives us, at large, two ſubſequent treaties engraven, like the firſt, on braſs, and kept with it under the cuſtody of the *Ædiles*, neither mentions *the names of the Conſuls* under whoſe adminiſtration they were made, nor aſſigns any *certain date* to either of them. Of the *former* of the two he ſays only, that it was made *after the firſt*; and of the *latter* he ſays only, that it was made *about the time of* Pyrrhus's *coming into* Italy: and for *this* it does not appear, that he had any voucher, but the matter of the treaty itſelf, where *Pyrrhus* is mentioned. If he had found dates and conſuls names to theſe brazen records, it is wonderful that ſo exact an hiſtorian ſhould omit them; and eſpecially when he is employing theſe records as evidence againſt *Philinus*'s accounts, and the evidence has no real weight for want of thoſe dates. Seeing then there is ſo much reaſon to believe that the records of the two later treaties wanted dates, we may well ſuſpect that the oldeſt had the like defect; and that the date given to it was by meer conjecture.

Diſſert. p. 37. II. M. DE *B.*'s ſecond diſcovery, in this important piece of antiquity, is, "That ſo early as the firſt year of the Republic, the *Romans* practiſ-
"ed navigation and *pyracy*; of which things (he adds) there is little ſaid
"in their hiſtory, which repreſents their *marine*, till the firſt Punic war,
"as conſiſting only of ſome merchant ſhips, and as not brought to any
L. 1. c. 20. "perfection but on occaſion of that war, *as* Polybius *himſelf remarks*."

I MUST here confeſs, that I cannot diſcern, in the treaty, one word importing, that the *Romans*, at the time of its being concluded, practiſed

[a] Suppoſe the treaty in queſtion to have been made ſo late as 304, the firſt year after the Decemvirate, when *Lucius Valerius Potitus* and *Marcus Horatius Barbatus* were Conſuls. The matter of the treaty will, in this caſe, ſuit better with the times, according to the accounts of them by *Livy* and *Dionyſius*. (For *Ardea* was then in alliance with *Rome*, and *Antium* was a *Roman* colony.) Imagine the names of the Conſuls to have been partly effaced, and that there remained of them, (ſuppoſing the cognomens to have been originally inſerted) only *Lucius —ius —tus, Marcus Horatius*. Who will not ſee, that the Roman vanity of thoſe, whom *Polybius* employed for his decypherers, might tempt them to ſupply the chaſms with *Jun— Bru—?* But I am inclined to think that the piece in queſtion was of much later date than the year 304.

pyracy,

pyracy, or had any *ships of war*. Perhaps M. de *B.* collects this *pyracy* from *Polybius*'s *comment* on the treaty, who says, "That the *Carthaginians* would not suffer the *Romans* to sail to the south of the Fair Promontory with *long ships*, μακραῖς ναυσὶ;" which are commonly understood to be *ships of war*. But his comment here does not well accord with what *he himself asserts*, when he writes of the *first Punic war*: For he there tells us, "That the *Romans*, to that time, had never thought of the "sea——and were so far from having *deck'd* ships, that they had not so "much as *one long ship*, or even a *Lembus*." In this particular the historian is undoubtedly mistaken; and I mention it, not only to shew its repugnance to his comment on the treaty in question, but to shew likewise that *Polybius* is not always to be followed with a blind deference; and that we ought, in reading him, to observe the rule which he recommends to those who read the historian *Fabius*, "not to regard so much the great name "of the person who writes, as the matter he delivers," and to consider whether this be probable, have the appearance of truth, and be consistent with what is unquestionably true [a].

L. 1. c. 20.

L. 3. c.

But further, this treaty, according to M. de *B.*, informs us,

[a] *Polybius* (L. 3. c. 26.) quarrels with *Philinus*, not for being ignorant of the three treaties before mentioned, as he supposes he was, but for asserting things contrary to the tenor of them. Now it does not appear, from any proof *Polybius* gives, either that *Philinus* was ignorant of these treaties, or that he asserted any thing contrary to them. *Philinus* affirmed (in speaking of the grounds of the first Punic war) that in some treaty between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, it had been covenanted, that the former should not invade any part of *Sicily*, nor the latter any part of *Italy*. But this assertion does not contradict what is contained in the other treaties. To shew a contradiction *Polybius* should have given us the dates of all the three treaties he has mentioned, and likewise the date, which *Philinus* assigned to the treaty mentioned by him; and this *Polybius* has not done. The treaty, to which *Philinus* refer'd, might have been made after the time of *Pyrrhus*'s coming into *Italy*: And *Philinus* might know there was such a treaty, though *Polybius* could find no record of it; which is the second bad reason he gives for denying the fact. What *Philinus* reported is so far from being manifestly false, that it is highly probable. For if the *Romans* before they had subdued *all Latium*, or had even alliances with *all* the *Latine* states, thought it necessary to bind the *Carthaginians* by treaty not to attempt conquests in any part of *Latium*, it was natural, that when they came to have the same sort of interest in protecting *all Italy* from the *Carthaginians*, which they had before in protecting *Latium* only, they should exclude the *Carthaginians* from every part of *Italy*; and doubtless in that case the *Carthaginians* would exclude the *Romans* for the like reasons, from every part of *Sicily*.

[*N. B.* In p. 18. of the second Volume of this History, where the question, *Whether the first war, undertaken by the Romans against the Carthaginians was justifiable*, is discussed, the reasoning is partly founded on the supposition, that the report of *Polybius* is true; and that no treaty had been concluded between the two states, whereby the *Romans* were barred from meddling in the affairs of *Sicily*]

It is sometimes urged against the authority of *Livy* and *Dionysius*, with regard to certain important facts related by them, that *Polybius* is silent concerning those facts, tho' he write of the same times and on the same subject which they treat. But I shall here observe, once for all, That this his silence will never *alone* be a sufficient reason for rejecting the accounts of the other historians. For *Polybius*, though he speaks three times of the taking of *Rome* by the *Gauls*, does not once mention their *burning* it; and yet this is an important fact, of which I believe no body questions the truth.

Differt. p. 37.

III. That ſo early as the firſt year of the Republic, "The *Romans* were "*maſters* of all the ſea-coaſt as far as to *Tarracina*, and even of the cities of "*Antium* and *Ardea*; a point wherein it manifeſtly ſtands in oppoſition to "*Livy* * and *Dionyſius* †. For theſe authors tell us, that *Antium* was the "capital of the *Volſci*, and that the *Romans* did not take it till 40 years af-"ter, in the conſulſhip of *T. Quinctius* and *Q. Servilius*. The city of *Ar-*"*dea* §, according to the ſame hiſtorians, was beſieged by *Tarquin* the "Proud at the time when the *Roman* people ſhook off the yoke of his do-"mination. The *Ardeates*, after that, having the ſame intereſts with the "*Romans*, made a fifteen years truce with them. After which time *Ardea* "continued in alliance with *Rome* to the year 310, when, on account of "ſome particular diſcontents, they confederated with the *Volſci*; but in "the following year the old alliance was renewed.

"This city therefore (adds M. de *B.*) was, according to thoſe hi-"ſtorians, *independent*, and *only in alliance* with the *Romans*; whereas *the* "*treaty*, given at large by *Polybius*, imports, that this city, and likewiſe "*Antium*, *Laurentum*, *Circeii*, *Terracina* were SUBJECT to them; and *ex-*"*preſly diſtinguiſhes theſe cities from the cities* IN ALLIANCE *with* Rome. "Hence it appears that the two hiſtorians give us a falſe notion of the "*Roman* ſtate in the beginning of the republic; for they repreſent its do-"mination as extending little further than the proper territory of *Rome*; "whereas by this treaty we ſee, that it extended over ſeveral cities, and "over all the ſea-coaſt as far as *Tarracina*."

* Lib. 2. *in fine.*

† Lib. ix. p. 615.

§ *D. Hal.* Lib. 4. p. 277. *Liv.* Lib. 1. c. 57.

Whenever this treaty was made (ſuppoſing it genuine) it is evident, that the main purpoſe of the *Romans* in it, was to exclude the *Carthaginians* from *all Latium*, not only thoſe parts of it that were ſubject to the *Romans*, or in alliance with them, but thoſe likewiſe with which they had neither of thoſe connexions. And it is not, I think, clear from the words of the treaty, that *all* the towns therein mentioned were *in abſolute ſubjection* to the *Romans*. It ſpeaks to this effect, "[a] Let the *Carthaginians* do no hurt to the "*Ardeates*, *Antiates*, *Laurentini*, *Circeënſes*, *Tarracinenſes*, or any other "of the *Latines*, if they be ὑπηκοοὶ, nay if any of them be not ὑπηκοοὶ, "let not the *Carthaginians* meddle with their towns. If they take any "town of the *Latines* [whether they be ὑπηκοοὶ or not ὑπηκοοὶ] let them "reſtore it unhurt to the *Romans*." Here is no diſtinction made of towns *ſubject* and towns *in alliance*, but of the *Latines* who were ὑπηκοοὶ, and the *Latines* who were *not* ὑπηκοοὶ. What the force of the word ὑπηκοοὶ is, does not fully appear; whether it mean *ſubject* in the ſtrict ſenſe, or only *dependent allies*. I ſay *dependent allies*; for theſe towns might be *in alliance* with the *Romans* and yet *not independent* on them; ſuch being the

[a] ΚΑΡΧΗΔΟΝΙΟΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΤΩΣΑΝ ΔΗΜΟΝ ΑΡΔΕΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙΑΤΩΝ, ΛΑΥΡΕΝΤΙΝΩΝ, ΚΙΡΚΑΙΑΤΩΝ, ΤΑΡΡΑΚΗΝΙΤΩΝ, ΜΗΔ' ΑΛΛΟΝ ΜΗΔΕΝΑ ΛΑΤΙΝΩΝ, ΟΣΟΙ ΑΝ ΥΠΗΚΟΟΙ. ΕΑΝ ΔΕ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΜΗ ΩΣΙΝ ΥΠΗΚΟΟΙ, ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΩΝ ΑΠΕΧΕΤΩΣΑΝ. ΑΝ ΔΕ ΛΑΒΩΣΙ, ΡΩΜΑΙΟΙΣ ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΤΩΣΑΝ ΑΚΕΡΑΙΩΝ. *Polyb. Lib.* 3. c. 22.

caſe

case of almost all the states of *Italy* at the commencement of the first Punic war. And what the true import was of the old obsolete Latin word, which *Polybius* has rendered ὑπήκοοι, who can tell? One would suspect that neither *Polybius* nor his assistants did very well understand the piece they undertook to explain. For it is a very strange covenant, *That in case the* Carthaginians *seized any town of the* Latines, not subject *to the* Romans, *they should restore it to the* Romans.

Further; If this Brazen Monument had, for its date, the names of *Brutus* and *Horatius* (Consuls in the first year of the Republic) and if the words of the treaty import, that the *Ardeates* were SUBJECT to *Rome*, and *distinguish* them from ALLIES, it is contradicted by an *Original Authentic Record*, which *Livy* mentions of a *Treaty of Alliance and Friendship*, made with the *Ardeates* in the Consulships of *L. Sempronius Atratinus*, and *L. Papirius Mugilanus* (year of *Rome* 309 or 311:) which treaty was a *Renewal of an Alliance* that had long subsisted between the two States [a]. Lib. 4. c. 7.

Again; it is hardly to be imagined that the *Romans* had *subdued* the maritime towns of old *Latium*, as far as to *Tarracina*, in the remotest extremity of it, without having reduced the intermediate inland towns, and in short, the whole or almost the whole country: Yet this *subjection* of the *Latine* Nation to *Rome* in the first year of the Republic, is incompatible with an Original Brazen Monument existing in *Livy*'s time, and recording the *Treaty of Alliance* made with the *Latines* in the second Consulship of *Cassius*, (year of *R.* 260, or 261.) L. 2. c. 33.

And, as to *Antium*, the Capital of the *Volsci*, though *Livy* reports, that it was taken (in 284) forty years after the commencement of the Republic, yet, by the sequel [b] of his story, it would seem, that the *Antiates* L. 2. c. 65.

[a] The *Ardeates*, on occasion of a dispute between them and their neighbours the *Aricini*, about a tract of land, were insulted by a decree of the *Roman* people, to whom the cause had been referred; who, instead of adjudging the land to either of the claimants, took it to themselves. Hereupon the *Ardeates* broke alliance with the *Romans*, and soon after, by Ambassadors, complained at *Rome* of the injury which had been done them; but complained in such terms, as shewed, they were willing to renew alliance and friendship with the *Roman* state, provided restitution were made of the land in question. The Senate gave them a soft answer; and the next year the alliance was renewed by treaty; the record of which treaty *Licinius Macer* had read. T. Quinctius Barbatus interrex consules creat, L. Papirium Mugilanum, L. Sempronium Atratinum. His consulibus cum Ardeatibus fœdus renovatum est. *Idque Monumenti est*, Consules eos illo anno fuisse qui neque in *Annalibus Priscis*, neque in *Libris Magistratuum* inveniuntur, Credo, quod Tribuni Militum initio anni fuerunt, eo perinde ac si totum annum in imperio fuerint, suffectis his Consulibus, prætermissa nomina Consulum horum. Licinius Macer auctor est, et in FOEDERE ARDEATINO et in *Linteis Libris* ad Monetæ inventa.

[b] The *Latine* Historian relates, that when after the taking of *Antium* in 285. by *T. Quinctius*, the Senate had decreed to place a Colony there, the persons appointed to settle the Colony could prevail with but few of the *Roman* Citizens to go thither, so that they were forced to admit of *Volsci* to compleat the necessary number; and he further tells us, that a multitude of the old inhabitants returning soon after to the City, these alienated the minds of the Colony from the *Romans*, and its fidelity could no longer be depended upon. *Livy* seems not to have known the exact time, when the *Antiates* shook off all dependance upon the Re- L. 3. c. 1. c. 4. c. 23.

tiates were not really ſubdued, not reduced to a ſtate of abſolute ſubjection till the year 415, when the *Latines* alſo, or at leaſt the much greater part of them, were brought into the like ſubjection. And even then *Antium* was made a *Roman* Colony into which the Natives were admitted.

Liv. L. 8. c. 13, 14.

IT would ſeem therefore, that the treaty, given by *Polybius*, as made with *Carthage* in 244, was not made till after the year 415, the matter of it perfectly agreeing with the ſtate of things after this year, and not before it.

Livy ſpeaks of a * treaty of alliance and friendſhip with the *Carthaginians* in the Conſulſhip of *Valerius Corvus*, and *Popilius Lænas*, year of *Rome* (according to the *Faſt. Cap.*) 405; and his words ſeem to import that this was the *firſt* treaty concluded between the two Republics. Cum Carthaginienſibus Legatis Romæ fœdus *ictum*, quum amicitiam ac ſocietatem petentes veniſſent. Liv. L. 7. c. 27. He ſpeaks of no other till he comes to the year 447, when he ſays a *Third* Treaty was made with *Carthage*; Cum Carthaginienſibus eodem anno fœdus *Tertio renovatum*. L. 9 c. 43. So that it would ſeem from hence, and from the matter of that treaty, which *Polybius* calls the *firſt*, that it was really the *ſecond*, and made between the years 405 and 447, and after the reduction of *Latium* in 415. According to the Epitome of *Livy*, the treaty concluded in the time of *Pyrrhus*, * which is *Polybius*'s *third* treaty, was the *fourth* treaty made with the *Carthaginians*. Iterum adverſus Pyrrhum dubio eventu pugnatum eſt. Cum Carthaginienſibus *quarto* fœdus *renovatum eſt*.

* Oroſ. L. 3. c. 7. calls this treaty, *Primum* illud ictum cum *Carth.* Fœdus.

L. 9 c. 43.

* Y. of R. 475.

Epit. L. 13.

GRANTING then, that, by the words of this old brazen record, the towns, there mentioned, were abſolutely SUBJECT to the *Romans*; what is the concluſion we ſhould naturally draw from it? Not that *Livy* and *Dionyſius* have given us a falſe account of the Roman ſtate in the firſt year of the Republic, but that the PIECE in queſtion was not genuine, or *that the names of* Brutus *and* Horatius *were not annexed to it*. For,

What could tempt *Livy*, a *Roman*, or *Dionyſius*, an extravagant flatterer of the *Romans*, *wilfully* to diſguiſe the extent of the *Roman* domination at the commencement of the Republic? I ſay *wilfulſu'ly to diſguiſe:* For is it poſſible to believe that either the *Romans* or the *Latines* were ignorant of the time when the latter became *Subjects* of the former? And M. de *B.*

Republic; But he repreſents them in the year 345 at the Head of a Confederacy againſt *Rome*. In 377, he makes them ſurrender their town and territory to the *Romans*. Nevertheleſs, in 407, we find them acting as an Independent people; they had rebuilt *Satricum*, and ſent a Colony thither: And they by deputies ſolicit the *Latines* to take arms againſt the *Romans*. And in 413 the *Antiates* make incurſions on the lands of *Oſtia*, *Ardea* and *Solonium*; and the *Romans* gain no honour in the war againſt them. But in 415 they are totally ſubdued, together with the *Latines*, and a new Colony is ſent to *Antium*. The *Antiates* are allowed to enrol themſelves in the Colony; but they are forbid the ſea, and deprived of their *Long Ships*, ſome of which the *Romans* burn, carrying the *Beaks* of them to *Rome*, where the *Suggeſtum* or Pulpit, in the Forum, being adorned with them, acquires thence the name of *Roſtra*. With the reſt of the ſhips, the *Romans* augment their own navy.

L. 4. c. 56.

L. 6. c. 33.

L. 8. c. 12.

L. 8. c. 13, 14.

Suppoſing the *firſt* treaty with *Carthage* to have been made in 244, and the *third* in the time of *Pyrrhus*, there will have been, according to *Polybius*, 231 years between the *firſt* and the *third*.

ſeems not to have duly reflected, when he ſays [a], "It is ſufficiently ap-
"parent, that *Livy* and *Dionyſius* knew nothing of the treaty mentioned
"by *Polybius*." They could not but meet with this piece in *Polybius*'s work, which they appear to be very well acquainted with, and of which *Livy* makes great uſe in compiling his own. And is it not evident therefore, from their ſhewing no regard to what *Polybius* ſays of his old brazen monument, either that they looked upon it as not authentic, or knew that he had been deceived concerning the date of it? It is remarkable, that *Livy*, who informs us, that ſome authors differing from the reſt, make *Horatius* the *immediate ſucceſſor* of *Brutus*, has not thought it worth while to obſerve, that *Polybius* makes them *collegues* in the conſulſhip. L. 2. c. 8.

Add to this the great improbability, that, during the unſettled and precarious ſtate of things at *Rome*, in the firſt year after the expulſion of *Tarquin*, the *Carthaginians* ſhould enter into any treaty with the *Romans*; and the yet greater improbability, that they ſhould conclude a treaty with them in terms, which ſuppoſe them in a ſettled ſtate, and in a condition to maintain the ſtipulations therein expreſſed.

Perhaps we ſhould have found the matter cleared up, and *Polybius*'s miſtake animadverted upon by *Livy* or *Dionyſius*, if thoſe parts of their hiſtories, which treated of the firſt war with the *Carthaginians*, had been preſerved.

I SHALL cloſe theſe Obſervations with the words of M. de *Pouilly*, in the beginning of his *Nouveaux Eſſais de Critique ſur la fidelité de l'Hiſtoire.*

"It very ſeldom happens, that we avoid one faulty extreme without
"running into another, its contrary: This maxim, true in morality, is
"true in criticiſm. Are men afraid of giving credit to fables? They
"ſometimes refuſe it to the moſt certain facts; they look upon Hiſtory
"as a compound of Truths and Fictions, ſo intimately united, that it is
"impoſſible to ſeparate them.——Had the Hiſtorian no part in the tranſ-
"actions he relates? They ſuſpect him of being ill informed.——Had he a
"part in thoſe tranſactions? They accuſe him of prejudice and pre-
"poſſeſſion.——On the other hand there are thoſe, who, fearing leſt they
"ſhould happen to reject true Hiſtory, give credit to all the fables
"which have borrowed its Name——Let us avoid theſe oppoſite ex-
"travagances: Let us confeſs, that, in Hiſtory, *falſhood* is mingled with
"*truth*; but that there are marks by which they may be diſtinguiſhed.
"Love of the *Marvellous*, Intereſt, Vanity, Spirit of Party, are ſo many
"fountains ever open, from whence fiction ſpreads itſelf in ample waves
"over the Annals of all nations.—When we are reduced to ſeek the truth
"of a fact in Hiſtorians biaſſed by paſſions, if they are of different parties
"and intereſts, let us bring their narrations together; and from this
"collation, we ſhall ſtrike out the truth, if I may ſo ſpeak, in ſpite of
"them: I ſay farther, that thoſe who are of one and the ſame party,
"will commonly deſerve ſome credit in facts of ſuch public notoriety,
"that they durſt not diſguiſe them; or in which they were too little in-
"tereſted to have ſufficient temptation to undertake it."

[a] *Il paroit meme aſſez, qu'ils n'en ont eu avoit eu connoiſſance de cette piece*, &c. *S'il nulle connoiſſance*, Diſſert. p. 34. *Si Tite Live avoit conſulté ce monument*, &c. p. 39.

E R R A T A.

P. 20. *l.* 22.	*of the 2d column,*———	*r.* Triremis
34. *l.* 5.	*in the margin* ———	*r.* Val. Max. B. 6. c. 6.
91. *l. ult.*	*of the note* ———	*r.* Villia-Titia
99. *l.* 17.	*in the margin* Excl.——	*r.* Eclog.
l. 35.	Dozon	*r.* Doſon
117. *l. penult.*	*in the margin* ———	*r.* Polyb. B. 3. c. 16.
127. *l. penult.*	*of the 2d column* ———	*r.* ὑπιρβολας
134. *l.* 15.	mind	*r.* minds
	demand	*r.* demanded
144. *l.* 42.	*in the margin* ———	*r.* Polyb. B. 3. c. 79.
214. *l.* 23.	repreſents	*r.* repreſented
232. *l.* 2.	*of the 2d column* milia	*r.* millia
476. *l.* 4.	*of the 1ſt column* [Maſiniſſa]	*r.* [Maſiniſſæ]
543. *l. ult.*	ἀπύλοιτο	*r.* ἀπόλοιτο
544. *l.* 8.	*in the margin* Frontig.	*r.* Frontin.
548.	She loſt &c———	

N. B. This firſt paragraph of the 2d Column ſhould be marked with *inverted Commas*, as a part of the citation from M. *Rollin*.

555. *l.* 1.	in the margin	Y. of R. 621. Bef. J. C. 131. 320. Conſul-p.	*r.* Y. of R. 631. Bef. J. C. 121. 330. Conſul-p.

30 31 32 33 34

39 38 37

THE TYRRHENIAN SEA

Strongyle I.
Didyme I.
Hicesia I.
ISLES OF VULCAN OR OF LIPARI
Isle of Lipari Colony
Osteodes I.
Ericodes I.
Phenicodes I.
Vulcan I.
Cape Pelorum
ITALY
Agathyrsus
Myla
Tyndaris Colony
Scylla
Charybdis a Whirlpool
Hyrara
Panormus Colony
Solus
Cephaloedis
Alonica
Messana Colony
Rhegium Colony
ÆGADES ISLES
Hiera I.
Buccina
Mont Eryx
Drepanum
Thermæ
Himera
Himera Colony
Himera R.
Alæsa
Alæa
Tisia
PELORIAS
Ægusa I.
Segesta
Paropus
Mytistratus
Herbita
Egithallus
ELYMÆI
Cape Lilybæum
Lilybæum Colony
Entella
Inicum
Tauromenium Colony
Naxos
Capitium
Mount Ætna
Craſtus
Petrina
Ennaum
Selinuntus
Triocala
Petra
MORGETES
Galarina
Adrana
Inuesa
Catana Colony
THE SEA OF LIBYA OR OF AFRICA
Thermæ Colony
Casmicus
Halycus R.
Erbessa
Heraclea Colony
Enna
Asorus
Centuripa
Hubla
Morgantia or Morgantina
Omphace or Agrigentum
Callonia
Nonymna
LEONTINI
Leontini
THE IONIAN SEA
Himera R.
Menæ
Phintia
Gela
Eubea
Megara
Leon
Erbessa
Anapus R.
Syracuse Colony
The Island of Ortygia
HYPERIA
Acrilla
Acræ
Camarina
Netum
Motya
Elorum
Cape Pachynum

Island of Cosyra

A MAP OF ANCIENT SICILY, otherwise call'd SICANIA and TRINACRIA by Mons.r De Lisle, First Geographer to the King of France and Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences.

Scale
Roman Miles of 5000 Feet each
10 20 30 40 50
Greek Stadia 8 of which make one Mile
100 200 300 400

T. Clark sc.

THE

Roman Hiſtory.

FOURTH BOOK.

From the Beginning of the FIRST PUNIC WAR in the Year of *Rome* 489, to the End of the SECOND in 552.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the cloſe of the preceding volume of this Hiſtory, we left the *Romans* complete conquerors and quiet poſſeſſors of all *antient Italy*, that is, of all the country between the *Adriatic* and the *Mediterranean* from the remoteſt border of *Hetruria* to the *Ionian* ſea. The far greater part of this Dominion, though their ſtate [by the uſual reckonings] was now 488 years old, had been of late acquiſition: For whatever advantage they might have over their neighbours, in the admirable conſtruction of their [a] *legion*, the diſcipline of war, or any other reſpects, they could make but little progreſs in conqueſt, during the ſpace of above four centuries from the building of their city. *Rome* while under the government of Kings was in the weakneſs of infancy; and if, with *Florus*, we conſider her as advanced to ſprightly youth, (the ſecond ſtage of life,) when ſhe became a Republick, yet her natural ſtrength was impaired, and her growth long check'd, by the diſeaſe of civil diſcord, a miſchief wholly proceeding from the want of that *eſſential* of a free ſtate, a juſt equality among its members.

By the revolution which expelled *Tarquin* the Proud, the Commons of *Rome* were delivered from a Tyrant, but not from Tyranny. A ſhort ſuſpenſion there was indeed of the weight of oppreſſion: This was owing to

[a] *Vegetius* thinks that the form of the legion was not the product of meer human reaſon, but that the *Romans* were led to it by a kind of inſtinct from Heaven: *Non tantum humano conſilio, ſed etiam divinitatis inſtinctu, legiones a Romanis arbitror conſtitutas. De re milit.* l. 2. c. 21.

the honeſt zeal of that excellent Patriot, *Valerius Poplicola*, and to the temporiſing lenity and moderation of the Senate, while their fears of *Tarquin*'s return were alive and ſtrong. In ſo perilous a ſeaſon the indulgent Fa-

Livy, B. 2. ch. 9 thers had the goodneſs to decree, *That the poorer ſort, by only educating their children, paid ſufficient tribute to the State, and ought not to be loaded with any other tax.* But it was not long before the Plebeians felt themſelves in the chains of ſervitude; *Livy* makes the death of *Tarquin*, which happened in the fourteenth year after his baniſhment, to be the preciſe period when they began [b] to be oppreſſed by the Nobles. The Commons then became ſenſible, that, by dethroning their King, they had only caſt off the domination of one Tyrant to become ſlaves to many, an Aſſembly of Tyrants, whoſe yoke was no leſs heavy and in-

* Paſſed in the Y. of *R.* 244. ſupportable. The *Valerian* * law, to permit appeals from the ſentence of the Magiſtrates to *the People aſſembled*, was not ſufficient to protect the Plebeians from injuſtice and cruelty. They found it neceſſary to provide themſelves *living* Protectors againſt the Tyranny of the

Y. of *R.* 260. Great, and therefore extorted from the Senate a conſent to the eſtabliſhment of the *Tribunitian* Power. Another rampart againſt the overflowings of ambition they raiſed to themſelves by inſtituting the *Comitia*

Y. of *R.* 262. *Tributa*, and by the practice of bringing into judgment, before thoſe aſſemblies, the moſt exalted of the Nobles, upon accuſations of treaſon againſt

Y. of *R.* 302. the People. By the publication of the laws of the *Twelve Tables* ſome check was given to the abuſe of that prerogative, which the Patricians tenaciouſly kept, of being the ſole judges in civil cauſes: And we find, that on ſeveral other occaſions, the Commons, urged by oppreſſion to fury, exerted their natural ſtrength in ſuch a manner, as ſeemed to proclaim them the ſovereign maſters in *Rome*. But thoſe acts of power were only tranſient flaſhes, the lightnings of a civil tempeſt: and, notwithſtanding all the advances hitherto made towards liberty and equality, the Patricians were the permanent, eſtabliſhed Lords of the Commonwealth: all the great Offices, Civil, Military, and Sacerdotal, were confined to their body; the publick treaſure at their diſpoſal: They heaped up riches to themſelves; and, while the People, through extreme indigence, fell under a neceſſity of contracting debts to the Patrician uſurers, the laws gave the creditors power to be cruel to their inſolvent debtors:

See B. 3. ch. 4. §. 1. And the conſequence of all this was, that multitudes of the Plebeians, ſlaviſhly dependent by reaſon of their poverty, durſt not concur with the more free, in uſing even the undiſputed rights of the commons. Hence the few inſtances of Plebeians choſen to the *Military Tribuneſhip*, even after they were legally qualified for that ſtation.

[b] Inſignis hic annus eſt nuncio Tarquinii mortis.——Eo nuncio erecti patres, erecta plebes. Sed patribus nimis luxurioſa ea fuit lætitia: plebi, cui ad eam diem ſumma ope inſervitum erat, injuriæ à primoribus fieri cœpere. B. 2. ch. 21.

The

The Commonwealth of *Rome* was never truly a free ſtate, till after the publication of the *Licinian* Laws, thoſe laws which, *in their conſequences*, made Merit alone the ordinary ſcale whereby to aſcend to the higheſt offices, and which by admitting the Plebeians to a reaſonable ſhare of what was purchaſed with their blood, delivered them from that ſervile ſubjection to the wealthy nobles in which their indigence had ſo long detained them. Y. of *R.* 386.

From this period, the *Roman* people, when they made laws, or elected Magiſtrates for the execution of them, were, generally ſpeaking, free from all undue influence; not over-awed, as before, by the rich and the great, nor conſtrained by any force, but that of reaſon and natural juſtice, in the moſt abſolute ſubjection to which is the moſt perfect freedom. No citizen, who had ſhewed ſuperior talents and virtue, ſtood excluded, on account of the low degree of his birth, from the dignities of the ſtate: The emulation among the individuals was to ſurpaſs each other in *deſerving* honours.

Indeed the haughty Patricians, as, when vanquiſhed by the Plebeians, they had given ground with an angry reluctance, and retired fighting, ſo they afterwards, from time to time, ſhewed a ſtrong diſpoſition to renew the war, in order to regain their unrighteous ſovereignty: but their efforts were faint and ineffectual; and at length acquieſcing in what they could not undo, there enſued domeſtic peace and union, and an eſtabliſhed liberty.

Union at home gave new ſtrength to the ſtate; and liberty ſeems to have inſpired the people with a more elevated courage, a more unwearied fortitude, than they had hitherto ſhewn, in their wars abroad. By a ſeries of victories, they, in the ſpace of about 70 years (reckoning from the battle againſt the *Latines* in 413) enlarged their narrow dominion, of a few leagues about the city, to the utmoſt extent of *Italy*. And, though deſtitute of naval ſtrength and naval ſkill, their next enterprize, as we ſhall preſently find, will be againſt a rival republic, beyond the continent; a republic that with greater riches, and more ample territories than theirs, had poſſeſſion of the abſolute dominion of the ſea. The boldneſs of the undertaking, and the amazing conſtancy with which they ſupported it, in ſpite of the moſt terrible adverſities, are not to be parallel'd in the hiſtory of any other nation: But the *Roman* legions were, at this time, legions of free citizens, whoſe predominant paſſion was glory, and who placed the higheſt glory in facing every danger, and ſurmounting every difficulty, to preſerve their Liberty, and extend their Empire.

CHAP. I.

The occaſion and commencement of the firſt Punic *or* Carthaginian *war.*

THE prophetic * exclamation of King *Pyrrhus*, as he ſailed from *Sicily*, is now going to be accompliſhed, and that iſland to be the theatre of a bloody war between *Rome* and *Carthage*. The

* See B. 3. ch. 28. §. 3.

Epirot, when he beheld theſe powerful and ambitious Republicks making ſwift advances in conqueſt, and by every ſtep approaching nearer to each other, could have no difficulty to foreſee that they would ſoon become enemies; and, as he might with reaſon believe that the *Romans* would finiſh the reduction of *Italy*, before the *Carthaginians* could totally ſubdue *Sicily*, the conjecture was natural, that this country would be the ſeat of the war between them. He himſelf had gone thither, on the invitation of the people of *Syracuſe*, to guard them againſt the *Carthaginian* encroachments; and he was, doubtleſs, perſuaded, that, in a ſhort time, they would find themſelves under a neceſſity of ſuing to the *Romans* for the like ſuccour. The occaſion however of the firſt rupture, between *Rome* and *Carthage*, was not any diſtreſs of the *Syracuſians*; it was an event ſingular and unexpected; and as it has left ground for a diſpute, whether the *Firſt Punic* or *Carthaginian War* was juſtly undertaken by the *Romans*, it may be proper, for the reader's ſatisfaction, to ſtate the caſe as fully as poſſible; and, in order thereto, we muſt recall ſome paſſages of the former * part of this Hiſtory.

* See B. 3. ch. 26. §. 1. & ch. 29. §. 5.

A conſiderable body of ſoldiers, *Campanians* by birth, and called *Mamertines*, had been mercenaries to *Agathocles* King of *Syracuſe*; upon whoſe death, finding themſelves no longer welcome there, they marched away with all their effects to *Meſſina*. Admitted here, and kindly entertained as friends, they treacherouſly maſſacred one part of the citizens, expelled the reſt, and ſeized, for their own uſe, upon the lands, houſes, and even wives of thoſe unfortunate men.

Strab. l. 6. p. 268. Polyb. l. 1. c. 7. Diod. Sic. in Eclog. p. 866.

Some time after this, when *Pyrrhus* was juſt landed in *Italy*, the inhabitants of *Rhegium*, that their city might neither fall into the hands of the *Epirot*, nor become a prey to the *Carthaginians*, who were maſters of the ſea, and whoſe fleets appeared frequently off the coaſt, requeſted of the *Roman* Senate to furniſh them with a gariſon. A Legion of 4000 *Romans*, raiſed in *Campania*, was, under the command of *Decius Jubellius*, appointed to that ſervice. At firſt, they demeaned themſelves ſuitably to the intention of thoſe who employed them: but, at length tempted by the wealth of the place, emboldened by the example of the *Mamertines*, and ſtrengthned by their aid, they acted the ſame perfidious and cruel part towards the *Rhegians*, which the other had acted towards the people of *Meſſina*.

As theſe cities are parted only by that narrow ſea (now called the *Faro*) which ſeparates *Italy* from *Sicily*, it was eaſy for the two bands of robbers mutually to aſſiſt each other in the defence of their uſurpations; for which purpoſe they entered into a ſtrict confederacy.

The *Romans*, though they found their honour greatly ſtained by the outragious wickedneſs of the gariſon, with which they had furniſhed their good allies, were then too much engaged in affairs more urgent, to take immediate revenge on the offenders: Nor in truth did they turn their thoughts that way till four years after *Pyrrhus* had left *Italy*, and the old enemies of *Rome* were all ſubdued. Then they marched an army to *Rhegium*, and beſieged it; in which enterprize *Hiero* of *Syra-*

cuſe lent his aid. The traitors hopeleſs of pardon, defended themſelves with an obſtinate reſolution; yet the town was at length carried by aſſault: All thoſe who eſcaped the ſword of the aſſailants, being led in chains to *Rome*, were, by a decree of the ſenate, firſt beaten with rods, and then beheaded: And the *Rhegians* were reſtored to their former liberty and eſtates.

About ſix years after this execution of juſtice, the fame of which had ſounded honourably through all quarters of *Italy*, came meſſengers to *Rome* from the *Mamertines* in *Sicily*, imploring help againſt the *Syracuſians*, under whoſe power they were ready to fall, and who, they fear'd, would inflict on them the like puniſhment for the like crimes: A moſt impudent requeſt from the thieves of *Meſſina*, To aſk protection of the very judges who had condemned to death their fellow-thieves of *Rhegium!* Nevertheleſs, from a view of their preſent ſituation, we ſhall perhaps be induced to conclude, that the *Mamertines* took this ſtep in conſequence of ſober reflection, and were not without a reaſonable hope of aſſiſtance from *Rome*.

Theſe uſurpers of *Meſſina*, ſo long as they could get ſuccours from their friends at *Rhegium*, had not only lived fearleſs of any danger, but had often been aggreſſors on their neighbours the *Carthaginians* and *Syracuſians*, putting many towns and villages under contribution. The poſture of their affairs received a mighty change by the deſtruction of their *Italian* allies: Of whoſe wonted aid being deprived, they were overthrown in battle by the *Syracuſians* under the conduct of *Hiero*[d], Prætor of that ſtate, and their army almoſt totally cut off. Humbled and Polyb. l. 1. c. 8. and 9.

[d] *Hiero*, on his return to *Syracuſe*, was elected King. He was the ſon of *Hierocles*, and by him deſcended from *Gelo*, who had formerly reigned in *Syracuſe*; but his mother was a ſlave. He diſtinguiſhed himſelf early from thoſe of his own years by his expertneſs in military exerciſes, and his courage in battle. He gained the eſteem of *Pyrrhus*, and was honoured with ſeveral rewards from his hand. Extremely handſome, of great bodily ſtrength, ſmooth and engaging in his addreſs, equitable in buſineſs, and gentle in command, he ſeem'd to want nothing kingly but a kingdom. Pulchritudo ei corporis inſignis, vires quoque in homine admirabiles fuere; in alloquio blandus, in negotio juſtus, in imperio moderatus; prorſus ut nihil ei regium deeſſe, præter regnum videretur. *Juſtin*, B. 23. chap. 4.

He was choſen Prætor by the ſoldiers on occaſion of a quarrel between them and the citizens: Nevertheleſs, the latter, on account of the great gentleneſs and humanity with which he proceeded on his firſt acceſſion to power, confirm'd him in that office. He aſpired however to ſomething yet higher, as was eaſily diſcerned by the quick-ſighted, from the very beginning of his adminiſtration. For *Hiero* knowing that the citizens, whenever the troops with their leaders went into the field, were apt to fall into factions and ſeditions, and that *Leptines*, a man in high repute for his probity, had the greateſt ſway with the people, he made an alliance with him, by taking his Daughter to wife, propoſing by this means to ſecure to himſelf the fidelity of the *Syracuſians* at home, during his expeditions with the army abroad. As to the ſoldiery, the veteran mercenaries having loſt their diſcipline, and being on all occaſions prompt to mutiny, and to raiſe new commotions, he took the following method to get rid of them. Under colour of a deſign to extirpate the uſur- Polyb. l. 1. c. 8.

and reduced by ſo terrible a blow, they thought themſelves no longer in a condition to defend *Meſſina*, and, being divided in opinion about what meaſures to take, one party had recourſe to the *Carthaginians*, made a league with them, and put the citadel into their hands; the other ſent ambaſſadors, with an offer of the city, to the *Romans*, whoſe protection they implored, and with whom they pleaded the relation between them, as men of the ſame country and original.

Polyb. l. 1. c. 10.

The *Romans*, having ſo ſeverely puniſhed the treachery and cruelty of their own citizens, were very ſenſible how much their honour might ſuffer, ſhould they protect villains notoriouſly guilty of the ſame crimes: And, when, on the other hand, they conſidered that the [e] *Carthaginians* had not only ſubdued a very long and rich tract of country in *Africa*,

c. 11.

uſurpers of *Meſſina*, he marched his forces that way, and, when he came up with the enemy, ſo ordered his battle, as to keep the *Syracuſians* both horſe and foot from engaging, while he expoſed the mercenaries to the entire ſhock of the *Mamertines*. The mercenaries were all cut off; and while the enemy were buſied in the ſlaughter, he withdrew his own people in ſafety to *Syracuſe*. After this having formed an army to his own mind, he marched once more againſt the *Mamertines*, and gave them that total overthrow which is mentioned in the text.

Mr. *Rollin*, who is a Divine, cannot approve this method which *Hiero* took to rid himſelf of the foreign mercenaries, though he grants, that he had no other way to ſecure himſelf from them. Chevalier *Folard*, who is a ſoldier, ſeems to applaud *Hiero* for the action, and ſays, that it ought to have ſerved for a leſſon to the *Roman* Emperors, how to guard themſelves againſt the *Prætorian* Cohorts, when they became licentious.

[e] In the following account of the riſe and progreſs of the *Carthaginian* power, great uſe is made of Mr. *Rollin*'s collections in his Hiſt. Ancienne.

Juſtin. B. 18. ch. 4, 5, 6. *App.* de Bell. Pun. p. 1. *Strab.* B. 17. p. 832. *Vell. Paterc.* B. 1. ch. 6. *Joſeph.* contr. *Ap.* B. 1.

THE CARTHAGINIANS were originally a colony from *Tyre* (in *Phœnicia*, a country on the eaſt coaſt of the *Mediterranean*) the moſt renowned city in the world for commerce, and which had long before ſent into *Africa* a colony, that built *Utica*. The foundation of *Carthage* is aſcribed to *Eliſſa*, a *Tyrian* Princeſs, better known by the name of *Dido*. Her great grandfather *Ithobal* King of *Tyre*, is thought to be the ſame with *Ethbaal* the father of *Jezebel*, wife of *Ahab*. *Dido* married her near relation *Acerbas* (called otherwiſe *Sicharbas* and *Sichæus*) a man immenſely rich. Her brother *Pygmalion*, King of *Tyre*, put *Acerbas* to death, that he might ſeize his great riches: but ſhe diſappointed the cruel avarice of the tyrant, by conveying them ſecretly out of his dominions. She put to ſea with a conſiderable number of friends and dependants, and, after ſtopping a while at *Cyprus*, purſued her voyage, and at length landed on the *African* coaſt, between *Utica* and *Tunis*. Here ſhe is ſaid to have bought of the natives a piece of ground, as much as ſhe could compaſs with an ox's hide (cut into thongs) and on this ſpot to have built *Byrſa*, afterwards the citadel of *Carthage*. Many of the *Africans* in the neighbourhood, invited by the proſpect of gain, repaired to theſe ſtrangers to traffick with them, and, in a ſhort time, took up their habitation among them; ſo that the whole had now ſomething of the appearance of a petty State.

Dido, ſoon after, by encouragement not only from the people of *Utica* (who look'd upon the *Tyrians* as their countrymen) but from the *Africans* alſo, built a city adjoining to *Byrſa*, and called it *Carthada*, a name that in the *Phœnician* tongue ſignifies *New City*. The *Romans* called it *Carthago*, the *Greeks Carchedon*. It was to pay an annual tribute to the *Africans* for the ground on which it ſtood.

[It is impoſſible to fix the time of the foundation of *Carthage*, chronologers both antient and modern, differing widely on the ſubject. *Appian* and others place it before the fall of *Troy*; others many years later.

Solinus,

ca, and ſome part of *Spain*, but were maſters of *Sardinia* and the adjacent iſles on the coaſt of *Italy*, and had even extended their dominion far in *Sicily*,

Solinus reckons 737 years from the firſt year of *Carthage* to its total deſtruction, which if placed in the 607th of *Rome*, *Carthage*, according to him, was built before *Rome* 130 years.

According to Sir *Iſaac Newton*, *Carthage* was founded by *Dido* 883 years before the beginning of the Chriſtian Æra. This Computation will fall in with that of *Solinus*, as to the age of *Carthage*, but not as to the juniority of *Rome*; which Sir *Iſaac* ſuppoſes to be younger than her rival by 256 years.]

The new City grew in a ſhort time into a flouriſhing condition; *Iarbas*, a neighbouring Prince, demanded *Dido* in marriage, threatning the *Carthaginians* with war in caſe of refuſal. *Dido*, to avoid this marriage, without drawing a calamity upon her people, put an end to her own life with a poniard. She was afterwards worſhipped as a Goddeſs, ſo long as *Carthage* ſubſiſted.

THE FIRST WAR[a] waged by the *Carthaginians* in *Africa* ſeems to have been on account of the annual tribute they had bound themſelves to pay to the *Africans* for the ground on which their city ſtood. In this war their arms proſpered under the conduct of one *Malchus*.

But *Mago* who ſucceeded *Malchus*, is conſider'd, by *Juſtin*, as the firſt builder of the *Carthaginian* empire, becauſe it was he that introduc'd an exact diſcipline among the troops. After his death, his two ſons *Haſdrubal* and *Hamilcar* had the command of the army. Theſe brothers left each three ſons, who ſhared among them the chief authority in *Carthage*. They carried the war againſt the *Moors* and *Numidians* with ſucceſs, and obliged the *Africans* to relinquiſh all claim to the tribute; which they had demanded ſword in hand.

[Six commanders out of one and the ſame family, and who governed all affairs both at home and abroad, ſeemed dangerous to a free State. It was a jealouſy of the exorbitant power of this family of *Mago*, which induced the *Carthaginians* to elect an hundred judges out of the Senators, to whom the Generals were to give an account of their conduct after their return from the war.]

When the *Carthaginians* had made conſiderable conqueſts in *Africa*, there aroſe a[b] war between them and the people of *Cyrene* (a powerful city, ſtanding to the Eaſt of the greater *Syrtis*) concerning the limits of their reſpective juriſdictions. After many bloody conflicts by land and ſea, it was agreed (as the ſtory is told) that two men ſhould ſet out from each of the two cities at the ſame inſtant, and that the place of their meeting ſhould be the boundary to the two States. The men from *Carthage* (who were brothers of the name of *Philænus*) either made more expedition than thoſe from *Cyrene*, or, as *Valerius Maximus* relates, began their courſe before the appointed time. Be that as it will, the *Cyrenians* complained of deceit, and refuſed to ſtand to the agreement, unleſs the two brothers (in proof of their innocence) would conſent to be buried alive in the place of meeting. The *Philæni*, readily acquieſcing in the propoſal, were buried quick in that ſpot; and the *Carthaginians* erected there two altars to their memory. The place from that time was called *The Altars of the Philæni* [*Aræ Philænorum*] and was ever after the eaſtern boundary of the *Carthaginian* Empire, which in time comprehended the whole extent of the northern coaſt of *Africa*, from thoſe Altars to the *Pillars of Hercules*.

Hiſtory does not inform us at what times the *Carthaginians* firſt carried their arms into SICILY, SARDINIA, or SPAIN.

SPAIN had ſufficient allurements to draw the *Carthaginians* thither. It abounded with mines of gold and ſilver, enchanting baits to their avarice, and it was peopled by a martial race of men, who (if once reduced to be ſubjects of *Carthage*) would furniſh her with brave troops for the conqueſt of other nations, and free her, in part, from the neceſſity of employing foreign mercenaries in her wars. For the genius of the *Carthaginians* being more turned to commerce than war, they had conſtantly recourſe (at leaſt in the latter ages of their ſtate) to that dangerous expedient of hiring ſtrangers to fight their battles.

[c] The

[a] *Juſtin*, B. 18. ch. 7. B. 19. c. 1. [b] *Salluſt.* de Bell. Jugurth. *Val. Maxim.* B. 5. c. 6.

Sicily, theſe things gave them very uneaſy apprehenſions. For they plainly foreſaw, that unleſs they interpoſed to prevent it, *Meſſina* would ſoon fall into the hands of thoſe formidable neighbours; who would then be able ſpeedily to invade *Syracuſe*, and all the other parts of the iſland, not yet in their obedience. They conſider'd likewiſe, that the *Carthaginians*, when once in poſſeſſion of *Meſſina*, might make uſe of it almoſt as a bridge to paſs into

[c] The occaſion of the firſt deſcent made by the *Carthaginians* on *Spain*, was, to defend the inhabitants of *Gades*, (a colony from *Tyre*, and more antient than thoſe of *Carthage* and *Utica*) againſt the *Spaniards*.

Encouraged by ſucceſs in this enterprize, they became aggreſſors and made conqueſts in *Spain*. It is plain however, by what *Polybius* and *Livy* tell us of the wars of *Amilcar Barcas*, *Aſdrubal*, and *Hannibal*, that, till the times of theſe Generals, (that is, till after the end of the firſt *Punic* War) the *Carthaginians* did not penetrate far into that country.

[*Some account of* Spain *will be given in a more proper place, when the* Romans *carry their arms thither.*]

Diod. Sic. L. 5.

Sicily, the largeſt iſland in the *Mediterranean*, was anciently called *Trinacria* and *Triquetra*, on account of its triangular form.

[e] *Paſſaro.*
[d] *Capo di Faro.*

The eaſtern ſide, which faces the *Ionian* or *Grecian* ſea, extends from Cape [e] *Pachinum* to [d] *Pelorus*. The chief cities on this coaſt were *Syracuſe*, *Tauromenium*, and *Meſſina*.

On the northern coaſt, looking towards *Italy*, and reaching from Cape *Pelorus* to Cape *Lilybæum*, the moſt noted cities were *Mylæ*, *Hymera*, *Panormus*, *Eryx*, *Drepanum*, *Lilybæum*.

The ſouth-weſt ſide, oppoſite to *Africa*, extends from Cape *Lilybæum* to *Pachynum*. Its principal cities were *Selinus*, *Agrigentum*, *Gela* and *Camarina*. The paſſage from *Lilybæum* to the promontory of *Mercury* in *Africa* is about 187 miles.

Diod. Sic. P. 11. p. 1. 2.

ABOUT the year Ant. Chr. 480. the *Carthaginians*, in conſequence of a league made with *Xerxes* King of *Perſia*, raiſed an army of more than 300,000 men, and equipped a fleet of 200 ſhips of war, and 3000 tranſports, in order to attack and expel all the *Greeks* who were ſettled in *Sicily* and *Italy*, while *Xerxes* himſelf was to invade *Greece*.

This mighty army, which landed at *Panormus*, and under the command of a general named *Hamilcar*, laid ſiege to *Hymera*, was, before that place, totally routed and deſtroyed by *Gelo* governor of *Syracuſe*; and this on the very day of the famous action of *Thermopylæ*, when *Leonidas* fell with his 300 *Spartans* in defending that paſs againſt the numberleſs forces of *Xerxes*.

[c] AFTER the memorable defeat of the *Athenians* under *Nicias* at *Syracuſe*, the people of *Segeſta* (a city not far from *Eryx*) who had declared in favour of the *Athenians* againſt the *Syracuſians*, fearing the reſentment of the latter, and being attacked by the inhabitants of *Selinus*, implored the aid of the *Carthaginian* Republic, under whoſe protection they put themſelves and their city. The *Carthaginians* allured by the proſpect of poſſeſſing a place, very convenient for them, promiſed ſuccour to the people of *Segeſta*.

[c] B. *J. C.* 413. *Diodor. Sic.* B. 13. p. 169.

The conduct of this war was given to *Hannibal*, grandſon to *Hamilcar*, who had been killed before *Hymera*. At the head of a great army, he beſieged *Selinus*, and took it by aſſault. He treated cruelly all whom he found in the place, but ſuffered thoſe, who had fled, to return and poſſeſs the city, paying a tribute to the *Carthaginians*. He afterwards took *Hymera* by aſſault, and, to revenge the death of his grandfather, not only razed the city, but cauſed 3000 priſoners to be murthered on the very ſpot where *Hamilcar* had been ſlain.

Hannibal, after theſe expeditions, returned to *Carthage*; but his ſucceſſes having rekindled the ambition of the *Carthaginians* to get poſſeſſion of all *Sicily*, they, with this view, 3 years after his return, appointed him a ſecond time to be their General, and allotted him an army of 120,000 (ſome ſay 300,000) men. On his pleading his

great

[c] *Juſtin*, B. 44. ch. 5. *Diod* B. 5. p. 300.

into *Italy*, the conqueſt of which had been long their ambition. All this was well weighed by the *Romans*; and yet, as *Polybius* reports, the *Conſcript*

great age, to excuſe himſelf from commanding in this enterprize, they gave him for his Lieutenant *Imilco*, ſon of *Hanno*, of the ſame family.

The *Syracuſians* and their allies prepared themſelves to give the enemy a warm reception.

Hannibal open'd the campaign with the ſiege of *Agrigentum*. Imagining that it was impregnable except on one ſide, he employ'd his whole force on that one ſide. He threw up banks and terraſſes as high as the walls, and made uſe of the rubbiſh and ruins of the tombs which he had found ſtanding round the city, and which he had demoliſh'd for that purpoſe. The plague ſoon after infecting the army, ſwept away a great number of the ſoldiers, and the General himſelf. The *Carthaginians* interpreted this diſaſter as a puniſhment inflicted by the Gods for the injuries done to the dead, whoſe ghoſts they fancied they ſaw ſtalking before them in the night. They forbore therefore to demoliſh any more tombs, and endeavour'd to appeaſe the Gods: a child was ſacrificed to *Saturn*, and many victims thrown into the ſea in honour of *Neptune*.

The beſieged after eight months were ſo preſſed by famine, that they reſolved to abandon the place in the night. Men, women, and children, all but the aged and ſick, retired to *Gela*, the neareſt city to them.

Imilco enter'd *Agrigentum*, and maſſacred all who were found in it. The plunder of the place was immenſly rich. It had contain'd 200,000 inhabitants, and had never before been beſieged, nor conſequently plunder'd. An infinite number of pictures, vaſes, and ſtatues of an exquiſite taſte were found in it, and among other curioſities the famous Bull of *Phalaris*, which was ſent to *Carthage*.

Imilco having quarter'd his troops during the winter in *Agrigentum*, and totally ruin'd it, laid ſiege to *Gela* in the beginning of the ſpring. He took this place notwithſtanding the ſuccours brought to it by *Dionyſius* the Tyrant, who had ſeized the government of *Syracuſe*. A treaty, which the *Carthaginians* afterwards made with *Dionyſius*, put an end to the war. The conditions of this treaty were, that *Carthage* ſhould remain miſtreſs of her ancient colonies, and of the territories of the *Sicanians*; that the people of *Selinus*, *Agrigentum*, and *Hymera* ſhould be ſubject to her; that thoſe of *Gela* and *Comarina* ſhould inhabit their own diſmantled cities, but be tributary to *Carthage*; that the *Leontines*, *Meſſenians*, and all the other *Sicilians* ſhould enjoy their own laws and liberties, except the *Syracuſians*, who were to continue ſubject to *Dionyſius*.

Theſe articles being ratified, the *Carthaginians* return'd home, having loſt one half of their army by the plague, which raging afterwards in *Africa*, multitudes periſh'd both of the people of *Carthage*, and of their confederates.

Dionyſius had concluded the late peace with the *Carthaginians* in no other view, but to get time to eſtabliſh his new authority, and make the neceſſary preparations for a vigorous war againſt them. Theſe things being accompliſh'd, he call'd the *Syracuſians* together, and repreſented to them the dangerous ambition of *Carthage*, which, he ſaid, aim'd at nothing leſs than the ſubduing of all *Sicily*, an enterprize which only the havock made in *Africa* by the plague did at preſent ſuſpend; and he exhorted them to ſeize the favourable opportunity they had of being the aggreſſors.

The tyrant was no leſs odious than his tyranny to the people of *Syracuſe*; nevertheleſs, the implacable hatred they bore to the *Carthaginians* made them receive his harangue with applauſe. *Dionyſius* hereupon, without any previous complaint of treaties violated, or ſo much as a declaration of war, gave up to the fury of the populace the perſons and poſſeſſions of the *Carthaginian* merchants, who in great numbers were then reſiding in *Syracuſe*, and were there trading ſecurely on the faith of treaties. Theſe unhappy men were not only plunder'd of all their effects, but made to undergo the utmoſt ignominy and cruelties that could be deviſed, under pretence of retaliation for what the *Carthaginians* had formerly done to the people of *Sicily*: and this example of perfidy and inhumanity was followed in many parts of the iſland. The Tyrant, after this ſtrange beginning of hoſtilities, ſent deputies to *Carthage*, to demand the reſtoration of all the

Conſcript Fathers could not be brought to determine for ſuccouring *Meſſina*; becauſe they judged, that the benefit which they ſhould draw from it would

Sicilian cities to their laws and liberties; and to declare that, in caſe of refuſal, all the *Carthaginians* found in thoſe cities ſhould be treated as enemies.

Dionyſius open'd the campaign with the ſiege of *Motya*, the chief magazine of the *Carthaginians* in *Sicily*; and, notwithſtanding all that *Imilco* could do to ſuccour it, carried the place by aſſault. He put all the inhabitants to the ſword, except thoſe who took refuge in the temples; he plunder'd the town, and then leaving a ſtrong garriſon in it under a truſty governor, return'd to *Syracuſe*.

Diod. Sic. B. 14. *Juſtin*, B. 19. ch. 2 & 3.

The following year *Imilco* came back to *Sicily* with a moſt formidable army. He landed at *Panormus*, recover'd *Motya* by force of arms, and took ſeveral other cities. Animated by theſe ſucceſſes, he march'd his forces towards *Syracuſe* with intention to beſiege it, ordering his fleet under the conduct of *Mago* to ſail thither. *Mago*, with two hundred ſhips of war, that were adorn'd with the enemies ſpoils, was quickly ſeen entring the great port as in triumph, and follow'd by 500 barks: The *Carthaginian* land-forces conſiſting, according to ſome authors, of 300,000 foot and 3,000 horſe, appear'd at the ſame time on the other ſide of the city, and both together threw the *Syracuſians* into the utmoſt conſternation. *Imilco* for thirty days ſucceſſively employ'd his troops in laying waſte the neighbouring country: He afterwards poſſeſs'd himſelf of the ſuburb called *Acradina*, and pillaged the temples of *Ceres* and *Proſerpine*, beating down the tombs that ſtood round the city, to fortify his camp with the materials. But now, when maſter of almoſt all the cities in the iſland, he expected to complete the conqueſt of it by the ſpeedy reduction of *Syracuſe*, a dreadful plague, which with incredible ſwiftneſs and deſtruction ſpread itſelf among his troops, put an end at once to all his pleaſing hopes, and made the ſplendor of his anticipated triumph vaniſh in a moment.

Dionyſius did not neglect ſo favourable an opportunity to attack the enemy. The *Carthaginian* ſhips were almoſt all either taken or burnt. The land-forces made but a feeble reſiſtance; but night coming on, *Imilco*, during that ſhort ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, ſent to *Dionyſius* for permiſſion to carry back to *Carthage* the ſmall remainder of his troops, offering him 300 talents, which was all the money he had left. This permiſſion could not be obtain'd but for the *Carthaginians* only, with whom he ſtole away in the night leaving the *Africans* to the diſcretion of the enemy. However, to ſhew that what he had done was purely to preſerve thoſe few of his countrymen whom the plague had ſpared, and not from a cowardly care of his own life, he on his arrival at *Carthage* retired immediately to his houſe, ſhut the doors againſt the citizens, and even his own children, and kill'd himſelf.

A misfortune far greater than what the *Carthaginians* had juſt ſuffer'd in *Sicily* now threaten'd them at home: for the *Africans* reſenting highly that their countrymen had been left behind in that iſland, to be ſlaughter'd by the *Syracuſians*, flew to arms in the utmoſt fury, ſeized upon *Tunes*, and, their numbers increaſing to more than 200,000 men, march'd directly to inveſt *Carthage*. Happily for the Republic, this numerous army had no leader, no diſcipline, no proviſions, no engines of war. Diſputes and jealouſies quickly broke the lawleſs rabble into factions, and famine ſoon after entirely diſperſed it.

Carthage, not yet deſpairing of the entire conqueſt of *Sicily*, made a new effort in that view. A General named *Mago* had the conduct of the enterprize. He loſt 15,000 men and his own life in a battle againſt *Dionyſius*; and thoſe of the *Carthaginian* army, who eſcap'd the ſlaughter, were conſtrain'd to ſue for peace. *Dionyſius* inſiſted on their evacuating *Sicily*, and defraying all the expences of the war.

The *Carthaginians* pretended to accept the peace on theſe terms; but repreſenting that it was not in their power to deliver up the cities they poſſeſs'd in *Sicily* without the expreſs orders of their Republic, they obtain'd a truce, which was to laſt till the return of an expreſs ſent to *Carthage*. During this interval they choſe the ſon of *Mago* to be their General. This new commander, tho' very young, yet by his great ability and conduct ſo improv'd the ſhort time he had to manage, that at the return of the expreſs

would not be greater than the reproach they ſhould ſuffer for ſo inconſiſtent a conduct. But the people having been greatly impoveriſh'd by the

he was in a condition to take the field, and give the enemy battle. He gain'd a victory over the *Syracuſians*, ſo conſiderable, as to produce an honourable peace for the *Carthaginians*. By the conditions of the treaty, they not only kept all their poſſeſſions, but acquired ſome additional places, and had alſo a thouſand talents from *Dionyſius*.

*Diod.Sic.*B.15. After the death of this the elder *Dionyſius*, and in the time of the younger (his ſon and ſucceſſor) *Carthage* took part in the troubles wherein *Syracuſe* was involved, endeavouring to make advantage of them for eſtabliſhing there her own domination. *Timoleon* from *Corinth* reſcued the *Syracuſians* from this danger, and reduced the *Carthaginians* to ſue for peace, which was ſettled on the following terms: The river *Halycus* (or *Lycus*) near *Agrigentum* was to be the boundary of the *Carthaginian* territory in *Sicily*; all natives of the cities ſubject to the *Carthaginians* were to be allowed to withdraw, if they pleaſed, to *Syracuſe* with their effects; and laſtly, the *Carthaginians* were not to aſſiſt, or to have any correſpondence with the ſeveral tyrants who at this time pretended to the lordſhip of that city.

Plut. in *Timol.* about the Y. ant. Chr. 346.

Juſtin, B. 21. ch. 4. It was probably about the ſame time that *Hanno*, one of the moſt conſiderable citizens of *Carthage*, form'd the deſign (but without ſucceſs) of making himſelf Tyrant of his country, by poiſoning the whole Senate at a banquet. His ſtratagem being diſcover'd, he was put to death by torture; and his children, and all his relations, were at the ſame time cut off without mercy, tho' they had no ſhare in his guilt.

About the Y. ant. Chr. 317. Some years after this, the *Carthaginians* were terribly alarm'd for their poſſeſſions in *Sicily*, by the growing power of the formidable *Agathocles*. This man, who is ſaid to have been the ſon of a potter, owed the wonderful riſe of his fortune in a great meaſure to the beauty of his perſon, his diſtinguiſh'd courage, and his enterpriſing genius; but chiefly to his conſummate wickedneſs, the arts of treachery, and the practice of the moſt unbounded cruelties. He was now abſolute lord of *Syracuſe*. Not content with this elevation, he aſpired to be King of all *Sicily*, and had made ſo ſwift a progreſs in ſubduing the iſland, that *Carthage* was obliged, in ſelf defenſe, to diſpatch a very numerous army thither, to put a ſtop to his conqueſts. *Hamilcar* commanded it; he gave the Tyrant a total overthrow near the *Hymera*, purſued him even to *Syracuſe*, and cloſely beſieged him in that capital of his dominion.

Juſtin, B. 22. *Dio.Sic.*B.19. ch.1. *Polyb.* B. 15. p. 1003.

The cruelties of *Agathocles* had made him univerſally deteſted by the *Sicilians*; he was now therefore deſerted by all his allies, and he knew at the ſame time that his own forces were too weak to preſerve the place. In theſe diſtreſsful circumſtances he form'd an enterpriſe worthy of the moſt accompliſh'd Hero; *To make a deſcent upon* Africa, *invade the dominion of his victorious enemies, and tranſfer the war to the very ſeat of their empire*. His great foreſight and judgment to diſcern that this deſign was practicable, and alſo the courage and prudence he diſplay'd in the execution of it, are much admired by the hiſtorians, but cannot be enlarged upon here. Let it ſuffice to mention, that leaving under the command of his brother *Antander* a ſufficient number of his troops to defend the city for ſome time, he put to ſea with the remainder, without letting any body know his deſign, or what courſe he intended to ſteer: But, before his departure, to encourage the *Syracuſians* to behave themſelves with conſtancy during his abſence, he aſſured them, that the ſiege would be but of ſhort duration, and that he had found an infallible way to victory.

The forces which *Agathocles* took with him in this expedition amounted to about 14,000 men. Having landed theſe troops ſafely in *Africa*, he immediately call'd them together, open'd to them his deſign, with the motives of it, and made them underſtand, that the only way to deliver their own country from its preſent diſtreſs was to carry the war into that of their enemies. He repreſented to them, that the citizens of *Carthage* were a luxurious and effeminate people,

the late wars, and it being repreſented to them by thoſe who were to command the army, in caſe of an expedition into *Sicily*, how profitable it would

utterly unable to cope with the *Syracuſians*, inur'd to the toils of war; that the unexampled boldneſs of his enterprize would alone diſconcert and terrify them; that they were wholly unprepar'd to repel an enemy at their gates; that the *Africans*, always hating the *Carthaginians*, would infallibly join him upon the firſt notice of his landing; and, in a word, he promiſed them the whole wealth of *Carthage* as the certain reward of their courage in the preſent expedition. The ſoldiers receiv'd his harangue with applauſe and acclamations, and fancied themſelves already in poſſeſſion of that rich city. Taking advantage of their preſent ſanguine temper, and the high hopes he had inſpired them with, he then perſuaded them to burn all their ſhips in honour to *Ceres* and *Proſerpine*, pretending, that in the paſſage to *Africa* he had ſecretly made a vow ſo to do, if thoſe deities would grant him a proſperous voyage. When by thus deſtroying his fleet he had brought his ſoldiers under a neceſſity of placing all their confidence in their courage, he led them on to action.

Two conſiderable cities he ſucceſſively attack'd, and carried by aſſault in a ſhort time; the latter was *Tunes*, not many miles from *Carthage*. The *Carthaginians*, terribly alarm'd at the ſwift progreſs of this unexpected invader, haſtily arm'd their citizens, to the number of above 40,000, and ſent them out under the command of *Hanno* and *Bomilcar*, men who had been long at variance about family-intereſts. A pitch'd battle quickly enſued; *Hanno* was ſlain in it, the *Carthaginians* routed, and their camp taken. It is ſaid, that *Bomilcar* might have reſtored the battle after the death of *Hanno*, if for private reaſons of ſelf-intereſt he had not choſe rather to quit the field to *Agathocles*. After this victory many fortify'd places ſurrender'd to the conqueror; and great numbers of the *Africans* revolted to him.

Dio. Sic. B. 17. *Q. Curt.* B. 4. It was at this time that an embaſſy came to *Carthage* from the *Tyrians*, to implore ſuccour againſt *Alexander* the Great, who beſieged their city; a requeſt which the *Carthaginians*, how willing ſoever, could by no means comply with in the preſent melancholy ſituation of their affairs.

The unhappy condition, to which the *Carthaginians* were reduced, they aſcribed to the anger of the Gods, provoked at ſome neglect of duty. It had been a cuſtom from the very infancy of *Carthage*, and was become a part of their religion, to ſend annually to *Tyre* (the mother-city) the tenth, or what was ſo call'd, of the public revenue, as an offering to *Hercules*, the patron and protector of both *Tyre* and *Carthage*. But from the time that this revenue grew conſiderable, the whole tenth was not fairly remitted: Remorſe ſeized the *Carthaginians*; and, to expiate their guilt, they now ſent to *Tyre* preſents of a prodigious value. *Diod. Siculus*, B. 20.

Another cuſtom had prevailed at *Carthage* of a moſt barbarous and bloody ſuperſtition, that of ſacrificing great numbers of children to *Saturn*. Anciently thoſe children were choſen out of the beſt families; of late the children of ſlaves and beggars had been ſubſtituted in the room of the nobly born; a fraudful impiety, for the expiation of which, two hundred children of the firſt rank were now thrown into the fire, an offering to the God: And, as *Diodorus Siculus* reports, three hundred of the citizens voluntarily ſacrificed themſelves on this occaſion to pacify the ſame Deity.

After theſe expiations expreſſes were diſpatch'd to *Hamilcar* in *Sicily*, with the news of what misfortunes had befallen the Republic in *Africa*, and to urge him to ſend ſpeedy ſuccours to *Carthage*. *Hamilcar* commanded the deputies not once to mention the victory of *Agathocles*, but on the contrary to report, that his forces had been all cut off, and his whole fleet taken by the *Carthaginians*. The Senate of *Carthage* had ſent to *Hamilcar* by the meſſengers all the beaks of *Agathocles*'s ſhips which had been burnt, that by ſhewing them he might the more eaſily gain credit to this report. The ſtratagem had like to have proved ſucceſsful. *Hamilcar* ſummon'd the beſieged to ſurrender, and ſhewed the beaks. The ruin of *Agathocles* being generally believ'd in *Syracuſe*, the majority of the citizens, and *Antander* himſelf, were diſpoſed to capitulate.

But

would be, not only to the public in general, but to each man in particular, they paſs'd a decree in favour of the enterprize; and *Appius Claudius*,

But *Eurymnon*, an *Ætolian*, whom *Agathocles* had left behind him to counſel his brother, by much perſuaſion prevailed with them to hold out till they had certain intelligence of the truth. A galley of thirty oars arrived ſoon after in the port, and brought the news of *Agathocles*'s victory, which at once reſtored life and reſolution to the inhabitants. *Hamilcar* made a laſt effort to carry the city by aſſault, but without ſucceſs. He then raiſed the ſiege, and ſent 5000 men to the relief of his diſtreſs'd country. Returning afterwards in hopes to ſurprize the city in the night, his deſign was diſcover'd, his army defeated, and he himſelf taken priſoner. The *Syracuſians* cut off his head, and ſent it into *Africa*, a welcome preſent to *Agathocles*.

The confuſion, into which all theſe diſaſters threw the *Carthaginians*, encouraged *Bomilcar* their General to attempt the execution of a deſign he had long harbour'd in his breaſt; it was to make himſelf monarch of the *Carthaginian* ſtate. He had gain'd over ſome of the citizens to his intereſt, and had ſecured a body of the foreign mercenaries to aſſiſt him. The conſpiracy nevertheleſs prov'd abortive; he was over-power'd, and being made priſoner, was crucified for his rebellion.

While *Bomilcar* was purſuing his wicked deſign againſt the liberties of his country, *Agathocles* was buſy in a treachery of another kind. He had won over to his cauſe *Ophellas*, King of *Cyrene*, by pretending that he would leave him the empire of *Africa*, and that he had no view in his preſent expedition, but to draw the *Carthaginians* out of *Sicily*. *Ophellas* brought a conſiderable army to the aſſiſtance of the *Syracuſians*. *Agathocles*, to get the abſolute command of theſe troops, ſlew their leader by ſurprize, after which by fair words and large promiſes he engaged the *Cyrenians* to follow him.

His affairs being now in a flouriſhing condition, he thought it proper to leave them a while under the conduct of his ſon *Archagathus*, and return into *Sicily*, to take ſome care of his intereſts at home. His renown and the report of his victories flew before him. On the news of his arrival in *Sicily* many towns revolted to him; but it was not long before ill news recall'd him into *Africa*. His abſence had entirely changed the face of things in that country, and all his arts and endeavours proved ineffectual to reſtore them to their former condition. His army had been defeated, his ſtrong holds had ſurrender'd to the enemy, and his troops were mutinous for want of pay. He attack'd the *Carthaginians* after his landing, but was repulſed and routed; he loſt 3000 men in the action. After this defeat and another diſaſter, by which he loſt 4000 of his men, the *Africans* of his army all deſerted him. Not thinking himſelf therefore in a condition to maintain the war any longer, he reſolved to leave *Africa*; and not having ſhips ſufficient to tranſport his troops into *Sicily*, he would have ſtole away with only a few of his friends, and his younger ſon *Heraclides*; for he fear'd leſt his elder ſon *Archagathus*, being a daring man, and having been too familiar with his ſtep-mother, would attempt ſomething againſt his life. *Archagathus* diſcover'd his deſign, cauſed him to be arreſted and put in chains. A ſudden panic ſoon after ſeized the army, believing that the enemy was juſt ready to fall upon them. The guard, who had the King in cuſtody, being in the ſame conſternation with the reſt, and in their fright coming out with their priſoner bound, the ſoldiers were ſo mov'd at this ſight, that they all cried out, *Unlooſe him, let him go.* *Agathocles* was no ſooner freed from his chains, but, conſulting only his own ſafety, he got on board a ſmall veſſel, and ſet ſail for *Sicily*, leaving his two ſons to the fury of the enraged ſoldiers, who ſlew them both upon the firſt diſcovery of his departure. The *Syracuſian* troops, tho' thus forſaken by their leader, made an honourable treaty for themſelves with the *Carthaginians*, with whom alſo *Agathocles*, after his return into *Sicily*, concluded a peace upon equal terms, notwithſtanding his late diſaſters and diſgrace.

After the death of *Agathocles*, and when *Syracuſe* was again involv'd in civil war, the *Carthaginians* renew'd their attempt once more to ſubdue the whole iſland of *Sicily*. They poſſeſs'd themſelves of many cities belonging to the *Syracuſians*, and inveſted *Syracuſe* itſelf. This common danger obliged the

Y. of *R.* 489. Bef. *J.C.* 263. [b] His collegue was *Fulv. Flaccus.*

dius, [b] one of the Conſuls, was order'd to conduct an army into *Sicily* to the relief of *Meſſina*.

the contending parties in the city to unite, and call in King *Pyrrhus* to their aid. *Pyrrhus* (as was mentioned in the former volume of this hiſtory) by repeated victories over the *Carthaginians*, deprived them in a ſhort time of all their poſſeſſions in *Sicily*, except the city of *Lilybæum* only. By his own miſconduct he afterwards loſt all the fruit of his ſucceſſes, being abandon'd by his *Sicilian* allies, and obliged to quit the iſland to preſerve himſelf and his *Epirots* from total deſtruction. The *Carthaginians*, who before his departure had brought a mighty army into *Sicily*, not only recover'd all their ancient poſſeſſions, but endeavour'd to enlarge their dominion by new conqueſts. *Hiero* being choſen to the government of *Syracuſe*, oppoſed the progreſs of their arms, till *the affair of* MESSINA united the two powers in one enterprize, drew the *Romans* into *Sicily*, and gave commencement to the firſt PUNIC WAR.

The Form of the CARTHAGINIAN GOVERNMENT.

The government of *Carthage*, like that of *Rome*, was compoſed of three different authorities, which balanced each other; the authority of the two ſupreme magiſtrates, call'd *Suffetes* (from the *Phœnician* word *Sophetim*, which ſignifies *Judges*) that of the Senate, and that of the Aſſembly of the People: To theſe was afterwards added the *Council of the Hundred*.

The SUFFETES.

The *Suffetes* were annual magiſtrates, and their authority much the ſame with that of the Conſuls at *Rome*. By the ancient writers they are frequently ſtyled Kings, Dictators, Conſuls. Hiſtory does not inform us of the manner of their election. Their office was to convene the Senate, to preſide there, propoſe the matters for debate, and collect the voices. They alſo ſat as chief Juſtices in private cauſes of importance: Nor was their authority confin'd to civil affairs, they ſometimes commanded the armies.

The SENATE.

The number of which the Senate of *Carthage* conſiſted is not known; it muſt certainly have been very conſiderable, ſeeing an hundred perſons were ſelected from it to form a ſeparate council. In the Senate all public affairs were debated, the letters from Generals read, the complaints from the Provinces heard, Ambaſſadors admitted to audience, Peace and War determined. When the Senators were unanimous, there lay no appeal from their deciſion; but whenever they were divided in opinion, the affair devolved to the People; a regulation which ſeems well contrived to prevent diviſions, and a factious oppoſition to reaſonable counſels; for it was not to be ſuppoſed, that any member of an aſſembly, which had the prerogative of judging deciſively in affairs, would willingly ſuffer them to be carried before another tribunal.

The PEOPLE.

It appears from *Ariſtotle*'s *Elogium* on the Government of *Carthage*, that, ſo low as to his time, the People ſpontaneouſly left the chief adminiſtration of public affairs to the Senate. And *Polybius* remarks, that, while the Senate govern'd, the *Carthaginians* were ſucceſsful in all their enterprizes. But at length riches and extenſive conqueſts made the people inſolent; and then forgetting that they owed their proſperity to the wiſe conduct of that venerable body, they not only interfered in the government of the State, but arrogated to themſelves almoſt the whole power. From that period the public affairs were tranſacted wholly by cabals and factions; and *Polybius* aſſigns this as one of the chief cauſes of their ruin. *Ariſtot.* B. 2. de Rep. ch. 11

The TRIBUNAL *of the* HUNDRED.

This Council was compoſed of 104 perſons, tho' for brevity ſake they are called *the Hundred*, and was inſtituted to be a check upon the *Carthaginian* Generals, who had uſed before to exerciſe an abſolute and uncontroulable power when at the head of armies in the field; they now became accountable to theſe judges for their actions, on their return from the campaign. *Y. of* Carthage 487.

Of theſe 104 Judges, five had a particular juriſdiction ſuperior to that of the reſt, and were like the Council of *Ten* in the *Venetian* Senate. A vacancy in their body could be filled by none but themſelves. They had alſo the power of chooſing thoſe who compoſed the Council of *The Hundred*.

Appius,

Appius, to learn the poſture of the enemy and the true ſtate of things in that place, is reported [a] to have ventur'd over thither in a fiſher-boat, and to have ſo happily conducted himſelf there, as by ſome means to make

[a] Primò ad explorandos hoſtes fretum piſcatoria navi trajecit [Appius Claudius Caudex] & cum duce Carthaginienſium egit, ut præſidium arce deduceret. Rhegium regreſſus, &c. *Aurel. Vict.* ch. 37.

That the Conſul in perſon went over privately to *Meſſina*, ſeems to be ſupported by the words of *Polybius*, who ſpeaks of the *Mamertines* ſending for *Appius*, and ſurrendring their city to him, as of a tranſaction previous to the paſſage of the *Roman* army to *Meſſina*. But, according to this author, they had either by art or force rid themſelves of the *Carthaginian* officer, before they call'd over *Appius*. Polyb. l. 1. c. 11.

If we may believe *Zonaras*, the perſon who went over privately to *Meſſina* to learn the ſtate of affairs in that city was not *Appius Claudius* the Conſul, but one *Claudius* a Legionary Tribune, whom the Conſul diſpatched on that commiſſion.

Zonaras differs in ſome particulars from *Polybius* concerning the origin of the firſt *Punic* War, and has many circumſtances which are not mentioned by any writer but himſelf. He tells us, that the two Republics were mutually jealous of each other; each thought its own ſafety depended on ſubduing its rival. This was the true cauſe of the war. Thus far he agrees with other writers. But he adds, that the *Romans* aſſign'd, for their motive to the war, ſome aſſiſtance which the *Carthaginians* had formerly given the *Tarentines* againſt *Rome*. The *Carthaginians* on the other hand alledged as their ground of quarrel, that the *Romans* had made a friendſhip with *Hiero* when he was at war with *Carthage*.

As to the affair of *Meſſina*, his relation is, in ſubſtance, as follows. The *Mamertines*, being beſieged by King *Hiero*, aſk ſuccour from the *Romans*. The *Romans* knowing that, if this requeſt ſhould be refus'd, they would give themſelves to the *Carthaginians*, who might then be able to paſs into *Italy*, readily promiſe to ſend the ſuccour deſired. This promiſe however not being ſpeedily perform'd, and the *Mamertines* being ſtraightly preſſed by the enemy, they apply for aid to the *Carthaginians*, who thereupon make peace with *Hiero*, both for themſelves and for the *Mamertines*, as the moſt effectual means to hinder the *Romans* from coming into *Sicily*; and under a leader named *Hanno* they take upon them the guard of the city and of the ſtraights. In the mean while *Claudius*, a Legionary Tribune, whom the Conſul had ſent before him with a few ſhips, comes to *Rhegium*, but finding that the enemy has a much ſtronger fleet at ſea, and therefore not daring to attempt the paſſage with his ſhips, he ſteals over privately in a ſmall boat to *Meſſina*, and has a conference with the *Mamertines*; but through the oppoſition of the *Carthaginians* is obliged to return without effecting any thing. Afterwards, when he hears that the *Mamertines* are in ſome commotion (for tho' they would not conſent to be ſubject to *Rome*, they were weary of the *Carthaginians*,) he goes over again, and promiſes that the *Romans*, if admitted into the place, ſhall return home as ſoon as they have reſtored *Meſſina* to a ſtate of ſecurity. He then bids the *Carthaginians* quit the place, or give a good reaſon for ſtaying. The *Mamertines* are ſilent through fear; the *Carthaginians* make him no anſwer, becauſe they hold the city by force, and deſpiſe him. *The ſilence of both*, cries *Claudius*, *ſhews that the* Carthaginians *act unjuſtly*, *and that the* Mamertines *deſire liberty*; *for if theſe cared for the* Carthaginians, *they would promiſe to ſtand by them*. The *Mamertines* applaud his words. He then returns to *Rhegium*, and endeavours to paſs from thence to *Meſſina* with his fleet. In this attempt he loſes ſome of his ſhips by ſtormy weather, others are taken by the *Carthaginians*, ſo that he is forced to return once more to *Rhegium*. The *Carthaginian* Admiral coming on the coaſt of *Italy* offers to reſtore the ſhips he had taken, but at the ſame time declares, that the *Straights* belong to the *Carthaginians*, and that he will not ſuffer the *Romans* even to waſh their hands in them. *Claudius* hearing this, rejects the offer with indignation, repairs his fleet, and ſeizing a favourable opportunity, paſſes ſafely with his troops to *Meſſina*. *Hanno* was now retired into the citadel; he had quitted the city thro' a diſtruſt of the inhabitants.

Claudius

make the *Carthaginian* officer and his ſoldiers evacuate the citadel; after which the Conſul return'd to *Italy* to prepare for the embarkation of his troops.

Claudius preſuades the *Mamertines* to invite *Hanno* to an amicable conference. The *Carthaginian*, tho' with great reluctance, comes to the aſſembly, leſt the *Mamertines*, who already complained of his injuſtices, ſhould begin hoſtilities againſt him. After much altercation between him and *Claudius*, he is ſeized by a *Roman* officer, and carried to priſon, the *Mamertines* approving of the action. Thus *Hanno* is reduced to the neceſſity of entirely abandoning *Meſſina*. The *Carthaginians* puniſh him for his ill conduct, and ſend a herald to ſignify to the *Romans* to quit *Meſſina* and all *Sicily* by a certain day; which demand not being complied with, they in the firſt fury of their reſentment murder all the *Italian* mercenaries in their ſervice; and then, aſſiſted by King *Hiero*, lay ſiege to *Meſſina*.

Such is the account given us by *Zonaras*, of what paſs'd in relation to *Meſſina* before the Conſul went thither. But I do not find the leaſt mention of the voyages or management of the Tribune *Claudius* in any other author. Only that the *Romans* ſent ſome troops to *Meſſina*, as *Zonaras* relates, before *Appius* went thither with the main army, is ſupported by a fragment of *Diodorus Siculus*, who ſpeaks of an agreement between *Hiero* and the *Carthaginians* to make war upon the *Romans*, unleſs they would immediately *withdraw all their forces out of* Sicily; and this is previous to the arrival of the Conſul with the Legions.

CHAP. II.

Firſt, ſecond, and third Years of the War.

The Conſul Appius Claudius Caudex *tranſports an army into* Sicily *to the relief of* Meſſina, *beſieged by the* Carthaginians *and* Syracuſians. *He forces them to raiſe the ſiege. His ſucceſſors make peace and an alliance with* Hiero, *King of* Syracuſe. *The next year's Conſuls, aſſiſted by* Hiero, *take* Agrigentum *from the* Carthaginians.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 11.

THE people of *Carthage*, upon the news of their officer's having quitted the citadel of *Meſſina* were ſo highly offended, that they condemn'd him to be crucified, as both a traitor and a coward. They order'd at the ſame time a fleet and a land-army to beſiege the place. *Hiero*, the new King of *Syracuſe*, having now a fair proſpect of exterminating the uſurpers of *Meſſina*, enter'd into a league with the *Carthaginians*, and join'd his forces to theirs: ſo that the *Mamertines* were entirely cloſed up within their city, the *Carthaginians* lying with a navy at ſea, and with an army on one ſide of the place, while the *Syracuſians* lay before it on the other.

In this their great danger came *Appius Claudius* the *Roman* Conſul to *Rhegium* with an army appointed for their relief: but how to paſs from thence to *Meſſina* was a difficulty that ſeem'd inſurmountable. Not that he wanted tranſports; for he had borrowed from the *Tarentines*, *Neapolitans*, and other neighbours, a ſufficient number of *triremes* and boats of fifty oars, wherein to waft over his men: but the *Carthaginian* fleet was in the way, and was by much ſuperior in ſtrength to that of the Conſul.

He was obliged therefore to have recourſe to ſtratagem. He pretended to give the enterprize entirely over as a thing impracticable, and, the better to deceive the enemy, ſteer'd his courſe towards *Rome*. This motion made the *Carthaginians* watch the *Straights* leſs narrowly; and then the Conſul tacking about on a ſudden, and being favour'd by a dark night, paſſed to *Meſſina* without oppoſition [a].

Frontin. de Strat. B. 1. ch. 4.

His

[a] *Polybius* (from whom this account of the origin of the firſt *Punic* War is chiefly taken) tho' he does not directly charge the *Romans* with injuſtice in their beginning this war, yet declares (L. 1. c. 10.) that it would be difficult to juſtify them. Sir *Walter Raleigh* is clearly of opinion, that the *Romans* in this enterprize were unjuſt. His words are theſe.

B. 5. ch. 1. §. 3.

"Now in this place I hold "it ſeaſonable to conſider "of thoſe grounds where- "upon the *Romans* entred in- "to this [the firſt *Punic*] war; not how pro- "fitable they were, nor how agreeable to "rules of honeſty (for queſtionleſs the enter- "prize was much to their benefit, tho' as "much to their ſhame) but how allowable in "ſtrict terms of lawfulneſs, whereupon they "built all their allegations in maintenance "thereof. *That the* Mamertines *did yield "themſelves, and all that they had, into "the Romans hands (as the* Campanes, *diſ- "treſs'd by the* Samnites, *had done) I cannot "find; neither can I find how the meſſen- "gers of thoſe folk, whereof one part had "already admitted the* Carthaginians, *could "be enabled to make any ſuch ſurrendry in "the publick name of all.*

"If therefore the *Mamertines*, by no law- "ful ſurrendry of themſelves and their poſ- "ſeſſions, were become ſubject to *Rome*, by "what better title could the *Romans* aſſiſt "the *Mamertines* againſt their moſt ancient "friends the *Carthaginians*, than they might "have aided the *Campanes* againſt the *Sam- "nites*, without the ſame condition? which "was (as they themſelves confeſs'd) by none "at all. But let it be ſuppoſed, that ſome "point ſerving to clear this doubt is loſt in "all hiſtories, doubtleſs it is, that *no com- "pany of pirates, thieves, outlaws, murder- "ers, or ſuch other malefactors, can by any "good ſucceſs of their villainy, obtain the "privilege of civil ſocieties, to make league "or truce*, yea to require fair war, but are "by all means, as moſt pernicious vermine, "to be rooted out of the world. I will not "take upon me to maintain that opinion of "ſome Civilians, that a Prince is not bound "to hold his faith with one of theſe; it "were a poſition of ill conſequence. *This "I hold, that no one Prince or State can "give protection to ſuch as theſe, as long as "any other is uſing the ſword of vengeance "againſt them, without becoming acceſſary "to their crimes.* Wherefore we may eſteem "this action of the *Romans* ſo far from be- "ing juſtifiable by any pretence of confede- "racy made with them, as that contrari- "wiſe, by admitting this neſt of murderers "and thieves into their protection, they juſt- "ly deſerved to be warred upon themſelves "by the people of *Sicily*, yea altho' *Meſſina* "had been taken, and the *Mamertines* all "ſlain, e'er any news of the confederacy "had been brought unto the beſiegers."

To this reaſoning of our learned country-man I take leave to anſwer:

WHETHER the meſſengers, who went to *Rome* from *Meſſina* from one part only of the *Mamertines*, could be enabled to treat in the name of all, or whether the *Mamertines* made ſuch an abſolute ſurrendry of their poſſeſſions to the *Romans*, as the people of *Capua* had formerly done, ſeems not material to the preſent purpoſe. Neither the *Romans* nor the *Carthaginians* could acquire any right to *Meſſina* in virtue of any ſuch ſurrendry, whether made by a part or by the whole body of the *Mamertines*, theſe having themſelves no right to the town, if they are to be conſider'd as a neſt of pirates, murderers, and outlaws, which is the light in which Sir *Walter* conſiders them.

In the next place, tho' it be granted, that no one Prince or State can give protection to pirates, thieves, and murderers, *as long as any other is uſing the ſword of vengeance againſt them*, without becoming acceſſary to their crimes; I ſay, tho' this be granted, it will not affect the preſent queſtion. For that the

His arrival, however, did not diſcourage the beſiegers; for they far exceeded him in number of men, and the whole iſland was ready to relieve them in their wants; and they were ſtrong enough at ſea to hinder any ſupplies from getting into the town. All this *Appius* well underſtood; and therefore apprehending both danger and diſhonour in the enterprize, he diſpatch'd ambaſſadors to the *Carthaginians* and *Hiero*, to treat of an accommodation, and obtain peace for the *Mamertines*.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 11.

Romans did not grant their protection to the *Mamertines*, in the circumſtance above deſcribed, is evident from what our author himſelf relates. He tells us, that the *Carthaginians* (and they were the principals in the preſent war, *Hiero* was only an auxiliary) upon the news of their officer's being driven out of the citadel of *Meſſina*, ſent a fleet and an army to beſiege the place, as a town *that had rebelled*, having once been theirs. Theſe preparations were to puniſh rebellious ſubjects, not to puniſh the *Mamertines* as pirates and murderers, not for the injuries they had done to the lawful proprietors of *Meſſina*. It would indeed have been ſhameleſs in the *Carthaginians* to pretend the latter after they had made a league with the uſurpers, treated them as a civil ſociety, and conſented to protect them againſt King *Hiero*.

From the whole then it would ſeem, that our author has not aſſign'd ſufficient reaſons for paſſing ſo rigorous a ſentence of condemnation againſt the *Romans*.

B 1 ch. 1. §. 3.

CHEVALIER FOLARD, who in his Comment upon *Polybius* entirely differs in opinion from Sir *Walter*, makes very ſhort work with the preſent queſtion.

A neceſſary war (ſays he) is always juſt. A war, without which the rights and liberties of a people muſt be greatly endanger'd, is a neceſſary war: This was the caſe of the *Romans* at the preſent juncture; and he cannot therefore believe, that the Senate of *Rome* were really ſo ſcrupulous as *Polybius* repreſents them to be, about accepting the offer made them by the *Mamertines*.

Nay the Chevalier declares, that not only the conſideration of a preſent danger to our liberties, but even the proſpect of a diſtant one, an allowable motive to begin a precautionary war; and that the two great power of any Prince will juſtify the neighbouring powers in making war upon him; becauſe Liberty is a thing, which by both divine and human laws we are allow'd to have ſo tender a concern for, that the apprehenſion of being deprived of it juſtifies whatever we do for its preſervation.

As I ſhall not contend with the force of this argument, ſo neither can I think it neceſſary to have recourſe to it to juſtify the *Romans* in the preſent war.

If the *Mamertines* are to be conſider'd as a civil ſociety, the *Romans* acted nothing contrary to juſtice in making an alliance with them, or in ſuccouring them when in that alliance. *Rome* (if we may believe *Polybius*) had made no treaty with the *Carthaginians*, or with *Hiero*, whereby ſhe was bound not to concern herſelf in the affairs of *Sicily*. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 26.

If the *Mamertines* are not to be conſider'd as a civil ſociety, but as a gang of robbers and pirates, *Meſſina* would then belong to the firſt civil ſociety that ſhould get poſſeſſion of it; and the *Romans* having acquired the right of firſt poſſeſſion, the *Carthaginians* muſt be conſider'd as the aggreſſors; for I preſume, that the latter cannot be deem'd to have acquir'd the right of firſt poſſeſſion even of the citadel, by the bare admiſſion of their officer with a few men into it, ſince they did not enter the citadel as taking poſſeſſion of it for themſelves, but to guard it for the uſurpers againſt King *Hiero*.

As to the conduct of the *Romans* in protecting the *Mamertines*, who had been guilty of the ſame crimes for which the Senate had puniſh'd the *Campanian* Legion, it muſt undoubtedly at firſt, as *Polybius* obſerves, have a ſtrange appearance; but certainly, when by ſparing the moſt notorious offenders a national good is to be obtain'd, much greater than could accrue from puniſhing ſuch offenders, there is no doubt but the arm of vengeance may wiſely and lawfully be ſtay'd. And this appears plainly to have been the motive on which the *Romans* acted in the caſe now before us, even according to *Polybius*'s relation of the matter.

The

The anſwer[b] from King *Hiero* was, that the *Mamertines* for their cruelty and wickedneſs in getting the poſſeſſion of *Meſſina*, and for diverſe other barbarities committed in *Sicily*, were moſt juſtly beſieged; and that it did not become the *Romans*, ſo famed for their juſtice and faithfulneſs, to protect ſuch bloody villains, who had contemptuouſly broken all the ties of faith and truth among men: That if the *Romans* began a war in defence of ſuch wicked invaders, it would be evident to all the world, that *ſuccour to the diſtreſſed* was but a pretence to cloke their covetouſneſs, when in truth their aim was to gain *Sicily*. *Diod. Sic.* in Eclog. p. 874.

The Conſul finding his negotiation fruitleſs, and that he was under a neceſſity of fighting, took at length the bold reſolution to ſally out into the field, and make the enemies know, that his coming to *Meſſina* was to drive them from the town, and not to be by them beſieged within it. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 11.

In executing this determination it was very advantageous for him, that the confederate armies lay incamped in ſuch a manner, as not to be well able to aſſiſt one another in diſtreſs. *Appius* ſallied out firſt againſt *Hiero*, and drawing up the Legions in order, preſented him battle. This brave Prince (ſays a learned writer, well ſkill'd in military affairs) muſt certainly have wanted good advice on the preſent occaſion; otherwiſe he would not have hazarded all his power againſt an enemy, of whom he had made no trial, when it had been eaſy for him, and as much as was requiſite, to defend his own camp. With great readineſs and gallantry he accepted the challenge, and met the enemy; but after a long and bloody conflict, the *Syracuſians* were defeated, and driven to ſave themſelves within their intrenchments. The *Romans* return'd triumphantly with the ſpoils of the dead into *Meſſina*. Sir *W. Raleigh*.

The King, by this diſaſter, learnt a point of wiſdom very uſeful both to him and his kingdom during the remainder of his life. Had *Meſſina* been taken by the *Carthaginians*, *Syracuſe* itſelf muſt have ſought help from *Rome* againſt thoſe friends whom it now ſo diligently aſſiſted. *Hiero* had (in reſpect of thoſe two mighty States) but a ſmall ſtock, which it behoved him to manage frugally; ſuch another loſs would have almoſt ruin'd him. He therefore quietly broke up his camp in the night, and retired home; intending to leave thoſe to try the fortune of the war, who had hopes to be gainers by the event of it[c]. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 11.

Appius receiving intelligence of the King's retreat, and finding the courage of his men greatly raiſed by their ſucceſs in the late action, reſolved to attack the *Carthaginians* without loſs of time. Having caus'd c. 12.

[b] According to *Diodorus Siculus*, the Conſul's embaſſy was ſent from *Rhegium* before he paſs'd the *Straights*.

[c] *Diod. Siculus* writes, that when the Conſul landed at *Meſſina*, *Hiero*, ſuſpecting that the *Carthaginians* had made way for him, fled himſelf to *Syracuſe*. *Florus* ſays, that *Hiero* confeſs'd he was conquer'd before he ſaw the enemy. *Zonaras*. B. 8. makes *Appius* to land with his forces, not at *Meſſina*, but ſome place near it, and to attack the *Syracuſians* before he enter'd that town.

the ſoldiers to take their repaſt at a very early hour, he ſallied out by break of day, ſurprized the enemy, and routed them with great ſlaughter; thoſe who eſcaped flying for refuge to the neighbouring towns. The *Romans* after this action made inroads upon the country as far as to the territory of the *Syracuſians*, and at length ſet down before *Syracuſe*. It does not appear, however, that the Conſul made any progreſs in the ſiege: remitting the conduct of this enterprize to his ſucceſſors, he returned to *Rome* [d].

Polyb. B. 1. c. 16. Y. of *R.* 490. Bef. *C.* 262. 189. Conſul p.

§. II. THE *Romans* being animated by the victories of *Appius* to purſue the war with more than ordinary vigour, it was decreed, that the Conſuls for the new year, *Manius Valerius* and *Manius Otacilius*, ſhould both go into *Sicily*, and ſhould take with them four Legions, each conſiſting of 4000 foot and 300 horſe. Upon the arrival of theſe forces in *Sicily*, moſt of the ‖ towns and caſtles, that had ſubmitted to the *Carthaginians* and *Syracuſians*, gave themſelves up to the *Romans*; inſomuch that the King of *Syracuſe* found it high time for him to endeavour after a

‖ *Diod. Siculus* (p. 875) makes the number to be 67.

[d] According to *Eutropius*, B. 2. and *Silius Italicus*, B. 6. *Appius Claudius* had a triumph for his victories; but the *Capitoline* Marbles ſay nothing of it.

He acquired his ſurname of *Caudex*, if we may believe *Seneca*, (*de Brev. Vit.*) from his having tranſported the *Roman* army from *Italy* to *Sicily* in ſmall boats, which the ancients call'd *Caudices*.

Mr. *Vertot*, perhaps on no other authority, ſays, that this General was the firſt who by the means of ſome Rafts tranſported troops into *Sicily*, which got him the ſurname of *Caudex*, as having found the art of faſtening Planks together, ſo as to make tranſports of them.

Chevalier *Folard* rallies the Abbot on this paſſage of his hiſtory, and wants to know his voucher. Doubtleſs the Chevalier has good reaſon to diſpute the fact. It would have been madneſs for the Conſul to have attempted to waft an army croſs thoſe ſtraights on ſuch tranſports; neither had he any occaſion to have recourſe to that dangerous expedient, all the ſhips in the ports of *Italy* being at his diſpoſal; and *Polybius* expreſsly tells us, that *Appius* embark'd his men on veſſels of fifty oars, and on *triremes* borrow'd of the *Tarentines*, *Locrians*, &c. This relation of *Polybius* is deciſive alſo againſt *Seneca*.

The Chevalier will have it, that *Appius*'s ſurname of *Caudex* was on account of a dull, ſtupid air, the word *Codex* ſignifying a blockhead.

Father *Catrou*, in the large *Roman* Hiſtory, ſpeaking of *Appius*'s ſurname, keeps clear of Mr. *Vertot*'s Rafts and *Seneca*'s little Boats; but then he wants a reaſon for *Claudius*'s ſurname of *Caudex*. He ſays, that when *Appius* undertook to croſs the *Straights* with his fleet, he went himſelf on boad a ſorry galley, haſtily and clumſily built (une mauvaiſe galere tumultuairement conſtruite & ſans art.) This enterprize happily executed, the *Romans* thought it ſo fine an exploit, that they gave the Conſul the ſurname of *Caudex*, which word, adds the Father, ſignified then un mauvais batteau fait de planches mal arrangées & précipitemment réünies.

But what reaſon in the world can be imagined why *Appius* ſhould make choice of ſuch a tranſport, wherein to convey his own perſon to *Sicily*, when he might have choſen the beſt *Triremes* in the fleet? I cannot find, that the Reverend Father has any authority for this fact.

If *Appius* did really acquire the ſurname in queſtion, from the bad built and faſhion of any veſſel in which he croſs'd the *Straights*, I ſhould conjecture it was from that fiſherboat (which might be a *Caudex*) wherein, as *Aurelius Victor* reports, he couragiouſly ventured over to *Meſſina*, to learn the ſtate of things there before he tranſported his army thither.

peace

peace with an enemy ſo formidable, and that came now to beſiege him in his capital. He perceived, ſays *Polybius*, that the deſigns and hopes of the *Romans* were better founded than thoſe of the *Carthaginians*, and in concluſion therefore ſent ambaſſadors to the Conſuls to treat of peace and an alliance with *Rome*. *Valerius* and *Otacilius* readily embraced the overture, and the more readily, on account of the difficulties they were under with regard to their convoys. The *Roman* troops had the laſt year been driven to great ſtraits, and there was good reaſon to apprehend leſt the *Carthaginians*, who were maſters of the ſea, ſhould be able totally to debar them of all ſupplies of proviſion. The Conſuls nevertheleſs made the King purchaſe the alliance which he ſought, with an hundred talents of ſilver.

Diodorus Siculus reports, that *Hannibal* the *Carthaginian* General was by this time come with a fleet to *Xiphonia* (not far from *Syracuſe*) to the aſſiſtance of the King, but that hearing of what was done, he inſtantly retired [e]. In Eclog. p. 875.

Hiero after this treaty continued ever a firm and uſeful friend to the *Romans*; and being a Prince who not only made the proſperity of his ſubjects his chief aim, but always purſued that aim by meaſures honeſt and noble, he enjoy'd a long and happy reign, dear to his people, belov'd of his allies, and univerſally eſteem'd by all the *Greek* nations.

§. III. THE treaty with the *Syracuſian* King being ratify'd by an ordinance of the *Roman* People, it was now thought adviſeable to abate of the number of troops in the ſervice, and to ſend into *Sicily* under the command of the new Conſuls (*L. Poſthumius Megellus* and *Q. Mamilius Vitulus*) only two Legions; which, through *Hiero*'s friendſhip, they truſted, would live in plenty of all things neceſſary. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 17. Y. of *R.* 491. Bef. *J. C.* 261. 190 Conſul. p.

As for the people of *Carthage*, when they learnt that *Hiero* of a friend was become an enemy, and when they conſider'd that the *Romans* were now ſuperior to them in ſtrength, they turn'd their thoughts to provide

[e] We find by the *Capitoline* Marbles, that a Dictator was created this year at *Rome* to *drive the Nail*, probably on account of ſome prodigies, or to ſtop the plague; from the ſame Marbles we learn alſo, that *Valerius* at his return to *Rome* was decreed a triumph, and that he acquired the ſurname of *Meſſala*; which ‖ *Seneca* and ‡ *Macrobius* tells us was given him for the conqueſt of *Meſſina*, (then call'd *Meſſana*.) It is hard to reconcile this with *Polybius*'s account, unleſs we ſuppoſe that the enemy got poſſeſſion of that place after the return of *Appius Claudius* into *Italy*. The *Jeſuits* believe rather, that *Valerius* perform'd ſome notable exploit in the defence of *Meſſina*, while *Otacilius* was otherways employ'd, and that this occaſioned the diſtinction with which he was afterwards honour'd above his collegue. *Pliny* authorizes this conjecture, when he tells us (*B.* 35. *ch.* 4.) that *Valerius* brought with him from *Sicily* a picture repreſenting the battle wherein he had vanquiſh'd *Hiero* and the *Carthaginians* before *Meſſina*. He fixed it up in the old palace of King *Tullus Hoſtilius*, where the Senate uſed to aſſemble. The ſame author reports alſo (*B.* 7. *ch. ult.*) that *Valerius* brought with him from *Sicily* another novelty, an horizontal ſun-dial, and that he placed it on a pedeſtal in the *Comitium* near the *Roſtra*.

‖ *De Brev. Vit.* ‡ *Saturn.* B. 1.

Y. of *R.* 491. Bef. *J. C.* 261. 190 Conſul-p.

a force that might be ſufficient to preſerve thoſe acquiſitions which they ſtill poſſeſs'd in the iſland. To this end they hired a great number of troops in *Gaul* and in *Liguria*, but principally in *Spain*; and having reſolved to make *Agrigentum* † (a ſtrong place, diſtant about eighteen furlongs from the ſea, on the ſouth coaſt of *Sicily*,) the rendezvous of their armies, and their chief magazine, they tranſported the mercenaries to that city.

† Called alſo *Agragas*, now *Girgenti*.

The Conſuls *Poſthumius* and *Mamilius* were now arrived in *Sicily* with the Legions, and having got intelligence of the deſigns of the *Carthaginians*, and of the preparations they were making in *Agrigentum*, came to a reſolution to march directly with their forces towards that place, and inveſt it. They pitch'd their camp about a mile from the town, and totally block'd it up.

It happening to be the time of harveſt, the *Roman* ſoldiers, who foreſaw that the ſiege would be a long one, diſpers'd themſelves abroad to forage; and this they did in ſo unguarded a manner, that it tempted the beſieged one day to ſally out upon them. The *Carthaginians* not only fell upon the reapers in the fields, but made a furious attack upon the *Roman* advanced guards, not without hopes to force the very camp. And here (ſays *Polybius*) the *Romans*, as in many other occaſions, owed their preſervation to that diſcipline in which they excell'd all nations; for being accuſtom'd to ſee thoſe puniſh'd with death who deſerted their poſt, or fled in battle, they diligently rallied, and bravely ſuſtained the ſhock of the enemy, tho' ſuperior in number. And tho' many of the *Romans* fell, the loſs was much greater on the enemies ſide, who being at length ſurrounded when they had almoſt forced the *Roman* entrenchment, were with great ſlaughter driven back to their works. After this action the *Romans* became more wary in their foraging, and the *Carthaginians* leſs forward to make ſallies. The Conſuls however, the better to ſecure themſelves, cut a deep trench between the walls of the city and their camp, and another on the ſide towards the country, to prevent any ſurprize that way; which double fortification alſo hindred the beſieged from receiving any ſupplies whatſoever. At the ſame time proviſions and all neceſſaries were brought to the beſiegers by their *Sicilian* allies to *Erbeſus*; and from that town, which lay not far from their camp, their convoys paſs'd without impediment.

Diod. Sic. in Eclog. p. 875. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 18.

Affairs continued five months in this poſture, neither party gaining upon the other any conſiderable advantage, their engagements being for the moſt part only in ſlight ſkirmiſhes. The beſiegers received daily reinforcements from the *Sicilians*, and, in all, amounted to above 100,000 men. In the mean time the city being ſtuffed with a garriſon of 50,000 ſoldiers began to be much ſtraitned for proviſions, *Hannibal*, who commanded there in chief, diſpatched frequent advices to *Carthage*, repreſenting the extremities to which they were reduced, and demanding ſpeedy ſuccour. The *Carthaginians* therefore embarking on board their

their fleet what ſoldiers and elephants they could readily muſter, ſent them into *Sicily* to *Hanno*, their other General in that country. *Hanno* having aſſembled all his forces at *Heraclea*, a maritime town a little to the weſt of *Agrigentum*, march'd directly to *Erbeſus*, where he had a ſecret correſpondence, and which was put into his hands by treachery. By this loſs the *Romans* not only were deprived of their wonted ſupplies, but became themſelves almoſt as cloſely beſieged by *Hanno*, as *Agrigentum* was by their troops; and they muſt unavoidably have quitted their enterprize, if King *Hiero* had not reliev'd them in their diſtreſs. He found means to convey proviſions to their camp, tho' not in great quantity, nor ſufficient to prevent thoſe diſtempers among the ſoldiers, which are the uſual conſequences of ſcarcity. V. of *R.* 491. Bef. *J.C.* 261. 190 Conſul. p.

Hanno having intelligence of the bad condition of the *Roman* army, that the ſoldiers were enfeebled by want, and their number diminiſh'd by diſeaſes, believ'd he might now be able to cope with them. He march'd with fifty elephants, and all the reſt of his forces from *Heraclea* (whither he had return'd after the affair of *Erbeſus*) ſending his *Numidian* horſe before, with orders to approach to the enemies camp, and endeavour to draw the *Roman* cavalry to a battle, in which they were to retreat till they join'd the main body. The *Numidians* punctually perform'd their inſtructions. They march'd up to the entrenchment of the enemy, and being attack'd by the *Roman* horſe, retired before them till they join'd *Hanno* with the army, which almoſt encompaſſing the *Romans*, ſlew many of them, and drove the reſt back to their camp. After this exploit the *Carthaginian* made no other attempt for two months, but lay ſtrongly encamp'd on an eminence about ten furlongs from the *Romans*, waiting for ſome opportunity to fight with advantage. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 19.

In the mean time *Agrigentum* was reduced to the utmoſt extremity by famine. *Hannibal* gave notice to *Hanno*, as well by ſignals from the town, as by frequent expreſſes, that the garriſon were no longer able to ſuſtain the wants they labour'd under, and that many of the ſoldiers were compelled by hunger to deſert. This brought *Hanno* to reſolve upon a deciſive action, to which the *Romans* were no leſs diſpoſed, on account of their inconvenient ſituation. The two armies therefore drawing out, came to an engagement on the ground between their camps. The ſucceſs was long doubtful; but *Hanno*'s elephants being at length diſorder'd by his own van-guard, which the *Romans* had broke and put to flight, thoſe unruly beaſts threw his whole army into confuſion. The *Carthaginians* ſuffer'd a great ſlaughter; ſome few got into *Heraclea*, but the *Romans* took moſt of the elephants, and all the enemies baggage.

And now *Hannibal* turn'd all his thoughts to make his eſcape from *Agrigentum*, which he deſpair'd of holding any longer; and perceiving that the *Romans* after their victory, wearied with labour, and grown ſecure by their good fortune, kept negligent watch, he ruſh'd out of the place at midnight with all his foreign troops, and filling the *Roman*

Y. of *R.* 491. Bef *J.C.* 261. 190 Conſul-p. trenches with faggots, paſſed over their works unhurt and unperceiv'd. The *Romans* ſaw not their error till the morning, when they contented themſelves with a ſhort purſuit, and preſently return'd to take poſſeſſion of the town; which they enter'd without reſiſtance, unmercifully deſpoiling the inhabitants both of their riches and of their liberty.

CHAP. III.

The fourth and fifth Years of the War.

The Romans, *to accompliſh their deſigns upon* Sicily, *find it neceſſary to provide themſelves with a naval force. They build a conſiderable fleet, and by the help of a new-invented engine for grappling and boarding the enemies ſhips, gain a memorable victory over the* Carthaginians *at ſea near* Milæ, (*now* Milazzo.)

Polyb. B. 1. c. 20.

GREAT joy there was at *Rome* on the news of the taking of *Agrigentum*, and every body's courage and hopes were raiſed. They now thought it not enough to have reſcued *Meſſina*, and enriched themſelves by the war; they propoſed nothing leſs than the entire expulſion of the *Carthaginians* out of *Sicily*; nay, and this was to be done the very next year by *L. Valerius* and *T. Otacilius*, their newly elected Conſuls. However, they ſoon became ſenſible, that the taſk was too difficult to be accompliſh'd in ſo ſhort a time. For tho' a great number of the inland towns of *Sicily* had, after the reduction of *Agrigentum*, readily ſubmitted to the *Romans*, who were evidently ſuperior to their enemies by land; yet many places ſituate on the coaſt had revolted from them through fear of the *Carthaginian* ſtrength by ſea. And indeed this advantage on the ſide of *Carthage* made the ſucceſs of the war ſtill doubtful; which being well conſider'd by the *Romans*, as alſo that the coaſt of *Italy* lay expoſed to the depredations of the *Carthaginians*, who made frequent deſcents upon it, whilſt *Africa* felt none of the calamities of war, they at length reſolved to apply themſelves diligently to maritime affairs, and even, at their firſt eſſay, to make proviſion of ſuch a fleet, as ſhould be able to contend with the naval power of *Carthage*.

Y. of *R.* 492. Bef. *J. C.* 260. 191 Conſul-p.

Polybius, in ſpeaking on this ſubject, cannot forbear to expreſs his admiration of the magnanimity of the *Romans*, ſo void of fear in enterprizes of the greateſt hazard and moment; and it is in truth an aſtoniſhing inſtance of the reſolute bravery of this people, that being hitherto extremely ignorant in all the arts relating to navigation, they ſhould now at once determine upon a naval battle with the *Carthaginians*, who had held unconteſted, from time immemorial, the dominion of the ſea.

The

The ſame author tells us, that the *Romans* were not at this time maſters[f] of one ſingle galley, no not even of a bark, and were ſo little ſkill'd in ſhip-building, that if fortune had not favour'd them, it would have been almoſt impoſſible for them to put their deſign in execution. A *Carthaginian* galley cruizing on the coaſt of *Italy*, and venturing too near the ſhore, happen'd to be ſtranded; the *Romans* ſeized her before the crew could get her off, and, by the model of this galley, their firſt fleet, which conſiſted of 100[g] *quinqueremes* and 20 *triremes*, was built.

While theſe veſſels were upon the ſtocks, the men appointed to be the rowers were taught the uſe of the oar in the following manner. Seats were raiſed on the ſea-ſhore in the ſame faſhion and order as they were to be in the galleys, and the mariners being placed thereon, an officer who ſtood in the midſt of them inſtructed them, by ſigns with his hand, how at once and all together to dip their oars, and in like manner to recover them out of the water. They afterwards ſpent ſome time in practiſing upon the water what they had been learning at land, adventuring firſt along the coaſt of *Italy*. c. 21.

Before the finiſhing[h] of this naval armament, the Conſular *Faſces* were transferred to *Cn. Cornelius Aſina* and *C. Duilius*. It fell to *Cornelius* to be the *Roman* Admiral. Leaving orders with the pilots to make the beſt of their way to the *Straights* ſo ſoon as all the new veſſels ſhould be equipped, he with only 17 of them repaired to *Meſſina* to give directions for the reception and ſecurity of the main fleet. He had not been long there, when, deceived by ſome falſe intelligence, he thought he had a fair Y. of *R.* 493. Bef *J.C.* 259. 192 Conſul-p.

[f] Doubtleſs *Polybius* goes too far, when he affirms that the *Romans* had no ſhips before the firſt *Punic* war; the ancient treaties between *Rome* and *Carthage*, which he himſelf preſents us with, evince the contrary; nay, it appears by the former part of this hiſtory, that they had ten *ſhips of war* at the time of the rupture with the *Tarentines*. And as to what he ſays of the loſs the *Romans* would have been at to build a fleet, if they had not ſeized a *Carthaginian* veſſel, which chanced to be ſtranded, his meaning, to be conſiſtent with himſelf, muſt be, either that without this accident they would have had no *good* model whereby to build any ſhip of war, or would have had no *model at all* of a *quinqueremis*. For he tells us in the very ſame part of his hiſtory, that ſome of the veſſels in which they tranſported their troops the firſt time to *Meſſina* were *triremes* (and theſe were ſhips of war) borrow'd from their neighbours the *Tarentines*, &c.

[g] Of the ancient ſhips of war the moſt conſiderable were the *naves longæ* (long-ſhips, or galleys) ſo named from their form, which was the moſt convenient to wield round or cut their way; whereas the ſhips of burden were generally built rounder and more hollow, that they might be more eaſy to load, and might hold the more goods. The moſt remarkable of the *naves longæ* were the *triremis*, the *quadriremis*, and the *quinqueremis*, exceeding one another by one bank of oars, which banks were raiſed ſloping one above another. Some indeed fancy a different original of theſe names, as that in the *triremes*, for example, either there were three banks one after the other on a level, or that three rowers tugg'd all together at one oar; but this is contrary not only to the authority of the claſſicks, but to the figures of the *triremes* ſtill appearing in ancient monuments. *Kennet*'s Antiq. part 2. b. 4. ch. 20.

[h] According to *Florus*, B. 2. and *Oroſius*, B. 4. ch. 7. the *Romans* were but ſixty days in building and equipping their fleet, reckoning from the time that the neceſſary timber was prepared.

A. of *R.* 493. Bef. *J. C.* 259. 192 Conſul-p.

occaſion of ſurprizing *Lipara* [1]. Thither he went with his ſquadron, and drew up under the walls of the town. *Hannibal*, who commanded at ſea for the *Carthaginians*, and was now at *Panormus*, having notice of this deſign, immediately diſpatch'd away 20 galleys under the command of one *Boodes* a Senator, who arriving in the night, block'd up *Cornelius* in the harbour. As ſoon as day appear'd, the *Roman* mariners, in their firſt fright, to ſave themſelves, got with all diligence aſhore. The Conſul in this diſtreſs ſeeing no remedy, yielded himſelf priſoner; and the *Carthaginians* poſſeſſing themſelves of the 17 veſſels, and the principal *Roman* officers, made the beſt of their way back to *Hannibal*.

Polyb. B. 1. ch. 21.

Such is *Polybius*'s account of this affair: But according to *Livy*'s Epitome, B. 17. *Cornelius* was made priſoner by treachery, being decoy'd from his ſhip by the pretence of a parley, to which the *Carthaginian* commander invited him in order to a peace.

Not long after this adventure of *Cornelius*, *Hannibal* himſelf was very near falling into a like diſaſter by an equal indiſcretion. For having received advice that the *Roman* fleet was at ſea, and coaſting along *Italy*, he would needs be himſelf a witneſs of the number and poſture of the enemy; and to that end went in ſearch of them with only fifty of his galleys. The *Romans* happen'd to be nearer than he was aware of, and juſt as he doubled a promontory on the *Italian* coaſt, ſurprized him with their whole fleet in order of battle. In this encounter he loſt the greater part of his ſquadron, and eſcaped narrowly himſelf, when every body deſpaired of his ſafety.

The *Romans* continued their courſe towards *Meſſina*, purſuant to the inſtructions they had formerly received from *Cornelius*, of whoſe defeat and captivity having got advice, they immediately ſent the news of it to *Duilius* (who then had the command of the land-forces in the iſland) and while they waited the coming of the Conſul, they prepared for a new engagement with the enemy, whoſe fleet they heard was not far off. And conſidering that their own ſhips were heavy and ſlow, not having been built with great art, they turn'd their thoughts to contrive ſome new invention which might compenſate for this diſadvantage; and then was deviſed that famous machine which they afterwards call'd the ‖ *Corvus*.

‖ The *Crow*.

The learned cannot agree concerning the exact form of this engine. *Polybius*'s deſcription of it has not been found ſufficient to make it clearly underſtood. It appears to have been a kind of draw-bridge, ſo framed on the prow of the veſſels, that being let fall upon an enemy's ſhip, it ſerved both to grapple her and to render the boarding her more eaſy.

Duilius, upon the firſt notice of what had happen'd to his collegue, remitting the conduct of the land-army to his Tribunes, haſten'd to the fleet; where hearing, on his arrival, that the enemy were cruizing on the coaſt near *Mylæ*, which was not far from *Meſſina*, he made the beſt of his way

c. 23.

[1] A town in a ſmall iſland of the ſame name, not far from *Sicily*, to the north.

with

with all his galleys to encounter them. Their fleet conſiſted of 130 ſhips, and was commanded by the ſame *Hannibal* who had eſcaped with his army by night from *Agrigentum*. His own veſſel was a *ſeptiremis*, or galley of ſeven banks of oars, belonging formerly to *Pyrrhus* King of *Epirus*. Y. of *R.* 493. Bef. *J. C.* 259. 192 Conſul-p.

The *Carthaginians* greatly rejoiced when they deſcry'd the *Romans*, whom they held in ſuch extreme contempt, that they advanced with their prows directly upon them, careleſs of any order of battle, and dreaming of nothing but certain victory. But when they drew near, they became much aſtoniſh'd at the ſight of the engines before mentioned, having never ſeen the like before, and not being able to conjecture the deſign of them. However, they ſtaid not long in ſuſpenſe, nor did the novelty of what they beheld leſſen their preſumption. The headmoſt of their veſſels made a furious attack upon the *Romans*, who grappling with them by means of their engines, enter'd them at once, fighting upon deck hand to hand with their enemies, as upon firm ground. And now neither the lightneſs of the *Carthaginian* galleys, nor the ſkill of their mariners, availed any thing; all was carried by the advantage of weapon and ſuperiority of valour, and both theſe were on the ſide of the *Romans*. The *Carthaginians* loſt in this firſt encounter thirty of their veſſels, of which *Hannibal*'s galley was one, he himſelf eſcaping in a ſmall boat, when he was by all given for loſt. At length the reſt of the fleet came up; but having perceived the terrible effect of the new engines in the defeat of their firſt ſquadron, they uſed all their endeavours to avoid them, nimbly rowing round the *Roman* galleys, to find an opportunity of attacking them with ſafety; but when they obſerv'd, that which way ſoever they approach'd, thoſe machines were travers'd and oppoſed to them, they were at length compell'd to yield the honour of the day to the *Romans*, retiring with the loſs of fifty more of their ſhips.

Hannibal with the remainder of his fleet ſtood away for *Africk*, but fearing leſt crucifixion ſhould be his fate, he ſent before him one of his friends, a man well choſen for the commiſſion, who being introduced into the Senate, *Your Admiral*, ſaid he, *deſires to know your opinion, whether, in caſe the* Romans *appear at ſea with a numerous fleet, he ſhould give them battle? Doubtleſs he ought to fight*, they all cry'd out unanimouſly. The meſſenger then added, *He has fought, and is vanquiſh'd.* And thus *Hannibal* eſcaped the danger that hung over him; for they were no longer free to condemn an action which they had already approved. *Val. Max.* B. 7. ch. 3. in Extern.

As for *Duilius*, the courage of whoſe men was greatly raiſed by their late ſurpriſing victory, he landed his forces on the iſland, and marched to the relief of *Segeſta*, which the enemy at that time cloſely beſieged. He not only forced them to raiſe the ſiege of this place, but took from them *Macella* by aſſault. After theſe exploits leaving the land-army behind him, he returned to *Rome*, to receive the recompence due to his valour and conduct. A victory at ſea ſo unexpected, ſo complete, and ſo important, made all former victories at land to be in a manner forgot. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 24.

Y. of *R.* 493. Bef. *J. C.* 259. 192 Conſul-p. *Cic.* in *Cat.* maj. *Florus*, B. 2. † Columna Roſtrata.

The conqueror, beſide the uſual honour of the *Triumph*, which was decreed him, was ſuffer'd to aſſume a new one of his own invention. During the reſt of his life, whenever he had ſupp'd abroad in the city, he cauſed himſelf to be attended home with flambeaux and muſic. Medals were ſtruck by the *Romans* to perpetuate the memory of his exploit; and to the ſame end they erected in the *Forum* a † Roſtral Pillar of white marble. This pillar was in the laſt century accidentally dug up out of the ground, in that part of *Rome* which was formerly the *Roman Forum*. There are yet the figures of ſix *Roſtra*, or *Prows* of *Roman* galleys ſticking to it, and a long, but imperfect inſcription on the pedeſtal.

CHAP. IV.

The ſixth, ſeventh, and eighth Years of the War.

The Romans *invade* Corſica *and* Sardinia *with ſucceſs, reduce ſome places in* Sicily, *and come to an engagement at ſea with the* Carthaginians *near* Tyndaris.

Y. of *R.* 494. Bef. *J. C.* 258. 193 Conſul-p. *Oroſius*, B. 4. ch. 7. *Zon.* B. 8.

THE Conſuls for the following year were *L. Cornelius Scipio* and *C. Aquilius Florus*. While the former employ'd himſelf on the coaſt in getting the fleet ready for new enterprizes, the latter was detained at *Rome* on occaſion of a conſpiracy then on foot to plunder and burn the city. Four thouſand *Samnites* being appointed, contrary to their inclination, to ſerve as rowers in the galleys, had united with three thouſand diſcontented ſlaves in this deſign; but a certain commander of auxiliaries, whom they had choſen to be their leader, and who ſeem'd at firſt to go heartily into their meaſures, had no ſooner learnt their whole ſecret, than he diſcover'd it to the Senate, who took effectual care to avert the miſchief and puniſh the offenders.

Before this domeſtick diſturbance was quite over, *Cornelius* weighed anchor and put to ſea. Ambitious of ſignalizing himſelf by ſome exploit yet unattempted, he made a deſcent firſt upon *Corſica*, and then upon *Sardinia*, and in a ſhort time made conſiderable progreſs in the conqueſt of thoſe iſlands, the poſſeſſion of which was of great importance to the *Romans*, who now aſpired to the empire of the ſeas.

Aquilius went late into *Sicily*. The affairs of the *Romans* had ſuffer'd much in that iſland ſince the departure of *Duilius*. For a diſpute had ariſen between the *Roman* and *Sicilian* troops about the poſt of honour; which diſpute was carried ſo far as to produce a ſeparation. *Hamilcar* (the *Carthaginian* General by land) who was then at *Panormus*, having intelligence of this diviſion, ſurprized the *Sicilians* as they were about to encamp between *Paropus* and *Thermas*, and ſlew four thouſand of them. He had alſo taken *Enna* and *Camarina*, and had fortified *Drepanum*.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 24.

Aquilius ſtaid in the iſland all the winter in quality of Pro-Conſul, and by his able conduct brought affairs into a better poſture. In

In the mean time his collegue held the *Comitia* for the new elections, where *A. Atilius Calatinus* and *C. Sulpicius Paterculus* were choſen Conſuls. The command of the land-army fell to the former, the fleet to the latter. Soon after the arrival of *Calatinus* in *Sicily*, *Miſiſtratum*, which the Proconſul *Aquilius* had reduced to the laſt extremity, ſurrender'd to him. From thence he march'd towards *Camarina*; but in his way, not taking ſufficient precaution, he brought his army into a valley, where he was ſhut in, and ſurrounded by the *Carthaginians* under the command of *Hamilcar*. In this deſperate ſituation *Calpurnius*[b] *Flamma*, a legionary Tribune, undertook, with the Conſul's conſent, an action of bravery much extolled by the hiſtorians. With three hundred choſen men, he, to make a diverſion, ſeized an eminence, where he knew the *Carthaginians* would ſoon attack him, and from whence he could have little hope to eſcape. He promiſed himſelf, that by this motion he ſhould give the enemy ſo much employment, that they would not be able to obſtruct the Conſul's march. The ſtratagem ſucceeded. The *Carthaginians*, in their attempt to diſlodge him, met with ſo obſtinate a reſiſtance, that they were forced to bring almoſt the whole body of their army to the charge; and in the mean time the Conſul with his legions got ſafely through the paſs with little oppoſition. Of the three hundred *Romans* *Calpurnius* was the only perſon that eſcaped: He was found miſerably wounded, but ſtill breathing, under a heap of dead bodies, and his wounds being carefully dreſſed, he recovered. A *Crown of Gramen* was the reward of his exploit.

Y. of *R.* 495. Bef. *J. C.* 257. 194 Conſul-p.

Zon. B. 8. *Oroſius*, *Florus*, *Aurel. Victor*, c. 39. *Livy*, epit. B. 17. *Livy*, B. 22. c. 60.

Pliny, B. 22. c. 6. and *Diod.* in Eclog. p. 876.

Calatinus after this eſcape continued his march towards *Camarina*, and by the help of engines, ſent him by King *Hiero*, made himſelf maſter of it. *Enna* betray'd her garriſon, and open'd her gates to him. He took *Sittanum* by aſſault; and then many other towns ſurrender'd without ſtanding a ſiege, and, among the reſt *Erbeſus* in the country of the *Agrigentines*. Fluſh'd with this ſucceſs he undertook the ſiege of *Lipara*, expecting for the future to meet with no reſiſtance wherever he appear'd: But *Hamilcar* having got notice of his deſign, had ſtoln with ſome troops into the place; and when the *Romans*, who ſaw none but citizens upon the ramparts, confidently began to ſcale the walls, they were on a ſudden ſurprized by a ſally of the *Carthaginians*, and ſhamefully repulſed with conſiderable loſs. And thus *Calatinus* finiſh'd his campaign, which by the mixture of good and bad ſucceſs gain'd him but little honour.

As for the other Conſul, *Sulpicius*, he had conducted the fleet like an able commander. He had not only aſſiſted his collegue in the reduction of the maritime towns of *Sicily*, but had much advanced the conqueſt of *Sardinia* and *Corſica*. However, this did not ſatisfy his paſſion for glory; he burnt with a deſire of diſtinguiſhing himſelf by a naval victory: And becauſe no *Carthaginian* fleet appeared at ſea, he ſpread a report, that he

Zon. B. 8.

[b] He is called by ſome writers *Cæditius*, by others *Laberius*.

intended

Y. of *R.* 495. Bef. *J.C.* 257. 194 Conſul-p. intended to go and burn the ſhips of the *African* Republic in their harbours. This news alarm'd the *Carthaginians*, and they truſted *Hannibal* once more with the command of a conſiderable fleet. He found *Sulpicius* with his not far from the coaſt of *Africa*. But when both ſides were preparing for an engagement, a ſtorm ſeparated them, and drove the ſhips of both fleets into the ports of *Sardinia*. After this, *Sulpicius* ſurprized the *Carthaginian* admiral in a harbour of that iſland, and took many of his galleys; which misfortune begetting a mutiny in the remainder of his fleet, the mariners ſeized of his perſon, and crucified him.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 24.

Y. of *R.* 496. Bef. *J.C.* 256. 195 Conſul-p. The year following, when *C. Attilius Regulus* and *Cn. Cornelius Blaſio* were Conſuls, the former being with the fleet at *Tyndaris*, deſcry'd the *Carthaginian* fleet ſtanding along the coaſt in a confuſed and careleſs manner, whereupon he haſten'd with a ſquadron of ten gallies to give them chace, directing at the ſame time the reſt of his ſhips to follow him. The *Carthaginians* obſerving that the detach'd ſquadron was advanced a good diſtance from the enemies main fleet, tacked about on a ſudden, and ſurrounding the ten ſhips, quickly ſunk them all, except the admiral galley, which eſcaped only by her lightneſs, and the force of her oars. But the reſt of the *Roman* fleet coming up ſoon after in order of battle, amply revenged this diſgrace; for the *Carthaginians* were forced to fly to the iſland of *Lipara* with the loſs of eighteen of their veſſels, of which eight were ſunk, and the other ten taken.

c. 25.

Little was perform'd this year by land, the armies engaging in no action of importance, and the contending powers being chiefly ſolicitous about the increaſe of their naval ſtrength, which for good reaſon, as we ſhall preſently ſee, was by each ſide deem'd to be more than ever its principal affair.

CHAP. V.

The ninth Year of the War.

The Romans, *under the conduct of* Marcus Attilius Regulus *and* L. Manlius, *defeat the* Carthaginians *in the memorable ſea-fight of* Ecnomus; *after which they make a deſcent upon* Africa. Carthage, *tho' reduced to great extremity, rejects the hard conditions of peace propoſed by* Regulus.

THE ſtruggle between the rival Republics for the dominion of *Sicily* had now laſted eight years, and *Carthage* had already loſt the greater part of her acquiſitions in that iſland, when the *Romans*, to make her relinquiſh the reſt, undertook to transfer the war into *Africa*. They imagined, that they ſhould hereby reduce the *Carthaginians* to the neceſſity of calling home all their forces for the defence of their own country. The naval preparations of the *Romans* the laſt year had been wholly in view to the execution of this deſign; and the fleet which they now put to ſea

Polyb. B. 1. c. 26.

under the command of their new Conſuls, *Marcus Attilius* ‖ *Regulus* and *L. Manlius*, was ſuitable to the importance of the enterprize; for it conſiſted of no leſs than 330 ſhips of war. Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J. C.* 255. 196 Conſul-p. ‖ 2d time.

On the other hand the *Carthaginians*, who well knew how eaſy it was for an enemy, who had once got footing in their country, to ſubdue the inhabitants on the coaſt, and to march even to the walls of *Carthage*, had determined to exert their utmoſt ſtrength in oppoſing the intended deſcent. Fully bent upon a ſea-engagement, they had equipped a fleet that was ſtill more numerous than that of the *Romans*. They arrived at *Lilybæum* with 350 galleys. From this place they went afterwards to *Heraclea Minoa*, where they ſtaid at anchor, waiting the motions of the enemy.

The *Roman* fleet had touch'd at *Meſſina*, and had thence ſteer'd its courſe along the coaſt of *Sicily* that lay to the right, and having doubled the promontory of *Pachinum*, was come to *Ecnomus*, where their land-forces then were. From theſe the Conſuls ſelected the ableſt of the ſoldiers for the preſent ſervice, providing all things neceſſary either for a battle with the enemy by ſea, if it ſhould be offer'd, or to make an irruption into *Africa*, if their voyage thither ſhould not be obſtructed. Each galley in the *Roman* fleet had 300 rowers and 120 ſoldiers, ſo that the whole army amounted to near 140,000 men. As the *Carthaginians* exceeded their enemies in number of ſhips, ſo was their army proportionably greater, conſiſting of above 150,000 mariners and ſoldiers. And now, ſays *Polybius*, who could behold, or but barely hear of ſuch fleets and armies, and of the hazard to which theſe contending States were expoſed, without being aſtoniſhed at the mightineſs of their power, and without taking part in the danger with which they threatned each other?

Ecnomus was not far from *Heraclea*; the two parties were obſtinately determined, the one to *invade*, the other to *defend*; it was eaſy therefore to foreſee they would ſoon come to a battle.

The *Romans* conſidering the advantage which the *Carthaginians* had over them in the lightneſs and ready working of their galleys, took eſpecial care to draw up their fleet, that it ſhould be difficult to break its order. They divided their ſhips into four ſquadrons, to three of which they gave the names of *the firſt*, *the ſecond*, and *the third fleet*; and theſe, in three lines, compoſed the form of a wedge or triangle, pointing towards the enemy.

The *firſt fleet* to the right, and the *ſecond* to the left (keeping the prows of their veſſels turn'd outwards) made the ſides of the triangle; and at the head of theſe two lines, that is, at the point where they met, were the Conſuls *Regulus* and *Manlius*, in two galleys abreaſt of each other. The *third fleet* made the baſe of the triangle, and towed the veſſels of burden, which carried the horſes and baggage.

In the rear of all was the fourth diviſion, which they called the *Triarians*, a term taken from the land-forces. This ſquadron was drawn up in

Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J.* C. 255. 196 Conſul-p. in a line parallel to the baſe of the triangle, but was ſtretch'd ſo far in length, that its two extremities extended a good way beyond thoſe of the baſe.

The ſeveral diviſions of the *Roman* fleet being thus diſpoſed, the whole, ſays *Polybius*, was fit for action, and very difficult to be broken.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 27. The *Carthaginian* fleet was commanded by *Hanno*, who had ſucceeded ſo ill during the ſiege of *Agrigentum*, and by *Hamilcar*, who had fought near *Tyndaris*. Theſe admirals obſerving how the *Roman* galleys were drawn up, and rightly conjecturing the intention of ſuch a diſpoſition, turn'd their thoughts to diſappoint it, by the order in which they ſhould diſpoſe their own veſſels, and by ſtratagem. Having divided their whole fleet into four ſquadrons, they drew three of them up in one long line frontways, their prows pointing directly on the enemy. *Hanno* was with the ſquadron which formed the right of this line, and which ſtretched a great way out into the ſea. He had with him all the beſt rowing galleys, ſuch as were proper to attack and retreat, and could row round the *Romans* at pleaſure. *Hamilcar* was with the ſquadron in the left of the line. The third ſquadron, which made the center, was deſignedly drawn up very thin, that the *Romans* might be tempted to begin the attack there, in which caſe this ſquadron had orders to retreat, thereby to engage the *Roman* galleys, which made the two ſides of their triangle, in a purſuit, which would ſeparate them from the baſe.

The fourth diviſion of the *Carthaginian* fleet, in form of a Tenail, kept cloſe under the ſhore which lay to the left of their long line of battle.

The ſtratagem above mention'd, and which *Polybius* imputes to *Hamilcar*, ſucceeded. The *Romans* began their attack on the *Carthaginians* in the middle of their line. The galleys that were attack'd pretended to fly through fear, and the aſſailants, that is to ſay, the firſt and ſecond fleets of the *Romans*, purſuing them warmly, disjoin'd themſelves from their third fleet (which towed the baggage) and from the *Triarians* in the rear of all.

When the *Carthaginians* judged that the *firſt* and *ſecond fleets* of the *Romans* were ſufficiently diſtanced from the reſt, the ſignal was given from *Hamilcar*'s galley; whereupon thoſe that were chaced by the *Romans* immediately tack'd, and made head againſt the purſuers, *Hamilcar* with his ſquadron charging them at the ſame time. And now the battle grew warm; for tho' the *Carthaginians* had the advantage in the lightneſs and ready working of their veſſels, yet the *Romans* loſt not their aſſurance of ſucceſs in the end; they found themſelves better men when they came to the ſword's point, and they had great truſt in their engines, with which they grappled and boarded the enemy; beſides, the ſoldiers were animated by the preſence of their Generals, in whoſe eye they fought, and who themſelves engaged in equal hazard with the reſt.

c. 28. During this conflict, *Hanno*, who commanded the ſquadron which had formed the right of the *Carthaginian* line, bearing down upon the *Roman*

Triarians attack'd them vigorouſly, and ſucceeded ſo well, as to reduce them to very great extremities. Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J. C.* 255. 196 Conſul p.

At the ſame time the fourth ſquadron of the *Carthaginians*, which in form of a Tenail had been poſted cloſe under the ſhore, ranged themſelves into a front, and advanced againſt that ſquadron of the *Romans* which they called their *third fleet*, and which had made the baſe of their triangle. This fleet was therefore obliged to caſt off the veſſels they had in tow, which having done, they received the *Carthaginians*, and fought them with great bravery. So that now might be ſeen three naval battles at one and the ſame inſtant.

The fortune of the day was for ſome time doubtful, and would at length have infallibly declared for the *Carthaginians*, if *Hamilcar*'s courage had been equal to his ſkill in ſtratagem, and if, with his two ſquadrons of the left and the center, he had only maintained the fight againſt the *firſt* and *ſecond fleets* of the *Romans*, ſo as to hinder them from going to the aſſiſtance of their other fleets; but he, after ſome loſs, ſhamefully fled out of the battle. And now while *Manlius* employ'd himſelf in towing away ſuch ſhips as had been taken, *Regulus*, who perceived the great danger the *Triarians* were in from *Hanno*'s attack, advanced with all diligence to their relief, taking with him thoſe ſhips of his collegue's ſquadron, which had not ſuffer'd any thing in the engagement with *Hamilcar*. The *Triarians* hereupon, though now almoſt quite vanquiſh'd, recover'd heart, and renew'd the battle with alacrity. *Hanno* ſeeing himſelf thus aſſaulted, contrary to all expectation, both in front and rear, betook himſelf to his oars, and made off to ſea, yielding the day to the *Romans*.

About the ſame time *Manlius* coming up, and joining *Regulus*, they both haſten'd to the ſuccour of their *third fleet*, which had been forced under the ſhore by the *fourth ſquadron* of the enemy, and was in a manner beſieged there. This *third fleet* would have been in great danger of deſtruction, before the Conſuls could have come to its reſcue, if the *Carthaginians* had had the courage to puſh their advantage; but their dread of being grappled by the *Corvi*, and of coming to a cloſe fight with the *Romans*, was ſo great, that they contented themſelves with driving their enemies againſt the ſhore, and there keeping them beſet. And now they were themſelves entirely ſurrounded by the *Romans*, who took fifty of their ſhips with all their equipage. Such was the event of this laſt combat in particular. The *Romans*, every where victors, took in all ſixty-four of the *Carthaginian* galleys, and ſunk thirty. Of their own fleet they loſt but twenty-four galleys, and theſe periſh'd againſt the ſhore, not one was taken.

The Conſuls, after this victory, returned into the ports of *Sicily* to take in proviſions and freſh troops, and prepare anew for a deſcent upon *Africa*. *Polyb.* B. I. c. 29.

Whilſt they were thus employ'd, *Hanno* made no ſcruple to go in perſon to amuſe them by conferences about peace, which *Hamilcar* had re-

Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J.C.* 255. 196 Conſul p.

fuſed to do, for fear he ſhould be treated as the *Carthaginians* had treated *Cornelius Aſina* five years before. *Hanno*'s confidence was founded upon a different judgment of the temper of the *Romans*; and experience on the preſent occaſion ſhew'd that he judg'd rightly. For when a certain legionary Tribune cry'd out, *That he ought to be detain'd priſoner by way of repriſal for the treachery practiſed towards* Cornelius, both the Conſuls immediately order'd him ſilence; and then turning to *Hanno*, *The faith of* Rome *ſecures thee from that fear.* The *Carthaginian* was diſmiſs'd in ſafety, but his propoſals were rejected, and the Conſuls purſued their enterprize.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 29.

The *Romans* had a fortunate voyage, and landed in the neighbourhood of *Clypea*, near the promontory of *Mercury*. Having made themſelves maſters of that town, they would not advance any farther till they had received freſh inſtructions from *Rome*: For ſuch was the dependance of the Conſuls upon the Senate at this time, that they did little more than execute the orders of the Fathers; moſt of whom being experienced ſoldiers, and having commanded armies, were very capable of directing the conduct of their Generals. The Conſuls however did not continue in a perfect inaction; they fortified *Clypea* after the *Roman* manner, and detach'd parties to ravage the rich territory all around, and plunder the fine houſes of the *Carthaginian* nobles. Theſe detachments, meeting no oppoſition, brought away an immenſe booty, beſides 20000 priſoners, who were made ſlaves.

When the Conſuls meſſenger came back from *Rome*, he brought orders for *Manlius* to return to *Italy* with the fleet, and for *Regulus* to continue in *Africa* with a ſufficient number of troops to carry on the war. The people of *Rome* depended greatly on the courage and abilities of *Regulus*, and the city was in univerſal joy upon the publiſhng of this regulation. But when the news of it came to *Regulus*, he was much afflicted. His pretext was, the bad condition of his little farm of ſeven acres of land. He repreſented to the Senate, that upon the death of the huſbandman, to whom he had committed the care of his farm, the management of it had fallen to a day-labourer, who had ſince ſtoln his inſtruments of huſbandry, and carried off all his ſtock; ſo that his preſence was neceſſary at home to provide for the ſubſiſtence of his wife and children. Upon this the Senate gave orders, that his loſſes ſhould be repair'd, his farm taken care of, and his family maintained at the public expence; but he himſelf was directed to ſtay in *Africa*. *Manlius* leaving behind him forty ſhips, 15,000 foot, and 500 horſe, return'd to *Italy* with the reſt of the army, and with all the priſoners which had been taken upon the continent of *Africa*.

Val. Max. B. 4. c. 4.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 29.

Regulus made incurſions into the country, and puſh'd on his conqueſts with prodigious rapidity. All the towns in his way, that were unfortified,

Flor. B. 2. *Zon.* B. 8.

[a] *Regulus*, in the progreſs of his conqueſts, encamping on the banks of the *Bagrada*, a river that diſcharged itſelf into the ſea not far from *Carthage*, is ſaid by many authors

tified, he took by aſſault, and thoſe that were fortified, by ſiege; and now at length he ſat down before *Adis*, a city of great importance, and preſs'd the ſiege of it with vigour. Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J. C.* 255. 196 Conſul p.

Hitherto the *Carthaginians* had brought no army into the field to oppoſe his progreſs. Upon the firſt notice of their terrible defeat at ſea, apprehending a ſudden invaſion from the *Romans*, they had diſpatched away ſome troops to keep guard upon the coaſt; but this care was over, ſo ſoon as they learnt that the *Romans* were landed. They proceeded therefore with all poſſible application to reinforce their army with new levies, and make due proviſion both for ſtrengthening the city, and ſecuring the country. They named two Generals to command their forces, c 30. *Boſtar*, and *Aſdrubal* the ſon of *Hanno*; they afterwards ſent orders to *Hamilcar*, who was then at *Heraclea*, to return home with all expedition. *Hamilcar* brought with him to *Carthage* 5000 foot and 500 horſe, and being there named third General of the Republic, and having conſulted with *Aſdrubal*, it was determined no longer to endure that the *Romans* ſhould make ſuch ſpoil upon the country, and to haſten to the relief of *Adis*. They advanced with their army, and encamp'd upon an eminence, which, tho' it overlooked the *Roman* camp, was a very incommodious ſituation; for, as their greateſt ſtrength lay in their horſe and elephants, to abandon the plain country, and poſt themſelves in high and ſteep places, where neither elephants nor horſe could be of any uſe to them, was in effect to point out to their enemies the method to deſtroy them. *Regulus*, who ſaw their miſtake, gave them no time to rectify it. At break of day he march'd againſt the enemy, his troops aſcending the hill on both ſides. The mercenaries of the *Carthaginians* behaved themſelves gallantly on this occaſion, and repuls'd the firſt legion of the *Romans* which charged them in front; but being preſently after attack'd in the rear by the ſoldiers who had got up the hill on the other ſide, they could no longer maintain the fight. The whole army diſbanded itſelf, and in the utmoſt confuſion fled out of the camp. The elephants and the horſe, which had been wholly uſeleſs during the action, gain'd the champain country and eſcaped. The *Romans* having purſued the foot for ſome ſpace, returned and pillaged the camp; after which they proceeded to make incurſions as before, ſpoiling the country, and taking towns without oppoſition. Among others, they ſeiz'd upon *Tunes*, and there

Val. Max. B. 1. *A. Gell.* B. 6. *Plin.* B. 8. thors to have met there with a monſtrous ſerpent of 120 foot long, which much infeſted his army, ſeizing his men, and ſwallowing them whole when they went to draw water. The ſkin of this animal was ſo tough, and its ſcales ſo thick, as to be impenetrable by the *Roman* weapons, inſomuch that they were forced to employ their battering-engines, called *Balliſtæ*, to deſtroy it. And even when they had killed it, the ſtench of its carcaſe infected the air and the water to ſuch a degree, that the *Romans* were forced to decamp. Many other extraordinary things are related by the hiſtorians of this ſerpent, which was probably nothing more than an overgrown crocodile, a creature common in *Africa*, but to which the *Romans* were at this time ſtrangers. *Catrou.*

Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J. C.* 255. 196 Conſul. p. they pitch'd their camp within the walls of it; this being of all places the moſt commodious for diſtreſſing *Carthage* itſelf, and the country about it.

The *Carthaginians*, who had ſo unfortunately managed their affairs both by ſea and land, not ſo much through the cowardice of their armies, as the inſufficiency of their chiefs, began now to deſpair. For over and above the calamities that have been related, the *Numidians*, their implacable enemies, taking advantage of the preſent troubles, had enter'd their provinces with fire and ſword, and compelled the inhabitants to fly for refuge to the capital, whither they brought both fear and famine, a mighty multitude of all ſorts flocking at once thither.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 31.

It is not ſurprizing therefore, if in ſuch extremity the *Carthaginians* were overjoy'd to receive a meſſage from the *Roman* General, exhorting them to think of an accommodation. What moved *Regulus* to make this ſtep was the apprehenſion leſt a ſucceſſor, who was expected from *Rome*, ſhould deprive him of the glory of putting an end to the war. The Senate of *Carthage* with great readineſs diſpatched away ſome of their principal citizens to confer with him; but theſe were ſo far from yielding to his propoſals, that they could not with patience even hear them mentioned. For *Regulus* would have had them eſteem it as a ſingular grace and benefit, that he granted them peace upon any terms whatſoever; and thoſe he demanded were ſo infamous for the *Carthaginians*, that in their imagination nothing worſe could befall them, ſhould they be entirely conquer'd. The deputies therefore return'd to *Carthage*, not only without having conſented to any thing, but full of indignation at the intolerable inſolence of the *Roman*. The Senate likewiſe, when the report was made to them of what had paſs'd at the conference, ſhew'd ſo much courage and greatneſs of mind, that tho' they were almoſt at the brink of deſpair, they determined rather to abide any adverſity which their worſt fortune could bring upon them, than ſtain the nobility of their name and actions by ſo ſhameful a treaty.

CHAP. VI.

Xantippus, *a Commander of* Greek *mercenaries in the ſervice of* Carthage, *by his excellent advice and conduct gives a wonderful turn to affairs in* Africa. *The* Roman *army is totally defeated, and* Regulus *taken priſoner.*

c. 32. IN the height of this diſtreſs, to which the victories and obdurate pride of *Regulus* had reduced the *Carthaginians*, there fortunately arrived at *Carthage* a body of recruits which they had hired in *Greece*. Among theſe was a certain *Lacedæmonian* named *Xantippus*, an officer well ſkilled in military affairs according to the *Spartan* diſcipline. This man having informed himſelf of the circumſtances of the late overthrow, and of the number of horſe and elephants which yet remained, concluded within himſelf, and freely ſaid it among his friends, that the *Carthaginians* had

not been vanquiſh'd by the enemy, but by the ignorance of their own leaders. This diſcourſe, being ſpread among the people, came at length to the ears of the magiſtrates, who thereupon commanded him to be brought before the great council. *Xantippus* offer'd ſuch ſtrong reaſons in ſupport of what he had advanced, that it was impoſſible to reſiſt the force of them. He ſhewed plainly, that if inſtead of encamping upon the high grounds, they would keep in the open champain country, they might not only baniſh all fear of the enemy, but even be aſſured of victory. The whole aſſembly, the Generals not excepted, applauded what he ſaid, and it was unanimouſly agreed to place him at the head of their troops; the only example of the kind in all hiſtory, and a ſure proof that the *Carthaginians* were in the utmoſt perplexity and conſternation. Y. of *R.* 497. Bef *J.C.* 255. 196 Conſul-p.

The ſoldiers had already begun to conceive a favourable opinion of this ſtranger, and to hope for ſome advantage from him: but when, after he had led them without the walls of the city, they ſaw in what manner he drew them up, and the new exerciſe he taught them according to his rules, diſplaying ſuch a ſkill in the art of war, as they had never ſeen in any of their former Generals, they were quite tranſported with joy; they preſs'd earneſtly to be led againſt the enemy, being aſſur'd that they could not fail of ſucceſs under the conduct of *Xantippus*. The army in a few days began to march. It conſiſted of 12,000 foot, 4000 horſe, and about 100 elephants.

The *Romans* were at firſt a little ſtruck with the novelty, to ſee their enemies boldly marching in the open flat country, but having no doubt as to the event, they advanced with all expedition to meet them, and incamped within about 1200 paces of them. Next day, the *Carthaginians* held a council of war, to determine how they ſhould proceed, while the ſoldiers aſſembling in great numbers, and proclaiming every where the name of *Xantippus*, demanded with much earneſtneſs to be led againſt the enemy. The officers obſerving this forwardneſs of the army to fight; and being urged by the preſſing inſtances of *Xantippus* not to let the ardour of the ſoldiers cool without action, directions were preſently given to prepare for battle, and the whole conduct of it was committed to the *Spartan*, who diſpoſed his troops in the following manner c. 33.

He drew up all his elephants in one rank, and behind theſe, at a reaſonable diſtance, he placed the *Carthaginian* infantry in one phalanx. The foreign troops were poſted one part of them in the ſame line with the phalanx, to the right of it; the other part, compoſed of light-arm'd ſoldiers, was placed in the intervals of the ſquadrons of horſe, which made the two wings of the army.

On the part of the *Romans*, as the chief care of *Regulus* was to guard againſt the elephants, he to this end placed in front his *Velites*, or light-arm'd ſoldiers, that theſe with their darts or other miſſive weapons might drive back thoſe huge beaſts upon the enemy, or at leaſt hinder them from ruſhing with their uſual violence upon the legions. It was alſo out of

Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J. C.* 255 196 Conſul-p.

of fear of the ſame animals, that he made his battalions deeper in file than he had been accuſtomed to do; an excellent precaution, ſays *Polybius*, againſt the ſhock of the elephants; but then, by narrowing his front, he left himſelf more expoſed to be attack'd in flank by the enemies cavalry, which greatly outnumber'd his.

It does not appear of what number of men *Regulus*'s army conſiſted; but ſuppoſing him to have loſt none of thoſe which his collegue left him, they amounted but to 15,000 foot and 500 horſe.

Poly'. B. 1. c. 34.

The two armies being thus drawn up, and the ſignal being given by *Xantippus*, the firſt onſet was made by the elephants, which met with ſo little reſiſtance from the *Velites*, that they preſently broke into the *Roman* main body, making great deſtruction amongſt the foremoſt ranks of it. However the reſt of that body ſtood firm for ſome time, by reaſon of its depth. But the *Carthaginian* horſe, having quickly driven thoſe of *Regulus* out of the field, began now to charge his battalions both in flank and rear, which put them into great diſtreſs, for they were forced to face every way, and could neither paſs forward, nor yet retire, and had much to do, to make good the ground on which they ſtood. In the mean while ſuch of the *Romans*, as with great difficulty had made their way through the elephants, and had left them at their backs, met with the *Carthaginian* phalanx, which not having yet engaged, and being therefore quite freſh and in good array, obtain'd an eaſy victory over a body of men already in diſorder, and wearied with wounds and labour. Theſe being entirely cut off, and the phalanx advancing, there was no longer any reſource for the *Romans*. Surrounded on all ſides, the greater part of them were cruſh'd to death by the enormous weight of the elephants, or ſlain in their ranks by the arrows of the horſe. Some attempted to eſcape by flight, but being in an open country, they were eaſily overtaken by the cavalry, and either cut off, or made priſoners. Five hundred who followed *Regulus* fell alive with him into the enemies hands [b].

Of the whole *Roman* army there eſcaped only 2000 men, who had been poſted in the left point of their main body, and who in the beginning of the action, to avoid the ſhock of the elephants, had wheeled round them, and charged the mercenaries that were to the right of the enemies phalanx, putting them to flight, and purſuing them even to their intrenchments. Theſe 2000, as it were by miracle, got ſafely to *Clypea*, when the reſt were all ſlain or taken.

On the enemies ſide were killed but 800 men, of whom the greater part were of thoſe mercenaries that had been attack'd by the 2000 *Romans*.

[b] Chevalier *Folard* is of opinion, that the loſs of this battle was wholly owing to the miſtake of *Regulus*, in not leaving (as *Scipio* did afterwards at the battle of *Zama*) ſufficient ſpaces between the columns of his main body, for the elephants to paſs freely through them. That if, by this precaution, the *Roman* infantry had ſhunn'd the miſchiefs, which for want of it they ſuffer'd from the elephants, they would have had nothing to fear from the *Carthaginian* horſe, which could have made no impreſſion on them, (form'd as they were) even after the *Roman* cavalry were driven out of the field.

This

The *Carthaginians*, having ſpoiled the dead, march'd back to their city, leading in triumph the *Roman* General and the 500 other priſoners. Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J. C.* 255. 196 Conſul-p.

Whoever, ſays *Polybius*, reflects ſeriouſly on this adventure, will gather from it excellent inſtruction for the conduct of human life. The misfortune of *Regulus* affords us an admirable leſſon of moderation, and teaches us to be always on our guard againſt the inconſtancy of fortune. We ſee him who but a few days before was ſo elated by ſucceſs, ſo haughty and inexorable, reduced at once to be the ſcorn of a people whom he had deſpiſed and inſulted, and to ſtand in need of that clemency from his enemies, which he had with pitileſs pride refuſed them in their miſery. We learn wiſdom, ſays our author, two ways; by our own experience, and by the experience of others. The firſt is the more convincing, but the other is the eaſier and ſafer. And this is the great benefit we reap from the ſtudy of Hiſtory. Without any peril to our ſelves, we gather rules of conduct from a view of the miſcarriages and misfortunes of other men. c. 35.

Polybius alſo obſerves, that the event which has been juſt related, confirms that ſaying of *Euripides*, *That one wiſe Head is of more value than a great many Hands*. For it is manifeſt in the caſe now before us, that the counſel and abilities of one ſingle perſon ſubdued the *Roman* legions that were eſteemed invincible, reſtor'd a ſinking and deſpairing Commonwealth, and revived the courage of a ſpiritleſs army, grown ſtupid by their defeats.

The *Carthaginians*, whoſe affairs had proſper'd to their wiſh, expreſs'd their joy by ſolemn thankſgivings to the Gods, and by congratulations and mutual good offices to one another. As for *Xantippus*, who had had ſo great ſhare in reſtoring the Commonwealth, he ſhortly after (an admirable example of judgment and wiſdom) took his leave and departed from *Carthage*, well foreſeeing that his ſervices, too great for a reward, would draw upon him both envy and calumny, againſt which a native perhaps might have been able to guard himſelf by the means of relations and friends, but which would in all probability bring ruin upon a ſtranger, who had nothing to ſupport him but his merit. ch. 36.

Polybius tells us, that ſome authors give a different account of *Xantippus*'s departure, and promiſes to take notice of it in another place: but that part of his hiſtory has not been tranſmitted to us. According to *Appian*, De Bell. Pun. c. 3. *Appian*, the *Carthaginians*, *fearing leſt the honour of the victory ſhould be aſcribed to the* Lacedæmonians, feigned a gratification of their General, made him magnificent preſents, and appointed a convoy of their own ſhips to conduct him to *Sparta*, but with ſecret inſtructions to the commanders of the galleys to throw him and his *Lacedæmonians* over-board, ſo ſoon as they could come into the open ſea. Such, ſays our author, was the end of *Xantippus*, and ſuch the recompence he received for ſo noble an exploit. But ſurely this is a very ſenſeleſs account, or the *Carthaginians* muſt have been a very ſenſeleſs as well as ungrateful people, firſt to do publick honour to the *Spartan*, as the known and undoubted

Y. of *R.* 497. Bef. *J. C.* 255. 196 Conſul-p. doubted author of the victory, and then to imagine they could rob him of that glory, and conceal their obligation to him, by treacherouſly throwing him into the ſea.

CHAP. VII.

From the 9th to the 14th Year of the War.

The Romans, *after the misfortune of* Regulus, *vanquiſh the* Carthaginians *in a ſea-engagement on the coaſt of* Africa; *but withdraw their forces from that country. In their return home they loſe their own fleet by tempeſt. They build a new one, and this is alſo deſtroy'd by the like misfortune. Hereupon they reſolve to think no more of naval enterprizes; but after two years, in which their land-forces perform nothing of moment, they change that reſolution, and, while a third fleet is building, they gain a ſignal victory at land over the* Carthaginians, *near* Panormus.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 36. THE *Romans*, having received an account of the miſerable condition of their affairs in *Africa*, applied themſelves with all diligence to repair and equip their fleet, in order to reſcue out of danger the 2000 ſoldiers, who after the late battle had eſcaped to *Clypea*. In the mean time the *Carthaginians*, to reduce thoſe remains of *Regulus*'s army, laid ſiege to that place, and uſed their utmoſt efforts to carry it; but ſo brave and ſo obſtinate was the reſiſtance they met with, that they were forced at length to abandon the enterprize and retire. And now hearing of the naval preparations of the *Romans*, for a new expedition to *Africa*, they fitted out in a ſhort time about 200 galleys, and put to ſea to watch the arrival of the enemy.

Y. of *R.* 498. Bef. *J. C.* 254. 197 Conſul-p. Early in the ſummer, the new Conſuls *Fulvius* and *Æmilius*, with a fleet of 350 ſail appear'd off the promontory of *Mercury*, and there came to an engagement with the *Carthaginians*, who, not being able to ſuſtain the very firſt ſhock, were entirely defeated, and loſt 114 of their veſſels. The *Romans* purſued their courſe, arrived at *Clypea*, took the garriſon on board, and then ſteer'd back towards *Sicily* [c].

They

[c] There are two parts of the *Roman* conduct in this war, which Mr. *Rollin* and Chevalier *Folard* think very hard to be accounted for.

1. Why did the *Romans*, after their victory at ſea near *Ecnomus*, and the fortunate deſcent made in *Africa* in conſequence of that victory, leave ſo ſmall a number of troops under *Regulus* to carry on the war in that country?

Mr. *Rollin* ſays, it was a manifeſt renouncing of the advantages gained by ſea; and the Chevalier declares, that it is enough to diſtract a commentator, and wonders that *Polybius* makes no remark on this ſtrange proceeding.

Again, 2. Why did the *Romans* juſt after this new victory at ſea, near the coaſt of *Africa*, entirely abandon that country, inſtead of attempting to complete the conqueſt of it? *Polybius* relates this fact alſo without any remark upon it, to the great amazement of Chevalier *Folard*.

But as to both theſe difficulties, may it not

Y. of *R.* 498. Bef. *J. C.* 254. 197 Conſul-p. c. 37.

They had a proſperous voyage till they came near the *Sicilian* coaſt, in the territory of *Camarina*; but then ſo terrible a tempeſt overtook them, as no words are able to deſcribe. Of above 400 veſſels, only fourſcore eſcaped deſtruction; the reſt either foundred at ſea, or were daſh'd to pieces againſt the rocks; ſo that the whole coaſt from *Camarina* to cape *Pachynum* was cover'd with dead bodies and fragments of ſhips. Hiſtory affords no example of a more deplorable ſhipwreck. And this calamity was owing, not to fortune, but to the obſtinacy of the Conſuls. For the pilots had often repreſented to them, that the ſeaſon was come when it was no longer ſafe to navigate on that coaſt of *Sicily* which looks towards *Africa:* but they being full of expectation, that the towns ſituate thereon, terrify'd by the late victory, would readily ſubmit to them on their firſt appearance, deſpiſed the admonition, to purſue an intereſt that was by no means worthy of the hazard. But ſuch, as *Polybius* tells us, was the character of the *Romans*; impetuous, preſumptuous, and obſti-

not be anſwer'd, that the only object of the *Romans* in this war, was the conqueſt of *Sicily?* To alarm *Carthage*, and induce her to withdraw her forces out of that iſland, are the reaſons aſſigned by *Polybius* for the deſcent made by the *Romans* on *Africa*. But they were diſappointed as to the effect of this meaſure; for the *Carthaginians* judging by the ſmall army left with *Regulus*, that the enemy, in making their deſcent, had no farther view, than to cauſe a diverſion, did not recall their troops out of *Sicily*; but ſeeing, as *Polybius* ſays, that *the war would go on ſlowly*, named two Generals, *Boſtar* and *Aſdrubal*,, to command the forces they had at home; and when afterwards *Hamilcar* was ſent for from *Sicily* to join thoſe Generals, he brought with him but 5500 men.

It is plain therefore from the conduct of both the contending powers, that neither the *Romans* intended, nor the *Carthaginians* feared, any ſerious attempt upon *Carthage* by *Regulus*, when he began the war in *Africa*.

But why did not the *Romans* reſolve to attempt *Carthage* after the victory at *Ecnomus?* I anſwer: Becauſe from their knowledge of its great ſtrength, and of the many reſources its prodigious wealth furniſh'd, they judg'd the conqueſt of it impracticable at this time, and before *Sicily* was ſubdued. And that they judged right, one may fairly conclude from *Polybius*'s not reproving their policy, and from the difficulties they afterwards met with in that enterprize, even when maſters of *Sicily*, and of all the iſlands between *Italy* and *Africa*.

But after the total defeat of *Regulus*'s army by means of the elephants, the difficulty of ſucceeding in an *African* war was become infinitely great. We find, that the legions were poſſeſſed with ſuch a dread of thoſe animals, that for ſome years they durſt not come to a pitch'd battle with the *Carthaginians* even in *Sicily*, where the *Romans* had many advantages which they muſt have wanted in *Africa*.

In a word, *Sicily* was the preſent object of the *Roman* ambition, and the only reaſonable object it could now have; and we ſhall ſee by what follows, that they had need of all their forces for the reduction of this iſland: ſo that their leaving *Africa* after the victory at ſea by *Fulvius* and *Æmilius*, ought not perhaps to have ſo greatly aſtoniſhed the Chevalier *Folard*.

If we may credit ſome authors, we have a ſhorter way of getting rid of the Chevalier's difficulties, which is, to deny the facts that give occaſion to them. According to theſe writers, *Regulus*'s army was not ſo inconſiderable, as from *Polybius*'s account it ſeems to have been. *Appian* and *Oroſius* make it 30,000 ſtrong; and *Eutropius* reckons 47,000 men, of whom 30,000 were ſlain, and 15,000 taken priſoners in the battle with *Xantippus*.

And as to the *Romans* quitting *Africa* after the victory at ſea by *Fulvius* and *Æmilius*, the laſt nam'd author [*Eutropius*] repreſents them, not as making this retreat by choice, but as being conſtrained to it by famine.

Y. of *R.* 498. Bef. *J. C.* 254. 197 Conſul-p.

nate, they would carry every thing by mere violence; they would force all nature to their will: to them nothing was impoſſible which they could deſire; nay, it muſt of neceſſity come to paſs, if they had once decreed that it ſhould be done. And indeed, *adds our author*, in their enterprizes by land, and where they had to do only with men and the works of men, this inflexible audaciouſneſs of ſpirit for the moſt part (not always) carried them through every obſtacle to the end propoſed; but in their naval expeditions, when they fooliſhly imagin'd that the winds and the ſeas muſt be complaiſant to their wiſhes and projects, they were ſure to be chaſtiſed for their overweening preſumption; and of this they had frequent experience.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 38.

The *Romans*, tho' extremely afflicted, were not diſcouraged by the ruin of their fleet; they ordered a new one of 220 ſail to be ſpedily built; and, which is almoſt incredible, this powerful armament was completely equipped in three months time.

Y. of *R.* 499. Bef. *J. C.* 253. 198 Conſul-p.

The Conſular *Faſces* had been transferr'd to *A. Attilius* and *Cn. Cornelius Aſina* (the ſame *Cornelius* who was formerly made priſoner at *Lipara*, and had lived ſome time in captivity.) Theſe commanders having paſs'd the *Streights* with the new fleet, and touch'd at *Meſſina* to take with them the eighty veſſels which had eſcaped the late ſtorm, ſhaped their courſe for *Cephaledium*, which was delivered to them by treachery; thence they ſailed to *Drepanum*, and began to beſiege it; but upon ſuccours being brought thither by *Carthalo* the *Carthaginian* General (who had retaken *Agrigentum*, and demoliſhed the walls of it) they drew off and ſail'd to ‖ *Panormus*, which, according to *Polybius*, was then the capital city of the *Carthaginians* in *Sicily*. The Conſuls beſieged this place, and having carried the out-works by aſſault, the beſieged capitulated, and ſurrender'd the town. The inhabitants of *Selinus*, *Tyndaris*, and other places, did the like, having firſt driven out the *Carthaginian* garriſons. After theſe conqueſts, the *Romans* leaving a ſtrong body of troops in *Panormus*, returned to *Rome*.

Diod. Sic. in Eclog. p. 877.

‖ *Palermo.*

Y. of *R.* 500. Bef. *J. C.* 252. 199 Conſul-p.

Early the next ſummer the ſucceeding Conſuls, *Cn. Servilius* and *C. Sempronius*, ſail'd over to *Sicily* with all their naval force, and from thence ſoon after ſtood for the coaſt of *Africa*, where they made ſeveral deſcents, and brought away ſome booty, but perform'd nothing of moment.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 39.

Coming at length near the iſland of the *Lotophagi*, (which was called *Meninx*,) not far from the leſſer *Syrtis*; and, being unacquainted with the coaſt, they ran upon ſome banks of ſand, and there ſtuck faſt: The ſea ebbing left them dry, and they were utterly at a loſs what to do, apprehending the deſtruction of the whole fleet. But the flood returning ſome hours after, and they lightning the veſſels by throwing their booty overboard, made a ſhift to get off. Immediately they ſtood away for *Sicily*, as if they were flying before an enemy, and, having doubled the cape of *Lilybæum*, arrived ſafely in the port of *Panormus*. But from thence ſteering their courſe homewards at a time unſkilfully choſen, they loſt 150 of their veſſels by a ſtorm that overtook them in the paſſage. So

So terrible a deſtruction of two fleets by tempeſt totally diſcouraged the *Romans* from all naval enterprizes. No more than ſixty veſſels were to be equipped for the future, and theſe were to be employ'd only to tranſport the troops with the baggage and ammunition into *Sicily*. Their thirſt of glory and empire was not abated, but they determined to rely wholly on their land-forces for the atchievement of the conqueſt they had in view. This conqueſt however could not be effected by land-armies alone, while the maritime towns in the poſſeſſion of the *Carthaginians* were open to receive proviſions and recruits by ſea, as occaſion ſhould require. Nay, ever ſince the defeat of *Regulus* by means of the elephants, the *Roman* ſoldiers were afraid of coming to any engagement by land, where they ſhould have to do with thoſe huge and furious animals. Y. of *R.* 500. Bef. *J. C.* 252. 199 Conſul-p.

The *Carthaginians* had diſpatch'd *Aſdrubal* with 140 elephants to *Lilybæum*, and had ſtrengthned the army which was there with troops drawn from other places; and they had ſent after him 200 ſhips of war. *Aſdrubal*, after his arrival, having firſt applied himſelf diligently to diſcipline his ſoldiers and elephants, had boldly taken the field with a reſolution to offer the enemy battle. But though the armies were on ſeveral occaſions encamp'd within five or ſix furlongs of each other, ſometimes in the territory of *Selinus*, ſometimes about *Lilybæum*, the *Romans* for the ſpace of two years together had not once the reſolution to come to an engagement with the enemy; nor durſt they deſcend into the open champain country. So that during the Conſulſhip of *C. Aurelius*[b] and *P. Servilius*, and that of *L. Cæcilius Metellus* and *C. Furius*, no progreſs was made in their affairs, except the taking of two towns, which they could beſiege, ſtill keeping themſelves poſted in high and inacceſſible places. This terror among the legions made the Senate of *Rome* at length change their meaſures, and reſolve to try their fortune once more at ſea. And accordingly, after the election of *C.* ‖ *Atilius* and *L.* † *Manlius* to the Conſulate, they order'd the building of fifty new veſſels, and that ſuitable levies ſhould be made of men fit for that ſervice. Y. of *R.* 501. Y. of *R.* 502. Y. of *R.* 503. ‖ A 2d time. † A 2d time.

In the mean time *Aſdrubal* having obſerv'd the dread that poſſeſſed the *Roman* army, whenever he preſented them battle; and having intelligence that *Furius* was returned to *Rome* with one half of the army, and that *Cæcilius* with the other was at *Panormus* to protect his allies while they gather'd in their harveſt, he marched from *Lilybæum*, and came with all his forces to the borders of the territory of *Panormus*, hoping to provoke *Cæcilius* to fight. But the *Roman*, who well underſtood his own buſineſs, kept cloſe within the town, and pretending fear, ſuffer'd the *Carthaginians* to advance, and pillage the country without oppoſition, till with all their elephants they had paſs'd a river which ran within a mile of the place. He then ſent out ſome light-arm'd troops, to ſkirmiſh and c. 40.

[b] In this Conſulate *Tib. Coruncanius* was choſen *Pontifex Maximus*, the firſt inſtance of a Plebeian raiſed to that high ſtation.

Y. of *R.* 503. Bef. *J. C.* 249. 202 Conſul-p. draw the enemy farther on, ſupporting his firſt detachment by others, as occaſion required, till by this management he had brought the whole *Carthaginian* army as near the town as he wiſh'd them to be. At a proper diſtance from the walls he had cauſed a trench to be cut, which the elephants could by no means paſs; and he had given his dartmen orders, in caſe thoſe animals advanced againſt them, to retire by ſlow degrees till they came to that trench, into which they were then to leap down, and from thence to gaul the elephants with their darts as much as poſſibly they could. He order'd the town's people at the ſame time to furniſh themſelves with great quantities of darts, and poſt themſelves at the foot of the walls. *Cæcilius* himſelf, with the main body of his forces, remained in readineſs at a certain gate of the town, which was oppoſite to the left wing of the enemy. When the battle grew warm, the leaders of the elephants, being deſirous to have the chief honour of the victory, advanced in order upon the *Romans*, whom, retiring before them, they purſued to the very brink of the trench above mention'd. There they were at a ſtand, and the elephants being terribly gaul'd with the darts both of thoſe who leap'd into the trench, and of thoſe who were on the other ſide of it, began preſently to grow unruly, and turning back furiouſly upon their own infantry, utterly diſorder'd them. And now *Cæcilius*, who ſaw his advantage, ſallied out with all his troops, freſh and in good order, and charging the enemy in flank, eaſily put them to the rout. The *Carthaginians* ſuffer'd a great ſlaughter; ſome of their elephants[c] were killed, and the reſt were all taken.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 41. The news of *Cæcilius*'s exploit cauſed great rejoicings at *Rome*, not ſo much on account of the taking the elephants, tho' that was a very terrible blow to the enemy, as becauſe by the victory obtained againſt thoſe formidable animals, the courage of the *Roman* ſoldiers was entirely reſtored, and they no longer feared to keep in the open country. It was reſolved therefore diligently to purſue the deſign of ſending the new Conſuls into *Sicily* with a naval force, and by vigorous efforts both by land and ſea, to put an end, if poſſible, to this deſtructive war.

[c] *Cæcilius*, according to *Pliny*, B. 8. ch. 6. cauſed the elephants to be tranſported to *Italy*, where they were baited to death in the *Circus* at *Rome*.

CHAP. VIII.

Regulus *is ſent to* Rome *with ſome Ambaſſadors from* Carthage *to negotiate a peace. His behaviour on this occaſion, and the conſequences of it.*

THE defeat of *Aſdrubal*[b] before *Panormus* threw the people of *Carthage* into diſcouragement; they began now to think ſeriouſly of peace;

[b] This General, according to *Zonaras*, was crucified for his miſconduct.

and

and believing that if *Regulus*, a man ſo much eſteemed by his countrymen, engaged in the affair, an accommodation might be eaſily effected, they ſent him to *Rome* with the ambaſſadors appointed for this negotiation; having firſt taken an oath of him to return to *Carthage*, in caſe there ſhould neither be peace nor an exchange of priſoners. When after his landing in *Italy* he came to the gates of *Rome*, he would by no means enter the city, alledging, that he was no longer a *Roman* citizen, but a ſlave of a foreign power, and that he did not come to infringe the laws and cuſtoms of his native country, which forbad the Senate to give audience to ſtrangers within the walls; nor, when his wife *Marcia* with her children ran to meet him, did he ſhew any ſigns of joy, but fix'd his eyes upon the ground, as one aſhamed of his ſervile condition, and unworthy of their careſſes. So extraordinary a behaviour raiſed the admiration both of the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, and all were impatiently curious to know how he would conduct himſelf in the Senate. The *Fathers* being at length aſſembled without the walls, the ambaſſadors were admitted to an audience, and made their propoſals; and then *Regulus*, whoſe turn it was to ſpeak next, only added, *Conſcript Fathers, being a ſlave to the* Carthaginians, *I come on the part of my maſters to treat with you concerning a peace and an exchange of priſoners.* He ſaid no more; aad when he had utter'd theſe few words, ſought to withdraw and follow the ambaſſadors, who could not be preſent at the deliberations. In vain the Conſuls preſſed him to ſtay, and give his opinion as a Senator and Conſular Perſon; he abſolutely refuſed to take his place among the *Conſcript Fathers*. However, he obey'd his *African* maſters, who directed him to continue in the aſſembly. There he remained in a modeſt ſilence till the oldeſt Senators had declared their opinions, and then he expreſs'd himſelf to the following effect: "*Romans*, "I am ſenſible, that the fatigues and expence of ſo difficult a war put "your virtue to a ſevere trial; but what great enterprize can ever be atchieved without a ſteady fortitude? I am an eye-witneſs of the diſtreſs "of *Carthage*. 'Tis nothing but the impoſſibility of maintaining the "war that makes the *Carthaginians* ſolicit for a peace. You have "loſt one battle, (it was when I commanded) a misfortune which "*Metellus* has repair'd by a notable victory. Except two cities, *Sicily* is "entirely yours; and your new fleet ſpreads a terror throughout "the ſeas. You govern your allies in tranquillity, and they ſerve "you with zeal. *Carthage*, drain'd of her wealth, can depend but "little on the provinces of her dominion. With how much eaſe did I "bring them into a revolt! Your armies are compoſed of ſoldiers of "one and the ſame nation, united by mutual eſteem and affection: the "troops of *Carthage* are chiefly made up of ſtrangers, who have no tie "to her but their pay, and whom the example of *Xantippus* will deter "from engaging in her ſervice. My opinion therefore is abſolutely againſt "a peace with our Enemies; nor do I think it for your intereſt to make "an exchange of priſoners. Among the *Carthaginian* captives you have "thirteen

Y. of *R.* 503. Bef. *J. C.* 249. 202 Conſul p.
Appian. in Punic. Bell. c. 3.
Livy. Epitom. B. 18.
Eutrop. B. 2.
Cic. de Offic. B. 3.
Sil. Ital. B. 6.
Val. Max. B. 1. c. 1. & B. 9. c. 2.
A. Gell. B. 6. c. 4.
Aurel. Vict. c. 40.
Zon. B. 8.

Y. of *R.* 503. Bef. *J.C.* 249. 202 Conſul-p.

" thirteen conſiderable officers, young, and capable of commanding one " day the armies of the enemy. As for me, I grow old, and my miſ- " fortunes have made me uſeleſs; add to this, that the number of *Car-* " *thaginian* captives of an inferior rank infinitely exceeds that of the *Ro-* " *man* priſoners, ſo that the exchange muſt be to your diſadvantage. " And after all, what can you expect from ſoldiers who have been van- " quiſh'd and reduced to ſlavery? Will they ſerve the Republic with the " courage of men whoſe reputation is entire and untouch'd? No, they " will rather be like timorous deer, that have eſcaped out of the toils of " the hunter, ever ready to fly at the approach of danger.

This diſcourſe fill'd the Senators with admiration and compaſſion, and tho' they approved his advice concerning the propoſals made by the *Carthaginians*, yet they knew not how to conſent to the ruin of a man whoſe contempt of life made him the more worthy to be preſerv'd. The *Pontifex Maximus* being conſulted, declar'd, that his oath having been extorted from him, he might without perjury continue at *Rome*. They preſs'd him therefore not to return to *Africk*; but *Regulus* was offended with theſe ſolicitations. " What! have you then reſolved to diſ- " honour me? I am too well acquainted with the inconſtancy of the " people's favour, to truſt them with the care of my reputation. At my " firſt return they are full of good will, touch'd with a freſh remembrance " of my misfortunes: this fit of joy once over, and I am no longer " thought of. Nay, I doubt not but my ſtay here would be reproach'd " me by thoſe who have ſeem'd the moſt afflicted for my abſence. How " often ſhall I be called Slave! May not *Rome* herſelf diſdain to own " me for one of her Citizens? I am not ignorant, that death and the " extremeſt tortures are preparing for me; but what are theſe to the " ſhame of an infamous action, and the wounds of a guilty mind? Slave " as I am to *Carthage*, I have ſtill the ſpirit of a *Roman*; I have ſworn to " return, it is my duty to go; let the Gods take care of the reſt.

The Senate, by the ſame decree which refuſed the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors both peace and an exchange of priſoners, left *Regulus* at liberty to continue at *Rome*, or return to *Carthage*, as he ſhould think fit. This was all that *Marcia* could obtain from the *Fathers* by her tears and ſolicitations. *Regulus*, to free himſelf from all farther importunity of his friends, aſſured them, that before his departure from *Africk* the *Carthaginians* had given him a ſlow poiſon, and that he could not long ſurvive the negotiation. As ſoon as it was ended, he quitted his native country, to go and reſume his chains at *Carthage*, with the ſame ſerenity as if he had been going to a country ſeat for his recreation.

Thoſe authors who have celebrated the heroiſm of *Regulus* on this occaſion, tho' they all concur in reporting that he ſuffer'd at his return into *Africa* ſome cruel death from the revenge of the *Carthaginians*, yet are by no means agreed concerning the particular kind of torment he was made to undergo.

The moſt current opinion is, that they cut off or ſew'd back his eye-lids, and then bringing him out of a dark dungeon, expoſed him to the ſun at mid-day: That after this they ſhut him up in a kind of cheſt or preſs ſtuck full, on the inſide, with iron ſpikes, and there left him to die in torment *. Y. of *R.* 503. Bef. *J.C.* 249. 202 Conſul-p.

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* Altho' this ſtory of the cruel revenge which the *Carthaginians* took of *Regulus* after his return to *Carthage* be found in many of the beſt *Roman* authors, and altho' it be not expreſsly contradicted by any ancient writer; yet the reaſons that are offer'd by ſome moderns againſt the truth of it may perhaps excuſe our incredulity, ſhould we look upon it as a meer fiction.

Palmerius, in a note upon *Appian*, offers two very weighty arguments for rejecting the account as fabulous.

1. The *total ſilence* of *Polybius* concerning every thing that happen'd to *Regulus* after his defeat and captivity.

How can we account for that author's ſilence upon matters of ſo intereſting a nature, in his Hiſtory of the Firſt *Punic* War; a Hiſtory, which in many parts of it is written rather with prolixity than brevity; I ſay, how can we account for this, but by ſuppoſing, that *Polybius* for good reaſons diſbelieved the tradition which had been greedily embraced by the *Romans* concerning *Regulus*'s death, and therefore diſdained to record it; and that nevertheleſs he was unwilling to offend them by contradicting ſuch a favourite ſtory? It was hence, doubtleſs, that he avoided ſaying any thing of *Regulus*'s voyage to *Rome*, his behaviour there, and his return to *Carthage*; becauſe had he mentioned theſe, without ſpeaking of his death, (the ſuppoſed immediate conſequence of them,) an affected ſilence in this particular only, would have amounted to a direct condemnation of the prevailing opinion.

2. A fragment preſerved by *Valeſius*, of the 24th book of *Diodorus Siculus*.

This fragment (ſpeaking of *Regulus*'s wife and ſons, into whoſe cuſtody *Boſtar* and *Hamilcar*, two captive *Carthaginian* Generals, had been given) begins thus:

" ——But the mother of the young men " [the *Attilii*] grievouſly laid to heart the " death of her huſband, and *thinking* [or " imagining] that he had loſt his life " [δι' ἀμέλειαν] *for want of good looking after*, " ſtirred up her ſons to uſe the captives " cruelly.

Then it relates, that the captives being thruſt together into a cloſe place, where they could hardly ſtir, and being kept from food, *Boſtar*, after five days of extreme miſery, expired: That *Hamilcar*, who yet held out, telling the wife of *Regulus how careful he had been of her huſband*, with tears implored her compaſſion; but that ſhe, far from being touched with the leaſt ſenſe of humanity, kept him five days after this in the ſame hole, ſhut up with the carcaſs of his companion, giving him only ſo much ſuſtenance as would ſerve to prolong his life in miſery: That by means of ſome ſervants in the houſe, a report of this horrible cruelty came to the ears of the Tribunes of the people: That the magiſtrates having well aſſured themſelves of the fact, ſummoned the *Attilii*, and threaten'd them with the ſevereſt puniſhments, if for the time to come they did not take all due care of the priſoners; nay, that they were very near pronouncing ſentence of death upon the young men, for having brought a diſhonour upon the *Roman* name: That the *Attilii*, to excuſe themſelves, laid the blame upon their mother: That they burnt the body of *Boſtar*, and ſent the aſhes to his relations, and for the future cheriſh'd *Hamilcar*, whom they had ſo barbarouſly treated.

Palmerius's conjecture from the whole is this:

That *Boſtar* and *Hamilcar* being taken priſoners, [probably in that ſea-fight on the coaſt of *Africa*, were the *Carthaginians* loſt 114 ſhips, becauſe no mention is made of them in the war after that time,] the Senate, to conſole the wife and ſons of *Regulus*, put thoſe captive Generals into their hands, that they might have the price of his ranſom in their poſſeſſion.

That *Regulus* died of ſome diſtemper in captivity, whereat the wife being extremely vexed, as having loſt the pleaſing hope of recovering her huſband by exchange, treated the captives cruelly; that the magiſtrates being

Y. of *R.* 503. Bef. *J. C.* 249. 202 Conſul. p.

The news of this barbarity no ſooner reached *Rome*, but the Senate, by way of retaliation, gave up the chief of the *Carthaginian* captives to be treated at the diſcretion of *Marcia*, (the widow of *Regulus*,) who condemned them to the ſame kind of death her huſband had ſuffer'd.

CHAP.

being angry at this conduct, ſhe, to give a colour of juſtice to her cruelty, told this fable of her huſband's periſhing by hunger, want of ſleep, and other torments, to her neighbours and goſſips; that hence the ſtory by degrees ſpread far, gathering ſtrength as it went, and eaſily obtained credit through the hatred born to the *Carthaginians*.

Palmerius might have added, That as ſome women have imaginations very creative, and as, eſpecially where their paſſions are concerned, they eaſily believe the real exiſtence of what meer imagination exhibits, the wife of *Regulus* might poſſibly have perſuaded herſelf without any ground, that her huſband had loſt his life through the hardſhips of his impriſonment. And this is conformable to the fragment of *Diodorus*, which ſays, that ſhe *thinking* that he had loſt his life through *neglect*, ſtirred up her ſons, *&c.*

3. A third argument againſt the ſtory of *Regulus*'s death by torture may be drawn from the diſagreement among thoſe who report it, concerning the kind of torture he was made to undergo. Did he periſh by being kept from ſleep? Was he ſtarv'd to death? Was he crucified? Or did he end his life in a cheſt or barrel ſtuck with ſpikes? All theſe are reported by different authors. If it were certain that the *Carthaginians* put him to death by torture, is it not ſtrange that the kind of torture ſhould not be more certainly known? *Florus* doubts whether he died by the hardſhips of his impriſonment, or upon a croſs.

4. Where there is any good reaſon to ſuſpect the evidence to a fact, the improbability ariſing from the ſituation of things, makes ſtrongly againſt the belief of ſuch fact. Now it ſeems highly improbable, that the *Carthaginians* ſhould treat *Regulus* in the manner pretended, at the very time when two of their Generals and many of their inferior Officers, as well as multitudes of their common Soldiers, were in the hands of the *Romans*.

5. We may obſerve, that *the Senate's giving up the* Carthaginian *priſoners to be treated at the diſcretion of* Regulus's *ſons, upon the news of the cruel death he had ſuffered*, a fact reported by *A. Gellius*, and which, if true, would be the ſtrongeſt argument in favour of the common opinion, is abſolutely inconſiſtent with what *Diodorus* relates of the anger of the *Roman* magiſtrates at the conduct of the *Attilii* with regard to the captives.

Thus much concerning the credibility of the ſtory of *Regulus*'s ſufferings. Before we take leave of him, let us ſee Sir *Walter Raleigh*'s judgment of that part of his behaviour, which is ſuppoſed to have drawn upon him the *Carthaginian* reſentment, and brought him to ſo miſerable an end. Sir *Walter*'s words are theſe:

" The death of *Attilius Regulus* the Conſul " was very memorable. He was ſent from " *Carthage* to *Rome* about the exchange and " ranſom of priſoners on both ſides, giving " his faith to return if the buſineſs were not " effected. When he came to *Rome*, and " plainly ſaw that his country ſhould loſe " by the bargain, ſo far was he from urging the Senate unto compaſſion of his own " miſery, that he earneſtly perſuaded to " have the priſoners in *Africk* left to their " ill deſtinies. This done, he returned to " *Carthage*, *where for his pains taken he was* " *rewarded with an horrible death.* For this " his conſtancy and faith all writers highly " extol him. But the *Carthaginians* ſeem " to have judged him an obſtinate and malicious enemy, that neither in his proſperity would hearken to reaſon, nor yet in " his calamity would have the natural care " to preſerve himſelf and others, by yielding to ſuch an office of humanity as is " common in all wars (not grounded upon " deadly hatred) only in regard of ſome " ſmall advantage. Whatſoever the *Carthaginians* thought of him, ſure it is, that " his faithful obſervance of his word given " cannot be too much commended. But " that grave ſpeech which he made in the " Senate, againſt the exchange of priſoners, " appears, in all reaſon, to have proceeded " from

" from a vain-glorious Forwardneſs, rather " than from any neceſſity of State. For the " exchange was made ſoon after his death; " wherein the *Romans* had the worſe bar- " gain, by ſo much as *Regulus* himſelf was " worth. As for the authority of all Hi- " ſtorians, that magnify him in this point; " we are to conſider that they lived under " the *Roman* Empire: *Philinus*, the *Cartha- " ginian*, perhaps did cenſure it otherwiſe.

CHAP. IX.

From the 14th to the 18th year of the war.

The Romans, *fluſh'd with their late victory at land, imagine, that, with the aſſiſtance of their new fleet, they ſhall now be able to take* Lilybæum, *and thereby put an end to the war in* Sicily. *After conſiderable progreſs made in the ſiege, they are forced to turn it into a blockade: And, not long after, their whole navy is utterly deſtroyed. More fortunate by land, they take* Eryx *from the enemy.* Amilcar Barcha *is ſent from* Carthage *to command the forces of that republic in* Sicily.

WHEN the Conſuls *Attilius* and *Manlius* had got all things ready for their expedition into *Sicily*, they put to ſea with a fleet of 200 ſail, and arrived on the coaſt of *Lilybæum*, in the neighbourhood of which place their land forces were already aſſembled. Y. of *R.* 503. Bef. *J. C.* 249. 202 Conſul p. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 41.

It was the ſtrongeſt, and except *Drepanum* (about 15 miles from it northward) the only city of importance, which the *Carthaginians* poſſeſſed in the iſland; and the *Romans* had therefore reſolved to beſiege it, as knowing that, could they make this conqueſt, it would be eaſy for them afterwards to tranſport the war into *Africa*.

Lilybæum ſtood almoſt at the extremity of the cape of the ſame name, and was ſurrounded by a ſtrong wall and a deep ditch, filled with water from the ſea. The *Romans* ſat down before it, and having fortified themſelves by an intrenchment which ran from ſea to ſea, made their firſt approaches againſt ſome towers of defence. Theſe they ſoon beat to the ground; after which they filled up the town ditch, and by their battering engines, and by mining, ſo weaken'd the wall in many parts of it, that the beſieged began to be extremely terrified; although the garriſon, without reckoning the inhabitants, conſiſted of more than 10000 men. *Himilco*, who commanded in the place, performed the part of a gallant and able officer. He repaired the breaches, made countermines, and was in a manner every where preſent, watching an opportunity to ſet fire to the enemies wooden towers, and engines of battery; and, in this view, making frequent ſallies by night and by day, with a boldneſs little ſhort of temerity; on which occaſions the ſlaughter was ſometimes not leſs than what commonly happens in ranged battles, in the field. c. 42. *Diod. Sic.* in *Eclog. p.* 879. *Zon.* B. 8.

In the mean while, though they were ignorant at *Carthage* of what paſſed at *Lilybæum*, yet concluding that the garriſon muſt be ſorely diſtreſſed, *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 44.

Y. of *R.* 503. Bef. *J. C.* 249. 202 Conſul-p. they diſpatched an officer, named *Hannibal*, with 10000 men on board a fleet of 50 galleys to their relief. *Hannibal* being arrived at the iſland of *Æguſa*, lying a little off of *Lilybæum*, waited there for a favourable and briſk gale, which no ſooner preſented, but crouding all his ſails he came to the entrance of the port, having ranged his ſoldiers in a fighting poſture on the decks of the veſſels. The *Romans*, (whoſe ſhips were ſtationed on each ſide of the mouth of the haven) partly through ſurprize, and partly through fear of being forced by the wind into the port with the enemy, made no motion to attack them, but contented themſelves to look on and wonder at their hardy attempt. Thus *Hannibal* without any oppoſition made his way into the haven, where he landed his men, to the great joy of the beſieged, who were yet more pleaſed with the conſternation, in which they beheld their enemies, than with the ſuccour they themſelves received.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 45. *Himilco* obſerving the alacrity and good diſpoſitions, both of the inhabitants, whoſe courage was raiſed by the reinforcement, and of the new comers, who had yet ſuffered nothing of the hardſhips incident to a town beſieged, reſolved now to make a general ſally and attempt what he had long meditated, the burning of the enemies towers and engines. The conflict on this occaſion was extremely bloody, all the forces on both ſides being engaged in it, and fighting with the utmoſt obſtinacy and emulation. In concluſion the *Romans* happily preſerved their works; for at the very inſtant when they were beginning to deſpair of it, *Himilco*, ſeeing great numbers of his men ſlain, and his purpoſe not effected, ſounded a retreat and put an end to the fight.

c. 46. After this action, *Hannibal* ſailing away in the night, went with his fleet to *Drepanum*, there to conſult with *Adherbal*, who was his intimate friend, and who commanded in that place for the *Carthaginians*.

But now the *Romans* kept *Lilybæum* ſo ſtraitly ſhut up, and watched the entrance of the haven ſo narrowly, that no body durſt make an attempt to come out of it. In the mean while they were very impatient at *Carthage* to have ſome account of the condition of the beſieged; and at length a certain *Rhodian*, named *Hannibal*, a man of diſtinction, undertook to ſatisfy their deſire. Having prepared a light galley expreſly for this enterprize, he put to ſea from *Carthage*, (or perhaps from *Drepanum*) and got under covert of one of thoſe iſlands lying off of *Lilybæum*. Early the next morning, with a fair and freſh gale, paſſing in view of the enemy, who could not thruſt from the ſhores on either ſide time enough to ſtop him, he got by ten o'clock into the Port. The *Romans* doubted not, but this bold adventurer would ſoon attempt to return. The Conſul therefore, to keep a better guard, poſted at the entrance of the Port ten of his nimbleſt veſſels (on each ſide five) which with their oars diſplayed like wings kept themſelves ready to fly upon the expected prey. The *Rhodian* nevertherleſs in broad day light made his paſſage ſafely through theſe guards, and not only ſo, but when he was got out

to

to ſea, turned about, and, lying upon his oars, with an inſulting mockery, challenged any one of them to come and fight him. In this manner he paſſed and repaſſed ſeveral times, bringing orders and carrying intelligence, to the great encouragement of the beſieged, and the amazement of the *Romans* at ſo ſucceſsful a temerity. But the boldneſs of the *Rhodian* was founded on his perfect knowledge of the channel, and how to keep clear of the rocks and ſand-banks on each ſide. His ſucceſs ſo often repeated, encouraged others, who had the ſame ſkill, to follow his example: which the *Romans* finding to be of very ill conſequence, they undertook to choak up intirely the mouth of the haven. For this purpoſe they filled a great number of round ſhips (or ſhips of burden) with huge ſtones, and ſunk them in the channel; but the force of the ſtream carried the moſt of theſe away. However they grounded ſo many of them in the beſt of the entrance, as at laſt it made a manifeſt riſing and heap, like a ragged iſland, in the paſſage. A certain *Carthaginian* galley coming out of the port in the night, and not ſuſpecting any ſuch impediment, ran herſelf aground upon it, and ſo fell into the enemies hands. The *Romans* immediately mann'd her with choſen ſoldiers and their beſt rowers, and then placed her on the watch to catch the *Rhodian*. He had happily got into the port by night, and was returning in open day, when he found himſelf chaſed by a galley that gathered upon him. He ſoon perceived what ſhe was by her form and her ſwiftneſs, and as he was not able to run from her, he had no way left but to turn about and fight with her. This he reſolutely did, but ſhe being too well mann'd for him, he was preſently taken; after which no more attempts were made to go in or out of the port of *Lilybæum*.

Y. of *R.* 603. Bef. *J.C.* 249. 202 Conſul-p.

c. 47.

The beſieged however were not ſo diſheartened by this diſadvantage, as to remit any thing of their attention to a vigorous defence; and though they had loſt all hope of deſtroying the works erected againſt their fortification, they continued indefatigable in repairing the breaches made in it. And now a favourable accident, when they leaſt expected ſuch good fortune, delivered them at once from the fear of thoſe wooden towers which overtopt their walls, and of all the battering engines of the beſiegers. So violent a tempeſt aroſe on a ſudden, as made the galleries of the *Romans* totter, and threw ſome of their towers to the ground. This was thought by ſome *Greek* ſoldiers, in the ſervice of *Carthage*, an opportunity which ought not to be neglected, to attempt once more the burning of the enemy's works of battery. Having communicated the project to their commanding officer (who both approved it, and prepared every thing neceſſary for its execution) out they ruſhed and ſet fire to the works in three places. The flames ſpread themſelves with great ſwiftneſs, by reaſon of the violence of the wind and the drineſs of the timber, the works having been long erected. The *Romans*, all in confuſion and ſurprize, knew not which way to turn themſelves; for they were blinded by the ſmoke and the ſparks of fire which the wind drove in their faces,

c. 48.

Y. of *R.* 503. Bef. *J.C.* 249. 202 Conſul-p.

ſo that many of them were ſlain before they could approach the places where help was wanted. On the other hand, the wind favouring the *Carthaginians*, not only they could ſee clearly, and ſo take their aim, but whatever they threw either againſt the enemy, or againſt their batteries, was carried with the greater violence to the mark, while the darts of the *Romans* could take no effect. In a word, the fire became irreſiſtible, and ſpreading every way, it conſumed to aſhes all the *Roman* works, and even melted the brazen heads of their battering rams.

The beſiegers by this blow were totally diſcouraged from the thoughts of renewing their attacks. They turned therefore the ſiege into a blockade, encompaſſing the place with a rampart and a ditch, and patiently hoping to obtain by ſome happy turn of fortune, or by ſtarving the enemy, what they now deſpaired of carrying by aſſault.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 49.

But when the news came to *Rome* that great numbers both of the ſea and land forces had been loſt in fighting to defend the works, and in the other ſervice of the ſiege, the people were only the more animated by it to purſue the enterprize with vigour, inſomuch that 10000 of them voluntarily offered themſelves to go and ſerve before *Lilybæum*. Upon the arrival of theſe troops at the camp, *Claudius Pulcher*, who was then in the Conſulate, (with *L. Junius Pullus*) and had the command of the forces in *Sicily*, having called his officers together, propoſed to them inſtantly to imbark and ſail with all the fleet to *Drepanum*. To engage their approbation of this project, he repreſented to them, that *Adherbal* the Governor of that place had not a ſufficient ſtrength to reſiſt them; that he knew nothing of the reinforcement they had received, and would never imagine they could be maſters of a naval army, after the loſſes they had ſuſtained in the ſiege. The deſign being generally approved, the ſeamen, both old and new comers, were ordered forthwith to imbark, together with the braveſt ſoldiers of the legions, who readily offered themſelves for this expedition, not doubting but they ſhould enrich themſelves with the plunder of *Drepanum*.

Y. of *R.* 504. Bef. *J. C.* 248. 203 Conſul-p.

For this place then the fleet, conſiſting of 124 gallies, ſet ſail about midnight; and at break of day the headmoſt of the veſſels were deſcribed from the town. *Adherbal* was at firſt ſtruck with the unexpected appearance of the enemy, but, ſoon recovering himſelf, he determined to run any hazard, rather than endure a ſiege, with which he plainly ſaw that he was threatened. Inſtantly he called together, upon the ſea ſhore, all his ſeamem and ſoldiers, both thoſe that were on board his gallies and thoſe that were in the town, and ſet before them in few words how eaſily they might be victors in a naval battle, if they would but reſolve to behave themſelves with courage; and, on the other hand, what dreadful calamities (the conſequences of a ſiege) they muſt unavoidably undergo, if on the preſent occaſion they let themſelves be intimidated by the apprehenſion of danger. The army unanimouſly declared their readineſs to follow him, whitherſoever he ſhould pleaſe to conduct them.

Hereupon he inſtantly ordered them all on board, and embarking himſelf, directed them to keep their eyes on his galley (which ſhould lead the van,) and to do as ſhe did. Then putting to ſea he brought his fleet out of the port, and hid them behind ſome rocks which lay on the ſide of the haven oppoſite to that by which the *Romans* were going to enter. Y. of *R.* 504. Bef. *J. C.* 248. 203 Conſul-p. c. 50.

The headmoſt of the *Roman* veſſels were already entered into the port, other gallies were entering, and others were not far off, when *Adherbal*, quitting his concealment, appeared on a ſudden with his fleet out at ſea, and in a poſture to give battle. At this ſight *Claudius*, extremely ſurprized and diſappointed, made a ſign to his foremoſt gallies to tack and ſtand back again; but when thoſe that had entered the port, or were in the haven's mouth, began to haſten back, they encountered with others that were yet ſtanding in, ſo that falling foul of one another, many of the ſhips received great damage, and were in danger of periſhing. At length, in ſuch manner as they could, they drew out; and as faſt as they got clear and obtained room, put themſelves in order of battle along the ſhore, with their prows pointing towards the enemy. *Claudius*, who had been in the rear of all his fleet, now placed himſelf in the left of his line. He had it once in his power (as ſome report) to ſheer off, but was obſtinately bent to try an engagement; inſomuch that when the ſacred chickens were conſulted and refuſed their meat, he threw them cage and all into the ſea; *If they wont eat*, ſaid he, *let them drink*, not reflecting that ſuch a contempt of religion might diſcourage thoſe who were witneſſes of it. *Cic.* B. 2. *de Nat. Deor.* *Val. Max.* B. 1. c. 4.

In the mean while *Adherbal*, having with five great veſſels paſſed the left wing of the *Romans*, turned the prow of his own galley upon the enemy, making a ſignal for the reſt of his fleet, which followed, on the ſame line, to do the like. And now the whole *Carthaginian* fleet being drawn up in front, advanced againſt the *Romans*, who, as was before ſaid, were drawn up along the ſhore, a ſituation than which none could be more dangerous. As ſoon as the two fleets were near each other, the flags of defiance were hoiſted by the two admirals, and the battle began. At firſt the conflict was equal on both ſides, each fleet having on board the hardieſt men they could pick out of their land forces. But victory by degrees began to declare for the *Carthaginians*, who indeed had many advantages above the *Romans*, by the lightneſs of their veſſels, the expertneſs of their rowers, and eſpecially by the wiſe precaution they had taken to have ſea room, wherein to work their veſſels as occaſion required; for at any time when they were preſſed by the enemy, they could at pleaſure retire, ſpread themſelves, or draw cloſe together, in which movements the lightneſs of their gallies greatly availed. Moreover when any of the *Roman* gallies (heavily built and unſkilfully managed) chaſed any of theirs, and thereby ſeparated themſelves from their own fleet, thoſe who were chaſed could tack upon the purſuers, and *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 50. c. 51.

Y. of *R.* 504. Bef. *J. C.* 248. 203 Conſul-p.

and intercept them, or rowing round them, come upon their flank with their prows and ſink them. All theſe benefits were wanting to the *Romans*; but their greateſt evil was their ſituation; becauſe when any of their veſſels were hard preſs'd, they could by no means retire for the ſhore; they muſt either run aground upon the flats, or bulge againſt the rocks.

The Conſul at length, obſerving the diſtreſs of his fleet, that ſome were ſplit upon the rocks and others ſtranded, ſtood away to the left, and with only thirty veſſels that were the neareſt to him, eſcaped out of the battle. The reſt, to the number of ninety three, fell into the enemies hands, together with all the men, except a few ſoldiers who had got aſhore, after their veſſels were run aground or broken to pieces. Eight thouſand of the *Romans* are ſaid to have been ſlain, and 20000 taken priſoners.

Oroſius, B. 4. c. 10.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 52.

This was a glorious action for *Adherbal*, to whom the *Carthaginians* did very great honour, aſcribing the ſucceſs to his ſole virtue and bravery; while on the other hand, *Claudius* was recalled to *Rome*, where he was reproached with his ſhameful defeat, and with the loſs his country had ſuſtained, as entirely owing to his folly and temerity. Nevertheleſs when he was ordered to name a Dictator, he, to inſult the ſenate, nominated to that ſupreme dignity one *Claudius Glycia*, a mean fellow who had been his viator or tipſtaff: but this mock dictator [c] did not hold the place; *M. Attilius Calatinus* was ſubſtituted in his room. After which the Conſul (now depoſed) was brought to a formal trial for his miſconduct, and was loaded with a rigorous ſentence.

Sueton. life of *Tib.*

Faſt. Cap.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 52.

As for the other Conſul, *Junius Pullus*, he had been diſpatched over to *Sicily* with order to ſupply the camp before *Lilybæum*, with proviſions and all neceſſary ſtores; for the ſafe convoy of which, he had a ſquadron of 60 galleys. Being arriv'd at *Meſſina*, he there augmented his fleet with what ſhips had been ſent thither from *Lilybæum*, and from other places in the iſland, and then ſet ſail for *Syracuſe*; his whole fleet now conſiſting of 120 ſhips of war and 800 ſtoreſhips. From *Syracuſe* he diſpatch'd his Quæſtors with one half of his veſſels of burthen, and ſome of his galleys, that they might without delay furniſh the camp with neceſſaries, while he himſelf ſtaid at this port, waiting the arrival of that part of his fleet which had not been able to keep him company, and was not yet come up, as alſo to receive the corn which the Iſlanders, in the alliance of *Rome*, had provided for him.

c. 53.

About this time *Adherbal*, ſtudious to make the beſt advantage of his victory, and having ſent away to *Carthage*, the ſhips and the Priſoners taken in the battle, deliver'd 30 of his Gallies to *Carthalo*, who had already under his own command 70, with which he was lately arrived, and ſent him to try what miſchief might be done to the *Roman* fleet in the harbour of *Lilybæum*. *Carthalo* ſuddenly entered the mouth of the haven, and finding the *Romans* more attentive to the keeping in of the beſieged,

[c] According to *Liv. Epit.* he was ſuffered afterwards to wear the prætexta at the publick ſhows.

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than to the defence of their fleet, without difficulty ſeized and towed away ſome of the Gallies and ſet fire to others. The *Roman* camp took the alarm, and the ſoldiers haſten'd to the reſcue: but *Himilco* governor of the town ſallying out at the ſame time, and putting the *Romans* in great diſtreſs, gave *Carthalo* leiſure to go through with his enterprize. After this exploit the *Carthaginian* ran all along the South coaſt of *Sicily*, with a view to obſtruct, what in him lay, the ſuccours that were coming to the *Roman* army. And receiving advice by his ſcouts, that a great fleet of all ſorts of veſſels was approaching, and was not far off, he advanced with much joy to encounter them; for both he and his men were full of courage by reaſon of their late victories. The fleet which had been deſcried was that under the conduct of the *Roman* Quæſtors; who when they got notice that the *Carthaginians* were at hand, not conceiving themſelves of ſufficient ſtrength to hazard an engagement, preſently made for the coaſt, and drew up their veſſels under covert of a poor town belonging to their party. Here was indeed no ſafe harbour, yet they found ſome ſort of ſhelter in certain coves, and ſmall retreats among the rocks; and the town having furniſh'd them with engines for caſting ſtones and ſhooting arrows, they waited here, in a poſture of defence, the attack of the enemy. But *Carthalo* knowing that they could not long ride under thoſe rocks, but would be forc'd by any great change of wind either to put out into the deep, or to abandon their ſhips in order to ſave the men, he, after he had taken ſome few of their veſſels, would not purſue the aſſault any further, but retir'd into the mouth of a neighbouring river, and there lay waiting for an opportunity to ſeize the reſt, without hazard to himſelf.

Y. of *R.* 504. Bef. *J. C.* 248. 203 Conſul-p.

In the mean while the Conſul *Junius*, having diſpatch'd thoſe affairs which had detain'd him at *Syracuſe*, departed thence, and doubling the cape of *Pachynus*, ſhaped his courſe for *Lilybæum*, totally ignorant of what had happened to his Quæſtors. The *Carthaginians* perceiv'd his approach, and quitting their ſtation ſailed away to attack him before he could join the other part of his fleet. *Junius* was yet a great way off when he firſt deſcried the enemy; yet finding himſelf too near to fly, and too weak to fight, he alſo, like his Quæſtors, ran in cloſe on a part of the coaſt that was quite harbourleſs and full of rocks, imagining no danger ſo great as that of the enemy. *Carthalo* did not care to attack him in a place where it was difficult to work a ſhip with ſafety; he betook himſelf therefore to a ſtation between the two fleets, and there watched to ſee which of them would firſt ſtir, reſolving to aſſault that which ſhould firſt dare to put out to ſea. Thus all the three fleets were on the ſouth coaſt of *Sicily*, between the cape of *Pachynus* and *Lilybæum*, a tract exceedingly dangerous when the wind ſtormed at South. The *Carthaginians*, who knew the times of tempeſt and their ſigns, and who now perhaps obſerved ſome *ſwelling billow*, or ſome other ſuch like indication of an approaching ſtorm, immediately weighed anchor and made all haſte to double the cape of *Pachynus*, thereby to cover themſelves from the rage

c. 54.

Y. of *R.* 504. Bef. *J. C.* 248. 203 Conſul-p.

they feared. This, though with great difficulty, they effected, and ſecured their ſhips. But the *Romans*, who knew better how to fight than how to navigate, remaining expoſed on that rocky coaſt, were ſo terribly aſſaulted by a boiſterous ſouth-wind, that not a ſingle ſhip of either fleet eſcaped being daſhed to pieces.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 55.

In this manner was *Rome* once more deprived of all her naval force; and, thus deprived, ſhe renounced once more the empire of the ſeas.

Notwithſtanding all theſe diſaſters the *Romans* were ſtill ſuperior to their enemies by land, and though driven to hard ſhifts for proviſions, they continued the blockade of *Lilybæum*, firmly fix'd to abide the utmoſt extremity rather than abandon their enterprize. As for the Conſul *Junius*, who had not loſt his men when his ſhips were deſtroyed, he repaired with all expedition to the camp, full of anxious thoughts, how to retrieve his honour, by ſome remarkable ſervice. Between *Panormus* and *Drepanum*, on the ſide of a mountain, the higheſt in all *Sicily*, except *Ætna*, ſtood the city of *Eryx*; and on the top of the mountain was the temple of *Venus Erycina* *, the faireſt and richeſt temple in the whole iſland. *Junius* formed a deſign upon theſe, and, being aſſiſted by the treaſon of ſome of thoſe who had been appointed to defend them, got poſſeſſion of them by ſurprize. The city was difficult of acceſs, the only way to it being ſteep and narrow; and the Conſul, the better to ſecure his conqueſt, built a

Zon. B 8.

Fort at the entrance of the paſſage to it, where he placed a garriſon of 800 men. He alſo poſted another body of men on the top of the mountain, not doubting but by theſe precautions he ſhould keep quiet poſſeſſion both of the city, and of the whole mountain.

Zonaras reports, that *Junius*, after this, was taken priſoner by *Carthalo*; but *Cicero* and *Val. Maximus* tell us that he killed himſelf to avoid an ignominious ſentence at *Rome*, for his loſing the fleet.

Upon the death or diſgrace of the two Conſuls, the Dictator *Calatinus* paſſed into *Sicily* to command the army, the firſt inſtance of a *Roman* Dictator appearing out of *Italy*. He performed no exploit.

Y. of *R.* 505.

In the following year † nothing very memorable was done by either party. *Zonaras* relates, that *Carthalo*, to draw one of the Conſuls out of the iſland, made a deſcent on the *Italian* coaſt, but without ſucceſs: for hearing that the Prætor of *Rome* at the head of an army was advancing againſt him, he preſently reimbarked and returned to *Sicily*. Here his troops, (whom he had not been able to ſatisfy with the plunder of the *Roman* territories) began to murmur for want of their pay. To put a ſtop to the mutiny he puniſh'd the moſt clamorous with rigour; but this exaſperating even thoſe who were more peaceably inclined, a general ſedition would probably have enſued, to the ruin of the *Carthaginian* cauſe,

* It does not appear at what time the *Carthaginians* made themſelves maſters of theſe places; it was probably after the defeat of *Claudius Pulcher*, for according to *Polybius* they had nothing in the iſland but *Drepanum* and *Lilybæum* at the time when the latter was firſt beſieged by the *Romans*.

† *C. Aurelius Cotta*, *P. Servilius Geminus*, } Conſuls.

if

if he had not been ſeaſonably recall'd, and a captain of much greater credit and abilities appointed to ſucceed him. This was *Amilcar Barcha*, the father of the famous *Hannibal*. Y. of *R.* 505. Bef. *J. C.* 247. 204 Conſul-p.

CHAP. X.

From the 18th year of the war to the end of it, in the 23d or 24th year after its commencement.

Amilcar Barcha, *by his maſterly conduct, hinders the* Romans, *during 5 years, from making any progreſs in the conqueſt of* Sicily. *They at length provide themſelves, once more, with a naval force as the only means to accompliſh their enterprize; and this new fleet, under the conduct of* Lutatius Catulus, *obtaining a complete victory over the fleet of* Carthage, (*commanded by* Hanno) *the* Carthaginians *are conſtrain'd to yield to their enemies the whole iſland, by a treaty of peace.*

IT was in the eighteenth year of the war, that *Amilcar Barcha* became commander in chief of the *Carthaginian* forces by ſea and land. Having quieted the diſcontents of the army, he began his expeditions by ſailing with the fleet to the coaſt of *Italy*; where making a deſcent he pillag'd and laid waſte the territories of the *Locrians* and *Bruttians*. After this he landed his troops in *Sicily*; and, becauſe the *Carthaginians* were not maſters there of any walled town ſo ſituated, as he could from thence infeſt the *Romans*, he took poſſeſſion of a commodious piece of ground near the ſea coaſt, between *Panormus* and *Eryx*. It was a mountain inviron'd on all ſides with rocks and precipices, and on the top of it was a plain of at leaſt twelve miles in compaſs, the ground yielding both good paſture and good corn. To this mountain the avenues were only three, one from the ſea, and two from the land; and being by nature ſtrait and difficult, it required but little fortification to ſecure them. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 56. Y. of *R.* 506.

Here [b] then the brave *Amilcar* encamp'd his forces to confront as well thoſe of the enemy, who were in *Panormus*, as thoſe who were poſted about *Eryx*, putting himſelf between the two armies with admirable reſolution. And though he was thus in the midſt of his enemies, and had no ally from whom he could hope for ſuccour, he nevertheleſs gave the *Romans* great and frequent alarms, obliging them to a conſtant exerciſe of all their courage, vigilance and ſevereſt diſcipline. For, as the place he was in had the command of a port [c], he made uſe of the opportunity, with which

[b] *Chevr. Folard* underſtands the words of *Polybius* to mean that *Amilcar* poſted himſelf in the avenue from the ſea to the mountain.

[c] *Frontinus* (in lib. 3. *Strat.*) reports, that *Amilcar*, in order to ſupply *Lilybæum* with proviſions, made uſe of a ſtratagem to draw the

Y. of *R.* 506. Bef. *J.C.* 246. 205 Conſul-p.

which this furniſh'd him, to ſcour all the coaſt of *Italy* with his fleet, as far as to the territory of *Cuma:* and, when afterwards in *Sicily*, the *Romans* had brought their camp within five furlongs of his army, on the ſide towards *Panormus*, he gave them battle ſo often, and had ſuch variety of encounters with them, that (as *Polybius* tells us) it would be ſcarce poſſible to relate all the particular actions. We muſt judge, *ſays he*, of this war, as we do of a combat between two ſtrong and vigorous gladiators, who in cloſe conflict have been inceſſantly giving and receiving wounds. Neither the ſpectators nor the combatants themſelves would be able to recount every feint and every ſtroke, and to ſay how and why they were made: but we judge of the ſkill, ſtrength, and reſolution of the parties, by their perſeverance in maintaining the fight, and by the event. So with regard to the war in queſtion, a minute detail of the various ſtratagems, ſurprizes, advances, attacks, which were daily practiſed on both ſides, would be very difficult to an hiſtorian, and not very uſeful to the reader. A general relation of what was performed, with the ſucceſs of the whole, will ſuffice to make us know the worth and abilities of the commanders.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 57.

In a word then, no ſtratagem which could be learnt from hiſtory, no new one which preſent circumſtances and opportunity could ſuggeſt, none that required even the utmoſt hardineſs and impetuoſity to execute it, was neglected: and yet, all this while, nothing deciſive was done. The ſtrength on both ſides being equal, the camps impregnable, and the ſpace between them very ſmall, it hence came to paſs that there were every day ſkirmiſhes and encounters between parties, but a general action never. For in all the engagements, ſo ſoon as one party found themſelves hard preſs'd by the other, the weaker inſtantly threw themſelves behind their entrenchments, where they knew they had a ſecure ſhelter; and from whence they preſently returned to the charge.

In this manner was the war carried on for almoſt three years[d]; till at length (as our author ſpeaks) Fortune, who preſided as an impartial umpire at this contention, tranſported the combatants to another theatre, where

c. 58.

the *Roman* fleet out of the harbour. But according to *Polybius*, the *Romans* had no fleet at this time, or if any, none that was able to contend with *Amilcar*, and oblige him to have recourſe to ſtratagem.

‖ *A. Gell.* B. 10 ch. 6. *Val. Max.* B. 8. ch. 1. *Sueton.* life of *Tib.* *Liv. Epit.* B. 19.

Polybius tells us, that the *Romans* abſtained from all naval preparations for 5 years. And therefore when *Florus* ſpeaks of a battle gain'd at ſea by the *Romans* during this time, it ſeems to be a tale without foundation.

[d] Y. of *R.* 506. { *L. Cæcilius Metellus*, 2d time. *N. Fabius Buteo.*

Y. of *R.* 507. { *M. Otacilius Craſſus*, 2d time. *M. Fabius Licinus.*

Y. of *R.* 508. { *N. Fabius Buteo.* *C. Atilius Balbus.*

‖ In the year 507 there happened at *Rome* an accident, which ſerves to ſhew how much it behoved even perſons of the higheſt rank to avoid all petulancy of ſpeech, and not by any indecent words to violate the dignity of *Roman* diſcipline. *Claudia*, the daughter of the famous *Claudius the Blind*; and ſiſter to that *Claudius Pulcher*, who loſt the battle of *Drepanum*, wherein many thouſand

where ſhutting them up in yet cloſer liſts they were engaged in a more perilous conflict.

The *Romans* (as has been before obſerv'd) had placed garriſons on the top and at the bottom of mount *Eryx*. *Amilcar* nevertheleſs found a way, lying towards the ſea, by which he convey'd his men (before the enemy had the leaſt notice of it) into the city of *Eryx*, that was about the middle of the aſcent. By this means the *Romans*, who held the top of the mountain, were in a manner beſieged, and it is wonderful with what reſolution and conſtancy they ſuſtain'd all the hardſhips to which their ſituation expoſed them: but it is yet more wonderful, that the *Carthaginians* ſhould be able to defend themſelves, when hard preſs'd by the enemy both from above and from below, and when deprived of all means of ſubſiſtence, except by one avenue from the ſea. And here again on this new ſtage of action were exerted, on both ſides, all the art and vigour that can poſſibly be conceived, in an infinite variety of ſtratagems and aſſaults. Nor was an end put to this fierce ſtruggle (as the hiſtorian *Fabius* falſly reported) by the failure of ſtrength in the contending parties, exhauſted by the ſufferings they underwent; for they ſuſtain'd famine, fatigue, and all the hardſhips incident to ſieges with ſo unwearied a fortitude, that they ſcarcely ſeemed to feel them: but a concluſion was given to the war after a different manner, and before either party in *Sicily* had gain'd any ſuperiority over the other. *Polybius* compares the rival powers to two valiant birds, that, weaken'd by a long combat, and unable any more to make uſe of their wings in the fight, yet ſupport themſelves by their ſole courage, and with joint conſent coming cloſe together, peck and maul each other with their bills, thus mutually ſtriving by theſe laſt efforts to obtain the victory.

Two [c] whole years were waſted by the *Romans*, in fruitleſs attempts to diſlodge the invincible *Amilcar* from *Eryx*. And now the Senate of c. 59. *Rome*, who had hoped every thing from the bravery of their land forces, became perfectly convinced that they ſhould never atchieve the conqueſt of *Sicily* without the help of a naval ſtrength. If, by means of a fleet, they could once get the maſtery of the ſea, it would then be impoſſible for the *Carthaginian* General to hold out much longer, becauſe his ſupplies of proviſion would be totally obſtructed. But where to find money at this time for a naval armament of ſufficent ſtrength, was a difficulty

thouſand *Romans* periſh'd, returning in her chariot from the public ſhow, happen'd to be ſtopt in her way by the multitude that throng'd the ſtreet. The Lady proud and impatient, cry'd out, *Gods, how this city is ever-crouded! I wiſh my Brother* Claudius *were alive again, and had the command of another Fleet!* Theſe words, even from a woman, were thought unpardonable. She was brought into judgment for them by the Ædiles, before the Tribes, and was there fined 25000 aſſes of braſs. [80*l.* 14*s.* 7*d. Arbuthnot.*]

[c] Y. of *R.* 509. { *A. Manlius Torquatus.* *C. Sempronius Blæſus,* 2d time.

Y. of *R.* 510. { *C. Fundanius.* *C. Sulpicius.*

that ſeemed not eaſy to be ſurmounted; for the expence would be great, and the public treaſury was exhauſted. On this preſſing occaſion the richeſt of the citizens ſhew'd a laudable zeal for their country's ſervice. They built each of them a Quinqueremis at his own coſt; and this example had ſo good an effect, that thoſe, who were not able ſingly to do the like, yet concurring, two or three of them fitted out a galley at their joint expence. In ſhort, a fleet of 200 [f] Quinqueremes was thus put to ſea by private citizens, who required no other condition, but to be reimburſed when the ſtate of the public affairs would allow of it. And this armament was vaſtly better than any of the former, in as much as all the new gallies were built upon the model of that light veſſel, which had been taken from *Hannibal* the *Rhodian*.

Y. of *R.* 511. Bef. *J. C.* 241. 210 Conſul-p. *Liv. Epit.* B. 19.

The Conſuls choſen for the new year were *C. Lutatius Catulus*, and *A. Poſthumius*. The later being at the ſame time High-Prieſt of *Mars*, the *Pontifex Maximus* declared it unlawful for him to abandon his prieſtly functions; nay, he abſolutely forbad it, accompanying his prohibition with threats, and *Poſthumius* was oblig'd to ſubmit. But this religious ſcruple occaſioned the creation of a new magiſtracy in the republic. The ſenate and people, not thinking it adviſable to truſt the command of their army to one general alone, nor yet to expoſe themſelves to the inconveniences which might ariſe from the too long abſence of the *Prætor of Rome*, to whom it naturally fell to ſupply the place of *Poſthumius* in the field, they created a ſecond Prætor for that purpoſe. This officer they ſtiled *Prætor Peregrinus*; and he was not only to aſſiſt the general abroad, but to judge or appoint judges in all civil cauſes between *Roman* citizens and ſtrangers. The former Prætor took the title of *Prætor Urbanus*; and it was now regulated, that his reſidence ſhould be at *Rome*, and his juriſdiction confined to the cognizance of cauſes between *Roman* citizens only. It was alſo decreed, that the perſons who were to fill theſe offices ſhould be choſen annually in the *comitia by centuries*, but their different provinces be determined by lot.

Valerius Falto, the firſt *Prætor Peregrinus*, embarked with the Conſul *Lutatius*, on board the new fleet for *Sicily*. They began the campaign with the ſiege of *Drepanum*, and they very ſoon made a breach in the wall; nevertheleſs they did not carry the place; for as the Conſul at the head of his men was mounting to the aſſault, he receiv'd a dangerous wound in his thigh; whereupn the ſoldiers quitted the enterprize, to take care of their general, whom they carried back to the camp. After this the ſiege was diſcontinued; for *Lutatius* being perſuaded, that the *Carthaginians* would ſoon appear with a fleet upon the coaſt, and that a victory over them at ſea, would contribute much more than any other exploit towards the entire conqueſt of *Sicily*, turn'd all his thoughts to diſcipline his men, and prepare them for a naval engagement.

Oroſ. B. 4. c. 10.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 59.

[f] Three hundred, according to *Eutropius*. B. 2. c. 27.

The

The *Carthaginians* greatly ſurprized at the news of a *Roman* navy at ſea, had diſpatched away a [b] fleet, with all expedition, under the conduct of an eminent commander named *Hanno*; of whoſe character, becauſe of the ſhare he will have in ſeveral important events of this hiſtory, it may not be improper to give ſome features: An able pen, on the preſent occaſion, has thus deſcribed him. A. Y. of *R.* 511. Bef. *J. C.* 241. 210 Conſul-p. c. 60.

" —— A man wiſe in picture, exceedingly formal, and ſkilful in the " art of ſeeming reverend. How his reputation was firſt bred, I do not " find, but it was upheld by a factious contradiction of things undertaken " by men more worthy than himſelf. This Quality procur'd to him (as " it has done to many others) not only approbation among the ancient " ſort, whoſe cold temper is averſe from new enterprizes, but an " opinion of great foreſight, opinion confirmed by every loſs received. " More particularly he was gracious among the people, for that he was " one of the moſt grievous oppreſſors of their ſubject provinces; where- " by he procured unto the *Carthaginians* much wealth, but therewith- " all ſuch hatred, as turn'd it all to their great loſs. He had before " this been employed againſt the *Numidians*, and wild *Africans*, who, " in making war, were more like rovers than ſoldiers. Of thoſe fugitive " nations he learned to neglect more manly enemies, to his own great " diſhonour, and to the great hurt of *Carthage*; which loſt not more " by his bad conduct than by his malicious counſel, when having ſhewed " himſelf an unworthy captain, he betook himſelf to the long robe. " Yet is he much commended in *Roman* hiſtories as a temperate man, " and one that ſtudied how to preſerve the league between *Rome* and " *Carthage*: In which regard how well he deſerved of his own coun- " try, it will appear hereafter; how beneficial he was to *Rome*, it will " appear hereafter, and in his preſent voyage, wherein he reduced the " *Carthaginians* to a miſerable neceſſity of accepting, upon hard con- " ditions, *that* PEACE, which he thenceforth *commended* [c]." Sir *W. R.*

Hanno had well furniſhed his navy with all neceſſary proviſions for the ſoldiers at *Eryx* (for dexterity in making ſuch preparations, was the beſt

[b] Of 400 ſail according to *Eutropius*.

[c] It is proper to inform the reader, that though Sir *W. R.* is here followed, in ſuppoſing that the *Hanno*, who now commanded the *Carthaginian* fleet, was the ſame with that *Hanno*, who afterwards headed the faction againſt *Amilcar Barcha* and his ſon *Hannibal*, there is ſome reaſon to doubt it. *Polybius*, indeed, ſays nothing from which we can infer, that they were different perſons; and the importance of the preſent expedition makes it probable, that the *Carthaginians* would not commit the charge of it, but to a man in the higheſt reputation and eſteem, as he, whom Sir *W. R.* characteriſes, was at this time. Yet by ſome words which *Livy* (as we ſhall ſee hereafter) puts into the mouth of that *Hanno*, who ſignalized himſelf by his oppoſition to *Hannibal*'s meaſures, one would think that the ſpeaker could not be the perſon who loſt the battle at ſea againſt *Lutatius*. For the hiſtorian makes the enemy of *Hannibal*, on two ſeveral occaſions, remind the *Carthaginians* of that ſhameful and fatal overthrow, as an event which they ought never to forget.

And if we may believe *Zonaras*, the *Hanno* who ſuffered the defeat at the *Ægates*, was crucified at his return home for his miſconduct.

Y. of *R.* 511. Bef. *J. C.* 241. 210 Conſul-p.

of his qualities) but he had neglected to man his galleys with able mariners, trained to the practice of ſea fights; he had taken the firſt that preſented themſelves; and his ſoldiers were raw men that knew nothing of ſervice. He had been careleſs in theſe matters, through a fooliſh contempt of his enemies; not remembring that it was the reſiſtleſs force of tempeſts, rather than any other ſtrength of oppoſition, which had made them forſake the ſeas. Yet in one thing he judged right, or at leaſt had been well inſtructed; for his intention was, firſt of all to ſail to *Eryx*, and there to diſcharge his ſhips of their loading, and when he had thus lightened them, to take on board the choice of the land-forces together with *Amilcar* himſelf; and then to offer the enemy battle. This was an excellent courſe if it could have been performed. But the Conſul *Lutatius*, who, on the firſt notice of *Hanno*'s being at ſea, had ſailed from *Drepanum* to the iſland of *Æguſa*, (one of the *Ægates*[i]) uſed all poſſible diligence to prevent the execution of the enemies deſign; not that he was informed of their deſign, but that he knew it was, for them, the beſt which they could have, and becauſe he feared no danger ſo greatly as an encounter with *Amilcar*. For theſe reaſons, though he was not yet cured of his wound, and though the weather was very rough, and the ſeas went high, when, the next morning he deſcried the *Carthaginian* fleet, coming with a flown ſheet from the iſland of *Hiera*[k], (where they had put in) he choſe rather to fight with the enemy, who had the wind of him, than upon unlikely hope of better opportunity, to ſuffer their convoy to paſs to *Eryx*.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 60.

All that *Hanno* ſhould have done, *Lutatius* had performed. He had carefully exerciſed his men in rowing; he had lightned his galleys of all unneceſſary burthens, and he had taken on board the beſt men of his land-forces. The *Carthaginians* therefore, at the very firſt encounter, were utterly broken and defeated: Fifty of their galleys were ſunk and ſeventy taken, the reſt by a ſudden change of wind eſcaping to the iſland of *Hiera*. The Conſul after the battle ſtood away with the fleet for *Lilybæum*, there to diſpoſe of his prizes and priſoners; of which latter the number amounted to near ten thouſand.

c. 61.

When, at *Carthage*, they received the news of *Hanno*'s defeat, ſo contrary to all expectation, they were greatly at a loſs what meaſures to take. If, to have their revenge, nothing had been neceſſary but courage and emulation, they were never better provided than at this juncture, to proſecute the war. But what could they do? *Amilcar*, on whoſe valour and judgment the honour and ſafety of the commonwealth depended, was ſurrounded by his enemies, and could not be relieved. For as the *Romans* were now maſters of the ſea, it was not poſſible for the *Carthaginians* to ſend either proviſions or reinforcements to their armies in *Sicily*. In this extremity they could fix upon nothing better than to ſend by an expreſs

[i] Iſlands lying off of *Lilybæum* and *Drepanum*.

[k] Another of the *Ægates*.

full powers to the General himſelf, to take what courſe he ſhould think moſt proper; and this they did, leaving all concluſions to his election and ſole counſel. Y. of *R.* 511. Bef. *J. C.* 241. 210 Conſul-p.

Amilcar, who had done every thing that could be expected from the moſt intrepid courage, and the moſt conſummate wiſdom, and whom no adverſity, accompanied with the leaſt hope or poſſibility of recovery, had ever vanquiſhed, but who yet knew when to yield as well as when to reſiſt, began now to turn his thoughts wholly to the preſervation of the army under his conduct; for he plainly ſaw, that *Sicily* was loſt. He diſpatched therefore an Ambaſſador to the Conſul, with an overture of peace. *Lutatius*, having well conſidered it, gathered ſo many arguments from the preſent poverty of the *Roman* ſtate, exhauſted beyond expectation by the war, that he readily liſtned to the propoſal. At firſt he demanded, that *Amilcar* and his ſoldiers ſhould deliver up their arms; but this the *Carthaginian* abſolutely refuſed, declaring that he would rather periſh than undergo ſo great an infamy; and the Conſul acquieſced. In ſhort, a treaty was concluded on terms to this effects. *Corn. Nep.* in *Amilc.* c. 1.

" There ſhall be peace between *Rome* and *Carthage* (provided the " *Roman* people approve of it) on the following conditions. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 62.

" The *Carthaginians* ſhall evacuate all *Sicily*.

" They ſhall deliver up all the *Roman* priſoners ranſom free.

" They ſhall pay to the *Romans*, within the ſpace of twenty years " next following, 2200 [b] talents of ſilver, whereof one thouſand ſhall " be paid immediately.

" They ſhall not make war upon King *Hiero*, nor upon any of the " allies of *Rome*; nor ſhall the *Romans* moleſt any of the allies of " *Carthage*.

" Neither of the contracting powers ſhall raiſe any fortreſs, or levy " any ſoldiers in the dominions of the other.

" Nor ſhall either of them enter into confederacy with the allies of " the other.

Theſe articles being brought to *Rome*, and not being entirely approved there, ten commiſſioners were ſent into *Sicily* to terminate the affair. Theſe added 1000 talents to the former ſum, and ſhortened the time for payment to ten years; and they alſo required, that the *Carthaginians* ſhould not only leave *Sicily*, but withdraw their troops from all the Iſlands between *Sicily* and *Italy*. *Amilcar* not thinking it adviſable to break off the negotiation for the ſake of theſe new demands, the treaty was ratified in form: but (probably) not in the Conſulate of *Caius Lutatius*, but of his ſucceſſors *Q. Lutatius* and *A. Manlius* in the year of *Rome* 512. c. 63. *Livy*, B. 30. c. 44. Y. of *R.* 512.

Such was the end of the Firſt Punic War, after it had laſted 23 [c] or 24

[b] 437250 *l. Arbuthnot.*

[c] *Polybius* makes this war to have laſted 24 years, and ſo do others: But *Eutropius* puts a concluſion to it in the 23d year; which

Y. of *R.* 512. Bef. *J. C.* 240. 211 Conſul-p.

24 years: A war (*ſays* Polybius) the longeſt, the leaſt interrupted, and the greateſt (that is, the moſt abounding with great actions and events) of any to be met with in hiſtory. The *Romans* in the courſe of it loſt 700 ſhips of war, and the *Carthaginians* about 500[b]; the greatneſs of which loſſes ſufficiently prove the greatneſs of the two ſtates, and of the war itſelf, wherein, (according to the ſame author) the *Romans* in general ſhewed themſelves the braver nation, and *Amilcar* the ableſt Captain.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 64.

AND now the great affair at *Rome* was to determine the fate of *Sicily*, the manner in which it ſhould be governed, and the emoluments which the republic ſhould draw from ſo fine a conqueſt. The whole iſland, excepting the little kingdom of *Syracuſe*, was declared a *Roman Province*, that is to ſay, a province that ſhould be ruled by *Roman* laws and *Roman* magiſtrates. A Prætor was to be annually ſent thither to be its Governor; and a Quæſtor to take charge of the revenues. Theſe revenues were either fixed or caſual. The fixed were called *tributes*, and were a certain ſum, which the province was obliged every year to pay into the publick treaſury. The caſual were the tenths of the product of the lands, and the duties upon merchandize exported and imported. And theſe tenths and cuſtoms were generally farmed by the publicans[c].

Solinus.

Val. Max. B. 2. c. 8.

Caius Lutatius the Conſul, and *Q. Valerius* the Prætor, had both of them the honour of the triumph at their return to *Rome*. The Conſul indeed diſputed the pretenſions of the latter to it, becauſe *Valerius* had not acted in a poſt of equal authority with him; and upon a reference to

which reckoning agrees with the *Capitoline* Marbles, ſince, according to them, *Appius Claudius Caudex*, who began the war, was Conſul in the year 489, and *C. Lutatius Catulus*, who made the treaty with *Amilcar*, was Conſul in 511.

Livy, towards the cloſe of his 30th book, ſays, the Firſt Punic War ended when *Q. Lutatius* and *A. Manlius* were Conſuls. Theſe were the ſucceſſors of *C. Lutatius*; and perhaps their Conſulate was begun when the ten Commiſſioners came into *Sicily* and the peace was ratified.

[b] How came it to paſs, that in *Polybius*'s time, when the *Romans* were arrived at almoſt univerſal empire, they could not fit out ſuch fleets, and make ſuch naval preparations, as in the time of the Firſt Punic War? This queſtion is on the preſent occaſion ſtarted by *Polybius* himſelf; who adds, that a plain and ſatisfactory reaſon may be aſſigned for the change, but defers giving it, till he ſhall come to ſpeak of the form of the *Roman* commonwealth. His diſcourſe on this latter ſubject not being tranſmitted to us, we are at a loſs to know how the difficulty may be reſolved.

B. 1. c. 64.

[c] Among the advantages which *Rome* gained from her wars in *Sicily*, may be reckoned an improvement of her taſte for letters and juſter notions of poeſy. *Sicily* abounded with excellent poets. In the firſt year after her peaceable poſſeſſion of this iſland, when *C. Claudius* and *M. Sempronius* were Conſuls, appeared *L. Livius Andronicus*, the reformer of the Latin theatre. He introduced upon the ſtage connected fables after the *Greek* manner, inſtead of the buffooneries, and rambling diſcourſes, with which the people were before entertained.

About this time was born at *Rudes*, a city of *Calabria*, *Ennius*, the famous poet and hiſtorian. He was the inventor of Hexameter verſes among the *Latins*; but his *Life of Scipio Africanus*, which was his maſter-piece, he wrote in Choraicks. He is thought to have eclipſed the poet *Nævius*, his contemporary.

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the arbitration of *Atilius Calatinus*, the point was decided againſt the Prætor; nevertheleſs, as his conduct in the war had been uncommonly meritorious, he obtained his ſuit by a decree of the people. Y. of *R.* 512. Bef. *J.C.* 240. 211 Conſul-p.

But the public joy at *Rome*, for the late important conqueſt, was greatly damp'd by two misfortunes, which about this time followed cloſe upon one another. The *Tiber* on a ſudden overflowed with ſuch violence, as to overturn a great number of houſes in the lower grounds; where the water continuing a conſiderable time, it much damaged alſo the foundations of many others.

After this there happened a greater calamity by fire, which breaking out in the night deſtroyed not only numberleſs houſes, but an incredible multitude of people. It conſumed all the buildings within the circumference of the forum. *Cæcilius Metellus* the *Pontifex Maximus* ſignalized his pious zeal on this occaſion: For when the fire had ſeized the temple of *Veſta*, and when the Virgins in a fright had all deſerted it, he ventured his life to ſave the *Palladium:* Making his way through the flames, he brought it ſafely out of the ſanctuary. One of his arms was much hurt in the attempt, and he entirely loſt his ſight. To reward ſo heroic an action of piety, it was decreed by the people, that he ſhould have the privilege of being carried to the ſenate houſe in a chariot, as often as he went thither; a diſtinction which had never been granted to any man before. *Val. Max.* B. 1. c. 4.

It is probable that the *Roman* tribes (by the addition of thoſe called *Velina* and *Quirina*) were about this time augmented to 35, which number was never after increaſed. *Liv. Epit.* B. 19.

CHAP. XI.

The Faliſci *in* Hetruria *rebel againſt the* Romans, *but are quelled in a few days.* Carthage *is reduced to great extremities in a war, which for more than three years is carried on againſt her by her foreign mercenaries, in conjunction with her* African *ſubjects. The conduct of the* Romans *on this occaſion.*

THE peace between *Rome* and *Carthage* was hardly ratified, when both theſe ſtates found themſelves on a ſudden engaged in new and unexpected wars at home, by the rebellion of their own ſubjects. *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 65.

The *Faliſci* in *Hetruria*, through ſome unaccountable levity or madneſs, roſe up in arms, and declared war againſt the *Roman* power. This inteſtine commotion cauſed a great alarm and terror throughout all *Italy*; and it occaſioned no leſs wonder, by the ſpeedy iſſue to which it was brought. The Conſuls *Q. Lutatius* and *A. Manlius*, at the head of the legions, are ſaid to have quelled the rebels in ſix days. Two battles were fought. In the firſt, the ſucceſs was doubtful; but in the ſecond, the Y. of *R.* 512. *Eutrop.* B. 2. *Liv. Ep.* B. 19. *Zonaras.*

Y. of *R.* 512. Bef. *J. C.* 240 211 Conſul p.

Romans obtained a complete victory. The *Faliſci* having loſt 15000 men in the action, humbly ſubmitted themſelves, and ſued for peace. They were deſpoiled of their arms, horſes, houſhold-goods, ſlaves, and half their territory. Their city, ſtrongly ſituated in a ſteep craggy place, was ordered to be demoliſhed; and the inhabitants to build a new one for themſelves in the flat open country. Nay, the people of *Rome* were meditating a more ſevere revenge againſt a nation that had ſo often rebelled; but they reſtrained their wrath by the advice of a venerable *Roman* named *Papirius*, whom the Conſuls had employed to draw up in writing the form of the rebels ſurrendry. He repreſented to the multitude, that the *Faliſci* had yielded themſelves, not to the *power* but the *faith* (or honour) of the *Romans*[b]; and this ſacred name of *publick faith* had ſuch a prevalency on the minds of the people, that they readily acquieſced in what had been agreed upon.

CARTHAGE, not ſo fortunate as *Rome*, had a much longer and more dangerous conflict to ſuſtain at the very gates of the capital.

The avarice of a republic of merchants, who better underſtood the value of money, than the merit of brave ſoldiers, was the ſource of this inteſtine miſchief. They would needs perſuade thoſe foreign troops, who had fought ſo gallantly under *Amilcar* in *Sicily*, and had endured ſo ſteadily all the hardſhips of war, in the defence of a ſtate, to which they had no tie but their wages; they would needs, I ſay, perſuade theſe ſtrangers to remit, *out of affection to that ſtate*, ſome part of what was due to them from it, by compact, for their ſervices: whereas in truth they ought rather to have rewarded them with rich gratuities beyond their ſtipulated pay. In the purſuit of this penurious project they fell into ſtrange imprudences. It could not be well imagined, that a propoſal to foreign mercenaries, to contribute out of their pay to the expences of the war, would be very chearfully received or eaſily digeſted. Nevertheleſs, that they might hear the grave oratory of *Hanno* on this head, the *Carthaginians* ſuffered theſe ſtrangers, amounting to 20000 men, to aſſemble all in one place, in the neighbourhood of the capital; and this at a time, when *Carthage* had not, on foot, a ſufficient body of her own people to reſiſt ſuch an army in caſe of a mutiny. And they committed a yet greater miſtake, as *Polybius* obſerves, in conſtraining the ſoldiers to take with them from the city, to the place of rendezvous, their wives and children; becauſe theſe, had they remained in *Carthage*, would have ſerved as hoſtages for the good behaviour of the fathers and huſbands.

In a word, the rhetoric of *Hanno* had no effect but to kindle the higheſt reſentment. The mercenaries turned their arms with fury againſt their late maſters; the *African* ſubjects of *Carthage*, eaſily drawn into rebellion, becauſe greatly oppreſſed, took this opportunity to attempt

[b] Faliſcos non poteſtati, ſed fidei ſe *Romanorum* commiſiſſe. *Val. Max.* B. 6. ch. 5.

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the recovery of their freedom; and the *Numidians*, the old enemies of the republic, and greedy of her deſtruction, joined their forces to the rebels. Y. of *R.* 512. Bef. *J. C.* 240. 211 Conſul-p.

In this war *, which laſted three years and almoſt four months, it was not with the *Carthaginians*, as in former times, when they fought for glory, or to give a wider extent to their empire; it was no ſportive enterprize of ambition; all was at ſtake; the very being of their government, their eſtates, their lives were all in the utmoſt peril, from the deſperate fury and cloſe attacks of the moſt cruel and implacable enemies they had ever contended with. *Amilcar* ſaved his country. Superior by his ſkill and courage, not only to the impetuous force of multitudes, but to the cautious bravery of an army, which he himſelf had trained, and diſciplined, it was through his abilities, that his republic remained victorious in the concluſion of this *inexpiable* war; a war that was never to be ended but by the total deſtruction of one of the contending parties.

The African *War, or War of the* Carthaginians *with their* Mercenaries.

* This war being a very curious part of hiſtory, and ſerving greatly to give us a more perfect knowledge of the character of that Rival State, whoſe deſtruction alone could eſtabliſh the *Roman* greatneſs, it may neither be unſeaſonable, nor diſagreeable to the reader, if the ſubſtance of *Polybius*'s account of it be here inſerted.

WHEN Amilcar *had finiſhed the treaty, which put an end to the* Firſt Punic War, *he led his troops from* Eryx *to* Lilybæum, *and there committed to* Giſco (*Governor of the place*) *the care of tranſporting them into* Africa. Giſco, *as foreſeeing what might happen, acted in this affair with great caution. For, inſtead of embarking the forces all at once, he ſhipped them off ſucceſſively, and in ſmall parties, allotting ſo much time between the embarkations, as might ſuffice for his prudent purpoſe; which was, that thoſe who were firſt ſent might be paid off and diſmiſſed to their own countries, before the others ſhould arrive. The* Carthaginians, *however, whoſe treaſury was much exhauſted, did not correſpond to the intention of* Giſco, *but hoping they ſhould be able to obtain from the whole army, when aſſembled, a remiſſion of ſome part of what was due to them, detained at* Carthage *the ſeveral diviſions as they came.* *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 66, & ſeq. and Sir *W. R.* B. 5. ch. 2.

Polybius does not aſſign any reaſon, nor does any reaſon readily occur, why it ſhould have ſeemed more eaſy to obtain this *remiſſion* from the whole army together, than from the parts when diſjoined. "One would

* Sir *W. R.* "think, (as a judicious hiſtorian* obſerves,) that to perſuade any ſmall "number of men, lodged in ſo great a city as *Carthage*, to have ſome "conſideration of the diſtreſs and poverty of the ſtate would have been "no hard matter; and if the firſt comers had been thus perſuaded, and "had been friendly diſcharged, it would have left a good precedent to "the ſecond and third, whilſt their disjunction had made them unable "to recover their whole due by force." Perhaps the beſt conjecture towards accounting for the conduct of the *Carthaginians* in this particular, is, That they had really no intention to diſband theſe troops, and yet were unwilling, for good reaſons, to let their deſign of keeping them on foot be known, before they were all ſafely arrived in *Africa*. And though avarice had determined the ſenate to try whether the ſoldiers could be perſuaded to remit ſome part of what was due to them, there was no deſign to refuſe them their full payment in caſe they inſiſted upon it. They never dreamt that the bare propoſal of ſuch a remiſſion as they deſired would have the ſudden and fatal conſequences, which it had.

Polyb. L. 3. c. 9. *Corn. Nep.* in *Amilc.* c. 1. That the leading men at *Carthage* had reſolved to continue theſe troops in the ſervice, may I think be fairly collected from *Polybius*, who aſſures us that *Amilcar* left *Sicily* with firm reſolution to renew the war againſt *Rome* without delay; and that he would have executed his purpoſe, if it had not been hinder'd by the revolt of the mercenaries. Now is it in the leaſt probable, that the *Carthaginian* General, with this project of ſpeedy revenge at his heart, would conſent to break a veteran army, which he himſelf had diſciplined, legions animated with the ſame ſpirit as himſelf?

Be this as it will, the Carthaginians *did not follow the ſcheme of* Giſco. *They detained the firſt and ſecond comers, telling them, that they would make a fair reckoning with all together. Thus every day the number increaſed, and many diſorders (incident among ſoldiers) were committed, which much diſquieted the city, not accuſtomed to the like. It was thought fit therefore to remove them all to ſome other place, where they might be leſs troubleſom;* and Sicca, *a little town at no great diſtance, being pitch'd upon for this rendezvous, the officers were civilly requeſted to conduct all their men thither, who, while they there waited the coming of their fellow ſoldiers from* Sicily, *ſhould receive, each of them, a piece of gold to bear his charges.*

This motion was accepted, and the ſoldiers began to diſlodge; leaving behind them their wives, their children, and all their baggage, as intending very ſoon to fetch all away when they came back for their pay. But the Carthaginians, *who wanted to rid the city entirely of theſe ungovernable gueſts, and who fear'd, that if the women and children remained there, it would be difficult to hinder ſome of the ſoldiers from ſtaying behind, and others from returning, which would fruſtrate the intention of the meaſure now taken, they prevailed with them to march away with all that belonged to them, wives and children, bag and baggage.*

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To Sicca *then they all removed, and there lay waiting for news of their fellows arrival, and their own pay. Buſineſs they had none to do, and therefore might eaſily be drawn to mutiny, the whole argument of their diſcourſe inclining them to nothing elſe. Their daily talk was, how rich they ſhould be, when all their money came in; how much would fall to every ſingle ſhare, and for how long a time the city was behind hand with them in reckoning. They were all grown Arithmeticians; and he was thought a man of worth, who could find moſt reaſon to encreaſe their demands, to the very higheſt, even beyond their due. No part of their long ſervice was forgotten; but the encouraging words and promiſes of their Captains, leading them forth to any dangerous fight, were called to mind as ſo many obligations, not to be cancelled, without ſatisfying their expectation by ſome extraordinary bounty.*

In this manner paſſed the time away, till at length, the whole army being arrived and united, Hanno *(chief magiſtrate of* Carthage*) appeared at* Sicca *to clear the accompt. Now was the day come, when they were all to be made rich, eſpecially if they could hold together, in maintaining reſolutely the common cauſe. Full of theſe thoughts and expectations they aſſembled themſelves to hear what good news this meſſenger had brought; with firm purpoſe to help his memory in caſe he ſhould happen to forget any part of the many promiſes made to them, which were all to be conſidered in the reckoning.*

Hanno *begins a very formal oration, wherein he bewails the poverty of* Carthage; *tells them how great a ſum of money is to be paid to the* Romans; *reckons up the exceſſive charges the commonwealth had been at, in the late war, and in concluſion deſires them to be contented with* part of their pay, *and out of* the love which they bore to the city, to remit the reſt.

Few of the hearers underſtood this Orator's diſcourſe: For the Carthaginian *army was compoſed of ſundry nations, as* Greeks, Africans, Gauls, Ligurians, Spaniards *and others, all of different languages. But when ſuch as conceived the whole tenor of his ſpeech had informed the reſt what meſſage he brought, they all broke out into ſuch a ſtorm of rage, that nothing would ſerve to appeaſe them. The inſurrection and revolt were univerſal, each nation at firſt caballing apart, and then all the ſeveral nations joining together in a general ſedition; of which the difference of languages greatly encreaſed the tumult and confuſion.*

Hanno *would fain have aſſwaged their fury, but he knew not how: for he leſs underſtood their diſſonant loud noiſes, than they did his oration. An army, collected out of ſo many countries, that have no one language common to all, is neither eaſily ſtirred up to mutiny, nor eaſily pacified, when once it is broken into outrage. The beſt that* Hanno *could do, was to uſe the help of their own officers as his interpreters and meſſengers; but theſe interpreters miſtook his meaning, ſome for want of ſkill, others on purpoſe; and ſuch as delivered his errands in the worſt ſenſe were the beſt believed. In ſhort, nothing was to be ſeen but fluctuation of mind, jealouſies, diſtruſts and caballing. Among the other cauſes of the ſoldiers anger, was this alſo, that the* Carthaginians, *inſtead of ſending to them ſome one of thoſe officers, under whom they had ſerv-*

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ed in Sicily, who knew their merits, and who ſo often had promiſed them rewards, had ſent a man who had not been preſent in any of thoſe actions where they had ſignalized their courage. In ſhort, they conſidered themſelves as not only wrong'd, but inſulted. Full of indignation therefore they haſtily left Sicca, and to the number of 20000 men advanced towards Carthage, as far as Tunes, where they took up their quarters, about 15 miles from the capital. And now when it was too late, the Carthaginians became convinced of their miſtakes; for it was a mighty fault in them to permit ſuch a body of ſtrangers to aſſemble all in one place; and it was yet a greater error to turn out of their city the wives, children, and goods of theſe poor ſoldiers, which, had they retained them in ſhew of kindneſs, they might have uſed as hoſtages for their own ſafety, and as means to bring the army to their own terms: But now the terror they were in from the neighbourhood of theſe mutineers carried them to yield to every demand though never ſo unreaſonable. They furniſhed a market at Tunes for the ſoldiers, whom they ſuffered to buy what they pleaſed, and at what price they pleaſed. Deputies out of the body of the ſenate were from time to time diſpatched to them, to aſſure them, that all their demands, if poſſible to be performed, ſhould be ſatisfied. The ſoldiers eaſily perceived the cauſe of this change; and taking advantage of the fright the city was in, they every day invented ſome new article to inſiſt upon; and their inſolence was the greater from the perſuaſion, that having ſerved with honour againſt the Romans in Sicily, neither the Carthaginians nor any other people would have the courage to face them in the field. No ſooner therefore had they adjuſted their demands of pay, but they proceeded further to exact ſatisfaction for the horſes they had loſt in the ſervice. When that was agreed to, the next demand was on account of ſhort allowance of proviſions for many years. They would be paid for the deficiency; and, in this reckoning, the corn ſhould be valued at the higheſt price it had at any time born during the whole war.

In ſhort, as there were many factious and ſeditious ſpirits in the army, theſe incited the multitude to make new and exorbitant demands, ſuch as it was impoſſible for the republic to comply with; nevertheleſs, as the Carthaginians promiſed to do every thing in their power to ſatisfy them, it was at length agreed, that the differences ſhould be referred to ſome one of the Generals who had been in Sicily, and that the ſoldiers ſhould chuſe the arbitrator. Accordingly they pitched upon Giſco, partly out of affection to him, who had ſhewn himſelf at all times a friendly man to them, and careful of their good, eſpecially when they were to be tranſported into Africa; and partly out of a diſlike they had conceived of Amilcar, becauſe he had not viſited them in all this buſy time. [It is probable that Amilcar had no deſire to be uſed as an inſtrument in defrauding his own ſoldiers of their wages; eſpecially conſidering, that as he could beſt bear witneſs of their merits, ſo was he not ignorant, that means to content them were not wanting, had the citizens been willing to do it.] Sir *W. R.*

Giſco then embarks and comes among them, and to pleaſe them the better brings money with him. He calls to him firſt of all the principal officers,

and then the ſeveral nations apart, rebuking them gently for what had paſſed; adviſing them calmly concerning the preſent, and exhorting them to continue their affection to a ſtate, which had long entertained them in its pay, and would be always mindful of their good ſervices. He then offered to give them their whole pay in hand, propoſing to defer the conſideration of other reckonings to a more convenient time. This might have been well accepted, and might have ſerved to reſtore things to quiet, if two ſeditious ringleaders of the multitude had not oppoſed it.

Among the mutineers there happened to be one Spendius *a Campanian, who had been a ſlave to a* Roman *maſter. He was ſtrong of body, and in all occaſions of danger very forward; this fellow fearing to fall into the hands of his maſter, (for by the cuſtom of* Rome *his fault was puniſhed with death) laboured both with words and actions, to trouble and perplex the treaty they were upon; and to hinder by all means poſſible their agreement with the* Carthaginians. *Another there was, whoſe name was* Matho, *an* African, *of free condition, and a ſoldier among them, who having been an active ſtirrer in this conſpiracy, and fearing puniſhment, joined with* Spendius *to obſtruct the accommodation, poſſeſſing the* Africans *with the belief, that as ſoon as the ſtrangers ſhould be paid, and diſpatched to their own countries, it would be their lot to pay for all; and that the* Carthaginians *would take ſuch revenge on them, for what they had done, that all* Africa *ſhould tremble at it. The ſoldiers grew hereupon inraged anew, and in regard they were not likely to receive of* Giſco *any other ſatisfaction than their arrears of pay, what was due for their horſes and bread being reſpited to another time, they therefore took thence occaſion of freſh diſorders, and ran together in a mutinous manner. To* Spendius *and* Matho *they lent a willing ear, who railed both againſt* Giſco *and the* Carthaginians, *and if any one preſumed to offer them temperate counſel, he was forthwith ſtoned to death, even before it could be underſtood what the purport of his diſcourſe was, whether for or againſt* Spendius; *and now great ſlaughter was made both of officers and private ſoldiers, and nothing was heard during the tumult but* throw, throw, down with him; *and what greatly augmented the rage of thoſe people, was the exceſs of wine they had drank, having newly riſen from their repaſt. So that the word* throw *was no ſooner heard, but the perſon againſt whom it was deſigned, was immediately ſlain. At length there appearing no one who preſumed to open his mouth to divert their determinations, they choſe* Spendius *and* Matho *for their Leaders and Commanders in chief.*

Giſco *was not without a due ſenſe of the danger he was in among theſe people, but he let that conſideration give place to the duty he owed his country. He foreſaw that if this mutiny once came to a head, the commonwealth would be driven to great ſtraits; to prevent which, he was willing to be expoſed to any hazard. He therefore with great conſtancy of mind purſued his purpoſe of reducing them to their duty by all means poſſible: Sometimes treating with the officers, ſometimes with the ſundry nations apart. It happened, that the* Africans *coming rudely to* Giſco *to demand the corn-money, which*

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they pretended was due to them; he to reprove their inſolence, bid them in a contemptuous manner go aſk their Captain Matho *for it. This anſwer put all into a flame. Without any heſitation they tumultuouſly ran, and ſeized on the money, which had been brought in order to their payment.*

Matho *and* Spendius *fomented with all their art and induſtry this audacious proceeding of the multitude, being perſuaded, that to do ſome outragious act, in violation of the treaty they were upon, and contrary to the law of nations, would be the ſureſt way to put things paſt accommodation, and to kindle the war they ſo much deſired. Thus therefore, not only the money and baggage of the* Carthaginians *were ſeized by the mutineers, but* Giſco *and all the* Carthaginians *who accompanied him were arreſted, put in irons, and thrown into priſon; and theſe violences were immediately followed by an open declaration of war againſt* Carthage.

AND now Matho *diſpatched deputies to the cities round about, exhorting them to lend him ſuccours, enter into confederacy with him, and bravely recover their liberty. It was not needful for the deputies to uſe much perſuaſion, the very fame of this rebellion ſufficing to draw the whole country into it. The mercileſs impoſitions of the* Carthaginians *upon their* African *ſubjects, were the cauſe of this univerſal proneneſs to a revolt. They had taken from the country people during the late war one half of their corn, and had doubled the tributes paid by the inhabitants of the cities, not exempting even the pooreſt from theſe exactions. When new magiſtrates were to be elected for the provinces, the choice never fell on thoſe who were likely to govern the people with lenity and moderation, but on ſuch whoſe rigour promiſed the Electors the richeſt fruits of oppreſſion.* Hanno, *for example, was of this ſort, and therefore a great favourite at* Carthage.

All theſe things conſidered, it is no wonder that the Africans *were not backward to rebel. Not only ſuch as could bear arms readily tendered their ſervice in this commotion, but the very women (who had ſeen their huſbands and fathers dragged to priſon by the tax-gatherers) brought forth their jewels and other ornaments, offering all to ſale for the maintenance of ſo juſt a quarrel. And by this great forwardneſs, and liberal contribution,* Matho *and* Spendius *were ſupplied with a ſtrong reinforcement of* 70000 Africans, *and were moreover furniſhed with money, not only to give the ſoldiers the arrears of their pay, (which to engage them in the revolt they had promiſed) but ſufficient to carry on the war begun, though it ſhould be of long continuance.*

The Mercenaries uſing the advantage of their preſent ſtrength, laid ſiege to Utica *and* Hippo, *two maritime cities of great importance, lying to the weſt of* Carthage *and not far from it; nor did they abandon their camp at* Tunes, *which, on the other ſide, lay commodiouſly to hinder the* Carthaginians *from paſſing up into the country that way.*

Carthage *was ſituate on a Peninſula, which is bounded on one ſide by the ſea, and on the other by a lake. The* Iſthmus *that joins this Peninſula to the continent is about three miles broad,* Utica *ſtood on that ſide of* Carthage *which regards the ſea,* Tunes *on the other ſide, upon the lake: ſo that the*

enemy, from thoſe two poſts, marching ſometimes by day, ſometimes by night, to the very walls of the capital, filled the inhabitants with extreme terror. The Carthaginians, *in this diſtreſs, appointed* Hanno *to be their General. He had gained ſome reputation in that capacity, when employed to conquer that part of* Africa *which lay towards* Hecatompolis. Hanno *did not fail to make with diligence all needful preparations (for that was his talent:) He got together whatever was neceſſary, as well to relieve a town beſieged, as to batter and aſſail any place defended againſt him. With theſe proviſions and with a hundred elephants he came to* Utica *ſo ſuddenly, that the mercenaries, as men ſurprized, forſook their trenches and retired to a riſing piece of woody ground, where they might be ſafe againſt the violence of his huge beaſts.*

Hanno, *having been accuſtomed to make war with the* Africans *and* Numidians, *who upon any defeat were wont to fly for two or three days together, imagined that the enemy he had only routed, were utterly ruined, even beyond a poſſibility of recovery; neglecting therefore to keep guard, and leaving his men at liberty, be immediately entered the town, there to recreate and divert himſelf. But thoſe old ſoldiers, with whom he was now at war, had learned of* Amilcar *to ſuſtain ſuch ſhocks as they had juſt ſuffered, without being diſcouraged, and to retire and to fight again many times in one day, as occaſion required. Wherefore as ſoon as they perceived that* Hanno *knew not how to make uſe of a victory, they inſtantly ruſhed down from their retreat, aſſailed their own camp, and with great ſlaughter drove the* Carthaginians *out of it, forcing them to hide themſelves within the walls of* Utica; *and they alſo got poſſeſſion of all the ſtores that* Hanno *had brought for the relief of the town. Nor was this the only occaſion wherein* Hanno *gave marks of his inſufficiency. Twice he might have defeated the enemy in pitched battle, and twice by ſurprize, yet he unaccountably neglected theſe opportunities, and even ſuffered the enemy to take poſſeſſion of all the paſſes in the* Iſthmus, *which joins the Peninſula, whereon* Carthage *ſtood, to the firm land.*

The Carthaginians, *diſſatisfied with the conduct of* Hanno, *had now recourſe to the undiſputed abilities of* Amilcar, *whom they ſent into the field with* 10000 *men and* 70 *elephants.* Amilcar *was for ſome time at a loſs how to meet with the enemy upon equal ground. For, beſide the other places of advantage, which the mercenaries had ſeized,* Hanno *had ſuffered them to get poſſeſſion of the only bridge by which the river* Macar *or* Bagradas *was paſſable to thoſe who were to travel from* Carthage *into the Continent. This river had not many fords, and the few it had were ſo well watch'd, that it was not eaſy for even a ſingle man to get over without being ſeen. As for the bridge itſelf the enemy guarded it with the utmoſt vigilance, and had built a town cloſe by it, for the more commodious lodging of the troops that were appointed to that ſervice.* Amilcar, *having in vain tried all means poſſible to force a paſſage, at length bethought himſelf of an expedient to gain one by ſtealth. He had obſerved that upon the blowing of certain winds, the mouth of the* Macar *uſed to be choaked up with ſand and gravel, which form'd a kind of bar acroſs*

it. Marching therefore to the mouth of the river, he there waited, without communicating his deſign to any body, the blowing of thoſe favorable winds; which no ſooner happened, but he paſſed the ſtream with his army by night unperceived, and the next morning appeared in the plain, to the great aſtoniſhment both of the Carthaginians *and of the enemy.*

Spendius *and his followers were extremely troubled as well as amazed at this news, as knowing that they had no longer to deal with the improvident gravity of* Hanno, *but with an able captain, even their own maſter in the art of war, whom they ſtill admired though they hated him.* Amilcar *marched directly towards thoſe of the enemy, who guarded the bridge.* Spendius *advanced to meet him with* 10000 *men, whom he drew out of the town that was near it. He had ordered* 15000 *to come from before* Utica *and join him. Upon the arrival of this reinforcement, the fear with which the mercenaries had been ſtruck was chang'd into preſumption. They thought to ſurround* Amilcar, *and bear him down by numbers.* Amilcar *had diſpoſed his elephants in the front, his cavalry and light armed infantry in the ſecond line, and his heavy armed foot in the rear of all. He had* ‖ *probably expected that the* 15000 *men from* Utica *would have fallen upon his rear, inſtead of joining the forces with* Spendius; *and this expectation was the reaſon of his placing his main ſtrength in the rear. But when he ſaw, that the enemy, neglecting their advantage, had join'd their two bodies of troops together, he immediately chang'd the order of his battle, making his horſe wheel about and go to the rear, and his infantry advance. This ſudden retreat of the* Carthaginian *cavalry was miſtaken by the mercenaries for a real flight and a mark of fear. They advanced therefore briſkly to the attack without obſerving any order, and in full confidence of victory. But no ſooner did they perceive that cavalry, which they had thought routed, appear again in good array, covering the whole body of the* Carthaginian *foot, (for by the general's order, the horſe wheeling from the rear to the right and left, had now placed themſelves in the ſame line with the infantry) than their aſtoniſhment at this movement quite took away their courage. They inſtantly turned their backs and fled, and being warmly purſued by the horſe and elephants of* Amilcar, *ſuffered a very great ſlaughter. In this overthrow,* 6000 *of the mercenaries were ſlain, and* 2000 *taken priſoners; the reſt eſcaped, ſome to the camp before* Utica, *others to the town by the bridge, whither* Amilcar *followed them ſo faſt, that he eaſily poſſeſſed himſelf of that place, the enemy not having ſufficiently recovered their ſpirits to make a defence, but flying thence to* Tunes *at his approach. After this he ſpeedily reduced ſeveral other Towns, partly by force, partly by compoſition, and by this happy progreſs gave the* Carthaginians *ſome better hopes of their affairs.*

‖ *Chev. Folard.*

As for Matho, *he ſtill continued the ſiege of* Hippo, *adviſing* Spendius, *and* Autaritus, *chief captain of the* Gauls, *to follow* Amilcar *ſo as never to loſe ſight of him, yet always to keep the higher grounds, or the foot of ſome hill, where they might be ſafe from the horſe and elephants of the* Carthaginians. *He alſo ſent into* Numidia *and* Africa, *admoniſhing the people to furniſh thoſe*

two

two commanders with ſupplies, and to exert themſelves on this occaſion for the recovery of their freedom. Spendius *with ſix thouſand men, choſen out of the ſeveral nations encamped at* Tunes, *and with* 2000 Gauls, *that followed* Autaritus, (*theſe being all that remained of thoſe who had ſerved under this captain in* Sicily, *the reſt having deſerted to the* Romans *at* Eryx) *purſuant to the counſel of* Matho, *continually coaſted the* Carthaginians, *but always keeping the foot of the hills. One day, when* Amilcar *was encamped in a plain encompaſſed on all ſides with hills, the ſuccours which* Spendius *had waited for arrived, and the* Carthaginian *general was not a little embarraſſed thereby; for he had now to deal with a body of* Africans *in front, and another of* Numidians *behind him, while the army of* Spendius *lay on his flank. In this difficulty the fame of* Amilcar's *perſonal worth was of great benefit to his country. In the enemies troops there happened to be a certain* Numidian, *named* Naravaſus, *a man of diſtinction both for his birth and courage. He had inherited from his father an inclination to the* Carthaginians, *and it was much increaſed by what he had heard of* Amilcar's *merit. Thinking that he had now an opportunity of gaining the friendſhip of this people, he came to the camp attended by about* 100 Numidian *horſe. Having halted near the lines without any ſhew of fear, he there made a ſign with his hand.* Amilcar *not a little wondering at the hardineſs of the action, ſent out to him a horſeman; to whom* Naravaſus *ſignified, that he deſired a conference with the general. The latter not readily complying with the motion, the* Numidian *no ſooner perceived his diſtruſt, but diſmounting, he gave his horſe and arms to thoſe who were with him; and with a noble confidence, entered the camp alone. Every body wondered at the bravery of the man, but received him amicably. Being conducted to* Amilcar, *he told him, he wanted not good inclinations for the* Carthaginians *in general; but that his principal motive of coming there was to engage in a friendſhip with* him; *which if he approved, he ſhould find him for the future a faithful friend, both in counſel and in action. This diſcourſe, together with the manly aſſurance and ingenuous ſimplicity with which it was ſpoken, fill'd* Amilcar *with unſpeakable joy; inſomuch, that he not only conſented to make him his companion in all his enterprizes; but, to purchaſe his fidelity to the* Carthaginians, *promis'd him his daughter in marriage.*

After this conference and treaty, Naravaſus *brought to the camp* 2000 Numidians, *that were under his command; with which reinforcement* Amilcar *offered the enemy battle.* Spendius, *on his part being ſtrengthened by the* Africans, *advanced boldly into the plain, where the battle was obſtinately fought.* Amilcar, *in the end, had the day: the elephants did great ſervice; and* Naravaſus *ſignalized himſelf moſt eminently.* Spendius *and* Autaritus *eſcaped by flight, about* 10000 *of their men being ſlain, and* 4000 *taken priſoners.* Amilcar *received kindly all thoſe of the priſoners, that were willing to take his pay, and ſerve under him, and he armed them with the ſpoils of the dead. As for thoſe that were not willing to ſerve, he aſſembled them all, and then told them, that he freely pardoned their paſt fault, and gave them their*

liberty; but bid them remember, that if ever they were taken again in arm againſt the Carthaginians, *they were to expect no mercy.*

During theſe tranſactions, the mercenaries that were in garriſon in Sardinia *mutinied, after the example of* Matho *and* Spendius; *and having ſhut up* Boſtar *their chief commander in the citadel, they at length murthered both him and all the* Carthaginians *with him. Hereupon the republic, in order to quell theſe mercenaries, diſpatch'd from* Carthage *into that iſland a body of troops, which, if we may judge from their proceedings, were alſo mercenaries (a ſtrange policy of the magiſtrates.) Theſe ſoldiers no ſooner arrived, but they entered into the views of the mutineers and joined the revolt. The united forces ſeized on the leader of the new comers and crucified him; they likewiſe in the moſt cruel manner murdered all the* Carthaginians *they could meet with, poſſeſſed themſelves of the towns, and remained maſters of the whole iſland; untill at length a quarrel happened between them and the natives, who prevailing conſtrained them to leave the country, and fly for refuge into* Italy. *But thus* Sardinia *became entirely loſt to the* Carthaginians.

To return to the mercenaries in Africa.

Matho, Spendius *and* Autaritus *having advice of the clemency which* Amilcar *exerciſed towards the priſoners, and fearing the effect it might have upon the* Africans, *and their other troops, reſolved to engage them in ſome new act of villainy, ſuch as ſhould put them paſt all hopes of indemnity. With this view they aſſembled the whole army. A meſſenger preſently arrives with a pretended letter from thoſe who had followed their ſteps in* Sardinia. *This letter admoniſhes them to be careful in guarding* Giſco, *and the reſt of the priſoners (whom they had ſeized at the treaty of* Tunes) *there being ſome perſons in the army, who held ſecret intelligence with the* Carthaginians *for their releaſe.* Spendius *took occaſion from this letter to warn the ſoldiers not to rely on the ſpecious humanity of* Amilcar *towards thoſe who had fallen into his hands; whoſe real intention, he ſaid, was not to ſpare them, but by a feigned clemency, to draw the reſt to ſubmiſſion; to the end, that having all at his mercy, he might at once take vengeance upon all. He likewiſe counſelled them, to be eſpecially watchful not to ſuffer* Giſco *to eſcape; who being a principal leader, and in great authority, would prove one of their moſt dangerous enemies.* Spendius *had hardly ended his diſcourſe, when a ſecond courier, pretending to come from* Tunes, *arrived with a letter preſſing the ſame matter that was contained in the other. Upon this* Autaritus, *the* Gaul, *immediately ſtep'd forth and declared to the aſſembly, that their ſafety and ſucceſs could only be found in renouncing all hopes of reconciliation with the* Carthaginians; *and that whoever ſhould appear to have turned his thoughts that way, ought to be diſtruſted as a traitor to the common cauſe, and as being in ſecret correſpondence with the enemy; and he adviſed them to be guided wholly by thoſe, who were for carrying things to the utmoſt extremity againſt the* Carthaginians. *After this he gave it as his opinion, that they ought to put to death by torments, not only* Giſco *and all the* Carthaginians *then in their cuſtody, but all thoſe that ſhould hereafter fall alive into their hands.* Autaritus *was always in theſe aſſemblies*

aſſemblies of the ſoldiers a leading man, having the advantage, by his knowledge of ſeveral languages, of being able to make himſelf underſtood by the greateſt part of his hearers. His propoſal was received with almoſt univerſal applauſe; nevertheleſs there were ſome of every nation, who joined in one common requeſt, that in regard of the many benefits they had received from Giſco, *he might at leaſt have the favour to ſuffer only death and not be put to torment. As they ſpoke in ſeveral languages, and all at once, it was not preſently underſtood what they demanded; but no ſooner was their intention known, and ſome one in the aſſembly had cried out,* down with them, knock them all on the head, *but theſe interceſſors were ſtoned to death by the multitude. Then, by order of* Spendius, *was* Giſco *with the other* Carthaginian *priſoners, to the number of* 700 *perſons, brought out to ſuffer the ſentence pronounced againſt them. The executioners (beginning with* Giſco, *that ſame* Giſco, *whom but a little before the whole army had owned for their benefactor, and whom they had made choice of to be arbitrator of their differences with the republic) cut off their hands, broke their legs, and then threw them alive into a ditch, there to expire in miſery. The* Carthaginians *receiving intelligence of this cruelty, and being deeply affected with the ſad fate of ſo many of their citizens, ſent orders to* Amilcar *and* Hanno, *to uſe their utmoſt diligence to revenge it. They likewiſe diſpatch'd heralds to the mercenaries, to demand the bodies of the dead; but the villains were ſo far from complying with this demand, that they threatned to treat whatever meſſengers ſhould hereafter be ſent to them, in the ſame manner they had treated* Giſco. *And in fact it became an eſtabliſhed law among them, that all* Carthaginian *priſoners they took ſhould be tormented to death; and that thoſe who were allies of the* Carthaginians *ſhould have their hands cut off, and in that condition be ſent back to them; and this law was afterwards rigorouſly executed.*

Amilcar, *ſeeing no means left to put an end to the unbounded audaciouſneſs of the enemy, but by utterly exterminating them, ſent to* Hanno *to come and join him with the forces, which, without performing any thing worthy of notice, he had hitherto ſeparately commanded. It was hoped that with their united ſtrength they might be able to give a happy iſſue to the war. And in the mean time it was reſolved, that in return for the barbarity practiſed by the enemy, all thoſe of them, who ſhould fall alive into the hands of the* Carthaginians, *ſhould be thrown to wild beaſts to be devoured.*

But *now when affairs began to have a promiſing aſpect, a diſpute, that aroſe on a ſudden between the two generals, was carried ſo far, that by it they loſt many fair occaſions of beating the enemy, and even gave them frequent advantages in the war. Upon the news of this diviſion, the magiſtrates of* Carthage *came to a reſolution, that one of the two ſhould quit his command, and that the option ſhould be left to the army.*

This quarrel ſo unſeaſonable, and its conſequences above mentioned, were not the only misfortunes that befel the Carthaginians *at this time. A convoy from* Emporium *with proviſions, and other ſtores, much wanted for the army, was loſt by tempeſt at ſea: and to fill the meaſure of their adverſity,*

ſity, the towns of Utica *and* Hippo, *that had hitherto ſtood firm to the* Carthaginian *party, not only in this war, but even in the time of* Agathocles, *and when the* Romans *made their deſcent on* Africa, *now abandoned them on a ſudden, without any plauſible motive; and not only entered into a league of faſt friendſhip with the* Africans, *but conceived an implacable hatred againſt the* Carthaginians; *which they ſufficiently teſtified by murdering all thoſe they had of that nation in garriſon, and throwing their bodies over the walls, without ſuffering them to be buried. Theſe events encouraged* Matho *and* Spendius *to think of laying ſiege even to* Carthage *itſelf.*

The Carthaginian *army having declared in favour of* Amilcar, Hanno *was conſtrained to relinquiſh his authority, and was ſucceeded by* Hannibal, *whom the Senate appointed to command in his ſtead. Aſſiſted by this new collegue, and eſpecially by* Naravaſus, *who was eminently uſeful in all expeditions,* Amilcar *ſcour'd the country, and endeavoured to cut off all means of ſubſiſtence from the enemy, who now inveſted* Carthage.

The city, blocked up on all ſides by land, was forced to have recourſe to her allies. Hiero *king of* Syracuſe, *who had all along had a watchful eye upon the events of this war, and had ſupplied the republick with every thing ſhe had deſired of him, was now, in her greateſt diſtreſs, more than ever diligent to aſſiſt her; as being well aware, that to maintain his own authority in* Sicily, *and his alliance of friendſhip with the* Romans, *it was neceſſary that* Carthage *ſhould be preſerved in a condition to balance their power; otherwiſe he himſelf might ſoon be at their mercy, and inſtead of their friend become their ſubject.*

L. 1. c. 83. *In this, ſays* Polybius, *he acted wiſely, for it greatly behoves a Prince not to neglect a miſchief of this kind, in the beginning, nor to ſuffer the exorbitant growth of a neighbouring power, till he is no longer able to conteſt with it for his own indiſputable right.*

Not only king Hiero, *but the* Romans *alſo, (faithfully obſerving their treaty of peace) ſupply'd the* Carthaginians *with ſuch proviſions and ſtores as they wanted; ſo that the city, being thus ſuccoured, was in condition to defend itſelf againſt the efforts of the beſiegers.*

In the mean time Amilcar *was ſo active and diligent in preventing any ſupplies from going to the camp of* Matho *and* Spendius, *that he at length reduced them to great ſtraits for proviſions, and in the end conſtrained them to raiſe the ſiege. And now* Spendius, *aſſiſted by one* Zarxas *an* African *leader, and by* Autaritus *the* Gaul, *iſſued into the field, at the head of* 50000 *choſen men, to try the fortune of war againſt* Amilcar. (Matho *was left at* Tunes, *to negotiate with their friends, and take a general care of the buſineſs.) The elephants of* Carthage *and the horſe of* Naravaſus *made* Spendius *afraid of deſcending into the plains, ſo that he betook himſelf to his former method of keeping the hills and rough grounds, or occupying the ſtreight paſſages, wherein the deſperate courage of his men might ſhew itſelf with little diſadvantage. But* Amilcar, *having more ſkill than he in the trade of war, artfully contrived to draw him to many ſkirmiſhes; in all which the ſucceſs was ſuch, as added courage to the* Carthaginians *and abated the ſtrength and*

ſpirit

ſpirit of their enemies. Thus he continued alarming and provoking them by night and by day; and, through his ſkill in laying ambuſhes, never failed to entrap ſome of them, when they engaged in ſmall parties, nor to cut off great numbers when the action was more general; and thoſe that fell alive into his hands he gave to be devoured by wild beaſts.

At length he ſurprized them in a place that was very commodious for his own army, and very diſadvantageous to theirs. They preſently ſaw their diſadvantage, and therefore had no heart to fight. Amilcar *prudently foreſeeing that neceſſity might draw them to attempt the moſt deſperate enterprizes, took the opportunity of their preſent fear, and ſhut them cloſe up with a trench and rampart. There they waited miſerably and in vain for ſuccour from* Tunes; *and having ſpent all their proviſions were ſo preſs'd with hunger, that they fed upon the bodies of their priſoners. This they ſuffered patiently, as knowing they had not deſerved any favour from* Carthage; *and hoping ſtill that their friends at* Tunes *would not neglect them. But when at length they were driven to ſuch extremity, as to be forced to devour their own companions, and yet ſaw no appearance of relief, then was their obſtinacy quite broken, and they began to threaten their captains.* Spendius, Zarxas *and* Autaritus *having therefore conſulted together, came to a reſolution to yield themſelves to* Amilcar, *if required, as the condition of peace. They ſent a herald to demand a paſs, which being granted them, they came in perſon to the* Carthaginian *general. What they could ſay to him is hard to conjecture; yet by the conditions that* Amilcar *granted, it would ſeem that they took the blame upon themſelves, and begged pardon for the multitude. The conditions were,* That the *Carthaginians* ſhould chuſe out of the whole number of theſe enemies, any ten whom they pleaſed, to remain at their diſcretion; and that the reſt ſhould all be diſmiſs'd, each in one ſingle coat. *When the treaty was thus concluded,* Amilcar *told* Spendius, *and thoſe who were with him, that he choſe them as part of the ten; and then immediately ordered them to be ſeized and ſecured. The army receiving intelligence that their leaders were detained, and not knowing that a treaty was concluded for them upon ſuch gentle terms, preſently imagined they were betrayed. In amazement therefore they all ran to arms. But now they wanted captains to order and conduct them; and the ſame aſtoniſhment that made them break the covenants of peace, of which they were ignorant, gave* Amilcar *both colour of juſtice in accompliſhing revenge, and facility in doing the execution. They were all ſlain, being* 40000 *or more in number.*

The news of this exploit, (as may well be ſuppoſed) gave new life and ſpirit to the people at Carthage, *and was terrible to the revolted cities.* Amilcar, *with* Naravaſus *and* Hannibal, *carried the war from town to town, and found all places ready to yield, except* Utica, Hippo, *and* Tunes, *the two firſt ſtanding out through fear of deſerved vengeance, and the laſt being held by* Matho, *with the remainder of the rebel army. It was thought fit to begin with* Tunes, *where lay the chief ſtrength of the enemy. Coming before this town, they brought forth* Spendius *with his fellows, and, in view of the garriſon, crucified them under the walls, to terrify thoſe of his old companions, that were*

were ſtill in arms. With this rigour the ſiege began, as if ſpeedy victory had been aſſured. Hannibal *quartered upon that ſide of* Tunes, *which lay toward* Carthage; Amilcar *on the oppoſite ſide; too far aſunder to help one another in ſudden accidents. It behoved them therefore to be more circumſpect. Nevertheleſs,* Hannibal *ſecure, as if all danger were paſt, neglected to keep good guard.* Matho *perceived it, and, uſing his advantage, ſallied out with unexpected fury againſt that part of the* Carthaginian *army, and ſo ſucceſsfully, that, after a great ſlaughter of the enemy, he put the reſt to flight, forced their camp, pillaged it, and took* Hannibal *himſelf priſoner. After the victory, having cauſed the dead body of* Spendius *to be taken down from the croſs, he ordered* Hannibal *to be fixed alive in his place, and executed him with unſpeakable torments. The reſt alſo of the nobleſt of the* Carthaginians, *who had fallen into his hands, were by his command ſlain round the body of* Spendius. *Of all this* Amilcar *knew nothing, till it was too late; neither had he ſtrength enough remaining, after this great loſs, to continue the ſiege; but was obliged to break it up, and remove to the mouth of the river* Bagradas, *where he encamped.*

The terror in Carthage, *upon the news of this diſaſter, was not leſs than had been the joy for the late important victory. All that could bear arms were ſent into the field under* Hanno; *and the Senate commiſſioned thirty principal men of their body to labour with all the force of perſuaſion, to bring* Amilcar *and him to a reconciliation. This could not be effected preſently.* Amilcar *was perhaps nearly touched in his honour, that the careleſsneſs of* Hannibal *ſeemed to be imputed to him, by ſending his enemy to ſhare with him the conduct of affairs, and be a check upon his proceedings. Nevertheleſs, after many conferences, the authority of the Senators prevailed; and the two Generals paſſed their words to live in friendſhip, and act in concert for the public good. And thenceforward all affairs were ſucceſsfully managed to the ſatisfaction of their fellow citizens.*

Matho, *during theſe tranſactions, was come abroad into the field, wiſely purpoſing to make advantage of the reputation of his late ſucceſs, while it gave ſome life to his cauſe. But this* African *Leader wanted the neceſſary ſkill to cope with* Amilcar, *who in all ſkirmiſhes and encounters between parties never failed to worſt him, and thereby to diminiſh both his ſtrength and his credit.* Matho, *ſenſible of this growing miſchief to his affairs, reſolved therefore to try the fortune of one battle, whereby either his ambition ſhould be accompliſhed, or his cares at an end. The* Carthaginians *were no leſs diſpoſed to a general action, having many advantages above their enemies, and eſpecially (which was worth all the reſt) ſuch a commander, as was not eaſily to be matched in that age. Both parties being thus agreed, the confederates and friends of both were called together, and the towns drained of their garriſons to augment the armies. At length with joint conſent, in time and place, the battle was fought. The* Carthaginians *won the day. The greateſt part of the* African *army was ſlain upon the ſpot; the reſt fled to a town, that not being defenſible quickly ſurrendered;* Matho *himſelf was there taken alive.*

Immediately upon this victory all the African *cities which had been in the rebellion, ſubmitted to their old maſters,* Utica *and* Hippo *only excepted, theſe, by their treacherous and outragious proceedings, having cut off from themſelves all hopes of pardon. However, theſe alſo were conſtrained to ſurrender at mercy.* Matho *and his companions, being led in triumph to* Carthage, *were put to death by all the torments that revenge could deviſe.*

Thus was a period given to this inexpiable *war, which had laſted three years and near four months, and had abounded with more acts of wickedneſs and cruelty, than any other to be met with in ſtory.*

ROME during all this[1] time took no advantage of her rival's diſtreſs to promote her ruin, but continued faithfully to obſerve the treaty of peace with her; and even aſſiſted her as a friend in many inſtances. Once indeed there ſeemed to be ſome danger of a rupture. For as the *Carthaginians*, at the beginning of this war, made prize of all veſſels that came on the coaſt of *Africa* to ſupply the rebels with proviſions, it happened that they had at one time in cuſtody 500 *Italians*, whom they had taken carrying on this traffic for the profit of private merchants. The *Romans*, offended at the detaining of theſe traders in priſon, began to turn their thoughts to revenge; but they were ſoon appeaſed by a reſpectful embaſſy from *Carthage*, who reſtored the priſoners in ſo frank a manner, that the *Romans*, not to be behind her in courteſy, enlarged, without ranſom, all the *Carthaginian* captives, that yet remained of thoſe who had been taken during the *Sicilian* war. They alſo permitted their merchants to ſupply *Carthage* with whatſoever ſhe ſtood in need of, and prohibited all commerce with her enemies. Nay more than this, when the people of *Utica*, having revolted from the *Carthaginians*, would have put that city into the hands of the *Romans*, the latter rejected the overture; as they alſo did an offer made them of the Iſland of *Sardinia* by the mercenaries there, who, following the example of thoſe in *Africa*, had turned their arms againſt the maſters in whoſe pay they were, and had forcibly ſeized upon that Iſland.

This behaviour towards a rival power (ſays a learned writer) might have ſerved as a notable example of *Roman* faith to all poſterity, had not the iſſue proved that it proceeded wholly from the hope of greater profit thereby, than could reaſonably be expected from an open violation of the treaty of peace. The whole eſtate of *Carthage* depended, at that time, upon the virtue of *Amilcar*, and had he been overthrown by the rebels in one main battle, that mighty city muſt either have fallen into the hands of mercileſs villains, or have humbled herſelf under the protection of the *Romans*, with whom ſhe had lately contended for ſuperiority. Sir *W. R.*

[1] Part of the Y. of *R.* 512. *Q. Lutatius*, and *A. Manlius*.
Y. of *R.* 513. *C. Claudius*, and *M. Sempronius*.
Y. of *R.* 514. *C. Mamilius*, and *Q. Valerius*.
Part of the Y. of *R.* 515. *Tib. Sempronius*, and *P. Valerius*.

She was once, during the war, reduced by the rebels to ſo great extremity as not to be far from ſuch a miſerable choice. Wherefore it was not unwiſely done of the *Romans*, to make ſuch demonſtration of kindneſs, and honourable dealing, as might invite a rich, but ſinking ſhip to run herſelf aground upon their ſhore. But when all was well ended in *Africa*, and the *Carthaginians* began to prepare for the recovery of *Sardinia*, then did ambition put off her goodly vizour. Though the *Romans* had formerly refuſed this Iſland, when offered them by the mercenaries, (who were afterwards driven thence by the natives) they now reſolved to take poſſeſſion of it by force of arms. One of the Conſuls paſſed thither with an army and denounced war againſt *Carthage*, under the ſhameleſs pretence, *That the preparations made* (by that enfeebled and impoveriſhed city) *to reduce* Sardinia, *were indeed deſigned againſt* Rome. The *Carthaginians* were in no condition at this time to enter upon a new war with ſo potent an enemy: yielding therefore to neceſſity, they relinquiſhed all pretenſions to the Iſland for ever; and not only ſo, but ſubmitted to the exactions of the Conſul, who further demanded of them, as the price of a peace, the ſum of * 1200 talents: Deteſtable injuſtice and extortion, which, as *Polybius* aſſures us, were the chief cauſe of that bloody war, in which *Hannibal* afterwards, with hereditary hatred and an implacable ſpirit of revenge, puſhed the *Romans* to the very brink of deſtruction.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 88.

Sinnius Capito apud Pomp. Feſt. in voce *Sardi Venales.*

* 232500 *L. Arbuthnot.*

CHAP. XII.

Wars of the Romans *with the* Boian Gauls, Ligurians, Sardinians *and* Corſicans.

DUring the three years and ſome months that the war of *Carthage* with her mercenaries had laſted, the *Roman* Conſuls had no affairs abroad, and ſeem to have chiefly employed their thoughts to eſtabliſh good order in *Italy*, and to ſecure the frontiers againſt the *Gauls* and *Ligurians*, by planting colonies in their neighbourhood. The Republic however would gladly have engaged in ſome quarrel, if ſhe could have found a plauſible pretence for it. *Eutropius* tells us that after the concluſion of the war in *Sicily*, ſhe ſent Ambaſſadors to *Ptolemy Euergetes*, King of *Egypt*, to offer him her aſſiſtance againſt *Antiochus* of *Syria*, ſurnamed *the God:* But the *Ægyptian* having got rid of his enemy before the Ambaſſadors arrived, his anſwer was only a compliment of thanks. And we have ſeen, that after the concluſion of the *African* war, in which *Carthage* was triumphant, the *Romans* would have renewed hoſtilities againſt that hated rival, on account of *Sardinia*, if they had not been prevented in this project, by an unwilling ceſſion of that Iſland to them.

Eutrop. l. 3. c. 1.

But

But about the ſame time theſe ambitious and reſtleſs ſpirits found ſufficient opportunity to keep their hardy legions in exerciſe. In the Conſulate of *Tib. Sempronius*, and *P. Valerius*, thoſe *Italic Gauls* who were called *Boii*, and who, after infinite loſſes and calamities ſuſtained in their ſtruggles with the *Romans*, had continued quiet 45 years, reſolved at length, upon ſome very trivial pretences, to break the peace, which had been ſo long maintained with the republic. The old men, all thoſe who had felt the hardſhips and ſufferings of the former wars, being extinct, the young men, their ſucceſſors, who had experienced nothing of thoſe miſeries, and feared nothing from fortune, began, according to the nature of man to grow turbulent and deſirous of ſome change in their condition; and this was the true ſource of their raſh enterprize. Y. of *R.* 515. Bef. *J. C.* 237. 214 Conſul-p. See B. 3. ch. 25. §. 1, 2. *Polyb.* L. 2. c. 21.

The [s] *Ligurians* alſo (whom *Rome* had not yet begun to ſubdue,) being in motion, and ſeeming to threaten her with war, the Conſuls for the year were obliged to divide their forces. *Liv. Epit.* 20.

Valerius led a *conſular* army againſt the *Gauls*, and was vanquiſhed in his firſt battle with them, in which he loſt 3500 men. Upon the news of this defeat, the *Romans* immediately diſpatched *M. Genucius Cipus*, one of the Prætors, from the city, with a reinforcement for the Conſul. *Valerius* looking on this precaution as a perſonal affront, and believing that he was ſtill ſtrong enough to cope with the enemy, notwithſtanding the blow he had received, haſtened to attack them again, before *Cipus* could arrive. His ſoldiers were no leſs zealous than himſelf to recover their honour; and being animated by this motive behaved themſelves ſo gallantly that they ſlew 14000 of the *Gauls* and took 2000 priſoners. However, this victory did not obtain the Conſul a triumph, becauſe he had been raſh in the attempt, and had not paid ſufficient deference to the ſentiments of the ſenate and people. *Oroſ.* B. 4. c. 12. *Val. Max.* B. 5. c. 6.

In the mean time *Sempronius*, the other Conſul, gained a battle, (though not a deciſive one) againſt the *Ligurians*.

Theſe wars were continued by the next year's Conſuls *L. Cornelius Lentulus*, and *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*. *Fulvius* acquired no honour by the campaign. It was with great difficulty that he preſerved his camp from being forced by the *Gauls*, whoſe country on this ſide of the *Po* he had entered; he was obliged to keep within his intrenchments, and to act entirely on the defenſive. Y. of *R.* 516. *Zon.* B. 8.

Cornelius had better ſucceſs againſt the *Ligurians* near *Hetruria*. He obtained a victory, for which he was rewarded with a Triumph.

During theſe wars, preparations were made at *Rome* to celebrate the [t] *ſecular games*: *Hiero* King of *Syracuſe* came to ſee the ſhow, and *Eutrop.* B. 3. c. 1.

[s] *Liguria* comprehended at this time the whole extent of country between the *Arno*, the *Apennines*, the country of the *Anares*, the *Po*, the maritime *Alps* and the *Ligurian* ſea (now the ſea of *Genoa.*)

[t] *Ludi Sæculares*, the moſt remarkable games that we meet with in the *Roman* ſtory. *Ken. Antiq.* Part. 2. B. 5. The c. 7.

Y. of *R.* 516. Bef. *J. C.* 236. 215 Conſul-p. brought with him 200000 *Modii* (meaſures containing a peck and a half) of wheat, that the vaſt concourſe of people might not cauſe a ſcarcity of proviſions. The

Lib. II. *cap.* 4. Miſcel. *cap.* 58.

The common opinion makes them to have had a very odd original, of which we have a tedious relation in *Valerius Maximus*, of the Ancients, and *Angelus Politianus* of the Moderns. Monſieur *Dacier*, in his excellent remarks on the ſecular poem of *Horace*, paſſes by this old conceit as trivial and fabulous, and aſſures us, that we need go no farther for the riſe of the cuſtom, than to the *Sybilline* oracles, for which the *Romans* had ſo great an eſteem and veneration.

In theſe ſacred writings, there was one famous prophecy to this effect; that if the *Romans*, at the beginning of every age, ſhould hold ſolemn games in the *Campus Martius* to the honour of *Pluto*, *Proſerpine*, *Juno*, *Apollo*, *Diana*, *Ceres*, and the *Parcæ*, or three fatal ſiſters, their city ſhould ever flouriſh, and all nations be ſubjected to their dominion. They were very ready to obey the oracle, and, in all the ceremonies uſed on that occaſion, conformed themſelves to its directions. The whole manner of the ſolemnity was as follows: In the firſt place, the heralds received orders to make an invitation of the whole world to come to *a feaſt which they had never ſeen already, and ſhould never ſee again.* Some few days before the beginning of the games, the *Quindecimviri*, taking their ſeats in the capitol, and in the *Palatine* temple, diſtributed among the people purifying compoſitions, as flambeaux, brimſtone and ſulphur. From hence the people paſſed on to *Diana*'s temple on the *Aventine* mountain, carrying wheat, barley, and beans, as an offering; and after this they ſpent whole nights in devotion to the deſtinies. At length, when the time of the games was actually come, which continued three days and three nights, the people aſſembled in the *Campus Martius*, and ſacrificed to *Jupiter*, *Juno*, *Apollo*, *Latona*, *Diana*, the *Parcæ*, *Ceres*, *Pluto*, and *Proſerpine*. On the firſt night of the feaſt, the Emperor accompanied by the *Quindecimviri*, commanded three altars to be raiſed on the bank of *Tiber*, which they ſprinkled with the blood of three lambs, and then proceeded to burn the offerings and the victims. After this they marked out a ſpace which ſerved for a *Theatre*, being illuminated by an innumerable multitude of flambeaux and fires: here they ſung ſome certain hymns compoſed on this occaſion, and celebrated all kinds of ſports. On the day after, when they had been at the capitol to offer the victims, they returned to the *Campus Martius*, and held ſports to the honour of *Apollo* and *Diana*. Theſe laſted till the next day, when the noble matrons, at the hour appointed by the oracle, went to the capitol to ſing hymns to *Jupiter*. On the third day, which concluded the feaſt, twenty-ſeven young boys, and as many girls, ſung in the temple of *Palatine Apollo*, hymns and verſes in *Greek* and *Latin*, to recommend the city to the protection of thoſe deities whom they deſigned particularly to honour by their ſacrifices.

The famous ſecular poem of *Horace* was compoſed for this laſt day, in the ſecular game held by *Auguſtus*. *Dacier* has given his judgment on this poem, as the maſterpiece of *Horace*; and believes that all antiquity cannot furniſh us with any thing more happily compleat.

There has been much controverſy, whether theſe games were celebrated every hundred, or every hundred and ten years. For the former opinion, *Cenſorinus* * alledges the teſtimony of *Valerius Antias*, *Varro* and *Livy*; and this was certainly the ſpace of time which the *Romans* called *ſæculum*, or an age. For the latter he produceth the authority of the regiſters, or commentaries of the *Quindecimviri*, and the edicts of *Auguſtus*, beſides the plain evidence of *Horace* in his ſecular poem; 21.

Certus undenos decies per annos, &c.

This laſt ſpace is expreſly injoined by the *Sybilline* oracle itſelf; the verſes of which, relating to this purpoſe, are tranſcribed by *Zoſimus* in the ſecond book of his hiſtory.

Ἀλλ' ὅπῃ ἂν μήκιϛ᾽ ἴκῃ χρόνϛ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳσι
Ζωῆς, εἰς ἑτέων ἑκατὸν δέκα κύκλοι ὁδεύων, &c.

Yet according to the ancient accounts we have of their celebration in the ſeveral ages,

* *De Die Natali*, cap. 17.

The year of the *ſecular games* was not a year of tranquillity. The new Conſuls, *P. Cornelius Lentulus*, and *C. Licinius Varus*, were obliged to take the field to oppoſe the *Gauls*. The confidence of their leaders being raiſed by the multitudes of men they had aſſembled, and by the expectation of a ſtrong reinforcement of their countrymen from the other ſide the *Alps*, they demanded the reſtitution of *Ariminum*, formerly taken from them by the *Romans*. *Lentulus* and *Varus*, to gain time (not having their troops compleat) referred the matter to the determination of the ſenate, and in the interim agreed upon a truce with the enemy, whoſe commanders were very ready to conſent to a ceſſation of arms till they ſhould be joined by the forces they expected from *Tranſalpine Gaul*. When theſe forces arrived, their number proved ſo great as to give umbrage to thoſe whom they came to aſſiſt. The *Ciſalpine Gauls*, more afraid of the new comers than of the *Romans*, turned their arms againſt them and put them to flight, but firſt ſlew their own two Generals (or Kings) *Ates* and *Galatus*, for having of their own head, and without conſulting the nation, invited ſuch dangerous allies to croſs the *Alps*. The enemy being thus defeated by themſelves, two conſular armies were no longer neceſſary to repreſs them. *Lentulus* with his legions alone, not only reduced the *Boii* to yield a part of their country as the condition of a peace; but took a great number of forts from the *Ligurians*, partly by force and partly by compoſition.

Y. of *R.* 517. Bef. *J. C.* 235. 216 Conſul-p.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 21.

In the mean time, *Varus* made preparations for going to the Iſland of *Corſica*, which, by the ſecret intrigues of the *Carthaginians*, had been induced to throw off the *Roman* yoke. The Conſul, not finding a fleet ready to tranſport his whole army, ſent away before him a ſmall number of ſhips with a detachment under the command of that *Claudius Glycias*, who had formerly been named to the Dictatorſhip in deriſion. *Claudius* had ſerved, ſince that time, with good reputation, in ſeveral poſts of a

Zon. B. 8.

ages, neither of theſe periods are much regarded.

The firſt were held *A. U. C.* 245, or 298.
The ſecond *A.* 330, or 408.
The third *A.* 518.
The fourth either *A.* 605, or 608, or 628.
The fifth by *Auguſtus*, *A.* 736.
The ſixth by *Claudius*, *A.* 800.
The ſeventh by *Domitian*, 841.
The eighth by *Severus*, *A.* 957.
The ninth by *Philip*, 1000.
The tenth by *Honorius*, *A.* 1157.

The diſorder, without queſtion, was owing to the ambition of the Emperors, who were extremely deſirous to have the honour of celebrating theſe games in their reign; and therefore upon the ſlighteſt pretence, many times made them return before their ordinary courſe. Thus *Claudius* pretended that *Auguſtus* had held the games before their due time, that he might have the leaſt excuſe to keep them within ſixty-four years afterwards. On which account, *Suetonius* tells us, that the people ſcoffed at his cryers, when they went about proclaiming games that no body had ever ſeen, nor would ſee again; whereas there were not only many perſons alive who remembered the games of *Auguſtus*, but ſeveral players, who had acted in thoſe games, were now again brought on the ſtage by *Claudius*. *Sueton. Claud.* 21.

What part of the year the ſecular games were celebrated in, is uncertain; probably in the times of the commonwealth on the days of the nativity of the city, *i. e.* the 9, 10, 11, *Kal. Mart.* but under the Emperors, on the day when they came to their power.

Mr. *Walker* of *Coins*, p. 168.

lower

Y. of *R.* 517. Bef. *J. C.* 235. 216 Conſul-p.

lower order, but had never commanded in chief. Seeing himſelf now at the head of a part of the Conſular army, his ambition was raiſed, and fancying it would be much for his honour to gain this Iſland to the republic without bloodſhed; he, without the conſent of Conſul or Senate, made a ſhameful peace with the *Corſicans*. The Conſul, at his arrival, annulled the treaty, renewed the war, and ſubdued the Iſland by force of arms. As for *Claudius*, by a decree of the ſenate, he was delivered up to the reſentment of the *Corſicans*, *for having drawn them* (as it was alledged) *into a bloody war by a fallacious peace:* In which ſentence the republic, beſide the puniſhing a breach of duty and order, had the further view of preventing the reproach that might have been caſt upon the Conſul, for having made war on a people who depended on the faith of a treaty. However, the *Corſicans* diſdained this reparation, and ſent *Claudius* back to *Rome*. There he was put to death in priſon, and then his body, being firſt carried to the top of the ſteps called *Scalæ Gemoniæ*, on which the bodies of the greateſt malefactors uſed to be expoſed, was thence dragged away with an iron crook and thrown into the *Tiber*.

Zon. B. 8. *Dio.* apud Valeſ. p. 593. *Val. Max.* B. 6. c. 3. § 3.

This execution of *Claudius* did not ſatisfy the *Corſicans*, who had been amuſed by a treaty of peace, only to give their enemies the better opportunity to ſubdue them by a war. The near neighbourhood of *Sardinia* made it eaſy for them to communicate their diſcontent to the people of that Iſland; and it is ſaid, that *Carthage* under-hand excited the *Sardinians* to revolt from the *Romans*; and that *Rome*, *for this reaſon*, made preparations for a new war with the *African* Republic. Alarm'd at this news the *Carthaginians* ſent ambaſſador after ambaſſador to negotiate an accommodation; but all in vain. At length they diſpatched to *Rome*, for the ſame end, ten of the principal members of their ſtate, among whom was one *Hanno*, a young man of great ſpirit and vivacity; when theſe new deputies had for a while employed the loweſt ſubmiſſions and the humbleſt entreaties to procure a reconciliation, and all to no effect, *Hanno*, weary of ſo much cringing, and full of indignation at the rough and haughty anſwers of the Senate, cried out, with an air of confidence and dignity, "Well then, if you are reſolved to "break the treaty, reinſtate us in the condition we were in before it "was concluded. Reſtore to us SICILY and SARDINIA. With *theſe* "we bought of you, not *a Short Truce*, but *a Peace* that was to be "*perpetual*." The Senators, aſhamed, diſmiſſed the Deputies with a milder anſwer.

Eutrop. B. 3. c. 2. *Oroſius*, B. 4. ch. 12. *Dio.* in *Excerp.* xi. p. 922.

Y. of *R.* 518. Bef. *J. C.* 234. 217 Conſul-p.

After this the Conſuls for the new year, *C. Attilius Balbus*, and *T. Manlius Torquatus*, drew lots for their provinces; the former continued in *Italy*, while the latter eaſily recovered *Sardinia*, and ſettled peace there, but without reducing it to a *Roman province*.

Eutrop. B. 3. c. 3. *Vell. Pat.* B. 2. c. 38. *Oroſ.* B. 4. c. 12.

And now the temple of *Janus* was ſhut up for the firſt time ſince the reign of *Numa Pompilius*. For near 450 years the *Romans* had been almoſt continually in arms: And ſo ſteady was their ambition, and

and ſo unwearied their conſtancy in purſuing its dictates, that in the ſucceeding parts of this hiſtory we ſhall ſee them, in ſpite of numberleſs misfortunes, ſtill forming new enterprizes upon the neighbouring nations, and never ceaſing to puſh their conqueſts till they have attained to univerſal empire. *Livy*, B. 1. c. 19.

The preſent tranquillity laſted but a few months. In the following *Conſulſhip* of *L. Poſthumius Albinus*, and *Sp. Carvilius*, three armies were raiſed to act againſt the *Sardinians*, *Corſicans* and *Ligurians* who had (probably) engaged themſelves, by ſecret treaties. mutually to aſſiſt one another. *Poſthumius* ſucceeded againſt the *Ligurians*; but the *Prætor Cornelius*, who commanded in *Sardinia*, was, with many of his ſoldiers, carried off by diſtemper. *Carvilius* (from *Corſica*) tranſported his *Legions* thither, gained a victory over the *Sardinians*, and then returned to *Rome* to triumph. Y. of *R.* 519. Bef. *J. C.* 233. 218 Conſul-p. *Zon.* B. 8. *Liv. Epit.* 20. *Tab. Triumph.*

In this Conſulſhip, the *Cenſors*, obſerving the number of the *Citizens* to be conſiderably leſſen'd, and imputing it to mens marrying only with a view to intereſt, deſerting their own wives for fear of having many children to maintain, and carrying on unlawful intrigues with other women, they obliged all the citizens to ſwear, that they would not marry with any other view, than that of increaſing the ſubjects of the republic. This oath raiſed many ſcruples; and cauſed many ruptures between huſbands and wives. Among the reſt, one *Carvilius Ruga*, a conſiderable man, thought himſelf bound by his oath to divorce his wife whom he paſſionately loved, becauſe ſhe was barren; and accordingly he put her away, contrary to his inclination, and married another; the firſt inſtance of divorce at *Rome* in 519 years, notwithſtanding that the laws had always allowed it. And it was on this occaſion that marriage-contracts were firſt introduced, to ſecure women's portions in caſe of divorces, which we ſhall ſee hereafter grow ſcandalouſly frequent, as a corruption of manners prevailed in the republic. *Gell.* B. 4. c. 3. and B. 17. c. 21. in fine. *Sulp. de dotibus.* *D. Hal.* p. 93.

The freſh revolts of the *Sardinians* and *Ligurians* obliged the new Conſuls, *M. Pomponius Matho* and *Q. Fabius Maximus*, (the ſame *Fabius* who afterwards acquired ſo much glory in the wars of *Hannibal*) to divide the *Roman* forces. It now falling to *Fabius*'s lot to make war with the *Ligurians*, he drove them out of the flat country and forced them to take ſhelter under the *Alps*. In the mean time, his collegue *Pomponius* ſailed for *Sardinia*, and gained ſome victories there, for which a triumph was granted him at his return home. Y. of *R.* 520. Bef. *J. C.* 232. 219 Conſul-p. *Plut.* life of *Fab.* *Tab. Triumph.*

It is conjectured, that about this time the *Æbutian Law* (ſo called from the two *Æbutii*, Tribunes of the people, who propoſed it and got it paſſed) was promulged. It retrenched many frivolous cuſtoms, ordained by *the twelve tables* to be obſerved in proceſſes relating to civil affairs, and it alſo directed that three able and judicious men ſhould be choſen out of each *tribe*, to form a new *tribunal*, which ſubordinate to the Prætors, might aſſiſt them, and remedy the inconveniencies often occaſioned *A. Gel.* B. xvi. c. 10. *Pompon. de orig. Juris.*

caſioned by their abſence from *Rome*. Theſe new judges were called, for brevity's ſake, *Centumuirs* [b], though they were 105 in number; and when they were afterwards augmented to 180, they ſtill kept the ſame name.

Y. of *R.* 521. Bef. *J. C.* 231. 220 Conſul-p. *Cic.* in *Bruto*, c. 14. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 21.

The eſtabliſhment of this new *tribunal* made no change as to the direction of ſtate affairs which continued wholly in the Senate and *Comitia*. *Flaminius*, one of the *Tribunes*, made a motion to the Commons, at this time, to diſtribute a fruitful country lately taken from the *Gauls*, among the poor citizens of *Rome*. All motions of this kind had ever been oppoſed by the Senators, out of private intereſt; and now they had indeed a better reaſon to unite their ſtrength, in order to hinder *Flaminius*'s motion from paſſing into a law. They foreſaw that the *Gauls*, on both ſides the *Po*, would impatiently bear the diſtribution propoſed of thoſe lands. Neither the threats of the preſent Conſuls, *M. Æmilius Lepidus*, and *M. Publicius Malleolus*, nor the entreaties of the Senate, nor yet the tears of his own father, whom the *Patricians* had gained over to them, could prevail with *Flaminius* to deſiſt. On the day appointed for propoſing the law to the *Comitia*, he mounted the *Roſtra* and ſpoke to the people in favour of it; but in the midſt of his harangue, his father appearing on a ſudden aſcended the *Roſtra*, took him by the arm, and *commanded* him to follow him home; and then *Flaminius* immediately obeyed without reply; and, what is moſt extraordinary, not the leaſt noiſe nor murmur was heard in the aſſembly. Nevertheleſs, the affair was *now* only poſtponed; it was afterwards carried into execution; and what the Senators had apprehended came to paſs; a dangerous war from the angry *Gauls*.

Val. Max. B. 5. c. 4. §. 5. *Cic. de Inven. Rhet.* B. 2. c. 17. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 21.

Y. of *R.* 522. Bef *J. C* 230 221 Conſul-p. *Zon.* B. 8.

In the following year the new Conſuls, *M. Pomponius Matho*, and *C. Papirius Maſo*, entirely finiſhed the conqueſt of the two iſlands of *Sardinia* and *Corſica*, which were then reduced to the ſtate of a *Roman Province*, upon the ſame foot as *Sicily*. It is probable, that after this regulation *Pomponius* continued in the new province to govern it in quality of *Pro-Conſul* or *Prætor*, when the year of his Conſulate, which was not far from a concluſion, ſhould expire; but *Papirius* returned to *Rome*. At his arrival he found the grand elections over; a Dictator had been created to hold the Comitia, ſo that during the few remaining days of his magiſtracy, he had nothing to do, and he alſo quickly perceived, upon trial, that he had no more credit than buſineſs. The ſenate, diſſatisfied with him for ſome reaſon unknown, refuſed him a triumph. This provoked him to take a method entirely new, to do himſelf honour. At the

Faſt. Cap.

Plin. Jun. B. 5. *Epiſt.* 1. *Cicero de Orat.* B. 1. c. 28.

[b] They were divided into four courts or chambers. The cauſes, which fell under their cognizance, were ſuch as related to preſcriptions, guardianſhips, degrees of conſanguinity, or affinity, damages occaſioned by inundations, conteſts about building or repairing middle walls, the windows a man might open upon his neighbour, with an infinite number of other matters, that often raiſed diſputes between the inhabitants of the ſame city.

A MAP of ILLYRICUM.

ADRIATICK or UPPER SEA

ITALY

THE

Gulph of Liburnia

The Flanatick Gulph

Gulph of Apollonia.

LIBURNIA

PANNONIA

DACIA

MŒSIA

DARDANIA

DALMATIA

MACEDON

Liburnians

Ceraunii

Melcomeni

Ditiones

Deriopes

Varcians

Vardeians or Ardians

Illyrians

Daorisians

Pyreians

Sardiotes

Labeates

Illyricans

Taulantii

Parthini

Enderoduni

Scordisci

Siculotes

Timaci

Dardani

Istria

Carni

Emona

Noviodunum

Quadrata

Inucerum

Venanes

Menneianes

Percentinum

Antianes

Mursa Colony

Teutoburgium

Cornacum

Cusum

Tibiscum

Singidunum

Margus

Lederata

Tricornium

Viminacium Colony

Municipium

Idimum

Pincum

Horrea on the Margus

Naissus

Pompeios

Timacus R.

Nestus R.

Save R.

Drave R.

Danube R.

Tibiscus R.

Margus R.

Drin R.

Barbana R.

Scardus

Mount Scardus

Axius R.

Erigonus R.

Hemus

Mount Stoba

Europa on the Axius

Scupi

Ulpianum

Lychnisa

Nicea

Heraclea

Castra

Celia

Daus ara

Edessa

Sirtiana

Lychnis

The Lake

Apollonia

Aulon

Dyrrachium Colony

Petra

Epidamnus

Dinda

Lissus

Dindarid

Albanopolis

Parthus

Epicaria

Acrolicus

The Gulph of Illyricum

Scodra Colony

Labeates L.

Barbana R.

Drin or Drilo R.

Labeates

Allata

Birziminium

Medeon

Chinna

Clanulus R.

Siculotes

Barbana R.

Siparuntum

Enderum

Enderoduni

Scordisci

Mount Scardus

Scupi

Axius R.

Dardani

Siculotes

Orsundus R.

Drin R.

Scardus

Mount Scardus

Illyricans

Parthini

Dimale

Pantauchus R.

Drin R.

Mount Scardus

Macedon

Lychnisa

Nicea

Heraclea

Castra

Sirtiana

Celia

Daus ara

Edessa

Erigonus R.

Axius R.

Hemus

Mount Stoba

Europa on the Axius

Ulpianum

Lissus

Dindarid

Epicaria

Acrolicus

Albanopolis

Parthus

Epidamnus

Dyrrachium Colony

Petra

The Gulph of Illyricum

Dinda

Gulph of Apollonia.

Taulantii

Apollonia

The Lake

Lychnis

Aous or Asus R.

Aulon

Labeates

Scodra Colony

Drin or Drilo R.

Barbana R.

Labeates L.

Lissus

Dindarid

Parthus

Albanopolis

Parthini

Dimale

Pantauchus R.

Illyricans

Dyrrachium Colony

Petra

Epidamnus

Dinda

Drin R.

Mount Scardus

Macedon

Lychnisa

Nicea

Heraclea

Castra

Sirtiana

Celia

Daus ara

Edessa

Erigonus R.

Axius R.

Hemus

Mount Stoba

Europa on the Axius

Ulpianum

Scupi

Scordisci

Dardani

Siculotes

Barbana R.

Orsundus R.

Drin R.

Scardus

Mount Scardus

Axius R.

Siparuntum

Enderum

Enderoduni

Allata

Birziminium

Medeon

Chinna

Clanulus R.

Labeates

Scodra Colony

Drin or Drilo R.

Barbana R.

Labeates L.

Lissus

Dindarid

Epicaria

Acrolicus

Albanopolis

Parthus

Epidamnus

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Petra

The Gulph of Illyricum

Dinda

Gulph of Apollonia.

Taulantii

Apollonia

The Lake

Lychnis

Aous or Asus R.

Aulon

Illyricans

Parthini

Dimale

Pantauchus R.

head of his army he marched to the temple of *Jupiter Latialis* on the hill of *Alba*, with all the pomp with which triumphant victors were wont to march to the Capitol; he made no alteration in the ceremony, except that inſtead of a crown of laurel, he wore a crown of myrtle, on account of his having defeated the *Corſicans* in a place where was a grove of myrtles. This example of *Papyrius*, was afterwards followed by many Generals to whom the ſenate refuſed the honour of a *Triumph*.

Val. Max. B. 3. c. 6. *Pliny.* B. 15. c. 29. Feſtus in voce *Myrtea.*

CHAP. XIII.

The firſt Illyrian *war.*

THE next year *M. Æmilius Barbula*, and *M. Junius Pera*, being Conſuls, the republic engaged in a new war out of *Italy*. *Illyricum*, or rather that part of the country ſo called, which lies upon the *Adriatic*, and confines upon *Macedon* and *Epirus*, was at this time governed by a woman, named *Teuta*, the widow of King *Agron*, and guardian to her ſon, *Pinæus*, under age. The ſucceſs of her late huſband's arms, who had vanquiſhed the *Ætolians*, made her vain and preſumptuous; and being governed by evil councils, ſhe, inſtead of prudently managing the affairs of her ward in peace, commiſſioned her ſubjects to practiſe piracy on the ſea coaſt, and ſeize all the places they could; which was, in a manner, declaring herſelf a common enemy to all nations. Her pirates had taken many ſhips belonging to the *Roman* merchants, and ſhe was now beſieging the iſland of *Iſſa* in the *Adriatic*; the inhabitants of which, had put themſelves under the protection of the republic. Upon the complaints of thoſe merchants, and to protect the people of *Iſſa*, the ſenate diſpatched two ambaſſadors, *Caius* and *Lucius Coruncanius*, to the *Illyrian* Queen, to require of her that ſhe would reſtrain her ſubjects from infeſting the ſeas with their piracies. To this demand the Queen anſwered, that ſhe would take care, that no injury ſhould be done to the *Romans* by the *Illyrian* NATION, but that ſhe thought it was never the cuſtom of Princes to hinder *private ſubjects* from making what advantages they could from the ſea. *But the* Romans, (replied the younger of the ambaſſadors) *have an excellent cuſtom, which is, to puniſh private injuries by a public revenge, and to relieve the oppreſs'd.* Teuta, *by the help of the Gods, we ſhall find means to make you ſpeedily reform your royal inſtitutions.* The proud Queen, angry to exceſs at theſe words, ſecretly contrived to have the ambaſſadors murdered in their return homeward. Upon the news of this cruel breach of the law of nations, the ſenate, having firſt done honour to the *manes* of the ambaſſadors, by erecting, as was uſual in ſuch caſes, ſtatues, three foot high to their memory, equip'd a fleet with all expedition to begin the war. *Teuta*, alarm'd with theſe preparations, diſpatched an embaſſy to *Rome*, to diſown her having

Y. of *R.* 523. Bef. *J. C.* 229. 222 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 2. *Appian* in *Illyr.* *Zon.* B. 8. *Dio. in Excerpt.* xii. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 8. *Plin.* B. 34. c. 6. *Dio. in Excerpt.* xii.

Zon. B. 8. having had any ſhare in the murder: Yet, when the *Romans* demanded, that the murderers ſhould be delivered up, ſhe peremptorily refuſed it.

Y. of *R.* 524. Bef. *J. C.* 228. 223 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 11. The Conſuls therefore for the new year, *P. Poſthumius Albinus*, and *Cn. Fulvius Centumalus*, both embarked for *Illyricum*. *Fulvius* had the command of the fleet, conſiſting of 200 gallies, and *Poſthumius* of the land-forces, which were 20000 foot, and a ſmall body of horſe. The Queen, in the beginning of the ſpring, had augmented her fleet, and ſent it to plunder the coaſts of *Greece*. One part ſailed to *Corcyra* *; (a ſmall iſland lying near *Pharos* in the *Adriatic*) the reſt anchored before *Epidamnum*. Theſe, who had thought to ſurprize the town, having failed of their hope, rejoin'd the ſquadron that lay before *Corcyra:* the people of which place had call'd in the *Ætolians* and *Achæans* to their aſſiſtance. Nevertheleſs, the *Illyrians*, being aſſiſted by the *Acarnanians*, had the victory in a briſk action by ſea: ſo that *Corcyra*, being no longer in a condition to defend itſelf, capitulated; and received an *Illyrian* garriſon, commanded by *Demetrius* of *Pharos:* after which, the conquerors ſailed to *Epidamnum*, and renew'd the ſiege of that Place.

* Now *Curzola.*

Fulvius ſail'd directly for *Corcyra*; and tho' he learnt by the way that the city had ſurrender'd, he purſued his courſe, having a ſecret intelligence with *Demetrius*; who, knowing that ſome ill offices had been done him with *Teuta*, and fearing her reſentment, had promiſed the Conſul to deliver up the Place to him; and this he did with the conſent of the *Corcyræans*, who thought it the only means of getting a protection from the inſults of the *Illyrians*.

By the advice and aſſiſtance of the ſame *Demetrius*, the *Romans* (after *Poſthumius* had landed his forces) made themſelves maſters of *Apollonia* (a great city, and one of the keys of *Illyricum* on the ſide of *Macedon*) and of many other places; of which, to reward his ſervices, they appointed him governor. *Teuta* was quickly conſtrained by *Poſthumius*'s army to retire for ſafety to the inner Part of *Illyricum*; while *Fulvius*, with his naval forces, clear'd the ſea of her pirates.

Y. of *R.* 525. Bef. *J. C.* 227. 224 Conſul-p. Upon the election of *Sp. Carvilius*, and *Q. Fabius Verrucoſus*, to the Conſulate, *Fulvius* was recalled from *Illyricum* with the greater part of the fleet, and of the land-forces; and *Poſthumius* received orders to ſtay there with the remainder, in quality of Pro-conſul. *Teuta*, who perhaps had built ſome hopes on a change of the *Roman* magiſtrates, finding that *Poſthumius* not only winter'd in *Illyricum*, but was raiſing freſh troops to purſue the war, ſent, early in the ſpring, from *Rhizon*, (whither ſhe had retired) an embaſſy to *Rome* to divert the ſtorm. The Senate granted her a peace on theſe conditions. *That ſhe ſhould pay an annual tribute to the* Romans. *Surrender to them all* Illyricum, *a few places excepted.* (*Appian* mentions *Corcyra*, *Pharos*, *Iſſa*, *Epidamnum* (or *Dyrrhachium*) and the country of the *Atintanes* as yielded to the *Romans.*)

Polyb. B. 2. c. 12. in *Illyr.*

mans). And (which principally concern'd the *Greeks*) *that not more than two of her ſhips, and theſe unarm'd, ſhould be permitted to ſail beyond* Liſſos, a ſea-port on the confines of *Illyricum* and *Macedon*. Thus ended the firſt *Illyrian* war, which had not laſted quite two years. As for *Teuta*, whether out of ſhame, or compell'd to it by a ſecret article of the treaty, ſhe abdicated the Regency, and *Demetrius* took her place. Y. of *R.* 525. Bef. *J. C.* 227. 224 Conſul-p.

Poſthumius, after this, ſent ambaſſadors to the *Ætolians* and *Achæans*, to lay before them the reaſons for which the *Romans* had undertaken the war, what had been the events of it, and upon what terms a peace had been concluded. The ambaſſadors, having performed their commiſſion, returned to *Corcyra*, much pleaſed with the courteous reception they had met with from thoſe ſtates. In reality, the treaty was of great benefit to the *Greeks*, and deliver'd them from vexations and perpetual fears: for all *Greece* had been plagued and infeſted with the *Illyrian* pyracies.

Polybius remarks that this was the firſt time that any *Roman* troops croſt the ſea into *Illyricum*; and the firſt time that there was any intercourſe by ambaſſadors between the *Greeks* and the *Romans*. The latter, about the ſame time, ſent ambaſſadors to *Corinth* and to *Athens*. They were honourably received. The *Corinthians*, by a public act, decreed that the *Romans* ſhould be admitted to the celebration of the *Iſthmian* games. And *Zonaras* tells us, that the *Athenians* declared the *Romans Citizens of Athens*, and decreed them the privilege of being admitted to the myſteries of *Eleuſis*; that is, of the feſtival of *Ceres* celebrated at *Eleuſis*, a city of *Attica*. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 12. *Zon.* B. 8.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans *vanquiſh the* Gauls *on both ſides the* Po.

BEFORE the *Illyrian* war was well ended, the *Italic Gauls* on both ſides the *Po* began to be in motion. Nevertheleſs it does not appear, that *P. Valerius Flaccus*, and *M. Attilius Regulus*, the Conſuls for the new year, took the field againſt them, or performed any military exploit[a]. Y. of *R.* 526. Bef. *J. C.* 226. 225 Conſul-p.

The *Romans* had the extremeſt dread of thoſe enemies, who had formerly reduced their ſtate to the very brink of total deſtruction. There was a prophecy, at this time current at *Rome*, *That the* Gauls *and* Greeks *ſhould one day be in poſſeſſion of it*. This prophecy is ſaid to have been found in

[a] Some authors ſay, that the firſt eſtabliſhment of two *Provincial Prætors*, one for the government of *Sicily*, and one for that of *Sardinia* and *Corſica*, was in this Conſulate, and not at the time before mentioned. Be that as it will, it was in this year that, at the motion of two Tribunes, *Villius*, and *Titius*, a law paſſed, impowering the *Roman* Prætors to appoint, as well in the provinces belonging to the republic, as at *Rome*, guardians to thoſe women and children who had none. This law was called *Villa-Titia*. *Catrou*. *Pomp. de Orig. Juris*. *Juſtinian. Inſtit.* B. 1. *Ulpian.* c. 11. *de tutelis*.

the *Sybilline* books. The completion of it ſeemed now to approach, when the ſtates of the republic were bounded on one ſide by the *Greeks*, and
Y. of *R.* 527. on the other by the *Gauls*. The ſucceeding Conſuls therefore, *M. Va-*
Bef. *J. C.* 225. *lerius Meſſala*, and *L. Apuſtius Fullo*, conſulted with the *Pontifices*, how
226 Conſul-p. to quiet the apprehenſions of the people; and immediately an edict was publiſhed by the *Decemvirs*, who had the care of the *Sybilline* books, com-
Zon. B. 8. manding that two *Greeks*, a man and a woman, and two *Gauls*, a man
Oroſ. B. 4. c. and a woman, ſhould be buried alive in the Ox-Market; and by this
13. they perſuaded the people, that the prophecy was fulfilled, and that the *Gauls* and *Greeks* had taken poſſeſſion of *Rome*.

The difficulties raiſed by ſuperſtition being thus ſurmounted, the *Romans* applied themſelves to create diviſions among the *Gauls*, and to levy
Polyb. B. 2. c. a prodigious force; which (according to *Polybius* [b]) amounted to near
24. 700000

	Foot,	Horſe.
[b] The numbers found upon the muſter, as recorded by *Polybius*, are as follow. With the Conſuls marched four legions of *Romans*, each legion conſiſting of 5200 foot, and 300 horſe.	20800	1200
They had alſo with them, of the allies, —— ——	30000	2000
Of the *Sabines* and *Hetrurians* were ſent, under the command of a Prætor, to the frontiers of *Hetruria*, ——	50000	4000
Of the *Umbrians* and *Sarcinates* (from the *Apennines*) 20000, and as many of the *Veneti* and *Cenomani* were appointed to invade the *Boii*, in order to oblige them to keep a part of their forces at home, for their own defence, —— —— ——	40000	
At *Rome* were kept ready to march, (on any exigence) of the citizens,	20000	1500
Theſe were ſtrengthened by a body of the allies, amounting to	30000	2000
On the muſter rolls ſent to the ſenate, from the allies were,		
Of the *Latins*, —— —— ——	80000	5000
Of the *Samnites*, —— —— ——	70000	7000
Of the *Iapyges*, and *Meſſapyges*, —— ——	50000	16000
Of the people of *Lucania*, —— ——	30000	3000
Of the *Marſi*, *Marrucini*, *Ferentini*, and *Veſtini*, ——	20000	4000
The *Romans* had alſo in *Sicily* and *Tarentum* two legions, conſiſting each of 4200 foot and 200 horſe, —— ——	8400	400
Beſide all theſe, of the common people, in *Rome* and in *Campania*, were muſtered, as fit to bear arms, ——	250000	23000
	699200	69100

Polybius, on occaſion of this muſter, expreſſes his admiration of the hardy enterprize of *Hannibal*, to attack an empire of ſuch prodigious ſtrength with an army of ſcarcely 20000 men.

But Sir *Walter Raleigh* obſerves, that this muſter ſeems to have been like to that which *Lodowic Sforza* made, when *Lewis* the XIIth invaded *Milan*; at which time, the better to encourage himſelf and his ſubjects, he took a roll of all perſons able to bear arms within the Dutchy, though indeed he was never able to bring a tenth part of them into the field. Certain it is (adds our hiſtorian) that the battles of *Trebia*, *Thraſymene*, and *Cannæ*, did not conſume any ſuch proportion as was anſwerable to this large account. Yet were the *Romans* fain to arm their ſlaves, even for want of other ſoldiers, after their overthrow at *Cannæ*. Wherefore the marvel is not great, that the *Carthaginians* and others were little terrified

700000 foot, and near 70000 horſe, ſo great was the terror which the threatened invaſion from theſe Barbarians ſpread over all *Italy*. The *Gauls* nevertheleſs, with only fifty thouſand foot, and twenty thouſand horſe, began the hoſtilities, entered *Hetruria*, pillaging and laying waſte the country, without oppoſition. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 23.

The republic had promoted *L. Æmilius Papus*, and *C. Attilius Regulus*, to the Conſulſhip. The latter went into *Sardinia*, to quiet ſome commotion there; while *Æmilius* took upon him the conduct of the war with the *Inſubrian* and *Boian Gauls*, joined by a numerous army, from the other ſide of the *Alps*, of the *Gæſatæ*, ſo [c] called (ſays *Polybius*) becauſe they ſerved for pay, the word having that ſignification. They were commanded by two kings, *Concolitanus*, and *Aneroeſtus*. A. of *R.* 528. Bef. *C.* 224. 227 Conſul-p. B. 2. c. 22.

Æmilius being uncertain what rout the *Gæſatæ* would take after they had paſſed the *Alps*, had led his troops to *Ariminum*, to hinder the enemy from entering upon the *Roman* lands by the coaſts of the *Adriatic* ſea. At the ſame time a Prætor, with a body of 50000 foot, and 4000 horſe, had been ordered into *Hetruria*, to defend the frontiers of that country. But in his march he miſſed of the enemy; who were advanced to the neighbourhood of *Cluſium* (within three days march of *Rome*) when they heard that a *Roman* army was behind them, and would ſoon be at their heels. They immediately turned back to meet the Prætor and give him battle. It being about the cloſe of day, when the two armies came in ſight of each other, they both encamped. But in the night, the leaders of the *Gauls*, having meditated a ſtratagem, marched away with their infantry towards *Fæſula* [d], leaving only their cavalry to appear in the field, when day ſhould return. In the morning, the Prætor ſeeing nothing but horſe to oppoſe him, ſallied out of his entrenchments and attacked them. The *Gallic* cavalry, according to their inſtructions, inſtantly gave ground, and took the road to *Fæſula*. Their flight drew the *Romans* B. 2. c. 26. c. 25. after

terrified with the report of ſuch a multitude: For, all heads are not fit for helmets; though the *Roman* citizens were, in general, as good fighting men as elſewhere might be found.

Another reaſon may be alſo aſſigned why *Hannibal* ſhould not be much frightened at theſe muſter rolls, even ſuppoſing the far greater part of the men, there regiſtered, to be fit to bear arms. *Polybius* tells us, that the people of *Italy*, terrified at the approach of the *Gauls*, did not conſider themſelves now as being to fight only as allies of *Rome*, and for the preſervation of her empire, but for their own proper ſafety, their families, their fortunes, all that was dear to them; and that it was for this reaſon they ſo readily executed the orders, that were ſent to them from the ſenate. The conteſt with the *Gauls* was looked upon as the common cauſe of all *Italy*.

But when *Hannibal* paſſed the *Alps*, the caſe was widely different; for we may well conclude from the neutrality and cold behaviour generally obſerved by the allies of *Rome*, on that occaſion, that they looked upon this war as regarding her only, and in which they themſelves had little concern.

[c] According to the *Jeſuits*, the *Gæſatæ* were not a particular people of *Tranſalpine Gaul*, but probably *Germans* diſperſed through all the *Gallic* nation, whoſe profeſſion was arms, and who hired themſelves to whoever would employ them in war. They had their name from a weapon they bore, called *Gæſum*.

[d] A city of *Hetruria*, at the foot of the *Apennines*.

Y. of *R.* 528 Bef. *C.* 224 227 Conſul. P

after them, never ſuſpecting that they ſhould find the enemy's infantry in their way. The latter on a ſudden appeared and fell vigorouſly upon the Prætor's troops already fatigued with the purſuit. 6000 of his men were killed upon the ſpot; the reſt in diſorder fled to a neighbouring hill, where they entrenched themſelves. The firſt thought of the *Gallic* Generals was to force the enemy immediately in this poſt; but conſidering afterwards that their own troops were wearied with the former night's march, they thought it beſt to give them ſome repoſe, and defer the attack till the next day.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 26. to c. 31.

In this diſtreſs of the Prætor's army, the Conſul *Æmilius* came ſeaſonably to their relief. Being informed of the approach of the *Gæſatæ* towards *Rome*, he had inſtantly quitted his camp at *Ariminum* and had marched with expedition to the defence of his country. He was now encamped within a ſmall diſtance from the enemy; and the Prætor's troops ſeeing the fires in his camp, and conjecturing the truth, took courage. The *Gauls*, perceiving the ſame fires, were greatly alarmed at the Conſul's unexpected arrival; and being unwilling to hazard by a battle the loſs of the rich booty they had got, they, by the advice of their King *Aneroeſtus*, decamped in the night, purpoſing to march home through *Inſubria*; and when they had ſecured their booty, to return to the war. In their march they kept along the ſhore of the *Hetrurian* ſea. *Æmilius*, though his army was now ſtrengthened by the remains of the Prætor's troops, did not think it adviſeable to hazard a pitch'd battle; but choſe rather to follow the enemy cloſe, and watch his opportunity to haraſs them in their retreat, and, if poſſible, to recover ſome part of the ſpoils they were carrying off. It luckily happened, that his collegue *Attilius*, having put a ſpeedy end to the troubles in *Sardinia*, had, in his return home, landed with his army at *Piſa*, and was now marching along the coaſt of the *Hetrurian* ſea towards *Rome*: he was overjoyed when, near *Telamon*, a little port of *Hetruria*, he learned, by his ſcouts, the ſituation of things. And, in order to intercept the *Gauls*, he immediately drew up his infantry, making as wide a front as he could; and then commanded them to advance ſlowly to meet the enemy. He himſelf haſtened with his cavalry to the top of a hill, by the foot of which the enemy muſt neceſſarily paſs. His ambition was to have the chief glory of the ſucceſs; and he perſuaded himſelf, that by being the firſt to begin the battle, he ſhould obtain that advantage.

The *Gauls* imagined at firſt that this body of *Roman* horſe was only a detachment from *Æmilius*'s army, and therefore ordered their cavalry to advance and drive them from their poſt. As for *Æmilius*, as ſoon as he perceived fighting at a diſtance, he concluded it was his collegue *Attilius*, attacking the enemy in front, for he had been informed of his landing at *Piſa*. He immediately detached all his horſe to fetch a compaſs and join thoſe of *Attilius*. Upon the arrival of ſo powerful a reinforcement the *Romans* renewed the attack with more briſkneſs than ever.

ever. *Attilius* fighting with the utmoſt intrepidity was kill'd in the engagement. A *Gaul* cut off his head, and ſticking it on the top of a lance carried it through all the files of the *Gallic* troops. However the death of this brave man proved no advantage to them. One of his lieutenants took his place, and the action was continued as before. The *Romans* in the end had the victory and kept poſſeſſion of their Poſt. Y. of *R.* 528. Bef. *J.C.* 224. 227 Conſul-p.

During the conflict between the cavalry on both ſides the *Gallic* Generals had time to form their infantry. Having two *Conſular* armies to deal with, one in their front, the other in their rear, they divided their battalions pretty equally, one half of them turning their backs to the other half; and to avoid being attacked in flank, they placed all their waggons and other carriages on the wings. Their plunder they had carried to a neighbouring hill, where they left it under a good guard.

The *Gæſatæ* who made the firſt line of the troops that faced *Æmilius*, confiding in their gigantic ſtature and ſtrength, and obſerving that the plain where they were drawn up was full of buſhes and briars, to avoid being incommoded in the battle by the thorns catching in their clothes ſtripped themſelves naked, keeping only their arms. But this vain confidence proved their deſtruction. For having only ſmall bucklers, which were not ſufficient to ward their huge bodies from the darts that were unexpectedly ſhower'd upon them by the *Romans* at a diſtance, they preſently fell into diſcouragement and perplexity. Some tranſported with rage and deſpair threw themſelves madly upon the enemy, where they found certain death; others, pale, diſcomfited and trembling, drew back in diſorder, breaking the ranks that were behind them. And thus were quelled at the very firſt attack the pride and ferocity of the *Gæſatæ*.

And now the *Roman* dartmen retiring within the intervals of the army, the cohorts advanced to encounter the *Inſubrians*, *Boians*, and *Tauriſcans*, who fought with great reſolution; for though they were hard preſs'd, and covered with wounds, they ſuſtained the ſhock and kept their poſt, and may be truly ſaid to have been inferior to the *Romans* only in their arms. Their ſhields were not ſo large as thoſe of the *Romans*, and their ſwords were made only for cutting. Nevertheleſs they maintained the fight till the *Roman* cavalry who had been victorious on the eminence, driving at once full ſpeed upon them, put an end to the ſtruggle. The defeat was general; 40000 of the *Gauls* remained dead upon the field of battle, and 10000 were made priſoners, together with *Concolitanus*, one of their kings. The reſt eſcaped by flight, but *Aneroeſtus* their other king, the braveſt ſoldier, and moſt experienc'd commander of all the *Gauls*, cut his throat afterwards in rage and deſpair. *Æmilius* after this victory marched his army into the country of the *Boian Gauls*, enrich'd his ſoldiers with booty, and then returned to *Rome*, where he had a magnificent triumph. *Diod. Sic.* B. 25. in *Eclog.*

The

Y. of *R.* 529. Bef. *J. C.* 223. 228 Conſul-p.

The fear of the *Gallic* war was over, but the deſire of revenge remained; and the next year's Conſuls therefore, *T. Manlius Torquatus*, and *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, had *Gaul* aſſigned them for their provinces. But theſe great men did not ſucceed, to the expectation of the *Romans*, nor paſs the *Po*, as it was hoped they would. Their marches were retarded by violent rains, and a plague infected their army, which latter calamity not ſuffering them to return to *Rome* at the uſual time, the famous *Cæcilius Metellus* was created *Dictator*, to hold the *Comitia* in their abſence, for the new elections.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 31.

Faſt. Cap.

Y. of *R.* 530. Bef. *J. C.* 222. 229 Conſul-p.

C. Flaminius Nepos, and *P. Furius Philo*, being choſen *Conſuls*, put the deſign of their Predeceſſors in execution, and notwithſtanding the vigorous oppoſition of the *Gauls*, paſs'd the *Po*, and entered *Inſubria*; but having ſuffered much both in their paſſage, and afterwards, and finding they could perform nothing of moment, they made a truce with this people, and retired into the territory of their friends the *Cænomani*. There they continued a while augmenting their army with auxiliaries; and then renewed their incurſions on the *Inſubrian* plains at the foot of the *Alps*. Hereupon the princes of this nation, perceiving the fix'd determination of the *Romans* to ſubdue them, reſolved to put all to the hazard of a battle; and having collected all their ſtrength, which amounted to 50000 men, march'd againſt the enemy, and encamped within ſight of them.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 32.

Zon. B. 8. *Plut.* life of *Marcel.* and *Oroſ.* B. 4. c. 13.

It happened a little before this that the *Romans* were much frighten'd by various prodigies in the heavens, in the waters, and upon the earth. In *Hetruria* extraordinary lights appeared in the air. At *Ariminum* three moons were ſeen at the ſame time. A river of *Picenum* roll'd waters as red as blood. The *Italians* felt the violent earthquake that overturned the *Coloſſus* of *Rhodes*. At *Rome* a vulture lighted in the middle of the *Forum*, and ſtaid there a conſiderable time. The *Augurs* being conſulted upon theſe prodigies, declared that there muſt have been ſome defect in the ceremonial at the election of the *Conſuls*: upon which, a courier was immediately diſpatch'd from the ſenate, with letters commanding them to return to *Rome*. But when theſe letters arrived, the *Conſuls* being on the banks of the river *Addua*, were in ſight of the powerful army of the *Inſubrians*; and *Flaminius* either gueſſing at the ſubſtance of the letters, or having been informed of it by his friends, prevailed with his collegue not to open the packet till after the battle.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 32, 33.

The *Romans*, being ſenſible that the enemy exceeded them in numbers, had intended to uſe the aid of thoſe *Gauls* with whom they had reinforced their army. But now, remembring the faithleſſneſs of theſe people, who were to be employed againſt troops of the ſame nation, they could not reſolve to truſt them in the preſent important conjuncture. At the ſame time it was by no means proper to expreſs a diffidence of them, in ſuch a manner as ſhould give them occaſion of quarrel. *Flaminius*, to free himſelf from this perplexity, made his *Gauls* paſs to the other

ſide of the river on a bridge of boats; and then, by cauſing the boats to be hawl'd to his own ſide, put it out of the power of thoſe ſuſpected troops to do him any harm during the action. By this means alſo his own army was left without any hopes but in victory; for the river which they had at their backs was unfordable. Thus far the conduct of *Flaminius* appears commendable: but he was guilty of a great overſight in drawing up his army too near the brink of the river; for he left ſo little ſpace between that and his rear, that had the *Romans* been ever ſo little preſs'd during the engagement, they had no whither to retire but into the water. However this defect of the Conſul's management was ſupplied by the bravery and ſkill of his ſoldiers, inſtructed by their Tribunes. Theſe officers had obſerved in former conflicts, that the *Gauls* were not formidable but in the ardour of their firſt attack, and that their ſwords were of ſuch a faſhion and temper as, after two or three good cuts, to ſtand bent in their hands, and ſo become uſeleſs to them, if they had not time to ſtreighten them on the ground with their foot. The Tribunes therefore furniſh'd the firſt line of the *Roman* troops with the arms of the triarii, or third line; that is to ſay, with long javelins, like our halberts, and order'd the ſoldiers, firſt to make uſe of theſe, and then to draw their ſwords. Theſe precautions had the deſired ſucceſs. The ſwords of the *Gauls* by the firſt ſtrokes on the *Roman* javelins became blunted, bent, and uſeleſs; and then the *Romans* cloſing in with them, ſtab'd them in the face and breaſt with their pointed ſwords, making a terrible ſlaughter. Nine thouſand of the enemy were kill'd, and ſeventeen thouſand taken priſoners.

Y. of *R.* 530. Bef. *J. C.* 222. 229 Conſul-p.

Oroſ. B. 4. c. 13.

After the action the *Conſuls* open'd the packet. *Furius* was for immediately obeying the order; *Flaminius* inſiſted on purſuing the war: *The victory*, he ſaid, *was a ſufficient proof that there had been no defect in the auguries, and that the letters of revocation were wholly from the envy of the ſenate; that he would finiſh his enterprize, and would teach the people not to be deceived by* THE OBSERVATION OF BIRDS, *or any thing elſe.* Purſuant to this reſolution he attack'd and took ſeveral caſtles, and one conſiderable town, with the ſpoils of which he enrich'd his ſoldiers, to prepare them for his defence in that quarrel which he knew would ariſe between him and the Senate. His collegue would not accompany him in theſe expeditions, but continu'd encamp'd, waiting to join him when he ſhould return from his incurſion.

Zon. B. 8.

When the two collegues came back to *Rome* with their armies, the people as well as the Senate at firſt ſhow'd their reſentment, by a very cold reception; but the troops of *Flaminius*, whom he had enrich'd, found means to prevail with the former to grant both the *Conſuls* the honours of the triumph. The Senate, however, obliged theſe magiſtrates afterwards to depoſe themſelves; ſuch a reſpect, *ſays Plutarch*, had the *Romans* for religion, making all their affairs depend on the ſole will

Life of Marcellus.

will of the Gods, and never ſuffering, even in their greateſt proſperities, the leaſt contempt or neglect of the ancient oracles, or of the uſages of their country; being fully perſuaded, that what moſt contributed to the welfare of their ſtate was not the ſucceſs of their arms, but their ſteady ſubmiſſion to the Gods.

Y. of *R.* 531. Bef. *J.C.* 221. 230 Conſul-p.

The *Comitia* being held by an interrex, *M. Claudius Marcellus* (of a *Plebeian* branch of the *Claudian* family) who became afterwards ſo famous, was raiſed to the *Conſulate*, with *Cn. Cornelius Scipio*. They were ſcarce enter'd upon their office when a deputation came to *Rome* from the *Inſubrians*, to implore a peace; but the Senate at the inſtigation of the new *Conſuls*, who repreſented thoſe *Gauls* as an untractable people, on whom there could be no dependance, diſmiſſed their deputies with a refuſal. Upon this they reſolved to bring into *Italy* a freſh inundation of *Gæſatæ*, who were always ready to fight for hire. Thirty thouſand of theſe mercenaries croſs'd the *Alps* under the command of their king, *Viridomarus*.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 34.

Early in the ſpring the *Conſuls* paſs'd the *Po*, and laid ſiege to *Acerræ*, a place near that river, and in the neighbourhood of *Cremona*. The *Gauls* were now ninety thouſand ſtrong, yet they thought it more adviſeable to oblige the *Romans* to raiſe the ſiege of that frontier town, by making a uſeful diverſion, than to hazard a battle. *Viridomarus* therefore with ten thouſand men paſs'd the *Po*, enter'd the *Roman* territories, and advanced towards *Claſtidium* in *Liguria*. Upon the news of this motion of the *Gauls*, *Marcellus* followed by only two-thirds of the *Roman* cavalry, and about ſix hundred of the light-arm'd infantry, left his camp and came up with the enemy near the place before named. He drew up his little army all in one line, giving it as much extent as he could. The *Gauls* ſeeing the infantry of the *Romans* ſo inconſiderable, and always deſpiſing their cavalry, had no doubt of the victory. But when the two armies were juſt ready to join battle, *Viridomarus* advancing before his troops, defied the *Roman* general to ſingle combat. *Marcellus* joyfully accepted the challenge (for ſingle combat was his talent) ruſhed upon his enemy, killed him and ſtripped him of his armour; and then the *Gæſatæ* were ſo diſhearten'd that the victor, with his handful of *Romans*, put them intirely to flight.

Plut. life of *Marcellus.*

Polyb. B. 2. c. 34. *Eutrop.* B. 3. c. 6. *Zon.* B. 8.

During the abſence of *Marcellus*, his collegue had taken *Acerræ*, and laid ſiege to *Milan* (or *Mediolanum*) the chief city of *Inſubria*, but was himſelf beſieged by the *Gauls*, while he lay before the town. The return of the victorious *Conſul* changed the ſcene; the *Gæſatæ* quite diſcouraged broke up their camp, fled, and repaſs'd the *Alps*; and *Milan* immediately ſurrendered at diſcretion. *Como* was reduced to the ſame neceſſity; and, in ſhort, the whole nation of the *Inſubrians* ſubmitted to receive law from the republic. *Inſubria* and *Liguria* were now made one province, and called *Ciſalpine Gaul:* and thus did all *Italy* become ſubject to *Rome*, from the *Alps* to the *Ionian* ſea.

Vide Pigh. ad *Ann.* 531.

The

The Senate decreed *Marcellus* a triumph, and it was ſaid in the decree to be, *for having conquered the Inſubrians and Germans*, which makes it probable that the *Gæſatæ* were originally *German*. The *Conſul*, in his triumphal proceſſion, carried on his ſhoulders a trophy of the ſpoils of *Viridomarus*; and this was the third and laſt triumph in which any *opima ſpolia* were ſeen at *Rome*. As for *Cornelius*, *Marcellus*'s collegue, he was continued in the new province as *Pro-Conſul*, to regulate the affairs of it; and the ſame *Comitia* which allotted him that poſt, choſe *M. Minucius Rufus*, and *P. Cornelius Scipio Aſina*, to be the *Conſuls* for the new year. The conqueſt of *Iſtria*, on the borders of the *Adriatic*, was the only military exploit during their magiſtracy.

Plut. life of *Marcel.* *Faſt. Cap.* See vol. 1. B. 1. c. 2. §. xii. & B. 2. c. 33. §. 1. Y. of *R.* 532. Bef. *J. C.* 220. 231 Conſul-p. *Eutrop.* B. 3. c. 7.

CHAP. XV.

The ſecond Illyrian *war.*

ABOUT this time *Demetrius of Pharos*, whom the *Roman* republic had placed in the government of *Illyricum*, and guardianſhip of the young king *Pinæus*, ſeeing the *Romans* engaged in a troubleſom war with the *Gauls*, and that *Carthage* wanted only a fair opportunity to break with them, had deſpiſed their orders, forced the *Atintanes* to renounce their alliance with the republic, and ſent fifty ſhips of war beyond *Lyſſos* to pillage the Iſlands, called *Cyclades*, in the *Archipelago*.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16. *App. Illyr.* *Dio.* in *Excl. ap. Valeſ.*

The new *Conſuls*, *L. Veturius Philo*, and *C. Lutatius*, would have ſailed for *Illyricum*, if they had not been forced to depoſe themſelves upon ſome defect found in the ceremony of their election. They were ſucceeded by *M. Æmilius Lepidus*, and *M. Valerius Lævinus*; but the ſeaſon was now too far advanced to begin the expedition, ſo that it was poſtponed to the next *Conſulſhip*. [By a *Cenſus* taken this year, the number of *Roman citizens* fit to bear arms appeared to be two hundred ſeventy thouſand, two hundred and thirteen. The *Cenſus*, as uſual, was followed by a *Luſtrum*, the forty-third from its inſtitution.]

Y. of *R.* 533. Bef. *J. C.* 219. 232 Conſul-p. *Vid. Pigh.* ad *Ann.* 533. *Liv. Epit.* 20.

BOTH the *Conſuls* of the new year, *M. Livius Salinator*, and *L. Æmilius Paulus*, imbarked for *Illyricum*. *Demetrius* had aſſiſted *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, (while a minor under the tuition of his uncle, *Antigonus Dozon*) in his wars with the Lacedæmonians, and had thereby ſecured himſelf a retreat with that prince, in caſe of a diſaſter. He had alſo fortified *Dimalum*, a city of importance in *Illyricum*; and having aſſembled the choiceſt of his troops in the Iſland of *Pharos*, his own country, held his court there. Early in the ſpring *Æmilius* ſat down before *Dimalum*, and by ſurprizing efforts took it in ſeven days; upon which all the old allies of *Rome*, who had been compelled to ſubmit to the tyrant, returned joyfully to their former engagements. The next attempt was upon *Pharos*, the laſt refuge of the traitor. As the en-

Y. of *R.* 534. Bef. *J. C.* 218. 233 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 16. c. 18, 19.

Y. of *R.* 534 Bef *J.C* 218. 233 Conſul-p

terpriſe was difficult, *Æmilius* thought it neceſſary to join artifice to valour. The *Roman* fleet had two *Conſular* armies on board it; one of them was ordered to land in the Iſland, in the night, and hide it ſelf in foreſts, and behind rocks. This done, a detachment of the fleet appeared off *Pharos*, in open day, as it were with deſign to land ſome forces there. *Demetrius* drew his army out of the town, to the ſea-ſhore, to hinder the deſcent; which when the *Legionaries*, that were already landed, perceived, they left their ambuſh, and marching ſilently ſeized an eminence between the city and the port. It was of the laſt conſequence to *Demetrius* to drive the *Romans* from this poſt, and therefore having encouraged his men he led them ſtrait to the attack.

This gave the *Conſuls* on board the fleet an opportunity to make their deſcent, and then the *Illyrians* finding themſelves inveſted on all ſides preſently took to flight. As for the regent he made his eſcape to *Macedon* in a bark kept ready for that purpoſe.

Polyb. B. 4 c. 66.

B. 3. c. 19.

The defeat of the *Illyrian* army was followed by the taking of *Pharos*, which the *Romans* firſt plundered and then levelled with the ground. Thus *Rome* became a ſecond time miſtreſs of *Illyricum*. However, ſhe did not reduce it to the ſtate of a *Roman* province, having ſome compaſſion for the young king, who had been embarked in theſe affairs merely by the fault of his guardians.

App. in *Illyr.*

Auth. of the lives of illuſt. men. c. 50.

The *Conſuls* returned to *Rome* and obtained a triumph for their victories. Their conduct, nevertheleſs, had not been, in all reſpects, pleaſing to the people, as appeared after the expiration of their magiſtracy[a]. *Livius* and *Æmilius* were then accuſed before the *Tribes* of having applied a great part of the ſpoils taken from the enemy to their own uſe, and of having diſtributed the reſt of the booty partially among the ſoldiers. *Æmilius* upon his trial was acquitted, but *Livius* was condemned by all the *Tribes*, except the *Mæcian*, an affront which he reſented to exceſs, as we ſhall ſee hereafter when he comes to be *Cenſor*.

Front. Strat. B. 4. c. 1. §. 45.

Liv. B. 29. c. 37.

In this Conſulſhip the Senate obſerving, that the great concourſe of ſtrangers from *Egypt* and the *Levant* had introduced into the city the worſhip of *Iſis* and *Oſiris*, to whom ſeveral ſanctuaries were already built, ordered theſe to be all demoliſhed, agreeably to one of *the twelve Tables*, forbidding the worſhip of ſtrange Gods. No workman, however, would venture the guilt of ſacrilege by doing it, ſuch credit had their worſhip gained among the people. The *Conſul Æmilius* therefore, full of zeal for the religion and laws of his country, laid aſide his *Conſular* robe, took a hatchet and beat down thoſe oratories to the ground.

Val. Max. B. 1. c. 3. §. 3.

Plin. B 29. c. 1.

[a] It was at this time *Archagathus* of *Peloponneſus* introduced ſurgery into *Rome*. At firſt he met with great applauſe, and a ſhop was built for him at the public charge, in a part of the city where four ſtreets met: But as his conſtant practice in the cure of wounds was to make large inciſions, which are painful remedies, his art ſoon fell into diſrepute.

But

But the moſt important tranſaction of this year was the planting colonies at *Placentia* and *Cremona* in the *Gallic* territories; this being the chief motive which inclined the *Boians* and *Inſubrians* to favour *Hannibal* in his attempt upon *Italy*, that memorable and ſurpriſing event which is next to engage the reader's attention. Y. of *R.* 534. Bef. *J.C.* 218. 233 Conſul p. *Liv. Ep.* B. 20. *Liv.* B. 21. c. 25.

CHAP. XVI.

The ſecond *Punic* war, or the war of *Hannibal*.

Its cauſes and commencement.

TWENTY-TWO years were now paſt, ſince *Carthage*, bending to the ſuperior fortune of *Rome*, had with ſhame and reluctance ſubmitted to the hard conditions of that treaty, which put an end to the FIRST PUNIC WAR. To relinquiſh the fair Iſland of *Sicily* to an imperious rival was a ſore and grievous article; and perhaps the payment of thoſe large ſums, that were further exacted for the peace, was a yet more ſenſible mortification to a republic of avaritious merchants: But neceſſity compell'd; nor could even the courage and abilities of the incomparable *Amilcar* furniſh any remedy, in the then *diſtreſsful* ſituation of affairs. For after the defeat of *Hanno* at the *Ægates*, which made the *Romans* maſters of the ſea, neither the army of *Amilcar* at *Eryx*, nor the garriſons of *Lilybæum* and *Drepanum* could receive any ſupply of proviſions or military ſtores. *Sicily* therefore was unavoidably loſt: The army might be preſerved; but the only viſible way to preſerve it was by a peace with the enemy. *Amilcar*'s immediate object in the treaty was this preſervation of the troops. Yet even this neither he nor they would conſent to purchaſe at the expence of their honour as ſoldiers. They choſe rather to periſh, than to give up their arms. As for the annual ſums which the Conſul *Lutatius* demanded from *Carthage*, *Amilcar*, on the part of his republic, readily yielded to that impoſition. Nor did he much heſitate in complying with the further demands of money, which the ten commiſſioners from *Rome* inſiſted upon, before they would ratify the peace. What render'd him ſo tractable on this head, was doubtleſs (beſide the danger of his army) the reſolution he had ſecretly form'd, that no more of the ſtipulated tribute ſhould be paid, than was required to be paid at the time of the ratification. For as we learn from *Polybius*, he was determined to renew the war againſt *Rome* as ſoon as it ſhould be poſſible to do it. Whatever fears ſome of the citizens of *Carthage* might have of the war's being transfer'd from *Sicily* to their own gates, if a peace were not concluded, it is evident that *Amilcar* with that army of hardy veterans he then commanded, feared no enemy but famine; and

Y. of *R.* 534.

See p. 62.

B. 3. c. 9.

could he have found means to tranſport thoſe troops ſafely into *Africa*, without a peace, he would have enter'd into no treaty with the *Romans*.

Polyb. L. 3. c. 9. The *indignation* of *Amilcar*, when he was thus conſtrain'd to leave *Eryx* and abandon *Sicily*, is aſſign'd by *Polybius* for the FIRST CAUSE of that memorable war which we are going to enter upon: For though this implacable enemy of the *Romans* did not live to attempt that vengeance, which to his laſt breath he was ever meditating, we ſhall preſently ſee, that his ſpirit of revenge was not extinguiſhed by his death.

The dreadful and deſtructive conflict at home, to which on his return thither from *Sicily* he was obliged to give all his attention during more than three years, unavoidably ſuſpended the execution of his purpoſe againſt *Rome*. And when that domeſtic diſturbance was happily quell'd, the treaſury and ſtrength of *Carthage* were too much exhauſted to furniſh what was neceſſary to ſupport her in ſo arduous an enterprize. The *Romans* ſenſible of her weakneſs took advantage of it (as we have ſeen) to extort from her not only the ceſſion of *Sardinia*, but the ſum of 1200 talents; a fine ſhameleſsly demanded for the reparation of an injury they had not received. And this odious extortion is held to be the SECOND and the PRINCIPAL CAUSE of that war which followed it at almoſt 20 years diſtance. For ſo barefaced an injuſtice, ſo inſulting a procedure, as it furniſhed *Carthage* with a juſt ground to attack the *Romans* whenever ſhe ſhould be in a condition to do it, ſo it alſo brought all the *Carthaginians* in general to concur with their brave captain in his reſentment and deſigns; it being now ſufficiently manifeſt that they muſt either reſolve to become obedient ſubjects of *Rome*, or take ſome effectual meaſures to render themſelves the more potent republic.

See p. 82.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 10.

With this view *Amilcar*, ſoon after the re-eſtabliſhment of tranquillity at home by the ſuppreſſion of the mercenaries and rebels, had a new army committed to him, to be employ'd in extending the *Carthaginian* empire in *Spain*; a country that both abounded with riches and was able to ſupply the republic with a ſufficient number of brave troops, to make head againſt thoſe multitudes of ſoldiers with which *Italy* furniſh'd the *Romans*.

How deeply *Amilcar*'s hatred to *Rome* had rooted itſelf in his heart, and that revenge was his chief aim in this expedition, we have a ſingular and inconteſtable proof, in what he did juſt before his departure from *Africa*. His ſon *Hannibal*, at that time about nine years old, was with him, when he perform'd a ſacrifice to *Jupiter* for the ſucceſs of his intended voyage. The rites being all ended, and *Amilcar* having order'd the reſt of the aſſiſtants to withdraw, he call'd his ſon to him, and tenderly careſſing the boy, aſked him, whether he were willing to accompany him into *Spain?* The boy not only moſt readily declared his conſent, but with all the blandiſhments and eager vivacity peculiar to children, begg'd of his father, that he would permit him to go. *Amilcar* then taking him by the hand led him to the altar, made him lay his hand

c. 11.

upon it, touch the ſacrifice, and ſwear, *that he would never be in friendſhip with the* Romans.

THE CARTHAGINIAN paſs'd the Streights of *Hercules*, and landed with his army on the weſtern coaſt of *Spain*. Nine years he conducted the war in this country with uninterrupted ſucceſs, reducing [b] many nations to the obedience of his republic: but at length, in a battle which he fought with the *Vettones*, a people of *Luſitania*, (defending himſelf a long time with admirable reſolution) he was encompaſſed and ſlain; carrying with him to the grave the ſame great honour and reputation, which by many ſignal victories he had acquired, together with the name of a *ſecond Mars*. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 1. *Portugal.* *Livy*, B. 21. c. 10.

This happened about the time when the *Romans* made their firſt expedition againſt the *Illyrians*. See p. 90.

Upon the death of *Amilcar* the command of the army was given to his ſon-in-law *Aſdrubal*, at that time admiral of the gallies. He was no bad ſoldier, and a very able ſtateſman; by his wiſdom and gentle manners attracting the good will of many princes of that country, and gaining more ſubjects to *Carthage* by his wonderful addreſs in negotiation, than his predeceſſor had done by the ſword. He alſo built new *Carthage*, (the preſent *Carthagena*) a town commodiouſly ſituated to be a magazine of arms, and to receive ſuccours from *Africa*. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 13. *Livy*, B. 21. c. 2.

ROME began now to be alarm'd. Her jealouſy of *Carthage* had been aſleep during *Amilcar*'s remote conqueſts in *Spain*: But the formidable growth of her rival's power under the management of *Aſdrubal* awakened it. She did not dare, however, to exact any thing of the *Carthaginians* very grievous, or to commence hoſtilities againſt them, being at this time in extreme dread of the *Gauls*, who threatened her with an invaſion. See p. 91. Ambaſſadors were therefore ſent to [c] *Aſdrubal*, to draw him by fair words into a treaty, wherein he ſhould covenant, *that the* Carthaginians *would confine their arms within the* Iberus. No mention was made of any other part of *Spain* in this treaty. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 13.

As the *Spaniſh* affairs had no relation to the peace between the two ſtates, this demand was unreaſonable; and the *Romans* ſeem to have

[b] According to *Zonaras*, in the Conſulate of *Q. Fabius* and *M. Pomponius*, [in the 520 of *Rome*, when *Amilcar* had been about five years in *Spain*] the *Romans* believing that the wars they had to ſuſtain againſt the *Ligurians* and *Sardinians*, were owing to the ſecret practices of the *Carthaginians*, ſent to theſe ſome ambaſſadors, who demanded of them in harſh terms, certain ſums of money due by treaty, and that they ſhould forbear touching at any of the Iſlands in the *Roman* juriſdiction: and to gain the readier compliance to theſe demands, the ambaſſadors preſented a caduceus and a javelin, the one a ſymbol of peace, the other of war, bidding the Senate take their choice. The *Carthaginians* nothing terrified at this menace, anſwer'd, *that they would chuſe neither, but would readily accept whichſoevar they ſhould think fit to leave them.*

If this ſtory [which does not ſeem probable] be true, the boldneſs of the *Carthaginians* proceeded doubtleſs from the great ſucceſs of *Amilcar* in *Spain*.

[c] According to *Appian* the treaty was made at *Carthage*, but the ſequel proves this to be falſe.

fought

ſought by it a *pretext of quarrel*, when by freeing themſelves from the *Gauls*, they ſhould be in a condition to begin a new war with *Carthage*. For ſhould *Aſdrubal* refuſe to engage, or engaging not perform, they would in either caſe be furniſh'd with ſuch a pretext, though perhaps in neither would the pretext be juſt [d].

Aſdrubal was full of the ſame ſpirit as *Amilcar*, and had the ſame deſigns ever at heart. However he made no difficulty to comply with the motion of the ambaſſadors, having much to do, before he could paſs that boundary which the *Romans* were for fixing to his conqueſts.

Sir *W. R.* By this treaty, *Rome* acquired ſome reputation in *Spain*. For when it was conceived by the *Spaniards*, that the *African* republic, which ſought to be miſtreſs over them, ſtood herſelf in fear of a more potent ſtate, they began to turn their eyes hither for protection; and the *Saguntines*, whoſe city was on the ſouth-ſide of the *Iberus*, entered into a confederacy with the *Romans*, and were gladly received.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 36. and B. 3. c. 13. WHEN *Aſdrubal* had govern'd in *Spain* for the ſpace of eight years, he was treacherouſly murder'd [e] by a certain *Gaul* whom he had provoked by ſome injury. The *Carthaginians*, upon receipt of this news, ſuſpended the nomination of a new commander, till they could learn the inclinations of the army; and they no ſooner underſtood that the ſoldiers had unanimouſly made choice of [f] *Hannibal* for their leader, than they called an aſſembly, and with one voice ratified the election.

Liv. B. 21. c. 3.

Hannibal

[d] This will be explain'd when we come to the proper place for it.

[e] *Livy* and *Appian* ſay, that *Aſdrubal* was kill'd in revenge by a ſlave, whoſe maſter he had put to death.

[f] It is ſurpriſing that the judicious Mr. *Rollin* (in his Hiſt. Anc. 380.) ſhould follow *Livy*, in relating an idle ſtory full of abſurdity, and which he afterwards (following again the ſame author) manifeſtly contradicts.

The *Latin* hiſtorian reports, "that *Aſdrubal* [about three years before his death] wrote to *Carthage* to have *Hannibal*, who was then *hardly at the age of puberty*, ſent to him, that the young man might be trained up to war, ſo as one day to imitate his father's proweſs. *He adds*, that *Hanno* and others oppoſed this motion in the Senate, imputing to *Aſdrubal* diſhoneſt intentions with regard to the lad; but that it was carried by a majority. That *Hannibal* arriving in *Spain* drew all eyes upon him; and that the old ſoldiers obſerved in his perſon and manner, a wonderful reſemblance to his father, *&c.* That he ſerved three years under *Aſdrubal*, and was then declared general of the army." Now is there the leaſt probability, either that *Hannibal* ſhould arrive at ſuch a maſterly knowledge in the art of war in three years ſervice; or that the *Carthaginians* ſhould truſt the conduct of their army and their empire in *Spain* to a young man of ſo ſhort experience? That *Livy* was very careleſs in delivering this tradition, appears ſufficiently from the age he gives to *Hannibal*, at the time of his being ſent into *Spain*, at *Aſdrubal*'s requeſt, HUNC VIX DUM PUBEREM, *when he was ſcarce fourteen*. By the hiſtorian's own account *Hannibal* was *nine* when *Amilcar* went into *Spain*; *Amilcar* lived there *nine* years; and *Aſdrubal* had commanded near *five* years, before he ſent for the young man.

Mr. *Rollin* aware, I ſuppoſe, of this inconſiſtency, drops the *vix dum puberem*, and makes *Hannibal* to be *twenty-two* at the time of his going from *Carthage* to *Aſdrubal*; and by this indeed he avoids the anachroniſm: but then he ſeems not to have been

Hannibal, ſoon after his confirmation in the command of the troops, undertook the reduction of the *Olcades*. The ſucceſs was anſwerable to his deſires. Having amaſs'd much treaſure by the ſale of the booty taken in ſeveral towns, he marched to New *Carthage*, which he made his winter quarters; where liberally paying the ſoldiers who had ſerved under him, and promiſing them farther gratifications, he both gain'd their affections, and inſpir'd them with extraordinary hopes. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 13.

Early the next ſpring he led his army againſt the *Vaccæi*, and made a fortunate expedition: but in his return home, being attack'd by the *Carpetani*, whom great numbers of the fugitive *Olcades* and *Vaccæi* (driven out of their own countries) had joined, he was reduced to very great ſtreights. Could the enemy have compelled him to a pitched battle, he had inevitably been undone; but he, with great ſkill, making a ſlow retreat, till he had got the river *Tagus* between him and them, ſo judiciouſly diſpoſed his horſe and elephants, as entirely to defeat their endeavours to croſs the river after him, which they attempted to their prodigious loſs, by ſeveral fords at one and the ſame time. After which, paſſing the river himſelf, and purſuing his advantage, he, with terrible ſlaughter, routed this army of 100000 *Barbarians*. c. 14.

The *Vaccæi* being thus vanquiſh'd there remained *no nation on that ſide the* Iberus, who durſt think of oppoſing the *Carthaginians*, except the *Saguntines*. *Hannibal* had hitherto carefully forbore all hoſtility againſt this people, being ever mindful of his father's advice, which was, to avoid giving occaſion to the *Romans* to declare war againſt *Carthage*, until ſuch time as by the enlargement of her dominion and ſtrength ſhe was in a condition to cope with them. This time was now at hand; and the great ſucceſs of the *Carthaginian* arms in *Spain*, under the conduct of *Amilcar*, *Aſdrubal*, and *Hannibal*, is therefore aſſigned by *Polybius* for the THIRD CAUSE of the SECOND PUNIC WAR. B. 3. c. 10.

While *Hannibal* was meditating the firſt blow he intended to give, and was clearing the way for the attack, by the ſeveral enterprizes abovementioned, the *Saguntines* diſpatched frequent meſſengers to the *Romans*, partly out of apprehenſion of their own impending danger, and partly out of friendſhip to their allies, that they might be perfectly informed of the progreſs of the *Carthaginians*. Little attention was given, at *Rome*, to theſe advices, for a long time; but at laſt it was judged proper to ſend ſome ambaſſadors into *Spain*, to examine into the truth of the facts. c. 15.

Hannibal having carried his conqueſts as far as he had propoſed that year, returned to take up his winter quarters in New *Carthage*, which

been aware that the whole ſtory is overthrown by what *Hannibal* ſays in the Senate of *Carthage* at the end of the ſecond *Punic* war, *That he had never before been at home ſince he was nine years old.* See *Livy* B. 30. and Mr. *Rollin*, Vol. I. p. 486.

was then become the ſeat of the *Carthaginian* government in *Spain*. There he found the *Roman* ambaſſadors; and, giving them audience, was by them admoniſhed, *upon no account to attempt any thing againſt the* Saguntines, *a people received into the protection of* Rome; *and alſo to be mindful of the treaty with* Aſdrubal, *and to forbear paſſing the river* Iberus.

HANNIBAL, young, full of martial fire, fortunate in his enterprizes, and mortally hating the *Romans*, anſwered with a careleſs and haughty air, (perſonating a friend to the *Saguntines*) *That a ſedition having formerly happened among the citizens of* Saguntum, *the* Romans, *to whoſe arbitration they referred the diſpute, had unjuſtly condemned to death ſome of the magiſtrates; and that he would not ſuffer this injuſtice to go unpuniſhed; for it had ever been the cuſtom of the* Carthaginians *to undertake the cauſe of thoſe who were wrongfully perſecuted.*

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16. The ambaſſadors departing with this anſwer, ſailed to *Carthage* (purſuant to their inſtructions, in caſe of ſuch a reception from *Hannibal*) there to expoſtulate upon the matter with the Senate; though they well ſaw, that a war was unavoidable. Little indeed did they imagine that *Italy* would be the theatre of it; but concluded that *Saguntum* and its territory would be the ſcene of action.

c. 15. *Hannibal* at the ſame time ſent to *Carthage* for inſtructions how to proceed, with regard to the *Saguntines*, *who*, as he ſaid, *encouraged by their confederacy with* Rome, *committed many outrages againſt thoſe who were in alliance with* Carthage. According to *Livy*, theſe allies of *Carthage* were the *Turdetani*, between whom and the *Saguntines Hannibal* had contrived to raiſe a quarrel, that he might have a pretence, in quality of friend to the former, to attack the latter.

Liv. B. 21. c. 6.

What anſwer the *Roman* ambaſſadors received from the *Carthaginian* Senate is not recorded; but we may well gather from the ſequel, that it was by no means ſatisfactory. The Senate of *Rome*, nevertheleſs, being in the ſame prepoſſeſſion as their ambaſſadors, concerning the ſeat of the war, that it would be in a remote country; and conſidering alſo that the war when once begun would probably be carried to a great length, reſolved, before they entered upon it, to give a period firſt to their affairs in *Illyricum*, and puniſh the perfidy of *Demetrius*; believing that they ſhould be able to effect this, and yet have ſufficient opportunity to defeat the deſigns of *Hannibal*.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16.

But theſe proved vain deliberations; for *Hannibal* was too much in earneſt. He marched with his army towards *Saguntum*, at the ſame time that the *Roman* Conſuls embarked for *Illyricum*; and before the Conſuls had finiſhed their expedition *Saguntum* was taken.

c. 17. The *Carthaginian* uſed the more diligence in attacking this ſtrong and wealthy city, for many weighty conſiderations. The reduction of *Saguntum* would probably deprive the *Romans* of all hope of making war in *Spain*: The nations, he had already conquered, terrified by this new

new ſucceſs of his arms, would be held in better obedience; and thoſe who were yet unconquered would ſtand in greater awe of his power. And, what was ſtill of greater importance, he ſhould be able to purſue his enterprizes with more ſecurity when he had no enemy at his back. He farther conſidered, that this town, ſhould he take it, would yield him large ſupplies of treaſure for carrying on the war; that his army would be more at his devotion when he had enriched them with booty; and that he ſhould be enabled to ſecure to himſelf friends at *Carthage*, by ſending thither a part of the ſpoil.

From all theſe motives he was indefatigable in preſſing the ſiege; which nevertheleſs laſted many months. The *Roman* Senate no ſooner received advice of his having begun it, but they ſent ambaſſadors into *Spain* with inſtructions to give him warning to deſiſt, and, in caſe of his refuſal, to ſail to *Carthage* and there demand of the Senate, the delivering up of their general to the *Romans* by way of compenſation for the breach of the league between the two ſtates. *Liv.* B. 21. c. 6.

HANNIBAL hearing of the arrival of theſe ambaſſadors on the coaſt of *Spain*, diſpatched ſome meſſengers to meet them at the ſea-ſide, and to ſignify to them, *that neither would it be ſafe for them to come to his quarters; nor had he leiſure to give them audience.* And, as he knew very well to what place they would direct their courſe, after receiving ſuch a meſſage, he without delay ſent proper emiſſaries to *Carthage* to prepare the chiefs of the *Barchine* faction for the occaſion. c. 9.

Livy reports that *Hanno*, the avowed enemy of *Amilcar*'s family, and the head of the oppoſite faction, was the only man, in the *Carthaginian* Senate, who was for complying with the demands of *Rome*; and that he ſpoke to this effect: c. 10.

" How often have I conjured you by thoſe Gods, who are the wit-
" neſſes and arbiters of leagues and treaties, not to ſuffer any of *Amil-*
" *car*'s race to command your armies! How often have I told you,
" that neither the manes nor the progeny of that man would ever be
" at reſt, and that no friendſhip, no peace with the *Romans* could be
" preſerved inviolate, ſo long as there remained one alive of the *Bar-*
" *chine* name and family! *Hannibal* is an aſpiring youth, proudly
" ambitious of being a monarch; and who thinks nothing ſo con-
" ducive to his purpoſe, as to draw upon us war after war, that ſo he
" may live in arms, and be always ſurrounded with legions: And
" you, by making him the general of your armies, have furniſhed
" fuel to his fire; you have fed the flame which now ſcorches you.
" Your forces at this time beſiege *Saguntum*, contrary to the faith of
" treaties. What can you expect, but that *Carthage* be ſoon inveſted
" by the *Roman* legions, under the conduct of thoſe very Gods, who
" in the former war took vengeance on us for the like [z] perfidiouſneſs?
" Are

[z] *Hanno* refers here (as he afterwards explains himſelf) to ſome attempts of the *Carthaginians* upon *Tarentum*, [at the time, I ſuppoſe, when *Pyrrhus*'s troops held that city.

" Are you yet to learn what kind of enemies they are whom you pro-
" voke? Are you ſtill ſtrangers to yourſelves? Are you ignorant of
" the fortunes of the two republics?

" Your worthy general would not vouchſafe the ambaſſadors of
" your allies a hearing; he has violated the law of nations. The am-
" baſſadors of our friends, worſe treated than the meſſengers from an
" enemy were ever known to be, have now recourſe to you. They
" demand ſatisfaction for the unjuſt violation of a treaty. They would
" have you clear the body of the nation from the ſhame of ſo odious
" a breach of faith, by giving up into their hands the author of the
" crime. The more moderate they are at preſent, the more exaſperat-
" ed, I fear, and the more implacable will they be hereafter. Remem-
See p. 92.
" ber the *Ægates*, and the affair of *Eryx*, with all the calamities you ſuf-
" fered for four and twenty years together. And yet we had not then
" this boy at the head of our armies, but his father, *Amilcar* himſelf,
" a ſecond *Mars*, as ſome are pleas'd to ſtyle him. But we could not
" then forbear making attempts upon *Tarentum* in violation of treaties,
" as we do now upon *Saguntum*. The Gods declared themſelves againſt
" us in that war, and, in ſpight of all our pretences of right, made
" appear by giving victory to our enemies, which of the two nations
" had unjuſtly broken the league.

" 'Tis againſt *Carthage* that *Hannibal* now plants his mantelets and
" erects his towers; it is her wall that he now ſhakes with his batter-
" ing rams. The ruins of *Saguntum* (I wiſh I may prove a falſe pro-
" phet!) will fall upon our heads; and the war begun with the *Sagun-*
" *tines* muſt be maintained againſt the *Romans*.

" But, ſay you, ſhall we then deliver up *Hannibal* into the hands of
" his enemies? I know that my opinion will have little weight with
" you, becauſe of the old animoſities between his father and me: Yet
" I muſt declare, that, as I rejoiced when *Amilcar* fell, becauſe, had
" he lived, he would have engaged us before now in a war with the
" *Romans*, ſo I hate and deteſt this youth as a fury and the firebrand
" to kindle a *Roman* war. Yes, I think it fit, that *Hannibal* be de-
" livered up to expiate the breach of the league; and, if no body had
" demanded him, I ſhould vote to have him tranſported to the re-
" moteſt corner of the earth, whence his name might never reach our
" ears to diſturb the repoſe of our ſtate.

" My concluſion therefore is, that deputies be forthwith ſent to
" *Rome* to pacify the Senate; others into *Spain*, with orders to the army
" to raiſe the ſiege of *Saguntum*, and deliver up their general to the

city, See Vol. I. p. 601.] In the Epit. of *Livy*, B. 14. it is ſaid, *that the* Carthaginians *came with a fleet to the ſuccour of* Tarentum, *whereby they broke their league with the* Romans. And this doubtleſs is the foundation whereon *Zonaras* builds his report, *that the motive aſſign'd by the* Romans *for their beginning the firſt* Punic *war, was the aſſiſtance which the* Carthaginians *had given the* Tarentines *againſt* Rome. See p. 15. of this Vol.

" *Romans*;

" *Romans*; and a third deputation to the *Saguntines* to make repara-
" tion for the injuries they have ſuſtained [h]."

The Senate, though they heard this orator with reſpectful attention, as a man of authority and reputation among them, paid no regard to his remonſtrance, invective, or advice on the preſent occaſion. Nay, the Senators in general exclaimed, that he had ſpoken more like an enemy than a ſubject of *Carthage*. As for the *Roman* ambaſſadors, they were diſmiſs'd with this anſwer, *That the war was begun by the* Saguntines *and not by* Hannibal. *And that the* Romans *would act injuriouſly to* Carthage, *if to her ancient alliance with them, they preferr'd the later friendſhip of the* Saguntines. *Liv.* B. 21. c. 11.

Hannibal was all this time preſſing the ſiege of *Saguntum* with uninterrupted diligence. He animated his ſoldiers in perſon, working in the trenches among them, and mingling with them in all hazards. The defence was brave even to obſtinacy; and it is ſaid to have laſted eight months. When the beſieged could no longer hold out, many of the citizens, rather than liſten to the hard terms of peace which *Hannibal* exacted, (as the giving up their arms, leaving their city to be demoliſhed, and moving off with nothing more of all their ſubſtance than two ſuits of apparel) threw themſelves into a great fire, where they had firſt caſt all their moſt valuable effects. While this was doing, it happen'd that a tower, which had been much battered and ſhaken, fell down on a ſudden. A body of *Carthaginians* immediately entered at the breach; and *Hannibal*, upon notice of this accident, ſeizing the opportunity, made a general aſſault and carried the place without difficulty. He gave orders, that all who were found in arms ſhould be put to the ſword; an unneceſſary order, for they themſelves were firmly determined to die fighting: many of the inhabitants ſhut themſelves up with their wives and children, and burnt the houſes over their heads. But notwithſtanding all this deſtruction of men and effects, the place yielded to the conquered great ſtore of wealth and many ſlaves. The money he appropiated for carrying on the war againſt *Rome*; the ſlaves he divided among the ſoldiers; and all the rich houſhold ſtuff he ſent to *Carthage*. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 17. *Livy*. B. 21. c. 14. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 17.

The *Roman* ambaſſadors who had been diſpatch'd to the *Carthaginian* Senate brought the anſwer, they had there received, to *Rome*, about the ſame time that the news arrived of the deſtruction of *Saguntum*. *Liv.* B. 21. c. 16.

Livy tells us, that the compaſſion of the *Romans* for this unfortunate city, their ſhame for having failed to ſuccour ſuch a faithful ally, their indignation againſt the *Carthaginians*, and their apprehenſion of the main

[h] The reader, I am perſuaded, will not eaſily believe, that a ſpeech of this tenor was really delivered either by *Hanno* or any other *Carthaginian* Senator. The greater part of the matter of it doubtleſs belongs to *Livy* no leſs than the form. However, thus much we may conclude from the party ſpirit of *Hanno*, that he diſapproved the proceedings of *Hannibal*, and was againſt a rupture with *Rome*.

event

event of things, (as if the enemy were already at the gates of *Rome*;) all theſe various paſſions were ſo ſtrong in their minds, that at firſt they only mourned and trembled, inſtead of conſulting for the common ſafety.

But it being now no longer a queſtion whether they ſhould enter into a war, they quickly began to make the neceſſary preparations for action. The Conſuls *P. Cornelius Scipio*, and *Tib. Sempronius Longus* drew lots for their provinces. *Sicily* and *Africa* fell to *Sempronius*, and *Spain* to *Cornelius*. *Sempronius* with two *Roman* legions, conſiſting each of 4000 foot and 300 horſe, and with 16000 foot and 1800 horſe of the allies on board a fleet of 160 gallies, was to go firſt into *Sicily* and thence into *Africa*, in caſe the other Conſul ſhould prove ſtrong enough to hinder the *Carthaginians* from coming into *Italy*. *Cornelius* for this purpoſe had two *Roman* legions, with 14000 foot and 1600 horſe of the allies committed to his conduct; and with a fleet of 60 quinqueremes, he was to ſail to *Spain*, and endeavour to prevent *Hannibal*'s leaving that country. The Conſul had no ſtronger a navy appointed him, becauſe it was ſuppoſed that the enemy would not come by ſea, nor chuſe to fight in that kind of ſervice. And his army was alſo the leſs numerous, becauſe the Prætor *Manlius* had two *Roman* legions with 10000 foot and 1000 horſe of the allies to guard the province of *Gaul*. The whole number of the forces raiſed by the republic on this occaſion was 24000 *Roman* foot and 1800 horſe, 40000 foot and 4400 horſe of the allies; and their ſhips of war amounted to 220.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J.C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

Liv. B. 21. c. 17.

Theſe extraordinary preparations ſufficiently ſhew the terror the *Romans* were in at the approaching war. And indeed it will not appear to be ill grounded, if we conſider, that the *Carthaginians* ever ſince *Amilcar*'s going into *Spain* had been fighting and conquering, and that the *Spaniards*, by whom their army was ſtrengthened, were men ſteady even to obſtinacy. Beſides, the *Roman* republic had now no general equal to *Hannibal*, a man of immenſe views; ever judicious in his enterprizes; a wonderful genius for ſeizing the critical moment to execute his deſigns; the greateſt maſter in the art of appearing not to act, when he was moſt buſy; inexhauſtible of expedients; as ſkillful in recovering himſelf out of danger, as in drawing an enemy into it. He had been bred up to arms from his infancy, and though now only in the flower of his age, had the experience of ſeveral years command of an army. For *Aſdrubal* being himſelf no great warrior had committed to him the conduct of all dangerous and difficult enterprizes. So that no general then living had had more exerciſe than he; nor were any troops better diſciplined than his. *Hannibal*'s deſign of carrying the war from the remote parts of *Spain* into the very center of *Italy*, is ſaid by an ingenious writer, to be the boldeſt project that ever captain durſt conceive, and what was *juſtify'd only by the event*. But this does not ſeem to have been the opinion of *Polybius*, who tells us, that *Hannibal*

Abb. Vert. B. 8.

Liv. B. 21. c. 4.

Abb. Vert. Polyb. B. 3. c. 34.

vid. inf. p. 113, 114.

nibal had taken all prudent meaſures for facilitating his march, and for ſecuring the aſſiſtance of the *Gauls* about the *Alps* and about the *Po*, which it was the eaſier to do, becauſe he and they had one common intereſt with reſpect to the *Romans*, the hated enemies of both. V. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

Though the *Romans* made the Preparations above mentioned for war, as a thing certain and unavoidable, yet that nothing might be wanting to the exact obſervance of forms, they diſpatched a[1] third embaſſy to *Carthage*, to demand once more, what they did not expect would be yielded, *That* Hannibal *and his council ſhould be delivered up to them*; and the ambaſſadors were alſo *now* inſtructed to *declare war* in caſe of refuſal. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 20. *Livy.* B. 21. c. 18.

When they were come to *Carthage*, and admitted to audience, the Senate heard the haughty demand they brought with a coldneſs, approaching to contempt. Nevertheleſs, one of the Senators beſt qualified, was directed to ſpeak in maintenance of the *Carthaginian* cauſe. This orator, *without taking the leaſt notice of the treaty made with* Aſdrubal, (as if no ſuch treaty had been made, or, if made, was nothing to the purpoſe, becauſe made without authority) dwelt wholly on that which was concluded at the end of the *Sicilian* war; in which, as he alledged, there was no mention of *Spain*. He al- *Polyb.* L. 3. c. 21.

[1] *Polybius* mentions only two embaſſies from *Rome* to the *Carthaginians*, on the affair of *Saguntum*, one *before the ſiege*, another *after the town was taken*. *Livy* alſo mentions only two; but, according to him, the firſt was *during the ſiege*, when (he tells us) *Hannibal* refuſed the ambaſſadors an audience; the ſecond, after the reduction of the place. That we may not reject *Polybius*'s authority, who relates an audience which *Hannibal*, before the ſiege of *Saguntum*, gave at *Carthagena* to ſome ambaſſadors from *Rome*; nor yet accuſe *Livy* or his vouchers of inventing the ſtory of *Hannibal*'s refuſing audience, and of all that followed thereupon at *Carthage*, we have ſuppoſed (what ſeems moſt probable) that there were *three* embaſſies from *Rome* in relation to *Saguntum*, the firſt before the ſiege, the ſecond while it was carrying on, the third after the place was taken.

To the firſt ambaſſadors *Hannibal* gave audience and a haughty anſwer, of which they made complaint to the *Carthaginian* Senate. Thoſe who came next were refuſed audience by him, and they alſo carried their complaints to *Carthage*. The laſt embaſſy was ſent only to *Carthage*.

Father *Catrou*, not liking, I ſuppoſe, that the *Romans* ſhould appear in ſo diſadvantageous a light as they do, upon this occaſion, is angry with *Livy*, for making them ſend even twice to *Carthage* before they declare war; though if any thing may be depended upon in the *Roman* ſtory, this fact has a title to credit.

It may indeed ſeem hard to be accounted for, that the *Romans*, contrary to their former methods of proceeding, ſhould ſo ſhamefully neglect to ſuccour their allies, the *Saguntines*, and, when the caſe required the moſt vigorous meaſures, ſhould loſe ſo much time in vain and fruitleſs embaſſies to a people they had formerly vanquiſhed and rendered tributary. Chevalier *Folard* conjectures, that the *Romans* were really intimidated by *Hannibal*'s ſuperior genius and ſkill in war, being conſcious of their having no general of equal ability with the *Carthaginian*. And may we not alſo reaſonably ſuppoſe, that at the time, when *Hannibal* began to threaten *Saguntum*, the *Roman* republic was not in a condition to ſend by ſea into *Spain* an army of ſufficient ſtrength to make head againſt the numerous and victorious troops of *Carthage*?

lowed

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p. lowed indeed, that it was there covenanted, that neither of the contracting parties ſhould make war on the allies of the other, but added, that the *Saguntines* were entirely out of the queſtion, they not being at that time in alliance with *Rome*; and he cauſed the articles of the treaty to be read.

The *Romans* refuſed abſolutely to enter into a verbal diſcuſſion of this point. They ſaid, there might have been room for ſuch a diſcuſſion, had *Saguntum* been then in the ſame ſtate as formerly, but that this city having been ſack'd contrary to the faith of treaties, the *Carthaginians* muſt either clear themſelves of perfidy, by delivering up the authors of the injuſtice, or confeſs themſelves guilty, by refuſing the ſatisfaction required. And finding that the Senate would give no anſwer to the queſtion, *whether* Saguntum *was beſieged by private or public authority*, but would confine the debate to *the juſtice or injuſtice of the action*, the eldeſt of the ambaſſadors, gathering up the ſkirt of his gown, and making a hollow in it, *Here*, ſaid he, *we bring you* Peace *and* War, *take which you will.* At which they all cried out with one voice, *Give us which you pleaſe. I give you* War *then*, ſaid the ambaſſador, letting his robe looſe again. *We accept it*, they all anſwered, *and with the ſame ſpirit that we accept it, we will maintain it.*

Liv. B. 21. c. 18. & *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 33.

A mutual denunciation of war being thus made, the ambaſſadors did not return directly homeward, but, purſuant, to their inſtructions, paſſed into *Spain*, to ſolicit the ſtates and princes of that country, who were on the north ſide of the *Iberus*, to enter into an alliance with *Rome*, or at leaſt not to contract any friendſhip with the *Carthaginians*. They were courteouſly entertain'd by the *Barguſians*. But when they came to the *Volſcians*, they received from this people an anſwer, which being reported all over the country, was a means to turn away all the other nations from ſiding with the *Romans*. *With what aſſurance*, ſaid they, *can you aſk of us to prefer your friendſhip to that of the* Carthaginians, *after we have ſeen the* Saguntines, *who did ſo, more cruelly betrayed by you, their allies, than deſtroyed by their open enemies. Go ſeek for confederates among thoſe who never heard of the ruin of* Saguntum. *The miſerable fate of this city will be a warning to all the nations of* Spain, *never to repoſe confidence in* Roman *faith or amity.* The ſame kind of reception they met with from all the *Spaniſh* ſtates to which they afterwards addreſs'd themſelves. So that finding their negotiations in this country fruitleſs they paſſed into *Gaul*, endeavouring to perſuade the ſeveral nations there, not to ſuffer the *Carthaginians* to march through their territories into *Italy*.

Liv. B. 21. c. 19.

c. 20.

The firſt public aſſembly of *Gauls*, to whom they made this propoſal, burſt into ſo loud a laughter, mixt with a murmur of indignation, that the magiſtrates and ſeniors could hardly ſtill the noiſe of the younger ſort, ſo impudent and fooliſh did it ſeem, *to requeſt of* them, *That they would ſuffer their own lands to be ravaged and ſpoiled, to preſerve thoſe of other men who were utter ſtrangers to them.* But ſilence

at

at length being made, the ambaſſadors were anſwered, *That neither had the* Romans *deſerved ſo well, nor the* Carthaginians *ſo ill at their hands, that they ſhould take arms, either in behalf of* Rome, *or againſt* Carthage. *That, on the contrary, they had heard, that ſome of their countrymen had been driven out of their poſſeſſions in* Italy *by the* Romans, *conſtrained to pay tribute, and made to undergo other indignities.* The like anſwers to the like demands were made in the other public councils of *Gaul*. Nor did the ambaſſadors meet with any thing like friendſhip or even peaceable diſpoſition towards them, till they came to *Marſeilles*, which was in alliance with *Rome*; and where, upon careful enquiry made by their allies, they learnt that *Hannibal* had been before hand with them, and by the force of gold, of which the *Gauls* were ever moſt greedy, had gained them over to ſide with him. And with this unpleaſing news they returned to *Rome*. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

Hannibal was all this time extremely buſy in ſettling the affairs of *Spain*, and in taking all the proper meaſures his foreſight could ſuggeſt, for the happy execution of his great deſigns. After the reduction of *Saguntum* he had retired into winter quarters at *New Carthage*. And the better to diſpoſe his *Spaniſh* ſoldiers to his ſervice, he had given them permiſſion to retire to their reſpective homes till the beginning of the ſpring, when, he told them, he expected their appearance again. In the mean while, as one of his chief cares was to provide for the ſafety of *Africa*, he tranſported thither, of *Spaniards*, (raiſed among the *Therſites*, *Maſtii*, and *Olcades*,) 13850 foot, and 1200 horſe, together with 800 ſlingers of the *Baleares*. And while he thus furniſhed *Africa* with *Spaniſh* troops, he took order for the ſecurity [k] of *Spain*, by ſending for a ſupply of near 15000 *Africans*, to be commanded by his brother *Aſdrubal*, whom he intended to leave governor in his abſence. He furniſhed him alſo with 50 quinqueremes, 4 quadriremes, and 5 triremes, that he might be in a condition to oppoſe any deſcents that ſhould be attempted there by the *Romans*. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 33. *Livy*, B. 21. c. 21.

Livy and *Polybius* commend the prudence of the *Carthaginian* in this exchange of troops; becauſe both the *Africans* and *Spaniards* would probably prove the better ſoldiers for being thus at a diſtance from their reſpective countries, and they would be a kind of pledges or hoſtages for the mutual fidelity of the two nations.

Beſides theſe precautions, *Hannibal* (as has been already hinted) had diſpatched ambaſſadors to the *Gauls* on both ſides the *Alps*, to ſound their diſpoſitions, and to engage them to take part with him in his enterprize. For this end he was extremely liberal, not only of his promiſes, *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 34.

[k] *Livy* reports, that *Hannibal* ſelected 4000 young men out of the chief cities in *Spain*, and of the beſt families, and cauſed them to be brought to [*New*] *Carthage*, there to remain as hoſtages for the fidelity of the *Spaniards*. Theſe were probably the ſame youths which are afterwards ſaid to be left by him in *Saguntum*, as we ſhall ſee in its proper place.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul p. but of his gold, believing it would be a main ſtep towards a happy iſſue of his undertaking, if, by avoiding war in his way to *Italy*, he could lead his army entire againſt the *Romans*. The anſwers he received were favourable to his wiſhes; *That the* Gauls *moſt willingly agreed to his propoſal, and expected him with impatience.* They alſo ſent him word, that though the paſſage of thoſe mountains was difficult, it was not inſuperable. Animated with new hope by theſe reports, he began early in the ſpring to march his troops out of their winter quarters; and having now the concurrence of the Senate and people of *Carthage* to his purpoſe, he began openly to diſcourſe of his intended war againſt *Rome*, exhorting the ſoldiers (whom he aſſembled for this purpoſe) cheerfully to engage in the expedition; and telling them, in order to raiſe their indignation againſt the *Romans*, that they had impudently demanded a ſurrendry of both him and all his chief officers into their hands. He alſo expatiated on the fertility of the country which he purpoſed to invade, the good will of the *Gauls*, and the confederacies he had made with their princes: And when the army had loudly declared their readineſs to go whitherſoever he was diſpoſed to conduct them, and he had, with thanks, applauded their fidelity, and prefix'd the day for their march, he diſmiſs'd the aſſembly.

The *Spaniards*, whom *Hannibal* had permitted to viſit their families during the winter, being returned to the ſervice, and the day[1] appointed for the general rendezvous being come, the whole army took the field. It conſiſted of 90000 foot and 12000 horſe, and with this mighty force the *Carthaginian* immediately began his march from *New Carthage* towards the river *Iberus*.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 35.

BUT now, before the reader accompanies *Hannibal* into *Italy*, he may perhaps be willing to make a pauſe, and enquire into the juſtice of the cauſe that leads him thither.

B. 3. c. 30. "IF *the deſtruction of Saguntum* (ſays *Polybius*) be conſidered as the "CAUSE *of the* SECOND PUNIC WAR, we muſt neceſſarily determine, "that the *Carthaginians* engaged in it very unjuſtly: Whether regard "be had to the *treaty of Lutatius*, whereby each party became bound
See p. 63. "*to offer no violence to the allies of the other:* Or regard be had to the "*treaty of Aſdrubal*, in which it was ſtipulated that *the Carthaginians*
See p. 103. "*ſhould not carry their arms beyond the Iberus.*

"But if, *for the* CAUSE *of the* war *made by* Hannibal, we aſſign the "*ſeizure of* Sardinia by the *Romans*, and *the money which they extorted* "*from Carthage* at that time, we ſhall be obliged to confeſs, that the

[1] According to *Livy*, *Hannibal*, before he began his expedition againſt the *Romans*, went from *New Carthage* to *Gades*, there to diſcharge ſome vows he had made to *Hercules*, and to bind himſelf by new ones, in order to obtain ſucceſs in the war he was going to enter upon. *Polybius* ſays nothing of the matter.

"*Carthaginians*

" *Carthaginians* acted not unjuſtly in entring upon this war. For they Y. of *R.* 535.
" did no more than lay hold of a favourable opportunity to revenge Bef. *J. C.* 217.
" themſelves on thoſe, who had taken advantage of their diſtreſſes, to 234 Conſul-p.
" injure and oppreſs them."

Here then *the queſtion of right* is decided by our author. For he had B. 3. c. 6.
before declared, and enlarged upon it, that *the ſiege of Saguntum* and the *paſſing the Iberus* were only the *beginnings* of the *war* and not the *cauſes*; and that *the affair of* Sardinia, and the *money extorted* at that time were the *principal cauſe* of it. And he now declares, that this *principal cauſe* is ſufficient to juſtify the *Carthaginians*.

Our author nevertheleſs, in another part of his hiſtory, obſerves, that though *Hannibal* had a juſt motive to begin the war, and though he did begin it from that juſt motive, yet becauſe he did not publickly aſſign that motive for beginning it, but made uſe of a falſe pretext, his enterprize *ſeemed* contrary to juſtice. After relating the haughty and evaſive *anſwer of Hannibal* to the firſt ambaſſadors that were ſent to him from *Rome*, he adds, See p. 106.

" Thus *Hannibal*, tranſported by a violent hatred, acted in every thing *Polyb.* B. 3. c.
" without conſulting his reaſon, and, inſtead of declaring the true motives 15.
" of his proceeding, had recourſe to falſe pretexts, after the manner of
" thoſe, who, prepoſſeſſed by their paſſion, do what they have deter-
" mined, without regard to equity or honour: Otherwiſe, had it not
" been better to have demanded of the *Romans* the reſtitution of *Sardinia*,
" and the money which, during the weakneſs and diſtreſs of the *Cartha-*
" *ginian* republic, they had extorted from her, and, in caſe of refuſal,
" to declare war againſt them? But as he conceal'd the true cauſe, and
" made uſe of the *falſe pretext* of *injuries done to the* Saguntines, *he* ſeem-
" ed *to enter into that war without reaſon, and contrary to juſtice.*"

The reader obſerves, that *Polybius* here takes it for granted, that *Hannibal*, in attacking *Saguntum*, made war upon the *Romans*. Now *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians* denied that the treaty with *Lutatius* could be broke by the ſiege of *Saguntum*. They alledged, that, as the *Saguntines* were not allies of *Rome* at the time of making that treaty, they could not be comprehended in it. *Polybius* indeed thinks, that *future* allies as well as *preſent* ought to be underſtood to be comprehended in that treaty; and ſo ſaid the *Romans*. But what then? It was ſurely a point that might well bear a debate. Yet the *Roman* ambaſſadors (as we have ſeen) would enter into no diſcuſſion of this matter with the *Carthaginians*, but upon their refuſal to give up *Hannibal* as having unjuſtly violated that treaty by the ſiege of *Saguntum*, *declared war*.

And this makes it difficult to conceive why *Polybius*, on the preſent occaſion, mentions the treaty with *Aſdrubal*; that treaty, according to him, relating only to the *Carthaginians paſſing the Iberus*, which river *Hannibal* did not attempt to paſs till after the declaration of war by the

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* B. 2. c. 13. * B. 3. 19. *Liv.* B. 21. c. 18. Sir *W. R.*

Romans. *Polybius* never ſpeaks of the *Saguntines* as concern'd in that treaty, but ſays expreſsly, that, when it was concluded, *no mention was made in it of any other part of Spain*, i. e. of any part on the ſouth of that river; conſequently no mention of the * *Saguntines*.

Livy indeed tells us, that the *Saguntines* were included in the treaty with *Aſdrubal*, and makes the *Carthaginians* confeſs it; which, if true, we muſt ſuppoſe that a new article in favour of the *Saguntines* was inſerted into that treaty, after *Rome* had enter'd into an alliance with them.

Livy adds, that the *Carthaginians*, in their conference with the *Roman* ambaſſadors, would have evaded the obligation of the treaty with *Aſdrubal*, by ſaying [m], that it was concluded by him without authority from *Carthage*, and that, in paying no regard to it, they did but follow the example of the *Romans*, who had refuſed to abide by the firſt treaty of *Lutatius* in *Sicily*, for the like reaſon. Doubtleſs, if the *Carthaginians* employed this ſubterfuge, it was weak and trifling, becauſe, (as the ſame author, from *Polybius*, obſerves) in the treaty of *Lutatius* this clauſe was added, *That it ſhould be firm and inviolable, if ratified by the people of* Rome; but in *Aſdrubal*'s treaty there was no proviſo of like import.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 29.

But it is poſſible that *Aſdrubal* might make an abſolute treaty, and yet have no authority for ſo doing. At leaſt, it was a common practice with the *Roman* generals, to make ſuch Treaties; and it was as common with the *Roman* Senate to break them, as having been concluded without ſufficient authority.

To return to the main queſtion, the juſtice of the war made by *Hannibal*:

It is plain that if the treaty of *Sicily* could not be conſtrued to extend to future allies as well as preſent; and if *Aſdrubal*'s treaty was made without ſufficient authority from *Carthage*, (both which the *Carthaginians* pleaded) there can be no pretence to charge *Hannibal* with beginning a war againſt *Rome*, by his attacking *Saguntum*.

But let us ſuppoſe, with the *Romans*, that the *Saguntines* were unqueſtionably within the treaty of *Sicily*; and alſo, that *Aſdrubal*, in his treaty, acted with ample authority. What will follow? Not, that the ſecond *Punic* war is to be imputed to the injuſtice of *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians*, or that they were the firſt violators of the treaty of peace

[m] *Livy*, in making the *Carthaginians* uſe this plea at the time of the conference in queſtion, ſeems to found himſelf on *Polybius*; and perhaps *Polybius* ought to be ſo underſtood: But as the *Greek* hiſtorian tells us, that the *Carthaginian* orator paſt over the treaty of *Aſdrubal* in ſilence, as if no ſuch treaty had ever been made, or, if made, was nothing to the purpoſe; I imagine, that the plea abovementioned was not employed at the time of the conference; but that afterwards, when they uſed to ſpeak of the juſtice of their cauſe, they urged among other things the nullity of *Aſdrubal*'s treaty: For, as *Polybius* relates, the *Roman* Ambaſſadors did not, at their audience in the *Carthaginian* ſenate, object that treaty, nor ſet forth their rights, or pretenſions of right, till after the war was begun. B. 3. c. 29.

between

between the two nations. No: The *Romans* had ſcandalouſly violated that treaty by their ſeizure of *Sardinia*, and extortion of the 1200 talents; and all conventions between *Rome* and *Carthage* following that firſt violence and breach of the peace, were no better than *Roman* injuries, as implying this menace, on the part of the *Romans*, *Do whatſoever we require; otherwiſe we will make war, without regard to our oath, which we have already broken.* And as their engaging *Aſdrudal* to covenant, that he would not paſs the *Iberus*, was a new breach of the *peace of Sicily*, and a new inſult upon *Carthage*; becauſe *Rome* had as yet no foot in *Spain*, on the one ſide of that river, whereas *Carthage*, on the other ſide, held almoſt all the country: So the alliance, which the *Romans* made with the *Saguntines*, was in reality a breach of their treaty with *Aſdrubal*. For the *Romans* could have no ſort of colour for requiring that *Aſdrubal* ſhould not paſs the *Iberus*, but an implicit covenant that this river ſhould be a boundary, over which they themſelves would not paſs in any diſcovery or conqueſt by them intended to be made upon *Spain*; and that the *Carthaginians* ſhould be free to puſh their conqueſts as far northward as to this limit. And ſo *Livy* ſays expreſsly, that by *Aſdrubal*'s treaty, *the river* Iberus *was to be the boundary between the two empires.* Only he adds (inconſiſtently with *Polybius*'s account) that the *Saguntines* were included in that Treaty.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-pt. Sir *W. R.*

B. 21. c. 2.

It would ſeem then that the *Carthaginians* were not obliged, by any treaties with *Rome*, or by any conſideration of juſtice, to abſtain from the war which *Hannibal* began. And as to that *open declaration* of his true motives, the want of which made his enterprize ſeem diſhonourable, he could not have made that declaration without throwing a bar in the way to the execution of his main deſign, *the marching into Italy*. For by demanding the reſtitution of *Sardinia*, and of the 1200 talents, he would have diſcovered the extent of his meditated revenge, and would thereby have put the enemy on ſuch preparations for war, as might have diſappointed all his views of doing juſtice to his country. It was to avoid this inconvenience, that he would ſeem at firſt to have no deſign but againſt the *Saguntines*; and we find his policy had its effect: For the *Romans* (as has been obſerved) had not the leaſt apprehenſion of his intending ſo ſoon to invade *Italy*, but imagined that the ſeat of the war, they ſhould have with him, would be in *Spain*.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

The march of Hannibal, *from the* Iberus *in* Spain, *to the* Po *in* Italy: *and how the* Roman *arms were employed in the mean time.*

First Year of the war.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

HANNIBAL, having paſſed the *Iberus*, ſubdued in a ſhort time all thoſe parts of *Spain*, which he had not before entered, and which lie between that river and the *Pyrenees*. His ſucceſſes however coſt him many hard conflicts in which he loſt abundance of men. Of this newly conquered country he appointed one *Hanno* to be governor, inſtructing him to have a particular watch over the *Barguſians*, of whom he had the greateſt jealouſy on account of the friendſhip they had contracted with the *Romans*. And for the ſupport of his government, he left under his command 10000 foot and 1000 horſe; and he committed likewiſe to his keeping all the heavy baggage of the main army, who left it behind them, that they might march light and diſencumbered.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 35. *& ſeq.* *Livy* B. 21. c. 23. *& ſeq.*

Being arrived at the borders of *Spain*, 3000 of his *Spaniſh* ſoldiers, (not ſo much for fear of the war, as of the fatigue of ſo long a march, and of paſſing over the *Alps*) returned home without aſking leave; which that others might not alſo do or attempt, he courteouſly diſmiſſed above 7000 more, who ſeemed willing to be gone; a condeſcenſion that made the journey ſeem leſs tedious to thoſe that did follow him, as not being enforced by compulſion. His army conſiſted now of but 50000 foot and 9000 horſe; but they were good men, and had been long trained, and in continual action during the wars in *Spain*, under the ableſt captains that *Carthage* could ever boaſt. With theſe he paſſed the *Pyrenees* and entered into *Gaul*. He found the *Gauls*, that bordered upon *Spain*, ready in arms to forbid his entrance into their country. However by gentle words and rich preſents to the leaders, he gained them over to favour his expedition, which he aſſured them was not deſigned againſt them; and he continued his march without any dangerous moleſtation, till he arrived upon the banks of the *Rhone*.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 42.

Here he bought up from the *Gauls*, (who, on the weſt ſide of the river, favoured his paſſage for money and to get rid of him) all the boats large and ſmall he could meet with, whereof the inhabitants, practiſing commerce, had a great number; and he alſo amaſſed prodigious quantities of timber for making floats, of which the ſoldiers, labouring in that employment with great diligence, in two days time made abundant proviſion. Nevertheleſs the *Carthaginian* found that it would be impoſſible to compaſs his paſſage without ſome ſtratagem,

gem, becauſe of the oppoſition of the *Gauls* on the eaſt ſide the river, who, in great multitudes, had determined to defend their bank. Where-fore, after three days deliberation, he in the night detached an officer named *Hanno* with a conſiderable part of the army, to go a good way up the river, then croſs it, and endeavour to get behind the enemy. *Hanno* paſſed the ſtream about 25 miles from the *Carthaginian* camp, made ſilent marches towards the camp of the *Gauls*, and, in the morning after the fifth night, by ſmoke in ſeveral places, (the appointed ſignal) gave notice of his approach to *Hannibal*, who thereupon immediately began to attempt his paſſage. He put into the larger boats a part of his cavalry, ready for action. The horſes of the reſt, which could not be embarked, ſwam in tow after the ſmall boats, one man, on each ſide of a boat, holding three or four horſes by the bridles. The horſemen and the infantry went in ſmall veſſels and on floats; and that their paſſage might be the eaſier, the largeſt veſſels were ſo diſpoſed, a little higher up the ſtream, as to break the force of the current. When the *Gauls* perceived the *Carthaginians* advancing on the river, they by dreadful howlings, (according to their cuſtom,) ſignified, that they waited the attack with reſolution. But when they heard a great noiſe behind them, ſaw their tents on fire, and themſelves aſſailed in rear, as well as front, they made but a ſhort reſiſtance. Vanquiſhed and broken, they fled every man to his own village.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p. c. 43.

It has been already obſerved, that the *Romans*, without waiting the return of their ambaſſadors from *Carthage*, had ordered the Conſul *P. Cornelius Scipio* into *Spain*, and *Tib. Sempronius* into *Sicily*, from whence he was to go into *Africa*.

See p. 110. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 40.

Cornelius, though, before he ſet out, the news arrived that *Hannibal* had paſſed the *Iberus*, was ſtill in hopes he ſhould be able to hinder him from marching out of *Spain*. For this end having embarked his forces at *Piſa*, on board the fleet of ſixty gallies, which had been aſſigned him, he ſteered along the coaſt of *Liguria* *, and in five days arrived at *Marſeilles*. Learning here that *Hannibal* had already paſſed the *Pyrenees*, he proceeded no further in his voyage than to the neareſt mouth of the *Rhone*, where he landed his men, with intention to wait for the enemy on the banks of that river, and there put a ſtop to their further progreſs. The difficulties of the way from the *Pyrenees*, and the divers nations, through which *Hannibal* was to make his paſſage, induced the Conſul to conclude, that he was yet a great way off. The *Carthaginian* however was at this time actually employed in paſſing the *Rhone*, at the diſtance of about four days march † from the ſea. The Conſul heard a report of this; but it ſeemed ſo incredible, that he could not believe it. Nevertheleſs, thinking it adviſeable to endeavour after ſuch intelligence as he might rely on, while the army lay to refreſh themſelves after the fatigue of their voyage, he commanded out

c. 41. & 42.

* *Genoa.*

† A little above *Avignon*.

A. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J.C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

300 choſen horſe to make *diſcovery*, giving them, for guides, ſome *Gauls* in the ſervice of *Marſeilles*.

This detachment met with a party of 500 *Numidian* horſe, not far from the *Carthaginian* camp. For *Hannibal*, the next morning after his paſſage, and while his men were wafting over the elephants, having received intelligence of the Conſul's arrival at the mouth of the *Rhone*, had ſent this party out to bring him an account of the ſtrength and ſituation of the enemy. The conflict between the *Romans* and *Numidians* was very bloody, an hundred and ſixty of the former were left dead upon the ſpot, and more than two hundred of the latter. The *Romans* had the honour of the day, forcing the *Numidians* to quit the field, and purſuing them ſo near their entrenchments as to be eye-witneſſes of what they were ſent to learn. After which they returned with all diligence to carry the news to the Conſul.

Liv. B. 21. c. 29.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 45.

c. 44. *Hannibal*, while theſe things paſſed, was giving audience, in the preſence of his whole army, to *Magilus* a *Gallic* Prince, who was come to him from the countries about the *Po*. *Magilus* (with whom the *Carthaginian* had before had a private conference) aſſured him by an interpreter, that the *Gauls* impatiently expected his arrival, and were ready to join him; and that he himſelf would be the guide to conduct the army through places, where they would find every thing neceſſary, and by a road, which would bring them ſpeedily and ſafely into *Italy*. When the Prince was withdrawn, *Hannibal* in a ſpeech to his troops reminded them of all their exploits to that time, and of the ſucceſs they had met with in every occaſion of danger, by following his counſels. He exhorted them to continue their confidence in him, and to fear nothing for the future; ſince having paſſed the *Rhone*, and ſecured ſuch good allies as they found the *Gauls* to be, the greateſt obſtacles to their enterprize were now ſurmounted. The ſoldiers applauded all he ſaid, expreſſing great willingneſs, and even ardour, to follow him whitherſoever he ſhould lead the way. He commended their good diſpoſitions, made vows to the Gods for the preſervation of all his troops, admoniſhed them to refreſh themſelves well, and prepare to march next day, and then diſmiſſed the aſſembly.

c. 45. Juſt at this time the *Numidians*, who had ſurvived the ſkirmiſh, returned with an account of their adventure. *Hannibal*, as he had before reſolved, broke up his camp, the next morning as ſoon as it was day, and poſting his horſe as a body of reſerve, a little down the river, ordered his infantry to march. He himſelf ſtaid behind, waiting the arrival of the elephants that were not yet all wafted over the ſtream.

c. 46. The method of doing it was this. From the bank of the river they threw a large float of timber, which, being ſtrongly held by great ropes twiſted about ſome trees, they covered over with earth, that the elephants might be deceived by this appearance, and take it for firm ground.

At the end of this firſt float was faſtened a ſecond, but ſo, as it might be eaſily looſened from it. The female elephants were brought upon the firſt float, the males followed them; and when they were all got upon the ſecond float, this was looſened from the firſt, and by the help of ſmall boats towed to the oppoſite ſhore. It does not appear how many of theſe animals were tranſported at a time. But when the firſt were landed, the float was ſent back to fetch others, and ſo on till the whole number was brought over. Some of them being unruly fell into the water, but they at laſt got ſafe to ſhore; not a ſingle elephant was drowned, though ſome of their conductors were. Y. of *R.* 535: Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

And now *Hannibal*, making his horſe and elephants the rear-guard to his infantry, marched along the banks of the river *northward* *, (though that was not the ſhorteſt way to the *Alps*,) being reſolved to avoid an engagement with *Scipio*, that he might lead his troops as entire as poſſible into *Italy*.

* *Polybius* (c. 47.) ſays *Eaſtward*, but this agrees not with the context.

Scipio, upon the information brought him by his *diſcoverers*, having immediately ordered all the baggage on board his ſhips, was coming by long marches with his whole army to attack the *Carthaginians*; but he did not arrive at the place where *Hannibal* had paſſed the *Rhone*, till three days after he was gone from thence. Deſpairing therefore to overtake him, he made haſte back to his fleet, embarked his army, diſpatched his brother *Cneius* with the greateſt part of it into *Spain*, to carry the war into that country, and ſet ſail himſelf for *Italy*, in hopes, by the way of *Hetruria*, to reach the foot of the *Alps* before *Hannibal* could arrive there. *Liv.* B. 21. c. 31. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 49.

The *Carthaginian* after four days march arrived in a country which, from its ſituation, was called *the Iſland*, being waſhed on two ſides by the *Rhone*, and another [m] river which runs into that. Its form is triangular

[m] It has been much diſputed whether this *other river* was the *Arar*, [now called the *Saone*,] or the *Iſara*, [the *Iſere*.]

" The text of *Polybius*, *ſays Monſ. Rollin*, " as it has been tranſmitted to us, and " that of *Livy* place this iſland at the " conflux of the *Rhone* and the *Saone*, " that is, in the place where the city of " *Lyons* now ſtands. But this is a manifeſt " error. It was, in the Greek, Σκωρας, " inſtead of which ὁ Ἄραρος has been ſub- " ſtituted. *J. Gronovius* ſays, that he had " ſeen in a manuſcript of *Livy*, *Biſarat*, " which ſhews, that we are to read *Iſara*, " *Rhodanuſque amnes*, inſtead of *Arar*, *Rho-* " *danuſque*; and that the iſland in queſtion " is formed by the conflux of the *Iſara* and " the *Rhone*.

Chevalier *Folard*, who knows perfectly well the road from the place where *Hannibal* paſſed the *Rhone* (which is agreed to be between *Orange* and *Avignon*) to *Lyons*; and who alſo knows perfectly well what an army like *Hannibal*'s is capable of doing, maintains, that it was abſolutely impoſſible for it to march to *Lyons* in four days, it being 35 leagues; and, though he does not omit the reaſons brought by Mr. *Rollin*, he lays the main ſtreſs of his argument (in behalf of the *Iſere*) on the length and badneſs of the way to the *Saone*, there being three rivers to paſs, and almoſt the whole way being through defiles.

I know not whether ſome aid to this cauſe might not be drawn from the *time* employ'd in *Scipio*'s march, who was ſo eager

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

gular and reſembles the *Delta* of *Egypt*, with this difference, that the country here ſpoken of, is bounded on it's third ſide by high mountains,

eager to come up with the *Carthaginians*, and give them battle. It is ſaid that he did not arrive at the place where *Hannibal* had paſſed the *Rhone*, till three days after he was gone from thence. Now it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that he began his march the very ſame morning that *Hannibal* began his; the ſkirmiſh between the parties having happened the morning before, and there being time enough for *Scipio* to receive intelligence by his ſcouts where the enemy was: and though, to get to that place, he had not half the way to make, that *Hannibal* had, to reach *Lyons*, it coſt him, with all his expedition, three days march.

On the deciſion of this queſtion, another is made very much to depend, *Over what part of the* Alps *the* Carthaginian *army paſſed into* Italy? *Whether over the* Alpes Penninæ, *that ſtand a good way to the north of* Turin, or *over the* Alpes Cottiæ, *that ſtand a little to the weſt of that* city? *Livy* is for the latter, and wonders that this fact ſhould ever be queſtioned, ſince it is agreed that the part of *Italy* which *Hannibal* firſt enter'd, was the territory of the *Taurini*, [the people of *Turin*] into which country the other paſſage would not have brought him; nor does he believe that paſſage was then open. He tells us alſo that the army croſſed the *Durance*, in its way to the mountains, which agrees very well with the opinion of it's going over the *Alpes Cottiæ*, as may be ſeen by the maps. But the reſt of *Livy*'s account does not well accord with theſe particulars, nor indeed with common ſenſe.

† *Cluverius.*

* B. 3. c. 47.

Chevalier *Folard*, who is well acquainted with the *Alps*, and all the roads thither, is ſure, that *Hannibal* went the ſhorteſt road, from the country of prince *Brancus* to *Turin*; not only becauſe it was the ſhorteſt, but becauſe it was the ſafeſt and the beſt. He won't allow, that *Hannibal* went ſo far northward, along the banks of the *Rhone*, as even to the conflux of that river and the *Iſere*. He ſays, there was no occaſion to do it, on account of any danger, either from *Scipio* or any allies of *Rome*. According to the chevalier, *Hannibal*, leaving *Grenoble* on his left, paſſed the *Drac* [which runs into the *Iſere*] over againſt *Vizille*. Thence he ſucceſſively march'd to *Bourg d'Oiſons*, *Le Mont de Lens*, *Le Lautaret*, *Briançon*, *Le Mont Genevre*, *Sezanne*, *Le Mont Seſtrieres*, *Suze*, *Col de la Feneſtre*, and *Pignerol*; at a ſmall diſtance from which laſt he encamp'd in the plains.

THE fathers *Catrou* and *Rouillé* differ from the chevalier on both theſe queſtions. According to them, *Hannibal* croſſed the *Rhone*, at its conflux with the *Saone*, and then turning eaſtward march'd along the *Rhone*, on its north-ſide; then croſs'd it again marching on its ſouth-ſide to the *Durance*, (which they ſuppoſe to be *Livy*'s *Durance*) and thence to the foot of the *Alpes Penninæ*, which they paſſed, by the *Great St. Bernard*.

As to the objection of the 35 leagues march, in four days, they think it is ſufficient to ſay, that *Hannibal* was in haſte to get out of *Scipio*'s way.

And as to Σκωρας [*Scoras*] (the ſuppoſed † ancient name of the *Iſere*) "It can "only impoſe, *ſay they*, on thoſe who don't "know that the *Saone* was anciently called "*Scona*, and by corruption *Saucona*. *Ammianus Marcellinus* calls it ſo, and it "had the name of *Matiſcona*, becauſe "*Macon* is ſituated upon its banks. So "that here is correction for correction. "Is it not more natural and more probable that *Scoras* ſhould be changed into "*Sconas*, than that *Scoras* ſhould be changed "into *Iſaras*?"

But the main ſtrength of their argument is from *Polybius*, who tells us *, *that* Hannibal *continued his march along the* Rhone EASTWARD. "Now, *ſay the reverend fa-* "*thers*, it is evident by a caſt of an eye "on the map, that if the *Carthaginian* "army march'd up the *Rhone* from weſt to "eaſt, it muſt firſt have marched along "it as far as to *Lyons*." *The neceſſity of this conſequence I don't ſee. However, much doubtleſs might be built on this paſſage of* Polybius, *if we did not meet with it at a time when it is impoſſible it ſhould be true; but it is juſt when* Hannibal *is ſetting out to go* NORTHWARD *along the river, and even* 35 *leagues northward, if he went to the conflux of the*

tains, whereas the *Delta* which the *Nile* waſhes on two ſides, is bounded on the third by the ſea. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

Here he found two brothers diſputing for the kingdom, and the nation engaged in a civil war. The two armies were juſt ready to give battle when *Hannibal* arrived. At the requeſt of the elder brother (named *Brancus*) he aſſiſted him, and forced the younger to retire. *Hannibal* had foreſeen, that it would be very advantageous to him to have the friendſhip of a prince of this country; and he immediately reaped many benefits from it. The *Gaul* furniſhed his troops, not only with proviſions and arms, but with clothes; for they were in a tattered condition, moſt of them barefoot, and very ill provided for a march over the ſnows and ice of the mountains. But the moſt eſſential ſervice he did was by putting his troops in the rear of *Hannibal*'s army, (which could not without great dread enter the territories of the *Gauls* called *Allobroges*) and eſcorting it to the place where it was to aſcend the *Alps*. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 49. *Livy.* B. 21. c. 31.

Hannibal, thus attended, marched 100 miles in ten days without moleſtation. So long as he was in the flat country the petty princes of the *Allobroges* made no oppoſition to his progreſs, either fearing the *Carthaginian* cavalry, or being held in reſpect by the *Gauls* that were in the rear of the army. But when theſe had retired to go home, and the *Carthaginians* began to aſcend the mountains, they perceived that the mountaineers had poſſeſſed themſelves of the higheſt cliffs that commanded the ſtreight through which the army was to paſs, with a reſolution to oppoſe its paſſage. Here *Hannibal* therefore was obliged to make a halt and encamp. Had the mountaineers, ſays *Polybius*, conceal'd their deſigns till the *Carthaginian* army was advanced a good way into the narrow paſſes, it had been inevitably deſtroyed. *Hannibal* having learnt by the means of ſome of thoſe *Gauls*, who ſerved him for guides, that the *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 50.

the Rhone *and the* Saone. Caſaubon *ſeems to have been ſhock'd at this inconſiſtency; for in his tranſlation he has neglected the words* παρὰ τὸν πόταμον *(along the river.)*

As to the PASSAGE OF THE ALPS,

" There are ſix reaſons, *ſay the Jeſuits*,
" which incline us to believe that *Hannibal*
" croſs'd the *Alps* by the *Great St. Bernard*,
" [one of the *Alpes Penninæ*.]"

I ſhall mention only three of them.

" 1. *Livy* and *Polybius* ſay, that this ge-
" neral, to encourage his troops, ſhewed
" them from the top of the mountain the
" rich plains of *Italy* that lay near the *Po*.
" Now ſuppoſing he had marched by the
" *Alpes Cottiæ*, as *Livy* pretends, he could
" not poſſibly from thence diſcover thoſe
" plains; other mountains would have in-
" tercepted his view.

" 2. *Polybius* reckons 1400 ſtadia, or
" about 175 miles from the place where
" *Hannibal* paſs'd the *Rhone* to the foot of
" thoſe Alps which he aſcended to go into
" *Italy*. And if we ſay with *Livy*, that
" he paſſed any of the *Alpes Cottiæ*, it is
" impoſſible to make out that diſtance.

" 3. *Polybius* tells us, that *Hannibal* paſſ-
" ed the *Alps near the place where the*
" Rhone *riſes*. Conſequently he paſſed
" over the *Alpes Penninæ*."

Theſe reaſons ſeem deciſive, as to the paſſage of the Alps, (*whatever becomes of* Scoras, *and the* 35 *leagues march*) Polybius's *authority being unqueſtionable, ſince, as he tells us, he made a journey on purpoſe to viſit the places where* Hannibal *had paſſed, that he might be the better able to give an account of them.*

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p. enemy quitted their poſts every night, retiring to a town not far off, he took his opportunity with a detachment of his beſt men (leaving the greateſt part of his forces with the baggage) to advance by night and ſeize thoſe poſts, before the return of the *Barbarians*; who in the morning were extremely ſurprized to find themſelves thus diſpoſſeſſed. However, as they perceived the cavalry and beaſts of burden moving forward in the ſtreights at a great diſtance, they ran thither and fell with fury upon the rear-guard of the army. The *Carthaginians* ſuffered a great loſs of men, horſes, and beaſts of burden upon this occaſion; which deſtruction was owing more to the difficulty of the paſſage, than the ſwords of the enemy. For the horſes, when wounded by the mountaineers, or frighted by their howlings, ruſh'd upon the beaſts of burden, overſetting them and every thing elſe that ſtood in their way, aud hurrying all down the precipices that border'd the road.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 51.

Hannibal being ſenſible, that the loſs of his baggage would alone be ſufficient to deſtroy his army, haſtened with his detachment to the ſuccour of the troops that were thus embarraſs'd. Falling on the enemy from the higher ground he ſlew moſt of them, and put the reſt to flight, yet not without ſuſtaining conſiderable loſs of men himſelf. What remain'd of his horſes and beaſts of burden now paſs'd the ſtreight, but with much difficulty, becauſe of the ruggedneſs of the way. After which, taking with him thoſe of his men who were the leaſt fatigued with the combat, he attacked the town, from whence the enemy had ſallied upon him, and he eaſily made himſelf maſter of it, the inhabitants having been almoſt all drawn out of it by the hopes of plunder. This conqueſt proved of great advantage to him. For he recovered a good number of men, horſes, and beaſts of carriage which had fallen into the enemies hands. He alſo found a ſufficient quantity of corn and cattle to ſuſtain his army for two or three days. And he gained this farther benefit, that the mountaineers of theſe parts were now ſo ſtruck with dread, that they thought no more of interrupting his march.

c. 52.

Here he encamped and ſtaid a whole day to refreſh his troops. He then purſued his march, which for ſome days was unmoleſted. On the fourth, the people inhabiting the places near the road, having contrived a ſtratagem to attack him by ſurprize, came to meet him with olive branches and garlands, the uſual ſignals of peace among theſe nations. *Hannibal*, miſtruſting them, was very inquiſitive concerning the intention of their coming. They told him, that having been informed of what had happened to their neighbours, and being themſelves unwilling either to do or to ſuffer any injury, they were come to aſſure him of their peaceable diſpoſitions; of which if he doubted they would give him hoſtages, for his ſecurity.

Hannibal was for a while in ſuſpenſe what reſolution to take: But conſidering that if he accepted their offer with condeſcenſion, they might poſſibly become more eaſy and tractable, and that, if he rejected

it,

it, he ſhould have them immediately for open enemies, he at length pretended a great willingneſs to be upon terms of friendſhip with them. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

Upon which they brought him hoſtages, furniſh'd him with cattle, and ſeemed to place intire confidence in the *Carthaginians*. *Hannibal* ſeeing this, and either having, or ſeeming to have a better opinion of them, told them, they ſhould be his guides to conduct him through the remaining part of his way over the mountains. Thus for two days they marched at the head of the army. But when it was got into a hollow way, overlook'd by ſteep and craggy rocks, theſe faithleſs friends, in concert with others of their countrymen who had lain concealed, fell ſuddenly upon the troops in front, flank and rear. The greateſt number attacked the rear. The army would have been utterly deſtroy'd, c. 53. ſays *Polybius*, if *Hannibal*, who all along retained ſome diffidence of theſe Barbarians, had not taken his precautions to guard againſt them, by placing his baggage and his cavalry in the van, and his heavy arm'd infantry in the rear-guard. Theſe ſuſtain'd the ſhock of the enemy. Nevertheleſs he loſt a great number of men, horſes, and beaſts of burden. For the *Gauls* having poſſeſſed themſelves of the cliffs, and advancing thereon as the *Carthaginians* advanced in the hollow way, rolled down upon them huge ſtones, which occaſioned an exceeding terror among them. *Hannibal* was obliged, with one half of his army, to remain all night in the open air upon a rock to defend the horſes and beaſts of carriage, as they filed along through the ſtreight below; for which movement that night was hardly ſufficient, the train was of ſuch a length.

The next day, the enemy being retired, *Hannibal* rejoined his horſe and baggage, and continued his march. The *Gauls* after this made no more attempts upon him, except in ſmall parties, that, ſallying out by ſurprize from their lurking places in the hollows of the rocks, ſometimes upon his van, ſometimes upon his rear, ſeldom failed to carry off a part of his baggage, which was their chief purpoſe. The elephants were of great uſe to the *Carthaginians* on theſe occaſions, for wherever they chanced to appear, they ſtruck ſuch a terror into the mountaineers as made them inſtantly take to their heels.

Hannibal at length, after nine days march from the firſt aſcent, gain'd the ſummit of the mountain. Here he ſtaid two days, that thoſe of his men, who with infinite toil had climbed to this height, might take breath; and that his ſick and wounded, who were ſtill behind and moving ſlowly on, might have time to crawl up. And *Polybius* adds, that while the troops continued here, they had the agreeable ſurprize of ſeeing many of the horſes and beaſts of burden which had fallen in the way, or had by fear been driven out of it, and were thought loſt, arrive ſafely at the camp, having followed the track of the army.

It

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 54.

It was now about the end of autumn, and abundance of ſnow was newly fallen on the top of the mountain. *Hannibal* perceiving his ſoldiers to be extremely diſcouraged by the ſufferings they had already undergone, and by the apprehenſion of thoſe that were to come, called them together, that he might try to revive their hope. Having led them to a convenient ſpot for taking an extenſive view of the plains below; "There! *ſaid he*, caſt your eyes over thoſe large and fruitful "countries. The *Gauls* who inhabit them are our friends. They are *Liv.* B. 21. c. 35. "waiting for us, ready, and impatient to join us. You have ſcaled, "not only the rampart of *Italy*, but the walls of *Rome* itſelf. What re- "mains is all ſmoothneſs and deſcent. One battle gained, or two at "moſt, and the capital of *Italy* will be ours."

The next day he broke up his camp and began to deſcend. But now, though he had no enemies to encounter except a few lurking robbers, he is ſaid to have loſt almoſt as many men and horſes in going down the mountain as in coming up. The way was ſo ſteep and ſlippery in moſt places, that the ſoldiers could neither keep on their feet, nor recover themſelves when they ſlipped; and the ground being covered with ſnow, it was difficult to hit the right path, and if they miſs'd it, they fell down frightful precipices, or were ſwallowed up in depths of ſnow. Nevertheleſs being inured to ſuch dangers, they ſupported this with fortitude. But at length they came to a place much worſe than any they had before met with, and which quite took away their courage. The path, for about a furlong and a half, naturally very ſteep and craggy, was rendered much more ſo by the late falling away of a great quantity of earth; ſo that neither elephants nor horſes could paſs. Here therefore they ſtopt ſhort. *Hannibal* wondering at this ſudden halt, ran to the place, and, having view'd it, plainly ſaw there was no advancing farther that way. His firſt thought was to try another, by fetching a compaſs. But he quickly deſiſted from this attempt, it being found impracticable. For though the ſnow that had laſt fallen, being ſoft and of no great depth, yielded good footing enough for the ſoldiers and horſes that marched foremoſt; yet when this had been ſo trampled upon, by them, that the feet of thoſe who followed came to the hard ſnow and ice under it, the latter could by no means advance, or even keep upon their feet. And when they endeavoured to ſuſtain themſelves on their hands and knees, they often ſlid down and were loſt in pits and precipices. And as for the horſes and beaſts of burden, when they ſtruck their feet into the ice to preſerve themſelves from falling, they could not draw them out again, but remained there as if they had been themſelves frozen. It was neceſſary therefore to ſeek ſome other expedient. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 55.

Hannibal having cauſed all the ſnow to be removed that lay upon the ground near the entrance of the firſt way, he there pitch'd his camp;

camp; and then gave orders to cut out a winding path in the [a] rock itſelf; and this work was carried on with ſo great diligence and vigour, that at the end of one day the beaſts of burden and the horſes were able to deſcend without much difficulty. He immediately ſent them forward, and, removing his camp to a place that was free from ſnow, put them to paſture. It now remained to enlarge the way that the elephants might paſs. This taſk was aſſigned to the *Numidians*, and it took up ſo much time, that *Hannibal* did not arrive with his whole army in the plains below, on the confines of *Inſubria*, till four days after he began to deſcend. He had been 15 days in paſſing the *Alps*, and, theſe included, five months and a half in his march (of about 1000 miles) from *New Carthage*. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

Of the thirty-eight thouſand foot with which the *Carthaginian* general had croſſed the *Rhone*, he had now but 12000 *Africans*, and 8000 *Spaniards*; and his eight thouſand horſe were reduced to about 6000. This enumeration is according to *Hannibal*'s own regiſter, which he afterwards cauſed to be engraved on a column near the promontory of *Lacinium* in *Calabria*. c. 56.

His firſt care, after entering *Italy* and pitching his camp in the plain at the foot of the mountain, was to refreſh his men, who ſtood in great need of it. Famine and fatigue had ſo disfigur'd them, that they look'd like Savages. But as ſoon as he ſaw that both men and horſes had recovered their ſtrength, and were fit for action; he marched againſt the *Taurini* *, who were at that time in war with the *Inſubrians*, and who had rejected his repeated ſolicitations to enter into an alliance with him. He ſat down before their chief city and took it in three days, putting all who had oppoſed him to the ſword. This expedition ſtruck ſuch a terror into the *Gauls* of this neighbourhood, that they came of their own accord and ſurrender'd themſelves at diſcretion. The remoter *Gauls* of the plains about the *Po* would have alſo been glad to join him, as they had long intended to do. But as the *Roman* legions had paſſed beyond thoſe plains, and had eſcaped the ambuſhes there laid c. 60.

* The people of *Turin*.

[a] Mr. *Rollin* ſeems very loth to part with *Livy*'s VINEGAR, which was poured upon the rock to ſoften it, after this had been firſt made red hot under flaming piles of huge trees. "Many, *ſays Mr. Rollin*, "reject this fact as fabulous. *Pliny* ob- "ſerves, that vinegar has the force to "break ſtones and rocks. *Saxa rumpit in- "fuſum, quæ non ruperit ignis antecedens.* "Lib. 23. For which reaſon he calls "vinegar *Succus rerum domitor*. Lib. 33. "c. 2. *Dio*, ſpeaking of the ſiege of "*Eleutheræ*, ſays, that the walls of it were "made to fall by the force of vinegar. "*L.* 36. *p.* 8.

"It is *likely*, [apparemment] *adds Mr.* "*Rollin*, what makes people queſtion the "truth of *Livy*'s account, is the difficulty "that *Hannibal* would have to procure in "thoſe mountains a ſufficient quantity of "vinegar for the operation." Doubtleſs the unbelievers do imagine this to be an inſuperable objection to the ſtory. But this is not all. For a better authority than *Livy* aſſures us, that *Hannibal* had no wood to make a fire with; *That there was not a* tree *in the place where he then was, or near it*. Polybius B. 3. c. 55. Των γαρ Αλπιων τα μεν ακρα, κ) πρὶς τας υπερβολας αιηκοίλα, τιλεως ἀδενδρα και ψιλα παντ' ἐστι.

for

Y. of *R.* 535 Bef *J.C* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

for them, theſe *Gauls* thought it better now to keep quiet; nay ſome of their nation were conſtrained to take arms for the *Romans*. *Hannibal* therefore judging that he had no time to loſe, reſolved to march into their country, and endeavour by ſome exploit to raiſe the courage of a people who were ſo well diſpoſed to favour him.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 61. *Livy*, B. 21. c. 39.

He was full of this deſign when he received intelligence that *Scipio* had paſſed the *Po* with his army, and that he was not far off. The two Generals are ſaid to have conceived a high opinion of each other. *Hannibal*'s name had been long renowned, even before the taking of *Saguntum*; and, that *Scipio* muſt be a captain of eminent worth, the *Carthaginian* had well concluded, from the *Romans* having choſen him, preferably to all others, to be his opponent. But this mutual impreſſion was now become much ſtronger, by the *hardy enterprize* of the one to march over the *Alps*, with the *happy execution* of it; and the expeditious courage of the other in coming from the banks of the *Rhone*, to meet him, at the foot of thoſe mountains.

But nothing had ever ſo aſtoniſhed the people of *Rome*, as the news of the *Carthaginians* being ſo near. They had ſcarce order'd one of their Conſuls into *Africa* to attack *Carthage*, and another into *Spain* to ſtop *Hannibal*, when they hear, that this ſame *Hannibal* is in *Italy* at the head of an army beſieging towns. Such terror ſeized them, that they immediately diſpatch'd an expreſs to the Conſul *Sempronius*, then at *Lilybæum*, to poſtpone every other affair, and come with all expedition to the defence of his country.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 41. and *Liv.* B. 21. c. 49. *&* *ſeq.*

Sempronius, to whom a conſiderable army, and a fleet of 160 gallies had been committed, and who had made mighty preparations at *Lilybæum* for a deſcent upon *Africa*, was ſo elated with ambitious hope that he thought of nothing leſs than laying ſiege to *Carthage* itſelf, when he had firſt cleared the coaſts of *Italy* and *Sicily* of the *Carthaginian* fleets: Before he went into *Sicily*, the *Roman* prætor of that province had gain'd ſome conſiderable advantages by ſea over the *Carthaginians*, and had diſappointed a deſign formed by them to poſſeſs themſelves of *Lilybæum* by ſurprize. When the Conſul arrived at *Meſſina* he was there met by king *Hiero*, who, continuing his friendſhip to the *Romans*, not only clothed the legions and furniſhed them with corn at his own expence, but with his fleet accompanied theirs to *Lilybæum*. From this place *Sempronius* made a ſucceſsful attempt upon the Iſland of *Malta*; a conqueſt which ſerved to cover *Sicily* on that ſide. After which, being returned to *Lilybæum*, and having learnt there, that a *Carthaginian* fleet was ravaging the coaſts of *Calabria*, he made preparations to drive the enemy from thence; but while he was getting ready for this expedition, he received the order abovementioned to return into *Italy* to the aſſiſtance of his collegue. Hereupon he gave one part of his fleet to his lieutenant *Pomponius*, to guard the coaſt of *Italy*, another to *Æmilius* prætor of *Sicily*, and with the reſt, having embark'd his army, ſet ſail for *Ariminum* in the *Adriatic*.

While

CHAP. XVIII.

The Battle of the TICIN.

WHILE the forces of *Sempronius* from *Sicily* were in their voyage, *Hannibal* and the Conſul *Publius Scipio* were advancing to meet each other. *Scipio* (as was before * obſerved) had, from the mouth of the *Rhone*, ſent almoſt all his own conſular army, under the conduct of his brother *Cneius*, into *Spain*. The forces which he now commanded were chiefly the remains of an army † which had been aſſigned to the Prætor *Manlius*, to guard the province of *Gaul*, and which had ſince been defeated by the *Boii*. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

* See p. 121.

† See p. 110.

For theſe *Gauls* had no ſooner heard of *Hannibal*'s paſſing the *Iberus*, in his way to *Italy*, but, regardleſs of the hoſtages they had given at the concluſion of the laſt war with *Rome*, they roſe in arms againſt her, and drew the *Inſubrians* into the revolt. What made the *Boii* ſo forward in this matter, was their extreme diſſatisfaction with the republic, for planting two colonies in their neighbourhood at *Placentia* and *Cremona*; an affair which, though long intended, was not quite finiſhed when the *Carthaginian* began his march from *Spain*. The *Boii* fell firſt upon thoſe lands which had been deſtined for the new colonies, purſuing the *Romans* who fled before them, to *Mutina* *, another *Roman* colony. In this place, which they beſieged, were three *Romans* of great diſtinction, (one of them having been Conſul, and the other two, Prætors) who had been commiſſioned to make the partition of the lands. The *Gauls*, contrary to their faith given, ſeized upon the perſons of theſe commiſſioners at a conference for an accommodation, hoping by this treachery to recover their hoſtages. The news of it rouzed the Prætor *Manlius*. He haſtened to the relief of *Mutina*: But the *Gauls* having got notice of his approach, fell upon him by ſurprize, in his paſſage through a foreſt, and cut off a great part of his army, he himſelf narrowly eſcaping with the remainder to *Tanetum*, a ſmall town on the banks of the *Po*. To this place the enemy purſued him, and there held him inveſted, till the Prætor *Attilius*, with a legion, that had been raiſed for *Spain*, and 5000 men of the allies, was ſent from *Rome* to his aſſiſtance. Upon the approach of theſe troops the *Gauls* raiſed the ſieges of both *Mutina* and *Tanetum*, and retiring thence diſperſed themſelves about the country. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 40.

* *Modena.*

Livy. B. 21. c. 26.

The forces of *Manlius* and *Attilius*, which had been thus employed, compoſed the army, which *Scipio*, (who had landed at *Piſa*, and gone thence to *Placentia*) led againſt *Hannibal*. Having paſſed the *Po*, he turned to the left, and advanced to the *Ticin* [a], over which he cauſed a *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 56. *Livy* B. 21. c. 39, & 40.

[a] A ſmall River on the north ſide of the *Po* and running into it.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J.C.* 217. 234 Conſul p.

bridge to be laid. But before he marched further, he thought it proper to aſſemble his ſoldiers, and endeavour to animate their courage for the approaching occaſion. He ſpoke to them in words to this effect.

" Were *you*, Soldiers, the ſame army, which I had with me in " *Gaul*, I might well forbear ſaying any thing to you at this time. " For, what occaſion could there be to uſe exhortation to a CAVALRY, " that had ſo ſignally vanquiſhed the ſquadrons of the enemy upon " the *Rhone*; or to LEGIONS, by whom that ſame enemy, flying before " them to avoid a battle, did in effect confeſs themſelves conquer'd? " But, as thoſe troops, having been enroll'd for *Spain*, are there with " my brother *Cneius*, making war under my auſpices (as was the will " of the Senate and People of *Rome*) I, that you might have a Conſul " for your captain againſt *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians*, have freely " offer'd myſelf for this war. *You* then have a *new general*, and *I* a " *new army*. In this circumſtance a few words from *me* to *you* will " be neither improper nor unſeaſonable.

" And that you may not be unapprized of what ſort of enemies you " are going to encounter, or of what is to be feared from them, they " are the very ſame, whom in a former war, you vanquiſhed both by " land and ſea; the ſame from whom you took *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, " and who have been for theſe twenty years your tributaries. You will " not, I preſume, march againſt *theſe* men with only that courage, " with which you are wont to face other enemies, but with a certain " anger and indignation, ſuch as you would feel, if you ſaw your " ſlaves on a ſudden riſe up in arms againſt you. Conquer'd and en- " ſlaved, it is not boldneſs but neceſſity that urges them to battle: un- " leſs you can believe that thoſe, who avoided fighting when their army " was entire, have acquired better hope by the loſs of two thirds of " their horſe and foot, in the paſſage of the *Alps*.

" But you have heard perhaps, that, though they be few in number, " they are men of ſtout hearts and robuſt bodies, heroes of ſuch ſtrength " and vigour, as nothing is able to reſiſt.—— Meer effigies! nay ſha- " dows of men! wretches emaciated with hunger, and benumbed with " cold! bruiſed and battered to pieces among the rocks and craggy " clifts! their weapons broke, and their horſes weak and founder'd! " Such are the cavalry, and ſuch the infantry with which you are going " to contend; not enemies, but the fragments of enemies. There is " nothing which I more apprehend, than that it will be thought, *Han-* " *nibal* was vanquiſhed by the *Alps*, before we had any conflict with " him. But perhaps it was fitting that ſo it ſhould be; and that with " a people and a leader, who had violated leagues and covenants, the " Gods themſelves, without man's help, ſhould begin the war, and " bring it near to a concluſion; and that we, who, next to the Gods, " have been injured and offended, ſhould happily finiſh what they " begun.

" I need

" I need not be in any fear, that you ſhould ſuſpect me of ſaying Y. of *R.* 535.
" theſe things merely to encourage you, while inwardly I have Bef. *J. C.* 217.
" different ſentiments. What hindered me from going into *Spain?* 234 Conſul-p.
" *That* was *my* province; where I ſhould have had the leſs dreaded
" *Aſdrubal*, not *Hannibal* to deal with. But hearing, as I paſt along
" the coaſt of *Gaul*, of this enemy's march, I landed my troops, ſent
" the Horſe forward, and pitched my camp upon the *Rhone*. A part
" of my cavalry encountered and defeated that of the enemy; my in-
" fantry not being able to overtake theirs which fled before us, I return-
" ed to my fleet, and with all the expedition I could uſe in ſo long a
" voyage by ſea and land, am come to meet them at the foot of the
" *Alps*. Was it then my inclination to avoid a conteſt with this tre-
" mendous *Hannibal?* And have I lit upon him only by accident
" and unawares? Or am I come on purpoſe to challenge him to
" the combat? I would gladly try, whether the earth, within theſe
" twenty years, has brought forth a new kind of *Carthaginians*; or
" whether they be the ſame ſort of men who fought at the *Ægates*;
" and whom, at *Eryx*, you ſuffer'd to redeem themſelves at 18 * *denarii* * 11*s.* 7*d.* ½
" *per* head: Whether this *Hannibal*, for labours and journies, be, as Arbuth.
" he would be thought, the rival of *Hercules*; or whether he be what
" his father left him, a tributary, a vaſſal, a ſlave of the *Roman* people.
" Did not the conſciouſneſs of his wicked deed, at *Saguntum*, torment
" him and make him deſperate, he would have ſome regard, if not to
" his conquer'd country, yet ſurely to his own family, to his father's
" memory, to the treaty written with *Amilcar*'s own hand. We might
" have ſtarved them in *Eryx*; we might have paſſed into *Africa* with
" our victorious fleet, and in a few days have deſtroyed *Carthage*. At
" their humble ſupplication we pardon'd them; we releaſed them when
" they were cloſely ſhut up without a poſſibility of eſcaping; we made
" peace with them when they were conquered. When they were
" diſtreſs'd by the *African* war, we conſidered them, we treated them
" as a people under our protection. And what is the return they make
" us for all theſe favours? Under the conduct of a hare-brain'd young
" man, they come hither to overturn our ſtate and lay waſte our country.
" —I could wiſh indeed, that it were not ſo; and that the war we are
" now engaged in, concerned only our glory and not our preſervation.
" But the conteſt at preſent is not for the poſſeſſion of *Sicily* or *Sardi-*
" *nia*, but of *Italy* itſelf. Nor is there, behind us, another army
" which, if we ſhould not prove the conquerors, may make head againſt
" our victorious enemies. There are no more *Alps* for them to paſs,
" which might give us leiſure to raiſe new forces. No, Soldiers, here
" you muſt make your ſtand, as if you were juſt now before the walls
" of *Rome*. Let every one reflect, that he is now to defend, not his
" own perſon alone, but his wife, his children, his helpleſs infants.

V. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

" Yet let not private conſiderations alone poſſeſs our minds; let us re-
" member that the eyes of the Senate and People of *Rome* are upon us,
" and that as our force and courage ſhall now prove, ſuch will be the
" fortune of that City, and of the *Roman* empire.

This diſcourſe, ſupported by the authority of the ſpeaker, the certainty of ſome things he had ſaid, and the probability of others, had the wiſh'd for effect on the minds of the hearers.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 62. *Livy.* B. 21. c. 42. & *ſeq.*

On the other ſide, *Hannibal* made uſe of a new kind of rhetoric to inſpire his ſoldiers with reſolution. He had taken priſoners, ſome young men of the mountaineers who oppoſed his march over the *Alps*; and, to prepare them for his purpoſe, had cauſed them to be treated in the ſevereſt manner, loaded with irons, tormented with hunger, and macerated with ſtripes. In this miſerable condition he had them brought into the preſence of his whole army; where ſhewing them ſuch weapons as the *Gallic* Princes were accuſtomed to uſe in ſingle combat, and placing alſo before their eyes horſes and handſom ſuits of apparel, he demanded, Who of them would be willing, with thoſe weapons, to fight in duel one againſt another, to the death of one of the duelliſts, on the condition, that the victor ſhould have his liberty, and the prizes they beheld? There was not a ſingle wretch of theſe priſoners, who did not inſtantly and eagerly call out for the arms; for, at worſt, they were ſure of this advantage, to be by death delivered from all their miſeries. *Hannibal* hereupon directed that they ſhould draw lots for entering the liſts. At the hearing of this order, all the young men lifted up their hands to heaven, each conjuring the Gods that he might be of the number of the combatants; and all thoſe, whoſe fortune it proved to be ſo, exceedingly rejoiced and exulted, while the reſt were as much dejected.

When theſe duels were over, thoſe of the priſoners who had been only ſpectators ſeemed to envy the conquer'd, no leſs than they did the conquerors.

The ſpectacle had made the like impreſſion on the greater part of the *Carthaginians*, who comparing the fortune of the dead with that of the living, who had not fought, compaſſionated theſe, and thought the others happy.

Hannibal, having thus brought his ſoldiers to the temper and diſpoſition he deſired, advanced into the midſt of them, and then ſpoke in the following manner.

" If in the eſtimation of your own fortune, you will but bear the
" ſame mind which you juſt now did, in contemplating the fortune of
" others, the victory, Soldiers, is ours. What you have ſeen, was not
" a meer ſhew for amuſement, but a repreſentation of your own real
" condition. I know not whether you or your priſoners be encom-
" paſſed by fortune with the ſtricter bonds and neceſſities. Two ſeas
" incloſe

" incloſe you on the right and left;—not a ſhip to fly to, for eſcaping. Y. of *R.* 535.
" Before you is the *Po*, a river broader and more rapid than the *Rhone*; Bef. *J.C.* 217.
" behind you are the *Alps*, over which, even when your numbers were 234 Conſul-p.
" undiminiſhed, you were hardly able to force a paſſage. Here, then,
" Soldiers, you muſt either conquer or die, the very firſt hour you meet
" the enemy. But the ſame fortune which has thus laid you under the
" neceſſity of fighting, has ſet before your eyes thoſe rewards of victory,
" than which no men are ever wont to wiſh for greater from the im-
" mortal Gods. Should we by our valour recover only *Sicily* and *Sar-*
" *dinia*, which were raviſhed from our fathers, thoſe would be no in-
" conſiderable prizes. Yet, what are thoſe? The wealth of *Rome*,
" whatever riches ſhe has heaped together from the ſpoils of nations,
" all theſe, with the maſters of them, will be yours. You have been
" long enough employed in driving the cattle upon the vaſt mountains
" of *Luſitania* and *Celtiberia*; you have hitherto met with no reward
" worthy of the labours and dangers you have undergone. The time
" is now come to reap the full recompence of your toilſom marches
" over ſo many mountains and rivers, and through ſo many nations,
" all of them in arms. This is the place, which fortune has appointed
" to be the limit of your labours; it is here that you will finiſh your
" glorious warfare, and receive an ample recompence of your com-
" pleted ſervice. For I would not have you imagine that victory will
" be as difficult as the name of a ROMAN WAR is great and ſounding.
" It has often happened that a deſpiſed enemy has given a bloody bat-
" tle, and the moſt renowned kings and nations have by a ſmall force
" been overthrown. And if you but take away that glitter of the
" *Roman* name, what is there, wherein they may ſtand in competition
" with *you?* For, (to ſay nothing of your ſervice in war for twenty
" years together with ſo much valour and ſucceſs) from the very pillars
" of *Hercules*, from the ocean, from the utmoſt bounds of the earth,
" through ſo many warlike nations of *Spain* and *Gaul*, are you not come
" hither victorious? And with whom are you now to fight? with raw
" ſoldiers, an undiſciplined army, beaten, vanquiſhed, beſieged by the
" *Gauls* the very laſt ſummer, an army unknown to their leader, and
" unacquainted with him.

" Or ſhall *I*, who, I might almoſt ſay, was *born*, but certainly *brought*
" [b] *up* in the tent of my father, that moſt excellent general, ſhall *I*, the
" conqueror of *Spain* and *Gaul*, and not only of the *Alpine* nations, but,
" which is greater yet, of the *Alps* themſelves, ſhall I compare myſelf
" with this half-year-captain? A captain before whom ſhould one place
" the two armies, without their enſigns, I am perſuaded he would not
" know to which of them he is *Conſul?* I eſteem it no ſmall advantage,

[b] Here we have another proof from *Livy* himſelf of his own inadvertency in deliver-ring the idle ſtory mentioned, p. 104.

" Soldiers,

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

" Soldiers, that there is not *one* among you, who has not often been an eye-witneſs of my exploits in war; not *one*, of whoſe valour, I myſelf have not been a ſpectator, ſo as to be able to name the times and places of his noble atchievements; that with ſoldiers, whom I have a thouſand times praiſed and rewarded, and whoſe pupil I was, before I became their general, I ſhall march againſt an army of men ſtrangers to one another.

" On what ſide ſoever I turn my eyes, I behold all full of courage and ſtrength; a veteran infantry, a moſt gallant cavalry [c]; you, my allies, moſt faithful and valiant; you, *Carthaginians*, whom not only your country's cauſe, but the juſteſt anger impels to battle. The hope, the courage of aſſailants is always greater, than of thoſe who act upon the defenſive. With hoſtile banners diſplayed you are come down upon *Italy*; you bring the war. Grief, injuries, indignities fire your mind, and ſpur you forward to revenge.—Firſt they demand *me*, that I, your general, ſhould be delivered up to them; next, *all you*, who had fought at the ſiege of *Saguntum*; and we were to be put to death by the extremeſt tortures. Proud and cruel nation! Every thing muſt be yours, and at your diſpoſal? You are to preſcribe to us, with whom we ſhall make war, with whom we ſhall make peace? You are to ſet us bounds, to ſhut us up within hills and rivers; but *you*, you are not to obſerve the limits which yourſelves have fixed [d]? *Paſs not the* IBERUS. What next? *Touch not the* SAGUNTINES; SAGUNTUM [e] *is upon the* IBERUS; *move not a ſtep towards that city.* It is a ſmall matter then, that you have deprived us of our ancient poſſeſſions, *Sicily* and *Sardinia*; you would have *Spain* too? Well, we ſhall yield *Spain*; and then—you will paſs into *Africa*. *Will* paſs did I ſay?—This very year they ordered one of their Conſuls into *Africa*, the other into *Spain*. No, Soldiers, there is nothing left for us but what we can vindicate with our ſwords. Come on then. Be men. The *Romans* may with more ſafety be cowards; they have their own country behind them, have places of refuge to fly to, and are ſecure from danger in the roads thither: But for *you* there is no middle fortune between death and victory. Let this be but well fixed in your minds, and once again I ſay, *you are* CONQUERORS."

[c] *Livy*'s Expreſſion is, *Generoſiſſimarum gentium equites frænatos & infrænatos*, horſemen that ride with bridles, and thoſe that ride without bridles, by the latter meaning the *Numidians*, who had no bridles nor ſaddles to their horſes, and who in action reſembled the modern *Huſſars*.

[d] By the words which *Livy* here puts into the mouth of *Hannibal*, it is plain, that the *Saguntines* were not included at firſt in the treaty with *Aſdrubal*; that this treaty only reſtrained the *Carthaginians* from paſſing the *Iberus*, as *Polybius* declares; and that the alliance of the *Romans* with the *Saguntines* was poſterior to it, and a real infraction of it. See pag. 116, 117.

[e] *Hannibal*, the more to incenſe his hearers againſt the *Romans*, makes theſe aſſert an impudent falſhood, *that* Saguntum *is upon the* Iberus.

Livy

Livy reports, that *Hannibal*, further to animate his men, aſſured them, that they ſhould have every one of them lands in property, either in *Africa*, *Spain*, or *Italy*, or elſe an equivalent in money, if they preferred money. And theſe aſſurances he ratified in form. Taking a flint in one hand, and holding a lamb with the other, he ſaid, *Great* JUPITER, *and all ye Gods, if I do not perform my promiſe, ſlay me as I do this lamb!* at which words he broke with the flint the ſkull of the lamb; a ſolemnity which much augmented the confidence of his troops. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J.C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 21. c. 45.

The next day the two armies advanced towards each other along the *Ticin*, on that ſide of it which is next the *Alps*, the *Romans* having the river on their left, the *Carthaginians* the ſame river on their right. The day following each army receiving intelligence by it's foragers that the enemy was near, encamped in the place where it then was. The third, *Scipio* with his cavalry and light armed foot marching forward to diſcover the ſtrength and ſituation of the *Carthaginians*; and *Hannibal*, with his cavalry only, coming on with the like intention, they ſoon perceived each other's approach by the duſt they raiſed in the plain, and thereupon immediately prepar'd for battle. The *Roman* General ſent before him his *Gallic* horſe, aſſiſted by his dartmen to begin the fight, he himſelf with the reſt of his cavalry in one line following ſlowly in good order. The *Gauls* behaved themſelves couragiouſly, but the foot, that ſhould have aided them, ſhrunk at the firſt onſet, or rather fled cowardly through the intervals of the ſquadrons without caſting a dart, fearing to be trodden down by the enemy's horſe. Nevertheleſs the *Gauls* maintained the fight, as preſuming they ſhould be well ſuſtained by the *Roman* Horſe behind them. Nor did the Conſul neglect his part, but hazarded his perſon ſo far, that he received a dangerous wound, and had been left upon the place, if his ſon [f], a meer youth (afterwards the great *Africanus*) had not, by a ſurpriſing effort of courage, brought him off. Whilſt the *Romans* were buſied in aſſiſting their Conſul, an unexpected ſtorm came driving at their backs, and obliged them to look to their own preſervation. For *Hannibal* had ordered his *Numidians*, who were in the wings, to wheel and give upon the *Romans* in flank and rear, while he with his *Spaniſh* and other horſe ſuſtained their charge in front. The *Numidians* performed their inſtructions, and having firſt cut in pieces the ſcattered foot that had run away at the beginning of the action, fell inſtantly upon the backs of the *Roman* cavalry, who by this impreſſion were intirely broken and forced to betake themſelves to their ſpeed, leaving to their enemies the honour of the day. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 65.

Scipio the night following decamped ſecretly, and marched with expedition over the plains to the *Po*, which he now repaſſed, retiring to c. 66.

[f] So *Livy* is inclined to believe, with the greater number of authors; but adds, that *Celius* the hiſtorian gives the honour of the Conſul's reſcue to a *Ligurian* ſlave.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p. the [g] neighbourhood of *Placentia*. For he thought it not ſafe, wounded as he was, to ſtay in a flat open country, with an enemy ſo near, that was much ſuperior to him in horſe. *Hannibal*, who had expected to have an engagement with the enemies infantry, no ſooner learn'd that the *Romans* were retired, but he followed them as far as to their bridge [h] upon the *Ticin*. Here he ſurprized and made priſoners 600 men who had been left behind to deſtroy the bridge ſo ſoon as the army ſhould be paſſed. The work was however effected; the boats which had compoſed the bridge being looſed from one another were floating down the ſtream; which *Hannibal* perceiving, and hearing alſo that the *Romans* were far advanced in their march, he immediately turned back, went down the *Ticin*, and then up along the banks of the *Po*, to find a convenient place where he might lay a bridge of boats over this river. After two

[g] *Livy* ſays, that *Scipio* retired to *Placentia*; which if true, *Placentia* muſt have had a different ſituation from what it has now, and muſt have been, not on the *eaſt* but the *weſt* ſide of the *Trebia*. For we find, that *Scipio, after this firſt retreat*, paſſed the *Trebia* to get further from *Hannibal*. *Polybius*'s words import no more than that the *Romans* retired to *the neighbourhood* of *Placentia*, περὶ πόλιν Πλακεντίαν.

* See *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 74.

[h] *Livy*, who, in this part of his hiſtory, plainly borrows from *Polybius*, ſeems to have miſunderſtood him with regard to the *Bridge*, at which *Hannibal* is ſaid to have arrived in his purſuit of the *Romans*. The Latin Hiſtorian makes it to be their *bridge over the* Po, as if they had no river to paſs in their way to the *Po*; which, if true, we muſt ſay, that the battle was fought on the *eaſt ſide* of the *Ticin*, the ſide towards *Placentia:* For *Polybius* expreſly affirms that *Scipio* at the head of the battle had the *Ticin to his left*, and *Hannibal* the ſame river to his right. Yet, that the battle was fought on the *weſt* ſide of the *Ticin*, we have *Livy*'s own authority. He makes *Scipio*'s march, in order to meet *Hannibal*, to have been *from* Placentia *to that river*, over which he paſſed by a bridge, before he gave battle to the *Carthaginian*. *Ponte perfecto traductus Romanus exercitus in agrum Inſubrium*, B. 21. c. 45. And in this he does not diſagree with *Polybius*. Now, if the battle was fought on the *weſt* bank of the *Ticin*, and *Scipio* had this river *to his left*, it is evident that the *Carthaginians* were between him and the *Po*, and that he could not ſteal a march to the *Po* (in the way to *Placentia*) without firſt repaſſing the *Ticin*; which *Hannibal* muſt alſo have croſſed in the purſuit of his enemy to the *Po*. But not one word is any where ſaid of *Hannibal*'s paſſing, or attempting to paſs, the *Ticin*.

B. 21. c. 39.

The bridge therefore to which *Hannibal* came, in purſuit of the *Romans*, muſt have been their bridge over the *Ticin*; at the entrance of which, according to *Livy*, *Scipio* had raiſed a fort and placed a guard. And it was this guard which *Hannibal* ſurpriſed.

The reaſon which *Polybius* aſſigns for *Hannibal*'s turning back, when he came to the broken bridge, is the *diſtance* of the enemy: He heard that the *Romans* were got a great way off (too far to be overtaken.) This furniſhes another proof, that the river in queſtion was the *Ticin* and not the *Po*. For as he had determined to paſs the *Po* with all expedition, how could he find a more convenient time to lay his bridge, than when he had no enemies to oppoſe him? But the *diſtance* of the enemy was a good reaſon why he ſhould not lay a bridge over the *Ticin*; ſince this would be only loſs of time and labour, and could not in the leaſt further his intention of paſſing the *Po*, or coming up with the *Romans*. And what neceſſity could he be under of ſpending two days (as *Livy* ſays he did) in ſearch of a convenient place to lay a bridge over the *Po*, if he was already at that very place where the *Romans* had laid their bridge over that river. Chevalier *Folard*'s tranſlator of *Polybius*, underſtands him as *Livy* does. Yet the chevalier, in his comment, regardleſs of his text, ſpeaks of the bridge in queſtion, as the bridge over the *Ticin*, tom. 4. p. 129.

days

days march, a proper place being found, and the bridge formed, he ordered *Aſdrubal* to lead over the army, while he himſelf was employed in giving audience to ambaſſadors come to him from the *Gauls* of the neighbouring countries, who, after his ſucceſs at the *Ticin*, retaining their firſt deſign, now offered to join their forces to his, and to furniſh him with whatever he wanted. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

When the army was all paſſed, the *Carthaginian* took his march down the river, and at the end of the ſecond day came within view of the *Romans*. The third, he drew up his forces in *battalia*, in the face of the enemy: But finding his challenge not accepted, he retired and pitch'd his camp about ſix miles from them.

At this time certain *Gauls*, to the number of 2000 foot and 200 horſe, who ſerved in the Conſul's camp, obſerving the fortunate ſtate of *Hannibal*'s affairs, plotted together to deſert to him. After ſupper they retired to their tents, and there kept quiet till towards day-break; but then, having ſuddenly armed themſelves, they fell upon the ſleeping *Romans*, who lay neareſt to them, ſlew a great number and wounded many others, after which they fled out of the camp, carrying with them to *Hannibal* the heads of thoſe they had ſlain. The *Carthaginian* received theſe traitors kindly, exhorted them to continue their zeal, and promiſed them rewards proportionable to their ſervices; but diſtruſting perhaps their fidelity, he did not enrol them among his troops, but diſmiſſed them to their reſpected towns and villages, that they might publiſh among their countrymen the ſucceſs of his arms, and exhort them to enter into alliance with him. There was in truth little need, for that end, of the exhortations of theſe emiſſaries, whoſe recent treachery alone ſufficed to put the reſt of the *Boii* under a neceſſity of ſiding with the *Carthaginian*. A party of them at this very juncture, brought to *Hannibal*'s camp the three *Roman* commiſſioners, whom, contrary to faith given, they had ſeized at a conference (as was before mentioned) and they put them into his hands. *Hannibal*, after many kind words and promiſes to theſe *Gauls*, made a treaty with them, and then reſtored to them the three captives, whom he adviſed them to keep under ſtrict guard, and to make uſe of (as they had at firſt propoſed) to recover their hoſtages from the *Romans*. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 67.

Scipio alarmed at the bloody treaſon of his *Gallic* deſerters, and not doubting but the *Gauls* in general would quickly declare themſelves in favour of *Hannibal*, thought it adviſeable to retire into a country where the friendſhip of the inhabitants was more to be depended upon. He decamped therefore about three hours after midnight, to paſs the *Trebia*[1], and take poſt upon the eminencies near that river, where he believed the enemy would not have the boldneſs to attack him. *Hannibal*, upon notice of this motion of the *Romans*, detached his *Numidian* cavalry after them, c. 68.

[1] A ſmall river running northward into the *Po* near *Placentia*.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217 234 Conſul-p

he himſelf ſoon following with the reſt of the army. The *Numidians*, finding the *Roman* camp deſerted, ſtopt to ſet fire to it, a delay very fortunate to the *Romans*, who, had they been overtaken in the plain, and before they had got their baggage over the river, would have been extremely embarraſſed. But when the *Numidians* came up, the main body of the Conſul's army, together with the baggage, had already paſſed the ſtream. There remained on the other ſide ſome of his rear guard only, of which the enemy ſlew a part and took the reſt priſoners.

The Conſul having fortified himſelf in his new camp, reſolved to wait there the arrival of his collegue *Sempronius* with the troops from *Sicily*, and, in the mean time, to attend carefully to the cure of his wound, that he might be in a condition to act, when, after the junction of the two armies, a favourable opportunity ſhould preſent. *Hannibal* advanced, and pitched his camp about five miles from that of the Conſul, the *Trebia* running between them. Great numbers of *Gauls* from the circumjacent country flocked to the *Carthaginian*, and ſupplied him abundantly with arms and proviſions.

CHAP. XIX.

The Battle of the TREBIA.

Hannibal *paſſes over the* Apennines *into* Hetruria.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 68.

WHEN the news came to *Rome* of the action upon the *Ticin*, though the publick expectation was much diſappointed by the ill ſucceſs, yet they endeavoured to account for it by reaſons that would leave no diſcouragement upon their minds. Some imputed the misfortune to raſhneſs in the Conſul, ſtimulated by too eager a deſire of fighting: others to perfidy in the *Gauls* of his army, whom they ſuppoſed to have deſignedly ſuffered themſelves to be vanquiſhed; a conjecture founded on the ſubſequent treachery of ſome of their countrymen: and as the *Roman* infantry remained unbroken, no danger to the republick was yet apprehended, from a defeat which the horſe alone had ſuſtained. The arrival of *Sempronius*, from *Sicily*, at *Ariminum*, with his legions, confirm'd this confidence. It was imagined that when theſe had joined the forces of *Scipio*, the very appearance of ſo powerful an army would alone be ſufficient to put the *Carthaginians* to flight.

Sempronius marched with all diligence from *Ariminum* to join his collegue. Having pitched his camp near him, and refreſhed his legions, which had been fatigued by their voyage[k] and march from *Lylibæum*, to

[k] *Livy* ſends the troops of *Sempronius*, all the way from *Lilybæum* to *Ariminum*, by ſea. *Polybius* repreſents them traverſing the city of *Rome*, and marching from thence to *Ariminum*.

Ariminum,

Ariminum, which took up forty days, he gave orders to get all things ready for battle. While theſe preparations were going forward, he made frequent viſits to *Scipio*, enquiring of him all the circumſtances of the late action upon the *Ticin*, and conſulting with him upon future meaſures. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul p.

In the mean time *Hannibal* found means to get poſſeſſion of *Claſtidium*, a ſmall town on the confines of *Liguria*, where the *Romans* had formed a magazine of arms and proviſions. To give an impreſſion of his clemency, and engage more of his enemies to have recourſe to it, he treated the gariſon with all gentleneſs. And as the governor had betrayed the place to him, he moſt richly rewarded him, in hopes thereby to allure other officers intruſted by the *Romans* to the like treachery. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 69.

Soon after this, having notice that certain *Gauls* who inhabited between the *Trebia* and the *Po*, and who had made alliance with him, continued nevertheleſs (that they might have a refuge in all events) to hold a ſecret correſpondence with the enemy, he detached 2000 foot and 1000 horſe to pillage and lay waſte their lands. His orders were punctually executed, and the booty proved conſiderable; the plundered *Gauls* flocking to the *Roman* entrenchments to aſk ſuccour.

Sempronius, who had impatiently waited an occaſion of fighting, ſeized this pretext. He ſent out the greater part of his cavalry with a thouſand light armed foot, who expeditiouſly paſſing the *Trebia*, attack'd the pillagers that were carrying off the booty, put them to flight, and obliged them to retire within their intrenchments. But a vigorous ſally being made from thence, the purſuers were repulſed, and obliged in their turn, to fly to their camp. Hereupon *Sempronius* put all his cavalry and all his light arm'd troops in motion, ſo that the enemy were once more forced to retire. *Hannibal*, who was not prepared for a general action, and who thought it not the part of a prudent commander, to hazard one lightly, and without a premeditated deſign, contented himſelf with ſtopping the flight of his men, and making them face about. He forbad them by his officers, and by his trumpets, either to charge or purſue the enemy; who after they had continued ſome time upon the place, retreated to their camp.

The loſs of men had not been very conſiderable on either ſide; but as the *Romans* had loſt fewer than the *Carthaginians*, *Sempronius*, much elated with this trivial advantage, could think of nothing now but a deciſive action. Nevertheleſs, he continued to obſerve the decency of adviſing with his collegue. *Scipio*'s opinion was, that in prudence they ought to avoid fighting, till the troops, having been trained and exerciſed during the winter, might more reaſonably be depended upon than at preſent: He added, that the *Gauls* were naturally too fickle and inconſtant, to keep long in friendſhip with the *Carthaginian*, and would infallibly turn againſt him, if they found him out of a condition to enterpriſe any thing of importance; and he therefore intreated *Sempronius* to c. 70.

Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul. p. lay aſide, for ſome time, all thoughts of a *general battle*; an occaſion, in which (he modeſtly added) he himſelf, when his wound was healed, might perhaps be of ſome uſe. *Sempronius* could not but be ſenſible, that this advice was judicious; but his paſſion to diſtinguiſh himſelf overpowering his reaſon, and begetting a confidence of ſucceſs, he, notwithſtanding the repeated remonſtrances of his collegue, bent his whole mind to bring on a general action, as ſoon as poſſible; that ſo neither *Scipio*'s cure, nor the election of new conſuls (the time for which drew near) might prevent his acquiring the ſole glory of finiſhing the war. And thus, ſays *Polybius*, as he conſidered not what was ſeaſonable for the publick, but for himſelf, it was impoſſible but he muſt take wrong meaſures.

Hannibal formed the ſame judgment as *Scipio* upon the ſituation of things, and was therefore no leſs deſirous than *Sempronius* of coming to a deciſive battle without delay. He was well aware of his preſent advantages in the favourable diſpoſition of the *Gauls* to him, the inexperience of the *Roman* troops, and the inability of *Scipio* to be in the action: But his ſtrongeſt motive was the neceſſity an invader is under of being almoſt inceſſantly active, and of performing repeated exploits, if he would preſerve to himſelf the eſteem, and keep alive the hopes of his confederates.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 71. The *Carthaginian* had viewed and fully examined the ground between the two armies. It was an open plain, through which ran a winding rivulet. The banks of this ſmall ſtream being pretty high, and alſo thick ſet with buſhes and brambles, *Hannibal* perceived that it was eaſy, not only for foot, but even for horſemen to be there conceal'd. Having imparted to his chief officers the deſign he had formed, and finding it univerſally approved, he after ſupper ſent for his brother *Mago*, a young man of great ſpirit and a good ſoldier, and directed him to chooſe out a hundred horſe and a hundred foot of the braveſt men in the army, and to bring them before night to his tent. This done, and the general having exhorted the two hundred to behave themſelves gallantly in the poſt he ſhould aſſign them, he bid each man go and chooſe out of the corps to which he belonged, nine others, ſuch as he knew to be the ſtouteſt ſoldiers in it, and then to repair to him at a certain place in the camp. The whole number came, a thouſand horſe, and a thouſand foot. He furniſh'd them with guides, and under the conduct of his brother, to whom he ſignified the time when they ſhould fall upon the enemy, ſent them to the place he had choſen for the ambuſh.

The next morning, at day break, he aſſembled his *Numidian* cavalry, a hardy people inured to fatigue; and when he had promiſed ample rewards to every one that ſhould diſtinguiſh himſelf in the diſcharge of his duty, he ordered them inſtantly to paſs the *Trebia*, brave the enemy in their camp, ſkirmiſh with them if they ſallied out, and, in ſkirmiſhing, retire and repaſs the river.

Hannibal's

Hannibal's view in making this movement ſo early in the morning, was to provoke the *Romans* to an engagement while they were yet faſting, thoughtleſs of fighting, and unprepared for it. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

Sempronius no ſooner ſaw the *Numidians* approach, but he ſent out his cavalry to attack them. The cavalry were followed by 6000 dartmen; and the general himſelf not long after came out of his entrenchment with all the reſt of his army. His numerous forces, and the light advantage he had gained the day before made him vain enough to think, that there needed little more than his appearance in the field to ſecure the victory. c. 72.

It was yet winter, it ſnowed, the weather was extremely cold, and the ſoldiers had begun their march before they had eaten any thing to ſuſtain them. And therefore, though they moved forward briſkly at firſt, and with an eager deſire of fighting, yet when they came to ford the river, which being ſwelled by the rain of the night before, was breaſt-high, they began to ſhrink; and when they had waded through it (the day being then pretty far advanced) they found themſelves extremely pinched and weakened both with cold and hunger: Whereas on the other hand the *Carthaginians* had, by *Hannibal*'s order, taken a good repaſt in their tents, rubbed themſelves with oil, and put on their arms before the fire.

When *Hannibal* perceived that the *Romans* had paſſed the *Trebia*, which was the favourable moment he had waited for, he inſtantly ſent out, to the ſuccour of his *Numidians*, the ſlingers of the *Baleares*, and his other light armed infantry, to the number of 8000; after which he led forth his main army. His foot conſiſted of 20000 men, *Gauls*, *Spaniards*, and *Africans*. His cavalry, including the *Gauls* his allies, amounted to above 10000. He drew up the whole horſe and foot, in one line, about a mile from his camp, poſting the horſe on the wings. His elephants he placed before the points of his body of infantry.

In the mean time, *Sempronius* by a ſignal called off his cavalry that were fatiguing themſelves to little purpoſe againſt the *Numidians*. For it was the cuſtom of theſe to attack briſkly; then on a ſudden break their ranks, turn their backs and fly; and preſently after return to the charge in as good order, and with as much boldneſs as at firſt: A manner of fighting, which being intirely new to the *Roman* cavalry, perplexed and diſconcerted them.

The Conſul's infantry conſiſted of [1] 16000 *Roman* legionaries, and 20000 foot of the allies. He formed his battle after the uſual manner of the *Romans*, the infantry in three lines, and the horſe, amounting to 4000, upon the wings. In this order he advanced ſlowly towards the enemy. The light armed troops on both ſides began the action, much to the advan- c. 73.

[1] *Livy* ſays 18000. He adds, that the Conſul's army was ſtrengthened by a body of the *Cenomani*, the only nation of the *Gauls* that continued faithful to the *Romans*.

tage

V. of *R.* 535 Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p.

tage of the *Carthaginians*: for the dartmen of the *Romans*, having ſuffered cold and hunger ever ſince the morning, and having ſpent the moſt of their darts againſt the *Numidians*, were by no means a match for thoſe of *Hannibal*, who had but juſt left their camp well armed, freſh and vigorous.

When theſe ſkirmiſhing troops had retired through the intervals of the reſpective armies to which they belonged, a general charge enſued. The *Roman* cavalry being ſoon routed and driven from their ground by the ſuperior numbers of the *Carthaginians*, left the wings of their infantry expoſed to be attacked in flank. The *Numidians* who had been employed to provoke the battle, and the light armed troops who had begun it, were ready on the part of *Hannibal* for this ſervice, having, after their retreat, poſted themſelves to the right and left behind the *Carthaginian* cavalry; falling furiouſly therefore on the two wings of the *Roman* infantry in flank, they put them into great diſorder, and diſabled them from defending themſelves againſt the elephants, that attacked them in front. Theſe wings utterly broken and put to flight were chaſed into the river.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 74.

At the ſame time the 2000 men, who had lain in ambuſh in the brock beforementioned, came out, and fell upon the rear of the *Roman* legions in the center, which cauſed a terrible confuſion there. The foremoſt ranks of this center were the only troops of the Conſul's army that could keep their ground. They fought a long time with undaunted bravery againſt the heavy armed forces of the enemy, and at length, urged by neceſſity, broke their way through them with great ſlaughter. But ſeeing that their wings were defeated, and not thinking themſelves able either to ſuccour them, or to return to their camp, by reaſon of the enemies numerous horſe and the river that were in the way, they formed themſelves into a cloſe compact body, to the number of 10000, and took the direct road to *Placentia*. Hither they retreated without the leaſt danger, or oppoſition; and they were followed by all thoſe of the rout, horſe and foot, that could eſcape out of the field, without paſſing the river. Of the remainder of the *Roman* army, ſome had the good fortune to get ſafely over the ſtream to their camp; but the greater part periſhed on the banks of it, either trodden down by the elephants or ſlain by the horſe. The *Carthaginians* purſued the enemy no farther than to the river, which the rigour of the ſeaſon reſtrained them from paſſing. They returned to their intrenchments. Their victory was complete, and their loſs inconſiderable. A few only of the *Africans* and *Spaniards* remain'd upon the field; the *Gauls* ſuffered moſt. Yet after this victory the *Carthaginians*, through the inclemency of the weather, loſt a great number both of men and horſes; and of the elephants all died but one [m].

As

[m] *Livy*, B. 21. c. 58. ſpeaks of ſeven elephants, that, after this time, periſhed of cold, in a fruitleſs attempt which *Hannibal* made to paſs the *Apennines*, being forced back from the top of thoſe hills by a hurricane. The ſame author relates a battle

As for the Conſul *Scipio*, and thoſe that were with him, they ſtole away from their camp, the very night after the battle, croſſed the *Trebia* upon boats or upon rafts, and got ſafe to *Placentia*; the enemy either not perceiving their flight, or not being able to purſue them, for cold and wearineſs. Y. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul-p. *Livy* B. 21. c. 56.

Sempronius, to conceal the ſhame of his defeat, ſent meſſengers to *Rome*, whoſe tidings imported only, that there had been a battle, and that the ſeverity of the weather had ſnatched the victory out of his hands. This report paſſed currently at firſt, but the true ſituation of affairs was quickly known; that the *Roman* forces had been utterly vanquiſhed; that the rout had fled to the neighbouring colonies for refuge; that *Scipio* after his flight to *Placentia*, not to ruin that place by keeping too great a number of ſoldiers there, had croſſed the *Po* with his part of the army, and retired to *Cremona*; that the troops had no proviſions but what were brought by ſea and up the *Po*; and laſtly, that all the nations of the *Gauls* had declared for *Hannibal*. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 75. *Liv.* B. 21. c. 56.

The people of *Rome* were yet in their firſt fright and conſternation at all this bad news, when *Sempronius* himſelf, after eſcaping many dangers from the enemies cavalry that were diſperſed, in parties, over the country, arrived in the city. His buſineſs was to hold the Comitia by centuries, for electing new Conſuls.

Notwithſtanding the late diſaſters and the preſent diſtreſs, party favour had a greater ſhare in the elections, than a due regard to the exigencies of the ſtate. For (with *Cn. Servilius*) was raiſed to the Conſulate *C. Flaminius*, a raſh hot-headed man, who, when in the ſame ſtation ſix years before, had ſignalized himſelf by his diſobedience to the ſenate, and his contempt of religion. His merit with the people, and what now procured him the faſces, was his having been the only man of the *Conſcript Fathers*, that aſſiſted in promoting a law, which enacted, that no Senator nor father of a Senator ſhould have a ſhip at ſea, carrying above eight ton or thereabouts. A veſſel of that burden was thought ſufficient for tranſporting to *Rome* the produce of any man's lands; and it was intended by this law to confine commerce to the *Plebeians*. See p. 96. and 97. *Livy*, B. 21. c. 63.

Sempronius's year not being yet expired, he immediately after the elections returned to his winter quarters at *Placentia*.

The ſenate provided for the next campaign. They made new levies amongſt the allies, ordered troops into *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, put garriſons into *Tarentum*, and other places where they were moſt wanted, and ſent proviſions to *Ariminum* and into *Hetruria*; through which country the army was to march againſt *Hannibal*. They alſo diſpatched ambaſſadors to aſk aſſiſtance of King *Hiero*, who furniſhed them with 500 *Cretan* *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 75.

battle that preſently followed *Hannibal*'s return into the plains, and was terminated by the night's coming on, when there had been no great ſlaughter on either ſide. *Polybius* ſays nothing of all this, and there is nothing of probability in the ſtory, but a good deal of poetry.

archers,

A. of *R.* 535. Bef. *J. C.* 217. 234 Conſul p.

archers, and 1000 other light armed ſoldiers. And leſt the *Carthaginians* ſhould from *Africa* attempt to land troops in *Italy*, they equipt ſixty quinqueremes to guard the coaſt. In a word, they omitted nothing that was neceſſary for carrying on the war with the utmoſt vigour, it being the peculiar character of the *Romans*, ſays *Polybius*, that they are then moſt to be feared when they are moſt afraid.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 76.

On the ſide of *Spain* all was ſafe; for in that country during the late unfortunate campaign in *Italy*, the arms of the republic, under the conduct of *Cn. Scipio*, had proſpered beyond expectation. He had entirely defeated *Hanno* *, the *Carthaginian* General, and reduced almoſt all the nations between the *Iberus* and the *Pyrenees*, to the obedience of *Rome*.

* See p. 118

Livy. B. 21. c. 57.

As for *Hannibal* he did not remain unactive after his victory at the *Trebia*. Wounded and repulſed in an attack upon one town belonging to the *Romans*, he aſſaulted and took another called *Victumviæ*, in *Inſubria*, and gave it up to be plundered by the ſoldiers.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 78.

The *Carthaginian*, during his winter quarters among the *Gauls*, with whoſe levity he was well acquainted, and who, he feared, might repent of their newly contracted alliance with him, is ſaid to have put in practiſe ſome of his *Punic* arts, to preſerve himſelf from their ſnares. He not only wore falſe hair, but at different times the habits of different ages, frequently changing his dreſs in order to diſguiſe himſelf. And becauſe the *Gauls* were extremely diſſatisfied that their country continued to be the ſeat of the war, and were impatiently deſirous (from a hatred, as they pretended, to the *Romans*, but in truth, from an eagerneſs to enrich themſelves with plunder) of being led into the territories of the allies of *Rome*, he reſolved to paſs as ſoon as poſſible over the *Apennines* into *Hetruria*. Juſt before he entered upon this expedition, he aſſembled all his captives that were of the *Roman* allies, and when he had aſſured them that he was come into *Italy*, not as their enemy, but

c. 77.

their friend, to reſtore them to liberty and to the poſſeſſion of the towns which the *Romans* had taken from them; and when he had exhorted them to join with him in the common cauſe, and to engage their countrymen to do the ſame, he diſmiſſed them all without ranſom.

c. 78.

After this, having made enquiry about the ſeveral roads into *Hetruria*, he learnt that there was one much ſhorter than any of the reſt, but very difficult to paſs, as it led through marſhy grounds; the other roads more eaſy, but known to the enemy, and in their poſſeſſion. *Hannibal*, for theſe reaſons, or perhaps becauſe he had naturally a turn for thoſe dangerous enterpriſes, which are apt to raiſe mens admiration of a general, and ſtrike his enemies with terror, choſe the difficult road,

Liv. B. 22. c. 2.

which was now render'd more ſo by the overflowing of the *Arnus*. Having paſſed the *Apennines*, he enter'd the marſhes. His *Africans*

Polyb. B. 3. c.

and *Spaniards*, who were inured to this ſort of fatigue, and who marched firſt, went into the water without heſitation, and kept their order. The *Gauls* had more difficulty (the way being made much worſe by the multitudes

multitudes of men and beaſts of burthen that had gone before them) and many of them were killed with the fatigue: for to add to the diſtreſs, they were obliged to march thus in mire and water four days together, with but very little ſleep, ſuch as they could get lying upon their baggage, or upon the beaſts which had carried it, and had periſhed in the mud. *Hannibal* himſelf was not without his ſhare of the inconveniencies of this march, for though he rode upon an elephant (the only one remaining) his continual watchings, and the unwholeſom damps, brought ſuch a defluxion upon his eyes that he loſt one of them. When he was come out of the marſhes, he halted for ſome days that he might refreſh his army, and enquire into the ſituation of the country, the ſtrength and deſigns of the enemy, and the character and diſpoſition of their General. c. 80.

CHAP. XX.

SECOND YEAR of the War.

The BATTLE *of the Lake* THRASYMENUS.

Fabius Maximus Cunctator *is ſent againſt* Hannibal; *who deceives him by a very ſingular ſtratagem.*

Tranſactions in Spain.

FLAMINIUS, as was before obſerved, had obtained the conſulſhip by the favour of the people, contrary to the inclinations of the Senate. Being apprehenſive that the augurs, influenced by his enemies, would, to render his election invalid, pretend ſome defect in the auſpices, he took a bold unprecedented ſtep, left *Rome*, without performing the uſual ceremonies of religion, went ſtrait to *Ariminum* (where he had ordered the army to rendezvous) and was there inveſted in the conſulate. The Senate, highly offended at this proceeding, ſent two of their body to recal him to *Rome*, that he might perform thoſe ceremonies which he had deſpiſed. But the Conſul paid no regard to their orders. At the head of four legions (two of which he received from *Sempronius*, and the other two from the Prætor *Atilius*) he croſſed the *Apennines*, and encamped his army under the walls of *Aretium* in *Hetruria*; and there he ſtill was when *Hannibal* came out of the marſhes. Y. of *R*. 536. Bef. *J*. *C*. 216. 235 Conſul-p. *Liv*. B. 21. c. 63.

The *Carthaginian* having learnt that *Flaminius*'s chief talent was haranguing the people, in whoſe aſſemblies he was a leading man, but that he wanted the ſkill for conducting a war, was of a haſty diſpoſition, eaſy to be inflamed, and confident of his own abilities, did not *Polyb*. B. 3. c. 80. 82.

Y. of *R.* 536 Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul-p.

doubt but he ſhould be able, by provoking his high ſpirit, to lead him whitherſoever he pleaſed. With this view, having put his army in march, he laid waſte, before the Conſul's eyes, the fertile fields of *Hetruria*, and in ſeeming contempt of him, paſſed by his camp at *Aretium*, and advanced nearer to *Rome*, as if he intended to carry on his devaſtations to the walls of the capital. *Flaminius* beheld the lands of *Cortona* (one of the moſt conſiderable cities of *Hetruria*) in a flame behind him. Enrag'd at being thus inſulted by *Hannibal*, he immediately called a council of war, but would not liſten to his officers who adviſed him to continue in his camp till he was joined by his collegue, and in the mean time content himſelf with ſending out ſtrong parties to hinder the enemy from ravaging the country. He ruſhed out from the council in great wrath, and gave orders for marching. And when word was brought him, that one of the ſtandards ſtuck ſo faſt in the ground that they could not pull it out, he aſked the meſſenger whether he had not likewiſe brought letters from the Senate forbidding him to fight. He added, *ſince fear has not left the ſoldiers ſtrength enough in their hands to pull up the ſtandard, bid them dig it up.* He then began his march with a full reſolution to fight *Hannibal* as ſoon as he could overtake him. And though his officers were greatly diſſatisfied, yet the common ſoldiers applauded the confidence of their General, who to ſuch an extravagant height had raiſed the hopes of the vulgar, that an immenſe number of them followed the camp in expectation of booty, and went loaded with chains for the multitudes of enemies that were to be taken priſoners.

Liv. B. 22. c. 4.

c. 3.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 82.

Hannibal was purſuing his march in the way towards *Rome*, having the lake *Thraſymenus* (now *Lago di Perugia*) cloſe on his right, and the town of *Cortona* at ſome diſtance on his left, when, he learnt that the Conſul was following him. Upon this advice, he turned his thoughts to ſeek out a convenient ſpot of ground where he might draw the enemy into an ambuſcade. Nor was it long before he found a place fit for his purpoſe. He came to a valley, which, extending lengthways from the lake to a hill very ſteep and difficult of acceſs, was lined on the two ſides by ridges of little hills. Upon the ſteep hill *Hannibal* poſted himſelf with his *Africans* and *Spaniards* in open view. Behind the ridge of hills, on the right of the valley, he placed in a long line the *Baleares* and other light armed infantry; and behind that on the leſt, his cavalry and the *Gauls*, who formed a line, the extremity of which reached to a narrow paſs, whereby he had entered the valley. Theſe diſpoſitions being made in the beginning of the night, he continued the remaining part of it in quiet and ſilence in his camp.

It was late before the Conſul arrived at the lake, he therefore encamped that night by the ſide of it. But next morning by break of day, without examining the ground, he marched into the valley through the paſs before mentioned. As ſoon as *Hannibal* was appriſed that the *Roman* army were entered, and that their vanguard was not far from him, he gave orders

orders for a general onſet. So thick a fog from the lake at this time covered the valley, that the *Romans* found themſelves attacked in front, flank and rear, almoſt before they ſaw the enemy. Many of them were ſlain in the order of their march, not having had time to form themſelves for battle: and ſo cloſely was the greater part hemm'd in, that they could neither fight nor fly[a]. Fifteen thouſand were ſlaughtered in the valley, among whom was the Conſul *Flaminius*. Great numbers being puſhed into the lake periſhed there. A body of ſix thouſand men forced their way through the enemy. Could thoſe brave legionaries have ſeen (ſays *Polybius*) what paſſed, they might, by facing about, and falling upon the backs of the *Carthaginians*, have given a turn to the fortune of the day. But they expecting to encounter new enemies, continued advancing on till they arrived at the ſummit of a hill: From which, when the fog was diſperſed, ſeeing the total defeat of the reſt of the army, they retreated to a neighbouring village. The *Carthaginian* General detached *Maharbal* after them with a large body of horſe and foot, to whom they ſurrendered next day upon a promiſe of their lives, and, if we may credit *Livy*, their liberties: Whence he takes occaſion to reproach *Hannibal* with breach of faith, becauſe when the next day he had aſſembled all his priſoners to the number of 15000, and had ſeparated the *Romans* from the other *Italians*, he delivered the former to his ſoldiers, to be kept in chains and releaſed only the latter. *Polybius* tells us, that *Hannibal* declared he did not think himſelf bound by the promiſe which *Maharbal* had made, as being without authority from him; but then according to the ſame hiſtorian, that promiſe was only of their lives, which, if true, *Hannibal* cannot on this occaſion be charg'd with breach of faith, whether he was in reality bound by *Maharbal*'s promiſe or not. The loſs on the ſide of the *Carthaginians* amounted only to 1500 men, moſt of them *Gauls*.

Y. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul. p.

Liv. B. 22. c. 6.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 83.

The firſt report of the defeat of the *Roman* army ſpread an unſpeakable conſternation in *Rome*. The people flocked in crowds to the forum, calling upon their magiſtrates to give them an account of the battle. It being impoſſible for theſe to conceal or diſguiſe the truth for any long time, the Prætor *Pomponius*, towards ſun-ſet, mounted the *roſtra*. All he ſaid was, *We are vanquiſhed in a great battle.* And the people, little accuſtomed to misfortunes in war, much leſs to hear their magiſtrates plainly and publicly own that they were conquered, could not bear this ſo heavy a calamity with patience and moderation. In this univerſal dejection the Senators alone preſerved their ſteadineſs. The Prætors aſſembled them, and kept them ſitting ſeveral days together from ſun-

[a] *Livy* and *Plutarch* tell us that this battle was fought with ſo much eagerneſs and fury on both ſides, that the combatants were not ſenſible of an earthquake, which happened during the engagement, and which ruined many cities in *Italy*, overturned mountains, and changed the courſe of rivers. *Livy* B. 22. c. 5. *Plut.* life of *Fabius*.

Y. of *R.* 536 Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul-p.

riſing to ſun-ſet. Before they came to any fixed reſolution in what manner to oppoſe the conqueror, they were alarmed with the news of a ſecond defeat. The Conſul *Servilius* having heard at *Ariminum* that *Flaminius* was following *Hannibal* with an intention to give him battle, had detached *C. Centenius* with 4000 horſe to ſtrengthen the *Roman* army. But this reinforcement had come too late. And *Hannibal*, after the action, hearing of *Centenius*'s approach, had ſent *Maharbal*, with the light armed foot, and part of the cavalry, to encounter him. Near 2000 *Romans* were killed in the engagement; the reſt fled to a riſing ground, but being inveſted by the enemy, were next day obliged to ſurrender.

It was thought by the Senate that the preſent exigency required a magiſtrate with dictatorial authority. Yet becauſe there was no precedent of the *people*'s naming a Dictator, and becauſe their only Conſul *Servilius*, to whom that nomination legally belonged, was abſent, and all communication between him and *Rome* cut off by the enemy, it was agreed that the Comitia ſhould create a magiſtrate, whoſe authority ſhould be ſuperior to the Conſular, but ſomewhat inferior to the Dictatorial; and that he ſhould be ſtiled Pro-Dictator. *Fabius Maximus* was the perſon pitched upon; and the only privilege he ſeems to have wanted of thoſe belonging to a Dictator was that of naming his General of the horſe. To this office the people appointed *M. Minucius Rufus*, a young man much in their favour. *Fabius* was a Senator diſtinguiſhed for the coolneſs of his temper, and the great caution with which he proceeded in all his actions. He was as wary and circumſpect in his conduct, as *Sempronius* and *Flaminius* had been raſh and impetuous. The Pro-Dictator began the exerciſe of his office by acts of religion. The Sybilline books were conſulted to know the cauſes of the preſent calamities; and the guardians of thoſe oracles declared, that the misfortunes of the republic were owing to the undue performance of a vow to *Mars*; that it ought to be repeated, and four new vows made to ſeveral Deities, beſides a dedication to Jupiter of all the pigs, lambs, kids and calves which ſhould be produced in one ſpring. This laſt required the authority of the people; the other were made by the proper magiſtrates. This done, *Fabius* and *Minutius* immediately applied themſelves to repair the fortifications of the city. They alſo poſted guards in proper places, cauſed the bridges over the rivers to be broke down, and ſent orders to the people all over the country through which it was thought *Hannibal* would paſs, to burn their houſes, deſtroy the fruits of the ground, and retire into places of ſtrength and ſafety.

Liv. B. 22. c. 8.

Before the Pro-Dictator took the field, he adviſed with the Senate concerning the troops that ſhould ſerve under him. They allotted him the army of *Servilius*, and decreed that he ſhould make what new levies he pleaſed, either at *Rome* or amongſt the allies. *Fabius* raiſed but two new legions, which having commanded to repair to *Tibur* upon the

the *Anio*, he ſet out for *Ocriculum*, a city of *Umbria*, there to meet the troops from *Ariminum* under the Conſul *Servilius*. Theſe forces he himſelf led to *Tibur*, where he was joined by the new recruits. And having been informed that a *Carthaginian* fleet had taken, near the coaſt of *Hetruria*, ſome *Roman* ſhips of burthen which were carrying proviſions to the army in *Spain*, he ſent the Conſul *Servilius* to equip with all diligence what veſſels were at *Rome* and *Oſtia*, and with them to take upon him the guard of the coaſt of *Italy*. After theſe regulations *Fabius* began his march towards *Hannibal*, in which he proceeded with great caution, carefully ſearching all the places through which the army was to paſs. Y. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul-p.

The *Carthaginian*, immediately after the defeat of *Centenius*, had led his army through *Umbria* and *Picenum* to the territory of *Adria*, a conſiderable town on the *Adriatic*, deſtroying the country wherever he paſſed, and putting to the ſword all the *Romans* he found in his way, that were able to bear arms; ſuch was his hatred to the *Roman* name. Here he halted for ſome time, becauſe the country abounded with good proviſions and ſtore of old wines, which ſerved to recruit the ſtrength of his exhauſted troops, who had contracted diſtempers from bad food, and the fatigues they had undergone. He armed his *Africans* after the *Roman* manner, out of the ſpoils he had taken from the enemy. And being now near the ſea, for the firſt time ſince his coming into *Italy*, he laid hold of the opportunity, and ſent to *Carthage* an account of his ſucceſs. Then having ravaged the territories of *Aſculum* and *Adria*, he proceeded to the countries of the *Prætutiani*, the *Marſi*, the *Marucini*, the *Peligni* and *Frentani*. Laſt of all he entered *Apulia*, and was laying waſte this country, when *Fabius* arrived and pitched his camp upon the hills near ° *Æce*, within ſix miles of him. *Hannibal* inſtantly led his army to the *Roman* entrenchments, and offered battle to the enemy. But the Pro-Dictator remaining quiet in his camp, the *Carthaginian*, after waiting ſome time, drew off his men, openly reproaching the *Romans*, (ſays *Livy*) that at length their martial ſpirit was broke, that the war was at an end, and that they plainly owned themſelves vanquiſhed. Nevertheleſs he was inwardly grieved to find he had to do with a General very different from *Sempronius* and *Flaminius*, and was much more afraid of *Fabius*'s prudence than his ſtrength: He had not yet try'd his conſtancy. To provoke him to battle he made frequent incurſions into the countries of the *Roman* allies, and deſtroyed them with fire and ſword; employing likewiſe all his arts by ſudden marches and counter-marches to enſnare him. All was to no purpoſe; he could neither ſurpriſe *Fabius*, nor make him leave his hills, where he kept himſelf continually on his guard againſt ſo active an enemy. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 86. *Livy* B. 22. c. 12. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 90.

° A town on the borders of *Apulia*.

V. of *R.* 536- Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conful-p

my. He did not ſuffer his ſoldiers to ſtir out of their camp, except in large bodies; he followed the *Carthaginians*, but at a conſiderable diſtance, becauſe he would on no account hazard a pitched battle; yet he had frequent ſkirmiſhes with the enemy, and intercepted ſuch parties of them as ventured too far from their camp. And indeed this was the ſureſt method to ruin *Hannibal*. The *Romans* were in no danger of wanting men or proviſions in their own country; whereas the *Carthaginian* could only ſubſiſt by pillage, and when his men dropped off, had but ſmall opportunities of recruiting. While the Pro-Dictator was thus baffling his enemy, he had the continual murmurs of his General of the horſe, and of his ſoldiers to contend with. *Minucius* being a favourite of the people, and ambitious of the chief command, openly accuſed *Fabius* of real cowardice concealed under the appearance of prudence. But neither the invectives of this ſeditious man, nor the freſh devaſtations of *Hannibal*, who paſſed over the *Apennines* into *Samnium*, could make him alter his wiſe meaſures.

The *Carthaginian* having ravaged *Samnium*, and taken the town of *Teleſia*, reſolved to penetrate into *Campania*, one of the fineſt countries in the world, and at the ſame time the moſt inacceſſible. Except on one ſide where it is bounded by the ſea, it is encompaſſed by a chain of high mountains through which there are but three paſſes, and thoſe very narrow and difficult. It was a bold ſtep in *Hannibal* to undertake this expedition in ſight of a *Roman* army commanded by an expert General; but he had his reaſons for it. He would thereby either force the enemy to a battle, or ſhew plainly to the neighbouring nations that he was maſter of all the open country; by which means he hoped to draw over ſome of the towns to his party, not one of which had hitherto fallen off from the republic. Add to this that the cities of *Campania* were the richeſt of any in *Italy*, and their trade the moſt conſiderable. *Hannibal* entered *Campania* by a paſs at the foot of mount * *Callicula* °, near the *Vulturnus*, and encamped on the banks of that river. *Fabius* was indeed ſurprized at the boldneſs of the *Carthaginian*, but *Minucius* and the reſt of the army, tranſported with rage at the being thus inſulted, impatiently demanded to be led to battle, inſomuch that the Pro-Dictator was forced to pretend the ſame eagerneſs to fight, and march with much greater expedition than uſual. But when he came near the enemy, he returned to his former conduct, encamped upon mount *Maſſicus*, and from thence quietly beheld the

* *Polyb.* calls it Eribanus.

° *Livy* tells us (B. 22. c. 13.) that *Hannibal* deſigned to enter *Campania* by a paſs near *Caſinum*, a town of *Latium*, beyond the *Liris*, becauſe by guarding that paſs he was told he might prevent the *Romans* from aſſiſting their allies. But the *Carthaginian* not pronouncing the word *Caſinum* well, his guides thought he had ſaid *Caſilinum*, and accordingly led him to that town, which was ſituated on the *Vulturnus*, at the foot of mount *Callicula*. *Hannibal* was ſo enraged at the miſtake, that he immediately order'd the chief of his guides to be crucified, for a terror to the reſt.

Carthaginian

Carthaginian army gathering the fruits and rich harveſts of the *Falernian* fields. This ſo provoked his ſoldiers, that they called him in deriſion *the Pædagogue of* Hannibal. And *Minucius* joining in the inſolent raillery, ſaid, their General had choſen for them a fine theatre, from whence they might conveniently behold the ravages of *Italy*. He then aſked the friends of *Fabius*, whether the Pro-Dictator did not think the earth an unſafe place for him, and was therefore going to pitch his camp in heaven, and cover himſelf with the clouds. When theſe things were told *Fabius*, he only replied, that he ſhould indeed be more cowardly than they made him, if he changed his reſolution through fear of idle raillerie ór reproaches. He added, *it is no inglorious thing, to fear for the ſafety of our country. That man is not fit to rule others who will be influenced by fooliſh calumnies, or ſubject himſelf and his government to the caprice of thoſe whom he ought to command.* *Fabius* continued the ſame conduct the whole ſummer, though he was not ignorant that his caution was blamed at *Rome* as well as in the army.

Y. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul-p. *Plut.* life of *Fabius.*

Liv. B. 22. c. 15.

Hannibal deſpaired of bringing the *Romans* to a battle, and therefore having got an immenſe booty, he began now to look out for a place in which to ſecure it, and where he might likewiſe take up his winter quarters; for though *Campania* abounded with fruits and wine, yet yielded not corn ſufficient to ſubſiſt a numerous army for any conſiderable time. For theſe reaſons *Hannibal* began to draw towards the paſs by which he had entered this country. *Fabius* perceiving his deſign, detached 4000 men to ſeize the ſtraight, which being commanded by mount *Callicula*, he encamped the reſt of his army towards the top of that hill. From thence he ſent a gariſon into *Caſilinum*, a town on the *Vulturnus*, on the other ſide the paſs, and ordered *L. Hoſtilius Mancinus*, with 400 horſe, to obſerve the enemy. This young officer raſhly engaging with a party of *Numidians*, was himſelf ſlain together with the greateſt part of the detachment. The ſame day *Minucius* joined *Fabius*. He had been ſent to guard a paſs at *Terracina*, a city of *Latium*, to hinder *Hannibal* from penetrating that way into the territory of *Rome* [p].

Polyb. B. 3. c. 92.

Liv. B. 22. c. 15.

The *Carthaginian*, not being able to diſlodge *Fabius*, contrived the following ſtratagem to be executed in the night. Being encamped at the foot of mount *Callicula*, he ordered *Aſdrubal* to pick out 2000 of the ſtrongeſt oxen, to cauſe faggots of dry wood to be tied to their horns, and then to keep the cattle, with the herdſmen, ready without the camp. After ſupper, when all things were quiet the oxen were brought to the foot of an eminence not far from the paſs, that was guarded by the 4000 *Romans*. Upon a ſignal given, the wood on the horns of thoſe beaſts was

Polyb. B. 3. c. 93.

[p] *Hannibal*, according to *Livy*, advanced towards *Fabius*, and ſent his light horſe to try once more to provoke him to battle. But though the Pro-Dictator had greatly the advantage of the ground, he would not hazard a general action, but contented himſelf with ſkirmiſhing with the enemies cavalry, of whom he killed eight hundred, with the loſs of only two hundred of his own men.

fett

V. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul-p. ſet on fire, and the herdſmen, who had been inſtructed to drive them if poſſible to the top of the eminence, immediately ſet out, being followed by the light armed infantry. Theſe had orders to aſſiſt the herdſmen as long as the cattle kept together, but upon their diſperſing, to ſeize the top of the hill, making as great a noiſe as they could, and be in readineſs to defend themſelves in caſe they were attacked by the enemy. In the the mean time *Hannibal* led his army to the very entrance of the paſs. The *Africans* marched firſt, next followed the cavalry, then the booty, and laſt of all the *Spaniards* and *Gauls*. The *Roman* detachment ſeeing the fires approach the top of the eminence, thought *Hannibal* was endeavouring to eſcape that way; they therefore left the paſs in all haſte, and marched up in order to oppoſe him. But as they came nearer the cattle, which now were running up and down, firing the buſhes wherever they went, they knew not what to think of theſe lights, their imaginations ſuggeſting to them a thouſand fears. In this perplexity they began to ſkirmiſh with the *Carthaginians* on the top of the hill, but the cattle running in among the combatants ſeparated them; after which both parties continued quiet waiting for day-light. *Fabius* was ſurpriſed at what he ſaw, but ſuſpecting it to be ſome ſtratagem of the enemy, would not ſtir from his camp, leſt he ſhould be entrapp'd, or, contrary to his intention, be forc'd to hazard a general action. *Hannibal* finding the paſs open, marched ſafely through it with his army and baggage: but that his light arm'd foot might not be overpowered by the *Romans* on the eminence, he, as ſoon as it was day, ſent his *Spaniards* to their aſſiſtance, who brought off the detachment, with the ſlaughter of a thouſand of the enemy. The *Carthaginian* continued his march to the neighbourhood of *Aliſæ*, a city on the confines of *Samnium* and *Campania*.

Liv. B. 22. c. 18. *Fabius*, though rallied by his ſoldiers by being thus over-reached, kept ſteady to his firſt reſolution; he marched directly after *Hannibal*, but encamped on the eminencies near him. The latter having again pillaged *Samnium* and the country of the *Peligni*, returned to *Apulia*, where he took *Geronium*, the houſes of which he turned into granaries, and pitched his camp under the walls. From thence he ſent out two thirds of his army to forage; part of the remainder he kept to guard the camp, and the reſt he diſpoſed in different ſtations to protect his foragers. As theſe were in great number, and the country was very fertile, vaſt quantities of proviſions were brought in daily. The Pro-Dictator, continuing to follow him, at length encamped in the territory of *Larinum*, in the country of the *Frentani*. From thence he was recalled to *Rome* to perform a ſolemn ſacrifice which required his preſence. Both the Senate and people were at this time much diſcontented with him. For beſide that his caution had not ſucceeded to their wiſhes, *Hannibal*, by ſparing the lands of *Fabius* in the general devaſtation, had rendered him ſuſpected at *Rome* of holding a ſecret correſpondence with the enemy. And as he had, without conſulting the Senate, agreed upon an exchange of

of priſoners with *Hannibal*, and to purchaſe the redemption of 247 captives which the *Carthaginian* had more than he, the Senate refuſed him the money. *Fabius*, determined to keep his word and releaſe his countrymen, directed his ſon to ſell his lands, and paid the ſum ſtipulated. And though moſt of the priſoners afterwards offered to reimburſe him their reſpective ranſoms, he would not conſent to it. Y. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J.C.* 216. 235 Conſul p. *Plut.* life of *Fabius*.

Fabius, upon his leaving the army, had adviſed, entreated, and by his authority commanded his General of the horſe not to fight during his abſence. But *Minucius*, even while the Dictator was making his exhortation, had his thoughts wholly intent upon a battle, which he was determined to hazard the very firſt opportunity. After *Fabius*'s departure he indeed ſtayed ſome time on the hills in hopes that *Hannibal* would give him an opportunity of coming to an engagement with him there. But in this being diſappointed, he marched down into the plain, and drew nearer the enemy. The *Carthaginian*, upon his approach leaving one third of his army to be employed in foraging, advanced with the reſt from *Geronium* to meet him. Between the two camps there was a riſing ground, that would be very commodious to which ever party ſhould poſſeſs it. A detachment of 2000 *Carthaginian* light armed troops ſeized it by night. *Minucius* the next day drove them from it, and there entrenched his forces. As *Hannibal*'s principal affair at this time was to provide abundantly not only for his men but for his horſes, that they might be in good condition for action the next ſummer; and as the *Romans* did not for ſeveral days ſtir from their camp, the *Carthaginian* detached great numbers of his ſoldiers to forage. *Minucius* laid hold of this advantage, and marched his legions to the very entrenchments of the enemy, at the ſame time ſending out his horſe and the light armed men, in parties, to attack their foragers, who being diſperſed over the fields, and loaded with booty, could make no reſiſtance. Nor had *Hannibal* ſufficient ſtrength within his camp to venture out againſt thoſe that aſſailed it. He was reduced to keep upon the defenſive, till *Aſdrubal*, informed of the danger by thoſe who had eſcaped the *Roman* horſe, came from *Geronium* with 4000 men to the aſſiſtance of his General. Upon the arrival of this ſuccour he ſallied out, and *Minucius* retired. The *Carthaginian* fearing leſt the *Romans* ſhould attack his camp at *Geronium*, and make themſelves maſters of the plunder and proviſions he had laid up in it, returned thither, and, after this time became more cautious in ſending out parties to forage. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 94.

When *Minucius*'s ſucceſs was known at *Rome*, his friends took advantage of it to extol his bravery and abilities above thoſe of *Fabius*. *M. Metilius*, a tribune of the commons, aſſembled the people, and made a ſpeech to them full of injurious reflections upon *Fabius*'s conduct, and concluded with a motion to give the General of the horſe an equal authority with the Pro-Dictator. The latter thought it to no purpoſe to defend himſelf in the aſſemblies of the people, ſince he had *Livy.* B. 22. c. 25.

Y. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul-p.

not a favourable hearing even in the Senate. There he endeavoured to convince the *Fathers* that their loſſes had been owing to the raſhneſs of their Generals; and he did not ſcruple to ſay, that if the Dictatorial power continued in him, he would call *Minucius* to an account for diſobeying his orders; that he hoped ſoon to make it evident to all the world, that fortune was of ſmall moment to an able General, and that reaſon and good conduct ſufficed; adding, that for his part he thought it a greater glory for a General to preſerve his army (if he did it without ignominy) than to deſtroy many thouſands of enemies. Having aſſiſted at the ſacrifice to which he had been called, and preſided at the election of a new Conſul, (*M. Atilius Regulus*, who was ſubſtituted in the room of *Flaminius*) he left the city the night before the *comitia* were to determine in his affair, that he might not be preſent at the affront which was going to be put upon him. Next day, when the people were aſſembled, though they were prejudiced againſt *Fabius* and zealous for *Minucius*, yet ſcarce any one had courage enough to harangue them in favour of *Metilius*'s propoſal. *C. Terentius Varro* was the only man that ſeconded the Tribune. *Varro* was the ſon of a butcher, had been a ſhopkeeper, then a pleader, undertaking poor mens cauſes right or wrong. By this practice, and by railing at the nobility, he had ingratiated himſelf with the multitude, and by their favour obtained ſucceſſively the offices of Quæſtor, Ædile and Prætor, and was now aiming at the Conſulſhip. The motion in ſhort was carried, *Minucius* was put upon an equal foot with *Fabius*, and the Senate confirmed the decree of the people.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 103.

Fabius being arrived at the camp, it was agreed between him and his late Maſter of the horſe, now his collegue, to divide the army equally between them. The former kept on the hills, and *Minucius* poſted himſelf at the diſtance of 1500 paces below him. Between the entrenchments of *Minucius* and thoſe of the *Carthaginian* at *Geronium* was an eminence from whence either camp might be annoyed. This poſt *Hannibal* reſolved to ſeize, not doubting but *Minucius* would attempt to diſpoſſeſs him; and he hoped to draw him into a ſnare. With this view he had over night choſen out 5000 foot and 500 horſe, divided them into bodies of 200 and 300 men each, and hid them in ſeveral cavities at the foot of the hill. And leſt his ambuſh ſhould happen to be diſcovered, he, to fix the attention of the *Romans* another way, ſent a detachment to take poſſeſſion of the eminence as ſoon as it was light. When *Minucius* perceived the *Carthaginians* upon the top of the hill, to diſlodge them, he ſent firſt his light armed foot, then his cavalry, and laſt of all (ſeeing that *Hannibal* ſuſtained his own men by ſucceſſive detachments) he followed in perſon with the legions. When the battle became general, the ambuſh, upon a ſignal given, roſe on all ſides. *Minucius*'s army was quickly routed, and would have been entirely deſtroyed, but that *Fabius* had too much zeal for his country to let himſelf be ſwayed by private reſentment. *We muſt make haſte*, ſaid he to thoſe that were

Plut. life of *Fabius.*

were about him, *to reſcue* Minucius, *who is a valiant man, and a lover of his country. And if he has been too forward to engage the enemy, we will tell him of it at another time.* Inſtantly he gave orders to march to the relief of his collegue and his routed troops, who at his approach began to rally, and retire to him for protection. *Hannibal*, ſeeing a freſh army advancing againſt him in good order, was obliged to give over the purſuit and ſound a retreat. He is reported to have ſaid to ſome of his friends while he was retiring, *Have not I often told you that that cloud which hovered upon the mountains would one day break upon us in a ſtorm?* The *Carthaginian*, after the battle, having poſſeſſion of the eminence, fortified it, and placed a guard on it to ſecure his camp on that ſide.

Y. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul p. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 105. *Plut.* life of *Fabius.*

Minucius and *Fabius* returned each to his entrenchments. The latter did not drop a word which ſavoured of contempt for his collegue, and *Minucius*, now convinced of his error, did juſtice both to *Fabius* and himſelf. Having aſſembled his troops, he ingenuouſly owned to them that he had learnt by experience, he was not fit to command, adding, that both he and they for the future ought to obey the orders of *Fabius*. Then marching them to the Pro-Dictator's camp, he preſented himſelf before him, made his acknowledgments, and reſigned the dignity laſt conferred on him by the people. *Fabius* received him with great kindneſs, the ſoldiers embraced one another, and there was an univerſal joy. The Pro-Dictatorſhip being almoſt expired, *Fabius* ſent for the Conſuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* to take upon them the command of the army.

Liv. B. 22. c. 30.

Servilius, with a fleet of 120 ſhips, had made an expedition into *Africa*, where as he was ravaging the coaſt, he fell into an ambuſcade, and was forced to retire to his fleet with the loſs of a thouſand of his men. Weighing anchor in all haſte he ſailed to *Lilybæum* in *Sicily*, and from thence, after delivering up the fleet to the Prætor *Otacilius*, was returned to *Italy*.

Liv. B. 22. c. 31.

The Conſuls following the advice and example of *Fabius*, no action of moment happened between the two armies, though *Hannibal* ſtill continued at *Geronium*, and the *Romans* held their camp ſo near him as to watch all his motions.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 106.

THE SAME YEAR, while the war was thus carried on in *Italy*, *Cn. Scipio* had great ſucceſs, both by ſea and land, againſt the *Carthaginians* in *Spain* [q]. Ambaſſadors came to him from all the nations between the *Iberus*

Livy B. 22. c. 20. vid. infr. p. 229.

[q] The *Romans* at firſt divided this country into *Hither Spain* and *Further Spain*. *Auguſtus Cæſar* afterwards divided *Further Spain* into two provinces, *Bætica* and *Luſitania*, and gave the name of *Tarraconia* to *Hither Spain*.

Bætica, ſo called from the river * *Bætis*, which runs through the middle of it, was the moſt ſouthern province, and comprehended the preſent kingdom of *Granada*, *Andaluſia*, part of *New Caſtile*, and *Eſtremadura*. *Cadiz*, called by the ancients

* Guadalquivir.

Y. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul-p.

Iberus and the *Pyrenees*, and a hundred and twenty cities ſurrendered to him. To add to this good fortune, his allies, the *Celtiberians*, defeated *Aſdrubal* in two battles, killed 15000 of his men, and took 4000 priſoners. This was the ſtate of the *Roman* affairs in *Spain*, when *P. Scipio*, the brother of *Cneius*, arrived there with the character of Pro-Conſul. The view of the Senate in carrying on the war with vigour in this country, was to divide the forces of *Carthage*, who would be more jealous of her conqueſts in *Spain* than of thoſe in *Italy*, and by ſending powerful ſuccours to *Aſdrubal*, would be leſs in a condition to ſupply his brother *Hannibal*. *P. Scipio* brought with him thirty ſhips of war, 8000 *Roman* ſoldiers, and a great quantity of arms and proviſions.

Liv. B. 22. c. 22.

Aſdrubal being employed in the *Celtiberian* war, the two brothers with joint forces paſſed the *Iberus*, and advanced to *Saguntum* without ſeeing an enemy. This city *Hannibal* had rebuilt, placed a gariſon in it, and aſſigned it for the reſidence of all the young noblemen, whom he had obliged their parents to put into his hands as pledges of their fidelity. There was then at *Saguntum* a *Spaniard* named *Abelox*, of a good family, and conſiderable intereſt in his country, and hitherto looked upon as firmly attached to the *Carthaginians*. This man ſeeing their affairs declining in *Spain*, while the *Romans* were daily gaining ground, began to think of going over to the prevailing party. But conſidering at the ſame time that a deſerter, how well born ſoever, makes but an indifferent figure, unleſs he can gain himſelf credit, by ſome important ſervices to his new friends, formed a ſcheme to put the young hoſtages into the hands of the *Romans*. At this time *Boſtar* commanded the *Carthaginians* in thoſe parts, having been ſent by *Aſdrubal* to hinder the *Scipio's* from paſſing the *Iberus*; but not daring to wait

Polyb. B. 3. c. 98.

ancients *Gades* and *Gadira*, is a town ſituated in a ſmall iſland of the ſame name, on the weſtern coaſt of *Andaluſia*, about nine leagues from *Gibraltar*. It is ſaid that *Hercules* having extended his conqueſts to the ocean, and imagining he was come to the extremity of the world, raiſed two pillars near *Gades*, as monuments of his victories. Geographers are not agreed about the place where theſe pillars were erected. *Bætica* was the moſt fruitful, the wealthieſt and the moſt populous part of *Spain*. It contained two hundred cities, the chief of which ſtood on the *Bætis*, *Caſtulo* towards the ſource of that river, *Corduba* (the native place of *Lucan* and the two *Seneca's*) lower down, and * *Hiſpalis* neareſt the ſea. It's chief inhabitants were the *Turdetani*.

Strabo l. 3. p. 171.

† *Tarragon.*

Strab. l. 3 p. 139-142.

* *Seville.*

Luſitania was bounded on the weſt by the ocean, on the north by the river *Durius*, and on the ſouth by the river *Anas*. Between theſe two rivers runs the *Tagus*. *Luſitania* included what is now called *Portugal*, together with part of *Old* and *New Caſtile*.

Terraconia comprehended the reſt of *Spain*, that is to ſay, the Kingdoms of *Murcia* and *Valencia*, *Catalonia*, *Arragon*, *Navarre*, *Biſcay*, the *Aſturias*, *Gallicia*, the kingdom of *Leon*, and the greateſt part of the two *Caſtiles*. *Tarraco* † a city on the ſea coaſt, not far from the *Iberus*, gave name to the province. Pretty near this town lay *Barcino*, which from it's name is thought to have been built by *Amilcar Barca* the father of the great *Hannibal*. The chief nations of *Terraconia* were the *Celtiberi* beyond the river *Iberus*, the *Cantabri*, where *Biſcay* now lyes, the *Carpetani*, whoſe capital was *Toledo*, and the *Overtani*, &c. *Rollin. Hiſt. Anc.* Tom. 1. p. 247.

for them, he had retired to *Saguntum*, and encamped under its walls. *Boſtar* was a good natured eaſy man, and placed great confidence in *Abelox*, which the latter abuſing, inſinuated to him, that the *Romans* having now paſſed the *Iberus*, it would be no longer poſſible for the *Carthaginians* to keep *Spain* in obedience by fear; that *Saguntum* being threatened with a ſiege, he had an opportunity of attaching all the *Spaniards* to the intereſt of his republic, by reſtoring the hoſtages to their parents, who would think themſelves under a perpetual obligation to him for ſo early providing for the ſafety of their children, and that if the *Romans* ſhould by force or artifice get them into their hands, they would certainly act the part which he adviſed him to act, and by that means bring over many nations to their party. *Abelox* added, that if *he* was ſent to conduct the hoſtages to their reſpective countries, he did not doubt but he ſhould be able to repreſent the obligation in ſuch a light to the *Spaniards*, as that they ſhould continue firm to the intereſt of a Republic, who had given ſo eminent an example of her regard for her allies. The eaſy *Carthaginian*, deceived by an appearance of friendſhip, gave his conſent to the propoſal. *Abelox* hereupon ſtole away in the night to the *Roman* camp, acquainted the Pro-Conſul with what he had done; and it was agreed between them that a detachment of *Romans* ſhould lye in ambuſh the night following, and intercept the youths with their leader. The project was executed with ſucceſs; and *Scipio*, by ſending back the hoſtages to their relations, gained to himſelf a conſiderable intereſt in the country.

Y. of *R.* 536. Bef *J.C* 216. 235 Conſul-p.

To return to *Italy*: The Senate at *Rome* was attentive to every thing that concerned the intereſt of the Republic. To maintain her dignity, and preſerve to her the reſpect of foreign nations, they ſent to *Pineus* the *Illyrian* king for the annual tribute he had engaged to pay, and to *Philip* of *Macedon* to demand the treacherous *Demetrius*, who had ſheltered himſelf in his dominions, and was exciting him to take advantage of the misfortunes of *Rome*, and make a deſcent upon *Italy*; at the ſame time ſhe refuſed to accept a preſent of forty vaſes of gold from the city of *Naples*, that the world might ſee her finances were not exhauſted.

Livy, B. 22, c. 33. *Polyb*. B. 5. c. 101. *Liv*. B. 22. c. 32.

CHAP. XXI.

THIRD YEAR of the War.

BATTLE *of* CANNÆ.

THE time for a new election of Conſuls drawing on, and the preſent Conſuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* not thinking it ſafe to leave the army, one of them, at the deſire of the Senate, nominated a Dictator to

Liv. B 22. c. 34.

Y. of *R.* 536. Bef. *J. C.* 216. 235 Conſul-p. to hold the *comitia*. *L. Veturius Philo* was the perſon pitched upon, but as he ſeems to have been attached to the intereſts of the people, it was probably for this reaſon that the Senators made the Augurs find ſome defect with regard to religion, in his nomination. After fourteen days exerciſe of his office he was forced to abdicate; and an interregnum enſued. *P. Cornelius Aſina*, one of the *interreges*, convened the *centuries*; and then amongſt the candidates for the conſulſhip appeared *C. Terentius Varro*, who had ſcarce any thing to recommend him but his hatred of the nobility, and the zeal he had lately ſhewn for advancing *Minucius* the General of the horſe to an equal authority with the Pro-Dictator *Fabius*. The *Patricians*, as the moſt effectual way to diſappoint the hopes of *Varro*, ſet up againſt him competitors of ſuch known merit, both out of their own body, and from among the *Plebeians*, as muſt naturally prepoſſeſs the people in their favour. But *Varro* happen'd to have among the tribunes of the commons a relation named *Q. Bebius Herennius*. This man, in a ſpeech to the people, inveighed bitterly againſt the nobility. He aſſerted that it was the *Patricians* who had brought *Hanybal* into *Italy*; that an end might have been put to the war had not they fraudulently protracted it; and that the *Carthaginian* would never be conquered till a true *Plebeian*, not ſuch a one as was only *Plebeian* by extraction, and being dignified and ranked among the nobility, had imbibed the patrician ſpirit, but a new man, not infected with their maxims, was at the head of the *Roman* armies. The people full of theſe impreſſions declared *Terentius Varro* Conſul, and would name no other that day, that *Varro* might preſide in the *comitia* for chooſing his collegue. The nobility, vexed at their diſappointment, prevailed with great difficulty upon *L. Æmilius Paullus*, an enemy to the *Plebeians* (on account of the affront they had put upon him after his victories in *Illyricum*) to offer himſelf as a candidate; and the other competitors yielding to him, he was choſen Conſul in the next aſſembly. The other offices were beſtowed with great judgment. *Servilius* and *Atilius* were directed to remain in quality of Pro-Conſuls, at the head of the ſame armies they at preſent commanded. *P. Scipio* was continued Pro-Conſul in *Spain*, *M. Cl. Marcellus* was appointed Prætor in *Sicily*, and *L. Poſthumius Albinus* in *Ciſ-Alpine Gaul*. All theſe except *Terentius Varro*, had born the ſame offices before, ſo careful were the *Romans* to have men of experience to conduct their affairs at ſo critical a time.

Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

See pag. 100.

The Senate alſo in the preſent exigence augmented the army to eight legions (each conſiſting of 5000 foot and 300 horſe) without reckoning the allies.

B. 3. c. 107. The uſual practice (ſays *Polybius*) is to raiſe yearly but four legions, each of 4000 foot and 200 horſe; and it is only in the moſt important conjunctures that theſe numbers are increaſed to 5000 and 300. The *Infantry* furniſhed by the allies is only equal to that of the legions, but

but the *cavalry*[1] twice the number of the *Roman* horſe. Generally ſpeaking each Conſul has two legions and one half of the auxiliary forces, and commands his army ſeparately, againſt a different enemy. It rarely happens that the four legions, with proportionable number of auxiliaries, are employed in the ſame expedition. But in *this* the *Romans* employ'd not only four but eight legions, ſo great was their apprehenſion of the impending danger. A. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J.C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

Though the Republic would not receive any preſents from her dependents in *Italy*, ſhe readily accepted at this time a very rich one from King *Hiero*, a ſtatue of Victory of maſſy gold, and of great weight, 75000 buſhels of wheat, 50000 buſhels of barley, and a 1000 dartmen and ſlingers to oppoſe the *Baleares* and *Numidians*. The King's preſent was accompanied with an exhortation to the Senate to employ a fleet and ſome land forces to make a deſcent upon *Africa*. The *Conſcript Fathers* returned him a grateful anſwer, and in purſuit of his advice ordered a reinforcement of twenty five quinqueremes to *T. Otacilius* the Pro-Prætor in *Sicily*, (for *Marcellus* was not yet arrived there) giving him permiſſion to carry the war into *Africa* if he thought proper. Before the Conſuls took the field, the ſoldiers (which had never been done before) were *required* to take an oath to this effect, that they would aſſemble at the command of the Conſuls, and not depart afterwards without leave; and whereas they had been accuſtomed *voluntarily* to ſwear that they would not forſake their enſigns through fear, nor go out of their ranks unleſs to take up a weapon, or to ſmite an enemy, or to ſave the life of a citizen, this oath alſo was now enjoined them by authority. *Livy*, B. 22. c. 37.

While theſe preparations were making at *Rome*, the army under the Pro-Conſuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* continued to obſerve the motions of *Hannibal*. As thoſe Generals had received orders from the Senate not to venture a battle, but only to train and diſcipline their men, and haraſs the enemy by frequent ſkirmiſhes, all the ſpring paſſed, as the winter had done, without any conſiderable action on either ſide. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 106.

But the time of harveſt being come, *Hannibal* decamped from *Geronium*, and to drive the enemy to the neceſſity of fighting, ſeized upon the caſtle of *Cannæ*, where the *Romans* had lodged the ammunition and proviſions they had brought from *Canuſium*. The town of *Cannæ* had been deſtroyed the laſt year; the caſtle was left ſtanding, and *Hanni-*

[1] We read *thrice* in *Polybius*, doubtleſs through a miſtake of the copyiſt. *Livy* ſays *twice*, and this muſt be the truth, otherwiſe the cavalry of the *Roman* army at the battle of *Cannæ* (which is going to be related) would have amounted to 9600, and *Polybius* himſelf ſays they were little more than 6000. Here again there muſt be ſome miſtake, it ſhould be *little more than* 7000: for reckoning 300 horſe to each of the eight legions, and ſuppoſing the allies to have furniſh'd double the Number that the *Romans* did, the whole amount will be 7200. and ſo *Livy*, who frequently copies *Polybius*, ſeems to have underſtood him in this place. Some hiſtorians, ſays he, write, that when the battle of *Cannæ* was fought the *Romans* were 87200 ſtrong (i. e. 80000 foot and 7200 horſe.) B. 22. c. 36.

Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

bal, by poſſeſſing himſelf of it, threw the *Roman* army into great perplexity: for beſide being maſter of thoſe proviſions, he was now in a poſt which by it's ſituation commanded all the adjacent country. The Pro-Conſuls diſpatched meſſenger after meſſenger to aſk inſtructions from the Senate, concerning the meaſures they ſhould take. In their letters they repreſented that the country all around was ruined, that it was impoſſible to advance near the enemy without being obliged to fight; and that all the allies, attentive to the uncertain ſtate of things, were in ſuſpenſe waiting the event. The Senate judged it expedient to come to a deciſive action with the enemy, but wrote to *Servilius* and *Atilius* to defer it, till the Conſuls (whom they now ſent from *Rome*) were arrived in the camp. Great dependance had the *Fathers* on the virtue and abilities of *Æmilius*; and indeed his known prudence, and the eminent ſervices he had done his country ſome years before in the *Illyrian* war, juſtified the confidence they repoſed in him. At his departure from *Rome*, when they had repreſented to him the great importance of the preſent occaſion, they urged him to exert himſelf, as a true citizen mindful of the majeſty of the *Roman* name. Nor was *Æmilius* wanting either of a juſt ſenſe of his country's danger, or of the warmeſt zeal for it's preſervation: So that when he was arrived at the camp, and had aſſembled the ſoldiers to impart to them the pleaſure of the Senate, he made uſe of all the arguments he could think of to reſtore their courage, much abated by ſo many preceding diſaſters. He told them that ſeveral good reaſons might be aſſigned for the defeat of the *former* armies; but that no excuſe could be found if *this* ſhould fail of victory. That the ſoldiers of thoſe armies were new raiſed men without diſcipline or experience, and entirely unacquainted with the ſort of enemy they had to deal with: That thoſe who fought at the *Trebia* were not recovered from the fatigue of their voyage from *Sicily* when they were led to battle: That at the lake *Thraſymenus* the *Romans*, ſo far from ſeeing the enemy before the battle, did not even ſee them during the conflict: That in none of the preceding engagements had there been two Conſuls with two conſular armies; but that now all circumſtances were changed: "By frequent ſkirmiſhes with the enemy "you have learn'd their manner of fighting. You have not only both "the Conſuls of the preſent year to conduct you, but both the Conſuls "of the laſt year, who have conſented to continue with us and ſhare "the fortune of the day. With equal numbers you have ſeldom failed "of beating the enemy in ſmall engagements: It would be ſtrange "therefore, nay I think it impoſſible, that now when you are double "their number you ſhould be vanquiſhed by them in a general action. "But what need of further exhortation? The fate of *Rome*, the preſervation of whatever is dear to you depends at this time upon your "courage and reſolution."

The

The next [f] day the Conſuls put their army in march towards the place where the *Carthaginians* were poſted, and the day following pitched their camp within ſix miles of them. As it was a ſmooth plain, and the *Carthaginian* cavalry were far ſuperior to the *Roman*, *Æmilius* judged it not proper to come to a battle in that ſituation. He was for drawing the enemy, if poſſible, to ſome ground where horſe would have little opportunity to act. But the next day, it being *Varro*'s turn to command, he, in ſpite of all that his collegue could ſay to diſſuade him from it, decamped and drew nearer the enemy. *Hannibal* with his cavalry and light arm'd foot advanced to meet him, fell furiouſly upon the *Romans* in their march, and put them into great diſorder. *Varro*, when he had ſuſtained this firſt ſhock by means of ſome of the heavy armed foot, commanded his horſe and dartmen to charge, and he had the prudence to mingle with theſe ſome of his legionaries; this gave him the advantage in the combat, to which the night at length put an end.

A. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J.C.* 215. 236 Conſul p. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 100.

The day following, *Æmilius*, who was againſt fighting, and yet could not ſafely retreat, encamped two thirds of his army along the *Auſidus* [t], which lay to their left. The other third he led over the river, and made them intrench themſelves at the diſtance of about 1300 paces eaſtward from his greater camp, and at ſomewhat more than that diſtance from the camp of the enemy, which lay to the ſouth. By this diſpoſition he could protect his own foragers and diſtreſs thoſe of the *Carthaginian*.

Hannibal foreſeeing that theſe movements of the *Romans* would infallibly bring on a general action, thought it adviſeable before he came to that hazard, to animate his ſoldiers for the occaſion; leſt their late repulſe ſhould have left ſome impreſſion of fear upon their minds. Having called them together, he bid them caſt their eyes over the country all around, and then tell him, "Whether, being ſuperior as they were "to the enemy in horſe, they could poſſibly, had the Gods conſulted "their wiſhes, have deſired any thing more to their advantage than to "come to a deciſive battle on ſuch a ſpot." They all agreed that they could not have choſen better. He added, "Thank the Gods then

[f] *Livy* differs from *Polybius* with regard to the particulars that happened before the battle of *Cannæ*. The *Latin* hiſtorian tells us that *Hannibal* had not yet removed from *Geronium* when the Conſuls began their march from *Rome*; that he had then ſcarce ten days proviſions in his camp, that the *Spaniards* were ready to deſert him, and that he himſelf had thoughts of running away into *Gaul* with his cavalry, and leaving his infantry to ſhift for themſelves. He adds ſeveral other circumſtances as little worth relating as theſe. And indeed, the accounts that he, *Appian*, and the later writers give of theſe affairs, are intermixt with ſo many things evidently fabulous, and often inconſiſtent with one another, that in the text *Polybius* has been chiefly followed, who wrote the neareſt to the times he ſpeaks of, was himſelf a ſoldier, and whoſe hiſtory is the moſt conſiſtent and the moſt judicious.

[t] The *Auſidus* runs through the *Apennines* into the *Adriatic*, and is the only river in *Italy* which takes that courſe.

A. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

" who have brought your enemies hither, that you may triumph over " them; and remember alſo your obligation to me for having reduced " the *Romans* to the neceſſity of fighting: for, advantageous as the " ground is to us, here fight they muſt, there is no avoiding it." He concluded with reminding them of their former exploits, and with aſſuring them that one victory more would give a period to all their labours, and put them in poſſeſſion of all their hopes, the wealth of *Rome*, and the dominion of *Italy*.

The *Carthaginian* after this entrench'd his forces on the weſt ſide of the *Aufidus*, where lay the greater camp of the *Romans*, and the next day but one drew out his army and preſented battle. *Æmilius* not liking the ground, and being perſuaded that want of proviſions would very ſoon oblige *Hannibal* to quit his poſt, declined the challenge, but took great care to have his two camps well fortified and guarded. *Hannibal* after waiting a while in the field, returned to his intrenchments, and detached ſome of his *Numidians* to paſs the *Aufidus*, and fall upon certain parties that from the *Roman* leſſer camp were coming to the river for water. The *Numidians* having eaſily put theſe to flight, advanced ſo far as to brave the *Romans* in their very camp; an inſult ſo offenſive to the ſoldiers in general as well as to *Varro*, that had it not been *Æmilius*'s turn to command, thoſe of the greater camp would have inſtantly croſſed the river to join their fellows, and offer battle to the enemy. " Their impatience to fight, ſays *Polybius*, was extreme; for " when men have once reſolved upon a difficult and dangerous enter- " priſe, no time ſeems ſo tedious as the ſpace between the determi- " nation and the execution."

The ſame author tells us, that when the news came to *Rome* of the armies being near each other, and of their daily ſkirmiſhing and picqueering, the people, remembring their former defeats, were univerſally in the utmoſt anxiety and fear, well foreſeeing the fatal conſequences of a new overthrow; that they talked of nothing but oracles, extraordinary appearances, prodigies ſeen both in temples and in private houſes; and that their whole time was ſpent in vows and ſupplications: He adds, " for " in all public calamities and dangers the *Romans* are extremely careful " to pacify the anger of the Gods; nor of the many religious ceremonies " preſcribed for ſuch occaſions, is there one, of which, how frivolous and " impertinent ſoever it may appear, they think the practice unbecoming."

The battle of *Cannæ*. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 113

At ſun-riſe in the morning after the inſult by the *Numidians*, *Varro*, having the command, led his troops of the greater camp over the *Aufidus*, and joining them to thoſe of the leſſer, drew them up in the plain after the accuſtomed manner*, excepting that, in all the three lines, the battalions ſtood cloſer, and thoſe in the firſt line were deeper than uſual. The *Roman* knights, commanded by *Æmilius*, formed the right wing cloſe to the river; the cavalry of the allies, under *Terentius Varro*, made the left. The Pro-Conſuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* led the main

* See Vol. I. B. 3. c. 10. § 6.

main body conſiſting of 70000 foot; for *Varro* had left 10000 men in the greater camp with orders to attack that of *Hannibal* when the armies ſhould be engaged. Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

The *Carthaginian*[v] no ſooner perceived the *Romans* in motion, but he ſent over the *Aufidus* his ſlingers and the other light armed foot. The reſt of the army followed, paſſing the river at two different places. He drew up his forces in one front. To face the *Roman* knights he poſted his *Spaniſh* and *Gallic* cavalry in his left wing; next theſe were placed one half of his *African* infantry, then the *Spaniſh* and *Gallic* foot, then the other half of his *Africans*; and the *Numidian* horſe made his right wing.

The *Africans* were armed after the *Roman* manner, out of the ſpoils taken from the enemy in former battles. The *Gauls*, naked from the waiſt upward, and the *Spaniards*, clothed in linen jackets trimmed with purple, were armed each after the manner of their country. They had ſhields alike; but the *Gauls* uſed long broad ſwords fit only for cutting ſtrokes, and at a certain diſtance; the *Spaniards* ſhort and well pointed blades proper both for ſtriking and thruſting. The cohorts of theſe two nations being ranged alternately, this medley of troops of ſuch different appearances, is ſaid to have been terrible to behold. Strong of body, and furious in charging were the *Gauls*, but accuſtomed to ſpend their violence at the firſt brunt; the *Spaniards* leſs eager and more wary, were neither aſhamed to give ground when over-matched, nor afraid to return and renew the fight whenever it was practicable. As the impetuoſity of the one, and the patience of the other ſerved mutually to reduce each of them to a good and firm temper, ſo the place which they held in this battle added confidence to them both: For they ſaw themſelves well and ſtrongly flanked by the *Africans*, whoſe name was grown terrible in *Spain* by their conqueſts, and in *Gaul* by this their preſent war. *Aſdrubal* commanded the cavalry of the left wing, *Hanno** the right; and *Hannibal* with his brother *Mago* took the conduct of the main body: This amounted to about 40000 foot; the horſe were 10000. The armies were neither of them incommoded by the riſing ſun, the *Romans* facing to the ſouth, their enemies to the north.

* Livy ſays Maharbal.

[v] *Plutarch* reports that *Varro*'s confidence and his numerous army alarmed the *Carthaginians*; that *Hannibal* with a ſmall company went out to take a view of the *Romans*, and that one of his followers, called *Giſco*, ſaying to him, *that the number of the enemy was very aſtoniſhing*; *Hannibal* with a ſerious countenance anſwered, *There is ſomething yet more aſtoniſhing which you take no notice of, That in all that multitude there is not one man whoſe name is* Giſco. This jeſt made all the company laugh, who telling it to every one they met in their return, the laughter was continued till they reached the camp. The army ſeeing *Hannibal* and his Attendants come back laughing, imagined that without doubt this mirth proceeded from the good poſture of their affairs, and their contempt of the enemy; which did not a little raiſe the ſpirits of the ſoldiers.

Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p

The action began with the ſkirmiſhing of the velites or light armed troops, with little advantage to either ſide. During this ſkirmiſh the *Roman* knights came to an engagement with the *Spaniſh* and *Gallic* cavalry. Being ſhut in by the river on one ſide, and by their own infantry on the other, they could practiſe none of the evolutions and returns commonly uſed in fight by the horſe in thoſe days. There was no way but to bear forward in a right line; and both parties ruſhing violently on, the men came at length to grapple with one another, and many of them, their horſes running from under them, fell to the ground, whence ſtarting up again they fought on foot. In concluſion, the *Roman* cavalry were overborn and forced to recoil. This the Conſul *Æmilius* could by no means remedy, for *Aſdrubal* with his boiſterous *Gauls* and *Spaniards* was not to be reſiſted by the *Roman* knights, unequal both in number and horſemanſhip. The greater part of them, after they had defended themſelves with the utmoſt bravery, were ſlain upon the ſpot, and moſt of the remainder, in their flight along the river; for *Aſdrubal* gave no quarter.

Sir *W. R.*

Before this rout was quite finiſhed, the heavy armed infantry on both ſides joined battle. *Hannibal*, in advancing againſt the enemy, had cauſed his *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, who held the middle of his line (and probably [w] made nine tenths of it) to march, ſome faſter ſome ſlower, ſo as by degrees to form the figure of a *creſcent*, the *convex* ſide towards the *Romans*, and the extreme points touching the *Africans* to the right and left. The middle or moſt prominent part of the curve being the thickeſt [x] (as it's figure of a creſcent implies) and the beſt ſtrengthened againſt all impreſſion, ſuſtained the ſhock of the enemy for ſome time, with great bravery and ſteadineſs; till the *Roman* center, reinforced by ſome battalions from the wings, compelled, by its very weight, the curve to yield: but by the artful management of *Hannibal*, this curve ſo yielded and bent inward as at length to form a new curve, the *concave* ſide towards the enemy. The *Roman* legions following their ſuppoſed victory, and preſſing ſtill forward againſt the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, who continued retiring before them, came inſenſibly between the two bodies of *African* infantry, which had not yet moved from their poſts, and the depth [y] of whoſe files was, perhaps, at firſt concealed by the ſides

[w] The reaſon for this opinion will be given hereafter.

[x] *Polybius* (B. 3. c. 115) tells us that the *Gauls* were *thinly* ranged, and therefore eaſily broken. But if this be meant of the *whole creſcent*, how will it accord with the ſtout fight which he himſelf ſays the *Gauls* maintained, or with the neceſſity which the *Roman* center, already deep, was under of being ſtrengthened by draughts from the wings, in order to break that creſcent. I imagine therefore, that *Polybius* ſpeaks here of the *ſides* only of the creſcent, the parts towards the horns, and not of the middle part, which though thick and ſtrong, was already broken by the ſuperior weight of the *Roman* center.

[y] Neither *Livy* nor *Polybius* ſay any thing of the proportion which the number of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* bore to that of the *Africans*;

ſides of the concave into which the *Romans* entered, and was but gradually diſcovered in proportion as the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* recoiled. The two bodies of *Africans*, as the conjuncture itſelf dictated, facing one to the right, the other to the left, attacked the *Romans* in flank, ſo that theſe could fight no longer in *the order* [z] *of a phalanx* (which form they had taken during the conflict) but were obliged to divide themſelves into platoons or ſmall bodies, to make head againſt thoſe unexpected enemies. Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

The Conſul *Æmilius*, after the defeat of his cavalry, ſeeing that all depended upon the foot, had by this time put himſelf among the legionaries, animating them both by words and example. *Hannibal* acted the like part among the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, the conduct of whom he had taken upon himſelf from the beginning.

Hitherto there had nothing of moment happened between the [a] *Numidian* horſe and the cavalry of the *Roman* allies, commanded by *Varro*; for the former would neither give nor ſuſtain any charge: yet by making frequent offers, they kept their enemies ſo employed as to hinder them from aſſiſting the legions. But now the laſt and fatal blow, which completed the deſtruction of the *Roman* army, was given by the ſame hand that gave the firſt. For *Aſdrubal*, having cut in pieces almoſt all the horſe of the *Roman* right wing, haſtened to the aſſiſtance of the *Numidians*. The cavalry of the *Roman* left wing, perceiving his approach,

Africans; nor whether the *African* battalions were longer in rank or in file. Nor do they give us any light concerning thoſe wonderful movements, by which *Hannibal* could, without confuſion, form his center from a ſtrait line into a creſcent, the convex to the enemy; and afterwards, without confuſion, invert its figure.

[z] Chevalier *Folard* (tom. 4. p. 377.) from this expreſſion of *Polybius*, triumphantly concludes that the *Romans* were *originally* drawn up by *Varro* in a *phalange coupée*, that is, ſays the Chevalier, in *columns with ſmall intervals between them*. The inference is not well deduced. For, ſuppoſing the *Romans* to have been ranged at firſt in three lines as uſual, yet *Polybius* might well ſpeak of them as in the order of a phalanx at this time. It was the conſtant practice for all the three lines to form themſelves into one phalanx, whenever it happened that neither the firſt alone, nor the firſt and ſecond united could make any impreſſion on the enemy. And that this was the preſent caſe with the center of the *Roman* army is plain from the neceſſity the Generals were under of bringing ſome battalions from the wings to ſtrengthen it. If the *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* of the center, united in one phalanx, had not failed in the attempt to break *Hannibal*'s creſcent, what occaſion could there be of adding ſtrength to them from the wings?

[a] According to *Livy*, when the two armies were juſt ready to join battle, 500 of theſe *Numidians* came galloping away from their fellows, with their ſhields caſt behind their backs (as was the manner of thoſe that yielded) and throwing down their arms, ſurrendered themſelves. *Varro* had not leiſure to examine them, but thinking them really diſarmed, ordered them behind the lines. In the heat of the battle, theſe pretended deſerters, having ſhort ſwords under their jackets, flew upon the hindmoſt of the *Romans*, while all eyes and thoughts were bent another way, ſo that they did great miſchief, and cauſed yet a greater terror. *Polybius* mentions nothing of this, which he would hardly have omitted had there been any foundation for it. Nor does he ſay any thing of a certain wind called *Vulturnus*, which, according to the *Latin* hiſtorian, proved very pernicious to the *Romans*, by blowing duſt in their eyes.

Y. of *R.* 537 Bef. *J. C.* 215 236 Conſul p.

did not wait to be attacked. They immediately fled. Hereupon *Aſdrubal* ordering the light *Numidians*, as fitteſt for that ſervice, to purſue them, turned with his *Spaniſh* and *Gallic* horſe upon the rear of the *Roman* main body, which by this means was entirely ſurrounded. Then was the ſlaughter dreadful, and then fell the Conſul [b] *Æmilius* quite covered with wounds, nobly diſcharging in this concluſion of his life, as in all the former parts of it, the duties of a good citizen. The *Romans*, encompaſſed on all ſides, faced every way and held out for ſome time: But the outermoſt ranks of their orb being ſtill mowed down, they were gradually forced into a narrow compaſs, and becoming at length a mere throng, unable to wield their arms, were all put to the ſword [c].

During

[b] *Livy* tells us that *Æmilius* had been wounded in the action between the cavalry, yet being aſſiſted by thoſe of the *Roman* knights who had eſcaped from *Aſdrubal*, he made head againſt *Hannibal*, and reſtored the fight in ſeveral places. At length, unable through weakneſs to manage his horſe, he was obliged to diſmount; his attendants did the like, and it being told *Hannibal* that the Conſul had ordered his cavalry to quit their horſes, he is reported to have ſaid jeſtingly, *I had rather he had delivered them to me bound*. *Livy* adds, what is hard to be conceived, that ſome of the *Roman* knights, when they ſaw the battle irrecoverably loſt, remounted their horſes and eſcaped. One of them, *Cn. Lentulus*, a legionary tribune galloping along, found the Conſul covered with blood, and ſitting upon a ſtone. *Lentulus* entreated him to riſe and ſave himſelf, offering him his horſe; but *Æmilius* refuſed it, exhorting the tribune to ſhift for himſelf, and not to loſe time, adding, that it was not his purpoſe to be brought again into judgment by the people; be an accuſer of his collegue, or be himſelf charged with that day's loſs. He further deſired *Lentulus* to give the Senate notice to fortify *Rome*, and to tell *Fabius* that he had been mindful of his counſel to the laſt. The Conſul had no ſooner uttered theſe words, but firſt a multitude of his own men in the rout, and then the enemy in the purſuit came upon him: the latter, not knowing who he was, diſpatched him with their darts. *Lentulus* eſcaped by the ſwiftneſs of his horſe.

[c] THE ACCOUNTS tranſmitted to us by *Polybius* and *Livy* of the battle of *Cannæ*, are not ſufficiently full and clear to convey to thoſe who read them at this diſtance of time, diſtinct and ſatisfactory Ideas of what paſſed in that memorable day; but have left much room for conjecture.

In the plans that are commonly given by the moderns of this battle, the *infantry* of the two armies are equal in front. *Hannibal's center* which he formed into a creſcent, the *convex* ſide towards the enemy, makes but *one third* of his line of foot. How then came it to paſs, that this creſcent, when it yielded and retreated, ſo as gradually to invert its figure, and preſent a *concave* to the enemy, drew after it and within it, *more* of the *Roman* infantry than had ſtood oppoſite to it, when the armies firſt faced each other? This may be anſwered from *Polybius*, who tells us, that during the conflict between the centers of the two armies, the *Romans*, by draughts from their wings, thickened or deepened their center, which therefore broke, by its very weight, the *Carthaginian* center or creſcent, conſiſting of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*. He adds, that the *Romans* preſſing unwarily after thoſe *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, came at length between the *two bodies of* African *infantry*; which by a converſion, one to the right, the other to the left, inſtantly preſſed the *Romans* on their flanks; and that *Aſdrubal* ſoon after came thundering upon their backs with his victorious cavalry.

All this is conceivable and credible: and we here ſee how not only the cohorts that were originally in the *Roman* center, but thoſe which were drawn from the wings to deepen it, became totally encompaſſed by

During this ſlaughter of the *Roman* foot, the *Numidians* were purſuing *Terentius* and the horſe of the left wing. Of all the *Roman* cavalry

by the enemy; by the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* in front, by the *Africans* in flank, and by *Aſdrubal* in the rear.

But the great difficulty ſtill remains: For it is generally agreed (and indeed *Polybius*'s words ſeem to import) that the *whole*, or almoſt the *whole* of the *Roman* infantry, in one deep phalanx, preſſed after the retiring *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, and ſo became at length wedged between the two bodies of *Africans*. Now, how could this happen, if the *ſpace between thoſe two bodies* was but *one third* of *Hannibal*'s line of foot? For is it credible, that the *Roman* Generals could be ſo infatuated as, in the heat of the battle, to contract the front of their army to one third of it's firſt extent, draw ALL the battalions of the wings to the center, and leave no troops to oppoſe the two wings (two thirds) of *Hannibal*'s line, that were ſtanding before them in battle array? And if thoſe Generals, to deepen their center, only *thinned* their wings (as Chevalier *Folard* ſuppoſes) what advantage could *Hannibal* hope from drawing the *Roman* center within his two wings? Since theſe wings, while employed in attacking the flanks of that center, would themſelves be expoſed to be attacked both in flank and rear by the remainder of the *Roman* wings; which, if we ſuppoſe them diminiſhed by *one half*, were ſtill equal in number of men to the *Carthaginian* wings.

It would ſeem therefore that the plans which repreſent *Hannibal*'s creſcent, as making but *one third* of his line, muſt be extremely faulty.

Chevalier *Folard*, though he ſpeaks as if he were a perfect maſter of the ſubject, is as unſatisfactory in his account of the battle as any writer before him. His plan of it (tom. 4. p. 391.) repreſents *Hannibal*'s curve, as but *one third* of his line of foot: but being aware of the *ſmall number* of *Africans* in the *Carthaginian* army, much too ſmall to make the other *two thirds* of the line (as they do in the Jeſuits plan) he repreſents the curve as conſiſting of only a *part* of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*; the remainder of which troops ſtand extended to the right and left from the horns of the creſcent, and between it and the *Africans*, who make only the extremities of the line, or the outer parts of the wings.

The employment, which the Chevalier finds for theſe wings, is not to give upon the flanks of the *Romans* that were advanced within the hollow of the inverted curve, but to wheel, extend themſelves, and attack both in flank and rear the *Roman* wings, which, he ſuppoſes, to be ſtill ſubſiſting, though much weakened by the imprudence of their leaders.

This account of the action has not the leaſt foundation in *Polybius*, who does not ſay, that the *Romans* of the center, by raſhly purſuing the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of *Hannibal*'s creſcent, came between other *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of his wings (as they muſt do according to the Chevalier's plan) but between the two bodies of *Africans*. The *Africans* are the only troops the hiſtorian ſpeaks of as coming upon the flanks of the *Romans*. Nor does he ſay any thing of the *Africans wheeling and extending themſelves to attack the* Roman *wings in flank and rear*, but that turning or inclining (κλίνασις) one part of them to the ſhield, the other to the ſpear, i. e. one facing or turning to the right, the other to the left, they preſſed upon the flanks of thoſe *Romans* that were purſuing the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of *Hannibal*'s creſcent or center.

The Roman *wings*, ſays the Chevalier, *ſtill ſubſiſted, though much weakened by the draughts made from them.* I know not how much the Chevalier would allow them to be weakened. But if we ſuppoſe them to be diminiſhed by one half, they were ſtill equal (as I ſaid before) in number of men to the *Carthaginian* wings; and it is hardly credible that the *Roman* wings having at this time no enemies to contend with but the *Carthaginian* wings, ſhould ſtand ſtill while theſe were wheeling and extending themſelves, to come upon their flank and rear; or that the *Carthaginians* ſhould find their account in ſuch an attempt.

I ſhall obſerve, by the way, that *Polybius* never ſpeaks of any part of the *Roman* army being attacked in *rear* by the *Carthaginian foot*. This was left for *Aſdrubal* and his *horſe*,

Y. of *R.* 537 cavalry ſeventy only eſcaped with the Conſul to *Venuſia*, and about three
Bef. *J.C.* 215 hundred more into other neighbouring towns, two thouſand were taken
236 Conſul-p priſoners the reſt were ſlain.

The

horſe, who could hardly have performed this part without riding over the *Africans*, had theſe incloſed the *Romans* behind.

What ſeems to have driven the Chevalier into all theſe deviations from his author, is his fundamental error of forming *Hannibal*'s creſcent out of but *one third* of his line.

Sir *Walter Raleigh* has gone into the other extreme. To account for the *whole* Roman *army's being incloſed by the enemy* he ſuppoſes that *Hannibal*'s creſcent was of ſuch extent, as to make his *whole front*; that the *Romans* ſaw nothing before them but that creſcent; that the *Africans* (deep in file) were hid behind it's two corners, and not diſcovered by the *Romans* till they were attacked by them. "*For* it is agreed, "ſays he, that the *Romans* were encom- "paſſed *unawares*, and that they behaved "themſelves as men who thought upon no "other work than what was found them "by the *Gauls*. Neither is it credible, that "they would have been ſo mad, as to run "headlong with the whole bulk of their "army into the throat of ſlaughter, had "they ſeen thoſe weapons bent againſt "them at the firſt, which when they did "ſee, they had little hope to eſcape. Much "might be imputed to their heat of fight, "and raſhneſs of inferior captains: but "ſince the Conſul *Paulus*, a man ſo expert
* See p. 127. "in war, being vanquiſhed in horſe, had "put himſelf among the legions, it cannot "be ſuppoſed that he and they did wilfully "thus engage themſelves."

That *Hannibal*'s creſcent of *Gauls* and *Spaniards* made the *whole* of his front, cannot be reconciled with *Polybius* or *Livy*, who expreſly relate, that the *Carthaginian* drew up all his infantry in one line, of which the *Africans* made the two points or wings; and *Polybius* more than once in deſcribing the action, calls this creſcent τὰ μέσα the middle or center of *Hannibal*'s battalia, and the *Africans* are ſpoke of, not as hid, but as *appearing* to the enemy armed after the *Roman* manner.

But it is not credible, ſays Sir *Walter*, that the *Romans* would have been ſo mad as to run with the whole bulk of their army between the *Africans*, had they ſeen them at firſt.

I will not pretend to *remove* this difficulty. All I can aim at, is, in ſome meaſure to *leſſen* it.

Hannibal's infantry is ſaid to have conſiſted of about 40000 men, extended at firſt in one ſtrait line. Of this line the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* (who afterwards formed themſelves into a creſcent) made the middle or center, and the *Africans* the wings. Now if that *middle part*, inſtead of being but *one third*, was at leaſt *nine tenths* of the line, as there is good reaſon to believe, it will much leſſen our wonder, that the *Romans*, when they had forced that middle part to give ground, ſhould imagine themſelves ſecure of the victory, and unwarily engage themſelves between the *Africans*, who made ſo narrow a front, as only a *tenth* of the *Carthaginian* line, that is to ſay, at each extremity a *twentieth*.

That the *Africans* made but a *very narrow front*, in reſpect of the reſt of the line, may, I think, be fairly collected from the *ſmall number* to which we are obliged to reduce them, and from the *manner in which* it is reaſonable to believe *they were drawn up*.

It cannot be ſuppoſed that the *Africans* amounted to above 8000 men. *Hannibal* brought into *Italy* but 20000 foot, of which number 12000 only were *Africans* *, and the other 8000 *Spaniards*. At the battle of the *Trebia*, his heavy armed infantry, *Spaniards*, *Africans*, and *Gauls* were but 20000 in all. He loſt ſome of his *Africans* in this battle, ſome at the lake *Thraſymenus*; and doubtleſs the *Africans* ſuffer'd with the reſt of the troops in their march through the fens of *Hetruria*, and in their other fatigues. *Hannibal* had now been three years in *Italy*, and had received no recruits from *Africa*; and from all theſe conſiderations we may well conclude, that his *Africans* were diminiſhed by one third at leaſt, before the battle of *Cannæ*.

Now ſuppoſing the *Africans* to be but 8000 of *Hannibal*'s 40000 foot, and ſuppoſing his battalia to be every where of

equal

The whole of the infantry that had been in the battle, was cut off except about 3000 [4] who fled, moſt of them to *Canuſium*. Among the dead were, beſide the Conſul *Æmilius*, the two Pro-Conſuls *Servilius* and *Atilius*, *M. Minucius* late Maſter of the horſe to *Fabius*, two military Quæſtors, twenty-nine legionary Tribunes, with eighty perſons who had either been Senators, or had born ſuch offices as entitled them to be choſen into the Senate. Thoſe of the infantry who were taken priſoners had not been in the fight. *Varro*, by the advice of *Æmilius*, had left 10000 foot in his greater camp, with orders to attack the camp of *Hannibal* during the battle. The Conſul's view in this was, to oblige the *Carthaginian* either to abandon his baggage, or to leave a greater part of his forces to guard it than he could well ſpare from the general action. The deſign ſo far ſucceeded, that *Hannibal* was juſt upon the point of loſing his camp, when (after his victory in the field) he came

A. Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 22. c. 49.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 117.

equal depth, it is plain that the *Africans* could make no more than one fifth part of the *Carthaginian* front, or one tenth of it at each extremity of the line. But if we conſider, that *Hannibal*'s intention, from the beginning of the day, was to draw the bulk of the *Roman* army between his *Africans*, it is reaſonable to believe that he ſo diſpoſed thoſe *Africans* as to hide their ſtrength as much as poſſible; and that he gave them no more *extent in front*, than was neceſſary to be their *depth* when they ſhould face, one part of them to the right, and the other to the left, to attack the flanks of the *Romans* preſſing after the retiring *Gauls* and *Spaniards*; and if ſo, it is probable that the front, which the *Africans* made, was not ſo much as a tenth part of the line, or, at each extremity a twentieth. And this being granted, it will not be ſo aſtoniſhing that the bulk of the *Roman* army ſhould run precipitately between them. That the *whole* did, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *engage themſelves between the* Africans, I do not conceive neceſſary to be ſuppoſed, in order to account for the event of the battle. For it ſeems from *Polybius*'s relation, that none of thoſe who *did ſo engage themſelves*, eſcaped deſtruction. Yet we find, according to the ſame author, that 3000 of the *Roman* foot eſcaped from the battle, and according to *Livy*, a much greater number. Theſe might be of the troops that were in the points of the *Roman* battalia, and who probably took to their heels as ſoon as they ſaw *Aſdrubal* with his horſe coming upon the rear of the legions.

[4] *Dionyſius* of *Halicarnaſſus* agrees nearly with *Polybius* as to the number of men the *Romans* loſt in this battle. Of 6000 horſe (ſays he, Antiquit. B. 2. p. 37.) there remained only 370, and of 80000 foot there eſcaped ſomewhat more than 3000. But *Livy* differs from *them*, and is not very conſiſtent with himſelf. According to the firſt account he gives, the ſum total of thoſe that were ſlain and taken priſoners amounts to about 59400, and of thoſe that eſcaped to about 5670. In which reckonings (ſuppoſing, as he ſeems to do, that the whole *Roman* army at *Cannæ* conſiſted of 87200 men) there are above 18000 omitted. He afterwards tells us (B. 22. c. 54, 49). that there were got together of the fugitives 10000 at *Canuſium*, and 4070 at *Venuſia*. In this caſe the number of the priſoners and the ſlain would be 73130. But (c. 56.) he makes *Varro* write to the Senate from *Canuſium* (after he had brought to that place thoſe that had fled to *Venuſia*) that the whole remains of the *Roman* army were only 10000 men. And yet in the ſame book (c. 60.) *M. Torquatus* tells the Senate, that if the captives who petitioned to be ranſomed, and who (as one of themſelves had ſaid a little before) amounted to 8000 men, were added to the forces at *Canuſium*, the republic would have there an army of 20000 men. According to *Appian*, the whole *Roman* army at *Cannæ* conſiſted of 70000 foot and 6000 horſe, of which 50000 were ſlain, a great number taken priſoners, and about 10000 eſcaped to *Canuſium*.

In *Hannibal*. c. 323.

Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p. to the aſſiſtance of the few troops he had left to defend it. Upon his approach, the aſſailants fled to their own entrenchments; where being inveſted, they ſurrendered themſelves priſoners, after they had loſt 2000 of their number [e].

Hannibal's loſs of men on this important day amounted to no more than 4000 *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, 1500 *Africans*, and 200 horſe [f].

Polyb. B. 3. c. 118. The conſequence of this victory (ſays *Polybius*) was ſuch as both parties had expected [g]. *Hannibal* became maſter of almoſt all *Great Greece*.

[e] *Livy* relates that 7000 *Romans* fled out of the battle to the leſſer camp, 10000 to the greater, and that 2000 took refuge in the village of *Cannæ*. Theſe laſt were immediately ſurrounded by *Carthalo*, and taken priſoners. The ſoldiers in the greater camp, who were without leaders, and but half-armed, ſent a meſſenger to thoſe in the leſſer, deſiring they would come over to them in the night, that they might march together and take refuge in *Canuſium*, a city not far diſtant. But the troops in the little camp could not be prevailed upon to hearken to this propoſal, fearing to be intercepted by the enemy in their paſſage. Nevertheleſs 600 of them, encouraged by *Sempronius Tuditanus*, a legionary tribune who commanded them, drew themſelves up in the form of a wedge, and caſting their ſhields upon their right arms, to defend themſelves from the darts of the *Numidians*, to which they were expoſed upon that ſide, made their way through the enemy to the great camp, from whence, in conjunction with another large body, they eſcaped to *Canuſium*. Next day *Hannibal* having inveſted the little camp, the *Romans* ſurrendered upon terms. They had leave to depart each with one garment, upon paying a certain ranſom. In the mean time about 4000 foot and 200 horſe eſcaped from the great camp in ſtraggling parties to *Canuſium*. The reſt yielded upon the conditions granted to thoſe of the little camp.

[f] According to the *Latin* hiſtorian the loſs of the *Carthaginians* amounted to 8000 men. *Liv.* B. 22. c. 52.

[g] *Livy* thinks it might reaſonably have been expected that *Hannibal* ſhould have taken *Rome* immediately after the battle of *Cannæ*. When the *Carthaginian* officers (ſays that author) flocked round their General, congratulating him on his victory, and adviſing him to ſpend the reſt of that day, and the following night, in refreſhing himſelf and his wearied Troops, *Maharbal*, on the contrary, preſſed him not to loſe a moment's time. *That you may know* (ſaid he) *the importance of this victory, follow me, I will inſtantly march away with the cavalry, and be at* Rome *before they have notice of my coming. In five days we ſhall ſup in the capitol.* *Hannibal* commended his zeal, but told him that what he had propoſed was of too great moment to be ſuddenly reſolved upon, and that he would take time to conſider of it. *Nay then* (ſaid Maharbal) *I find that no one man is endued by the Gods with all talents.* Hannibal *knows how to conquer, but he knows not how to make advantage of his victories.* It is generally believed (adds *Livy*) that this day's delay was the preſervation of the city and empire of *Rome*. B. 22. c. 51.

Several of the ancients have joined with *Livy* in blaming *Hannibal* for not laying ſiege to *Rome* without delay, but whether juſtly or not may very well be a queſtion. If the advantages he had gained were, as *Polybius* ſays, chiefly owing to the ſuperiority of his cavalry, thoſe could be of little uſe in a ſiege, and the *Roman* infantry not inferior to his, would be invincible behind walls. *Rome* was provided with every thing neceſſary to ſuſtain a ſiege. After the battle of *Thraſymen*, it's fortifications had been repaired, (*Liv.* B. 22. c. 8.) and *Polybius* takes notice of the care of the Senate upon the preſent occaſion to put the city in a poſture of defence, (B. 3. c. 118.) *Rome* abounded with ſoldiers well trained to war. *Livy* ſpeaks of four new legions and 1000 horſe raiſed in the city by *Junius Pera*, who was made Dictator immediately after the battle of *Cannæ*. (*Liv.* B. 22. c. 57.) And excluſive of theſe the ſame Dictator led out an army of 25000 men (id. B. 23.

Greece[h]. Nay, the *Carthaginians* were not without hope, by ſome ſudden ſtroke, to poſſeſs themſelves of *Rome*. The *Romans*, on the other hand, deſpaired of being able to retain the dominion of *Italy*, and, every moment expecting to hear of *Hannibal*'s approach, were in the utmoſt anxiety for themſelves and for their country. The Senators nevertheleſs preſerved their fortitude and dignity; they all zealouſly applied themſelves to put the city in a poſture of defence, and did every thing that could be done for the common ſafety. And though the *Romans* were now undoubtedly vanquiſhed, and yielded, for the preſent, in military glory, to their enemies, yet by their courage, ſteadineſs, and unwearied labours, the wiſdom of their counſels, and the conſtitution of their government, they not only recovered the empire of *Italy*, but totally ſubdued the *Carthaginians*, and in a few years after became lords of the world.

Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

B. 23. c. 14.) which he would not have done, had not he thought he had left troops enough in the town to defend it. *Marcellus* had alſo ſent from *Oſtia* 1500 men to ſtrengthen the gariſon of *Rome* (*Liv.* B. 22. c. 57)

Now what forces had *Hannibal* to bring againſt ſo powerful a city? His army after the battle of *Cannæ* conſiſted of ſcarce 45000 men, 9800 of which were cavalry. He was moreover intirely unprovided of implements for carrying on a ſiege. And had he marched directly to *Rome*, it is not probable any of the nations of *Italy* would have gone over to him. At moſt they would have waited the iſſue of the ſiege, in which, if he had not ſucceeded, they would have been the leſs diſpoſed to venture themſelves under his protection. Nor perhaps would it have been prudent in him, when not one city in *Italy* had declared for him, to neglect the other towns (that were beginning to waver in their fidelity to the *Romans*) to go and beſiege the capital; eſpecially ſince his hopes of ſucceſs in this undertaking muſt have depended more on the terror of his name, than the force of his arms. And that both theſe would have been inſufficient ſeems plain from the little effect they had upon *Nola* and *Naples*, which cities were twice in vain attempted by *Hannibal* ſoon after his victory at *Cannæ*, (*Liv* B. 23. c. 1, 14, 16.) *Nuceria* alſo and *Caſilinum*, two inconſiderable towns, gave him a great deal of trouble before he could reduce them. The latter held out more than a whole winter, though defended by only 960 men. (*Liv.* B. 23. c. 15, 17, 18, 19.)

Add to this, that had *Hannibal* laid ſiege to *Rome*, it is not likely that the *Latin* nations, and thoſe other of the allies who always continued ſteady to her intereſt, would have quietly looked on till the city had been taken. And that theſe allies were not yet exhauſted of ſoldiers, is plain from the great levies made among them in the courſe of this war. In the Dictatorſhip of *Junius Pera*, juſt after the defeat at *Cannæ*, the *Roman* armies in *Italy* (reckoning the remains of *Cannæ* at 10000) amounted to above 84000 men, as appears from *Livy* B. 22. c. 57. and B. 23. c. 14. The year after, the Republic had twelve legions on foot, and the year after that eighteen legions (*Liv.* B. 24. c. 11.) The third year after the battle they had twenty-one legions, and the fourth, viz. in the Conſulſhip of *Q. Fulvius Flaccus* and *Appius Claudius Pulcher*, twenty-three Legions. (*Liv.* B. 25. c. 3.)

Upon the whole, *Livy*'s cenſure of *Hannibal*'s conduct ſeems not well founded, and the rather as we do not find that *Polybius* has any where blamed him upon this article.

[h] The nations that revolted to the *Carthaginians* after the battle of *Cannæ* are thus reckoned up by *Livy* (B. 22. c. 61.) The *Atellani*, *Calatini* and *Hirpini*, part of *Apulia*, the *Samnites* except the *Pentri*, all the *Bruttians*, the *Lucanians*, the *Surrentini*, and almoſt all *Great Greece*, the *Tarentines*, *Metapontines*, *Crotonienſes*, *Locri*, and all the *Ciſalpine Gauls*.

Y. of *R.* 537.
Bef. *J. C.* 215.
236 Conſul-p.

CHAP. XXII.

The extreme terror, with which the Romans *were ſtruck, by their defeat at* Cannæ. *Their reception of* Terentius Varro *at* Rome. *They refuſe to redeem the priſoners.* Hannibal *gets poſſeſſion of* Capua, *and winters there. He ſends to* Carthage *an account of his victories. The* Romans *create a Dictator for the ſole affair of filling the many vacant places in their Senate.*

Liv. B. 22. c. 53.

AMONG thoſe *Romans*, who had fled from the late battle to *Canuſium*, were four legionary Tribunes. Of theſe the ſoldiers choſe two, to be their chief commanders, *Appius Claudius Pulcher* and *P. Cornelius Scipio*, the ſon of the Pro-Conſul in *Spain*. Whilſt *Scipio* (who was now about nineteen years of age) was deliberating with his collegue, and ſome others, what meaſures to take, notice was brought them, that certain young men of the beſt families of *Rome*, at the head of whom was *L. Cecilius Metellus*, giving all up for loſt, had reſolved to embark at the firſt port, and fly from *Italy*. So baſe a thought ſtirred up *Scipio*'s indignation. Turning therefore to the company, he ſaid, *Let thoſe who value the preſervation of* Rome *follow me.* They all went immediately to the houſe where the young Patricians were aſſembled. *Scipio*, as he entered their chamber, *I ſwear*, ſaid he, drawing his ſword, *that I will never abandon the Republic, nor conſent that any of her citizens forſake her; I call the great* Jupiter *to witneſs this my oath:* And then addreſſing himſelf to *Metellus*, he added, *Do you,* Metellus, *and all that are here preſent take the ſame oath, or not a man of you ſhall eſcape this ſword.* His look, his action, his menaces ſo terrified them all, that they readily came into the engagements he required.

The conſternation and deſpondency of the people at *Rome* almoſt equalled thoſe of *Metellus* and his companions. For it was there currently reported that both the Conſuls were killed, and their armies ſo entirely deſtroyed, that not an officer, nor hardly a ſingle ſoldier remained alive; and that *Hannibal* was maſter of *Apulia*, *Samnium*, and all *Italy*. The *Conſcript Fathers*, the pilots of the ſtate, did not, however, leave the helm becauſe the ſtorm blew high. For want of Conſuls the two Prætors aſſembled them. As *Fabius*'s *cunctation*, that *lingering war*, he had counſelled and practiſed againſt *Hannibal*, was diſcovered, by the preſent calamity, to have been the dictate of wiſdom, *he* now was principally liſtened to. He adviſed, that ſome horſemen well mounted ſhould be ſent out upon the *Appian* and *Latine* roads, to learn, if poſſible, of ſuch as they met, the true ſtate of affairs, what was become of the Conſuls; to what place the remains of the army, if there were any, had retreated; where *Hannibal* was encamped; what he was doing, and what he deſigned to do: That the women ſhould be forbid to appear in public, diſturbing the city with their lamentations:

That

That when any courier arrived, he ſhould be brought privately and without noiſe to the Prætors; and that no perſon ſhould be ſuffered to go out of the city. Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

Not long after, a meſſenger arrived from *Terentius*; his letters imported that the *Roman* army had been defeated; that his collegue *Æmilius* was ſlain; that he himſelf was retired to *Canuſium*, where he was aſſembling the remains of the troops; that about 10000 men of different corps, and for the moſt part without officers, had joined him; and that *Hannibal* was ſtill at *Cannæ* [i].

At the ſame time a bark arrived from *Sicily* with advice from the Pro-Prætor *Otacilius*, that one *Carthaginian* ſquadron was ravaging the coaſt of *Syracuſe*, while another appeared off the *Ægates* ready to make a deſcent at *Lilybæum*; and that it was neceſſary to ſend a fleet thither with all ſpeed. The *Conſcript Fathers*, not dejected at theſe additional cares, prepared for the defence both of *Italy* and *Sicily*. *Marcellus*, appointed Prætor for the laſt named province, and now at *Oſtia* aboard the fleet, was ordered to reſign the conduct of it to *P. Furius Philus*, the Prætor *Peregrinus*, and to go and take upon him the command of the army at *Canuſium*. As for *Terentius Varro*, the Senate recalled him to *Rome*; and nothing has been more wondered at, than the reſpect with which he was received at his arrival. Multitudes of people of all ranks went out to meet him, and the Senate returned him thanks *for that he had not deſpaired of the commonwealth*. How different this conduct, ſays *Livy*, from that of the *Carthaginians*, who were wont to put their unſucceſsful Generals to the moſt cruel deaths [k]! *Liv.* B. 22. c. 61.

As

[i] *Livy* ſays that *Hannibal*, after this famous battle, acted more like a man that had finiſhed his conqueſts than one that had a war to carry on, and that he was ſitting at *Cannæ* bargaining about his plunder and the captives, in a manner very unbecoming a great General (*Liv.* B 22 c 56, 58.) If this be not a calumny, at leaſt the *Carthaginian* did not continue *long* thus employed; for the ſame author begins his 23d book by telling us, that *Hannibal*, after the battle of *Cannæ*, having taken and plundered the *Roman* camps, marched immediately (*confeſtim*) from *Apulia* into *Samnium*.

[k] The Reception *Varro* met with at *Rome*, and his being afterwards intruſted with the command of an army, ſeem to have been the effects of juſt policy in the *Romans*. This General had done nothing irregular, nothing contrary to orders. The Senate and people had ſent him to fight *Hannibal*, not to follow him at a diſtance like *Fabius*. *Æmilius*, it is true, was againſt fighting at that time; and he was an able General. But what then? *Varro* was not obliged to follow his advice. In a diſpute they had had a little before about marching, *Æmilius* had no officer of his opinion, except the late Conſul *Servilius*, as we are informed by *Livy*. And there is reaſon to think that it was not only the general inclination of the ſoldiers, but agreeable to the judgment of moſt of the officers, that *Varro* ſhould fight, when he did. No objection is made to the order of his battle. If a fatal error was committed during the action, through the raſhneſs of the infantry imagining themſelves victorious, this was no more imputable to *Varro* than to *Æmilius*. In ſhort, as *Varro* does not appear to be chargeable with any thing worſe, than the having ſuch a dependence on the number and valour of his troops, as to venture a battle contrary to the advice of his collegue, it ought not perhaps to be ſo ſurpriſing that the Senate and people received him in the manner they did. They could not have treated him with rigour without

V. of *R* 537. Bef *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p

As the preſent ſituation of things required an abſolute magiſtrate to govern the ſtate, *M. Junius Pera* was, by the authority of the Senate, named Dictator, and *Sempronius Gracchus* to be his General of the horſe.

Livy, B. 22. c. 57.

Junius made it his whole buſineſs to put the army in a condition to reſiſt the enemy. Four legions and a thouſand horſe were raiſed among the citizens of *Rome*. The two *Latiums*, the *Municipia*, and the colonies furniſhed their contingents as uſual; and to all theſe were added 8000 ſlaves, whom the Republic bought of their maſters, and who were called *Volones*, from the word *volo* (I will) which every one returned in anſwer, when he was aſked, whether he would ſerve in the troops. To recruit the treaſury, which was greatly exhauſted, and to put the public revenues under a good regulation, three men of eminent prudence and integrity were choſen for that truſt. And then, the Senators giving the example, and being followed by the knights, the whole people in general of the *Roman* tribes brought all their gold to the public treaſury; the Senators only reſerving their rings, and the *bullæ* about their childrens necks. The ſilver coin was now, for the firſt time, alloyed with copper.

Faſt.

Liv. B. 23. c. 21.

Florus, B. 2. c. 6.

Liv. B. 22. c. 56. 58.

While they were thus employed at *Rome*, *Hannibal*, to get a ſupply of money, and with the further view of abating the obſtinate reſolution of the *Romans* in battle, by the hopes of being ranſomed, in caſe they ſhould be defeated and taken, gave leave to his *Roman* priſoners, to redeem themſelves[l]. Theſe choſe out ten of their body, to ſend to *Rome*, to negotiate their redemption; and *Hannibal* exacted no other ſecurity for their return than an oath. They were accompanied by a noble *Carthaginian*, named *Carthalo*, who, in caſe he found the *Romans* inclined to peace, was empowered to declare upon what terms *Hannibal* would grant it. Upon the firſt report of *Carthalo*'s arrival, the Dictator ſent a lictor to order him out of the *Roman* territory. The ten deputies were admitted to an audience of the Senate. *M. Junius*, the chief of them, pleaded with great earneſtneſs in behalf of the captives. He juſtified them from the charge of cowardice in having yielded themſelves priſoners to the enemy. He alledged that they had been left in the camp to defend it, that they had done nothing cowardly or unworthy the *Roman* name, but by the adverſe fortune of the day, the troops in the field being all cut off, they had been under a neceſſity of ſurrendering to the conqueror. He cited precedents of the regard had to priſoners in former times, and urged the advantage it would be to the Republic, to have in her army 8000 *Romans*, redeemed at a leſs [m] price than the purchaſe of ſo many ſlaves would

c. 59.

without diſcouraging their Generals, which might have been of dangerous conſequence at this juncture. Nor is it much to be wondered at that they employed him again. He was very humble after his defeat at *Cannæ*, and behaved himſelf to the general ſatisfaction of both Senate and people. However, they never put him at the head of a great army; he ſeldom had the command of above one legion.

* *Liv.* B. 22. c. 58.

[l] The ranſom of each horſeman he fixed at 500 *denarii* (16l 2s. 11d); that of each ſoldier at 300 (9l. 3s 9d); and that of each ſlave at 100 (3l. 4s 7d.) *

[m] This (ſays Sir *W. Raleigh*) is but a tale deviſed to countenance the *Roman* proceedings,

would amount to. His diſcourſe was ſeconded by the multitude, whoſe concern for their relations in captivity had brought them together; and they implored the clemency of the *Fathers* in a ſuppliant manner. Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

The Senate debated the matter for ſome time, being much divided in opinion; but at length they concluded abſolutely againſt the redemption of the captives: For having penetrated into *Hannibal*'s views, they would convince their ſoldiers, that they muſt either conquer or be at the mercy of their enemies.

Hannibal, after his victory at *Cannæ*, marched without delay from *Apulia* into *Samnium*. *Compſa*, a city of *Hirpini*, almoſt at the head of the *Aufidus*, ſurrendered to him, and was the firſt which fell off from the *Romans*. Having here placed a gariſon, together with all his plunder and baggage, he divided his army. One part of it he gave to his brother *Mago* to reduce the towns and fortreſſes of this country and of all *Bruttium*; and with the other he himſelf marched towards *Naples*, to get poſſeſſion, if practicable, of that maritime city, which would open to him an eaſy communication with *Africa*. But though he drew a part of the gariſon into an ambuſcade, and cut them off, yet the ſtrength of the place deterred him from laying ſiege to it. *Liv.* B. 23. c. 1.

From thence he turned towards *Capua*. This city, which had been formerly governed by *Roman* laws, and a *Roman* prefect, was now a *Municipium*, and choſe her own magiſtrates; and the *Capuans* had the uncommon privilege of intermarrying with the *Romans*. After the battle of the lake *Thraſymenus*, one *Pacuvius Calavius*, a man of the greateſt intereſt among the people, and then governor of the town, had laid a deſign to aſſaſſinate the Senate, who were odious both to himſelf and the people, and deliver up the place to *Hannibal:* But afterwards he thought that to aſſume a kind of ſovereignty himſelf there, would be a better ſcheme, than that of introducing a ſtranger to uſurp it. The only difficulty he had was to engage the Senators, who were univerſally for adhering to the *Romans*, to favour the project of his ambition. To this end, he told them that the people had ſworn to cut their throats, and to ſurrender up *Capua* to the *Carthaginians*; but that if they would leave themſelves to his conduct, he would preſerve them. The Senators truſted him, upon his oath, and ſuffered him to c. 2. & ſeq.

ings, as if they had been ſevere, when as indeed they were ſuitable to the preſent fortune, poor and ſomewhat beggarly. Hereof it is no little proof, that *Hannibal* valued thoſe *Roman* ſlaves whom he had taken in the camp among their maſters, at no more, than every one the third part of a common ſoldier's ranſom: and likely it is, that he offered them at the price, whereat he thought them current. But if we ſhould ſuppoſe, that by trading with *Hannibal*, a better bargain for ſlaves might have been made, than was by the ſtate at home, in dealing with private men; yet muſt we withal conſider, that theſe private men did only *lend* theſe ſlaves for a while unto the commonwealth, and were afterwards contented *to forbear the price of them*, until the war ſhould be ended. [*Liv.* B. 24 c. 18.] If *Hannibal* would have given ſuch long day of payment, it is likely that the *Romans* would have been his chapmen: but ſeeing he dealt only for ready money, they choſe rather to ſay we *will not* give, than we *can not*. *Hiſt. of the World*, part 1. B. 5. ch. 3. §. 9.

ſhut

Y. of *R* 537 Bef. *C.* 215 Consul-p

ſhut them up in the temple, where they were then aſſembled, and to ſet a guard at the door. He then called the people together, and acquainted them, that the Senate were now entirely in his power, and that he would abandon thoſe deteſtable ſlaves of *Rome* to their reſentment, to be treated according to their demerits; but he inſiſted that (in order to preſerve the old form of government, which ought not to be deſtroyed) as ſoon as any one of them had received ſentence, and before he was executed, the people ſhould name ſome man of probity, to ſucceed him; by which ſtratagem, *Pacuvius* ſaved the lives of all the Senators; for the multitude could not agree upon this man of probity. Some diſqualification or other was ſtill objected to whoever was named; ſo that in the end, the people finding that they could not rid themſelves of their preſent Senate without chooſing a worſe, deſired that all the priſoners might be releaſed; and from this time the Senate courted the people by all manner of kindneſs and adulation, and (if we may credit *Livy*) *Pacuvius* acquired an abſolute aſcendant over both.

After the defeat of the *Romans* at *Cannæ*, the *Capuans* were again diſpoſed to ſide with the *Carthaginians*. Two reaſons reſtrained them; the intermarriages before-mentioned, and the conſideration that the flower of their nobility were in the ſervice of the *Romans*, in *Sicily*, and were therefore as ſo many hoſtages for their fidelity. And the relations of theſe young men prevailed to have a deputation ſent to the Conſul *Terentius*, then at *Venuſia*, to offer him ſuccours. Theſe deputies found the Conſul ſo dejected and deſponding, that, weighing the circumſtances of things, they thought the time now come to ſhake off the *Roman* yoke, and recover their ancient liberty. But to do this with the more decency, they firſt ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome*, with ſuch propoſals as they knew would not be received. They demanded, that for the future *Rome* and *Capua* ſhould be upon a perfect equality, and that every year one of the Conſuls ſhould be choſen out of the *Capuans*.

The *Conſcript Fathers* having haughtily rejected the demand, it was carried by a majority of voices, both of the Senate and people of *Capua*, to ſend deputies to treat with *Hannibal*. They demanded entire liberty and independence, and that three hundred *Roman* knights ſhould be put into their hands, to be exchanged againſt the ſame number of *Capuan* youths in the ſervice of *Rome*. *Hannibal* readily granted all that was aſk'd; and then the people contrived to have all the *Romans* in the city ſhut up in the public baths, and there ſuffocated. One *Decius Magius*, a man of a *Roman* ſpirit, and a friend to the *Romans*, loudly declared againſt theſe proceedings of his countrymen, warning them not to receive a *Carthaginian* gariſon, and putting them in mind of *Pyrrhus*'s tyranny over the people of *Tarentum*; but his diſcourſe was deſpiſed. When *Hannibal* was to make his entry, all the town crowded to meet him, except this *Magius*, and ſome few of the nobility, among whom was *Perolla*, the ſon of *Pacuvius*, who though not governor of

Capua at this time, had been the ſoul of all the late proceedings. *Pe-* Y. of *R.* 537.
rolla was afterwards obliged by his father to go and pay his homage to Bef. *J. C.* 215.
Hannibal, nevertheleſs having deeply imbibed the ſentiments of *Magius*, 236 Conſul p.
he formed a reſolution to ſtab the *Carthaginian* General, at a magnificent entertainment which *Pacuvius* and ſome other of the principal citizens were to give him: but the young man, having communicated the deſign to his father, was by his tears and entreaties diſſuaded from it. The next *Liv.* B. 23.
day the Senate aſſembled, and *Hannibal* complaining to them of the diſ- c. 10.
affection of *Magius*, this brave man was delivered up to him, loaded with irons, and put on board a ſhip bound for *Carthage*. A tempeſt drove the veſſel into the port of *Cyrene*, a city belonging to the kings of *Egypt*; there the priſoner finding means to get to a ſtatue of *Ptolemy Philopater*, and laying hold of it, the *Carthaginians* durſt not drag him from that ſanctuary. The *Cyrenians* conveyed him to *Alexandria*, where he choſe to continue under the protection of *Ptolemy*.

About this time *Hannibal* diſpatched his brother *Mago* to *Carthage* with an account of his ſucceſs. *Mago* reported to the Senate, "That "their General had defeated ſix Conſular armies, ſlain above 200000 *Liv.* B. 23.
"*Romans*, and taken more than 50000 priſoners; that *Bruttium* and c. 12
"*Apulia*, with a part of *Samnium*, and a part of *Lucania*, had revolted "to the *Carthaginians*; that *Capua*, the chief city, not of *Campania* "only, but (in the preſent low eſtate of *Rome*) even of *Italy*, had ſur- "rendered to *Hannibal*:" and he concluded with ſaying, "That for "ſo many and ſo great victories it was meet to return ſolemn thanks "to the immortal Gods." To verify his report he ſpread abroad in the Senate-houſe, ſome ſay *one*, others *three* buſhels of gold rings taken from the *Roman* Knights and Senators. Having thus pre-poſſeſſed the Senate in favour of his brother, he proceeded to ſolicit for him ſupplies of men, corn, and money, that he might be enabled to carry on ſo ſucceſsful a war. The requeſt was univerſally applauded; and *Himilco*, a Senator of the *Barchine* faction, turning towards *Hanno*, as it were to inſult him, "Well, *Hanno*, are you ſtill diſſatisfied that "we entered into a war againſt *Rome?* Are you ſtill of opinion that "we ought to deliver up *Hannibal?* Come, declare againſt our giving "thanks to the Gods for our ſucceſs; ſpeak, *Hanno*, let us hear the "language of a *Roman* in a *Carthaginian* Senate." *Hanno* roſe up; c. 13.
"To day, Fathers, if I had not been *compelled* to ſpeak, I ſhould have "held my peace, that, in this concert of *your common gladneſs*, no diſ- "cordant word might drop, from *me*. But to be ſilent when thus in- "terrogated by a Senator, would argue either pride or diſaffection to "the ſtate, a diſregard of other mens liberty or of my own. To *Hi-* "*milco*, therefore, I anſwer, that I do ſtill condemn the war, and that "I never ſhall ceaſe to blame our invincible General, till I ſee it ended "by a peace upon ſome tolerable conditions. The exploits which "*Mago* has boaſted of, have cauſed much joy to *Himilco* and his friends.

Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215 236 Conſul-p

" To *me* too they *may* prove matter of joy, if a proper uſe be made of " them for bringing about an honourable peace. But what is the " ground of all this exultation? To what does it amount? *I have ſlain,* " ſays *Hannibal, whole armies of enemies: ſend me ſoldiers.* What elſe " could he have aſked had he been vanquiſhed? *I have taken two camps,* " full, doubtleſs, of wealth and proviſions: *ſupply me with corn and money.* " What other demand could he have made, had he loſt his own camp " with every thing that was in it? And, that I alone may not wonder " at all this, I would have *Himilco* (for as I have anſwered him, I " have now ſurely a right to interrogate) I ſay, I would have *Himilco* " or *Mago* anſwer *me* ſome queſtions. The *Roman* empire, it ſeems, " was overturned at the battle of *Cannæ*, and all *Italy* is revolting: Is " any one, I pray, of the *Latine nations* come over to us? Has any one " man of the *five and thirty tribes* deſerted to *Hannibal?*" When *Mago* had to both theſe anſwered in the negative: " There remain then (re- " plied *Hanno*) a huge number of enemies ſtill to be ſubdued. And this " multitude, what heart, what hope have they?" *Mago* anſwered, *That he knew not.* " And yet (returned *Hanno*) there is nothing eaſier to be " known. Have the *Romans* ſent any ambaſſadors to *Hannibal* to treat of " peace? Has intelligence been brought you, that any mention of peace " was made at *Rome?*" *No*, ſaid *Mago*. " Why then (replied the other) " the progreſs made in this war, is exactly the ſame, as when *Hannibal* " firſt entered *Italy*. The viciſſitude of our fortune in the firſt *Roman* " *War* many of us here preſent can well remember. Our affairs were " never in a more proſperous courſe both by land and ſea, than juſt be- " fore our defeat at the *Ægates*. Should the like turn of fortune (the " Gods avert the omen) happen to us again, can we hope to obtain, " when vanquiſhed, that peace, which when we are victorious, we diſ- " dain to think of? Were it now in debate to *offer* or to *accept* a peace, " I know what I ſhould ſay: If you aſk my opinion concerning the " ſupplies which *Mago* demands for the army, my anſwer is, That if " they be truly conquerors, they little need them, and if they deceive " us with vain hope, the leſs deſerve them." *Hanno*'s ſpeech made no impreſſion on the Senate. It was carried by a great majority to ſend to *Hannibal* from *Africa*, 4000 *Numidians*, 40 elephants, and 1000 talents of ſilver *. And one of the magiſtrates was immediately commiſſioned to go with *Mago* into *Spain*, and there hire 20000 foot and 4000 horſe for recruiting the armies in that country and in *Italy*. Theſe preparations however went on ſlowly, as is uſual in times of proſperity. On the other ſide, neither the character, nor the preſent circumſtances of the *Romans* would permit *them* to be dilatory in their proceedings. The Senate neglected nothing, deferred nothing, that was neceſſary for ſupporting the war. The Conſul *Varro* ſhewed himſelf extremely diligent in whatever belonged to his office; and the Dictator *Junius Pera*, after performing the uſual ceremonies of religion, marched out of *Rome* at

* 193750 l.

Liv. B. 23. c. 14.

at the head of 25000 men. This army was compoſed of two legions, which had been raiſed in the beginning of the year for the defence of the city, of ſome cohorts from *Picenum* and the *Gallic* territory [m], of the 8000 *Volones* before-mentioned, and of 6000 priſoners for crimes and debt, whom *Junius* had releaſed, upon the condition of their enliſting themſelves in the troops, and whom he had armed out of the ſpoils *Flaminius* had formerly brought from *Gaul*. Y. of *R.* 537. Bef *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

As for *Hannibal*, having ſettled his affairs at *Capua*, he made a ſecond attempt upon *Naples*, with as little ſucceſs as in the firſt. From thence he marched to *Nola*, in hopes that the populace, who were inclined to his party, would deliver up the town to him. But their Senate, alarmed at the danger, had ſent for aſſiſtance from *Marcellus*, who commanded the *Roman* army at *Canuſium*, and who came in all haſte to the defence of the place. *Hannibal*, diſappointed here, once more attempted *Naples*. *Liv.* B. 23. c. 15. As this city had lately received a *Roman* gariſon, under the command of *M. Junius Silanus*, the *Carthaginian* ſoon deſpaired of being able to reduce it by force; and he turned his arms againſt *Nuceria*, a town not far from the other. The inhabitants, for want of proviſions, were obliged to capitulate: Yet he could not prevail upon any of them to ſerve in his army. After he had plundered and burnt *Nuceria*, he again ſat down before *Nola*. *Marcellus* ſallied out upon him at three ſeveral gates, and killed 2300 of his men, with the loſs only of 500 of his own. The *Carthaginian* being thus repulſed, laid ſiege to *Acerræ*, a ſmall town on the banks of the *Clanis*, near *Nola*, and took it. Here he learnt that the Dictator was approaching to *Caſilinum* with his army. Whereupon being afraid leſt the neighbourhood of the enemy might occaſion ſome ſiniſter accident at *Capua*, he drew near to this city, and at the ſame time ſent a part of his forces to attack *Caſilinum*. Theſe not ſucceeding, he himſelf marched thither with his army, and beſieged the town in form. It was not gariſoned by *Campanians*. A body of *Prænestini*, to the number of 500 men, happening to paſs that way, had found the inhabitants wavering in their fidelity to *Rome*, and had therefore cut their throats in the night, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the walls. The *Prænestini* were afterwards reinforced by about 400 *Peruſini* from *Hetruria*, and ſome *Romans* and *Latines*. All theſe being men of bravery and reſolution, made a vigorous reſiſtance. Winter approaching, *Hannibal* diſcontinued the ſiege, intending to renew it in the ſpring. He left a ſmall body of troops before the town, and retired to *Capua* with the reſt of his army. c. 17.

Livy and ſome other hiſtorians tell us, that both *Hannibal* and his ſoldiers were extremely ſoftened by the effeminate life they gave themſelves up to, this winter at *Capua*, and are very particular in their deſcriptions of the luxury of the *Carthaginians*, making *Capua* prove as fatal a place c. 18.

[m] This was a tract of land between the *Rubicon* and the *Eſis*, formerly taken from the *Galli Senones*, and divided amongſt ſome *Roman* citizens by virtue of a law lately enacted.

Y. of *R.* 537 Bef. *J. C.* 215 236 Conſul-p

to them as *Cannæ* had been to the *Romans*. It does not however appear by their after behaviour, that they had loſt much of their martial ardour. The principal cauſe of the decline of *Hannibal*'s affairs in *Italy* after the battle of *Cannæ*, ſeems to have been his not receiving ſupplies from his own country. He had not men enough to oppoſe ſo many armies as the *Romans* ſent againſt him, and at the ſame time to gariſon the towns, and protect the countries, that had ſubmitted to him. And that his reſidence at *Capua* had abated nothing of his wonted activity, ſeems plain from *Livy* himſelf, who informs us, that as ſoon as the rigour of the ſeaſon began to ſoften he renewed the ſiege of *Caſilinum*, and this in ſight of an army which without reckoning the allies, amounted to 25000 men. This army was now under the conduct of *Sempronius*, General of the horſe, the Dictator having been recalled to *Rome* on account of ſome religious affair. *Sempronius* continued quiet in his camp; for he had received orders not to fight. *Marcellus* (according to *Livy*) would have gone to the aſſiſtance of the beſieged, if he had not been hindered by the ſwelling of the *Vulturnus*, and by the people of *Nola*, who feared that the *Capuans* would attack them if the *Roman* gariſon ſhould withdraw. In the mean time *Caſilinum* was reduced to great extremities for want of proviſions, inſomuch that many of the ſoldiers threw themſelves from the walls, or expoſed themſelves without defence to the darts of the enemy. *Sempronius* attempted to relieve them, firſt by throwing barrels of meal into the *Vulturnus*, that ran through the town, and afterwards by ſcattering in the ſtream great quantities of nuts, which the beſieged ſtop'd with hurdles. Theſe convoys of proviſions being diſcovered and cut off, the gariſon were reduced to live upon rats, and what other vermin they could find; nay, they pull'd off the leather that covered their ſhields, boiled it ſoft in water, and eat it. And when *Hannibal*, to hinder them from gathering any weeds or roots that grew cloſe under the wall, had ploughed up the ground, they threw turnip ſeed out upon the mould; which when the *Carthaginian* heard of, he cry'd out, *What! am I then to ſit here till their turnips are come to maturity?* And from this time he became more willing to grant them terms. They were at length allowed to march out of the town, provided each freeman among them paid ſeven ounces of gold. The condition was accepted; they remained priſoners till the money was paid, and the *Carthaginian* put a gariſon of 700 men into the place.

Liv. B. 23. c. 19.

c. 20.

& 30.

The inhabitants of *Petilia*, in *Bruttium*, gave likewiſe a ſignal proof of their attachment to the Republic, and ſhewed how agreeable her government was to her ſubjects. They reſolutely ſtood a ſiege, though refuſed aſſiſtance from *Rome* on account of the diſtreſs ſhe was in; and *Himilco*, one of *Hannibal*'s Lieutenants, found almoſt as much difficulty in ſubduing them, as the General had met with, in reducing the gariſon of *Caſilinum*.

c. 21.

About the ſame time couriers arrived from *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, with complaints from the Prætors of thoſe two provinces, of the want both of

of proviſions and pay for their armies and fleets. The anſwer was, that they muſt ſhift for themſelves as well as they could; for that *Rome* was not in a condition to help them. King *Hiero* ſupplied the Prætor of *Sicily* with what money he wanted, and ſix months proviſions; and the cities of *Sardinia* in alliance with the Republic raiſed contributions among themſelves for the Prætor of that iſland. Y. of *R.* 537. Bef. *J. C.* 215. 236 Conſul-p.

And now the Senate began to think of filling up the many vacant places in their aſſembly. When this matter was in debate, *Sp. Carvilius* propoſed that the preſent opportunity might be taken to oblige the *Latines*, thoſe ancient and faithful allies of *Rome*, by admitting two out of each nation of them to ſit among the Fathers: but the motion was rejected with indignation; and *Fabius* reproved *Carvilius* for his imprudence in expoſing the Senate to a ſhameful innovation, or to the danger of affronting the *Latines*, at ſo critical a conjuncture. He added, that it was of the utmoſt conſequence to obſerve a ſtrict ſilence upon this head, that ſo the allies might never know ſuch a propoſal had been made. The matter was kept ſecret; no miſchief followed. c. 22.

As there were no Cenſors in being, to fill up the vacancies in queſtion, and the Dictator was now with the army, the Conſul *Terentius*, by order of the Senate, nominated *M. Fabius Buteo*, the oldeſt of the former Cenſors, to be a ſecond Dictator, whoſe office ſhould be confined to this affair. And never did Dictator diſcharge his truſt with more modeſty and prudence. The firſt upon his liſt were all thoſe who ſince the laſt Cenſors had obtained *curule magiſtracies*, but had not yet been ranked among the Fathers; then all thoſe, without exception, who had been Tribunes of the people, *Plebeian* Ædiles or Quæſtors, and laſtly, ſuch of the citizens as could ſhew the ſpoils of enemies by them vanquiſhed, or had been rewarded by their Generals with a Civic Crown. By this impartial election the *Romans* had the happineſs to ſee 177 new Senators created without jealouſy or contention. *Fabius* was highly applauded for his conduct, and when he had finiſhed his liſt, he immediately abdicated the Dictatorſhip, though he had been named to it for ſix months. c. 23.

CHAP. XXIII.

The FOURTH YEAR of the War.

A Roman *army deſtroyed by the* Gauls. *King* Philip *of* Macedon *enters into league with* Hannibal *againſt* Rome. *Favourable accounts from* Sardinia *and from the* Scipios *in* Spain. *After the death of King* Hiero, Syracuſe *takes part with the* Carthaginians.

THE next affair, at *Rome*, was to appoint the great officers of the ſtate for the new year. *T. Sempronius Gracchus* (General of the horſe to the Dictator *Junius*) and *L. Poſthumius Albinus*, now at the Y. of *R.* 538. Bef. *J. C.* 214. 237 Conſul-p.

V. of *R.* 538 Bef. *J.C.* 214 237 Conſul p. *Livy* B. 23. c. 30.

the head of an army in *Ciſalpine Gaul*, were elected Conſuls. Then the ſeveral Prætors were named, and *Marcellus* had the power and title given him of Pro-Conſul; becauſe, of all the *Roman* Generals in *Italy*, he was the only one who had gained any advantage over the enemy ſince the battle of *Cannæ*. The elections being over, *Junius* returned to his camp in *Apulia*, but *Sempronius* continued in the city, to conſult with the Senate about the operations of the approaching campaign. While they were deliberating on theſe things, news came to *Rome* that

c. 24. *Poſthumius Albinus* (one of the Conſuls elect) with all his army, was deſtroyed by the *Gauls* [n]. The fortitude of the *Romans* enabled them to ſurmount this laſt calamity of ſo unfortunate a year. *Sempronius* aſſembled the Senate, and endeavoured to raiſe their dejected ſpirits. "The

c. 25. "defeat of *Cannæ* ought to have hardened us againſt every adverſity "that can happen in war. Shall we be diſcouraged by moderate loſſes, "after having ſupported the greateſt calamities? The war with the *Gauls* "may be deferred. Let us have no more armies in *Gaul*, but turn all "our forces againſt *Hannibal*. When he is once driven out of *Italy*, the "rebellious nations will ſoon be reduced again." This advice was followed, and all the *Roman* forces were ordered to the provinces near *Hannibal*.

In the new diſpoſition of employments, *Terentius Varro*, notwithſtanding his former ill ſucceſs, was intruſted with the command of an army in *Apulia*, and had the character of Pro-Conſul. His behaviour ſince his misfortune had ſoften'd every body to him. He had let his hair and beard grow, and had never taken a meal lying on a bed, as was the manner of the *Romans*. Nay, it is ſaid, he modeſtly declined the Dictatorſhip, to which the people, ſtill well affected to him, would have raiſed him.

Val. Max. B. 4. c. 5. f. 2. *Frontin. Stratag.* l. 4. c. 5. f. 6.

Livy, B. 23 c. 31.

It now remained to chooſe a new Conſul in the room of *Poſthumius Albinus*; and *Marcellus* being ſent upon a commiſſion to the army, it was ſuſpected, and complained of in the Senate, that he was kept out of the way on purpoſe that he might not be preſent at the *comitia*. *Sempronius* therefore deferred convening the centuries till the return of *Marcellus*, and then he was unanimouſly choſen Conſul. But as it had happened to thunder during the aſſembly, the augurs laid hold of this accident to declare the election diſagreeable to the will of the Gods. Their true reaſon for oppoſing it was his being a *Plebeian*, for *Sempronius* alſo being of that order, ſhould *Marcellus*'s election be confirmed, *Rome* would have two *Plebeian* Conſuls. Hereupon *Marcellus* abdicated, and *Fabius Cunctator* was choſen (the third time) in his ſtead.

[n] According to *Livy* (B. 23. c. 24.) the *Gauls* made uſe of a very extraordinary ſtratagem upon this occaſion. *Poſthumius* being to paſs through a wood, they, againſt his coming, had, on each ſide the road, ſawed all the trees ſo far that a little force would ſerve to caſt them down. When therefore the whole army had entered this dangerous paſſage, the *Gauls* that lay about the wood, began to throw down the trees, which falling one againſt another, thoſe that were neareſt the road came upon the heads of the *Romans*, ſo that ſcarce ten men of them eſcaped being cruſhed.

And

And now the *Romans* began to be in motion. *Fabius* put himſelf at the head of thoſe troops which the late Dictator had commanded. *Sempronius* was General of the *Volones*, and of 25000 auxiliaries. The troops that had eſcaped from *Cannæ*, and which after that battle had ſerved under *Marcellus*, and all the weak ſoldiers in the army lately under the conduct of *Junius Pera*, had been ſent into *Sicily*, there to ſerve as long as the war ſhould laſt in *Italy*. In the room of theſe, *Marcellus* led to his camp near *Sueſſula* (a city nine miles from *Nola*) two legions that had been raiſed for the defence of *Rome*. The Prætor *Lævinus* was ordered to cover *Apulia* with two legions, which arrived from *Sicily*, and to defend the coaſt from *Brunduſium* to *Tarentum*, with a fleet of twenty five ſhips. A like number of veſſels was ſent under *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, the other Prætor, to guard the coaſt near the capital. The legion under *Varro* being commanded into *Sicily*, he was ordered to make new levies in the country of *Picenum*, and to continue there to protect that and the neighbouring territories. Y. of *R.* 538. Bef. *J.C.* 214. 237 Conſul-p. *Livy*, B. 23. c. 32.

While the Prætor *Lævinus* lay encamped at *Luceria* in *Apulia*, a company of *Macedonians* were to his great ſurpriſe brought before him. c. 33.

At the head of them was an *Athenian* named *Xenophanes*. Theſe ſtrangers had landed not far from the *Lacinian* promontory, and were making their way to *Hannibal*'s camp near *Capua*, when *Lævinus*'s ſcouts intercepted them. Being examined by the Prætor, the *Athenian* anſwer'd that he was commiſſioned by King *Philip* of *Macedon* to treat of an alliance with the *Roman* Republic. *Lævinus* overjoy'd at this, ſhewed great reſpect to the ambaſſador, and furniſhed him with guides to conduct him to *Rome*. It is not known by what artifice he got to *Hannibal*'s camp: But the league which, in his maſter's name, he made with the *Carthaginian*, is preſerved to this day °. Having finiſhed his commiſſion

° The form of the league as it is in *Polybius* B. 7. c. 2. runs thus.

The treaty confirmed by oath, which *Hannibal* the General, *Mago*, *Myrcan*, *Barmocar*, and all the Senators of *Carthage* that are with him [*Hannibal*] and all the *Carthaginians* that ſerve under him, have concluded with *Xenophanes* the *Athenian*, the ſon of *Cleomacus*, whom King *Philip*, the ſon of *Demetrius*, hath ſent to us, in his own name, and in name of the *Macedonians*, and of his allies.

In the preſence of *Jupiter*, and *Juno*, and *Apollo*; in the preſence of the tutelary Divinity of the *Carthaginians*, and of *Hercules*, and of *Iolaus*; in the preſence of *Mars*, of *Triton* and *Neptune*; in the preſence of the Gods who accompany our expedition, and of the ſun, the moon, and the earth; in the preſence of the rivers, the fields, and the waters; in the preſence of all the Gods who rule over *Carthage*; in the preſence of all the Gods who rule over *Macedon* and the reſt of *Greece*; in the preſence of all the Gods who preſide over war, and at the making this treaty; *Hannibal* the General hath ſaid, and all the Senators of *Carthage* that are with him, and all the *Carthaginians* that are in his army.

If it ſeem good unto you and to us, this ſhall be a treaty of amity and good will between you and us, as friends, allies, and brethren, upon condition that King *Philip*, and the *Macedonians*, and all the other *Greeks* that are his allies, ſhall preſerve and defend the *Carthaginian* Lords, and *Hannibal* the General, and thoſe that are with him, and the Governors of provinces dependent

Y. of *R.* 538. Bef. *J. C.* 214. 237 Conſul-p. commiſſion he returned to his ſhip, and *Mago*, *Boſtar*, and *Giſco*, three ambaſſadors from *Hannibal*, embarked with him. They were ſcarce out at ſea when the veſſel was deſcried by *P. Valerius Flaccus*, whom *Lævinus* had appointed to command the fleet. She was ſoon obliged to ſtrike to ſome ſhips ſent after her. *Xenophanes* endeavoured to eſcape a ſecond time, by the ſame ſtory of his embaſſy from *Philip* to the Senate; adding only, that not having been able to reach the capital, becauſe the enemy infeſted the roads, he had negotiated his buſineſs with the Prætor *Lævinus*. He would have impoſed upon *Flaccus*, but for the habit and language of the three *Carthaginians*. The *Roman* having diſcovered the truth, detached five galleys under the command of *Valerius Antias*, to tranſport the *Athenian* and his companions to *Rome*.

Liv. B. 23. c. 35. To return to *Hannibal*. *Campania* was now the chief ſeat of the war; and the *Campanians* themſelves, to aſſiſt him, raiſed an army of 14000 men. Theſe having, in vain, ſollicited *Cumæ*, a city in the neighbourhood, to join with them; endeavoured, with no better ſucceſs, to ſurpriſe the *Cumans* by treachery. After which *Hannibal*, at the requeſt of the *Campanians*, laid ſiege to the place.

c. 36. *Fabius* was then encamped at *Cales*, but durſt not croſs the *Vulturnus*, to go to the aſſiſtance

dent upon the *Carthaginians*, and thoſe that uſe the ſame laws with them; and the inhabitants of *Utica*, and of all the cities and countries ſubject to the *Carthaginians*, and all the ſoldiers and allies, and all the cities and nations in confederacy with us in *Italy*, *Gaul*, and *Liguria*, and all thoſe in this country who are in friendſhip and alliance with us. In like manner the *Carthaginian* armies, and the inhabitants of *Utica*, and all the cities and nations ſubject to *Carthage*, and the ſoldiers and allies, and all the nations and cities with which we have amity and alliance in *Italy*, in *Gaul*, in *Liguria*, and with which we may contract amity and alliance in this country, ſhall preſerve and defend King *Philip*, and the *Macedonians*, and all their allies amongſt the *Greeks*. We will not ſecretly deviſe evil againſt one another. We will not lay ſnares for one another. We [the *Macedonians*] with all affection and good will, without guile or fraud [declare that we] will be enemies to the enemies of the *Carthaginians*, except to thoſe Kings, cities and ports with which we are in friendſhip and alliance. In like manner, we [the *Carthaginians*] will be enemies to the enemies of King *Philip*, except to thoſe Kings, cities and nations with whom we are in alliance and friendſhip. You [the *Macedonians*] ſhall engage in the war we have with the *Romans* till it pleaſe the Gods to give ſucceſs to our arms and yours. You ſhall aſſiſt us with what is neceſſary, according as ſhall be agreed upon between us. But if the Gods ſhall not grant to you and us a happy iſſue of the war againſt the *Romans* and their allies, and if we be reduced to make peace with the *Romans*, we ſhall treat in ſuch a manner as that you ſhall be included in the treaty; and on condition that they ſhall not be allowed to declare war againſt you; that the *Romans* ſhall not be maſters of the *Corcyræi*, nor of the *Apolliniates*, nor of the *Dyrrachini*, nor of *Pharus*, nor of *Dymallar*, nor of the *Parthini*, nor of *Antintania*. They ſhall likewiſe reſtore to *Demetrius Pharius* all his friends and relations who are in the *Roman* dominions. If the *Romans* ſhall declare war againſt you or againſt us, we will aſſiſt each other as the occaſion ſhall require. We will act in the ſame manner in caſe any other ſhall declare war againſt us, except the Kings, cities and nations with whom we are in alliance and friendſhip. If either of us ſhall judge proper to add any thing to this treaty, or retrench any thing from it, it ſhall not be done without the conſent of both of us.

of

of the beſieged, becauſe of unlucky omens and prodigies. *Sempronius* had a little before entered the place, and he defended it. He is ſaid to have ſlain in a ſally 1300 of the *Carthaginians*. *Hannibal* the next day preſented battle, in hopes the Conſul, fluſh'd with his ſucceſs, would venture to fight: But the *Romans* keeping cloſe within the walls, he at length drew off his men, and returned to his camp, which was on mount *Tifata*. Y. of *R.* 538. Bef. *J. C.* 214. 237 Conſul-p. c. 37.

Whilſt *Sempronius Gracchus* was thus defending *Cumæ*, the *Roman* armies proſpered in two other places. Another *Sempronius*, ſurnamed *Longus*, gained a victory over *Hanno* in *Lucania*, and drove him from thence into *Bruttium*. And *Lævinus* retook three cities of the *Hirpini*, which had revolted to *Hannibal*.

About the ſame time the intercepted ambaſſador from King *Philip*, and his letters, were brought to *Rome*. And the Senate finding that the treaty was actually concluded, came immediately to the wiſe and noble reſolution of keeping the *Macedonian* out of *Italy*, by carrying the war into his country. c. 38.

And now *Fabius*, having made expiation for the prodigies, at length paſſed the *Vulturnus*, and both the Conſuls carried on the war in concert together. *Fabius* recovered ſome towns that had declared for *Hannibal*, and had received *Carthaginian* gariſons. At *Nola*, the people ſtill diſaffected to *Rome*, were ſecretly plotting to deſtroy their Senators, and betray the city to *Hannibal*. To prevent this, *Fabius* ſent *Marcellus* with his army into *Nola*, and he himſelf removed to the Pro-Conſul's camp near *Sueſſula*. There he continued quiet while *Marcellus* made frequent incurſions into the lands of the *Hirpini* and the *Samnites* about *Caudium*. Deputies from theſe two nations came to *Hannibal* to inform him of the devaſtation of their country, and to deſire relief. They even added reproaches to their complaints. "We believed (ſaid they) "that ſo long as you were ſafe and our friend, we might have baniſhed "all fear, not only of the *Romans*, but (were it lawful ſo to ſpeak) even "of the angry Gods themſelves. Yet certain it is, that whilſt you "are not only ſafe and victorious, but ſo near us too, that you can "ſee the burning of our houſes, and almoſt hear the cries of our wives "and children, we have been miſerably haraſſed this ſummer by *Mar*-"*cellus*, as if he, and not you, had been conqueror at *Cannæ*. The "*Romans* give out that you are like a bee that can ſting but once [p]." c. 39. c. 40. c. 41. c. 42. *Hannibal*

[p] The *Roman* hiſtorians frequently reproach *Hannibal* with inaction after the winter he ſpent in *Capua*, and *Livy* upon this occaſion has put very ſevere reflections upon him into the mouths of the *Samnite* deputies. The truth of the matter ſeems to be this: The *Romans* had now learnt by their defeats that they were not a match for *Hannibal* in the open field. It was a long time before they would yield this point; but the battle of *Cannæ* ſeems to have convinced them. At firſt they ſent one Conſul to oppoſe him with the uſual army of two legions (conſiſting of about 4000 men each) with a proportionable number of auxiliaries. The misfortune at the *Ticin*, and

Y. of *R.* 538. Bef. *J. C.* 214 237 Conſul-p *Liv.* B. 23. c. 43. *Hannibal* returned a civil anſwer to the deputies, and encouraged them to hope for a happy iſſue of the war. "Of the victories I have "gained, ſaid he, the laſt has always been the greateſt. That of the "lake *Thraſymenus* was more conſiderable than that of the *Trebia*, and "the victory of *Cannæ* ſurpaſſed them both. I ſhall ſoon gain a fourth "victory ſuperior to all the paſt." With this anſwer, and rich preſents, he diſmiſſed the deputies.

Hannibal, being ſoon after joined by *Hanno* with ſome troops from *Bruttium*, inveſted *Nola*, which was defended by *Marcellus*, who (if we may credit the *Latine* hiſtorian) boldly marched his troops out of the c. 44. town, and came to a pitched battle with the *Carthaginian* before the walls: victory declared for the *Romans*, and *Hannibal* loſt 5000 men [q].

About

and what immediately followed it, obliged them to ſend the other Conſul with his army to join his collegue. Theſe being defeated at the *Trebia*, the Republic encreaſed her armies the next year. *Flaminius* had alone the command of four legions, and his collegue of two. The former being vanquiſhed at the lake *Thraſymen*, and *Fabius*'s dilatory arts not having any ſenſible good effect, the *Romans* ſeemed reſolved to exert their whole ſtrength, and ruin *Hannibal* at a blow. They doubled their legions, encreaſed the number of men in each, and ſent both their Conſuls at the head of an army of near 90000 men to fight a deciſive battle. The victory over theſe at *Cannæ* was ſo compleat, that the *Romans* ſaw plainly they could not hope to conquer the *Carthaginian* in a general battle, and that they muſt change their manner of carrying on the war. Accordingly they divided their troops into many armies, never riſked their whole ſtrength in one action, but contented themſelves with waſting *Hannibal*'s forces in ſmall engagements, haraſſing his allies, and protecting their own. This very year they beſieged him, as it were, with armies. *Fabius* commanded one at *Liternum*, *Sempronius* had another at *Cumæ*, and *Marcellus* a third at *Sueſſula*, all in *Campania* where *Hannibal* was. *Lævinus* defended *Apulia*, and *Terentius Varro*, *Picenum*. Each of theſe Generals had at leaſt two legions under him, except *T. Varro* who had but one. Beſide theſe, *Livy* mentions a *Sempronius Longus*, who had an army in *Lucania* ſufficient to defeat a conſiderable part of the *Carthaginian* army under *Hanno*, of which 2000 were ſlain in the action. All theſe forces joined together would have made a greater army than the *Romans* had at *Cannæ*, but the Republic had now alter'd her meaſures. Nay ſo ſteady was ſhe in purſuing this new method of carrying on the war, that though *Hannibal* was many years hemm'd in among the *Bruttians*, in a corner of *Italy*, without ſupplies from his own country, and in great want of men and money, ſhe never ventured to unite her forces, in order to compel him to a general battle. Now conſidering the ſmall number of his troops, his want of money, the many armies he had to deal with, the towns he had to gariſon, and the ſeveral allies he had to protect, it is more to be wondered at that he kept footing ſo long in *Italy*, than that he made no progreſs in conqueſt.

[q] *Livy*, *Plutarch*, and others, relate ſeveral victories gained by *Marcellus* over *Hannibal*. But *Corn. Nepos* (*in Vit. Hannib*) tells us, that the latter was always victorious in *Italy*, and that after the battle of *Cannæ* no one ever ventured to pitch a camp in the plain againſt him. *Quamdiu in* Italia *fuit*, nemo *ei in* Acie *reſtitit*, *nemo adverſus eum*, *poſt* Cannenſem pugnam, in Campo Caſtra poſuit. *Polybius*'s hiſtory of the *Roman* affairs after the battle of *Cannæ* is not entire; but we have ſeveral conſiderable fragments of it remaining, none of which mention any victory over *Hannibal* in *Italy*. From a paſſage in B. 9. c. 3. it is plain, that *Hannibal* was never defeated by any *Roman* General before the ſiege of *Capua*, and conſequently not by *Marcellus* this year. Who (ſays "the hiſtorian) "can help admiring the *Ro-* "*mans?* That they who durſt not draw "out an army in battle againſt *Hannibal*, but "uſed

About this time, 1272 of his *Spaniſh* and *Numidian* horſe went over to the enemy. Theſe deſerters continued faithful to *Rome*, and did her important ſervices, for which they were recompenſed with lands in their own countries at the end of the war. The *Carthaginian* General raiſed the ſiege of *Nola*, ſent *Hanno* again into *Bruttium* with the forces he had brought from thence, marched himſelf into *Apulia*, and pitched his camp near *Arpi*, where he purpoſed to winter. As ſoon as he was gone, *Fabius* made two incurſions, with the greateſt part of his army, into the flat country of *Campania*, gathered in all the corn, and carried it to his camp at *Sueſſula*, which he put in a condition to ſerve him for winter quarters. He then ordered *Marcellus* to keep no more ſoldiers at *Nola* than were neceſſary to defend the town, and to ſend the reſt to *Rome*, that they might neither be a burden to the allies nor an expence to the Republic. The Conſul *Sempronius* marched his legions from *Cumæ* to *Luceria* in *Apulia*; from thence he diſpatched the Prætor *Lævinus* with the army under his command, to *Brunduſium*, to guard the coaſt of *Salentum*, and provide what was neceſſary for the *Macedonian* war.

Y. of *R.* 538. Bef. *J. C.* 214 237 Conſul. p. c. 46. c. 48.

While affairs in *Italy* were in the ſituation that has been deſcribed, good news came to *Rome* from *Sardinia* and *Spain*. The Prætor, *Manlius Torquatus*, had defeated the rebel *Sardinians*, though aſſiſted by an army ſent from *Carthage* under the command of *Aſdrubal* the Bald. Twelve thouſand of the enemy were killed upon the ſpot, *Aſdrubal* himſelf with *Hanno* and *Mago*, his chief officers, taken priſoners, and the iſland entirely reduced.

c. 34, 40, 41.

The *Scipios* had been equally fortunate in their wars in *Spain*. However, they wrote to the Senate, that the troops wanted their pay, clothes to cover them, and proviſions to ſubſiſt them. As to the firſt indeed, they added, that if the public treaſury was exhauſted, they would find means to get money from the *Spaniards*; but that the other neceſſaries muſt be ſent from *Rome*, otherwiſe they could neither keep the province in obedience, nor ſupport the army. The Senators were all ſenſible of the reaſonableneſs of the requeſt; but how to comply with it was the difficulty. They conſidered the numerous forces they already had to maintain both at land and ſea, and what a large new fleet muſt preſently be equipped, if a war with *Macedon* ſhould be commenced: That as to *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, which, before the war, brought in conſiderable ſubſidies to the treaſury, they were now ſcarce able to maintain the forces neceſſary for the defence of theſe provinces; and that

Livy B. 23. c. 48.

" uſed to lead their legions, and that with " difficulty, along the hills, ſhould venture " to lay ſiege to a ſtrong city, while they " themſelves were haraſſed by an enemy " whom they dared not to think of en- " countering in the field. But the *Car-* " *thaginians*, who had been conquerors in " every battle, ſuffered no leſs than the " vanquiſhed, &c." And in B. 15. c. 16. he expreſsly aſſerts, that *Hannibal* was never vanquiſh'd before the battle of *Zama*. And in chap. 11. he repreſents *Hannibal*, juſt before that battle, reminding his ſoldiers, that they had been victorious in every battle they had fought in *Italy*.

Y. of *R.* 538. B. f *J. C.* 214. 237 Conſul-p. to tax the citizens at home for the ſupply demanded, would quite oppreſs and ruin them. The reſult of all was *that* Fulvius *the Prætor ſhould aſſemble the people, and lay before them the neceſſities of the ſtate, and earneſtly preſs all thoſe who were grown rich by farming the public revenues, to lend the public, for a while, a part of what they had gained by it, and furniſh the army in* Spain *with neceſſaries, under a promiſe of being reimburſed the firſt of any of the public creditors, when the treaſury ſhould be in a condition to diſcharge debts.* The Prætor accordingly repreſented the matter to the people, and alſo appointed a day when he would bargain for clothes and corn, to be ſent to the troops in *Spain*, and for other neceſſaries to equip the fleet.

When the day came, three companies of nineteen perſons each, preſented themſelves as undertakers; but they inſiſted on two demands, *That while thus employ'd, they ſhould be exempted from ſerving in the war*: And *That, if what they ſhipped were taken by the enemy, or caſt away by ſtorm, the public ſhould bear the loſs*; both which conditions being agreed to, they undertook this affair, ſo that now the *Roman* armies were ſubſiſted by the purſes of private ſubjects; nor was any thing wanting to carry on the war in *Spain* more than if the treaſury had been full.

The *Scipios*, thus ſupply'd, immediately took the field, and (according to *Livy*) perform'd ſtrange things, as ſhall hereafter be related.

Livy B. 24. c. 4. B. 23, 30. The accounts from *Sicily* were not ſo ſatisfactory as thoſe from *Spain* and *Sardinia*. King *Hiero* was dead, and had left his dominions, by will, to his grandſon *Hieronymus* (whoſe father *Gelo* had rebelled againſt the old King the year before his death, and had come to an untimely end) under the tuition of fifteen guardians; whom he had entreated, a little before his deceaſe, to keep up a good underſtanding with the *Romans*, as he himſelf had done for fifty years paſt. *Hieronymus*, being ſuffered by his guardians to take the reins of government into his own hands at fifteen Years of age, ran into many exceſſes of vice and cruelty. He affected an extravagant pomp, was difficult of acceſs, gave audience with an air of contempt, and often added inſulting jeſts to refuſals. Three lords of diſtinction engroſſed his favour, *Andranodorus* and *Zoippus* (his two uncles in law) and *Thraſo*, ſirnamed *Charcarus*. This laſt was a friend to the *Romans*; the other two favoured *Carthage*. *Thraſo* being put to death, upon a falſe accuſation of treaſon, the uncles eaſily perſuaded their nephew to enter into a negotiation with *Hannibal*. *Claudius Pulcher*, the *Roman* Prætor in *Sicily*, ſent a deputation to the King, to renew the alliance formerly made by his grandfather with the *Romans*. *Hieronymus* inſulted the deputies, aſking them *What fortune they had at the battle of* Cannæ? *becauſe*, ſaid he, Hannibal's *ambaſſadors have given moſt incredible accounts of it*; *and I would fain know the truth, that I may take my meaſures accordingly* The *Romans* only anſwered, that when he had learnt to give audience to ambaſſadors in a ſerious manner, they would come to him again; and then

Polyb. de Virt. & Vit. Exc. lib. 7.

Liv. B. 24. c. 5, 6.

then having rather admoniſh'd, than requeſted him, not raſhly to violate the ancient league, they departed and returned to the Prætor. *Hieronymus*, without delay, ſent ambaſſadors to *Carthage*, to ratify a treaty he had already made with *Hannibal*; the ſubſtance of which was, that he and the *Carthaginians* ſhould divide *Sicily* between them, when they had jointly conquered the whole iſland. But being afterwards perſuaded to think that he had himſelf a title of inheritance to all *Sicily*, by being deſcended from *Nereis*, the daughter of *Pyrrhus* (who had been declared King of it) he ſent a new embaſſy, with inſtructions to lay before the Senate of *Carthage* his pretended rights, and to conclude only a treaty of mutual aſſiſtance with them. The *Carthaginians* were glad at any rate to draw off *Syracuſe* from the *Roman* intereſt, and readily yielded to the propoſals. Y. of *R.* 538. Bef. *J. C.* 214. 237 Conſul. p.

Not long after, this fooliſh King being at *Leontini*, a town ſituate on the frontiers of his dominions, was there aſſaſſinated in the preſence of his guards, by ſome conſpirators among his own ſubjects; an event which promiſed no great benefit to the *Romans:* for though the *Syracuſians*, fond of liberty, ſeemed much inclined to change the monarchy into a commonwealth, they ſeemed no leſs inclined to ſide with the *Carthaginian* Republic. c. 7.

CHAP. XXIV.

FIFTH YEAR of the War.

The wiſe and public ſpirited conduct of the Romans *in ſeveral inſtances. They gain ſome advantages over* Hannibal *in* Italy, *and over King* Philip *in* Greece.

IN *Italy*, the campaign of this year being ended, *Fabius* took the road to *Rome*, to hold the *comitia* by centuries for the new elections. The prudent Conſul did not enter the city, but appeared at the aſſembly in the *Campus Martius*, on the day appointed, in his military habit, and attended by his Lictors with their axes as well as faſces. It fell by lot to the tribe of the *Anio*, to vote firſt, and of this tribe to a century which conſiſted of the younger men; and the majority of this prerogative [r] century named to the Conſulſhip, *T. Otacilius* (a relation of the preſident) and

[r] After the thirty-five tribes were compleated, the Centuries, which form'd the *comitia centuriata*, were divided among the tribes, and became parts of them; and then in theſe aſſemblies it was decided by lot which of the tribes ſhould vote firſt, and the tribe upon which the lot fell was called the *prerogative tribe*. Then lots were again caſt among the *centuries* of this *prerogative tribe*, to determine which of thoſe ſhould vote before the reſt; and the Century upon which the lot fell was called the *prerogative century*, *Roſin.* p. 466.

M. Æmilius

Y. of *R.* 538. Bef. *J. C.* 214. 237 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 24. c. 8.

M. Æmilius Regillus, men, neither of them, of ſuch abilities as the preſent exigency required. *Fabius* therefore thought fit to interrupt the election, and harangue the aſſembly. He firſt excuſed the irregularity of his proceeding, by the preſent dangers which threatened the ſtate. He then repreſented to them the importance of chuſing Conſuls qualified to enter the liſts with *Hannibal*; that *Otacilius* had given no cauſe to think him equal to that enterpriſe, not having performed any one thing for which the command of the fleet had, this year, been intruſted to him; and that *Æmilius*, as high-prieſt of *Quirinus*, could not be abſent from *Rome*. Romans, (he added) *do you name ſuch Conſuls as you would wiſh to be conducted by, if you were this moment to give* Hannibal *battle. I pronounce, That the prerogative century give their ſuffrages again. Heralds, proclaim my orders.* *Otacilius* at firſt made ſome oppoſition to this; but the Lictors with their axes ſurrounded him, and ſoon forced him to ſilence. Then the prerogative century returned to the voting place, and gave their ſuffrages for the preſident himſelf, *Q. Fabius Verrucoſus* * (ſurnamed *Cunctator*, or the *Lingerer*) and *Claudius Marcellus* †, who was abſent; and the other Centuries unanimouſly followed the example of this. *Rome* had never ſeen two greater men together at the head of her affairs. And though *Fabius*, by an irregular proceeding, had procured his own continuance in the Conſular dignity, againſt law and cuſtom, yet no one accuſed him of ambition or tyranny, or of being actuated by any motive but a zeal for his country. The *Romans* were convinced of the neceſſity of continuing the commanders of their armies more than one year in office; and they now therefore made little alteration in the diſpoſition of military employments.

Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J. C.* 213. 238 Conſul-p. c. 9.

* 4th time.

† 3d time.

Livy, B. 34. c. 1.

As a law had been made the laſt year (at the motion of *Oppius*, a tribune of the people) to reſtrain the luxury of women, forbidding them to wear above half an ounce of gold in toys, and to ride in a chariot within a mile of *Rome*, except to a public ſacrifice; ſo now the Cenſors, *M. Atilius Regulus*, and *P. Furius Philus*, made a ſtrict enquiry into offences committed by the men, to the detriment of the public. *Cæcilius Metellus* and the other young nobles who with him would in deſpair have left *Italy* after the battle of *Cannæ*, thoſe of the ten deputies, from the priſoners taken at that battle, who had not returned to *Hannibal* according to their oath, and about 2000 young men of military age who had neglected, without juſt cauſe, to enrol themſelves for the ſervice, were all degraded. The Senate alſo decreed that all who were ſtigmatized by the Cenſors, ſhould be ſent into *Sicily*, and there be obliged to ſerve on foot, amongſt the runaways from the battle of *Cannæ*, till the war ſhould be at an end. The *Romans* never exerted their virtue and diſintereſted zeal for their country in a greater degree than in this ſecond *Punic* war; private men voluntarily advanced money for the public works; the maſters who had ſold their ſlaves to the Republic, would not accept of payment till the war was ended; ſcarce a centurion or trooper demanded his

* *Liv.* B. 24. c. 18.

his pay, and if any one had ſo little generoſity as to receive it from the Quæſtor, he became the jeſt of his legion. Nay the money of the widow and the orphan was freely brought into the treaſury, ſo great was the confidence in the public faith. Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J. C.* 213. 238 Conſul-p.

Such being the diſpoſitions of the people, the new levies were ſoon compleated. Six legions were added to the twelve already on foot. The *Sicilian* expedition ſeemed to require the moſt diſpatch: and *Otacilius* was therefore ordered to embark with all diligence for that iſland, with one legion. And in order to man and equip the fleet, the Conſuls, by authority from the Senate, laid a tax upon the rich. Each head of a family, who by the Cenſors regiſter was found worth from 50000 to a 100000 aſſes, was obliged to maintain a rower or a ſailor, at his own expence, for ſix months; and the more wealthy three, five, ſeven, in proportion to their riches. The Senators were obliged each to maintain eight ſailors for a whole year. *Liv.* B. 24. c. 11.

What remained now, was to march the land forces, and begin the campaign in *Italy*. *Hannibal*, who had ſpent the winter in *Apulia*, returned to his camp on the *Tifata*, at the requeſt of the *Capuans*, who thought their city threatened. He had ordered *Hanno*, with an army of 17000 foot, and 1200 *Numidian* horſe, to come from the country of the *Bruttians* and ſeize *Beneventum*; but *Sempronius*, with his army of *Volones*, prevented him, and poſſeſſed himſelf of that defenceleſs city. From thence he marched to give *Hanno* battle; and to engage his *Volones* to exert themſelves, he promiſed every man his liberty, who ſhould bring off the head of an enemy. The Senate had given him power to enfranchiſe whom he pleaſed. But this promiſe had like to have ruined his affairs. For though his troops fought bravely at firſt, they loſt much time in cutting off the heads of the enemies they had ſlain, and the ardour of thoſe who had performed the condition of obtaining their freedom, was immediately abated: ſo that he was forced to publiſh a new declaration through all the ranks of his army, *That none ſhould obtain their liberty, unleſs the* Carthaginians *were routed.* Hereupon the *Volones* renewed the fight with impetuoſity, and gained ſo compleat a victory, that ſcarce 2000 of the enemy eſcaped [f]. We are told however that 4000 of thoſe legionary ſlaves did not behave themſelves in the battle ſo well as the reſt, and were afraid to purſue the enemy to their camp; and that apprehending puniſhment for their cowardice, they retired after the action to a hill. *Sempronius* had compaſſion for their weakneſs, and ſent a Tribune to invite them back: And then to perform his promiſe, he pronounced all, without exception, free. Nevertheleſs, that ſome diſtinction might be made between the brave and the cowards, he forbad the latter to eat ſitting or lying down, all the time of their ſervice, unleſs they were ſick. c. 12. c. 14. c. 15, 16.

[f] The reader has been already cautioned concerning *Livy*'s tales of *Roman victories* in this war.

In

Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J. C.* 213. 238 Conſul-p.

In the mean while, *Hannibal* endeavoured to ſurpriſe *Puteoli*. Failing in this attempt, he went and pillaged the country about *Naples*. From thence he moved towards *Nola*, whither the populace (who were ſtill in his intereſt, in oppoſition to their Senate) had invited him. *Marcellus* being joined by the army from *Sueſſula* (now under *Q. Pomponius*) attack'd and kill'd 2000 of his men, with the loſs only of 400; and would have entirely ruined him, had *Claudius Nero*, whom the Conſul had ordered with ſome ſquadrons out of *Nola* to make a tour, and fall upon the *Carthaginians* in the rear during the action, come up in time. *Marcellus* offered *Hannibal* battle again the next day; but the latter declined it, decamped the night following, and marched towards *Tarentum*.

Liv. B. 24. c. 17.

He had entertained ſtrong hopes that this city would open her gates to him, upon his firſt appearance before it. Some *Tarentine* priſoners, whom he had formerly releaſed without ranſom, had engaged a great number of the young men of that place in his intereſt, and theſe invited him thither. But *M. Livius*, who commanded in the place, took ſuch effectual meaſures to prevent the deſigns of the factious, that *Hannibal* was again diſappointed. He quitted the enterprize, and marched towards *Salapia* in *Apulia*, where he reſolved to ſpend the winter. Thither he ordered corn to be brought from *Lucania*; and his foragers having found in *Apulia* about 4000 colts, *Hannibal* ordered them to be broke; and with them he remounted his *African* horſemen. Theſe were all his exploits during the whole campaign.

c. 20.

c. 19.

But whilſt the *Carthaginian* was on his march to *Tarentum*, *Fabius* beſieged *Caſilinum*, and ſent to *Marcellus* to come with ſome legions and cover the ſiege, apprehending an attack from the *Capuans*. The gariſon in the place conſiſted of 2000 *Campanians*, and 700 *Carthaginians*; and they made ſo vigorous a defence, that *Fabius*, by the daily ſlaughter of his men, was much diſcouraged. He would have raiſed the ſiege, if *Marcellus* had not repreſented to him, *That a wiſe General ſhould well conſider all the difficulties of an enterprize before he undertakes it; but that, when it is once undertaken, he ought to go through with it: and that to deſiſt now from the ſiege, would much leſſen the credit of the Republic among her allies.* Upon this *Fabius* renewed his attacks with more ardour than ever; and the *Campanians* were ſo intimidated by it, that they ſent to him an offer to quit the place if they might retire in ſafety to *Capua*. *Fabius* conſented; but *Marcellus* taking his opportunity, before fifty of them were come out of the city, ſeized the gate, entered the place, and put all who oppoſed him to the ſword, without diſtinction[t]. The priſoners he ſent to *Rome*. After the taking of *Caſilinum*,

Plut. life of *Fabius*.

[t] This ſtory *ill* agrees with the character given by the hiſtorians of *Marcellus*, but *well* with his after behaviour at the ſiege of *Syracuſe*.

Marcellus returned to *Nola*, and *Fabius* marched into *Samnium*, laid waſte the country, and took ſeveral towns. Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J.C.* 213. 238 Conſul-p.

Hannibal ſtill depended upon his alliance with the king of *Macedon*, and indeed *Philip* began to draw towards *Italy*. He firſt beſieged *Apollonia*; but not ſucceeding in this enterprize, he turned his arms againſt *Oricum*, and took it. The inhabitants ſent notice of their misfortune to *Lævinus* at *Brunduſium*, who in two days after the news, arrived before the place. The King had left a ſmall gariſon in it, and was returned to the ſiege of *Apollonia*. *Lævinus* eaſily took *Oricum*, and, while he was there, deputies came to him from the people of *Apollonia*, begging aſſiſtance againſt the *Macedonians*. He ſent thither 2000 foot under the command of *Q. Nævius Criſta*, who got into the town without being perceived by the enemy. *Nævius* ſoon after underſtanding that the *Macedonian* camp was very negligently guarded, broke into it in the night, and, if his ſoldiers had abſtained from ſlaughter, might have taken *Philip* priſoner; but the groans of the dying waked others, who carried off the King half naked to his ſhips. He returned into *Macedon*, and the *Roman* fleet wintered at *Oricum*. *Liv.* B. 24. c. 40.

CHAP. XXV.

Tranſactions in Sicily. *The* Carthaginian *intereſt prevails in* Syracuſe. Marcellus *beſieges it, but ſoon turns the ſiege into a blockade.*

HANNIBAL made himſelf ſome amends for his diſappointment on the ſide of *Macedon*, by the troubles he found means to raiſe in *Sicily*. *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* two brothers, of *Syracuſian* extraction, whom he had ſent to conclude the treaty with *Hieronymus*, had worked themſelves into that Prince's favour, and, at the time of his death, commanded a body of 2000 *Syracuſians*. Upon the news of the King's aſſaſſination, theſe Generals, being abandoned by their ſoldiers, repaired to *Syracuſe*, as thinking this the ſafeſt place for them in the preſent conjuncture. At their arrival they found that the heads of the conſpiracy, who were favoured by the people, had come to an accommodation with *Andranodorus*, the late King's uncle-in-law, and chief of the royaliſt party, and that he, *Themiſtus*, and thoſe leaders, had been choſen Prætors to govern the ſtate with the aſſiſtance of a Senate. The two *Hannibal*ſts, doubtleſs believing that this change of government had changed the diſpoſitions of the *Syracuſians* with reſpect to *Hannibal*, to prevent all ſuſpicion of their deſigning to raiſe diſturbances, applied themſelves to the Prætors, and by their means obtained an audience of the Senate. They ſpoke to this effect. "We came hither on the part "of *Hannibal* to treat with his friend *Hieronymus*. We have only "obeyed the commands of our General, and deſire now to return to "him; but as our journey is not like to be with ſafety to our perſons, *Livy*. B. 24. c. 23. & ſeq.

Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J. C.* 213. 238 Conſul-p.

" the *Roman* forces ſo much infeſting *Sicily*, we requeſt that we may " have a convoy as far as *Locri* in *Italy*." Their ſuit was eaſily obtained; for the aſſembly had no unwillingneſs to be rid of theſe Generals of the late King, men extremely bold and enterpriſing, of great ability in war, and of narrow fortunes. The Senate however were too dilatory in executing their own deſires; and the brothers took advantage of the delay. Sometimes to the ſoldiers, with whom they were very intimate and familiar, ſometimes to the deſerters from the *Roman* fleet, and occaſionally to the meaneſt of the populace, they whiſpered calumnies againſt the ſenators and other principal men of the city, accuſing them, that under colour of renewing the league with *Rome*, they deſigned to betray *Syracuſe* to her, in the view, that their own faction, having the ſole merit of the pretended new alliance, might lord it over the reſt.

Theſe rumours being ſpread and believed, and drawing every day crowds of people to *Syracuſe*, gave not only *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes*, but alſo *Andranodorus*, who at the preſſing inſtances of his ambitious wife *Demarata*, the daughter of *Hiero*, aimed at the royalty, good hopes of changing the government, and effecting their ſeveral deſigns. *Andranodorus* having concerted his ſcheme with *Themiſtus*, the huſband of *Harmonia*, *Hieronymus*'s ſiſter, unadviſedly imparted the ſecret to *Ariſto*, a tragedian, who diſcovered it to the Prætors. *Ariſto*'s profeſſion was not diſhonourable among the *Greeks:* He was a man well deſcended, and of a good eſtate, and the Prætors therefore had no reaſon to reject his teſtimony; and it being confirmed by ſeveral corroborating circumſtances, they, in concert with ſome of the oldeſt ſenators, placed guards at the door of the ſenate-houſe, who ſlew *Andranodorus* and *Themiſtus* as ſoon as they entered. This extraordinary action, moſt of the ſenators being ignorant of the cauſe of it, raiſed a great commotion and terror in the aſſembly. *Ariſto* put an end to their fears. Being introduced by the Prætors, he informed the Senate, " That a plot had been laid to " cut off all the chiefs of the republic, and to ſeize *Ortygia*[b] in the " name of *Andranodorus*, and that this was to have been executed by " the help of the *Spaniſh* and *African* mercenaries, who had ſerved " under *Hieronymus*." He then entered into the particulars of the conſpiracy, declaring the names of all the conſpirators, and the ſeveral parts they were to have acted. His evidence obtained full belief, and the aſſembly paſſed a decree, pronouncing the death of *Andranodorus* and *Themiſtus* no leſs juſt than that of *Hieronymus*. In the mean time the people without doors had taken the alarm at this proceeding; and it was neceſſary to quiet them. The Senate therefore deputed *Sopater*, one of the Prætors, to harangue the multitude.

This orator began with invectives againſt *Andranodorus* and *Themiſtus*, as if he had been accuſing them at the bar, charging them, as the tutors and counſellors of *Hieronymus*, with all the injuſtices, oppreſſions,

[b] A well fortified iſland to the South of *Syracuſe*, and joined to the town by a bridge.

and

and cruelties, committed by the order or authority of that King, and with many other atrocious crimes perpetrated ſince his death. In the concluſion of his ſpeech he intimated that they had been ſpirited up by their wives, the ambitious daughter and grand-daughter of *Hiero*, to aſpire to royalty by the deſtruction of the people's liberty. At this the whole multitude cried out, that neither of thoſe women ought to live, nor any one of the royal race be ſuffered to remain on the earth. The Prætors, taking advantage of the people's preſent fury, immediately put it to the vote, and it was no ſooner propoſed than carried, *that all who were of the royal family ſhould be deſtroyed.* In purſuance of this decree certain officers, commiſſioned by the Prætors, quickly diſpatched *Demarata* and *Harmonia*. There was another daughter of *Hiero*, named *Heraclea*, the wife of *Zoippus*, who had been ſent ambaſſador by *Hieronymus* to King *Ptolomy*, and had choſen to continue at the *Egyptian* court in a voluntary exile from his country, rather than be a ſpectator of its miſeries. This lady with her two daughters the ſame executioners inhumanly murthered, and with ſo much expedition, that an expreſs from the magiſtrates (who on ſecond thoughts relented) came too late to ſave them. But now the people alſo began to repent of their own precipitation, and to pity the fate of the dead. Their pity ſoon turned into rage againſt the firſt authors of the cruelty. They furiouſly called out for an election of Prætors in the room of *Andranodorus* and *Themiſtus*; an election that was not like to be to the ſatisfaction of thoſe already in power.

Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J. C.* 213. 238 Conſul-p.

When, on the day appointed, the aſſembly was formed, it happened beyond all expectation, that ſomebody from the farther end of the crowd named *Epicydes*, and another a little after named *Hippocrates*, and ſtrait almoſt the whole multitude joined their ſuffrages for theſe two agents of *Hannibal*. The Republic, being very young, no method was yet ſettled for voting; all were indifferently admitted into the voting place, citizens, ſtrangers, and *Roman* deſerters. The magiſtrates in vain oppoſed the people's choice. Fearing a ſedition they gave way to numbers, and *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* were declared Prætors.

Livy B. 24. c. 27. & ſeq.

The two *Hannibaliſts* did not immediately diſcover their intentions. They were much diſſatisfied, that deputies had been ſent to *Appius Claudius* to renew the ancient alliance between *Rome* and *Syracuſe*, yet they thought it beſt to conceal their diſſatisfaction till a more favourable opportunity ſhould preſent to embroil affairs. *Appius* was then at *Murgantia* with a fleet of a hundred ſhips, waiting to ſee what the revolutions among the *Syracuſians* would produce.

At *Rome* it had been reſolved, from the apprehenſion that a dangerous war might ariſe in *Sicily*, to ſend the Conſul *Marcellus* to take upon him the direction of affairs in that iſland. He was juſt arrived in his province; and *Appius* referred the *Syracuſian* deputies to him for a final anſwer. The Conſul approving the conditions, diſpatched ambaſſadors

Y. of *R.* 539 Bef. *J.C.* 213 238 Conful-P

to conclude the treaty with the Prætors at *Syracuſe*. But thoſe ambaſſadors found the ſtate of things there very different from what they had expected. A *Carthaginian* fleet had appeared off *Cape Pachynum*, and *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* had laid hold of this advantage to attempt ſomething in favour of *Carthage*, by infuſing anew into the minds of the people a jealouſy of the Partiſans of *Rome*, a ſuſpicion of their intending to betray *Syracuſe* to the *Romans*. This jealouſy was the more readily entertained, as *Appius* to encourage the *Roman* party in the town was come with his fleet to the mouth of the port. The populace ran tumultuouſly to hinder the *Romans* from landing in caſe they ſhould attempt it.

In the perplexity occaſioned by theſe commotions, the magiſtrates thought it proper to call an aſſembly of the people. The multitude were for ſome time divided in opinion. At length *Apollonides*, one of the chief citizens, with great calmneſs, and as a man unbiaſſed by any private or party views, repreſented to them "the neceſſity of unanimouſly adhering to the one or the other of the rival Republics. "The choice, *he ſaid*, was of much leſs importance than unanimity in "chooſing: yet in his opinion, they had more encouragement to follow "the example of *Hiero* than of *Hieronymus*, and to prefer a treaty with "*Rome*, whoſe friendſhip they had happily experienced for 50 years, "to the uncertain advantages of an alliance with *Carthage*, who, in "times paſt, had not proved very faithful to her engagements. Nor "was it a conſideration of ſmall moment, that they muſt have immediate "peace with the *Romans*, or immediate war with them; whereas "ſhould they reject the friendſhip of the *Carthaginians*, a war with *them* "might yet be at a great diſtance." The more diſpaſſionate *Apollonides* appeared, the greater weight his advice had with the people; and as they were in no condition to ſupport a war with *Rome*, it was in concluſion agreed, that the treaty with that Republic ſhould be renewed, and a deputation ſent to *Marcellus* for that purpoſe.

A few days after, the *Leontines* having demanded of the *Syracuſians* a body of troops to defend their frontiers, the government thought this a favourable opportunity to get rid of a multitude of ſoldiers and officers, who were very turbulent in the city; and it was determined that *Hippocrates* ſhould march to the aſſiſtance of the *Leontines* at the head of 4000 men, moſt of them deſerters or mercenaries. This Prætor, glad of an opportunity to create diſturbances, readily accepted the commiſſion, and, ſoon after his arrival among the *Leontines*, began to make ſtolen incurſions into the *Roman* province, laying waſte the country. *Appius* informed of theſe hoſtilities, ſent a body of ſoldiers to protect his allies. Thoſe troops *Hippocrates* openly attacked, and put moſt of them to the ſword. Hereupon *Marcellus* ordered deputies to *Syracuſe* to complain of the infraction of the treaty, and to remonſtrate, that a firm and laſting peace between *Rome* and *Syracuſe*, was not to be hoped for ſo long as

Hippocrates and *Epicydes* continued in *Sicily*. The latter, fearing to be accuſed in the abſence of his brother, and deſirous of having ſome ſhare in exciting a war, repaired in all haſte to *Leontini*. There, in conjunction with *Hippocrates*, he repreſented to the inhabitants "that "*Syracuſe*, while ſhe provided for her own liberty, had expreſsly "*covenanted* with the *Romans*, that ſhe ſhould have dominion over all "the cities formerly ſubject to *Hieronymus*: But that the *Leontines* had "as good a right to liberty as *Syracuſe*; and that they ought therefore "to refuſe acceding to her treaty with *Rome*, unleſs *that covenant* were "taken out of it." The multitude was eaſily perſuaded; ſo that when deputies from *Syracuſe* complained of the ſlaughter made of the *Roman* troops, and deſired the *Leontines* would concur with the *Syracuſians*, to baniſh *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* out of the iſland, the citizens haughtily anſwered, "that they had given no commiſſion to the *Syracuſians* to "make a peace for them with *Rome*, nor were they bound by a treaty "concluded without their participation." The *Syracuſians* acquainted *Marcellus* with this anſwer, and at the ſame time declared, that they would not only adhere ſteadily to their engagements with the *Romans*, but would join with them in beſieging *Leontini*, on condition that this city, after it's reduction, were reſtored to the dominion of *Syracuſe*. *Marcellus* agreed to the propoſal, aſſembled all his forces, ſent for the Prætor *Appius* to come to his aſſiſtance, and prepared to attack *Leontini*. Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J. C.* 213. 238 Conſul-p.

About this time, a great company of thoſe *Roman* ſoldiers who had fled from the battle of *Cannæ*, and who had been condemned, by a decree of the Senate, to ſerve in a ſeparate corps in *Sicily* as long as the war ſhould laſt in *Italy*, came, with the permiſſion of their commander *Lentulus*, and earneſtly begged of the Conſul to be incorporated in his legions. *Marcellus* wrote to *Rome* in their favour: The Conſcript Fathers returned anſwer, that it was their opinion, the Republic ought not to put any confidence in the courage of ſoldiers who had deſerted their companions at the battle of *Cannæ*; yet if *Marcellus* thought otherwiſe, he might act in this matter as he pleaſed, provided none of them ever received any military rewards, or were ſuffered to return to *Italy* before the end of the war. *Plut.* life of *Marcellus*. *Liv.* B. 25. c. 5, 6, 7.

Leontini was taken upon the firſt aſſault, but *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* made their eſcape to *Erbeſſus*. A body of 8000 Men from *Syracuſe*, under the command of *Soſis* and *Dinomenes*, two of the Prætors, marching to join *Marcellus*, were met at the river *Mylas*, by a man who told them, that *Leontini* had been ſacked, and all, without diſtinction, able to bear arms, put to the ſword. This falſe ſtory (occaſioned by the execution of 2000 deſerters, whom *Marcellus* had taken in the place) made ſuch an impreſſion on the ſoldiers, that their officers could not prevail with them to proceed to *Leontini*, but were forced to turn aſide and lead them to *Megara*. From this place the Prætors marched them ſoon *Liv.* B. 24. c. 30. & ſeq. *Plut.* life of *Marcellus*.

Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J. C.* 213. 238 Conſul. p.

ſoon after towards *Erbeſſus*, believing, that the ſeditious ſpirit among them would be eaſily quelled, if *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes*, the true authors of all the late diſturbances, were deſtroyed, or driven out of the country.

The brothers found themſelves now reduced to extremities; yet having ſome hope in the good-will of the ſoldiers, with whom they were well acquainted, and this hope being favoured by the recent report of the maſſacre at *Leontini*, they left *Erbeſſus*, in the reſolution to yield themſelves up to the ſoldiers at diſcretion. It happened luckily for them, that a body of *Cretans*, which had formerly ſerved the *Romans* as auxiliaries, and, being taken priſoners at the battle of *Thraſymen*, had been ſet at liberty by *Hannibal*, and had ſince ſerved under *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* in the reign of *Hieronymus*, was marching in the van of the army. To theſe they addreſſed themſelves in a ſuppliant manner, preſenting them olive branches, and imploring their protection, "that "they might not be left at the mercy of the *Syracuſians*, who would "quickly deliver them up to be ſlain by the *Romans*." The *Cretans* immediately cried out to them, to take courage, and promiſed to defend them: So that when *Soſis* and *Dinomenes*, informed of what paſſed, came in haſte and ordered the *Hannibaliſts* to be ſeized, they found no obedience from their troops, but rather a diſpoſition to revolt. In this perplexity they gave orders for returning to *Megara*, and ſent an account to *Syracuſe* of what had happened. During the march of the army, a letter forged by *Hippocrates*, but pretended to be written by the Prætors at *Syracuſe* to *Marcellus*, and intercepted, was produced and read to the ſoldiers by the contriver of it. It was to this effect. "The "Prætors of *Syracuſe* to the Conſul *Marcellus*, health. You have done "juſtly and prudently in ſparing none at *Leontini*. All the mercenaries "deſerve the ſame fate. Nor will *Syracuſe* ever be in peace while any "foreign ſoldiers remain either in the city or the army. Turn then "your arms againſt thoſe who are with our Prætors at *Megara*, and by "their deſtruction reſtore us to perfect liberty." This letter kindled ſuch a flame among the ſoldiers, and their ſudden loud clamours ſo terrified *Soſis* and *Dinomenes*, that they galloped away in all haſte to *Syracuſe*. Their flight did not quiet the commotion: The mercenaries fell upon the *Syracuſian* ſoldiers that were in the army, and would have put them all to the ſword, if the *Hannibaliſts* had not interpoſed in their defence, deſiring to make uſe of them as hoſtages, and alſo hoping by their means to gain friends in *Syracuſe*. Thither they inſtantly ſent a ſoldier, who had been in *Leontini* when it was taken, to ſpread the falſe ſtory of the maſſacre of it's inhabitants. The artifice had the deſired effect, even upon the Senate and the chief men in the Republic. They thought it neceſſary to ſhut the gates and guard the city againſt the *Romans*, as againſt an enemy whoſe avarice and cruelty would ſpare nothing. Scarce was this done, when *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* appeared before

before the walls at the head of the mercenaries, and, by the assistance of the multitude within (who would not be restrained by their magistrates) broke open one of the gates and entered the city. The Prætors retired with the *Syracusian* soldiery into that quarter of the town, which was called *Achradina*, hoping to defend themselves there; but the *Hannibalists* being joined by the mercenaries, the deserters and all the soldiers of the late King, took it at the first assault. Those of the Prætors who could not escape in the first confusion of the conflict were massacred, together with many of the citizens; and the next day, liberty being granted to all slaves and prisoners, the mixed multitude declared *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* their Prætors. V. of *R.* 539. cf. *J. C.* 213. 238 Consul. p.

Marcellus, upon the news of this revolution, advanced with his army to *Syracuse*. Before he began hostilities, he sent deputies to the *Syracusians*, to assure them, he did not come to make war upon *them*, but assist those of their fellow-citizens who, having escaped the slaughter in *Achradina*, had taken refuge in his camp, and those who suffered yet greater wrongs in the city, from tyranny and oppression: That what he therefore insisted upon was, that the refugees under his protection should be restored to their possessions and privileges, the authors of the disturbances given up, and *Syracuse* put in a condition to enjoy peaceably her laws and liberty: And he threatned war against whoever should oppose these demands. The brothers, not thinking it safe to let the deputies enter the town, gave them audience without the walls; and when the latter had made their demands, *Epicydes* spoke to this effect: "If you had brought any message to us, we would have "returned an answer. You may now go back; and when the go- "vernment of *Syracuse* is in the hands of those to whom you have or- "ders to address yourselves, you may come again. If *Marcellus* is "for war, he will find the siege of *Syracuse* an enterprise somewhat "different from the siege of *Leontini*." The Consul, upon the return of his deputies, invested the place by sea and land

Syracuse stood on the south-east side of *Sicily*, and was properly five cities in one; *Ortygia*, *Achradina*, *Tyche*, *Neapolis* and *Epipolæ*. *Ortygia* was a small island, very near the continent, and might be called the citadel of *Syracuse*; it was joined to *Achradina* by a bridge. All the attempts of *Marcellus* to carry the town by assault were frustrated by the surprizing inventions of *Archimedes*. This great man is said to have once told King *Hiero*, that he could move the globe of the earth, provided he had another earth to stand upon. And he now contrived machines which cast stones of so prodigious a weight, as to break in pieces all the battering engines of the *Romans*. Nay, he invented a sort of iron crows fastened to chains, which being let fall upon the *Roman* gallies (that were brought close to the wall of the town) stuck fast in the prows of them, drew them up, by means of a counterpoise on that part of the machine which was within the rampart, and set them on one end, or

Y. of *R.* 539. Bef. *J. C.* 213. 238 Conſul-p. overturned them: Inſomuch that the *Romans* were utterly diſcouraged, and *Marcellus* obliged to remove to a further diſtance. It was reſolved in a council of war, to attack the place no more, but ſhut up all the avenues of it, in order to reduce it by famine.

CHAP. XXVI.

SIXTH YEAR of the war.

The Roman *arms proſper in* Italy. Syphax *a* Numidian *King is gained by the* Scipios *to make war upon the* Carthaginians *in* Africa. *The blockade of* Syracuſe *is continued, while* Marcellus *reduces ſome other towns in* Sicily.

Y. of *R.* 540. Bef. *J. C.* 212. 239 Conſul-p. AT *Rome*, *Q. Fabius Maximus*, the ſon of *Fabius Cunctator*, and *T. Sempronius Gracchus*, were choſen Conſuls for the new year, and appointed, in concert with the Prætorian armies in *Italy*, to conduct the war againſt *Hannibal*. *Marcellus* continued in *Sicily*, and had the government of the country formerly ſubject to *Hiero*. *Lentulus*, with the title of Pro-Prætor, commanded the *Roman* province in that iſland, and *T. Otacilius Craſſus* guarded the coaſt with his fleet. The two *Scipios*, *Lævinus* and *Scævola* managed the affairs of *Rome* in the reſpective countries of *Spain*, *Greece* and *Sardinia*. And the Republic employed this year, in her ſeveral armies, twenty one *Roman* legions, beſides the troops of her allies.

All the regulations neceſſary for beginning the campaign being diſpatched, young *Fabius* ſet out from *Rome*, and took upon him the command of the army at *Sueſſula*. His father ſerved under him.

Liv. B. 24. c. 45. While the *Fabii* continued here, *Daſius Altinius*, one of the chief men of *Arpi*, who had engaged that city to revolt to *Hannibal*, came and offered, for a reward, to reſtore it into the hands of its former maſters. The affair being brought before a council, ſome were for treating the villain as *Camillus* had treated the ſchool-maſter of *Falerii*; but old *Fabius* repreſented to them, that though ſuch traitors ought never to be truſted as friends, yet, in the preſent circumſtances of the Republic, no diſcouragement ſhould be given to thoſe of the rebels who were diſpoſed to return to their former obedience; and he adviſed, that *Altinius* ſhould only be kept in an eaſy confinement till the end of the war, when it would be time enough to judge whether he had made ſufficient amends for his revolt. This advice was followed, and the traitor ſent to *Cales*, where in the day-time he was ſuffered to walk abroad with a guard, but confined cloſe priſoner at night. As ſoon as he was miſſed at *Arpi*, the inhabitants ſent notice of it to *Hannibal*. The *Carthaginian* was in no manner of pain at the news; he had long conſidered *Altinius* as a man

man in whom he could place no confidence, and was glad of this pretext to ſeize his riches, which were very great. But that he might appear to act rather from the motive of revenge than avarice, he ſent for the wife and children of *Altinius*, and having put them to the torture, partly to diſcover the traitor's deſigns, but chiefly to learn what money he had left behind him, he ordered them to be burnt alive. Y. of *R.* 540. Bef. *J. C.* 212. 239 Conſul p.

The *Fabii* opened the campaign with an aſſault upon *Arpi*, in which was a gariſon of 5000 men. The *Romans* in a dark rainy night ſurpriſed and entered the place on the ſtrongeſt ſide, where it was leaſt guarded. Nevertheleſs the gariſon, aſſiſted by 3000 of the townſmen, whom, through ſuſpicion of them, they placed in the front, made a ſtout defence. At length the citizens, and, after their example, 1000 *Spaniards* went over to the *Romans*. The *Spaniards*, according to *Livy*, bargained that the reſt of the gariſon ſhould have leave to depart in ſafety, which they accordingly did, and joined *Hannibal* at *Salapia*.

In the mean time 112 of the chief men of *Capua* having, under the pretext of pillaging the enemy's lands, got permiſſion to leave the town, went to the *Roman* camp above *Sueſſula*, and yielded themſelves to the Prætor *Fulvius*, upon a promiſe of being reſtored to their eſtates, when *Capua* ſhould be reduced to the obedience of the Republic.

Nothing further of great moment happened in *Italy* this campaign. The Prætor *Sempronius Tuditanus* took *Aternum* by aſſault, and in it 7000 priſoners, and a good deal of money. *Sempronius* the Conſul had ſeveral ſlight ſkirmiſhes with the enemy in *Lucania*, and reduced a few towns, but none of any note. Two petty nations of *Bruttium* returned to their former obedience. *Hanno* the *Carthaginian* defeated a Præfect of the *Roman* allies in that country, and cut off almoſt all his army, which conſiſted of raw undiſciplined men. *Hannibal* marched from *Salapia* to *Tarentum*, in hopes of having that city betray'd to him. He ſpent the ſummer near it to very little purpoſe, only ſome inconſiderable towns of the *Salentini* revolted to him. *Livy* B. 24. c. 47. *Liv.* B. 25. c. 1.

In *Spain*, the two *Scipios* not only made conſiderable progreſs there, but extended their views even to *Africa*. They engaged *Syphax* King of *Maſæſylia* (the weſtern part of *Numidia*) to take arms againſt *Carthage*: And *Statorius*, one of the three officers, whom the *Scipios* had ſent upon the negotiation, continued with the *Numidian* King at his requeſt, to diſcipline his troops. On the other hand, the *Carthaginians*, alarmed at the motions of the *Maſæſylian*, prevailed with *Gala* King of *Maſylia* (the eaſtern part of *Numidia*, and the neareſt to their territory) to join with them, to divert the threatned ſtorm. *Gala* gave the command of his forces to his ſon *Maſiniſſa*, a youth of about 17 years of age, who, in conjunction with the *Carthaginian* army, defeated *Syphax* in a great battle, and ſlew 30000 of his men. The vanquiſhed King retired into *Mauritania*, and made new levies there, intending to paſs the ſtreights, and join the *Scipios* in *Spain*: But *Maſiniſſa* following him cloſe, *Liv.* B. 24. c. 48.

Y. of *R.* 540. Bef. *J. C.* 212 239 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 24. c. 35.

kept him ſo employed in *Africa*, that he had not leiſure to croſs the ſeas.

In the mean while the blockade of *Syracuſe* continued. *Marcellus*, not thinking all his forces neceſſary for that purpoſe, left two thirds of the army before the place under the command of *Appius Claudius*, and marched with the remainder, to reduce ſome towns of *Sicily* which had gone over to the *Carthaginians*. *Pelorus* and *Erbeſſus* ſurrendered to him, and *Megara* he took by force and plundered. About this time *Himilco* arrived from *Africa*, with an army of 25000 foot, 3000 horſe, and 12 elephants, and ſoon made himſelf maſter of *Heraclea* and *Agrigentum*. Upon this news, *Hippocrates* left his brother *Epicydes* to command in *Syracuſe*, and ſallying out of the town with 10000 foot and 500 horſe, broke through the *Roman* lines in the night, and marched to join *Himilco*. This detachment *Marcellus* ſurpriſed, as they were pitching their camp near *Acrillæ*, and he cut in pieces the infantry: But *Hippocrates* eſcaped with the cavalry, and, joining *Himilco*, turned againſt the Pro-Conſul, in hopes of overtaking him before he could reach his camp at *Syracuſe*. Diſappointed in this expectation, and not daring to attack *Marcellus* in his entrenchments, the *Carthaginian* Generals employed their forces to reduce the *Sicilian* cities that were in the intereſt of *Rome*. *Murgantia* opened her gates to them, and betrayed the *Roman* garriſon into their hands. *L. Pinarius*, the Governor of *Enna*, dreading the like fate, maſſacred all the inhabitants of that town, and pillaged it. *Marcellus* approved the fact, and granted the plunder of *Enna* to the ſoldiers of the garriſon. The news of this barbarity, committed in a city held in great veneration all over the iſland, and ſacred to *Proſerpine* (whom *Pluto* was ſaid to have carried off from that neighbourhood) alienated the minds of the *Sicilians* from *Rome*; and many of their towns embraced the party of the *Carthaginians*. Winter approaching, *Marcellus*, having diſmiſſed *Appius Claudius*, who had a mind to ſtand for the Conſulſhip, gave the command both of the fleet and the army before *Syracuſe* to *Quinctius Criſpinus*, and took up his own quarters about five miles from the town.

Liv. B. 25. c. 1.

During theſe tranſactions in *Sicily*, all was peaceable at *Rome*: Only religion ſuffered by the introduction of foreign Gods and foreign rites, which the ſuperſtition of a multitude of people from the country, driven by poverty and fear to ſhelter themſelves in *Rome*, had, in this uncertain ſtate of things, made them prone to receive. Foreign prieſts and diviners had diſperſed among them books, containing prophecies, forms of prayer, and particular methods of ſacrificing. The ancient worſhip was almoſt forgot. It ſeemed, ſays *Livy*, as if a new ſet of Gods were, on a ſudden, come into being; or that a new ſpecies of men was riſen. The evil became at length ſo general, that *Conſcript Fathers* were forced to interpoſe. The Prætor having aſſembled the people, read to them a decree of the Senate, and, in conformity thereto, his own edict; which

which *commanded all persons, who had books of divination or prayers, or containing instructions about the rites of sacrifices, to bring them to him before the first of* April; *and forbad all persons to offer sacrifice in public, or in any sacred place whatsoever, according to any new or foreign ceremonies.* Thus were the innovations suppressed, and religion settled again upon the ancient footing. Y. of *R.* 540. Bef. *J. C.* 212. 239 Consul-p.

CHAP. XXVII.

SEVENTH and EIGHTH YEARS of the war.

The city of Tarentum *betrayed to* Hannibal. *He besieges the citadel.*
Capua *besieged by the* Romans.
Syracuse *taken by* Marcellus.
Hannibal *marches into the neighbourhood of* Rome; *retires thence; defeats a* Roman *army; and marches to* Rhegium.
Capua *surrenders to the* Romans.
They gain some advantages over King Philip *in* Greece.

THE time for the elections drawing on, and the present *Consuls* being both engaged abroad in the war, one of them nominated *C. Claudius Centho* Dictator, to hold the *Comitia*. And there *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, and *Appius Claudius Pulcher*, were chosen Consuls for the new year. It was thought fit to add two legions to the twenty-one already on foot; a surprising multitude of soldiers, to be all raised out of the citizens of *Rome*, and exclusive of the troops of the allies, which were at least as numerous as the *Roman* legionaries! But the making these new levies was interrupted, and the departure of the Consuls delayed for some time, by an incident, which revived the hatred of the people to the publicans. Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J. C.* 211. 240 Consul-p. *Liv.* B. 25. c. 3.

It has been observed before, that the publicans undertook to supply the *Roman* armies in *Spain* with provisions; and the Senate had agreed to indemnify them, in case of losses at sea. *Posthumius*, an avaricious wretch, took advantage of this condition to practise rogueries, and impose upon the public. He placed to their account many shipwrecks which had never happened; he also put small quantities of goods of little value on board old shattered vessels; which after he had brought off the seamen in boats ready for that purpose, he sunk; and then pretended the cargoes had been extremely rich. By this means he made his losses run very high, and demanded great sums in consideration of them. But his knavery was at length discovered, and two Tribunes of the people threatned to have him fined 200000 *asses* of brass; in order to which they cited him to appear and take his trial before the *Comitia by* 6451. 16s. 8d. Arbuthnot.

Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J. C.* 211. 240 Conſul-p.

Liv. B. 25. c. 3.

Tribes. Hereupon the friends of the accuſed applied themſelves to *Servilius Caſca*, a relation of *Poſthumius*, and one of the Tribunes: But *Caſca* not daring, through ſhame and fear of the people, to proteſt againſt the proceedings of his collegues, the publicans, who were all intereſted in the affair, had recourſe to violence, and inſulted both the people and their magiſtrates. And they were juſt ready to come to blows, when the Conſul *Fulvius* ſaid to the Tribunes of the commons, *You ſee how little reſpect is ſhewn to your perſons. If you do not diſſolve the aſſembly, the affair will end in ſedition*; the Tribunes followed his advice; and, being afterwards authoriſed by the Senate, changed the nature of the proceſs, and made the affair capital. *Poſthumius*, and the other publicans who aſſiſted him in the riot, were cited to appear as criminals before the *Comitia by Centuries*. Some were dragged to priſon, for want of the ſureties required of them; others went into a voluntary baniſhment; *Poſthumius* left his bail and fled; and *Rome* was delivered from a gang of bold and avaricious villains.

Polyb. B. 8. c. 19. *Liv.* B. 25. c. 8.

In the end of the winter *Hannibal* had ſurprized *Tarentum*. The inhabitants of this place had long been diſaffected to the Republic, and lately provoked by the cruel execution of ſome hoſtages, they had ſent to *Rome*, and who had attempted to make their eſcape. Thirteen of the principal citizens entered into a plot to deliver up the city to the *Carthaginian*. *Nico* and *Philomenus* were at the head of them. They made hunting their pretence for night-excurſions. The game they brought home, and with which they furniſhed the table of *Livius*, the commander of the *Roman* gariſon, pleaſed him ſo much, that without the leaſt ſuſpicion he allowed them the liberty of going out and coming in at pleaſure. By this means the conſpirators had frequent conferences with *Hannibal*, and having engaged him to promiſe, *That when he ſhould become maſter of* Tarentum, *the inhabitants ſhould enjoy their laws, liberties, and eſtates, without infringement; that they ſhould not be ſubject to pay any tribute, or to receive a* Carthaginian *gariſon, without their own conſent; and that the effects of the* Romans *only ſhould be given up as free booty to his troops*, they undertook to bring him into the town. *Hannibal* was at the diſtance of three days march from *Tarentum*, and feigned himſelf ſick in his camp, that his long ſtay there might not occaſion ſuſpicion. At length *Philomenus* gave him notice, that a favourable opportunity offered to put their project in execution. The *Carthaginian* came away with a detachment of 10000 men, and concealed himſelf in a valley fifteen miles from the city. Hither *Philomenus* brought him word, that the next night the *Roman* Governor was to be at an entertainment, and would probably drink to exceſs; and that when he was faſt aſleep, it would be the proper time for the attempt.

Polyb. B. 8. c. 24.

All preparations being made by the conſpirators, both within and without the city, *Hannibal*, conducted by *Philomenus*, approached the walls about midnight. The *Carthaginian* then giving a part of his

forces to the *Tarentine*, ſilently drew near with the reſt to the gate *Temenides*, and gave the appointed ſignal to *Nico*, who at the head of his party in the town, without much noiſe made himſelf maſter of the gate, ſlew the guard, and admitted the *Carthaginians*. The General, for the greater ſecurity in caſe of accidents, left 2000 horſe without the gate, and advancing with the reſt of his troops into the Forum, took poſſeſſion of it. In the mean time, *Philomenus* had marched with 1000 *Africans* to another gate, at which he uſed to be admitted when he returned from hunting. He was follwed by two young men carrying a wild boar of an enormous ſize, and when the wicket was opened, and the centinel upon guard ſtood examining the beaſt, *Philomenus* ran him through with a hunting ſpear. Then 30 *Carthaginians* entered in an inſtant, broke down the gate, and let in their companions, who, as had been agreed upon, joined *Hannibal* in the Forum. After this the general ſeized the principal poſts in the town, ſent parties of men into the different quarters, and with each of them ſeveral of the conſpirators. His view in this was, that the inhabitants might be diſtinguiſhed and preſerved, while all the *Romans* were put to the ſword. To draw theſe out the more effectually, ſome men, prepared on purpoſe, ſounded a charge in the theatre with *Roman* trumpets, and after the *Roman* manner. The ſlaughter continued all that night and part of the next day; but *Livius* with his domeſtics, in the beginning of the tumult, eſcaped in a bark to the citadel, which was ſtrongly fortified, and where all that remained of the gariſon took refuge. Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J. C.* 211. 240 Conſul-p.

In order to ſecure the *Tarentines* againſt all attacks from the *Romans*, *Hannibal* propoſed to caſt up a rampart over-againſt the wall of the citadel, and as he knew the enemy would endeavour to hinder the work he prepared to receive them. The rampart was no ſooner begun, than the *Romans* made a vigorous ſally. *Hannibal* defended himſelf but faintly till he obſerved that the greateſt part of the gariſon was got over their ditch: then falling furiouſly upon them, he drove them with ſuch ſlaughter within their walls that they did not think proper to attack him a ſecond time; and he had leiſure to carry on his works. Beſides the rampart abovementioned he ordered a ditch to be drawn, and another rampart to be raiſed upon the brink of it, and within that a wall, ſo that the inhabitants might, without the aſſiſtance of the *Carthaginians*, eaſily defend their town againſt all attempts from the citadel. Having left a part of his troops to finiſh and guard the works, in conjunction with the *Tarentines*, he encamped with the reſt of his army on the banks of the *Eurotas* (otherwiſe called *Galeſus*) five miles from the city. When the fortifications were completed, he returned and beſieged the citadel in form; but the gariſon having received a reinforcement from *Metapontus*, a *Roman* city on the gulph of *Tarentum*, ſallied out, burned his machines in the night, and made him lay aſide the thoughts of reducing the place by aſſault.

However,

Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J. C.* 211. 240 Conſul-p.

However, it was neceſſary to ſecure the *Tarentines* a free paſſage to the ſea, which was at preſent cut off by the citadel, that ſtood at the entrance of the port. No veſſel could ſafely go out, or come in; and this made the *Tarentines* apprehend a ſcarcity of proviſions. *Hannibal*, who was not to be diſcouraged by difficulties, formed a ſcheme (which the ancients have much admired) to remedy this evil. There were a good number of ſhips in the haven of *Tarentum*; and he cauſed them to be tranſported to the ſea by land, on carriages made for that purpoſe. Theſe veſſels anchored before the mouth of the haven; ſo that the citadel, which before commanded the ſea, could now receive no proviſions that way; and the city was ſupplied. After this, *Hannibal* returned to his winter quarters, leaving the citadel blocked up by ſea and land.

Liv. B. 25. c. 13.

The Conſuls *Fulvius* and *Appius*, when their affairs at *Rome* were diſpatched, took the field, and marched with joint forces into *Samnium*. As the *Capuans* expected to be beſieged by them, and began already to feel the miſeries of famine (for the *Roman* armies had not permitted them to ſow their lands) they ſent a deputation to *Hannibal*, then near *Tarentum*, to beg he would order them a ſupply of corn from the towns in their neighbourhood, while the roads were yet open. The *Carthaginian* ſent *Hanno* with an army from *Bruttium* to their relief. *Hanno* having pitched his camp near *Beneventum*, gave notice to the *Capuans*, to ſend their waggons to fetch the corn, which he had collected for them in vaſt quantities. So indolent and lazy were theſe effeminate wretches, that they ſent but four hundred carts, and a few mules. The *Carthaginian* could not forbear expreſſing his indignation at ſuch intolerable negligence, and fixed a day when a greater number of carriages ſhould come to remove the reſt of the corn. In the mean time the Conſuls had notice of what was doing, from the people of *Beneventum*; and *Fulvius* with his troops marched thither with all expedition. He entered the town in the night, and the next morning appeared by break of day before the enemy's camp, while *Hanno* was abſent foraging with a part of his army. Two thouſand *Capuan* carts were arrived there, and the carters and peaſants mixing with the ſoldiers cauſed a good deal of diſorder. Nevertheleſs, as the camp was ſituated upon an aſcent, it was very difficult to take it by aſſault; the *Roman* ſoldiers ſignalized their bravery on this occaſion, beyond the expectation of their General, who was for quitting the enterpriſe, or at leaſt ſuſpending it, till his colleague ſhould come to his aſſiſtance. One *Vibius*, who commanded a cohort of the *Peligni*, and, after his example, *Pedanius* a Centurion of the third *Roman* legion, threw each a ſtandard over the enemy's rampart, to excite the ſoldiers to recover them. The ſtratagem ſucceeded,

c. 14.

the *Carthaginian* entrenchments were forced, and the ſlaughter was great. As for *Hanno*, having loſt his camp, he was forced to return to *Bruttium* with the remainder of his army; and the *Capuans* ſent a new deputation to *Hannibal*, to preſs him to come to their aſſiſtance, being now more

more than ever apprehenſive of a ſiege. The *Carthaginian* anſwered, that he would take care of *Capua*; and for the preſent ſent them 2000 horſe to defend their territory from the enemy's incurſions. He had ſtill hopes of reducing the citadel of *Tarentum* by famine; but a convoy of proviſions having forced its way through the *Tarentine* galleys, entered the place, and diſappointed his expectations. His deſign upon *Thurium* ſucceeded better. *Hanno* and *Mago* defeated the Prætor *Atinius*, who ſallied out of the place; after which the inhabitants opened their gates to the conquerors. The *Metapontines* alſo, when left by the *Roman* gariſon, which went to the relief of the citadel of *Tarentum*, ſubmitted to the *Carthaginians*. Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J. C.* 211. 240 Conſul-p.

During theſe things, the Conſuls entered the territory of *Capua* with a deſign to beſiege the city in form, and believing undoubtedly, that *Hannibal* would come to its relief, they ordered *Sempronius Gracchus* to leave *Lucania*, and draw near to *Capua*, with his horſe and light arm'd infantry, that they might be the better able to withſtand the enemy's cavalry. *Sempronius* having left his legions under the command of *Cn. Cornelius*, his Quæſtor, was preparing for his march, when one *Flavius*, a *Lucanian*, and hitherto zealous in the *Roman* intereſt, changed his inclinations on a ſudden, and in order to recommend himſelf to the *Carthaginians*, betrayed the Pro-Conſul to them. He pretended to *Sempronius*, that the heads of the *Carthaginian* faction in *Lucania* were diſpoſed to a reconciliation with the Republic, and only deſired a private conference with him. The *Roman*, not ſuſpecting any deceit, ſuffered himſelf, attended only by his lictors and a troop of horſe, to be led by the traitor into an ambuſh, where *Mago* with a body of *Carthaginians* ſurrounded them; and then *Flavius* went over to the enemy. The Pro-Conſul, ſeeing himſelf betrayed, diſmounted, and wrapping his left arm in his paludamentum, for want of a buckler, ruſhed ſword in hand to the place where he ſaw *Flavius*, in hopes to kill the traitor before he fell himſelf; but he periſhed in the attempt, though the *Carthaginians* endeavoured to take him alive. The body of this brave Pro-Conſul was carried to *Hannibal*'s camp, who erected a funeral pile for him, and did honour to his memory. *Liv.* B. 25. c. 16.

While the Conſuls were pillaging the country about *Capua*, *Mago* with his cavalry and ſome of the *Capuans* fell upon the *Romans*, of whom he ſlew 1500. Upon this news *Hannibal* advanced towards the city and offered battle to the enemy. *Appius* and *Fulvius* accepted the challenge, and the engagement was begun, to the diſadvantage of the *Romans*, when *Cn. Cornelius* appeared with the *Volones* which had been commanded by *Sempronius*. Each ſide apprehending, that aſſiſtance was coming to the other, immediately ſounded a retreat. The Conſuls, to draw *Hannibal* from *Capua*, decamped in the night, divided their armies, and marched the one into *Lucania* and the other towards *Cumæ*. The *Carthaginian* next day ſet out for *Lucania* in purſuit of *Appius*, who had c. 18.

Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J.C.* 211. 240 Conſul. p. had taken that road, but the latter, fetching a compaſs, returned by another way to the neighbourhood of *Capua*. There happened to be at this time in *Lucania* one *M. Centenius Pænula*, who by the credit of the Prætor *Cornelius Scylla*, and by promiſing great things, had obtained of the Senate the command of a body of 8000 men, which he had encreaſed to near double that number. *Hannibal*, miſſing the Conſul *Appius*, turned his arms againſt *Centenius*, entirely defeated him, and cut off almoſt all his whole army. The *Carthaginian* then marched into *Apulia*, and attacked the Prætor *Fulvius*, who commanded 18000 men in that country. The victory was complete, 16000 of the *Romans* being ſlain, and their camp taken. And to add to the misfortunes of the preſent campaign, the *Velones* diſbanded themſelves. Notwithſtanding theſe diſcouragements the Conſuls were buſy at *Caſilinum*, preparing all things neceſſary for the ſiege of *Capua*. They ſent for the Prætor *Claudius Nero*, with the forces he commanded at *Sueſſula*; and the three Generals with their united armies beſieged *Capua* in form.

Livy. B. 25. c. 23. & ſeq. During this ſiege, *Marcellus* made himſelf maſter of *Syracuſe*. He took the opportunity of a feſtival, when the ſoldiers and citizens had drunk plentifully, to make a detachment ſcale the walls of *Tyche*, in that part of it which was neareſt to *Epipolæ*, and which was ill guarded [a]. He preſently after poſſeſſed himſelf of *Epipolæ*; whereupon the inhabitants of *Neapolis*, as well as *Tyche*, ſent deputies to him, and ſubmitted. *Marcellus* granted life and liberty to all of free condition, but gave up thoſe quarters of the city to be plundered.

Notwithſtanding this, there was a great deal yet to do. *Achradina* and *Ortygia*, which were ſtrongly fortified, ſtill held out; *Hippocrates* and *Himilco* arrived with their troops to the relief of the beſieged; and the *Romans* were forced to exert all their bravery and ſkill to maintain the advantages they had gained.

But now a plague made terrible havock in both armies. At the firſt breaking out of the peſtilence, the *Sicilians*, who ſerved under *Hippocrates* and *Himilco*, diſbanded themſelves, and returned to their reſpective homes; but all the *Carthaginian* ſoldiers periſhed, together with thoſe two Generals. The *Romans* ſuffered leſs by the infection, becauſe, having been a long time before *Syracuſe*, they were ſeaſoned to the air and water of the country.

About this time *Bomilcar* arrived on the coaſt of *Sicily* from *Carthage* with a fleet of 130 galleys and 700 ſhips of burthen, but was long hindred by contrary winds from doubling the cape of *Pachynum*. *Epicydes*, fearing the *Carthaginian* might ſail back to *Africa*, left the command of *Achradina* to the Generals of the mercenaries, and went

[a] Though this account be taken from *Livy*, yet he afterwards tells us, in two or three places, that *Soſis* a Brazier let *Marcellus* into *Syracuſe* by night. *Liv.* B. 26. c. 21, 30 and 31.

to *Bomilcar*, in order to perſuade him to fight the *Roman* fleet. The Admiral would not engage, but ſailed away to *Tarentum* with all his galleys, ordering his ſhips of burthen to return to *Africa*. *Epycides*, thus fruſtrated of his hopes, and knowing himſelf unable to defend a city already half taken, retired to *Agrigentum*; whereupon the *Syracuſians* maſſacred the commanders appointed by him, choſe new Prætors to govern in the town, and ſent deputies to *Marcellus* to treat of peace. In the mean time the deſerters, fearing to be given up to the vengeance of the *Romans*, perſuaded the mercenaries that they alſo would have the ſame fate. Inſtantly the ſoldiers ran to arms, put to death the new Prætors, together with many of the *Syracuſians*, and plundered part of the city. After this ſlaughter, they choſe ſix Generals, three to command in *Achradina*, and three in *Ortygia*. Upon the return of the deputies from *Marcellus*, the mercenaries finding that their caſe was different from that of the deſerters, and that there was no deſign againſt their lives, became perfectly ſatisfied, and the negotiation went on. During the courſe of the treaty, *Marcellus* found means to corrupt *Mericus*, a *Spaniard*, one of the ſix Generals choſen by the ſoldiers, and engaged him to admit the *Romans* into that part of the city where he commanded. *Mericus*, the better to accompliſh this deſign, feigned an extraordinary zeal for the preſervation of the place; pretended not to like, that deputies ſhould have leave to go out and in at pleaſure; and propoſed, that for the greater ſecurity of the town, each General ſhould have a diſtinct quarter aſſigned him, and be reſponſible for any neglect of duty in it. The motion was agreed to, and, upon the diviſion, that diſtrict of *Ortygia*, which extended from the fountain of *Arethuſa* to the mouth of the great port, fell to his care. *Marcellus*, informed of what was done, took his meaſures accordingly. He ſent a body of troops to that ſide where *Mericus* commanded, and the *Spaniard* admitted them at the gate of *Arethuſa*. At the ſame time the Pro-Conſul ordered a falſe attack to be made on *Achradina*, which drawing almoſt all the ſoldiers of the gariſon thither, *Ortygia* was in a manner left defenceleſs. Foreſeeing this, he had detached another party of ſoldiers to take advantage of it. Theſe entered *Ortygia* almoſt without fighting; upon which the deſerters made their eſcape, the *Romans* giving them way; and the *Syracuſians* in *Achradina*, thus delivered from the fear of the deſerters, immediately opened their gates to *Marcellus*, who thereby became maſter of the whole city.

Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J.C.* 211. 240 Conſul p.

And now the conqueror, who is ſaid to have wept, during the ſiege, with compaſſion for the inhabitants, gave up both *Ortygia*, and *Achradina*, to be plundered by his army, after he had ſecured the late King's treaſures for the uſe of his Republic, and the ſtatues, paintings, and principal ornaments of *Syracuſe* to illuſtrate his triumph. The ſoldiers had orders to ſpare the lives of the citizens; but they were cruel in their avarice, ſlew many of them, and, among the reſt, the incomparable *Archimedes*.

Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J. C.* 211. 240 Conſul-p. *Plut.* life of *Marcellus.*

He was very intent on a demonſtration in geometry, and calmly drawing his lines, when a ſoldier entered the room and clapped a ſword to his throat. "Hold! (ſaid *Archimedes*) One moment, and my demonſtration "will be finiſhed." But the ſoldier, equally regardleſs of his prayer and his demonſtration, killed him inſtantly. There are different accounts of the manner of his death; but all agree, that *Marcellus* regretted it extremely, and ſhewed ſingular favour to his relations, for his ſake.

The conſular year being ready to expire, the Senate ordered, that one of the Conſuls ſhould come from *Capua* to hold the *Comitia* for the great elections. *App. Claudius* repaired to *Rome*, and preſided in the aſſembly, which transferred the faſces to *P. Sulpicius Galba*, and *Cn. Fulvius Centumalus*. *Apulia* was to be their province; while the late Conſuls were in quality of Pro-Conſuls to continue the ſiege of *Capua*. But as theſe propoſed to reduce the place rather by famine than force, they turned the ſiege into a blockade.

Y. of *R.* 542. Bef. *J. C.* 210. 241 Conſul-p.

Liv. B. 26. c. 2.

At *Rome*, *Cn. Fulvius*, the late Prætor, was called to account for the defeat he had ſuffered in *Apulia*. One of the Tribunes of the people cited him to appear before the *Comitia*, purpoſing only to get him fined for his cowardice and ill-conduct. When the witneſſes came to be examined, the charge appeared ſo heavy, that all the people cried out, *The proceſs ought to be made capital*; and a day was appointed for the trial. *Fulvius* ſent to his brother, the Pro-Conſul before *Capua*, urging him to come to *Rome* and employ all his credit to avert the impending ſtorm. The Pro-Conſul would willingly have complied; but the *Conſcript Fathers* thinking it a caſe wherein the publick intereſt was greatly concerned, abſolutely refuſed him leave to come: So that the accuſed, having no hopes, went into exile without waiting for his ſentence; and the *Comitia*, after his departure, condemned him to baniſhment.

c. 4.

In the mean time the *Capuans*, greatly diſtreſſed for want of proviſions, ſent a meſſenger to acquaint *Hannibal* with their preſent ſituation. A *Numidian* horſeman had the addreſs to paſs undiſcovered through the *Romans* in the night, and carried the meſſage to the *Carthaginian* General. Upon this advice, leaving the greateſt part of his baggage behind him, he marched away with all expedition, arrived before *Capua*, and pitched his camp near the *Roman* entrenchments. At firſt he endeavoured by ſkirmiſhes to provoke the enemy to a battle, but this not ſucceeding, he almoſt beſieged them in their camp, frequently aſſaulting it with bodies of infantry, which relieved one another, while ſome troops of horſe covered them, and threw darts upon the enemy. All his attempts to draw the *Romans* to a battle, or to break into the town, proved ineffectual: Nor was it poſſible for him to ſtay long in the neighbourhood of *Capua* for want of forage; becauſe the enemy, foreſeeing his coming, had ruined the country all around. Add to this, that there being ſeveral armies in the field againſt him, he

Polyb. l. 9. c. 3. & ſeq.

he feared leſt they ſhould join and attack him, or cut off his proviſions, and ſo reduce him to extremities. Convinced that it was impracticable to raiſe the ſiege by force, he formed a deſign, much extolled by the ancient writers. He reſolved to leave his camp ſilently, march with all expedition, and appear before the walls of *Rome*. By this means, he hoped the affright of the citizens might produce ſome accident in his favour, perhaps might give him an opportunity of ſurpriſing the town: If that ſhould not happen, the Pro-Conſuls, he thought, would either quit the blockade of *Capua*, or at leaſt divide their army, and ſend a part of it to the defence of the capital. In this laſt caſe he did not doubt but he ſhould have an eaſy victory, both over thoſe that ſtaid before *Capua*, and thoſe that marched away. Before he put this ſcheme in execution, he took care to acquaint the beſieged with his intention, leſt upon his departure they ſhould in deſpair ſurrender the town. Every thing being ready for his expedition, he ſet out in the night, and, to deceive the enemy, left fires burning in his camp. Having marched through *Samnium*, he croſſed the *Anio*, and pitched his camp within five miles of *Rome*, deſigning to attack the city next day, if practicable. The *Romans* terrified at his approach, for he had never been ſo near their walls before, at firſt imagined he had made his way thither by the ſlaughter of their army at *Capua*. Their fears however did not leſſen their reſolution; and it happened luckily for them that the Conſuls had already raiſed one legion, which was to rendezvous at *Rome* that very day, and had alſo called together the citizens in order to ſelect from amongſt them another legion: By which means there was very ſeaſonably a great concourſe of men in the town. *Sulpicius* and *Fulvius* the Conſuls, marched out with an army, and encamped before the walls. *Hannibal* ſeeing the *Romans* prepared to make a ſtout defence, loſt all hopes of being able to take the town [a], and therefore fell to pillaging the country. The Conſuls boldly advanced, and encamped within ten furlongs of him. The *Carthaginian*, to ſecure his booty and execute the remaining part of his ſcheme, decamped in the night, and paſſed the *Anio* at a ford, the bridges being all broken down. In his paſſage he was attacked by the *Romans*, and though the *Numidians*, and the reſt of his cavalry, covered his retreat, ſo that he ſuffered no great loſs, yet the enemy regained a part of the ſpoil, and took about three hundred priſoners. *Sulpicius* and *Fulvius*, thinking that *Hannibal* fled before them, followed him, but kept to the hills, for fear of a ſurprize. He, on the other hand, marched at firſt in great haſte, to intercept any forces that, on occaſion of his march to *Rome*, might have been ſent from *Capua*, or in their abſence to attack the *Roman* entrenchments before that city.

Y. of *R.* 542. Bef. *J.C.* 210. 241 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 26. c. 7. & ſeq.

[a] *Livy* ſays that when *Hannibal* was before the walls of *Rome*, the ground on which his camp ſtood was ſold at the full price; which ſo provoked the *Carthaginian* that he put up to ſale the banker's ſhops that were round the *Roman* Forum. The account which the *Latin* hiſtorian gives of this expedition differs in many particulars from that of *Polybius*, which is followed in the text.

Y. of *R.* 542. Bef. *J. C.* 210. 241 Conſul-p

Finding that none of the beſiegers had ſtirred, he turned againſt the Conſuls that were purſuing him, fell upon their camp in the night, and took it with great ſlaughter. Next morning he ſaw thoſe that had eſcaped poſted upon a hill, which was very difficult of acceſs; and he would not loſe time in attacking them, having formed a project of greater moment. Deſpairing to raiſe the ſiege of *Capua*, he hoped to ſurprize *Rhegium*. And though it was ſituated in the remoteſt corner of *Italy*, he marched with ſuch rapidity through *Apulia*, *Lucania*, and *Bruttium*, and appeared ſo unexpectedly before the place, that he took priſoners many of the inhabitants who were walking ſecurely without the walls; and was very near getting poſſeſſion of the town.

Hannibal's departure left *Capua* without hope of relief. The *Pro-Conſuls* ſignified to the inhabitants, that they would ſpare the lives of all thoſe of them who would repair to the *Roman* camp; but not one *Capuan* accepted the offer. The commanders of the *Carthaginian* gariſon wrote letters to *Hannibal* full of reproaches, and preſſing him not to abandon them to the cruelty of the *Romans*. These letters were committed to the care of ſome *Numidians*, who pretended to deſert, and then ſought an opportunity to eſcape to *Rhegium*. One of them being followed to the *Roman* camp by his miſtreſs, to whom he had diſcloſed the ſecret, ſhe betrayed it; and above ſeventy of the *Numidians* were ſeized, whipped, had their hands cut off, and were driven back to *Capua*.

Livy B. 26. c. 12.

The ſight of theſe maimed wretches threw the city into the utmoſt conſternation. The people forced the chief of the Senators, who had for ſome time withdrawn themſelves from public affairs, to aſſemble with the reſt in the Senate-houſe; where the greateſt part were for ſending a deputation to the *Pro-Conſuls* to capitulate: But *Vibius Virius*, one of the authors of the revolt, oppoſed this motion, and made a ſpeech, the whole ſtrain of which was rage and deſpair. Having repreſented the implacable hatred of the *Romans* to *Capua*, and expoſed the folly of hoping for any favour from them, he thus concluded. *Death is our only refuge. I have prepared an entertainment at my houſe. When we have finiſhed our repaſt, a cup ſhall go round, that will end our days and our misfortunes together. Let all thoſe who are weary of life, or deſpiſe it, or deſpair of preſerving it, follow me. Funeral piles are already prepared to burn our bodies. A glorious death will gain us eſteem from our enemies; and the perfidious* Hannibal *will lament the loſs of allies, who did not deſerve to be thus deſerted and betrayed.* Twenty ſeven of the aſſembly followed *Virius*, accepted the entertainment to which they were invited, and cloſed all with a cup of poiſon.

As to the terms of the treaty, which the reſt of the *Capuans* made with the *Romans*, we can only gueſs at them by what followed. As ſoon as the latter were in poſſeſſion of the place, they ſeized the ſoldiers of the gariſon and the *Capuan* Senators. Theſe they conveyed to

to their camp to be tried by the *Pro-Conſuls*. They were firſt made to diſcover all their treaſures, which amounted to ſeventy pounds weight of gold, and three thouſand two hundred pounds weight of ſilver; and then fifty three of them were ſent in cuſtody to two *Roman* cities in ſeparate companies; and it was reſolved to determine their fate before any thing was decreed concerning the reſt of the inhabitants. *Appius* inclined to clemency, *Fulvius* to ſeverity; and the diſpute grew warm between them. The former, to put an end to it, wrote to the Senate, and referred the matter to them; but his collegue, without waiting for the Senate's decree, went with two thouſand horſe, firſt to *Teanum*, whither twenty eight of the *Capuan* Senators had been tranſported, and he cauſed them to be beaten with rods, and then beheaded by the *Lictors*. Thence he haſten'd to *Cales*, and treated with the ſame rigour the twenty five Senators who had been conveyed thither, though he might well have ſpared them, having juſt before the execution received letters from *Rome*, with orders to ſuſpend it; but he put the letters in his boſom, and would not read them till all was over. Nor did the Republic ever blame him for this inſtance of ſeverity, being doubtleſs pleaſed to have revenge, without incurring the odium of inhumanity among her allies. This charge fell only upon *Fulvius*. Y. of *R*. 542. Bef. *J*. *C*. 210. 241 Conſul-p. *Liv*. B. 26. c. 15.

And the impreſſion of this Proconſul's cruelty became yet ſtronger in the minds of the people, by the following incident. One *Jubellius Taurea*, a man, among his own party, reputed brave, had come from *Capua*, and had been preſent at the late maſſacre of the Senators. Pierced with compaſſion, and full of indignation, he thus addreſſed himſelf to the *Pro-Conſul*, juſt as he was going to diſmiſs the aſſembly: *Stay one moment*, Fulvius, *and command me to be murthered; and then thou mayeſt boaſt of having killed a braver man than thyſelf*. *Fulvius* (who had publiſhed the Senate's decree) replied, *You come too late to be puniſhed, and are mad with rage*. *What!* ſaid Jubellius, *have I lived to ſee my country reduced to ſlavery! Have I ſtabbed my wife and children, to preſerve them from inſults and diſhonour; and when I am come hither, to have my blood mixed with that of my friends and countrymen; do my enemies, after all, deny me death? My own arm ſhall put an end to this hated life:* As he ended theſe words he ſtabbed himſelf with a dagger he had brought under his robe, and fell dead at the foot of the Tribunal.

In *Greece*, the Pro-Prætor *Lævinus* had, in order to keep *Philip* of *Macedon* employed at home, endeavoured (with the approbation of the Senate) to draw ſome of the *Greek* States into the intereſt of *Rome*. He began with the *Ætolians*, who were much diſcontented, becauſe *Acarnania* had been by *Philip* diſmembered from the body of their ſtate, and he aſſured them that he would reduce it again under it's ancient government and juriſdiction. Theſe promiſes of the *Roman* General were confirmed to the people by *Scopas* their chief magiſtrate, and by *Dorimachus* a noble *Ætolian*, who with leſs c. 24.

Y. of *R.* 542. Bef. *J. C.* 210. 241 Conſul-P. modeſty, and ſtronger aſſeverations, magnified the grandeur, power, and majeſty of the people of *Rome*. The main motive however with the *Ætolians* was the hope of recovering *Acarnania*. Articles were therefore drawn up and agreed to, expreſſing the conditions on which theſe *Grecians* entered into an alliance with the *Romans*; and a clauſe was added, *That the* Eleans, *the* Lacedæmonians, Attalus *King of* Pergamus *in* Aſia Minor, Pleuratus, *a King of* Thrace, *or perhaps of a part of* Illyricum, Scerdilœdus, *King of the eaſt part of the laſt mentioned country, ſhould if they pleaſed be compriſed and included in the treaty. Polybius* tells us, that the *Ætolians* ſent embaſſadors to theſe ſeveral States and Princes, to ſolicit them to join in a confederacy againſt *Philip*; and he has tranſmitted to us the ſpeeches made in the Senate of *Lacedæmon*, by *Chlæneas* an *Ætolian*, and *Lyciſcus* an *Acarnanian*, two orators, the firſt an advocate for the *Ætolians*, the ſecond for *Philip*. *Chlæneas*'s harangue conſiſted chiefly of invectives, diſplaying *the tyranny, oppreſſion, and uſurpations exerciſed in* Greece *by the Kings of* Macedon, *from the time of* Philip *the father of* Alexander, *to the preſent King*; and in the cloſe of his ſpeech he urged *the ſafety the* Lacedæmonians *would find in joining themſelves with ſo powerful a confederacy as that formed againſt* Philip. *Lyciſcus* on the other hand endeavoured to clear the *Macedonian* Kings from the charge brought againſt them; mentioned ſeveral of their laudable actions; loaded the *Ætolians* with the guilt of many violences, outrages, and ſacrilegious abominations; and in concluſion repreſents *the danger of making alliances with* Barbarians; *that theſe defenders of the* Ætolians *would ſoon become their conquerors, and, in time, of all* Greece. Theſe apprehenſions were not unreaſonable; but the *Lacedæmonians* did not at this time look ſo far forward; it ſeemed ſafeſt for them, at preſent, to come into the alliance propoſed by the *Ætolians*; and they declared for that ſide.

Polyb. B. 9. c. 22.

The articles of confederacy between the *Ætolians* and *Romans* ran thus. *The* Ætolians *ſhall forthwith enter into a war with King* Philip *by land, and the* Romans *ſhall aſſiſt them by ſea with a fleet of twenty quinqueremes at leaſt. All the cities that ſhall be conquered between the confines of* Ætolia *and* Corcyra *ſhall, as to the walls, houſes, and lands belonging to them, be poſſeſſed by the* Ætolians; *but the* Romans *ſhall have the moveable goods and plunder. The* Romans *ſhall uſe their endeavours that the* Ætolians *may again poſſeſs* Acarnania. *If at any time the* Ætolians *make a peace with* Philip, *they ſhall inſert a clauſe, that the ſame ſhall be of no force until ſuch time as* Philip *ſhall have withdrawn his forces employed againſt the* Romans, *or any of their allies. And in the ſame manner, if the* Romans *treat with the* Macedonian *King, they ſhall make the like proviſion for the ſecurity of the* Ætolians *and their allies.* Though theſe articles were not ſigned till two years after, the confederates immediately began hoſtilities againſt *Philip*. *Lævinus* took the iſland of *Zacynthus*, and alſo two cities of *Acarnania*, which he replaced under the dominion of the *Ætolians*; and having thus

thus kindled a war in *Greece* againſt the King, and found him ſufficient employment at home, to hinder his aſſiſting the *Carthaginians*, he retired with his fleet to *Corcyra*, and there wintered. Y. of *R.* 542. Bef. *C.* 210. 241 Conſul p.

The news, that the *Ætolians* were in motion, was brought to *Philip* as he lay in his winter quarters at *Pella*. Reſolving to invade *Greece* in the ſpring, he firſt turned his arms againſt *Illyricum*, that by the deſolation and deſtruction he ſhould cauſe there, he might intimidate the reſt of his neighbours from attacking *Macedon* in his abſence. From thence he marched his troops into *Thrace* againſt the *Mædi*. In the mean time the *Ætolian* army entered *Acarnania*, where they found that the people of the country were come to the moſt deſperate reſolutions for their defence: For ſending away their wives and children, and all who were above ſixty years old, into *Epirus*, the reſt engaged themſelves by a ſolemn oath never to return from the field but with victory: And they laid the heavieſt curſes on thoſe of their own nation, who ſhould harbour or relieve any who were vanquiſhed and fled. Theſe deſperate meaſures, together with the approach of *Philip*, whom the *Acarnanians* had earneſtly preſſed to come from *Thrace* to their aſſiſtance, ſo terrified the *Ætolians*, that they retired into their own territories, and there continued quiet, till *Lævinus*, coming in the ſpring with his fleet to *Naupactus*, put them again in motion. In conjunction with the *Pro-Prætor*, they beſieged *Anticyra*, (a city of the *Locrenſes*, in the neighbourhood of *Ætolia*) by ſea and land, and reduced it. But *Lævinus*, after this, by reaſon of a dangerous ſickneſs, was obliged to continue there a great while unactive.

Winter now approached, and *Marcellus* returned from *Sicily* to *Rome*, for the firſt time ſince the taking of *Syracuſe*. He demanded a triumph at his arrival: But having, purſuant to orders, left his army in *Sicily*, and it not being the cuſtom for Generals to triumph when their army was not preſent to give teſtimony to their exploits, he was granted only an ovation by the Senate. To do himſelf juſtice therefore in the beſt manner he could, he decreed himſelf a triumph on *The Hill of Alba*, for which there were ſome precedents in ſuch caſes. Next day he had a very magnificent ovation. A plan of *Syracuſe*, ſtatues and paintings of an exquiſite taſte, coſtly vaſes, and immenſe quantities of gold, ſilver, and braſs, were carried on biers before him. Eight elephants, and all ſorts of military engines, uſed in ſieges, made a part of the ſhow. It was at this time that *Marcellus* introduced among the *Romans* a refined taſte for paintings, and ſculptures; which made ſome of the old *Romans* uneaſy. They feared it would gradually deſtroy the people's love of huſbandry and war, and would be a means to ſoften and enervate them. *Liv.* B. 26. c. 21. *Plut.* life of *Marcellus*. Author of the lives of illuſtrious men.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The NINTH YEAR of the War.

Marcellus's *conduct complained of before the Senate, by the* Sicilians.
Fulvius *accuſed of cruelty by the* Capuans. *The fate of their city is determined.*
The fortune of the campaign in Italy *various.*
The reduction of Sicily *completed.*

Y. of *R.* 543. Bef. *J.C.* 209. 242 Conſul p. *Livy*, B. 26. c. 22.

THE time for electing new magiſtrates drawing on, *Fulvius Centumalus* was recalled to *Rome*, to preſide in the *Comitia*. The firſt *Century* that voted, named *T. Manlius Torquatus*, and *T. Otacilius*, for *Conſuls*. It was not doubted but the reſt of the Centuries would join in the nomination; and a multitude of people flocked round *Manlius* to congratulate him upon his election. But he, approaching the Conſul's tribunal, begged that he would call back the Century that had juſt given their votes, and allow him to ſpeak a few words. While all were in expectation of what he would aſk, he excuſed himſelf, on account of a weakneſs in his eyes, from accepting the dignity offered him. "A man, *ſaid he*, muſt be very ſhameleſs to deſire to be a pilot "or a general, and to have the lives and fortunes of multitudes com- "mitted to his care, when he knows that in every thing he does, he "muſt make uſe of other men's eyes." He therefore entreated the preſident of the aſſembly to order the prerogative Century to give their votes anew, and deſired of them, that in their choice they would have regard to the circumſtances of the Republic, remember that the war was ſtill in *Italy*, and that *Rome* was ſcarce recovered from the terror cauſed by the late inſult of the enemy at her gates. Notwithſtanding this remonſtrance, the Century, with repeated cries, inſiſted upon the choice they had made. "No, *ſaid* Manlius, neither can I "bear your manners, nor you my government. Return into the vot- "ing place, and conſider that *Carthage* is making war in *Italy*, and "that *Hannibal* is her General." The Century finding theſe words applauded by all who ſtood round *Manlius*, and having a real reſpect for him, made no longer any difficulty to comply with his deſire; and *Marcellus* the fourth time, and *Lævinus* the ſecond time, were raiſed to the conſular dignity.

Lævinus was ſtill lying ſick at *Anticyra* in *Greece*. *Marcellus* entered upon his office on the Ides of *March*, and according to cuſtom aſſembled the Senate that day, but declared he would bring no matters relating to the Republic before the Fathers, till the arrival of his collegue. He complained that there were numbers of *Syracuſians* in *Rome*, who ſpread reports

reports about the city to his diſadvantage; that *M. Cornelius Cethegus*, the Prætor of *Sicily*, had not only ſent over many of theſe to accuſe him, but had alſo aſſerted in his letters, that the war was far from being finiſhed in the iſland [no untruth, as will appear by and by] that he might have the greater glory, in putting an end to it. The Conſul added, that he himſelf would immediately give his enemies an opportunity of laying their accuſations before the Senate, were it not that he underſtood, they affected to be afraid of accuſing him in the abſence of his Collegue; and that, as ſoon as *Lævinus* ſhould arrive, he would take care they ſhould be heard. Y. of *R.* 543. Bef. *J. C.* 209. 242 Conſul-p.

As *Lævinus* paſſed through *Campania*, in his return to *Rome*, the inhabitants of that country crowded about him, and implored his protection againſt the tyranny and cruelty of the Pro-Conſul *Fulvius Flaccus*. *Lævinus* ordered them to follow him to *Rome*; which when he drew near, the company of *Sicilians*, who were to accuſe *Marcellus*, joined him likewiſe; and he ſuffered them to enter the city with him. However, before he procured them an audience from the Senate, he gave the Conſcript Fathers an account of his own conduct, and the ſtate of affairs in *Greece*. And the next thing to be done, was to aſſign the Conſuls, and the reſt of the Generals of the *Roman* armies, their reſpective provinces, for the enſuing campaign. *Italy* fell by lot to *Lævinus*, and *Sicily* to *Marcellus*. This was no ſooner declared, than the *Sicilians*, who were preſent at the ceremony, made a horrible outcry, and expreſſed as much terror and conſternation as they had done at *Syracuſe* when *Marcellus* ſurprized it. They dreſſed themſelves in mourning, ran to the houſes of the Senators, and there declared, they would never return home, rather than be again ſubject to *Marcellus:* and that it would be better for *Sicily* to periſh in the flames of *Ætna*, than to be given up as a prey to her implacable enemy. The affair was mentioned in the Senate, and the Conſuls were aſked to conſult the Fathers about an exchange of provinces. *Marcellus* anſwered, that, had the *Sicilians* been already heard, perhaps he ſhould not think that motion ſo equitable, but now, leſt it ſhould be ſaid, that fear reſtrained them from accuſing a man who muſt ſhortly be their Governor, he was very willing to exchange provinces with his collegue, provided he agreed to it; but begged the Senate would not give him the mortification of interpoſing a judgment of theirs in the matter; for, ſaid he, if it would have been unjuſt to give my collegue his option, without caſting lots, how much more unjuſt, nay, what an indignity would it be to me, to transfer my lot to him? The Senate did not interpoſe their authority, and the exchange was made by the Conſuls themſelves. Then the *Sicilians* were admitted to bring their complaints againſt *Marcellus*. Their accuſation turned upon his pretended cruelty at *Leontini*, his having ſacked *Syracuſe*, and his having ſtripped the citizens of every thing, though *Liv.* B. 26. c. 27. *Faſt. Cap.* *Livy*, B. 26. c. 28.

Y. of *R.* 543. Bef. *J. C.* 209. 242 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 26. c 30. *Plutarch* in *Marcel.*

(as the accuſers proteſted) it had been by compulſion, that the *Syracuſians* had ſided with the *Carthaginians*; and they prayed, that what had been taken from them, and could be recovered, might be reſtored.

When the *Sicilians* had done ſpeaking, *Marcellus* left the *Curule* chair, and went to the place where perſons accuſed were wont to make their defence. He fairly laid before the houſe the matters of fact (as they have been related) and then withdrew, to give the Senators more freedom in their debates. A great many of the Fathers, and among the reſt *T. Manlius Torquatus*, were of opinion, that the war ought to be conſidered as having been carried on againſt the tyrants *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes*, equally the enemies of the *Romans* and *Syracuſians*. After a long debate, the majority voted the proceedings of *Marcellus* to have been regular; but added to their decree, that the Senate would take care of the *Syracuſians*, and recommended it to the Conſul *Lævinus*, to conſult their intereſt, as far as it was conſiſtent with that of the Republic.

When the *Sicilians*, being called in, had heard the decree read, they threw themſelves at the feet of *Marcellus*, and begged he would forgive whatever, with a view to ſet forth their miſeries and move compaſſion, they had ſaid againſt him; and would receive them into his protection. The Conſul granted their requeſt; and, in gratitude to him, the people of *Syracuſe* ordered, that whenever he or any of his family ſet foot in *Sicily*, the people ſhould crown themſelves with garlands, and celebrate the day with ſacrifices; and *Syracuſe* was, ever after, under the patronage of the *Marcelli*.

Livy, B. 26. c. 33.

The cauſe of the *Campanians* came on next. Their pleading conſiſted wholly of a pathetic repreſentation of their miſeries. When they had finiſhed their complaint, they were ordered to withdraw. And then *M. Attilius Regulus*, who had ſerved in the army at the taking of *Capua*, was examined, as to the facts. This Senator could ſay little to the advantage of the *Capuans*; but he moved that the Senate might not determine the affair, till it had obtained the conſent of the Tribes; becauſe the *Capuans*, being *Roman* citizens, could not legally be judged by the Senate, without the approbation of the people. Accordingly, a Tribune of the commons was deſired to ſummon the comitia by tribes; and requeſt them, to empower the Senate to pronounce ſentence on the *Capuans*. He complied. The comitia anſwered in that authoritative ſtile which ſhewed their ſovereignty: *What the majority of the Senate now ſitting, after being ſworn, ſhall determine, that we will and command.* The Senate, thus authoriſed, pronounced judgment: and when the ſentence came to be executed, *Campania* was ſtripped of all the monuments of its grandeur; *Capua* was no longer a city; it had neither Senate, Comitia, nor Magiſtrates of its own; *Rome* ſent a Præfect thither annually, to preſerve order in the place, and to hear cauſes. Its former

ſlothful

slothful and effeminate inhabitants were transplanted elsewhere, and succeeded by *Roman* colonies of laborious and industrious husbandmen. Y. of R. 543. Bef. J. C. 209. 242 Consul-p. *Liv.* B. 26.

And now the Consuls applied themselves wholly to the preparations for the approaching campaign. As the navy wanted great repairs, and the public treasury was exhausted, they published an edict, ordering every man, according to his census, to furnish pay and provisions for thirty days to a certain number of sailors and rowers, agreeably to a precedent on the like occasion. This falling heavy on the poorer citizens, already drained by taxes, since *Hannibal*'s invasion, it had like to have caused an insurrection. The people threatened to do themselves justice, if the edict was not revoked in three days. In that time the Consuls, to make matters easy, proposed in the Senate a method which gained them great applause. They moved, that all the dignified persons in the state, and the Senators, should give a good example of zeal for the Republic, by voluntarily carrying in to the treasury their superfluous gold, silver, and brass. All present approved the motion; and the Knights and common citizens so readily followed the example of the Consuls and Senators, that there was an emulation who should first enter their names in the register of the contributors. Thus were the *Roman* fleets recruited; and *Rome* put into a condition to support the war on all sides. c. 35. c. 36.

When *Marcellus* and *Lævinus* set out for their provinces, there were in the town of *Salapia* in *Apulia* two men of great authority, *Dasius* and *Blasius*; the latter was in the *Roman* interest, and had entered into a negotiation with the Consul to betray the town to him. As this could not be done without *Dasius*'s consent, the traitor ventured to open his mind to him, and sollicit his assistance, though he knew him to be a zealous *Hannibalist*. *Dasius* immediately informed the *Carthaginian* of the affair, who thereupon cited both to appear before him. But the accuser not being able to bring any proof to support his charge, *Hannibal* imagined the accusation to have proceeded entirely from jealousy and hatred; and would take no farther cognizance of it. After this, *Blasius* gained over his collegue, and they took measures together for the surrendry of the place. *Marcellus* on a sudden appeared before it, and was admitted into the town; and then the *Carthaginian* garison, which consisted of 500 brave *Numidian* horse, finding themselves betrayed, resolved to sell their lives dear. They quitted their horses, which were of no use to them, and fought on foot, till they were all killed except fifty, who yielded themselves prisoners. This, if we may credit *Livy*, was so great a loss to *Hannibal*, that in all the battles he afterwards fought in *Italy*, his cavalry never gained the superiority over the enemy, as in former engagements. c. 37.

The *Carthaginian* had still hopes of taking the citadel of *Tarentum*, which he kept blocked up. On the other hand, the *Romans* sent a squadron of ships to supply the garison with provisions: But this fleet, c. 39.

Y. of *R.* 543. Bef. *J. C.* 209. 242 Conſul-p.

before it could enter the port, being obliged to come to an engagement with the *Tarentine* fleet, was utterly defeated, and the Admiral of it killed in the action.

Plut. life of *Marcellus.* *Liv.* B. 27. c. 1.

Marcellus took two more cities in *Samnium*, and in them about 3000 *Carthaginian* priſoners, together with a great quantity of grain. *Fulvius Centumalus*, who commanded as Pro-Conſul in *Apulia*, being ambitious of imitating the Conſul, without his abilities, drew near to a city called *Herdonea*, in hopes to reduce it by force, or by treaty, but was ſurprized by *Hannibal*; and though the *Romans* behaved themſelves bravely, they were totally defeated, their camp taken, and the General, with eleven Legionary Tribunes ſlain in the engagement.

Plut. life of *Marcellus.* *Livy* B. 27. c. 2.

So complete a victory recovered the affairs and credit of *Hannibal* for ſome time, and greatly diſcouraged the people at *Rome*, whoſe only hopes were now in *Marcellus*. This Conſul, knowing how much the people were terrified, wrote to the Senate, in theſe terms. *I am the ſame man that I was after the battle of* Cannæ. *I am going to meet the ſame conqueror, and have reaſon to expect the ſame ſucceſs. The joy that now ſwells the mind of the Carthaginian will not be of long duration.* He then marched towards *Hannibal*, and came up with him near *Numiſtro*, in *Bruttium*. The *Carthaginian* did not decline a battle. The engagement was bloody; and the night alone put an end to it. At ſunriſing *Marcellus* offered him battle again; but *Hannibal* would not accept the challenge. He decamped; and the Conſul followed him from place to place. So that theſe two great Generals ſpent the reſt of the campaign, the one in ſeeking for an opportunity to come to a general action, the other in endeavouring to avoid it, and to draw his enemy into an ambuſh.

c. 3.

In the mean time, *Fulvius Flaccus* was buſy in managing the affairs of the Republic in *Campania*. And the Senate ordered a great quantity of corn to be bought up in *Hetruria*, and carried to the citadel of *Tarentum*. Two thouſand men were likewiſe commanded to the relief of the gariſon; and this convoy had a happier paſſage thither than the laſt.

From the Conſul *Lævinus* the Senate received news of the total reduction of *Sicily*. *Agrigentum* had long held out for the *Carthaginians*. *Hanno* had commanded there a numerous gariſon; but having through jealouſy diſobliged, and even broke, a brave *Numidian* officer, named *Mutines*, much eſteemed among his countrymen, and who having been ſent by *Hannibal* into *Sicily*, to ſupply the place of *Hippocrates*, had done the *Carthaginians* ſignal ſervice in that iſland, the proud *African* could not brook the affront. To revenge himſelf, he entered into a correſpondence with the Conſul; and having engaged a body of the *Numidians* in the conſpiracy, they opened one of the gates to the *Roman* troops. *Hanno*, with *Epicydes*, and a few more officers eſcaped in a ſmall veſſel; but the reſt of the gariſon were all cut in pieces. After this, twenty towns were betrayed into the hands of the *Romans*, ſix taken by force, and the reſt,

reſt, to the number of forty, ſurrendered voluntarily. *Lævinus*, having ſettled all affairs in the iſland, (which from this time became the granary of *Rome*) received an order from the Senate, to return home, to hold the Comitia by centuries: For though *Marcellus* was nearer, it was dangerous to interrupt his purſuit of *Hannibal*. However, *Lævinus* was hardly arrived, when he found himſelf obliged to go back again, to take care of his province, an expreſs coming from *Valerius Meſſala* (who commanded a fleet in *Sicily*, and had been ravaging the coaſt of *Africa*) with an account, that the *Carthaginians* were preparing a naval armament, to re-conquer *Sicily*.

Y. of *R.* 543. Bef. *J. C.* 209. 242 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 27. c. 4.

The Senate haſtened the departure of *Lævinus*, and ordered him to name a Dictator, to hold the Comitia for the new elections. The Conſul did not refuſe to obey; but that he might continue the longer in the ſupreme dignity, inſiſted upon deferring the nomination till he ſhould arrive in *Sicily*; and he promiſed that he would then name *Meſſala*: But it being contrary to ancient cuſtom, for a Dictator to be named elſewhere than in *Italy*, the Conſcript Fathers paſſed a decree, requiring *Lævinus* before he left the city to petition the people to recommend a proper perſon for the Dictatorſhip, and enjoining the Conſul to name that perſon; and the decree provided alſo, that in caſe the Conſul refuſed to petition, as before mentioned, the Prætor of *Rome* ſhould do it; and if he likewiſe refuſed, the Tribunes of the Commons ſhould bring the matter before the Comitia. *Lævinus* was obſtinate, and forbad the Prætor to offer any petition to the people. Upon this, the Tribunes aſſembled them; and it was determined, that *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, then at *Capua*, ſhould be nominated Dictator. But *Lævinus*, the night before the holding of the Comitia, had ſet out for *Sicily*, ſo that the Fathers were obliged to write to *Marcellus* to name the Dictator the people had recommended. *Q. Fulvius*, being thus raiſed to the Dictatorſhip, named *P. Licinus Craſſus*, the Pontifex Maximus, to be his General of horſe.

CHAP. XXIX.

TENTH YEAR of the war.

Some of the Roman *colonies refuſe to contribute to the expences of the war.* Marcellus *is vanquiſhed by* Hannibal; *but the day following gains a victory over him.* Fabius Cunctator *gets poſſeſſion of* Tarentum.

THE Dictator *Fulvius*, having artfully carried on his intrigues to promote his own election to the Conſulſhip, called together the Comitia, and was there named Conſul, with *Fabius Maximus Cunctator*; c. 6.

by

Y. of *R.* 541. Bef. *J. C.* 208 243 Conſul-p

by the firſt Century which voted; and the reſt of the Centuries ſeemed inclined to the ſame choice. But two of the Tribunes interpoſed, alledging, *That it was dangerous to the conſtitution to allow a continuation of magiſtracy in the ſame perſon; and to ſuffer Preſidents of the* Comitia *to pervert their authority to ſerve their private purpoſes*; and they declared, that they would diſſolve the aſſembly if the Dictator did not deſiſt from his pretenſion. *Fulvius* however juſtified the proceedings of the Comitia by a law made juſt after the battle of *Thraſymenus*, allowing the people to chuſe the ſame men to the conſulſhip as often as they pleaſed, while the war ſhould laſt in *Italy*; and by the examples of *Poſthumius Metellus*, and *Fabius Maximus*, who at different times being Preſidents of the Comitia, had been elected Conſuls by the aſſemblies in which they preſided. After ſome time ſpent in theſe diſputes, it was at length agreed, that the matter ſhould be referred to the Senate. The Conſcript Fathers, pleaſed with the choice that had been made of two ſuch able Generals, declared, that neither the Dictatorſhip, nor Preſidentſhip of *Fulvius* diſqualified him for being choſen Conſul.

Liv. B. 27. c. 9.

It was neceſſary at this time to raiſe recruits, and to ſend ſome forces into *Sicily* in the place of two legions drawn from thence to ſerve in *Italy*; but this affair had like to have occaſioned a rebellion. The *Latins* and allies of *Rome* murmured at the continuation of a war, which drained their countries of their people and their wealth. Nay twelve out of thirty *Roman* colonies that had been planted in the provinces conquered by the Republic, abſolutely refuſed to furniſh their contingents, either of men or money; alledging that they really were not in a condition to do it. But the other eighteen complied, and declared themſelves ready to enlarge their quotas, if neceſſary. The agents of theſe faithful and affectionate colonies received the thanks of the Senate, and of the people in full *Comitia*. As for the twelve, it was thought proper, at this juncture, to ſhew a contempt of them, and to neglect their contributions, rather than extort them by violence, which would probably throw theſe colonies into the *Carthaginian* intereſt. To ſupply the deficiency occaſioned by their refuſal, recourſe was had to a treaſure which had been long hoarded up in the exchequer. From the year 396 the Republic had reſerved to herſelf the twentieth part of the purchaſe-money of every ſlave's freedom. The produce had been kept againſt a day of neceſſity, and was now firſt applied to the public uſe. It amounted to four thouſand pounds weight of gold, which was all diſtributed among the Generals for the expences of the war. The *Cenſors* alſo requeſted of the Senate, that the territory of *Campania*, from which the old poſſeſſors had been driven, ſhould be diſpoſed of after the beſt manner, for the benefit of the public. Their petition being referred to the people; the latter decreed, that thoſe vaſt plains,

plains, and fruitful hills, ſhould be farmed out, and the rents paid into the public treaſury. Y. of *R.* 544. Bef. *J. C.* 208. 243 Conſul-p.

And now, the ſeaſon of the year, and the motions of *Hannibal*, drew the *Conſuls* from *Rome*. *Fabius* undertook to beſiege *Tarentum*, whilſt *Fulvius* and *Marcellus* were to oppoſe the enterprizes of the *Carthaginian*. *Marcellus* thinking himſelf, of all the *Roman* Generals, the fitteſt match for *Hannibal*, marched out of his winter quarters as ſoon as there was graſs in the fields, and came up with the enemy near *Cauſium* in *Apulia*. The *Carthaginian* retired, becauſe the country was open and unfit for ambuſhes. *Marcellus* followed him, pitched his camp near him, and offered battle. *Hannibal* would have avoided a general action, but was at length forced to it. The *Roman* attacked him as he was encamping; and the engagement laſted till night, without any advantage on either ſide. Next morning, as ſoon as it was light, *Marcellus* again drew out his forces; nor did *Hannibal* decline the challenge. He harangued his men, putting them in mind of *Thraſymenus* and *Cannæ*, and exhorting them to repreſs the audacious temerity of their enemies, who would not permit them either to march or to encamp in quiet, or give them time to breathe or look about them. *The riſing ſun*, ſaid he, *and the* Roman *army daily appear to us at the ſame inſtant. Shall we bear this? One ſingle victory will free us from an importunate enemy that is more raſh than formidable.* The *Carthaginian* ſoldiers thus animated by their General, and vexed at being continually haraſſed by the *Romans*, behaved themſelves with uncommon reſolution in the battle. *Marcellus* was now vanquiſhed, his whole army routed; he loſt two thouſand ſeven hundred men. Not being uſed to ſuffer theſe indignities he ſhewed his reſentment, by bitterly reproaching his troops with cowardice. They readily owned their fault, aſked pardon, and proteſted that they would expoſe themſelves to any danger he ſhould think fit, with a reſolution either to die or conquer. *Prepare then*, replied the *General*, *to perform your promiſes to morrow, and to merit the forgiveneſs you deſire.* Next morning the legionaries were ready to march by break of day; *Marcellus* declared that he would place in the firſt line thoſe manipuli which had behaved themſelves diſhonourably; and he urged them all to exert themſelves in ſuch a manner as to wipe off their ſhame; *Let not* Rome, ſaid he, *be informed of yeſterday's defeat before ſhe hears of this day's victory.* He then ordered them to refreſh themſelves well with food, that their ſtrength might not fail, in caſe the battle ſhould prove long, which done, he marched them out of the camp, and formed them as uſual. *Hannibal* ſurprized at this unexpected challenge from the *Roman* General, *What!* cried he, *we have to do then with a man that can bear neither good nor bad fortune. When victorious he gives his enemy no repoſe, nor takes any himſelf when he is vanquiſhed.* Which ſaid, he gave orders for the trumpets to ſound, and

Plutarch's life of *Marcellus*. *Liv.* B. 27. c. 12, 13.

Y. of *R.* 544. Bef. *J. C.* 208. 243 Conſul. p. *Plutarch*'s life of *Marcellus.*

and drew his men out into the field. This battle was more ſharp than that of the day before. At length the *Romans* prevailed by driving the elephants, which *Hannibal* brought againſt them, back upon his own troops. For by this means the *Carthaginians* were thrown into the utmoſt confuſion; and two of thoſe great beaſts falling down juſt in the gate of their camp, ſtopped up the entrance of it; ſo that the runaways were forced to make their way with difficulty over the ditch and rampart, which occaſioned a great ſlaughter of them. *Hannibal* loſt eight thouſand men. However, *Marcellus* bought his victory dear. Three thouſand of his legionaries were killed upon the ſpot, and almoſt all the reſt wounded; he led his ſcattered forces to *Venuſia*, and could not take the field again that campaign [a]. *Hannibal* decamped the night after his defeat, retired into *Bruttium*, raiſed the ſiege of *Caulonia*, and took the beſiegers priſoners. They conſiſted of 8000 men beſides *Bruttian* deſerters, and had been ſent by *Fabius* upon that enterprize, under the conduct of the governor of *Rhegium*. About this time the *Hirpini*, the *Lucani*, and the *Volcenſes* ſubmitted to the Conſul *Fulvius*. Some of the *Bruttians* alſo ſent deputies to him, who were well received: But this negotiation had little ſucceſs, probably becauſe of the preſence of *Hannibal*.

Liv. B. 27. c. 14, 15.

As for *Fabius*, who had undertaken the reduction of *Tarentum*, (in which *Hannibal* had placed a gariſon, conſiſting partly of his old troops, and partly of new levies raiſed among the *Bruttians*) while he was with all prudence making his preparations for the ſiege, a young *Tarentine*, who ſerved in his army, came and diſcovered to him a ſecret, which he thought might be of uſe in the preſent enterprize. He told the General, *That he had a ſiſter in* Tarentum, *whoſe beauty had captivated the commander of the* Bruttian *troops there; that he believed he could gain over his ſiſter to the* Roman *intereſt; and that, if ſo, ſhe could undoubtedly engage her lover in the ſame cauſe.* *Fabius* thinking the project feaſible, ſuffered the young man to return to his native city, as a deſerter. The *Tarentine* conducted himſelf with ſo much art, that he ſoon gained his point. The ſixth night after the attacks began, he returned to the *Conſul*, and informed him of his ſucceſs, and when and where the *Bruttian* officer would

Plutarch's life of *Fabius.*

[a] Theſe battles of *Marcellus*, as they are told by *Livy*, and nearly copied by *Plutarch*, have very much the air of a romance. Three general battles are fought in three days time. In the firſt, victory inclines to neither ſide, in the ſecond, *Hannibal* is conqueror, and, in the third, *Marcellus*. And what is as ſtrange, *Marcellus* when conqueror, was leſs able to keep the field than when he was vanquiſhed. He lay idle all the ſummer, (for which he was afterwards impeached at *Venuſia*, while *Hannibal*, maſter of the open country, continued his ravages in *Italy*. *Vagante per Italiam Annibale, media æſtate, Venuſiam, in tecta, milites abduxiſſet.* Liv. B. 27. c. 20. It is alſo to be obſerved, that *Polybius* knew nothing of theſe *Roman* victories, for he expreſsly tells us, that *Hannibal* was never vanquiſhed in any battle or engagement till that of *Zama*. *Polyb.* B. 15. c. 11. and 16.

would be ready to let the *Romans* into the place. The plot was happily executed; and when the *Romans* had ſurprized the town, they ſpared neither *Carthaginians*, *Tarentins* nor even *Bruttians*. Some authors lay the blame of this odious maſſacre on *Fabius* himſelf, who they ſay, gave theſe cruel orders, leſt, if he ſpared the *Bruttians*, ſo important a conqueſt ſhould be imputed more to treachery, than to his prudence and bravery; a conduct not ſuitable to his general character. Y. of *R.* 544. Bef *J. C.* 208. 243 Conſul p.

The riches found in this maritime city were, according to *Livy*, immenſe: The *Quæſtors* received, for the public treaſury, eighty ſeven thouſand pounds weight of gold; but *Plutarch* with more probability reckons the ſum at only three thouſand talents *. As to the pictures and ſtatues, *Fabius* had not the taſte of *Marcellus*; and therefore, when he was aſked what he would have done with thoſe maſter-pieces of painting and ſculpture, he anſwered, *Let us leave to the* Tarentins *their angry Gods*; alluding to the attitudes, in which the Gods of *Tarentum* were repreſented: For, after the *Lacedæmonian* manner, they had generally ſwords in their hands, and were in fighting poſtures. Nevertheleſs he carried to *Rome* a brazen coloſſus of *Hercules*, which had been caſt by the famous *Lyſippus*; and it was placed in the Capitol, with an equeſtrian ſtatue of *Fabius* near it. *Liv.* B. 27. c. 16. * 581250 l. Arbuth. *Strabo*, p. 278. *Plin.* B. 34. c. 7. *Plutarch*'s life of *Fabius*.

The unexpected news of the ſiege of *Tarentum* drew *Hannibal* from *Bruttium*. He marched night and day, and doubted not to come time enough to relieve it; and it was with the greateſt aſtoniſhment he received the account, when within five miles of the city, of its being taken: *Nay then*, ſaid he, *the* Romans *have their* Hannibal *too*; *We have loſt* Tarentum *by the ſame art that we took it*. However, that he might not ſeem to fly before the enemy, he did not immediately turn back, but encamped on the place where he heard the news. At length he marched to *Metapontus*, a city in his intereſt, and there invented a ſtratagem, which had like to have fatally deceived the cautious *Fabius*. He ſent two of the inhabitants with letters to the Conſul, from the chief men of the city, offering to deliver up the place, and the *Carthaginian* gariſon into his hands, if he would promiſe an oblivion for what was paſt. *Fabius*, not ſuſpecting the cheat, fixed the day for his march, and would have fallen into an ambuſh prepared for him, if the *Augurs* and *Haruſpices*, who had probably better intelligence than the General, had not detained him in the camp, by declaring that the preſages were all unfortunate. *Hannibal*, impatient of *Fabius*'s delays, ſent new emiſſaries; but theſe being arreſted, and terrified by threatenings of ſevere puniſhment, confeſſed the ſecret. *Liv* B. 27. c. 16.

CHAP. XXX.

ELEVENTH YEAR of the War.

The Conſul Marcellus *ſlain, and his Collegue at the ſame time mortally wounded.*
Favourable accounts from Sicily *and from* Greece.

Y. of *R.* 545. Bef. *J. C.* 207. 244 Conſul-p.

MARCELLUS had been accuſed, before the Comitia, for inaction the laſt campaign; nevertheleſs he was choſen Conſul for the new year, with *T. Quinctius Criſpinus*. When they had taken the field, the latter, ambitious of ſignalizing himſelf by the conqueſt of ſome important place, caſt his eyes on *Locri*, a maritime city of that part of South *Italy*, now called *Farther Calabria*: But being afraid to engage with *Hannibal*, who advanced towards him, he poſtponed his expedition, and haſtned to join his Collegue *Marcellus*. The two Conſuls, having conferred together, determined not to drop the enterprize upon *Locri*. They commanded *Cincius*, Admiral of the fleet appointed to guard the coaſts of *Italy* and *Sicily*, to inveſt the place by ſea, and at the ſame time ordered a body of troops, then in gariſon at *Tarentum*, to go and beſiege it by land: But theſe latter were ſurpriſed by *Hannibal* in their march, two thouſand of them killed, and twelve hundred taken priſoners. The *Carthaginian*, however, declined a battle with the united forces of the Conſuls; and watched for an opportunity to deceive his enemies by artifice.

Plutarch's life of *Marcellus*. *Liv.* B. 27. c. 27, 28.

Between his entrenchments, and thoſe of the *Romans*, was a little hill, from which either camp might be annoyed; and the *Roman* ſoldiers were equally ſurprized at *Hannibal*'s neglect of it, and impatient to take poſſeſſion of it themſelves. They even murmured at their Generals not being ſo quick as they would have them, to ſeize ſuch an advantageous poſt: Hereupon *Marcellus* and his Collegue, with a guard of two hundred and twenty horſe, went to view the eminence. *Hannibal* had hid a detachment of *Numidians* in the cavities of the hill, and under the buſhes which covered it. His deſign was to intercept thoſe of the *Romans* that ſhould ſtraggle from their camp. The *Numidians* coming out of their ambuſh, ſurprized and ſurrounded the two Conſuls and their guard; and *Marcellus*, in the attempt to retreat, was killed. His ſon, and the other Conſul were wounded.

Hannibal, informed of *Marcellus*'s death, went immediately to the place where the body lay, and, at the ſight of it, ſhewed no marks of joy, but ſeemed rather to pity the misfortune of ſo great a man, who had fallen in a manner unworthy of him. Yet his firſt care was

to

to take off the ring, which the dead Conſul had on his finger, and with which he uſed to ſeal his diſpatches. He then cauſed the body to be laid on a funeral pile, and burnt; and, having gathered the aſhes into a ſilver urn, ſent them to young *Marcellus* the ſon. Y. of *R.* 545. Bef. *J. C.* 207. 244 Conſul-p.

The ſurviving Conſul decamped the following night, retired to the neareſt mountains, and poſted himſelf on a ſteep aſcent. And fearing leſt *Hannibal* ſhould make a miſchievous uſe of the ring he had taken from *Marcellus*, he diſpatched couriers to all the neighbouring cities, in the intereſt of *Rome*, to prevent their being deceived by letters, which might be ſent to them in *Marcellus*'s name. By this prudent ſtep *Salapia* in *Apulia* was preſerved: Nay, the inhabitants turned the artifice of the *Carthaginian* upon himſelf. He had ſent a *Roman* deſerter with letters, as from *Marcellus*, to give them notice that he would be there the next night, and that they ſhould prepare to receive him. The *Salapians* ſeemed to ſuffer themſelves to be cheated, and admitted into the town ſix hundred of *Hannibal*'s men, (choſen out of the *Roman* deſerters, that their language might not betray the deſign;) but then on a ſudden, the inhabitants letting fall the portcullis, ſurprized and ſlew thoſe who had entered, and with a ſhower of darts from the ramparts drove back the reſt. *Liv.* B. 27. c. 28.

This unſucceſsful expedition did not ſo far diſcourage *Hannibal*, as to hinder him from marching to the relief of *Locri*, now inveſted by ſea and land. And upon the firſt appearance of his *Numidian* horſe, the beſiegers were ſo terrified, that *Cincius*, the Admiral of the *Roman* fleet, embarked the land forces on board his galleys, left all his machines behind him, and ſailed away for *Rome*.

In the mean time, *Quinctius*, whoſe wounds were mortal, and who, having left his poſt in the mountains, was now with his army at *Capua*, ſent letters to the Senate, acquainting them with the death of his colleague, and that he himſelf was drawing near his end; and deſiring that the Fathers would ſend ſome perſons to him, of prudence and integrity, with whom he might entruſt the affairs of the Republic. Accordingly three Senators were commiſſioned to receive his laſt advices; and, at their requeſt, he nominated a dictator to hold the Comitia for the new elections. He named *T. Manlius Torquatus*. c. 29.

The *Romans*, during this unfortunate campaign, received the agreeable news from *Sicily* that *Valerius Lævinus*, who commanded an hundred ſail of ſhips, had made a deſcent on *Africa*, brought thence much booty, and afterwards defeated a *Carthaginian* fleet off *Clypea*. And the advices from the Pro-Conſul *Sulpicius* of the ſtate of affairs in *Greece*, were not unfavourable. The *Ætolians* had received aſſiſtance from *Attalus* King of *Pergamus*, and being alſo joined by a thouſand *Romans*, had ventured to march againſt *Philip*; and though he defeated them in two battles, he could not prevail with them to deſert the intereſt of *Rome*. He had alſo

A. of R. 545. Bef. J. C. 207. 244 Conſul p.

attacked the *Roman* army, while they were pillaging the country about *Corinth*, and forced them aboard their ſhips with loſs: But *Sulpicius* being joined by the *Ætolians* and *Elæans*, ſurprized the King near *Elis*, and gained ſome advantage over him. Next day *Philip* hearing that the country people were gathered together at a fortreſs called *Pyrgus*, (in order to defend their cattle, which they had driven thither as to a place of ſafety) he ſet upon them, took 4000 priſoners, and 20000 cattle of all kinds. After this, he was obliged to return into his own country, to put a ſtop to the irruptions of the *Dardans*, which a report of his death had occaſioned; ſo that *Rome* had no reaſon to fear the *Macedonian*'s coming ſuddenly to join *Hannibal*.

Liv. B. 27. c. 30.

Ibid. c. 32.

Ibid. c. 33.

CHAP. XXXI.

The Romans *are alarmed by the approach of* Aſdrubal, *the brother of* Hannibal, *with an army from* Spain.

A ſummary account of the Roman *affairs in that country, from the firſt landing of the* Scipios *there, to the time of* Aſdrubal's *leaving it.*

BUT now the chief care of the Senate was to fill up the vacant Conſulſhip, with two men who would be equal to that important charge, at a time when, beſide the difficulties they had already to ſtruggle with, a new and dreadful ſtorm was driving towards *Rome* from the *Alps*. For *Aſdrubal*, the brother of *Hannibal*, had left *Spain* with an army of 60000 men, and was croſſing thoſe mountains, in order to join him in the heart of *Italy*; a danger, than which none could have a more gloomy, a more threatning aſpect to the Republic.

Vid. p. 155, 156, 157.

The *Roman* affairs in *Spain* have been hitherto but lightly touched. And indeed a credible and conſiſtent account of what paſſed in that country, while the *Scipios* commanded there, to the departure of *Aſdrubal*, is not eaſy to be formed out of the Hiſtorians and Geographers. Let the collection and obſervations, made by a judicious and able writer, ſupply the defect of the preſent work, in this particular.

Sir *Walter Raleigh*'s Hiſt. of the World, B. 5. c. 3. §. 11.

" The acts of theſe two brethren [*Publius* and *Cn. Scipio*] in their " province, were very great, and, as they are reported, ſomewhat " marvellous. For they continually prevailed in *Spain* againſt the " *Carthaginians*, whom they vanquiſhed in ſo many battles, and with- " drew from their alliance ſo many of the *Spaniards* their confederates, " that we have cauſe to wonder, how the enemy could ſo often find " means to repair his forces, and return ſtrong into the field. But as the " *Romans*, by pretending to deliver the country from the tyranny of " *Carthage*, might eaſily win unto their confederacy as many as were

" galled



A Map of Spain

THE CANTABRIAN OCEAN

THE ATLANTICK OCEAN

THE IBERIAN SEA

HISPANIA ULTERIOR

HISPANIA CITERIOR

BETICA

LUSITANIA

GAUL

AQUITANIA

Roman Miles of 5000 Feet each

The Celtic or Artabrian Promontory

The Islands of the Gods

The Sacred Promontory

The Port of Hannibal

The Streights of Hercules

The Isle of Errour

The Gulph of The Sucro

The Gulph of Illice

The Gulph of Virgi

BALEARES ISLANDS

The Great Balearis

PITYUSÆ. ISLANDS

The Pyrenees

Cantabri

Lusitanians

Celtici

Turduli

Cuneans

Gallæci

Astures

Vettones

Carpetains

Oretani

Bastuli

Contestani

Edetani

Ilercaones

Ausetani

Lacetani

Volcæ Tectosagæ

Volcæ Arecomicæ

Nemausus

Tholouse

Narbonne

Beziers

Marseilles

Arles

Perpignan

Roussillon

Ruscinon

Illiberis

Roses

Emporiæ

Sambroca R.

Cape Lunarium

Barcelona Colony

Rubricatus R.

Hannibals Scaling ladders

Tarragona Col.

Lerida

Old Carthage

New Carthage

Cape Scombraria

Cape Charidenium

Cape Ferraria

Ebro R.

Tenebrium Prom.

Iberus R.

Tagus R.

Tader R.

Sucro R.

Xucar R.

Segura R.

Guadiana R.

Munda R.

Durius R.

Minius R.

Lavara

Lusitanians

Promontory of ye Moon

Mouth of ye Tagus

Barbarum Prom.

Lisbon

Olisipo

Salacia

Volobriga

Braccara Augusta

Bracarii

Limia or Lethe

Coelibriga

Langobriga

Talabriga

The Ancient Turduli

Lamaca

Lavara

Emenio

Columbrica

Londobris I.

Concordia

Lerabrica

Scalabis

Mundobriga

Plagia

Liciniana

Larcutis

Castra Cecilia

Emeritta

Augustobriga

Rusticiana

Turmulos

Noliba

Oretum

Libosa

Consabrum

Murum

Laminium

Saltici

Cusubi

Caparo

Norba Cesarea Col.

Obila

Ebura

Caurita

Mount Hermenus

Vicus Caecilius

Deobriga

Tolado

Illuca

Segortia

Mantua

Vicus Cuminarius

Mantinia

Arcabala

Abula

Lanciana

Segobia

Urbiaca

Arriaca

Valeponia

Complutum

Contrebia

Tortose

Intibili

Iacetani

Iacetani

Iacetani

" galled with the *African* yoke, and durſt adventure to break it; ſo " the antient reputation of the firſt conquerors might ſerve to arm " the natives againſt theſe invaders, and to reclaim thoſe that had re- " volted unto the *Romans*, were it only by the memory of ſuch ill " ſucceſs, as the like rebellions in former times had found. Hereto " may be added, the *Carthaginian* treaſure, which eaſily raiſed ſoldiers " amongſt thoſe valiant, but (in that age) poor and gold-thirſty nati- " ons. Neither was it of ſmall importance, that ſo many of the *Spani-* " *ards* had their children, kinſmen and friends abroad with *Hannibal* in " his *Italian* wars, or ſerving the *Carthaginians* in *Afric*. And per- " adventure, if we durſt be bold to ſay it, the victories of the *Scipios* " were neither ſo many nor ſo great as they are ſet out by *Livy*. " This we may be bold to ſay, that the great captain *Fabius*, or *Livy* in " his perſon, maketh an objection unto *Scipio*, which neither *Scipio*, " nor *Livy* for him, doth anſwer; that if *Aſdrubal* were vanquiſhed, " as *Scipio* would ſay, by him in *Spain*, ſtrange it was, and as little to " his honour, as it had been extremely dangerous to *Rome*, that the " ſame vanquiſhed man ſhould invade *Italy*. And indeed it is an in- " credible narration, that *Aſdrubal*, being incloſed on all ſides, and not " knowing how to eſcape out of battle, ſave only by the ſteep deſcent " of rocks, over a great river, that lay at his back, ran away with all " his money, elephants and broken troops, over *Tagus*, directly towards " the *Pyrenees*, and ſo toward *Italy*; upon which he fell with more " than threeſcore thouſand armed ſoldiers. Neither do I ſee how it " hangs well together, that he choſe a piece of ground very defenſible, " but moſt incommodious for his retreat, if he ſhould happen to be " vanquiſhed; and yet that he ſent all his money and elephants away " before him, as not intending to abide the enemy, or how it could " be true, that theſe his elephants being ſo ſent before, could hinder " the *Romans* (for ſo are they ſaid to have done in the laſt battle " between him and *Scipio*) from breaking into his camp. Wherefore " we can no more than be ſorry, that all *Carthaginian* records of this " war, and *Spaniſh* (if there were any) being utterly loſt, we can " know no more thereof, than what it hath pleaſed the *Romans* to tell " us; unto whom it were no wiſdom to give too much credit. In this " regard, I will ſummarily run over the doings of the *Scipios* in *Spain*; " not greatly inſiſting on particulars, whereof there is no great cer- " tainty.

" *Cn. Cornelius* landed at *Emporiæ*, a haven town, not far within the " *Pyrenees*, retaining ſtill the name with little inflexion *. That by the " fame of his clemency he allured many nations to become ſubject unto " *Rome*, as the ſtory begins of him, I could eaſily believe, if I under- " ſtood by what occaſion they had need to uſe his clemency, or he to " give ſuch famous example thereof, being a mere ſtranger, and hav- " ing no juriſdiction in the country. Yet it is certain that he was a

Liv. B. 21. c. 60. Y. of *R.* 535.

* *Ampurias*, a town in *Catalonia*.

" man

" man very courteous, and one that could well inſinuate himſelf into
" the love of the Barbarians; among whom his dexterity in practice had
" the better ſucceſs, for that he ſeemed to have none other errand than
" ſetting them at liberty. This pretext availed with ſome; others were
" to be hired with money; and ſome he compelled to yield by force or
" fear; eſpecially when he had won a battle againſt *Hanno*. Into all
" treaties of accord made with theſe people, likely it is that he remem-
" bered to inſert this article, which the *Romans* in their alliances never
" forgat unleſs in long times paſt, and when they dealt with the *Carthagi-*
Orat. pro *Corn. Balb.* " *nians*, or their ſuperiors, *Majeſtatem Populi Romani comiter conſervent*,
" which is, as *Tully* interprets it, *that they ſhould gently (or kindly) uphold the*
" *majeſty of the people of* Rome. This was in appearance nothing trouble-
" ſome, yet implied in it indeed an obſcure covenant of ſubjection.
" And in this reſpect it may be true, that the *Spaniards* became *ditionis*
" *Romanæ, of the Roman juriſdiction*; though hereafter they will ſay,
Polyb. B. 3. c. 34. " they had no ſuch meaning. That part of the country wherein *Scipio*
" landed, was newly ſubdued by *Hannibal* in his paſſage towards *Italy*,
" and therefore the more eaſily ſhaken out of obedience: particularly
" the *Barguſians*. *Hannibal* had found, at his coming among them,
" ſuch an apprehenſion of the *Roman* greatneſs, as made him ſuſpect,
" that any light occaſion would make them ſtart from the *Carthaginians*.
" Wherefore he not only appointed *Hanno* Governor over them, as over
" the reſt of the province between *Iberus* and the *Pyrenees*, but
" made him alſo their Lord; that is (as I conceive it, for I don't
" think he gave the principality of their country to *Hanno* and his heirs)
" he made him not only Lieutenant General over them, in matters of
" war, and things concerning the holding them in obedience to *Carthage*;
" but took from them all inferior officers of their own, leaving them
" to be governed by *Hanno* at his diſcretion. Theſe therefore had
" good cauſe to rejoice at the coming of *Scipio*, with whom others alſo,
" no doubt, found reaſons to join; it being the cuſtom of all conquered
" nations, in hatred of their preſent Lords, to throw themſelves in-
" diſcreetly into the protection of others, that many times prove worſe
" than the former. This bad affection of this province would not ſuf-
" fer *Hanno* to temporize. Ten thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe,
" *Hannibal* had left unto him; beſides which, it is like, that ſome
Liv. B. 21. c. 60. " forces he was able to raiſe out of his province. Therefore he ad-
" ventured a battle with *Scipio*; wherein he was overthrown and taken.
Polyb. B. 3. c. 76. " Following this victory, *Scipio* beſieged *Ciſſa*, a town hard by, and
" won it. But *Aſdrubal*, having paſſed *Iberus*, and coming too late
" to the relief of *Hanno*, with 8000 foot and 1000 horſe, fell upon the
" *Roman* ſea forces, that lay not far from *Tarracon*, whom he found
" careleſs as after a victory, roving abroad in the country; and with
" great ſlaughter drove them aboard their ſhips. This done, he ran

" up into the country, where he withdrew the *Ilergetes*[a] from the *Roman* *Liv.* B. 21.
" party, though they had given hoſtages to *Scipio*. *Scipio* in the mean c. 61.
" ſeaſon was gone to viſit and aid his fleet: where having ſet things in
" order, he returned back, and made towards *Aſdrubal*, who durſt not
" abide his coming, but withdrew himſelf again over the *Iberus*.
" So the *Ilergetes* were compelled by force, having loſt *Athanagia*, their
" chief city, to pay a fine to the *Romans*, and increaſe the number of
" their hoſtages. The *Auſetani* likewiſe, confederates of the *Carthagi-*
" *nians*, were beſieged in their chief town, which they defended thirty
" days; hoping, in vain, that the ſharp winter, and great abundance
" of ſnow that fell, would have made the *Romans* diſlodge. But they
" were fain at length to yield, and for this their obſtinacy they were
" amerced twenty talents of ſilver. During the ſiege, the *Lacetani* came
" to help their diſtreſſed neighbours, and were beaten home by *Scipio*,
" leaving 12000 of their company dead behind them. I cannot but
" wonder how theſe *Lacetani*, that are ſaid to be the firſt which em-
" braced the friendſhip of *Scipio*, ſhould, without any cauſe remem-
" bred, become *Carthaginian* on the ſudden, in the next news we hear
" of them. As alſo it is ſtrange, that all the ſea coaſt northward of
" *Iberus*, having lately become voluntarily *ditionis Romanæ*, *ſubject*
" *unto Rome*, ſhould, in continuance of the ſtory, after a few lines, hold
" war againſt *Scipio*, without any reſiſtance of the *Carthaginians*. Nei-
" ther can I believe, that *Aſdrubal*, as it were by a charm, ſtirred up
" the *Ilergetes*, making them lay aſide all care of their hoſtages, and
" take arms in his quarrel; whilſt himſelf had not the daring to ſtand
" againſt *Scipio*, but ran away, and ſaved himſelf beyond the *Iberus*.
" *Philinus* perhaps, or ſome *Carthaginian* writer, would have told it
" thus: that *Scipio* adventuring too far into the country, was beaten
" by *Aſdrubal* back to his ſhips, whence he durſt not ſtir until winter
" came on: at what time the *Carthaginian* returned to the heart of his
" province, leaving ſome few gariſons to defend thoſe places, that
" after *Scipio* won, by returning upon them, unlooked for, through a
" deep ſnow. As for the *Lacetani*, *Ilergetes* and the reſt, we may
" reaſonably think, that they ſought their own benefit; helping them-
" ſelves one while by the *Romans* againſt the *Carthaginians*, and con-
" trariwiſe, upon ſenſe of injuries received, or apprehenſion of more
" grievous tyranny, under which they feared to be brought by theſe
" new maſters, hearkning again unto the comfortable promiſes of thoſe
" that had ruled them before. For that it was their intent to live un-
" der their own country laws, and not under governors ſent from *Rome*
" or *Carthage*, their demeanour in all ages following may teſtify; even
" from henceforth unto the days of *Auguſtus Cæſar*, till when they
" were never throughly conquered.

[a] *Polybius* ſays nothing of the rebellion of the *Ilergetes*, *Auſetani*, or *Lacetani*. The Hiſtorian follows *Livy*.

" The

Y. of *R.* 536. " The year following this, *Cn. Scipio* had a victory againſt the " *Carthaginians* in fight at ſea; or rather came upon them unlook'd for, " while they rode at anchor, moſt of their men being on ſhore. All
Polyb. B. 3. c. 95. " their ſhips that ran not too far on ground he took; and thereby grew " maſter of the whole coaſt, landing at pleaſure, and doing great hurt
Livy. B. 22. c. 20. " in all places that were not well defenced: After this victory above a " hundred and twenty nations, or petty eſtates in *Spain*, are ſaid to have " ſubmitted themſelves unto the *Romans*, or given hoſtages: whereby " *Aſdrubal* was compelled to fly into the utmoſt corners of the land, " and hide himſelf in *Luſitania*. Yet it follows, that the *Ilergetes* did " again rebel, that *Aſdrubal* hereupon came over *Iberus*; and that " *Scipio* (though having eaſily vanquiſhed the *Ilergetes*) went not forth " to meet him, but ſtirred up againſt him the *Celtiberians*, that lately " were become his ſubjects, and had given him hoſtages. Theſe took " from the *Carthaginian* three towns, and vanquiſhed him in two battles, " wherein they ſlew 15000 of his men, and took 4000 priſoners. " Then arrived *P. Scipio* with a ſupply [of 8000 men and a fleet of " thirty galleys;] and henceforward the two brethren jointly admi- " niſtered the buſineſs in *Spain*.

" The *Carthaginians* being occupied in the *Celtiberian* war; the two " *Scipios* did *haud cunctanter*, *without both fear or doubt*, paſs over " *Iberus*, and beſieged [b] *Saguntum*. Little cauſe of *doubt* had they, " if *Cneius* had already ſubdued many nations beyond it, and among " many others the ſame *Celtiberians*, who with their proper forces were " able to vanquiſh *Aſdrubal*. *Boſtar*, the Governor of *Saguntum*, a " ſimple man, ſuffered himſelf [as has been before related, p. 156.] to " be perſuaded by one *Abelox*, a *Spaniard*, that the only way to get " the favour and hearty good will of the country, was by freely " reſtoring unto them their hoſtages, as reſting without any pledge " aſſured of their faith: But the crafty *Spaniard*, being truſted with this " meſſage, and reſtitution of the hoſtages, carried them all to the " *Roman* Generals; perſuading them, as he had done *Boſtar*, to make " the liberality their own. Hereby the *Romans* purchaſed much love, " if the tale were true; and if it were not rather true, as afterward, " and ere this, we find, that all the *Spaniſh* hoſtages were left in new " *Carthage*. I am weary of rehearſing ſo many particularities, where- " of I can believe ſo few. But ſince we find no better certainties, we " muſt content ourſelves with theſe.

" The year following was like unto this: *Aſdrubal* muſt be beaten " again. The two *Scipios* divide their forces: *Cneius* makes war by

[b] Neither *Livy* nor *Polybius* ſay that *Saguntum* was beſieged. The *Romans* ſeem to have deſigned it, but winter coming on, hindered them. *Saguntum pergunt ire: —defectionem omnes* [*Hiſpani*] *ſpectare, armaque extemplo mota forent, ni hiems—interveniſſet. Liv. B. 22. c. 22. Saguntinorum urbi appropinquarunt, 5 milia ab oppido—caſtra faciunt.—Quia autem inſtabat hyems, utrique* [*Rom. & Hiſpani*] *in hyberna, ſuos exercitus dimiſerunt. Polyb. L. 3. c. 97, 99. Caſaub. trad.*

" land,

" land, *Publius* by ſea. *Aſdrubal* with much labour and entreaty hath Y. of *R.* 537.
" gotten 4000 foot and 500 horſe out of *Afric.* He repairs his fleet,
" and provides every way to make reſiſtance. But all his chief ſeamen
" and maſters of his ſhips revolt unto the *Romans*, becauſe they had
" been chidden the laſt year for their negligence, which had betrayed
" the navy. The revolt of theſe ſhip-maſters animates to rebellion
" the *Carpeſians* or *Carpetani*, an in-land people, about *Toledo*, in the
" very center of *Spain.* Theſe do much miſchief, ſo that *Aſdrubal*
" is fain to make a journey to them. His ſudden coming cuts off ſome
" of them that were found ſcattered abroad in the fields. But they
" making head, ſo valiantly aſſail him, that they drive him, for very
" fear, to encamp himſelf ſtrongly on a high piece of ground, whence
" he dares not come forth to give them battle. So they take a town by
" force, wherein he had laid up all his proviſions, and ſhortly make
" themſelves maſters of the country round about. This good ſucceſs
" breeds negligence, for which they dearly pay. *Aſdrubal* comes upon
" them, takes them unprepared, beats them, kills the moſt of them,
" and diſperſeth the reſt; ſo that the whole nation yieldeth to him the
" next day. Then come directions from *Carthage*, that *Aſdrubal* ſhould
" lead his army forth into *Italy*; which we may wonder why the *Car-*
" *thaginians* would appoint him to do, if they had been informed by
" his letters in what hard caſe he was, and had ſo weakly ſupplied him,
" as is ſhewed before. But thus we find it reported, and that upon the
" very rumour of his journey, almoſt all *Spain* was ready to fall to the
" *Romans.* *Aſdrubal* therefore ſends word preſently to *Carthage*, that
" this muſt not be ſo; or if they will needs have it ſo, that then they
" muſt ſend him a ſucceſſor, and well attended with a ſtrong army,
" which to employ they ſhould find work more than enough, ſuch
" notable men were the *Roman* Generals. But the Senate of *Carthage*
" is not much moved with this excuſe. *Aſdrubal* muſt needs be
" gone: *Himilco* with ſuch forces as are thought expedient for that
" ſervice, both by land and ſea, is ſent to take the charge of *Spain.*
" Wherefore *Aſdrubal* hath now no more to do, than to furniſh himſelf
" with ſtore of money, that he might have wherewithal to win the
" friendſhip of the *Gauls*, through whoſe countries he muſt paſs, as
" *Hannibal* had done before him. The *Carthaginians* were greatly to
" blame for not remembring to eaſe him of his care. But ſince it can
" be no better, he lays great impoſitions upon all the *Spaniards* his ſub-
" jects; and having gotten together as much treaſure as he could,
" onward he marcheth toward *Iberus.* The *Scipios*, hearing theſe
" news, are careful how to arreſt him on the way. They beſiege *Ibera*
" (ſo called of the river's name running by it) the richeſt town in all
" thoſe quarters, that was confederate with *Aſdrubal*, who thereupon
" ſteps aſide to relieve it. The *Romans* meet him, and fight a battle
" with him, which they win the more eaſily, for that the *Spaniards*,

Y. of *R.* 537. " his followers, had rather be vanquiſhed at home, than get the victory,
" and afterwards be haled into *Italy*. Great numbers are ſlain, and few
" ſhould have eſcaped, but that the *Spaniards* run away ere the battles
" were fully joined. Their camp the *Romans* take and ſpoil, whereby
" (queſtionleſs) they are marvelouſly enriched; all the money that
" could be raked together in *Spain* being carried along in this *Italian*
" expedition. This day's event joins all *Spain* to the *Romans*, if any
" part of the country ſtood in doubt before; and puts *Aſdrubal* ſo far
" from all thought of travelling into *Italy*, that it leaves him ſmall
Liv. B. 23. " hope of keeping himſelf ſafe in *Spain*. Of theſe exploits advertiſe-
c. 48. " ment is ſent to *Rome*, and letters to the Senate from *P.* and *Cn. Scipio*,
See page 187. " whereof the contents are, that they have neither money, apparel, nor
" bread, wherewith to ſuſtain their army and fleet; that all is wanting;
" ſo as unleſs they may be ſupplied from *Rome*, they can neither hold
" their forces together, nor tarry any longer in the province. Theſe
" letters come to *Rome* in an evil ſeaſon, the ſtate being ſcarely able,
See page 188. " after the loſs at *Cannæ*, to help itſelf at home. Yet relief is ſent.
Y. of *R.* 538. " At the coming of this ſupply, the two *Scipios* purſue *Aſdrubal*, and
" hunt him out of his lurking holes. What elſe can we think that
" remember the laſt news of him, and how fearfully he miſtruſted his
" own ſafety? They find him, and *Mago* and *Hamilcar*, the ſon of
" *Bomilcar*, with an army of threeſcore thouſand men, beſieging *Illi-*
" *turgi*, (which the learned *Ortelius* and others probably conjecture to
" have ſtood where *Carinnena* is now in the kingdom of *Arragon*; for
" there was *Illiturgi*[a], afterwards called *Forum Julii*, quite another way)
" a town of the *Ilergetes*, their neareſt neighbours, for having revolted
" to the *Romans*. The town is greatly diſtreſſed; but moſt of all for
" want of victuals. The *Romans* therefore break through between the
" enemy's camps, with terrible ſlaughter of all that reſiſt them; and
" having victualed the place, encourage the townſmen to defend their
" walls as ſtoutly as they ſhould anon behold them fighting manfully
" with the beſiegers in their behalf. So they iſſue forth, about ſixteen
" thouſand againſt threeſcore thouſand, and killing more of the enemies
" than themſelves were in number, drove all the three *Carthaginian*
" commanders every one out of his quarter, and took that day, beſides
" priſoners and other booty, fifty and eight enſigns.

" The *Carthaginian* army, being thus beaten from *Illiturgi*, fall upon
" *Incibili*, that ſtood a little ſouthward from the mouth of *Iberus*.
" The *Spaniards* are blamed as too greedy of earning money by war,
" for thus reinforcing the broken *Carthaginians*. But it may be won-
" dered whence the *Carthaginians* had money to pay them; ſince *Aſ-*

[a] Father *Rouillé* (B. 29. p. 208. Note 6.) and *Cellarius* (Vol. I. p. 69.) ſeem rightly to have placed *Illiturgi* on the river *Bætis*, near *Caſtulo*. But that the *Carthaginians* ſhould, after being beaten from thence, go and lay ſiege to *Incibili*, which ſtood where Sir *W. Raleigh* places it, is not eaſy to be credited.

" *drubal*

" *drubal* was lately driven to poll the country, wanting money of his Y. of *R.* 538.
" own; and being beaten in his journey, had loſt his wealthy carriages,
" when his camp was taken after the battle by *Ibera*. Howſoever it
" happens, the *Carthaginians* (according to their cuſtom) are beaten
" again at *Incibili*, where there were of them above 13000 ſlain, and
" above 3000 taken, beſides two and forty enſigns, and nine elephants.
" After this (in a manner) all the people of *Spain* fell from them unto
" the *Romans*. Thus could *Fabius*, *Valerius Antias*, or ſome other
" hiſtorian, to whom *Livy* gave credit, conquer all *Spain* twice in one
" year[a], by winning famous victories, whereof theſe good Captains
" *P.* and *Cn. Scipio* perhaps were not aware.

" The *Romans*, notwithſtanding this large acceſs of dominion, win- *Liv.* B. 24.
" ter on their own ſide of *Iberus*. In the beginning of the next c. 41.
" year, great armies of the *Spaniards* riſe againſt *Aſdrubal*, and are over- Y. of *R.* 539.
" thrown by him. *P. Scipio*, to help theſe his friends, is forced to make
" great haſte over the river. At [b] *Caſtrum Altum*, a place in the mid-
" way between new *Carthage* and *Saguntum*, *Publius Scipio* encampeth;
" and ſtores the place with victuals, being ſtrong and defenſible; as in-
" tending to make it his ſeat for a while. But the country round about
" is too full of enemies: The *Carthaginian* horſe have charged the
" *Romans* in their march, and are gone off clear; falling alſo upon
" ſome ſtragglers, or ſuch as lagged behind their fellows in march,
" they have cut off two thouſand of them. Hereupon it is thought
" behoveful to retire unto ſome place more aſſured. So *Publius* with-
" draws himſelf unto [c] *Mons Victoriæ*, that riſing ſomewhat eaſtward
" from *Incibili*, overlooketh the ſouthern outlet of *Iberus*. Thi-
" ther the *Carthaginians* purſue him. His brother *Cneius* repairs unto
" him; and *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Giſco*, with a full army, arrives to
" help his companions. As they lye thus near encamped together, *P.*
" *Scipio*, with ſome light armed, going cloſely to view the places
" thereabouts, is diſcovered by the enemies, who are like to take
" him, but that he withdraws himſelf to a high piece of ground; where
" they beſiege him, until his brother *Cneius* fetched him off. After
" this (but I know not why) [d] *Caſtulo*, a great city of *Spain*, whence
" *Hannibal* had taken him a wife, joineth with the *Romans*, though
" being far diſtant from them, and ſeated on the head of the river
" *Bætis*. Nevertheleſs the *Carthaginians* paſs over *Iberus* to be-
" ſiege *Illiturgi* again, wherein lodgeth a *Roman* gariſon; hoping to

[a] Not twice in the ſame year according to *Livy*.

[b] *Rouillé* (note 54. p. 238. B. 29.) ſays it is the ſame with *Valeria*, which he and *Cellarius*, V. 1. p. 103. place at the head of the *Sucro*.

[c] According to *Rouillé*, *loc. cit.* note 56. this hill was part of mount *Oroſpeda*, between the *Sucro* and the *Anas*. But then *Publius* inſtead of retiring was advancing farther into the country.

[d] *Caſtulo* is upon the *Bætis*, not far from *Oroſpeda*.

Y. of *R.* 539. " take it by famine. We may juſtly wonder what ſhould move them
" to neglect the rebellion of *Caſtulo*, yea and the *Roman* army lying ſo
" cloſe by them, and to ſeek adventures farther off, in that very place,
" wherein they had been ſo grievouſly beaten the year before. But
" thither they go; and thither follows them *Cneius Scipio* with one le-
" gion; who enters the town by force, breaks out upon them the next
" day, and in two battles, kills above twelve thouſand, and takes more
" than a thouſand of them priſoners, with ſix and thirty enſigns. This
" victory (doubtleſs) is remarkable, conſidering that the greateſt *Roman*
" legion at this time conſiſted of no more than 5000 men. The
" vanquiſhed *Carthaginians* beſiege [e] *Bigerra*, but that ſiege is alſo
" raiſed by *Cn. Scipio*. Thence the *Carthaginians* remove to [f] *Munda*,
" where the *Romans* are ſoon at their heels. There is a great battle
" fought, that laſteth four hours, wherein the *Romans* got a notable
" victory; and a more notable would have gotten, had not *Cn. Scipio*
" been wounded. Thirty nine elephants are killed, and twelve thou-
" ſand men; three thouſand priſoners taken, and ſeven and fifty en-
" ſigns. The *Carthaginians* fly to *Auringes* [g], and the *Romans* purſue
" them. *Cn. Scipio* in a litter is carried into the field, and vanquiſhes
" the *Carthaginians* again, but kills not half ſo many of them as before;
" good cauſe why, for there are fewer of them left to fight. Not-
" withſtanding all theſe overthrows, the *Spaniards*, a people framed
" even by nature to ſet war on foot, quickly fill up the broken troops
" of *Aſdrubal*, who having alſo hired ſome of the *Gauls*, adventures
" once more to try his fortune with the *Romans*. But he is beaten
" again, and loſeth eight thouſand of his men, beſides priſoners, ele-
" phants, enſigns, and other appurtenances. After ſo many victories,
" the *Romans* are even aſhamed to leave *Saguntum* enthralled unto the
" *Carthaginians*, ſince, in behalf of that city, they had at firſt entered
" into this war. And well may we think it ſtrange, that they had
" not recovered it long before, ſince we may remember, that, long
" before this, they had won all the country once and again. But it
" muſt not be forgotten, that they had ere now beſieged *Saguntum*;
" and were fain (as appears) to go their way without it: So as that they
" need not to bluſh for having ſo long forborn to do that, which ere
" now they had attempted, but were unable to perform. At the pre-
" ſent they win *Saguntum*, and reſtore the poſſeſſion thereof unto
" ſuch of the poor diſperſed citizens as they can find out. They alſo
" waſte and deſtroy the country of the *Turdetani*, that had miniſtred
" unto *Hannibal* matter of quarrel againſt the *Saguntines*. This laſt

[e] *Bigerra*, according to *Rouillé* (who follows *Ptolomy*) and *Cellar*. V. 1. p. 108. ſtood in the country of the *Baſtetani*, a people in the eaſt part of *Bætica*.

[f] *Munda Cellar*. p. 73. places near the ſea, not far from the Streights of *Gibraltar*.

[g] According to *Cellarius*, *Aurinx*, or *Orinx*, is not far from *Illiturgi* on the *Bætis*, but nearer the ſea. *Cellar*. V. 1. p. 75.

" action

" action (queſtionleſs) was much to their honour; and wherein we may Y. of *R.* 539.
" be aſſured, that the *Carthaginians* would have diſturbed them if they
" had been able.

" But overlooking now this long continuance of great victories,
" which the *Romans* have gotten in *Spain*, other print or token of all
" their brave exploits we can perceive none, than this recovery of *Sa-*
" *guntum*, excepting the ſtopping of *Aſdrubal*'s journey, which was in-
" deed of the greateſt importance, but appertaining to their own de-
" fence. For they have landed at *Emporiæ*, an haven town, built and
" peopled by a colony of the *Phocæans*, kin to the *Maſſilians*, friends
" to the *Romans*. They have eaſily won to their party, loſt, recover-
" ed, and loſt again ſome petty bordering nations of the *Spaniards*,
" that are carried one while by perſuaſion, other-whiles by force, and
" ſometimes by their own unſettled paſſions; and now finally they have
" won a town, whereof the *Carthaginians* held entire poſſeſſion, who
" had rooted out the old inhabitants. Wherefore we may eaſily be-
" lieve, that when they took *Saguntum* (if they took it not by ſurpriſe;
" which is to be ſuſpected, ſince in this action we find no particulars
" remembered, as when the ſame place was taken by *Hannibal*) they
" had gotten the better of their enemies in ſome notable fight. In like
" ſort alſo muſt we think, that all thoſe battles lately remembered, after
" every one of which *Aſdrubal* ſat down before ſome place that had
" rebelled, or ſeemed ready to rebel, were proſperous unto the *Car-*
" *thaginians*. For it is not the cuſtom of armies vanquiſhed, to carry
" the war from town to town, and beleaguer cities of their enemies;
" but to fortify themſelves within their own places of ſtrength, and
" therein to attend the levy and arrival of new ſupplies. And ſurely
" if the *Romans* had been abſolute maſters of the field, when they
" won *Saguntum*, they would not have conſumed a whole year follow- Y. of *R.* 540.
" ing in practiſing only with the *Celtiberians*, the next adjoining peo- *Liv.* B. 24.
" ple. Yet made they this little leſs than two years buſineſs. Of theſe c. 49.
" *Celtiberians* we hear before, that they have yielded up themſelves
" unto the *Romans*; for ſecurity of their faith given hoſtages to *Scipio*;
" and, at his appointment, made war againſt the *Carthaginians*, with
" their proper forces. Wherefore it is ſtrange, that they are now thus
" hardly wrought, and not without expreſs condition of a great ſum,
" hired to ſerve in the *Roman* camp. How this may hold together I
" cannot perceive, unleſs perhaps in thoſe days it were the *Roman*
" cuſtom, or rather the cuſtom of ſome bad author, whom *Livy* fol-
" lows, to call every meſſenger, or ſtraggler, that entered their camp,
" an hoſtage of that people from whom he came.

" The *Celtiberians* at length, hired with great rewards, ſend an army Y. of *R.* 541.
" of thirty thouſand men to help the *Romans*, out of which three *Livy* B. 25.
" hundred [b], the fitteſt, are choſen and carried into *Italy*, there to deal c. 32. & ſeq.

[b] *Livy* does not ſay theſe 300 were *Celtiberians*, *nobiliſſimos Hiſpanos* 300, l. 24. c. 49.

" with

A. of *R.* 541. " with their countrymen, that follow *Hannibal* in his wars. But if any " of theſe three hundred [c] return back into *Spain*, it is to be feared that " he brings with him ſuch news of the riches and welfare of *Hannibal*'s " men, that all his fellows at home are the leſs unwilling to follow " *Aſdrubal*, when he ſhall next have a deſire to lead them into *Italy*. " Hereof we find more than probability when theſe mercenary *Celti-* " *berians* meet the *Carthaginian* army in the field. The two *Scipios*, " preſuming on this acceſs of ſtrength, divide their forces, and ſeek " out the enemies, who lye not far off with three armies. *Aſdrubal* " the ſon of *Hamilcar* is neareſt at hand, even among the *Celtiberians*, " at [d] *Anitorgis*. With him *Cn. Scipio* doubts not to take good order: " But the fear is, that this one part of the *Carthaginian* forces being " deſtroyed, *Mago* and the ſon of *Giſco*, hearing the news, will make uſe " of their diſtance, which is five days march, and, by running into the " fartheſt parts of the country, ſave themſelves from being overtaken. " *Publius* therefore muſt make the more haſte, and take with him the " better ſoldiers, that is two parts of the old *Roman* army; leaving the " third part, and all the *Celtiberians*, to his brother. He that hath " the longer journey to make comes ſomewhat the ſooner to his life's " end. *Mago* and *Aſdrubal* the ſon of *Giſco* are not ſtudying how to " run away: They find no ſuch neceſſity. They join their forces to- " gether, meet with *Publius Scipio*, and lay at him ſo hardly, that he " is driven to keep himſelf cloſe within his trenches, wherein he thinks " himſelf not well aſſured. Eſpecially he is vexed by *Maſiniſſa*, Prince " of the *Maſſylii*, *Numidians* bordering upon *Mauritania*, in the re- " gion now called *Tremizen*; to whom the chief honour of this ſervice " is aſcribed, for that he becomes afterwards confederate with the " *Romans*. In this dangerous caſe, *Publius Scipio* gets intelligence that " *Indibilis*, a *Spaniſh* Prince, is coming with 7500 of the *Sueſſetani* [e] to " join with his enemies. Fearing therefore to be ſtrait ſhut up, and " beſieged, he iſſues forth by night, to meet with *Indibilis* upon the " way; leaving *T. Fonteius* his lieutenant, with a ſmall company to de- " fend the camp. He meets with *Indibilis*, but is not able, according " to his hope, to defeat him at the firſt encounter. The fight continues " ſo long, that the *Numidian* horſe appear (whom he thought to have " been ignorant of his departure) and fall upon the *Romans* on all " ſides: Neither are the *Carthaginians* far behind, but come ſo faſt

[c] Theſe 300 were ſent into *Italy* the year before the ſiege of *Capua*, and three years after the battle of *Cannæ*. It may therefore be queſtioned, whether *Hannibal*'s ſoldiers were ſo rich as Sir *Walter* repreſents.

[d] It is not agreed where *Anitorgis* ſtood, *Rouillé* places it near the *Anas* (n. 24. p. 286. B. 31.) *Cellar*. V. 1. p. 77. ſeems to think it the ſame with *Cuniſtorgis*, which *Strabo* calls a town of the *Celticæ*, but which *Appian* places in *Luſitania*. The *Anitorgis* here mentioned by *Livy*, muſt have been near the *Iberus*; for according to him, *Publius Scipio*'s camp, which *Fonteius* and *Marcius* poſſeſſed after the General's death, was near that river.

[e] The *Sueſſetani* were a people on the north ſide of the *Iberus*.

" upon him in rear, that *Publius Scipio*, uncertain which way to turn, Y. of *R.* 541.
" yet fighting and animating his men, where need moſt requireth, is
" ſtruck through with a lance, and ſlain; very few of his army eſcap-
" ing the ſame deſtiny, through benefit of the dark night. The like
" end hath *Cneius Scipio* within nine and twenty days after. At his
" meeting with *Aſdrubal*, the *Celtiberian* mercenaries all forſake him,
" pretending that they had war in their own country. If *Anitorgis*,
" where *Aſdrubal* then lay, were, as *Ortelius* following *Beuterus* takes it,
" a *Celtiberian* town, this was no vain pretence, but an apparent truth.
" But we may juſtly believe that they were won by *Aſdrubal*, and eaſily
" perſuaded to take as much money for not fighting, as they ſhould have
" had for hazarding their lives. *Cneius Scipio* therefore being unable to
" ſtay them, and no leſs unable without their help, either to reſiſt the ene-
" my, or to join with his brother, maketh a very violent retreat; herein
" only differing from plain flight, that he keeps his men together. *Aſ-*
" *drubal* preſſeth hard upon him; and *Mago*, with *Aſdrubal* the ſon of
" *Giſco*, having made an end of *Publius*, haſten to diſpatch his brother
" after him. *Scipio* ſteals from them all by night; but is overtaken the
" next day by their horſe, and arreſted in an open place, of hard ſtony
" ground, where grows not ſo much as a ſhrub, unfit for defence of
" his legions againſt ſuch enemies. Yet a little hill he finds of eaſy
" aſcent on every ſide, which he takes for want of a more commo-
" dious place, and fortifies it with pack-ſaddles, for default of a better
" paliſado. Theſe weak defences the *Carthaginians* ſoon tear in
" ſunder [f], and breaking in on all hands, leave very few of them alive,
" that ſaving themſelves, I know not how, within ſome woods ad-
" joining, eſcape unto *T. Fonteius*, whom *Publius* had left in his camp,
" as is before ſaid. It is a terrible overthrow, they ſay, out of which
" no man eſcapes. Yet how they that were thus hemmed in on every
" ſide, in ſo bare a ground as afforded not a ſhrub to cover them,
" could break out and ſhrowd themſelves within woods adjoining, I
" ſhould much wonder, did not a greater miracle following call away
" mine attention. *T. Fonteius* is in *Publius Scipio*'s camp on the
" north ſide of *Iberus*, fearful (as may be ſuppoſed) of his own life,
" ſince his General, with two parts of the *Roman* army, had little
" hope to remain long ſafe within it. Thither comes *L. Marcius*, a
" young *Roman* gentleman of a notable ſpirit; who having gathered
" together the ſcattered ſoldiers, and drawn ſome companies out of
" their gariſons, makes a pretty army. The ſoldiers being to chooſe a
" General by moſt voices, prefer this *L. Marcius* before *Fonteius* the
" lieutenant, as well they may. For *Aſdrubal* the ſon of *Giſco*
" coming upon them, this *L. Marcius* ſo encourageth his men (fondly
" weeping when he led them forth, upon remembrance of their more

[f] *Livy* ſays it coſt them a great deal of trouble, and they were a long while about it. B. 25. c. 36.

" honourable

Y. of *R.* 541. " honourable Generals lately ſlain) and admoniſheth them of their pre-
" ſent neceſſity, that he beats the *Carthaginians* into their trenches.
" A notable victory perhaps he might have gotten, but that he wiſely
" ſounds the retreat, reſerving the fury of his ſoldiers to a greater oc-
" caſion. The *Carthaginians* are at firſt amazed, and wonder whence
" this boldneſs grows, in enemies lately vanquiſhed, and now again
" little better than taken. But when they ſee that the *Roman* dares
" not follow his advantage, they return to their former ſecurity, and
" utterly deſpiſing him, ſet neither corps de garde nor centinel, but
" reſt ſecure, as if no enemy were near. *Marcius* therefore animates
" his ſoldiers with lively words, and tells them that there is no adven-
" ture more ſafe, than that which is furtheſt from ſuſpicion of being
" undertaken. They are ſoon perſuaded to follow him in any deſperate
" piece of ſervice. So he leads them forth by night, and ſteals upon
" the camp of *Aſdrubal*; where finding no guard, but the enemies faſt
" aſleep, or very drowſy, he enters without reſiſtance, fires their ca-
" bins, and gives a terrible alarm; ſo that all affrighted the *Carthagi-*
" *nians* run head-long one upon another, they know not which way.
" All paſſages out of their camp *Marcius* hath prepoſſeſſed, ſo that
" there is no way to eſcape, ſave by leaping down the rampart; which
" as many do as can think upon it, and run away towards the camp
" of *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Hamilcar*, that lay ſix miles off. But *Mar-*
" *cius* hath way-laid them. In a valley between their two camps he
" hath beſtowed a *Roman* cohort, and I know not what number of
" horſe; ſo that into this ambuſh they fall every one, and are cut in
" pieces. But leſt perchance any ſhould have eſcaped, and give the
" alarm before his coming, *Marcius* haſtens to be there as ſoon as they.
" By which diligent ſpeed he comes early in the morning upon this fur-
" ther camp, which with no great difficulty he enters, and partly by
" apprehenſion of danger which the enemies conceived, when they be-
" held the *Roman* ſhields foul, and bloodied with their former execu-
" tion, he drives headlong into flight all that can ſave themſelves from
" the fury of the ſword. Thirty ſeven thouſand of the enemies periſh
" in this night's work, beſides a thouſand eight hundred and thirty
" taken priſoners. Hereunto *Valerius Antias* adds, that the camp of
" *Mago* was alſo taken, and 7000 ſlain, and that in another battle
" with *Aſdrubal*, there were ſlain 10000 more, beſides 4330 taken
" priſoners. Such is the power of ſome hiſtorians *Livy* therefore
" hath elſewhere well obſerved, that there is none ſo intemperate as
" *Valerius Antias* in multiplying the numbers that have fallen in battles.
" That whilſt *Marcius* was making an oration to his ſoldiers, a flame
" of fire ſhone about his head, *Livy* reporteth as a common tale, not
" giving thereto any credit; and temperately concludeth, that this
" Captain *Marcius* got a great name; which he might well do, if
" with ſo ſmall forces, and in ſuch diſtreſs, he could clearly get off

" from

" from the enemies, and give them any parting blow, though it were Y. of *R.* 542.
" far leſs than that which is here ſet down.

" Of theſe occurrents *L. Marcius* ſent word to *Rome*, not forgetting
" his own good ſervice, whatſoever it was, but ſetting it out in ſuch wiſe
" as the Senate might judge him worthy to hold the place of their
" vicegerent in *Spain*, which the better to intimate unto them, he
" ſtiled himſelf Pro-Prætor. The Fathers were no leſs moved with
" the tidings than the caſe required, and therefore took ſuch careful
" order for ſupplying their forces in *Spain*, that although *Hannibal* came
" to the gates of *Rome*, ere the companies levied to ſerve that province
" could be ſent away, yet could they not ſtay a tide for defence of
" the city itſelf, but ſhipped them in all haſte for *Spain*. As for the B. 26. c. 11.
" title of Pro-Prætor which *Marcius* had aſſumed, they thought it too
" great for him, and were offended at his preſumption in uſurping it;
" foreſeeing well, that it was a matter of ill conſequence, to have the
" ſoldiers abroad make choice, among themſelves, of thoſe that ſhould
" command armies and provinces. Therefore *C. Claudius Nero* was *Liv.* B. 26.
" diſpatched away, with all convenient haſte, into *Spain*, carrying with c. 17.
" him about 6000 of the *Roman* foot, and as many of the *Latines*,
" with 300 *Roman* horſe, and of the *Latines* eight hundred.

" It happened well that about theſe times the affairs of *Rome* be-
" gan to proſper in *Italy*, and afforded means of ſending abroad ſuch
" a ſtrong ſupply, otherwiſe the victories of *Marcius* would ill have
" ſerved, either to keep footing in *Spain*, or to ſtop the *Carthaginian*
" armies from marching towards the *Alps*. For when *Claudius*, landing
" with his new forces, took charge of that remainder of the army,
" which was under *Marcius* and *Fonteius*, he found ſurer tokens of the
" overthrows received, than of thoſe miraculous victories, whereof
" *Marcius* had made his vaunts to the Senate. The *Roman* party was
" forſaken by moſt of the *Spaniſh* friends, whom how to reclaim, it
" would not eaſily be deviſed. Yet *Claudius* advanced boldly towards
" *Aſdrubal*, the brother of *Hannibal*, whom he found among the *Au-*
" *ſetani* °, near enough at hand, incamped in a place called *Lapides atri*,
" out of which there was no iſſue, but only through a ſtraight, whereon
" the *Roman* ſeized at his firſt coming. What ſhould have tempted any
" man of underſtanding to incamp in ſuch a place, I do not find; and
" as little reaſon can I find in that which followed. For it is ſaid that

° The *Auſetani* were indeed near enough at hand. *Pliny* mentions a people of that name near *Emporiæ*. *Livy*, as quoted by *Cellarius*, V. 1. p. 116. places them near the *Iberus*. But the *Lapides atri* (the black rocks) acccording to the ſame *Cellarius*, p. 99. were between *Illiturgi* and *Menteſa*, or *Mentiſſa* on the *Bætis*. *Livy* alſo ſays the *Lapides atri* were between *Illiturgi* and *Mentiſſa*, but then he places theſe towns in the country of the *Auſetani*, which agrees to the ſituation Sir *Walter Raleigh* gives to *Illiturgi*. *Aſdrubal ad Lapides atros Caſtra habebat in Auſetanis, is locus eſt inter oppida Illiturgim & Mentiſſam.* Liv. L. 26. c. 17. *Rouillé* (N. 33, 34. p. 320. B. 32.) agrees with *Cellar.*

A. of R. 542. " *Aſdrubal*, ſeeing himſelf thus locked up, made offer to depart forth-
" with out of all *Spain*, and quit the province to the *Romans*, upon
" condition that he and his army might be thence diſmiſſed; that he
" ſpent many days in entertaining parly with *Claudius* about this buſi-
" neſs; that night by night he conveyed his footmen (a few at a time)
" through very difficult paſſages out of the danger, and that finally
" taking advantage of a miſty day, he ſtole away with all his horſe
" and elephants, leaving his camp empty. If we conſider, that there
" were at the ſame time, beſides this *Aſdrubal*, two other *Carthaginian*
" Generals in *Spain*, we ſhall find no leſs cauſe to wonder at the ſim-
" plicity of *Claudius*, who hoped to conclude a bargain for ſo great a
" country, with one of theſe three chieftains, than at the ſtrange nature
" of thoſe paſſages, through which the footmen could hardly creep
" out by night, the horſe and elephants eaſily following them in a
" dark miſty day. Wherefore in giving belief to ſuch a tale, it is
" needful that we ſuppoſe both the danger wherein the *Carthaginians*
" were, and the conditions offered for their ſafe departure, to have
" been of far leſs value. Howſoever it was, neither this nor ought
" elſe that the *Romans* could do, ſerved to purchaſe any new friends in
" *Spain*, or to recover the old which they had loſt. Like enough it
" is, that the old ſoldiers, which had choſen *Marcius* their Pro-Prætor,
" took it not well, that the Senate, regardleſs of their good deſerts,
" had repealed their election, and ſent a Pro-Prætor whom they fancied
" not ſo well. Some ſuch occaſion may have moved them to deſire a
" Pro-Conſul, and, perhaps, young *Scipio* by name, as if a title of
" greater dignity were needful to work regard in the *Barbarians*, and
" the beloved memory of *Cneius* and *Publius* likely to do good, were
" it revived in one of the ſame family. Whether upon theſe or upon
" other reaſons, *C. Claudius* was recalled out of the province, and
" *Publius* the ſon of *P. Scipio* ſent Pro-Conſul into *Spain*.

" This is that *Scipio*, who afterwards transferred the war into *Afric*,
" where he happily ended it to the great honour and benefit of his
" country. He was a man of goodly preſence, and ſingularly well
" conditioned, eſpecially he excelled in temperance, continency, boun-
" ty, and other virtues that purchaſe love; of which qualities what
" great uſe he made ſhall appear in the tenor of his actions following.
" As for thoſe things that are reported of him, ſavouring a little too
" much of the great *Alexander*'s vanity: How he uſed to walk alone
" in the Capitol, as one that had ſome ſecret conference with *Jupiter*:
" How a dragon (which muſt have been one of the Gods, and in
" likelihood *Jupiter* himſelf) was thought to have converſed with his
" mother, entering her chamber often, and vaniſhing away at the
" coming in of any man; and how of theſe matters he nouriſhed the
" rumour by doubtful anſwers; I hold them no better than fables,
" deviſed by hiſtorians, who thought thereby to add unto the glory of
" *Rome*;

" *Rome*; that this noble city might ſeem not only to have ſurpaſſed Y. of *R.* 542
" other nations in virtue of the generality, but alſo in great worth of
" one ſingle man. To this end nothing is left out that might ſerve
" to adorn this *Roman* champion. For it is confidently written as mat-
" ter of unqueſtionable truth, that when a Pro-Conſul was to be choſen
" for *Spain*, there durſt not any Captain of the principal citizens offer
" himſelf as petitioner for that honourable but dangerous charge; that
" the people of *Rome* were much aſtoniſhed thereat; that when the
" day of election came, all the Princes of the city ſtood looking one
" another in the face, not one of them having the heart to adventure
" himſelf in ſuch a deſperate ſervice; and finally, that this *Publius*
" *Cornelius Scipio*, being then about four and twenty years of age[p],
" getting up upon an high place, where he might be ſeen of all the
" multitude, requeſted and obtained, that the office might be conferred
" upon him. If this were true, then were all the victories of *L.*
" *Marcius* no better than dreams; and either very unreaſonable was the
" fear of all the *Roman* Captains, who durſt not follow *Claudius Nero*,
" that not long before was gone into *Spain* Pro-Prætor, or very bad
" intelligence they had out of the province, which *Aſdrubal* the *Car-*
" *thaginian*, as we heard even now, was ready to abandon. But upon
" theſe incoherences, which I find in the too partial *Roman* hiſtorians,
" I do not willingly inſiſt.

" *P. Scipio* was ſent Pro-Conſul into *Spain*, and with him was joined *Polyb.* B. 10.
" *M. Junius Silanus* as Pro-Prætor and his Coadjutor. They carried with c. 6. & *ſeq.*
" them 10000 foot and 1000 horſe in thirty quinquereme gallies. With & *Liv.* B. 26.
" theſe they landed at *Emporiæ*, and marched from thence to *Tarracon* c. 19.
" along the ſea coaſt. At the fame of *Scipio*'s arrival, it is ſaid, that
" embaſſages came to him apace from all quarters of the province,
" which he entertained with ſuch a majeſty, as bred a wonderful opi-
" nion of him. As for the enemies, they were greatly afraid of him, *Livy*, B. 26.
" and ſo much the greater was their fear, by how much the leſs they c. 20.
" could give any reaſon of it. If we muſt believe this, then muſt we
" needs believe, that their fear was even as great as could be; for very
" little cauſe there was to be terrified with the fame of ſo young a man,
" which had as yet performed nothing. All the winter following (or, *Liv.* B. 27.
" as ſome think, all the next year) he did nothing, but ſpent the time c. 7.
" perhaps, as his foregoers had done, in treating with the *Spaniards*. His Y. of *R.* 544.
" firſt enterprize was againſt new *Carthage*, upon which he came unex- *Polyb.* loc.
" pected, with 25000 foot and 2500 horſe; his ſea forces coaſting cit. &—Liv.
" him and moderating their courſe in ſuch wiſe, that they arrived B. 26. c. 42.
" there together with him. He aſſailed the town by land and ſea, and & ſeq.

[p] *Polyb.* B. 10. c. 3. ſays upon the authority of *C. Lælius*, from whom he heard it, that *Scipio* was ſeventeen years of age at the battle of the *Ticin*, and (c. 6.) twenty ſeven when he went into *Spain*. But if he was ſeventeen at the battle of the *Ticin*, and went to *Spain* this year (as *Livy* and *Pighius* ſay) he was now only twenty four.

Y. of *R.* 544. "won it by aſſault the firſt day. The *Carthaginians* loſt it by their too "much confidence upon the ſtrength of it, which cauſed them to man "it more ſlenderly than was requiſite. Yet it might have been well "enough defended, if ſome fiſhermen of *Tarracon* had not diſcovered "unto *Scipio* a ſecret paſſage unto the walls, whereof the townſmen "themſelves were either ignorant, or thought, at leaſt, that their "enemies could have no notice. This city of new *Carthage* reſembled "the old and great *Carthage* in ſituation, ſtanding upon a demi-iſland, "between a haven and a great lake. All the weſtern ſide of the walls "and ſomewhat of the north was fenced with this lake, which the "fiſhermen of *Tarracon* had ſounded, and finding ſome part thereof a "ſhelf, whereon at low water men might paſs knee deep, or, at moſt, "wading up to the middle, *Scipio* thruſt thereinto ſome companies of "men, who recovered the top of the walls without reſiſtance, the "place being left without guard, as able to defend itſelf by the natural "ſtrength. Theſe falling ſuddenly upon the backs of the *Carthaginians* "within the city, eaſily forced a gate, and gave free entrance to the "*Roman* army. What booty was found within the town [q], *Livy* him-"ſelf cannot certainly affirm, but is fain to ſay, that ſome *Roman* hiſto-"rians told lies without meaſure, in way of amplification. By that "ſmall proportion of riches, which was afterwards carried by *Scipio* "into the *Roman* treaſury, we may eaſily perceive how great a vanity "it was to ſay, that all the wealth of *Afric* and *Spain* was heaped up "in that one town. But therein were beſtowed all the *Spaniſh* hoſtages[r], "or at leaſt of the adjoining provinces, whom *Scipio* intreated with ſin-"gular courteſy, reſtoring them unto their kindred and friends, in "ſuch gracious manner as doubled the thanks due to ſo great a benefit."

Polyb. B. 10. c. 18. Liv. B. 26. c. 49.

A procedure ſo generous encouraged a woman of a majeſtick mein, to come and throw herſelf at his feet. (She was the wife of *Mandonius*, brother to *Indibilis*, King of the *Ilergetes*.) With tears in her eyes ſhe beſought him, that he would order his *Romans* to be more civil to their captives than the *Carthaginians* had been. Her modeſty hindered her from expreſſing herſelf more clearly; and *Scipio* miſunderſtood her meaning. Imagining that ſhe and her companions had been hardly treated with reſpect to the neceſſaries of life, he gave her an aſſurance that, for the future, they ſhould want nothing. *That*, returned the noble matron, *has no part in my concern. Cares of another kind diſturb my thoughts, when I conſider the age of theſe about me.* *Scipio* caſting his eyes upon her nieces (the daughters of *Indibilis*) and other beautiful captives of like quality, who were with her, and ſeemed to

[q] *Polyb.* B. 10. c. 19. ſays, *Scipio* found in the town 600 talents of the public money; and that he had brought with him 400 talents from *Rome*, for the expence of the war.

[r] *Scipio* promiſed to ſend home the hoſtages, provided their friends would enter into an alliance with *Rome*, *Polyb.* Lib. 10. c. 18.

regard

regard her as a mother, underſtood the nature of her petition. Mov- Y. of R. 544.
ed with compaſſion for young Princeſſes, whoſe honour had been expoſed to ſo much danger, tears dropped from his eyes; and, reaching out his hand to raiſe the ſuppliant, he replied, "For my own ſake, "and for the ſake of the *Roman* people, I would ſuffer nothing, that "is any where eſteemed ſacred, to be violated amongſt us. But that "virtue and dignity, which you have preſerved under all your misfor- "tunes, oblige me to be more particularly attentive to your protection." He then appointed men of known probity to have the charge of the fair captives and their conductreſs, and commanded, that they ſhould be reſpected as his ſiſters and daughters.

A ſecond adventure made it believed, that it was not mere policy, but virtue, which moved *Scipio* to ſuch generous actions. His officers, knowing that he loved women, brought to him a young virgin of ſurpriſing beauty. Where-ever ſhe appeared ſhe charmed the eyes of all; and *Scipio* was ſtruck at the ſight of her. Nevertheleſs he gave this anſwer to the officers. "Were I in a private ſtation, you could "not make me a more agreeable preſent; nor, in the poſt I now fill, "a preſent leſs acceptable." Then, having aſked the Lady concerning her birth, country, and circumſtances; and finding, that ſhe was contracted to a Prince of the *Celtiberians* named *Allucius*, he ſent for her father, and for the Prince. When they came into his preſence, he thus addreſſed himſelf to the lover of the captive. "*Allucius*, we are both "young, and may therefore ſpeak freely to one another of our ſen- "timents. My ſoldiers have brought me hither a virgin, who, I hear, "is your miſtreſs, and that you paſſionately love her. Her beauty "makes me eaſily believe it; and would the buſineſs with which I am "entruſted by our Republic allow me to think of ſuch pleaſures, I "ſhould be glad to be indulged in them, while they did not exceed "the bounds of juſtice and honour. *Your* love I can favour, and am "pleaſed with an opportunity to do it. Your miſtreſs has been with us, "as if ſhe had been with her own parents, or yours, that I might "make you a preſent worthy of me and of you. The only return "I aſk, is this: *Be a friend to the* Roman *people.* If you believe me "to be an honeſt man, ſuch as my father and uncle were eſteemed "in theſe countries, Know, that *Rome* has many citizens like us; and "that there is not at this day, in the world, a nation, whom you and "your countrymen would think a more terrible enemy, or a more "deſirable friend." At theſe words he put the fair captive into the hands of the *Celtiberian* Prince; and, as her parents had brought a rich preſent of money for the Pro-Conſul, he gave that likewiſe to *Allucius*, as an addition to his wife's portion. This action did the *Roman* Republic great ſervice in *Spain*. *Allucius* publiſhed in *Celtiberia*, *That there was come among them a young hero, terrible and beneficent as the immortals, all conquering by his benignity as by his ſword.*

Y. of *R.* 544. Sir *W. Ral.* B. 5. c. 3. §. 11.

The grateful Prince ſoon after brought to *Scipio* a reinforcement of one thouſand four hundred horſe; " and two petty Kings of the " *Ilergetes* and *Lacetani*, neareſt neighbours to *Tarracon*, and dwelling " on the north ſide of the *Iberus*, forſook the *Carthaginian* party, " and joined with the *Romans*. The ſpeech of *Indibilis*, King of " the *Ilergetes*, is much commended for that he did not vaunt " himſelf, as commonly fugitives uſe, of the pleaſure which he did " unto the *Romans*, in revolting from their enemies, but rather " excuſed this his changing ſide, as being thereto compelled by the " injuries of the *Carthaginians*, and invited by the honourable dealing " of *Scipio*. This temperate eſtimation of his new profeſſed friendſhip " was indeed no unſure token that it ſhould be long laſting. But if the " *Ilergetes* had long ere this (as we have heard before) forſaken the *Car-* " *thaginian* party, and ſtoutly held themſelves as friends to *Cn. Scipio*, " then could nothing have been deviſed more vain than this oration of " *Indibilis*, their King, excuſing, as new, his taking part with the ſame, " when he ſhould have rather craved pardon for his breach of alliance, " formerly contracted with the father and the uncle. Moſt likely " therefore it is, that howſoever the two elder *Scipios* had gotten ſome " few places among theſe their neighbours, and held them by ſtrength; " yet were the *Romans* never maſters of the country, till this worthy " commander, by recovering their hoſtages from the *Carthaginians*, " and by his great munificence in ſending them home, won unto himſelf " the aſſured love and aſſiſtance of theſe Princes. The *Carthaginian* " Generals, when they heard of this loſs, were very ſorry, yet never- " theleſs they ſet a good face on the matter, ſaying, that a young man, " having ſtolen a town by ſurprize, was too far tranſported and over- " joy'd, but that ſhortly they would meet with him, and put him in " mind of his father and uncle, which would alter his mood, and bring " him to a more convenient temper.

Liv. B. 27. c. 17. & ſeq.

" Now if I ſhould here interpoſe mine own conjecture, I ſhould " be bold to ſay, that the *Carthaginians* were at this time buſy in ſetting " forth towards *Italy*, and that *Scipio*, to divert them, undertook new " *Carthage*, as his father and uncle upon the like occaſion, ſat down " before *Ibera*. And in this reſpect I would ſuppoſe, that it had not " been much amiſs, if the paſſage over the lake had been undiſcovered, " and the town held out ſome longer while. For howſoever that par- " ticular action was the more fortunate in coming to ſuch good iſſue " upon the firſt day, yet in the generality of the buſineſs between *Rome* " and *Carthage*, it was more to be wiſhed, that *Aſdrubal* ſhould be " ſtayed from going into *Italy*, than that half of *Spain* ſhould be taken " from him. Whereas therefore he had nothing left to do that ſhould " hinder his journey, *Mago* and *Aſdrubal* the ſon of *Giſco*, were " thought ſufficient to hold *Scipio* work, in that lingring war of taking " and retaking towns, whilſt the main of the *Carthaginian* forces,

" under *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Hamilcar*, went to a greater enterprize,
" even to fight in trial of the empire.

" But the *Roman* Hiſtorians tell this after another faſhion, and ſay, Y. of *R.* 545.
" that *Aſdrubal* was beaten into *Italy*, whither he ran for fear, as
" thinking himſelf ill aſſured of the *Spaniards*, as long as they might
" but hear the name of *Scipio*. *Scipio*, ſay they, coming upon *Aſdrubal*,
" his vant-currers charged ſo luſtily the *Carthaginian* horſe, that they
" drave them into their trenches, and made it apparent, even by that
" ſmall piece of ſervice, how full of ſpirit the *Roman* army was, and
" how dejected the enemy. *Aſdrubal* therefore by night retired out
" of that even ground, and occupied a hill, compaſſed on three ſides
" with the river, very ſteep of aſcent, and not eaſy of acceſs on the
" foreſide, by which himſelf got up, and was to be followed by the
" *Romans*. On the top of it there was a plain, whereon he ſtrongly
" encamped himſelf, and in the midway, between the top and the root
" of the hill, was alſo another plain, into which he deſcended, more
" upon bravery, that he might not ſeem to hide himſelf within the
" trenches, than for that he durſt adventure his army to the hazard of
" a battle, for which this was no equal ground. But ſuch advantage
" of place could not ſave him from the *Romans*. They climbed up
" the hill to him, they recovered even footing with him, drove him out
" of this lower plain up into his camp on the hill top, whither although
" the aſcent were very difficult, and his elephants beſtowed in the
" ſmootheſt places to hinder their approach, yet compaſſing about,
" and ſeeking paſſage where it was hardeſt to be found, but much
" more ſtrongly breaking their way, where the *Carthaginians* had got
" up before them, they drave both men and elephants headlong,
" I know not whither, for it is ſaid, that there was no way to fly. Out
" of ſuch a battle, wherein he had loſt 8000 men, *Aſdrubal* is ſaid to
" have eſcaped, and gathering together his diſperſed troops, to have
" marched towards the *Pyrenees*, having ſent away his elephants ere
" the fight began [a]. Nevertheleſs *Mago* and *Aſdrubal* the ſon of *Giſco*, *Liv.* B. 27.
" are reported after this to have conſulted with him about this war, c. 20.
" and finally to have concluded, that go he needs muſt, were it but to
" carry all the *Spaniards*, as far as might be, from the name of *Scipio*.
" How likely this was to have been true, it ſhall appear at his coming
" into *Italy*, whence theſe incoherent relations of the *Spaniſh* affairs have
" too long detained us."

[a] *Polybius*, B. 10. c. 35, 36. relates this battle ſomewhat different from *Livy*, whom Sir *W. Raleigh* follows.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

The TWELFTH and THIRTEENTH YEARS of the War.

Aſdrubal *vanquiſhed in the battle of the* Metaurus. Hannibal *is forced to confine himſelf within* Bruttium.

A. of *R.* 545. THE approach of *Aſdrubal* (as was before obſerved) made it incumbent on the *Romans* to be very careful in their choice of Conſuls to ſucceed *Marcellus* and *Quinctius*. The Conſcript Fathers caſt their eyes on *C. Claudius Nero*, who had formerly ſerved in *Spain*; a man of approved courage and ability: But where to find him a proper collegue was the difficulty; for *Nero* being ſomewhat haſty, and extremely enterpriſing, it ſeem'd neceſſary to join with him, in the command, ſome perſon whoſe flegm may temper his vivacity. It happened about this time, that the reputation of one *M. Livius Macatus* was attacked in the Senate. His kinſman *M. Livius Salinator* ſpoke in his defence. *Salinator* had diſcharged the office of Conſul with great prudence twelve years before; yet was afterwards unjuſtly cenſured by the people for a pretended unequal diſtribution of the ſpoils of *Illyricum*. Piqued at the affront, he retired from all public buſineſs to his country farm; and though *Marcellus* and *Lævinus* obliged him to return to the city, he lived there like a man in diſgrace, his beard long, his hair neglected, and his dreſs ſlovenly, till the Cenſors forced him to ſhave himſelf and take his place in the Senate: and even then he continued to ſhew his reſentment of the affront he had received, giving his opinion only by an Aye or a No, or by moving from one ſide of the houſe to the other. The cauſe of his friend now engaged him to ſpeak, this drew upon him the attention of the Fathers. They called to mind his merit and his paſt ſervices, were ſurprized at themſelves for having ſo long neglected a man of his worth and abilities, and judged him a proper perſon to be joined with *Nero* in the Conſulſhip. But, when the Comitia met, *Livius* himſelf oppoſed his own election: *If I am worthy*, ſaid he, *to be choſen Conſul a ſecond time, why was I condemned? Or if my condemnation was juſt, why ſhould I be placed again at the helm?* However, he was at length prevailed upon to accept of the dignity offered him. It fell to his lot to march againſt *Aſdrubal*, and to *Nero*'s to oppoſe *Hannibal* in *Bruttium:* But the reſt of the winter was ſpent in the celebration of games, proceſſions, and other religious ceremonies, to render the Gods propitious.

Liv. B. 27. c. 33.

c. 34.

When the ſpring came, the Conſuls began to make new levies with extraordinary rigour. Five out of ſeven maritime colonies, which had been

been hitherto exempted, by treaty, from furniſhing their contingents of troops, were deprived of that immunity, which was confirmed only to *Oſtia* and *Antium*. The *Volones* were enrolled in the legions, and *Scipio* ſent from *Spain* to *Livius* two thouſand legionaries, eight thouſand *Spaniards* and *Gauls*, and eighteen hundred horſe, partly *Numidian*, and partly *Spaniſh*. Y. of *R.* 546 Bef. *J. C.* 206 245 Conſul-p *Livy*, B. 27. c. 38.

Aſdrubal had come from *Spain* to *Italy* in a much ſhorter time than *Hannibal*. He had found means to gain the good will of the *Gauls*. A great number of the *Arverni* had liſted themſelves in his ſervice; and even the mountaineers of the *Alps*, being by this time ſenſible, that there was no deſign upon their cottages and poſſeſſions, and that their hills were only a road by which one powerful ſtate marched its armies to attack another, at a great diſtance from them, had been ſo far from oppoſing his march, that many of them had joined his army. The *Carthaginian*, after paſſing the *Alps*, laid ſiege to *Placentia*. While he was before the town, the Conſuls in great haſte ſet out for their reſpective provinces. *Nero* found, as *Livy* would have us believe, that the Prætor *Hoſtilius* (who met him at *Venuſia*, and there reſigned the command of the troops to him) had, with ſome light armed cohorts, attacked all *Hannibal*'s army on a march, killed 4000 of his men, and taken nine ſtandards. The ſame author adds, that *Nero* obtained a victory over *Hannibal*, by means of an ambuſh he placed behind the *Carthaginian* army, ſlew 8000 of them and four elephants, and took 700 priſoners, with the loſs only of 500 men; and in a ſecond engagement cut in pieces 2000 of the enemy. Soon after this, four *Gallic* and two *Numidian* troopers, who had been diſpatched with letters to the *Carthaginian* General from *Aſdrubal*, miſſing their way, fell into the hands of ſome *Roman* ſoldiers, in the neighbourhood of *Tarentum*, who carried them before *Q. Claudius*, the Pro-Prætor; and when dread of torture had made theſe meſſengers confeſs their errand, *Claudius* ſent them under a guard, with the letters unopened to the Conſul *Nero* at *Canuſium*. *Nero* having cauſed theſe letters to be interpreted, and finding the import of them to be, *That* Aſdrubal *was repairing to* Umbria, *and deſired his brother to join him there*, he ſent them ſtrait to the Senate, ſignifying to them by the ſame expreſs, that he was reſolved to march with 6000 foot and 1000 horſe of his choiceſt troops to reinforce his collegue, and give *Aſdrubal* battle, before *Hannibal* could come to his aſſiſtance. This ſtep was contrary to the laws, which forbad Generals to make war out of their own provinces, or to enter thoſe of their collegues: But the Conſul imagined, that the preſent perillous circumſtances would juſtify his conduct. c. 39. c. 40. c. 41. c. 43.

The meſſenger diſpatched, *Nero* ſent orders to the people of the ſeveral provinces through which he was to march, to have proviſions, horſes, carts, and all other accommodations, in readineſs. Then having cauſed a report to be ſpread, that he was going to force a *Car-*

Y. of *R.* 546. Bef. *J.C.* 206. 245 Conſul-p.

thaginian gariſon in a neighbouring city of *Lucania*, he left the command of the body of his army with one of his Lieutenants, and in the night took the road to *Picenum*. When he was got to a conſiderable diſtance from his camp, he diſcovered his intention to the detachment he had taken with him, and encouraged them to the enterprize by the proſpect of the glory they would acquire by a victory over *Aſdrubal*, in which, notwithſtanding the ſmallneſs of their number, they would be undoubtedly thought to have had the greateſt ſhare.

Livy, B. 27. c. 45.

c. 44.

Nero's deſign, when known at *Rome*, threw the people into a conſternation; ſome thought, that to leave an army without its General, and deprived of its braveſt ſoldiers, in the neighbourhood of *Hannibal*, was too bold a ſtep; others approved the enterprize; and the leaſt equitable ſuſpended their judgment, till they ſhould ſee the ſucceſs.

c. 46.

In the mean time the Conſul drew near his collegue's camp, by whoſe advice he entered it in the night, to conceal his arrival from the enemy. A council of war was immediately held, in which many were for giving *Nero*'s troops time to refreſh themſelves after ſo long a march; but the General himſelf oppoſed this motion, being in hopes to defeat *Aſdrubal* and return to his camp at *Canuſium*, before *Hannibal* ſhould diſcover his abſence, or be able to take any advantage of it.

Zon. B. 9.

Liv. B. 27. c. 47.

Notwithſtanding the precautions uſed by the *Romans* to conceal from the enemy the arrival of *Nero*, *Aſdrubal* the next morning perceived that *Livius* had got a reinforcement; and imagining that *Hannibal* had been defeated, and that the victorious army was come againſt him, he declined a battle, though he had already drawn out his men in order to engage; and the next night, under favour of the darkneſs, he decamped and took the road to *Inſubria*, reſolving to wait there for an anſwer from his brother, with certain intelligence of his ſituation. The two guides whom the *Carthaginian* choſe to conduct him, proved unfaithful, and on a ſudden diſappeared: So that the army was bewildered, and knew not what rout to take. They marched all night along the banks of the *Metaurus*, a river in *Umbria*, *Aſdrubal* deſigning to paſs it as ſoon as it was light: And while he purſued his tedious march along the winding ſtream, the *Romans* had time to come up with him. He was forc'd to give battle in a diſadvantageous ſituation, and when his men were faint with thirſt, hunger, and want of reſt. Nay, he had loſt a great number of his ſoldiers in the night, eſpecially of the *Gauls*, who, not able, or not willing to endure the fatigue of ſo painful a march, had laid themſelves down to ſleep. He ranged his elephants, which, according to *Polybius*, were ten in number, in the front of his battle, before the center, which conſiſted of his *Ligurians*. His *Gauls* he poſted in the left, on an eminence near the river; and, in the right, his *Africans* and *Spaniards*, which were the ſtrength of his army; and the whole was drawn up very deep in file. The main body of the *Romans* was led by *L. Porcius*, the Prætor, of *Gaul*, who with his forces had joined *Livius* before

Polyb. B. 11. c. 1. and *Liv.* B. 27. c. 48.

before the arrival of *Nero*. This laſt took upon him the command of the right wing, and *Livius* of the left. *Aſdrubal*, knowing that his *Gauls* were ſecured by the advantage of their ſituation, made his greateſt efforts againſt the left of the enemy. There the battle continued obſtinate a long time. At length *Nero*, unable to mount the eminence to attack the *Gauls*, and impatient of inaction, choſe out the ſtouteſt of his ſoldiers, and, having led them round the rear of their own army, fell upon the *Africans* and *Spaniards* in flank and rear. Victory then declared for the *Romans*; and *Aſdrubal* (after having performed all the duties of a great General) ſeeing the entire rout of his troops, and unwilling to ſurvive their defeat, threw himſelf into the midſt of a *Roman* battalion, and was ſlain. There were more elephants killed by the *Carthaginians* than by the enemy: for when the beaſts grew unruly, their riders drove a ſharp iron into the joint, where the head is ſet on to the neck. This (ſays *Livy*) was found to be the quickeſt method of diſpatching thoſe animals, a method invented by *Aſdrubal*. According to the Latin Hiſtorian, the *Carthaginians* had 56000 men killed in the battle, and 5400 taken priſoners; above 4000 *Roman* captives were found in the enemy's camp; the *Romans* loſt, in the action, 8000 men. But *Polybius* ſays, that of the *Carthaginians* there died only 10000 men, and of the *Romans* 2000. *Livy* reports that the conquerors were ſo fatigued with ſlaughtering their enemies, that the next day, when advice was brought to *Livius*, that a large body of *Ligurians* and *Ciſalpine Gauls* (who either had not been in the battle or had eſcaped from it) were going off in great diſorder, without leaders and without enſigns, and that it would be very eaſy to put them all to the ſword; *No matter*, ſaid he, *let ſome remain to carry the news of their own defeat, and of our bravery*. *Nero* ſet out from the camp of his collegue the night after the battle, and in ſix days time reached his own camp at *Canuſium*.

Y. of *R.* 546. Bef. *J. C.* 206. 245 Conſul-p.

Polyb. B. 11. c. 3. *Oroſius*, B. 4. *Liv.* B. 27. c. 50, 51.

The joy of the people at *Rome*, on the news of this ſucceſs, was equal to the fears they had been in, on account of *Nero*'s march. It quite changed the face of the city: from this time the citizens ventured to make contracts, to buy and ſell, lend money, and pay debts, as ſecurely as in a time of peace. *Nero*, at his return to his camp, ordered *Aſdrubal*'s head, which he had brought with him, to be thrown before the advanced guards of the enemy, and ſome *African* priſoners to be expoſed in chains to their view. Two of theſe priſoners he ſet at liberty, and ſent them to *Hannibal*'s camp, to give him an account of the victory. The *Carthaginian*, ſtruck with a blow ſo fatal to his Republic and his family, is ſaid to have cried out, *It is like the fortune of* Carthage. He immediately decamped, and retired into *Bruttium* with all his forces. Thither he tranſplanted the *Metapontines* and all thoſe of the *Lucanians* who ſtill adhered to him; preparing to defend this corner of *Italy*, ſince he was obliged to abandon the reſt of it.

Y. of *R.* 546. Bef. *J. C.* 206. 245 Conſul-p.

To add to the good fortune of the Republic this year, the Pro-Conſul *Sulpicius*, in conjunction with *Attalus* King of *Pergamus* and the other allies, had kept *Philip* employed in *Greece*, and thereby ſecured *Italy* from an invaſion from that quarter. And *Lævinus* had gained a victory over the *Carthaginians* at ſea, and ſent a large ſupply of corn from *Sicily* to *Rome*.

From ſome motive not known, the *Romans* were deſirous of having a Dictator to preſide at the approaching elections. *Nero* named his Collegue *Livius* to that dignity. *Q. Cæcilius Metellus*, and *L. Veturius Philo*, who had both diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their valour in the laſt campaign under *Livius*, were choſen Conſuls.

Y. of *R.* 547. Bef. *J. C.* 205. 246 Conſul-p.

Theſe new Generals had orders to carry on the war jointly in *Bruttium* againſt *Hannibal*. And now, ſtrange as it may appear, the *Carthaginian* made himſelf feared, even in the low condition to which the defeat and death of his brother had reduced him: He gained ſome advantages over the Conſuls, in the plains of *Conſentia*; and they durſt not attack him in his camp. *Hannibal* never appeared greater than in his adverſity. Who, (ſays *Polybius*) that conſiders attentively *Hannibal*'s conduct, how many great battles he fought, how many leſſer actions he was engaged in, the prodigious number of [a] towns he took, the various turns of fortune he experienced, and the difficult ſituations in which he often found himſelf, during the courſe of a ſixteen years war, which he [b] alone ſupported againſt the moſt powerful ſtate in the world: Who that conſiders theſe things can help admiring his extraordinary talents as a General? And though, during all that time, he kept the field with his army, and that army was a mixture of *Africans*, *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, *Carthaginians*, *Italians* and *Greeks*, differing in their laws, cuſtoms and languages, and having no other bond of union but his command; and though they were often in want of neceſſaries, [eſpecially, adds *Livy*, when confined to *Bruttium*, a country little able to ſuſtain them in its proſperity, much leſs when exhauſted by ſo long a war, and when its inhabitants were forced to leave tilling their lands, to inliſt as ſoldiers] ſuch was the excellence of *Hannibal*'s diſcipline, that no ſedition ever happened amongſt his troops, no mutiny againſt the General.

Polyb. B. 11. c. 17.

Livy, B. 28. c. 12.

Polybius adds, that had the *Carthaginian* invaded the other parts of the world firſt, and reſerved *Italy* for his laſt attempt, it is not to be doubted, but he would have ſucceeded in all his undertakings: But having begun where he ſhould have ended, his illuſtrious actions found their period on the ſame theatre, where they had their commencement.

[a] According to *Appian* [in Syr. c. 91.] he took no leſs than 400 in *Italy*.

[b] *Polyb. de Virt. & Vit. Excerp. ex Lib.* 9. tells us, that *Hannibal* was the ſole ſpring and director of the ſecond *Punic* war. "He carried it on in *Italy* by himſelf; in "*Spain* by his brothers, firſt *Aſdrubal*, then "*Mago*; in *Sicily* by *Hippocrates*, and afterwards by *Mytto* [*Mutines*]; and in *Greece* "by King *Philip*."

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

The continuation of the events of the war in Spain, *after the departure of* Aſdrubal, *the brother of* Hannibal, *from that country.*

THE next day after the battle in which *Scipio* is ſaid * to have defeated *Aſdrubal*, and driven him over the *Pyrenees*, he aſſembled the priſoners, amounting to 10000 foot and 2000 horſe: He ordered the *Africans* to be ſold, but the *Spaniards* he diſmiſſed, without ranſom. This act of generoſity had ſuch an effect upon the *Spaniards* in general, that they with one voice ſaluted him King. The *Roman* anſwered, that "to him the greateſt title was that of Imperator, which his ſoldiers "gave him; that the name of King, ſo much reſpected in other places, "was intolerable at *Rome*: That, if to have a royal ſoul was in their "eſtimation the higheſt character among men, they might ſilently "think of him as they pleaſed, but he deſired they would forbear "the appellation." Y. of *R.* 545. * See p. 229. and 247.

There ſeems to have been no more action this year in *Spain*. The *Carthaginians* had two Generals in that country, *Mago*, the brother of *Hannibal*, and *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Giſco*, each with an army. *Mago* reſigned his troops to *Aſdrubal*, and went into the *Baleares* to make new levies there, while the latter poſted himſelf in *Luſitania* near the Streights of *Gades*. *Scipio* wintered at *Tarraco*.

The year following, *Silanus*, the Pro-Prætor under *Scipio*, with a detachment of 10000 foot and 500 horſe, routed the united forces of *Mago* and *Hanno*, which latter had been ſent from *Africa* with an army to ſupply the place of *Hannibal*'s brother *Aſdrubal*. *Hanno* was taken priſoner in the action, but *Mago* eſcaped with his broken troops to *Aſdrubal* (the ſon of *Giſco*.) Theſe, with their united ſtrength, marched from *Gades* into *Bætica*, in order to protect their allies in that country, but at the approach of *Scipio*, were obliged to return to the place from whence they came. Upon their departure, the Pro-Conſul ſent his brother *Lucius* to beſiege *Oringi*, a city of importance at the head of the *Bætis*, and after the reduction of that town, retired to *Tarraco* for the winter. Y. of *R.* 546.

Mago, having employed himſelf for ſome time in making levies among the *Spaniards*, brought ſuch recruits to *Aſdrubal*, that the army conſiſted of 54000, ſome ſay 74000 men. With theſe forces the two Generals, in conjunction with *Maſiniſſa*, marched the following ſpring in queſt of the *Romans*, and encamped in a vaſt plain near a town called *Silpia*, on the confines of *Bætica*. *Scipio*, upon the news of the enemy's ſurprizing preparations, thought it neceſſary for *him* alſo to arm the *Spaniards*; but remembring the misfortune that befel his Y. of *R.* 547.

V. of *R.* 547. Bef. *J. C.* 205. 246 Conſul p.

father and uncle, by relying on them too much, he reſolved to be cautious of employing them on critical occaſions. Having ſwelled his army to 45000 foot and 3000 horſe, he moved from *Tarraco*, marched towards the *Carthaginians*, and pitched his camp in the ſame plain with them.

The two armies were frequently drawn up before their entrenchments; and as *Scipio* obſerved, that *Aſdrubal* always placed his beſt troops, which were his *Africans*, in the center, and his *Spaniards* in the two wings, he conſtantly poſted his *Spaniards* in the wings, and his *Romans* in the center. But this he did to deceive the enemy. For when the day came, on which he reſolved to give battle, he changed this diſpoſition, and placed his legionaries in the two wings, and the *Spaniards* in the middle. In this order he marched out of his camp very early in the morning, and ſent his cavalry and the light armed foot to provoke the enemy; inſomuch that *Aſdrubal* was obliged to draw out his men before they had taken their uſual refreſhment. In the mean time *Scipio* advanced with his infantry. At his approach, his cavalry and *Velites*, purſuant to orders, ceaſed the fight, and retired through the intervals of the foot. He then directed his center to move on ſlowly, but his wings to advance very faſt, the cavalry and light armed men at the ſame time moving from the rear, and extending themſelves to fall upon the enemy in flank. Thus the braveſt of his troops came to an engagement with the weakeſt of the oppoſite army, and defeated them before the two centers could join battle. And the great prudence of the *Roman* General, in this conduct, was viſible, when after he had routed the enemies wings, he came to attack their center; for the *Africans* made ſo ſtout a reſiſtance, as almoſt quite diſheartened the *Romans*; inſomuch that *Scipio* (as one author relates) was forced to diſmount, and throw himſelf, ſword in hand, into the midſt of the enemy's battalions, before he could engage his men to make the neceſſary efforts to complete the victory. But then the *Africans* gave ground, and the ſlaughter was terrible. *Aſdrubal*, with the runaways, gained the camp; but the *Spaniards* deſerted him ſo faſt, that he laid aſide the thought of fortifying himſelf there, and retired in the night towards the ſhore of the ocean. *Scipio* purſued, and came up with him; and, after a ſecond ſlaughter, the three chiefs, *Aſdrubal*, *Mago*, and *Maſiniſſa*, had no more than ſix thouſand men left about them, and theſe for the moſt part diſarmed. With all expedition they gained the ſummit of a ſteep hill, and there entrenched themſelves as well as they could. *Aſdrubal* perceiving that theſe remains of his army continually leſſened, abandoned them in the night. The ſea was near, he found ſhips ready to ſail, and embarked for *Gades*. *Scipio* being informed of *Aſdrubal*'s flight, left *Silanus* with ten thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe to beſiege the enemy's camp, and he himſelf with the reſt of his forces marched back to *Tarraco*. After his departure, *Maſiniſſa* had

Polyb. L. 11. c. 20.

Appian. in Iberic.

had private conferences with *Silanus*, and entered into engagements to favour the *Roman* cauſe. *Mago* eſcaped to *Gades* with ſome ſhips which *Aſdrubal* had ſent him; and the ſoldiers abandoned by their Generals, either went over to the enemy, or diſperſed themſelves up and down the country. Y. of *R.* 547. Bef. *J. C.* 205. 246 Conſul. p.

The *Carthaginian* power in *Spain* was now almoſt totally reduced; but the Pro-Conſul did not confine his views to *Spain* alone. He began to think of paving his way to *Africa*. *Syphax*, King of *Maſæſylia*, was now in alliance with the *Carthaginians*; and, as *Scipio* knew that the *Numidian*'s friendſhip to them would not be more conſtant than their good fortune, he ſent his friend *Lælius* to perſuade him to break the treaty. *Lælius*'s arguments wrought conviction; but he being only a ſubaltern in *Scipio*'s army, the King inſiſted for his greater ſecurity, upon having a perſonal conference with the Pro-Conſul himſelf; and he proteſted, that if *Scipio* would come into *Numidia*, he ſhould be received there with honour, and diſmiſſed with ſatisfaction. The *Roman* conſidered the hazard of ſuch an enterprize; but being above the fear of danger, when he had the intereſt of his Republic in view, (leaving *Marcius* at *Tarraco*, with a part of his troops, and ordering *Silanus* with the reſt to *New Carthage*,) embarked with *Lælius* for *Africa*, and arrived at the capital of King *Syphax*. *Aſdrubal* happened to arrive there the ſame day from *Spain*; and nothing could be more agreeable to the *Numidian* Prince, than to ſee two Generals of the two moſt powerful nations in the world, at his court, at the ſame time; and both come to ſeek his alliance. He firſt put on the perſon of a mediator, and would have had *Scipio* enter into a conference with the *Carthaginian*, in order to an amicable accommodation. But *Scipio* excuſed himſelf, as not having received any commiſſion from his Republic to treat of peace. However, he accepted of an invitation to dine at the King's table with *Aſdrubal*. And then not only *Syphax*, a ſtranger to the *Roman* manners, but even *Aſdrubal* a *Carthaginian*, a mortal enemy, was charmed with his converſation. The latter is reported to have ſaid, "That he did not queſtion but *Syphax* and his kingdom "would ſoon be at the devotion of the *Romans*, ſuch an art had *Scipio* "of conciliating to him the hearts of men: That the *Carthaginians* "need not enquire how *Spain* was loſt, but how *Africa* might be pre-"ſerved: That *Scipio*'s voyages were not voyages of pleaſure; that "he would not have croſſed the ſea with only two veſſels, nor put "himſelf in the power of a King whoſe honour he had never tried, "but with a view to gain all *Africa*." *Aſdrubal* judged rightly. *Syphax* entered into a treaty with *Scipio*; and, left the *Roman*, in his return to *Spain*, ſhould be attacked at ſea by *Aſdrubal*'s galleys, kept the *Carthaginians* with him, and amuſed them till the Pro-Conſul was ſafely arrived at *New Carthage*. *Liv.* B. 28. c. 17. *Liv.* B. 28. c. 18. Appian in Ibericis.

His

Y. of *R.* 547. Bef. *J. C.* 205. 246 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 28. c. 19.

His chief buſineſs now was to puniſh the nations and cities which had ſignalized themſelves againſt the *Romans*, and to keep the *Spaniards* in awe by examples of ſeverity. He marched in perſon to beſiege *Illiturgi*, and ſent *Marcius* to inveſt *Caſtulo*. The former, which, *Livy* ſays, had revolted to the enemy after the death of the two *Scipios*, was taken by aſſault, ſacked and burnt; and men, women, and children, put to the ſword. The latter capitulated, and was more favourably treated. From *Caſtulo*, *Marcius* went and appeared before *Aſtapa*, a city obſtinately devoted to the *Carthaginians*. The inhabitants, being deſperate, brought all their moveables, and threw them in a heap in the market-place; and then putting their wives and children on the top of the pile, and encompaſſing it with faggots, they choſe out fifty of the moſt ſteady of the citizens to guard this dear depoſitum; and

Liv. B. 28. c. 22.

ſpoke to them in the following manner: *Be aſſured, we will either repulſe the* Romans, *or all periſh in the attempt. If we are overcome, do you, upon the firſt news of the enemy's approach, ſave the honour and liberty of our wives and children. Firſt make uſe of your ſwords, and then of fire, to preſerve theſe remains of an unfortunate people from captivity and infamy.* After this they did not wait to be attacked, but marched out at one of the gates, in good order, to give battle; and all died fighting. And the news of this ſlaughter produced another in the heart of the city: The fifty *Aſtapans* diſcharged their truſt, and then threw themſelves into the flames.

Whilſt *Marcius* was executing vengeance on theſe cities, *Scipio* returned to *New Carthage*, where he entertained his army with a fight of gladiators, in honour to the manes of his father and uncle, purſuant to a vow he had made. On this occaſion two *Spaniſh* Princes are ſaid to have fought in duel with each other for a principality. During theſe diverſions, ſome deſerters arrived from *Gades*, the only city of *Spain* in the *Carthaginian* intereſt; and upon their report of a conſpiracy, among the *Gaditani*, to put the *Romans* into poſſeſſion of the place, *Scipio* diſpatched

Liv. B. 28. c. 30.

Marcius, with ſome troops by land, and *Lælius* by ſea, with eight ſhips, to carry on the enterprize. But *Lælius*, in his paſſage, having met and defeated eight *Carthaginian* triremes, learnt from the priſoners, that the conſpirators at *Gades* had been diſcovered, and ſent in chains to *Carthage* to be tried there. Whereupon he gave *Marcius* notice of it, adviſing him to lead back his troops; and he himſelf likewiſe returned to *New Carthage*.

Liv. B. 28. c. 24.

And now it appeared, how neceſſary *Scipio*'s preſence was, both to preſerve his conqueſts in *Spain*, and to maintain diſcipline in the army. He happened to fall dangerouſly ſick; and *Fame* made his caſe worſe than it was; nay, a report prevailed that he was dead; and this had ſuch an effect, that not only *Indibilis* (a petty King before mentioned) and his brother *Mandonius*, who had not been rewarded ſuitably to their expectations, immediately revolted from the *Romans*, and ſtirred up the

Celtiberians

Celtiberians againſt them; but eight thouſand *Roman* legionaries, who were incamped on the banks of the *Sucro*, to keep that part of *Spain* in awe, mutinied, caſt off their leaders, (who would not enter into their meaſures) and choſe two inſolent common ſoldiers, *Atrius* and *Albius*, to conduct them. And the madneſs of theſe two fellows roſe to ſuch a height, that they uſurped the conſular dignity, and ordered Lictors to walk before them. The pretence for the mutiny was want of pay, which they had not received for ſix months. They alſo demanded to be led againſt the enemy, or if *Spain* was already reduced, to be permitted to return to *Italy*. Y. of *R.* 547. Bef. *J. C.* 205. 246 Conſul p.

The Pro-Conſul recovered his health; but was much embarraſſed how to manage the mutineers, ſo as not to puſh them to extremities, and yet to make ſuch examples as ſhould keep his troops in their duty. He at length decoyed them to *New Carthage*, by promiſing to pay them their arrears there, and by giving ſuch orders as deceived them into a belief, that the troops with him were immediately to go, under the command of *Silanus*, upon an expedition againſt *Indibilis* and *Mandonius*; which would leave the Pro-Conſul abſolutely at the mercy of the malcontents. Full of theſe hopes, they entered the city. *Scipio* had before ſent ſeven Tribunes to them, to ſupply the place of thoſe whom they had driven away. And theſe, who had by an artful conduct gained the confidence of the rebels, were ordered each of them to invite five of the moſt guilty to his houſe, make them drink plentifully, then bind them, and give the General notice of the ſucceſs. Thirty five of the mutineers were thus ſecured, without the knowledge of the reſt. The next morning, by break of day, *Silanus*, who was to lead away the faithful troops, pretended to make preparation for his march, and drew up his manipuli near the gates: But he had ſecret orders to return into the heart of the city, upon a ſignal agreed on. *Scipio*, at a proper time, gave the uſual notice for his ſoldiers to aſſemble in the market place; and upon the firſt ſound of the trumpet, the ſeditious all ran thither without their arms, as the laws required. *Silanus*, at the ſame time, brought back his armed troops, and ſurrounded the aſſembly. The Pro-Conſul, in a long harangue, expoſtulated with the mutineers on the baſeneſs and folly of their late proceeding, when the ſum of their grievances could amount to no more than this: *That their General, being ſick, had neglected to pay them at the uſual time.* As ſoon as he had ended his ſpeech, the names of the thirty five chiefs of the revolt who had been already condemned by a council of war, were called over; they appeared before the Tribunal half naked, were whipped, and afterwards beheaded by the Lictors. Then the Herald called over the names of all the reſt of the mutineers; the General took the military oath of them anew; and thus ended the ſedition.

Liv. B. 28. c. 25. *Polyb.* B. 11. c. 23—25.

Liv. B. 28. c. 27.

Y of *R.* 547. B. f. *J. C* 205. 246 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 28. c. 32.

Scipio was yet at *New Carthage*, when he received an account that *Indibilis* and *Mandonius* had raiſed an army among their ſubjects and allies, of twenty thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe, and were living upon free quarter, in the territories of the friends of *Rome*. It was neceſſary to put a ſtop to the progreſs of theſe faithleſs Princes, and to employ the ſeditious troops (who were now quiet, and had received their pay) jointly with the reſt, in the expedition. *Scipio* therefore having aſſembled all in the market-place, ſpoke to this effect: *The reſolution I have taken to puniſh the perfidious* Spaniards, *gives me much leſs uneaſineſs than the vengeance I was forced to execute on the late mutineers. Among theſe, I found none but citizens of* Rome, *or* Latines, *old ſoldiers who had been attached to my father, and the companions of my victories. I could not do juſtice upon* them *without tears. But among thoſe I am going to puniſh, I ſhall find none but ſtrangers and ingrates, robbers and their leaders, who lay waſte the fields of our allies, and burn their houſes. Let us go then and clear the plains of theſe* Banditti; *nor let it be ſaid, that in this province, ſo happily ſubdued, we left in arms one ſingle enemy of the* Roman *name.* Whilſt the Pro-Conſul was ſpeaking, he ſaw alacrity and joy painted on every face; and taking advantage of the preſent diſpoſition of his ſoldiers, he immediately began his march. In fourteen days he came up with the enemy in the country of the *Sedetani*, and there gained a complete victory. The *Spaniards* loſt about two thirds of their army, the reſt eſcaped with *Indibilis* and *Mandonius*. Theſe brothers had now no reſource but in the clemency of the conqueror. *Mandonius* came and fell at the Pro-Conſul's feet, begging pardon for the King, and for himſelf. He laid the blame of their revolt on the misfortunes of the times, and the unaccountable effect which the report of *Scipio*'s death had cauſed in the minds of men, even of the *Romans* themſelves. The Pro-Conſul gave him the following anſwer: *Both* Indibilis *and you have deſerved to die; live nevertheleſs, and owe your lives to my favour, and the favour of the* Roman *people. I ſhall not diſarm you: That would look as if I feared you. Neither will I take vengeance upon your blameleſs hoſtages, ſhould you again rebel, but upon yourſelves. Conſider therefore whether you ſhall like better to feel the effects of our clemency in peace, or to experience the ſeverity of our revenge. Scipio* carried his reſentments no farther; only he obliged the two Princes to furniſh him with a large ſum of money. Then he divided his army into two parts; gave one to *Silanus*, to conduct it to *Tarraco*; and ordered *Marcius* to lead the other to the ſhores of the ocean. He himſelf joined the latter ſoon after near *Gades*.

Polyb. B. 11. c. 29.

Liv. B. 28. c. 34.

c. 35.

The Pro-Conſul's chief deſign in this journey was to fix *Maſiniſſa* in the intereſt of *Rome:* The *Numidian*, who was then at *Gades* with *Mago*, delayed concluding an alliance with the Republic, till he ſhould confer with *Scipio* in perſon, and have his ſanction to the treaty. Upon the approach of the *Roman* General, *Maſiniſſa* repreſenting

ing to *Mago*, that the cavalry were not only a burden to the iſland, but would be ruined by inaction and want of forage, obtained leave to tranſport them to the continent. He was no ſooner landed, but he ſent three *Numidian* chiefs to the Pro-Conſul; who, with them, fixed the time and place for an interview. *Maſiniſſa* had already conceived a high opinion of *Scipio*, and was confirmed in that opinion by the firſt ſight of him. The Pro-Conſul had an equal mixture of majeſty and ſweetneſs in his countenance; he was in his full ſtrength, and in the bloom of manly beauty. His hair flowed down his back to a great length. There was nothing affected, or too negligent about him; his habit plain, but neat, and ſuch as became a ſoldier, who deſpiſed the ſtudied elegancies of dreſs. The *Numidian* began with a compliment of thanks for *Scipio*'s having formerly ſent him back his nephew, taken priſoner in battle; aſſuring him, that ever ſince that time he had been ſeeking the opportunity which now preſented itſelf, and deſired nothing more earneſtly than a ſtrict union with *Scipio* and *Rome*. He added, that if the Republic would ſend the Pro-Conſul into *Africa* at the head of an army, he did not doubt but the domination of *Carthage* would ſoon be at an end. *Scipio* returned theſe advances with dignity and politeneſs; and was extremely pleaſed to engage in his intereſt a Prince, who, in every battle, had been the ſoul of the enemy's cavalry; and whoſe very aſpect promiſed a man of ſpirit. The treaty concluded, *Scipio* ſet out for *Tarraco*. The *Numidian* concealed the true deſign of his excurſion, by pillaging ſome part of the continent, before he went back to *Gades*; and *Mago* ſoon after abandoned the place, having received orders to go to the aſſiſtance of his brother *Hannibal* in *Italy*.

A. of *R.* 547. Bef. *J. C.* 205 246 Conſul-p. c. 36, 37.

The *Carthaginian* ſignalized his departure from *Gades*, by cruel exactions and oppreſſions. He ſtripped the temples, plundered the public treaſury, and forced private perſons to give him their gold and ſilver. His view was, with this money to raiſe new levies among the *Ligurians* in *Ciſalpine Gaul*. But as he coaſted along *Spain* in his way thither, he formed a raſh deſign of ſurprizing *New Carthage*, and in the attempt loſt eight hundred men. After this misfortune he returned to *Gades*, where finding the gates ſhut againſt him, he retired to *Cimbis*, a neighbouring city. From thence he ſent deputies to the *Gaditani*, (who were themſelves a colony of *Phœnicians*, as well as the *Carthaginians*) to complain of their proceedings. The chief magiſtrate and the treaſurer of the city went out to him, and aſſured him, that the refuſal he had met with was owing wholly to the populace, whom the *Carthaginian* ſoldiers had plundered at their departure. This civility *Mago* returned with cruelty, cauſing the deputies to be inhumanly ſcourged, and afterwards crucified. He then ſteered his courſe towards the *Baleares*, landed at the iſland now called *Minorca*, forced two thouſand of the inhabitants into the ſervice of his Republic, and ſent them to *Carthage*. Winter approaching he did not ſail for *Italy* till the ſpring.

Y. of *R.* 547. Bef. *J.C.* 205. 246 Conſul-p *Zon.* B. 9. c. 11. *Livy*, B. 28. c. 38.

As ſoon as *Mago* had left *Spain*, the *Gaditani* ſubmitted to the *Romans*; and *Scipio*'s conqueſt was complete. Before he got back to *Tarraco*, two new Pro-Conſuls, *Cornelius Lentulus* and *Manlius Acidinus*, arrived in the port with commiſſions from the Senate one to govern *Hither Spain*, the other *Further Spain*. *Scipio* ſurrendered up the faſces; and, attended by his brother *Lucius*, and his friend *Lælius*, immediately ſet ſail, with ten ſhips for *Italy*.

Livy, B. 29. c. 1.

Scarce was *Scipio* gone, when *Indibilis* and *Mandonius*, deſpiſing the new Pro-Conſuls, revolted, and engaged ſeveral of the *Spaniſh* nations to take arms to recover their independence. They got together 30000 foot, and about 4000 horſe. *Lentulus* and *Acidinus* endeavoured to bring them back to obedience by negotiations. Theſe proving ineffectual, a battle enſued; *Indibilis* was ſlain, the confederate army totally routed, 13000 of them killed, and 800 taken priſoners.

The *Spaniards*, to preſerve their countries from the ravages of the enemy, ſeized *Mandonius* with the other heads of the revolt, and ſent them in cuſtody to the camp of the Pro-Conſuls, who had inſiſted on this as a condition of their ſhewing mercy to the vanquiſhed. Thus was the confederacy broken; and *Spain* continued for ſome years in tranquillity.

CHAP. XXXIV.

FOURTEENTH YEAR of the War.

Scipio *choſen Conſul, goes into* Sicily *to prepare for invading* Africa. *He ſurpriſes* Locri. *The cruelties exerciſed by the Pro-Prætor* Pleminius *in that city.*
The Romans *ſend for the Goddeſs* Cybele *from* Peſſinus *in* Phrygia. *A miracle wrought at her landing.*

Livy, B. 28. c. 38.

WHEN *Scipio* arrived from *Spain*, he did not immediately enter within the walls of *Rome*, but according to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of Generals, continued in the ſuburbs, till the Senate, aſſembled in the temple of *Bellona*, had heard the relation of his expeditions. He gave them a detail of his exploits, told them how many battles he had fought, how many towns he had taken, and what nations he had ſubdued, adding, that though he had found in *Spain* four *Carthaginian* Generals at the head of four flouriſhing armies, yet he had not left in the country one *Carthaginian* in arms. But though *Scipio* deſerved a triumph, he demanded it but faintly, as knowing that the laws were againſt his having that honour: His appointment to the Pro-

Pro-Conſulſhip had been extraordinary, and out of rule: He had not paſſed to it from the Conſulſhip, nor had he taken the command of an army under the ſanction of *the Greater Auſpices*, like the Conſuls. However, he adorned his entry into *Rome* by a great quantity of ſilver, which he had brought from *Spain* for the public treaſury, and which was carried before him in the proceſſion. Y. of *R.* 548. Bef. *J. C.* 204. 247 Conſul-p.

And now the Comitia being held for electing new Conſuls, it is not to be expreſſed with what zeal the Centuries gave their ſuffrages in favour of *Scipio*, though he had not yet attained to the years cuſtomarily required for that dignity, being only between twenty eight and twenty nine years of age. The Collegue appointed him was *P. Licinius Craſſus*, ſurnamed *Dives*, who being at this time *Pontifex Maximus*, an office which confined him to *Italy*, the province of *Sicily* was given to *Scipio* without drawing lots. But *Scipio* could not be ſatisfied, unleſs he had alſo a commiſſion to go immediately with an army into *Africa*. The matter was debated in the Senate. *Scipio* depending upon the favour of the people, had not ſcrupled openly to give out, that he had been appointed Conſul, *Not only to carry on the war, but to finiſh it; that this could be done no other way than by his tranſporting an army into* Africa, *and that if the Senate ſhould oppoſe this deſign, he would have recourſe to the people, and put it in execution by their authority.* Theſe unguarded words had given great offence to the Fathers. Old *Fabius*, now preſident of the Senate, declared loudly againſt the pretenſions of the young Conſul, and employed all his eloquence to hinder his being ſent into *Africa*. In a long and ſtudied harangue he ſet forth the difficulties of ſuch an enterprize, the fatal conſequences which might attend it, and the neceſſity of driving *Hannibal* out of *Italy*, before the war could ſafely be carried into the neighbourhood of *Carthage*. He ſaid, it would be endleſs to enumerate all the inſtances of Kings and Generals, who, by raſh invaſions of foreign countries, had ruined themſelves and their armies. He mentioned the irreparable miſchief which had happened to the *Athenians*, by their deſcent upon *Sicily*, in purſuance of the advice of *Alcibiades*, a noble youth, and an expert General. But he inſiſted eſpecially on the more recent and intereſting example of *Atilius Regulus*, the cataſtrophe of whoſe fortune, fair in its beginning, ought to be a uſeful leſſon to them. And *Fabius* took great pains to guard againſt the ſuſpicion of his being actuated by emulation or jealouſy of another's glory in this oppoſition to *Scipio*'s deſires.

Liv. B. 28. c. 40. & ſeq.

Plut. life of *Fabius*.

" I, *ſaid he*, am grown old in the poſſeſſion of honours. Two Dicta-
" torſhips, five Conſulſhips, the ſucceſs of my counſels, many victo-
" ries raiſe me above any rivalſhip with a young General, not yet come to
" the years of my ſon. When I was Dictator, and in the full career of
" glory, and when my General of the horſe, a man inceſſantly declaim-
" ing againſt me, was put upon an equality with me in the command,
" (an unprecedented hardſhip) no one heard me, either in the Senate or

" in

Y. of *R.* 548. Bef. *J. C.* 204. 247 Conſul-p.

" in the aſſemblies of the people, refuſe to acquieſce. And is it likely " that now, in my old age, when weary of public affairs, weary of " the world, and even of life itſelf, I ſhould enter into an emulation " with a youth, a General in the prime of life, full of vigour and " activity; or that I expect to have the province of *Africa* aſſigned " to me, if it ſhould be denied to him? No, I am content with the glory " I have acquired. It is enough for me to have hindered *Hannibal* " from compleating his conqueſt, that by younger Captains, you that " are in the flower of your age and ſtrength, he might be after- " wards entirely overcome. But you will pardon me, *P. Cornelius*, if " I, who, for the ſake of the commonwealth, always neglected popular " applauſe, and my own private advantage, cannot now to the real " welfare of the Republic prefer the imaginary intereſts of your glory. " I ſay, imaginary intereſts. For no ſooner will you have a view of " that coaſt, whither you are ſo eager to ſail, than you will be ſenſible " that your exploits in *Spain* were but ſport and play, in compariſon of " what you will have to do in *Africa*. In *Spain* you landed at *Emporiæ*, " a confederate port; and, through countries in alliance with *Rome*, or " guarded by *Roman* troops, you marched ſafe and undiſturbed to " *New Carthage*, which you had opportunity to beſiege, without fear " of moleſtation from any one of the *Carthaginian* Generals, who were " then all at a great diſtance. In *Africa*, no friendly port to receive " your fleet, no ally to add ſtrength to your army—unleſs you truſt to " *Syphax* and the *Numidians*. You truſted them once; let that ſuf- " fice: Raſhneſs is not always fortunate. The fraudulent ſometimes " procure themſelves credit by fidelity in ſmall things, that they may " afterwards the more eaſily deceive in matters of moment, and " when it can ſerve a weighty intereſt. *Syphax* and *Maſiniſſa*, it is not " to be doubted, would gladly be more powerful in *Africa* than the " *Carthaginians*; but it is as little to be queſtioned, they had rather " *Carthage* ſhould have the ſuperiority there than ſtrangers. Emula- " tion prevails amongſt thoſe powers, while the fear of foreign arms is " yet remote: Let them but once ſee the *Roman* banners diſplayed in " *Africa*, and they will all run together as to extinguiſh a fire, that " threatens the general deſtruction. What if *Carthage*, confiding in " the ſtrength of her walls, the fidelity of her allies, and the unani- " mity of all the States around her, ſhould reſolve, when ſhe ſees *Italy* " no longer guarded by you and your troops, to pour in upon us a " new army from *Africa*? Or order *Mago*, who is even now with a " fleet on the coaſt of *Liguria*, to join his brother *Hannibal*? We " ſhould then be in the ſame terror as when *Aſdrubal* invaded *Italy*, " that *Aſdrubal*, whom you, who, with your army, are to inveſt not " only *Carthage*, but all *Africa*, ſuffered to ſlip through your hands into " this country. You will ſay, *you vanquiſhed him.* Be it ſo. But I

" could

Y. of *R.* 548. Bef. *J. C.* 204. 247 Conſul-p.

" could wiſh then, for your own ſake, as well as for the ſake of the " Republic, that you had not opened a paſſage for the ſame van- " quiſhed man to come into *Italy*. However, let us aſcribe to your " wiſe conduct every enterprize of yours that proſpered, and all your " ill ſucceſs to fortune and the chance of war. The more brave and " the more worthy you are, the more it concerns your country and all " *Italy* to retain ſuch a protector. That where-ever *Hannibal* is, *there* " is the principal ſeat of this war, you yourſelf allow, ſince to draw him " into *Africa* is your ſole pretence for paſſing thither. With *Hannibal* " therefore you purpoſe to contend, whether here or there. And will " you be ſtronger in that country, and alone, than here, when joined by " your Collegue and his army? Will *Hannibal* be weaker in the neigh- " bourhood of *Carthage*, and ſupported by all *Africa*, than now when " he is confined to a corner of *Bruttium*, and in want of ſupplies, which " he has long, but in vain, demanded from his country? Would a " prudent man chuſe to fight where the enemy is double his number, " when he may with *two* armies attack *one*, and this one already fatigued " and exhauſted by many battles and a diſtreſsful war. Conſider how " different your conduct is from your father's. He, though on his " way to carry the war into *Spain*, returned to meet *Hannibal* at the " foot of the *Alps:* You, while *Hannibal* is in *Italy*, are preparing to " leave the country, not becauſe it is advantageous to the Republic, " but becauſe you think it for your glory; as when, being General " for the *Roman* people, you, againſt law, and without authority from " the Senate, left your province and your army, and with only two " ſhips ſailed to *Africa*, hazarding in your perſon the intereſt of the " public, and the majeſty of the empire. My opinion, Conſcript " Fathers, is, that *P. Cornelius* was created Conſul, not for himſelf, " but for us and for the Republic; and that the armies were raiſed for " the defence of *Rome* and *Italy*, and not that the Conſuls might, out " of pride, like Kings, tranſport them into whatever countries they " pleaſed."

Notwithſtanding what *Fabius* had ſaid of his own integrity, and his unmixed zeal for his country's good on the preſent occaſion, *Scipio* did not fail to obſerve, that *while the old man was proving himſelf free from all jealouſy or emulation, he had taken particular care to extol his own actions, and to depreciate thoſe of a young man, with whom, nevertheleſs, it was impoſſible he ſhould have any competition for glory.* He then proceeded to juſtify his deſign of going into *Africa*. " *Fabius* tells us, that it is " an inacceſſible coaſt, that there is no port open to receive us. He " reminds us of *Atilius Regulus*, taken captive in *Africa*; as if *Regulus* " had failed in attempting a deſcent on that country. He forgets, that " this unfortunate Commander found the *Carthaginian* havens open, " performed many noble actions the firſt year, and, to the laſt, remained " unconquerable by any *Carthaginian* General. But, it ſeems, we are

" to

Y. of *R.* 548. B. f. *J. C.* 204. 247 Conſul p.

"to take warning from the example of the *Athenians*. If we have "leiſure, Conſcript Fathers, to hearken to *Grecian* tales, why does he "not rather ſpeak of *Agathocles*, King of *Syracuſe*, who, when *Sicily* "was diſtreſſed by the *Carthaginians*, transferred * the war from that "iſland to the very gates of *Carthage?*" He then aſſerted that no method could be ſo effectual to force *Hannibal* out of *Italy* as to carry the war into *Africa*, whither *Carthage* would undoubtedly recal him in ſo preſſing a danger. He argued, that ſince the allies of *Rome* had deſerted her after the battle of *Cannæ*, and this in greater numbers than *Hannibal* himſelf could have expected, certainly the *Carthaginian* Republic, imperious and oppreſſive to her ſubjects, and faithleſs to her allies, had little reaſon to depend on the conſtancy of the *Africans*. That as ſhe had no inherent ſtrength, and was obliged to truſt abſolutely to mercenaries, or to allies, whoſe very character was inconſtancy, ſhe would not be able to ſupport the war like *Rome*, potent by her own ſtrength, and whoſe citizens were all ſoldiers. He concluded with theſe words, "It "would be tedious, and what no way concerns you, Conſcript Fathers, "if, as *Q. Fabius* has made light of my actions in *Spain*, I ſhould at"tempt to leſſen his merit, and extol my own. I ſhall therefore do "neither: In moderation at leaſt, and in continence of ſpeech, if in "nothing elſe, young as I am, I will ſurpaſs this old General. Such "has been the conſtant tenor of my life and actions, both in public "and private, that I can be ſilent on this ſubject, and eaſily reſt con"tented with the opinion which you have formed of me."

* See p. 11.

Scipio's diſcourſe was not favourably received by the Senate. The report that he intended to have recourſe to the people, had prejudiced the aſſembly againſt him. *Fulvius*, who had been twice Conſul and once Cenſor, deſired him to declare frankly, whether he would refer the affair of the provinces to the deliberation of the Fathers, and acquieſce in their decree, or, in caſe he ſhould not like it, appeal from it to the people. *Scipio* anſwered, that he would do what he thought moſt conducive to the public welfare. To which *Fulvius* replied: "When I aſked you theſe queſtions, I was not ignorant either of what "you would anſwer, or of what you would do; for it is plain your de"ſign is rather to found than conſult the Senate; and, unleſs we im"mediately decree you the province you deſire, you are prepared to lay "the matter before the people." Then turning towards the Tribunes of the Commons, "I refuſe, ſaid he, to declare my opinion; becauſe, "ſhould it be approved by the Senate, the Conſul would not ſubmit "to their determination: And I deſire you, Tribunes, to ſupport me "in this refuſal." *Scipio* contended, that it was not equitable for the Tribunes to obſtruct a Conſul in his demanding the opinion of any Senator. They neverthleſs pronounced, That, if the Conſul would refer the matter in queſtion to the Senate, the Senate's decree ſhould ſtand; nor would they ſuffer an appeal from it to the people; but if he would not refer

refer the matter to the Senate, they would ſupport all thoſe who ſhould refuſe to declare their opinions. *Scipio* deſired one day's time to conſult with his Collegue. To this they conſented. The day following the aſſembly met again, and then, the Conſul ſubmitting the affair to the determination of the Conſcript Fathers, without appeal, they decreed, That *Scipio* ſhould have *Sicily*, and the fleet of thirty ſhips of war, now commanded by the Prætor of that iſland; and that if he thought it for the advantage of the Republic, he might ſail to *Afric* [a]. As for *Licinius*, he was directed to carry on the war againſt *Hannibal* in *Bruttium*. Y. of *R.* 548. Bef. *J. C.* 204. 247 Conſul-p.

Though *Africa* was not aſſign'd to *Scipio* as his province, nor any levies granted him for the enterprize which he had in view; nevertheleſs, he obtained leave to take with him into *Sicily* as many volunteers as he could aſſemble; and alſo permiſſion to aſk of the allies all neceſſaries for building and equipping a new fleet. Many of the provinces and cities voluntarily taxed themſelves, in order to furniſh him, not only with materials for the ſhips, but with arms and proviſions for the marines. So that in five and forty days time after bringing the timber from the foreſt, he was in a condition to ſet ſail with a fleet of thirty new galleys, and about ſeven thouſand volunteers [b]. *Liv.* B. 28. c. 45.

About this time *Mago* (the brother of *Hannibal*) with twelve thouſand foot and near two thouſand horſe, landed at *Genoa* and took it: And finding two nations of *Liguria*, the *Ingaunians* and *Intemelians*, at war, he joined the former, his army increaſing daily by the great number of *Gauls* that flocked to him from all parts. Theſe advices from *Spurius Lucretius*, who commanded in *Ciſalpine Gaul*, cauſed a general alarm in the Senate: They ordered *M. Livius* to march his army, of *Volones*, then in *Hetruria*, to *Ariminum*; and *Lævinus*, to lead the legions appointed for the defence of *Rome*, to *Aretium*. Other advices came, that *Octavius* the Prætor of *Sardinia* had taken fourſcore ſhips of burden belonging to the *Carthaginians*. In *Bruttium* no remarkable action happened between the armies this campaign. The plague raged in *Licinius*'s camp; and *Hannibal*'s troops were afflicted with peſtilence and famine at the ſame time. c. 46.

[a] From this decree, and the after conduct of the Senate, it is not improbable what *Livy* hints, [ſpeaking of the tranſactions of the next year] that their deſign was to make preparations for carrying the war into *Africa*, without doing it by public authority; and to lull the *Carthaginians* into ſecurity, by making them believe, that theſe preparations were only the effect of *Scipio*'s ambition, which the Senate would not fail to oppoſe. *Quanquam nondum aperte Africa provincia decreta erat (occultantibus id, credo, Patribus, ne præſciſcerent Carthaginienſes) tamen in eam ſpem erecta civitas erat, in Africa eo anno debellatum iri, finemque bello Punico adeſſe. Liv. L. 29. c. 14.*

[b] According to *Plutarch*, *Fabius* would have engaged the Conſul *Licinius*, to obſtruct *Scipio*'s meaſures: Not ſucceeding herein, he diſſuaded the *Roman* youth from following him into *Sicily*, as volunteers; and he had before, by his influence in the Senate, hindered any funds being aſſigned to *Scipio*, for the expence of his armament.

Y. of *R.* 548. Bef. *J. C.* 204. 247 Conſul-p.

Scipio was buſy in *Sicily*, forming an army, for his *African* expedition. In his choice of men, he preferred, before all others, the veterans who had ſerved under *Marcellus* at the ſiege of *Syracuſe*. He refitted the old galleys he found in the iſland, gave the command of them to *Lælius*, and commiſſioned him to make a deſcent on *Africa*, and pillage the country.

Lælius landed near *Hippo*, and laid the territory about it waſte; which threw the people of *Carthage* into a great conſternation: For they falſly imagined, that *Scipio* was come with a formidable army. When their fright, upon better information, was over, they ſent ambaſſadors to *Syphax*, and other Princes of *Africa*, to renew their treaties with them; and alſo to King *Philip of Macedon*, offering him two hundred talents of ſilver, if he would invade either *Italy* or *Sicily*. Meſſengers were diſpatched to *Hannibal* and *Mago*, with inſtructions to theſe two brothers, to hinder, if poſſible, the departure of any troops which *Scipio* expected from *Italy*; and a reinforcement of ſix thouſand foot and eight hundred horſe was ſent to *Mago* in *Liguria*, with large ſums for hiring troops in *Ciſalpine Gaul*.

Liv. B. 29. c. 4.

Maſiniſſa having learnt the arrival of *Lælius* in *Africa*, came to confer with him. He aſſured him, that there could not be a more favourable opportunity to attack *Carthage*; and expreſſed his ſurprize that *Scipio* had lingered ſo long in *Sicily*. The King added, that though he was by violence diſpoſſeſſed of the throne of his anceſtors, yet he could ſtill bring ſome troops into the field, and would join the Conſul at his landing. He alſo told *Lælius*, that he believed a *Carthaginian* fleet was already ſailed out of the port to intercept him; and adviſed him to haſten his departure. *Lælius* took the Prince's counſel, weighed anchor the next day, and arrived ſafe in *Sicily* with his booty.

In the mean time, *Mago* received the reinforcement from *Carthage*, with orders to raiſe as numerous an army as poſſible, and haſten to join his brother: Upon which he called a council of the chiefs of *Liguria* and *Ciſalpine Gaul*, and endeavoured to perſuade them to declare openly againſt *Rome*, and furniſh him with troops. The *Ligurians* complied; but the *Gauls* durſt not follow their example; becauſe there were actually two *Roman* armies (under *Livius* and *Lucretius*) in their neighbourhood. However, they conſented to his levying men privately in their country; and ſupplied him with proviſions and forage. *Livius* led his army from *Hetruria* into *Gaul*, intending, if *Mago* approached *Rome*, to march, in conjunction with *Lucretius*, and give him battle; but to poſt himſelf near *Ariminum*, in caſe the *Carthaginian* ſhould continue in *Liguria*; which it is probable he did, ſince we hear of no action in that part of *Italy* this campaign.

c. 5.

While *Scipio* was at *Meſſina*, he received information, that a plot was formed by ſome *Locrians*, then in exile at *Rhegium*, to ſurprize their

c. 6. & ſeq.

native city (which ſtood on the ſea coaſt in *Bruttium*) and put it again into the hands of the *Romans*. He ſent *Pleminius* with two Tribunes, and three thouſand men, to aſſiſt in the enterprize. There were two citadels belonging to the place; and, when the *Romans* had made themſelves maſters of one, the *Carthaginians* retired into the other, leaving the inhabitants in ſole poſſeſſion of the city. Theſe favoured the *Romans*; ſo that when *Hannibal* came to inveſt the place, they let in *Scipio* (who had haſtened to their relief) privately in the night: The next morning he made a vigorous ſally, and repulſed the aſſailants. *Hannibal* having learnt, that *Scipio* was in perſon at the head of his troops, immediately retired to his camp near the *Alex*, ſending orders to the *Carthaginians* in the citadel to provide for their ſafety as well as they could. Hereupon, ſetting fire to the houſes, they eſcaped amidſt the confuſion, and joined their General before night. Y. of *R.* 548. Bef. *J. C.* 204. 247 Conſul-p.

Scipio left the government of *Locri* to *Pleminius*, who treated the inhabitants more cruelly than if their city had been taken by aſſault: He rifled the temples of their Gods, and ſeized the treaſure in the ſanctuary of *Proſerpine*. The two Tribunes were no leſs rapacious. Their ſoldiers, in a ſcuffle with thoſe of the Pro-Prætor, about plunder, happened to wound ſome of them; of which theſe having made their complaint to him, he ordered the Tribunes to be whipt. But the Tribunes were reſcued by their followers, who not only mauled the Lictors, but pull'd *Pleminius* himſelf from off his tribunal, dragged him into a private place, beat him ſeverely, cut off his noſe and ears, and left him weltring in his blood. This accident made it neceſſary for *Scipio* to return to *Locri*. He took the part of the Pro-Prætor, put the Tribunes in chains, and ordered them to be carried to *Rome* to be judged. But this did not ſatisfy *Pleminius*: As ſoon as the Conſul was gone, he of his own authority condemned the Tribunes to die by the moſt cruel torments, and their bodies to be left unburied; and, not yet content, he exerciſed the ſame cruelty towards thoſe of the inhabitants who had complained to *Scipio* of his rapines and brutalities. The odium of theſe horrible actions fell in ſome meaſure upon the Conſul: He had indeed been too indulgent to the guilty Governor; for which (as we ſhall ſee hereafter) his enemies, in the Senate, did not fail to inveigh againſt him, when occaſion offered.

The time for the elections drew near: The Conſul *Licinius* being ſick of the plague, in his camp, could not go to *Rome*, to preſide in the Comitia. He therefore, with the approbation of the Senate, named a Dictator for that purpoſe; and his choice fell upon *Q. Cæcilius Metellus*, who, in the quality of Pro-Conſul, was commanding a ſecond army in *Bruttium*. In this army alſo the plague ſo raged, that *Licinius* preſſed the Senate to recal the troops, aſſuring them, that otherwiſe there would not be a ſoldier left alive.

Y. of *R.* 548. Bef. *J. C.* 204 247 Conſul p. *Liv.* B. 29 c. 10. *App.* in *Annib.* *Ovid. Faſt.* *Liv.* B. 29. c. 11.

Many prodigies happening this year, and the *Sybilline* books being conſulted for the proper expiations, the *Decemvirs* found it written in thoſe oracles, *That if a foreign enemy invaded* Italy, *he might be vanquiſhed, and driven out of it, if the Goddeſs* Cybele *were brought to* Rome *from* Peſſinus *in* Phrygia. This ſame *Cybele* (ſtiled the Mother of the Gods) was nothing more than a ſhapeleſs ſtone, which, as was pretended, had fallen down from Heaven upon Mount *Ida*. The Conſcript Fathers ſent five ambaſſadors, men of diſtinction, to obtain by negotiation this powerful protectreſs. And, becauſe the *Romans* had little commerce with the *Aſiatics*, the ambaſſadors were to engage *Attalus* King of *Pergamus* in their intereſt. They went by the way of *Delphi*, and there conſulted the Oracle; from which they received this anſwer, *That by the help of* Attalus *they ſhould infallibly obtain what they deſired; but that, when they had carried the Goddeſs to* Rome, *they ſhould put her into no hands, but of the moſt virtuous man in the Republic.* King *Attalus* was ſo obliging as to conduct the ambaſſadors himſelf to *Peſſinus*, where the inhabitants, with equal complaiſance, granted them the ſtone they ſo earneſtly deſired. One of them ſailed away before the reſt, to give notice at *Rome*, that the Goddeſs was coming; and to report the anſwer of the *Delphic* Oracle. And now the great difficulty was, to find out that man of ſuperior probity, who alone was worthy to receive the ſacred and important ſtone, at its landing. Hiſtory has not told us the remarkable virtues which gained *P. Cornelius Scipio*, ſurnamed *Naſica*, the preference before all others: but this young man, couſin-german to the great *Scipio*, and ſon to *Cneius Scipio*, (who loſt his life in *Spain*) was the perſon who obtained the honourable diſtinction. Attended by ſuch of the ladies of *Rome*, as were in the higheſt veneration for their virtue, he went to meet the Goddeſs. Some of the Veſtals likewiſe accompanied him, and particularly *Quinta Claudia*; of whom it is related, that when the veſſel, on which the Goddeſs was imported, unfortunately ſtuck upon a bank of ſand near the mouth of the *Tyber*, and neither the mariners, nor ſeveral yoke of oxen, were able to move it, ſhe, pulling it only by her girdle tied to it, eaſily ſet it afloat. *Claudia* is ſaid to have been ſuſpected of incontinence; and it is added, that this miracle was wrought in anſwer of her prayer to the Goddeſs, to give a teſtimony of her innocence. There are not wanting Fathers of the church, who allow the fact, but they piouſly impute it to good angels, ſent by God, to deſtroy the unjuſt aſperſion caſt upon the Veſtal. The day on which *Cybele* arrived at *Rome* became a ſolemn annual feſtival, diſtinguiſhed by games, called *Megalenſes*. She was depoſited in the temple of VICTORY.

Liv. B. 29. c. 14.

App. in *Annib.* 345.

CHAP.



A MAP OF AFRICA PROPRIA, AND NUMIDIA.

THE SEA OF AFRICA

THE SEA OF LIBYA

MAURITANIA

NUMIDIA

GETULIA

ZEUGITANA

BYZACIUM

THE LITTLE SYRTIS

TRIPOLITANA

SICILY

Ægades Isles

Maritim I.

Galata I.

The Fair Promontory

Hippo Diarrhytos Colony

Ægimur I.

Promontory of Mercury

Selinus

Hyccara

Cephaloedium

Solus

Alæsa

Himera

Panormus

Mount Eryx

Thermæ Colony

Thermæ Himeræ Colony

Drepanum

Thermæ Col.

Heraclea Col.

Enna

Centuripe

Agrigentum Col.

Gela

Cossyra I.

Lipis or Clypea

Curubis

Neapolis Colony

Ægusa I.

Lopadusa I.

Gaulos I.

Melita or Malta

Isle of Malta

Tretum Promontory

Cultucitana

Aphrodisium

Paratianæ

Sullucha

Tacatua

Hippo Royal Colony

Cultu Mun.

Rusicada Colony

Thurburnica Colony

Vaga

Gazaufula

Nalpotes

Madaura

Thuellaba

Cultu Col.

Tucca

Thunusda

Cirta Col.

Tagaste Mun.

Idicra

Cuicultum

Sigus

Tipasa

Miletis Colony

Gemella

Royal Lake

Macomadæ

Tagura

Narangara

Azuritanum

Nova Sparsa

Zarai

Tibiga Col.

Marcimenum

Thunudronum Colony

Tamugas

Tuburnica

Lambæsa

Taduti

Lambesa

Glaudi

Mascula

Megesela

Mount Aurasius

Zama Colony

Hadrumma

Telepte Col.

Gemella

Gremella

Capsa Colony

Putea

Tisurus

The Altar of Neptune

The Temple of Apollo

Thinissa

Utica Colony

Cap. of Apollo

G. of Carthage

CARTHAGE Colony

Fabraca Colony

Uthina Col.

Castra Cornelia

Theudalis

Saphira

Cigisa

Sicilibba

Little Tuburbis Col.

Tunis

Utica

Sepheris

Casula

Marcilla Col.

Carpis

Curubis

Vacaria

Membressa

Tallis

Quiza Col.

Vina

Putput

Siagul

Tuburbis

Aphrodisium

Simittu Col.

Bulla Regia

Musti

Horrea Cælia

Adrumetum Col.

Leptis

Thapsa

Jupiter's Mount

Aburus

Tucca Terebentina

Ruspina

Vaccæ

Uzita

Sublecti

Hannibal's Tower

Maracana

Tegla

Agar

Zella

Sarsura

Lares Colon.

Altaba

Ammedera Colony

Sufes

Altiburus

Mascliana

Elices

Germaniciana

Tysdrum Col.

Acolla

Ruspæ

Sufetula

Amudasa

Orisca

Uzecia

Thenæ

Taphora

Cercinitis I.

Cercina Island and City

Macomades Municipium

Usula

Cella

Tasbalta

Septimunicia

Lotophagitis Island

Tacape Col.

Menina

Gita. Mun.

Zugar

Tritonis Lake

The Waters of Tacape

Tasarta

Pontezita Municipium

Artava

Mount Gillius

Sabrita Colony

Fisida

Oea Colony afterward Tripoly

R. Triton

Roman Miles of 5000 Feet each

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

J. Clark Sc.

CHAP. XXXV.

FIFTEENTH YEAR of the war.

Scipio *is continued in his command in* Sicily.
He is accuſed in the Senate, by his Quæſtor, Cato, *of profuſeneſs and idleneſs.*
He is alſo accuſed of partiality to the cruel Pleminius.
Commiſſioners are appointed to enquire into his conduct. Their report favourable to him.
Syphax *declares for the* Carthaginians.
Scipio *makes a deſcent on* Africa. Maſiniſſa *joins him.*
A remarkable quarrel between the Cenſors at Rome.

BEFORE the arrival of the Goddeſs, the Dictator *Q. Cæcilius Metellus* had held the Comitia by Centuries where *M. Cornelius Cethegus*, and *P. Sempronius Tuditanus*, were choſen Conſuls. *Sempronius* was then Pro-Conſul in *Greece*. The *Romans* having, for two years paſt, (i. e. from the year 546,) neglected their affairs in *Greece*, *Philip* had forced the *Ætolians* to conclude a peace with him upon his own terms. Soon after this, *Sempronius* arrived at *Dyrrachium* with 10000 foot, 1000 horſe and 35 ſhips of war. He was very angry with the *Ætolians*, for having, contrary to the league, made peace without conſent of the *Romans*. Yet, not daring to venture a battle with *Philip*, he was eaſily prevailed upon to come to an agreement with him, by the mediation of the *Epirots*. The treaty was confirmed by the people of *Rome*. In this treaty were included, on *Philip*'s ſide, *Pruſias* King of *Bithynia*, the *Achæans*, *Bœotians*, *Theſſalians*, *Acarnanians* and *Epirots*; and, on the ſide of the *Romans*, the *Ilienſes*, King *Attalus*, *Pleuratus*, *Nabis*, the tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, the *Eleans*, *Meſſenians*, and *Athenians*. *Sempronius* returned to *Rome*, after which the following diſtribution of offices was agreed upon. The Conſul *Cornelius* had the command of the forces in *Hetruria*; his Collegue *Sempronius* was ordered into *Bruttium* with new levies, to act againſt *Hannibal*; and *Licinius* continued at the head of two legions, in that country, in quality of Pro-Conſul. *Pomponius Matho* had the Prætorſhip of *Sicily*; *Scipio*, the army and fleet he before commanded; and *M. Livius* and *Sp. Lucretius* remained in *Gaul* to oppoſe *Mago*. There were alſo two other armies in *Italy*, one at *Tarentum*, under *T. Quintius Flamininus*, the other at *Capua*, under *Hoſtilius Tubulus*.

Y. of *R.* 549. Bef. *J. C.* 203. 248 Conſul-p. *Livy* B. 29. c. 12.

About this time, young *Marcellus* dedicated a temple to Virtue. His father had formerly vowed one to Honour *and* Virtue, intending to place the ſtatues of both under one roof. But the Pontifices oppoſed this, declaring, that it was not lawful to worſhip more than one God in one temple; and they likewiſe urged, that if lightning fell upon

Liv. B. 29. c. 11. and B. 27. c. 25.

Y. of *R.* 549 Bef. *J. C.* 203. 248 Conſul-p.

the building, or any prodigy ſhould happen in it, it would be impoſſible to diſcover to which of the two divinities expiatory duties ſhould be paid. The temple therefore, which *Marcellus* had deſigned for both divinities, was dedicated only to HONOUR, and another built in all haſte to VIRTUE.

And now the Republic being to recruit her armies, ſhe thought proper to call to account the twelve *Roman* colonies, who, about ſix years before, had with impunity refuſed their contingents of men and money. The Senate determined, that each colony ſhould furniſh double the number of foot it had done in any year of the war, and a hundred and twenty horſe. If any of them could not raiſe the number of horſe required, they were to ſend three foot ſoldiers in the room of each horſeman wanting. The Fathers alſo impoſed a new yearly tax upon each colony, and ordered its cenſus to be taken according to the form uſed at *Rome*. This decree was put in execution with rigour. It was followed by another in favour of thoſe private perſons, who, in the Conſulſhip of *Lævinus*, had lent the Republic the ſums requiſite to ſupply her preſſing wants. At the motion of *Lævinus*, the Senate ordered theſe debts to be diſcharged at three payments; the firſt to be made immediately, and the laſt within five years.

Liv. B. 29. c. 16.

Such inſtances of equity in the Conſcript Fathers emboldened all, who were oppreſſed, to demand juſtice; and particularly the *Locrians*, who the laſt year had been ſo ill treated by *Pleminius*. From this people, ten deputies, in a neglected and ſordid dreſs, (the mark of grief and diſtreſs among the ancients) and with olive branches in their hands, came to *Rome*, and laid before the Senate, in a long and pathetick harangue, the grievances and miſeries they had ſuffered under the tyranny of the Pro-Prætor. When the *Locrians* had done ſpeaking, *Fabius* aſked them, whether they had made their complaint to *Scipio*; to which they anſwered, that deputies had been ſent to him for that purpoſe, but that he was then buſy about his preparations for war, and that now he was either gone for *Africa*, or intended to ſail in a few days; That they had ſeen, in the quarrel between the Tribunes and *Pleminius*, how much *Scipio* favoured the latter, whom, though equally criminal, if not more ſo, he had continued in his government, while he ordered the Tribunes to be laid in irons. After the deputies had withdrawn, ſome of the chief Senators not only inveighed againſt *Pleminius*, but began to take *Scipio*'s character to pieces. Among theſe was *M. Porcius Cato*, the firſt of his family who diſtinguiſhed himſelf at *Rome*. He had been Quæſtor to *Scipio* in *Sicily*, and had reproved him for his profuſeneſs to his ſoldiers, to which the General had anſwered, "that he did not want "ſo exact a Quæſtor; that he would make war at what expence he "pleaſed, nor was he to give an account to the *Roman* people of the "money he ſpent, but of his enterprizes and the execution of them." *Cato*, provoked at this anſwer, had left *Sicily*, and returned to *Rome*.

c. 19.

Plut. in *Cat. Maj.*

He

He now declaimed againſt *Scipio*, accuſing him of making great and uſeleſs expences, of paſſing his time boyiſhly at the Theatre and the Gymnaſia, as if he had been commiſſioned, not to make war, but to celebrate games. Others of the Senators added, that the Pro-Conſul had laid aſide the *Roman* habit, publicly appeared in the *Greek* cloak and ſandals, and that the reading of *Greek* books, and the pleaſures of *Syracuſe*, had made him intirely forget *Hannibal* and *Carthage*, while his army, grown as effeminate as their General, was become more terrible to their allies, than their enemies. *Fabius* called *Scipio*, *a man born to be the corrupter of military diſcipline*. "He acted, *ſaid the old man*, "the like part in *Spain*, where we loſt not much leſs by ſedition than "we did by the war. One while he indulges his ſoldiers in all licenti-"ouſneſs, and then cruelly tyrannizes over them; as if he were a King "and a [b] foreigner." *Fabius*'s ſentence was as harſh as his invective. "That *Scipio* ſhould be recalled home, for having quitted his province "without orders from the Senate; and that the Tribunes ſhould be "deſired to move the Comitia, to depoſe him from the Pro-Con-"ſulate. That *Pleminius* ſhould be brought to *Rome* in chains, and, "in caſe the crimes laid to his charge were proved, be executed in "priſon and his goods confiſcated. And laſtly, that the Senate ſhould "diſavow the ill treatment of the *Locrians*, and give them all the ſa-"tisfaction poſſible for the wrongs they had ſuffered.

Y. of *R.* 549. Bef. *J.C.* 203. 248 Conſul p. *Liv.* B. 29. c. 19.

The debate was carried to ſuch a length, that the opinions of all the Senators could not be taken that day. In the next aſſembly, the Fathers concurred in opinion with *Q. Metellus*. He approved the propoſals of *Fabius*, with regard to *Pleminius* and the *Locrians*, but urged, that it was unreaſonable, upon dubious accuſations, to recal a general, whom *Rome* had choſen Conſul, in the expectation of being by him delivered from *Hannibal*, and of becoming miſtreſs of *Africa*: And he moved, that two Tribunes of the people, one Ædile, and ten other commiſſioners [c], out of the Senate, ſhould be ſent into *Sicily* with *Pomponius* the Prætor of that iſland, to take cognizance of *Scipio*'s conduct in the affair of *Pleminius*; and, if they found him an accomplice in that Pro-Prætor's crimes, to ſend him to *Rome*; but in caſe *Scipio* had already ſailed for *Africa*, the Tribunes, the Ædile, and two of the Commiſſioners ſhould follow him thither, the laſt to aſſume the command of the army, if the Pro-Conſul ſhould be ordered home. The Commiſſioners, who were to embark at *Rhegium*, went firſt to *Locri*,

c. 20.

[b] *Externo & regio more, & indulgere licentiæ militum, & ſævire in eos.* *Liv.* B. 29. c. 19.

[c] Perhaps this pompous embaſſy was rather deſigned to enquire into the ſtate of *Scipio*'s army, and to ſee whether it was yet a proper time for the Senate to give him openly a commiſſion to carry the war into *Africa*. This conjecture ſeems confirmed by the conduct of the Commiſſioners, who, even after the *Locrians* had cleared *Scipio*, or dropt the accuſation, went nevertheleſs into *Sicily*; though the decree of the Senate, as it is in *Livy*, had confined their commiſſion to the affair of *Pleminius*.

There

V. of *R.* 549. Bef. *J. C.* 203. 248 Conſul-p

There they ſeized the guilty Governor, and thirty two of his accomplices, put them in irons, and ſent them to *Rome*. They alſo made reparation to the *Locrians* for their loſſes, and, having examined them concerning *Scipio*'s conduct, received anſwer, "That though the Pro-"Conſul had not ſhewn great concern at the miſeries of their city, yet "he was a man they had much rather have for a friend than an "enemy: That they perſuaded themſelves, ſo many heinous crimes had "not been committed by his command, or with his approbation; that he "had only given too much credit to *Pleminius*, and too little to them; "and that ſuch was the diſpoſition of ſome men, they were more willing "to believe people innocent, than diſpoſed to puniſh them when guilty." This declaration pleaſed the Commiſſioners, as it freed them from the invidious office of beginning a criminal proceſs againſt a man ſo much in favour with the people of *Rome*. And, when they came into *Sicily*, they were thoroughly convinced, by the vaſt preparations *Scipio* had made for his intended expedition, and the fine appearance both of his army and fleet, that the General had not ſpent his time wholly at the theatre, and in amuſements. *Go*, ſaid they, *into* Africa, *and the Gods give you that ſucceſs which the* Roman *people promiſed themſelves from your virtue and abilities, when they choſe you Conſul. Such a General and ſuch an army will conquer the* Carthaginians, *or they are invincible.*

Liv. B. 29. c. 22.

The report of the Commiſſioners at their return to *Rome*, raiſed the glory of *Scipio*. The Senate paſſed a decree, that he ſhould immediately go into *Africa*, and take with him ſuch of the *Roman* troops in *Sicily* as he thought fit for his enterprize. And, as for the people, the favour in which he ſtood with them, made them tender even to the guilty *Pleminius*, for whom they imagined the Pro-Conſul had ſome regard. Their compaſſion for the criminal was likewiſe raiſed, by ſeeing the miſerable figure he made, without his noſe and ears; ſo that, though he was often produced before them, he was never condemned. He died in priſon, or, as ſome ſay, was, long after this, executed for attempting to ſet fire to *Rome*.

It has been before obſerved, that *Scipio*, in order to pave his way to *Carthage*, had gained over to the *Roman* intereſt the two *Numidian* Kings, *Syphax* and *Maſiniſſa*. The *African* Republic endeavoured to deſtroy the engagements which thoſe Princes had entered into with her enemy: And *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Giſco*, by the means of his daughter *Sophoniſba*, drew off *Syphax* [d]. The Hiſtorians repreſent her as a woman of excellent beauty, accompanied

c. 23.

Appian. in *Punic.* 6.

[d] According to *Appian* (*in Punic.* c. 6.) *Aſdrubal* had promiſed his daughter in marriage to *Maſiniſſa:* But, *Syphax* being in love with her, the *Carthaginians*, to bring him off from the alliance of *Rome*, gave him *Sophoniſba*, without the knowledge of her father, who was then in *Spain*. *Maſiniſſa*, in revenge, privately entered into a league with *Scipio*. Upon hearing this, *Aſdrubal* (ſays the ſame Hiſtorian) was indeed

accompanied with graces and a manner irreſiſtibly winning; love for her country, the ruling paſſion of her ſoul, with a courage to execute whatever that love could dictate. This lady being given in marriage to *Syphax*, his paſſion for her made him forget his engagements with *Rome*; and he readily entered into an alliance offenſive and defenſive with *Carthage*. Prompted by *Aſdrubal*, he wrote a letter to *Scipio*, to diſſuade him from making a deſcent upon *Africa*, acquainting him at the ſame time with his marriage, the new alliance he had made with the *Carthaginians*, and the neceſſity he ſhould be under of taking part with them, in caſe they were attacked. V. of *R.* 549. Bef. *J.C.* 203. 248 Conſul-p.

The Pro-Conſul received this letter at *Syracuſe* with ſome ſurprize; and, to conceal the contents of it from his army, ſent back the meſſenger immediately, with a ſhort anſwer to the *Numidian* Prince, adviſing him to beware how he offended both Gods and men, by a violation of public faith: After which, aſſembling his troops, he bid them prepare for a voyage to *Africa*: *Formerly*, ſaid he, Maſiniſſa *complained to* Lælius *of my dilatorineſs*; *and now* Syphax *preſſes me to haſten my departure*; *and deſires, that if I have changed my reſolution, I will let him know it, that he may provide for his own ſafety*. He then ordered his ſhips of war and tranſports to *Lilybæum*; and thither he, in perſon, marched the land forces, purpoſing to ſet ſail with the firſt favourable wind. All the troops ſhewed an incredible ardour to follow him in this expedition, eſpecially thoſe legionaries, who had run away at the battle of *Cannæ*, and had therefore been condemned to ſtay in *Sicily*, for the whole time, that *Hannibal* ſhould continue in *Italy*. As they were old ſoldiers, and had been in many battles and ſieges, the Pro-Conſul, notwithſtanding their diſgrace, took with him as many of them, as were fit for ſervice. *Liv.* B. 29. c. 24.

Lælius commanded the fleet. It is uncertain what number of men were embarked; but never was embarkation made with more order and ſolemnity; and the concourſe of people, who came from all parts to ſee it, and to wiſh the Pro-Conſul a proſperous voyage, was incredibly great. Juſt before he weighed anchor, he appeared on the poop of his galley, and, after a herald had proclaimed ſilence, addreſſed this prayer to Heaven: *O all ye Gods and Goddeſſes of earth and ſea, I intreat and implore you to make whatever I have done, am doing, or ſhall do, in my command, proſperous to me, to the people and commons of* Rome, *to the allies and the* Latine *name, to all thoſe who eſpouſe the cauſe of the people of* Rome *and* c. 25. c. 27.

indeed ſorry for the injury done to the young Prince, but reſolved to have him murdered, becauſe it was for the intereſt of *Carthage*. Accordingly he ſent guards with him under pretence of convoying him into his dominions, but gave them ſecret inſtructions to kill him. *Maſiniſſa* having diſcovered the deſign, found means to eſcape. *Zonaras* tells us, that *Aſdrubal* promiſed his daughter to *Maſiniſſa*, but afterwards broke his word, and gave her to *Syphax*; thinking it of greater conſequence to gain this Prince to the intereſt of *Carthage* than the other.

Y. of *R.* 549. Bef *J. C.* 203. 248 Conſul. p.

mine, and follow my command and auſpices by land, by ſea, and on rivers: to favour all theſe enterprizes, and encreaſe them with good encreaſe: Bring us all home ſafe and unhurt, victorious over our enemies, adorned with ſpoils, loaded with booty, and triumphant: And enable us to execute upon Carthage *all that ſhe deſigned againſt* Rome. When he had ended this prayer, he cauſed a victim to be ſlain, and the entrails to be thrown into the ſea; and then the trumpets ſounding, he weighed anchor, and with fifty galleys and four hundred ſhips of burden, ſet ſail, with a favourable wind, for *Africa*. As he drew towards the coaſt, he aſked the name of the neareſt land then in view, and being told it was called the *Fair Promontory*, he liked the omen, ordered his pilots to direct their courſe thither, and ſafely landed his army. Soon after, *Maſiniſſa*, the only *African* Prince in the intereſt of *Rome*, came and joined him. The Hiſtorians have left us the following relation of the adventures of this young King.

Liv. B. 29. c. 29.

Gala, King of *Maſſylia* *, and father of *Maſiniſſa*, had, according to the laws of *Numidia*, been ſucceeded by his younger brother *Oeſalces*. And when the latter died, his ſon, *Capuſa*, had mounted the throne. *Capuſa* was ſlain in a battle againſt his rebellious ſubjects, headed by one *Mezetulus*, a factious man of the blood royal, and a conſtant rival and competitor of the Kings of *Numidia*. The Conqueror, though he durſt not aſſume the title of King, made himſelf tutor to *Lacumaces* the younger brother of *Capuſa*, and ſeized the government, as in right of his ward. And, to ſecure himſelf in his uſurped authority, he not only entered into an alliance with King *Syphax*, but married his pupil's mother, who was niece to *Hannibal*; hoping thereby to gain the *Carthaginians* to his intereſt.

c. 30, 31, 32, 33.

Maſiniſſa was then in *Spain*; where hearing of *Capuſa*'s death, he paſſed into *Africa*, and aſked aſſiſtance of *Bocchar*, King of *Mauritania*. *Bocchar* lent him 4000 men to convoy him to the frontiers of *Maſſylia*. There, being joined by a ſmall body of *Numidians*, and having advice, that *Lacumaces* was marching into *Maſſæſylia* †, to aſk ſuccours of King *Syphax*, he ſurprized the young Prince near *Thapſus*, routed his forces, and took the town; but *Lacumaces* eſcaped to *Syphax*. This ſucceſs engaged many of the *Numidians* to ſide with *Maſiniſſa*; and particularly the ſoldiers who had ſerved under his father *Gala*. Encouraged by theſe veterans, he ventured, though inferior in number, to attack *Mezetulus*, who was now in the field with a great army, *Lacumaces* having brought him a reinforcement of 15000 foot from *Syphax*. *Maſiniſſa*'s ſuperior ſkill in war, and the bravery of his troops gave him the victory. *Lacumaces*, with his tutor, and the ſmall remains of their forces, fled for refuge into the territories of *Carthage*; and the conqueror took poſſeſſion of

* A part of *Numidia*.

† A part of *Numidia*.

the

the vacant throne. But now, apprehending he ſhould have a much more difficult war to ſuſtain againſt *Syphax*, he thought it adviſable to come to an accommodation with his kinſman. He offered to place him in the ſame rank *Oeſalces* had held at *Gala*'s court, pardon *Mezetulus*, and reſtore to him all his effects. The Princes preferring a moderate, but certain fortune, in their own country, to uncertain hopes, in exile, accepted the propoſals, notwithſtanding all the induſtry of the *Carthaginians* to hinder it. Y. of *R.* 549. Bef. *J. C.* 203. 248 Conſul p.

At this time *Aſdrubal*, happening to be at *Syphax*'s court, inſinuated to him, that *Maſiniſſa* was an ambitious enterprizing youth, who would not be contented, like his father *Gala*, or his uncle *Oeſalces*, with the dominion of *Maſſylia*, and if not cruſhed in the beginning, might one day prove a dangerous neighbour, both to him and the *Carthaginians*. *Syphax*, inſtigated by theſe ſuggeſtions, marched an army againſt *Maſiniſſa*: A pitched battle was fought, in which the *Maſſylians* were totally vanquiſhed; the King himſelf narrowly eſcaped, with only a ſmall guard of horſe, to *Mount Balbus*. Thither ſome families of his own ſubjects followed him, with all their cattle, (wherein the riches of the *Numidians* chiefly conſiſted,) and there being plenty of paſture and water round the mountain, he lived on the milk and fleſh of their flocks. The reſt of the *Maſſylians* ſubmitted to the conqueror.

Maſiniſſa having, in this retreat, got ſome troops together, began to make nocturnal incurſions upon the frontiers of the *Carthaginians*; and, in a ſhort time, his forces augmenting, he ventured in open day to penetrate farther into their country, deſtroyed the inhabitants, and brought thence a conſiderable booty. *Carthage*, to put a ſtop to his devaſtations, had recourſe to *Syphax*. The King diſdaining to go in perſon to reduce a band of robbers, diſpatched away *Bocchar*, one of his officers, with four thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe. Theſe ſurrounded the mountain, where *Maſiniſſa* was lodged, hindered the return of the detachments he had ſent out, and forced him to the top of the hill.

Bocchar, thinking that he had his enemy ſecure, ſent back all his troops, except five hundred foot, and two hundred horſe. Soon after, he ſurprized *Maſiniſſa* in a narrow paſs, attempting to get away by ſtealth. The Prince, with only fifty horſe, eſcaped by flight. *Bocchar*, and his two hundred horſe, purſued him, came up with him near *Clypea*, and cut in pieces all his guard, except four. With theſe *Maſiniſſa*, though wounded, fled full ſpeed; and finding a river in their way, they leaped horſe and man into it. Two of them were drowned in croſſing the ſtream; but the Prince, and the other two, gained the oppoſite bank, and hid themſelves among ſome buſhes. *Bocchar*, who purſued them to the river, imagined they had all periſhed, and went no farther; and from that time it was reported at *Carthage*, and the court of *Syphax*, that *Maſiniſſa* was dead. In the mean while, he hid himſelf

Y. of *R.* 549 Bef. *J. C.* 203. 248 Conſul-p.

ſelf in a cave, dreſſed his wound with herbs, and lived upon the prey which his two companions brought him.

Dethroned Princes, who have any ſpirit, do not eaſily relinquiſh the hopes of a reſtoration. *Maſiniſſa*, as ſoon as his wound would ſuffer him to mount on horſeback, left his cave, and took the road to his own country. In a few days after his appearance there, ſome of his people, to the number of ſix thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, gathering about him, he not only poſſeſſed himſelf of *Maſſylia*, but made dreadful ravages in the territories of the *Carthaginian* allies, and King *Syphax*. The latter thinking the affair ſerious, came in perſon with an army to ſtop the enemy's progreſs. During the battle which followed, *Vermina*, the ſon of *Syphax*, having with a large detachment fetched a compaſs, fell upon the *Maſſylians* in the rear. By this means *Maſiniſſa* was again defeated[c]. With only ſixty horſe he fled to the ſea coaſt near the leſſer *Syrtis*; and there he continued, for the moſt part, till the arrival of *Scipio*; by which time he had augmented his troop; for he joined the Pro-Conſul with two hundred, ſome ſay, two thouſand horſe.

Liv. B. 29. c. 28.

The alarm and terror which *Scipio*'s deſcent cauſed among the *Carthaginians*, made them think it neceſſary to ſtrengthen the fortifications of their capital. They had no General in any degree qualified to oppoſe him in the field. *Aſdrubal* (the ſon of *Giſco*) the beſt they had, is ſpoken of by *Livy*, as a man of great quality and wealth, but as excelling in no military talent, except that of ſaving himſelf by a ſwift retreat *; nor were they provided with diſciplined and experienced ſoldiers.

c. 34.

Scipio, having ordered his fleet towards *Utica*, encamped on certain eminences, not far from the ſea coaſt. Next day, a body of five hundred *Carthaginian* horſe, commanded by *Hanno*, a young warrior, who had been ſent to watch the motions of the enemy, fell in with the advanced guards of the *Roman* camp, who routed them, and ſlew their commander.

Appian. in *Punic.* 9.

This firſt ſucceſs was a good *Augury*; and *Scipio* drew near to *Locha*, a city which ſeemed to promiſe his ſoldiers a rich booty. He had no ſooner planted his ladders for the aſſault, than the inhabitants being terrified, ſent a herald to aſk their lives, with liberty to retire. Hereupon the General ſounded a retreat; but the ſoldiers, greedy of plunder, would not

[c] *Appian* makes no mention of this ſecond battle. According to him, after *Maſiniſſa* was once driven from his kingdom, he continued diſpoſſeſſed of it, till *Scipio*'s arrival in *Africa*; at which time *Syphax* and the *Carthaginians*, to draw him off from the *Romans*, pretended to be reconciled to him, and reſtored him to his kingdom. Though *Maſiniſſa* was ſenſible, that they were not ſincere, yet he pretended to come into their meaſures, and joined *Aſdrubal* with his cavalry. However he held ſecret intelligence with *Scipio*, and only waited a favourable opportunity to go over to him, which he did ſoon after, betraying, at the ſame time, a party of *Carthaginian* horſe into the hands of the *Romans*. *In Punic.* §. 7. *& ſeq.*

* —— *Aſdrubale, fugaciſſimo Duce. Liv.* B. 30. *c.* 28.

obey,

obey: They forced the town, and put all, even women and children, to the ſword. It was neceſſary to puniſh ſo ſignal a diſobedience; and the centurions being the moſt guilty, as having encouraged the ſoldiers to it, the Pro-Conſul decreed that three of them ſhould die as lots ſhould determine. The ſoldiers were deprived of the booty they had taken. After ſome few expeditions of ſmall moment, *Scipio* undertook the ſiege of *Utica* with all his army. But *Aſdrubal*, who commanded 30000 foot, and 3000 horſe, being joined by *Syphax* with 50000 foot, and 10000 horſe, obliged the *Roman* to diſlodge, after he had been before the place forty days. He retreated to a promontory, under which his fleet rode at anchor, entrenched himſelf there, and waited the return of the ſpring to renew the war. *Aſdrubal* lay encamped near him, and *Syphax* at a little diſtance from the *Carthaginian*. We ſhall leave them here a while, and return to the affairs of *Italy*. Y. of *R.* 549. Bef. *J.C.* 203. 248 Conſul-p.

THE Conſul *Sempronius*, who marched into *Bruttium* againſt *Hannibal*, was worſted in his firſt engagement with him, and loſt 1200 men: But, in a ſecond, being aſſiſted by the forces of the Pro-Conſul *Licinius*, *it is ſaid*, he defeated the enemy, left four thouſand of them dead upon the ſpot, and retook ſeveral towns after the victory. *Liv.* B. 29. c. 36.

On the other hand, the Conſul *Cethegus*, who was to act againſt *Mago*, kept *Hetruria* in awe. By commencing legal proceſſes againſt thoſe who had entered into a correſpondence with the enemy, he prevented the inſurrections which the *Carthaginian* endeavoured to raiſe in that country. The guilty would not appear upon the ſummons, but went into a voluntary baniſhment; and their eſtates were confiſcated.

While the Conſuls were thus employed abroad, the two Cenſors at *Rome*, *Livius Salinator*, and *Claudius Nero*, drew a contempt on themſelves by a moſt ridiculous behaviour. Though their quarrels with each other had formerly been very great, yet the diſtreſs of the Republic, during their Conſulſhip, had reconciled them in appearance for ſome time; but now their mutual hatred broke out afreſh. It was cuſtomary for the Cenſors, juſt before leaving their office, to draw up a liſt of the Senators, review the *Roman* Knights, aſſemble the Tribes, and ſet a mark of infamy on ſuch perſons as deſerved it. As to the firſt, *Livius* and *Nero* were equitable in their proceedings; but when they came to review the Knights, of which body they both were, *Nero* ordered his Collegue's name to be ſtruck out of the liſt, on pretence, that he had been formerly condemned by the people for a miſdemeanor. And *Livius*, when *Nero*'s name was called over, paſſed the like ſentence againſt him: *My reaſons*, ſaid he, *are, that he has borne falſe witneſs againſt me; and that his reconciliation with me was not ſincere.* Their paſſion and folly appeared yet more extravagant, when they came to take an account of the Tribes. *Nero* ranked his Collegue among thoſe whom he declared ÆRARII, *i. e.* Perſons deprived of the rights c. 37.

Y. of *R.* 549. Bef. *J. C.* 203. 248 Conſul-p. rights of *Roman* Citizenſhip, but ſtill obliged to pay the public taxes. And *Livius* not only did as much for *Nero*, but diſfranchiſed all the thirty five Tribes, except the *Mœcian*, (which was the only one that had formerly voted for him upon his trial) *for*, ſaid he, *it muſt be owned they acted unjuſtly either* once *when they condemned me, or* twice *when they conferred upon me the Conſulſhip and Cenſorſhip.* Among the effects of *Livius*'s anger againſt the people, may be reckoned a tax he laid, during his Cenſorſhip, upon ſalt; ordering that it ſhould be ſold dearer in ſome places than others. It was hence that he got the name of *Salinator*. Theſe Cenſors however were very exact in taking an account of the number of *Roman* Citizens, and ſent to the moſt diſtant of the camps abroad, for that purpoſe. The number appeared to be two hundred and fourteen thouſand fit to bear arms.

CHAP. XXXVI.

SIXTEENTH YEAR of the War.

Scipio *attacks the two camps of* Syphax *and* Aſdrubal.
The Carthaginians *attempt to burn the* Roman *fleet.*
Syphax *taken priſoner.* Maſiniſſa's *conduct towards* Sophoniſba; *and* Scipio's *cenſure of it. Her unhappy fate.* Hannibal *recalled from* Italy. *He arrives with his army in* Africa.

Y. of *R.* 550. Bef. *J. C.* 202. 249 Conſul-p. *Livy*, B. 30. c. 1. WHEN the Comitia had elected *Cn. Servilius Cæpio* and *C. Servilius Geminus* Conſuls for the new year, and came to appoint the Pro-Conſuls, they nominated *Scipio* for *Africa*, directing that he ſhould continue there, in that capacity, till the end of the war.

Early in the ſpring, *Scipio*, knowing the levity of the *Numidian*, and hoping (ſays *Polybius*) that he might by this time be tired both of his wife, and of the *Carthaginians*, employed ſome perſons to ſound his inclinations. Finding that the King inſiſted on the *Romans* leaving *Africa*, and *Hannibal*'s returning from *Italy*, as the conditions of a treaty, the Pro-Conſul formed a new deſign. He pretended to be very deſirous of a peace; and, to carry on the negotiation, frequently ſent deputies to the *Numidian.* Theſe deputies were attended by officers, who underſtood the art of war, and who, in the habit of ſervants, acted the part of ſpies, and obſerved exactly the ſtate and diſpoſition of both the enemies camps. The *Romans* ſeemed ſo fond of an accommodation, that *Syphax* and *Aſdrubal* (for *Scipio* had deſired the King to conſult with the *Carthaginian*) ſtarted new pretenſions; and the diſcuſſion of theſe demands gave the ſpies all the time they could deſire, to make their obſervations. They at length returned, and made their

Polyb. B. 14. c. 1. *Liv.* B. 30. c. 3.

report

report to *Scipio*; who thereupon ſent the *Numidian* this anſwer: "That "he himſelf was earneſt for the treaty, but that none of his council "approved the conditions. That the King muſt therefore come over "to the *Romans* or expect no peace." This declaration put an end to the truce, and *Scipio* was at liberty to execute his project. *Y. of R.* 550. *Bef. J.C.* 202. 249 Conſul-p. *Appian* in *Punic.*

In order thereto, he firſt ſent a detachment to take poſſeſſion of the ground where he had poſted himſelf the laſt autumn, when he beſieged *Utica*. This he did to ſecure his camp from being attacked, in his abſence, by the gariſon of *Utica*; and to make *Aſdrubal* and *Syphax* believe, that he intended to renew his enterprize upon that town. He then aſſembled the ableſt and moſt faithful of his officers, and told them, that his deſign was to ſet fire to the two camps of the enemy the following night, an enterprize which might be eaſily effected, the barracks in which the *Carthaginians* had wintered being made of wood, and thoſe of the *Numidians* of reeds. The project was univerſally applauded. Whereupon *Scipio* divided his troops, and gave the command of one part to *Maſiniſſa*, and of another to *Lælius*, with orders to aſſail the camp of *Syphax* on different ſides. He himſelf with the reſt of his forces marched towards *Aſdrubal*, but reſolving not to begin the attack on his camp till he ſaw that of the *Numidian* actually in flames. The whole ſcheme was happily executed. The *Romans* ſurpriſed and burnt both camps, and deſtroyed forty thouſand of the enemy by fire or ſword. *Syphax* fled to *Abba*; *Aſdrubal* to a city named *Anda*; whither being purſued by *Scipio*, and finding the inhabitants wavering in their reſolutions, he would not venture to ſtand a ſiege. He retired to *Carthage* with two thouſand foot and five hundred horſe. *Polyb.* B. 14. c. 2. *Liv.* B. 30. c. 4. *Liv.* B. 30. c. 5.

Great was the conſternation of the people in that city, when they ſaw him arrive there with thoſe poor remains of his routed army. The Suffetes, (whoſe office in the *Carthaginian* Republic, reſembled that of the Conſuls at *Rome*) convened the Senators. Divided in opinion, ſome were for ſending immediately for *Hannibal*; others for propoſing a truce with the enemy: But the *Barchine* faction inſiſted upon continuing the war, and would hearken to no expedient which tended to the recalling *Hannibal* from *Italy*; and theſe prevailed. The Senate ordered levies to be made both in the city and in the country, and diſpatched ambaſſadors to *Syphax* preſſing him to ſteadineſs in the cauſe of the Republic. *Syphax*, ſtill at *Abba*, was greatly at a loſs what meaſures to follow. The ambaſſadors aſſured him, that [b] *Aſdrubal* would ſpeedily take the field with a conſiderable army, and that a large body of *Celtiberians* from *Spain*, hired into the ſervice, were already landed,

[b] *Appian* differs widely from *Polybius* and *Livy*. He tells us, that the *Carthaginians* condemned *Aſdrubal* to death for his miſconduct, and appointed *Hanno*, the ſon of *Bomilcar*,

Y. of *R.* 550. Bef. *J. C.* 202 landed, and on their march to *Abba*. By theſe aſſurances, but chiefly by the tears and intreaties of his wife *Sophoniſba*, he was fixed in the intereſt of *Carthage*.

249 Conſul p *Polyb.* B. 14. c. 7. *Livy*, B. 30. c. 8.

Scipio was buſy in the ſiege of *Utica*, when he received intelligence that the enemy, having got together near thirty thouſand men, were encamped in a place called *The Great Plain*, about five days march from him. He immediately turned the ſiege into a blockade, and haſtened to attack them. After ſome ſlight ſkirmiſhes, the two armies came to a general battle, in which the *Romans* obtained a complete victory. However, the ſtout reſiſtance, made by the *Celtiberians*, gave the *Africans* the better opportunity to eſcape by flight. *Aſdrubal*, with the remains of his army, retired to *Carthage*, and *Syphax*, with the beſt part of his cavalry, into his own country.

Polyb. B. 14. c. 9. *Livy*, B. 30. c. 9.

The Pro-Conſul having called a council of war, it was there agreed, that *Lælius* and *Maſiniſſa* ſhould purſue *Syphax*, and not give him time to recruit his forces; and that *Scipio* ſhould apply himſelf to reduce the towns in the neighbourhood of *Carthage*. *Tunis*, from whence the capital could be ſeen, opened her gates to him; the gariſon, upon his approach, having deſerted the place.

And now *Carthage* herſelf, expecting to be beſieged, prepared for a long defence; and the Senate diſpatched meſſengers into *Liguria* and *Bruttium*, with orders for *Hannibal* and *Mago* to return home with all poſſible expedition. In the mean time the *Carthaginians* formed a deſign to burn the *Roman* fleet, which lay in ſhelter under the promontory near *Utica*. *Hamilcar*, with an hundred galleys, equipped in a few days, ſailed away to execute this enterprize. The courſe which the *Carthaginian* ſteered was perceived by *Scipio* from *Tunis*: He made all haſte to his fleet, and got thither by land before the enemy arrived. To preſerve his galleys, he drew them up as near to the ſhore as he could, and made a triple or quadruple defence before them of his ſhips of burden moored together, but with ſpaces between, for ſmall veſſels to launch out againſt the enemy. Over theſe ſpaces he laid bridges, for the conveniency of ſending aſſiſtance from one row of ſhips to another; and in the ſhips he placed a thouſand choſen men, with great quantities of miſſive weapons. Had *Hamilcar* been expeditious, he might have deſtroyed all the *Roman* fleet, but, it being night before he came up, he was obliged to lie by; ſo that *Scipio* had time ſufficient to prepare for his reception. Next day the attack began: The *Carthaginian* broke the chain of ſhips in the firſt line, and took ſix of them: But he had not courage to purſue his advantage; he returned with his ſmall prize to *Carthage*.

Liv. B. 30. c. 10.

Bomilcar, to command the army in his room; and that the former being then at *Arda*, got together a body of 8000 foot, and 3000 horſe, and carried on the war againſt the *Romans*, as an independent General. *App. in Punic.* f. 13.

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In the mean time, *Maſiniſſa* and *Lælius*, with a third part of the *Roman* legions, were in purſuit of *Syphax*. In fifteen days they arrived in the heart of *Numidia*; and, when *Maſiniſſa* had taken poſſeſſion of his own kingdom, he carried the war into the dominions of his enemy. *Syphax*, with a numerous army, advanced confidently to meet him; but, in a general action which enſued, was defeated and made priſoner together with one of his ſons. Y. of *R.* 550. Bef. *J. C.* 202. 249 Conſul-p. *Appian* in *Punic.* *Livy*, B. 30. c. 11. & ſeq.

After this, the victorious *Numidian*, with the approbation of *Lælius*, who was to follow by eaſy marches, haſtened to appear before *Cyrtha*, the capital of *Syphax*'s dominions, whom he took with him. On the appearance of their King in chains, thoſe of the inhabitants who were upon the walls deſerted them in a fright; others, to gain the favour of the Conqueror, opened the gates to him. Quickning his horſe, he rode directly to the palace to take poſſeſſion of it. In the entrance of the portico ſtood *Sophoniſba* the wife of *Syphax*. When ſhe ſaw *Maſiniſſa*, judging by the richneſs of his armour, and other marks of diſtinction, that he was the King, ſhe fell down at his feet, and ſaid: "The Gods, your valour, and your good fortune have given you all "power over us. But, if a captive woman may be allowed to ſuppli- "cate the arbiter of her life and death, if ſhe may be permitted to "touch your knees and this victorious right-hand, I beg and implore you, "by the regal Majeſty—with which *we* alſo, it is not long ſince, were "inveſted;—by the name of *Numidian*, common to you with *Syphax*; "by the Gods of this palace (may they receive you more auſpiciouſly "than they have ſent *Syphax* hence!) to grant me this favour, *that "you yourſelf will determine my fate, and not abandon me to the pride "and cruelty of any* Roman. Were it only that I am the wife of *Sy- "phax*, I would rather be at the mercy of a *Numidian*, a native "of *Africa*, as I am, than of an alien and a ſtranger. I need not "ſay what a *Carthaginian*, what a daughter of *Aſdrubal* has to fear "from *Roman* enmity. If you can no other way ſave me from falling "into their hands, do it by my death, I beſeech you, I conjure you." Surpaſſingly beautiful was the ſuppliant, and in the richeſt bloom of life: She claſped the Prince's hand, ſhe embraced his knees; and her pleading, when ſhe ſued to him for a promiſe, that he would not give her up to the *Romans*, was more like the blandiſhments of love, than the prayer of wretchedneſs. The victor, melting not only to pity, but to love, gave her his right hand, the pledge of aſſured protection. *Maſiniſſa* promiſed, without weighing the difficulty of performing; and, had he weighed it, he would ſtill have promiſed. For, when he began to conſider, by what means he might be able to keep his word, *Sophoniſba* being truly *Scipio*'s captive, he took counſel only of his paſſion. He married her that very day; flattering himſelf, that neither *Lælius* nor *Scipio* could think of treating, as a captive,

Y. of *R.* 550. Bef. *J. C.* 202. 249 Conſul-p. the wife of *Maſiniſſa*. The ceremony was hardly over when *Lælius* arrived. Far from diſſembling the diſpleaſure this marriage gave him, he was, at firſt, going to ſnatch the Queen from the arms of her huſband, and ſend her away with the reſt of the priſoners to *Scipio*; but being overcome at length by the King's entreaties, who begged him to refer the matter to the judgment of the Pro-Conſul, he forbore that violence, and took *Maſiniſſa* with him to aſſiſt in the reduction of ſome towns, which adhered to *Syphax*; while this unfortunate King, mad with rage at the ſucceſs of his rival, was ſent under a guard to *Scipio*'s camp.

The whole army were much affected with the ſpectacle of King *Syphax* in chains, a Prince, whoſe alliance had been ſo lately courted by two powerful Republics. The General remembered the hoſpitable entertainment the *Numidian* had formerly given him at his court: And the ſame remembrance encouraged *Syphax* to ſpeak with the more freedom to his conqueror. When *Scipio* aſked him, what it was that could induce him, not only to reject the alliance of *Rome*, but, without provocation, to begin a war againſt her; "Madneſs, *anſwered Syphax.* "But this madneſs did not *then* commence, when I took up arms againſt "the *Roman* people; *that* was the end of it, not the beginning. *Then* "it began, *then* I forgot all private ties and public leagues, when I "married a *Carthaginian* woman. It was the nuptial torch that ſet my "palace on fire. *Sophoniſba* was the ſorcereſs, who by her enchantments "deprived me of my reaſon; nor did ſhe ever reſt till with her own "hands ſhe had armed me with thoſe impious arms I have employed "againſt my gueſt and my friend. But, in the midſt of my adverſity "and ruin, I have this conſolation left, that I ſee the peſt, the fury "gone into the houſe of my moſt implacable enemy. *Maſiniſſa* will "not be more prudent or more ſteady than *Syphax:* Nay, he will be "leſs upon his guard; for he is younger. This at leaſt is ſure; *his* "marriage ſpeaks more of folly and intemperance of paſſion than *mine.* "*Sophoniſba* will have all power over him; and it is in vain to hope "ſhe will ever be brought to favour the *Roman* cauſe; ſo deeply rooted, "ſo immovable is her affection to her country."

App. de Bell. *Punic.* c. 15.

Though theſe words were dictated by the hatred of an enemy, and the rage of jealous love, yet they made a ſtrong impreſſion in the mind of the Pro-Conſul. *Maſiniſſa*'s precipitate marriage in the midſt of arms, without conſulting, or even waiting for *Lælius*, made the King's prediction but too credible: And ſuch ſallies of paſſion, ſays *Livy*, ſeem'd the more inexcuſable to *Scipio*, as he, during his command in *Spain*, had never ſuffered himſelf, though young, to be tranſported by the charms of any of his fair captives. While he was revolving in his thoughts this ſtrange event, *Lælius* and *Maſiniſſa* arrived. The Pro-Conſul received them both with equal marks of kindneſs; and having in a crowded aſſembly of his officers, expatiated in their praiſe, he took *Maſiniſſa* aſide,

aſide, and ſpoke to him in the following manner. " It was doubtleſs, " *Maſiniſſa*, ſome good qualities you ſaw in me, which inclined you, in " *Spain*, to enter into friendſhip with me; and afterwards, in *Africa*, to " commit yourſelf and your fortunes to my protection. Of all the " virtues for which you think my friendſhip deſirable, there is none in " which I pride myſelf more than *continence:* And I wiſh, *Maſiniſſa*, " that *You*, to your other eminent virtues, would add *this* alſo. There " is not, believe me, there is not ſo much danger, to our years, from " armed enemies, as from the pleaſures that on all ſides ſurround us. " He who has acquired the maſtery over his appetites and paſſions, has " made a nobler conqueſt, and gained greater glory, than we by our " vanquiſhing King *Syphax*. The exploits of bravery which you have " performed in my abſence, I have juſt now publicly acknow- " ledged, and *ſhall* remember: The reſt I had rather you yourſelf " ſhould reflect upon, than that I, by the mention of it, ſhould put " you to the bluſh. *Syphax* was conquered and made priſoner, under " the auſpices of the people of *Rome*. He, therefore, his wife, his " kingdom, his lands, his towns, all who inhabit them, all that be- " longed to *Syphax*, are become the property of the *Roman* people. " *Sophoniſba*, if ſhe were not a *Carthaginian*, if her father did not " command the army of our enemies, muſt, as well as her huſband, " be ſent to *Rome:* It is the prerogative of the Senate and people " there, to determine the fate of a woman, who is charged with having " ſeduced a King from our alliance, and hurried him to take arms " againſt us. *Maſiniſſa*, get the better of yourſelf. Beware of tar- " niſhing, by one vice, the luſtre of many virtues. Do not loſe the " merit of ſo many ſervices, by a ſingle fault, to which the cauſe of it " bears no proportion [b]."

Y. of *R.* 550. Bef. *J. C.* 202. 249 Conſul. p.

Livy tells us, that this diſcourſe brought bluſhes into the Prince's cheeks, and drew tears from his eyes. When he had promiſed an abſolute ſubmiſſion to the General's pleaſure, and had begged, that he might be permitted, as far as the ſituation of things would allow to perform the raſh promiſe he had given *Sophoniſba*, of not delivering her into the power of any other perſon, he left *Scipio*'s tent in confuſion, and retired to his own. There ſhutting himſelf up, he ſpent ſome time

[b] It is ſomewhat ſtrange, that *Livy* ſhould make his divine *Scipio* preach ſuch a grave lecture upon *continence*, when he had nothing in his heart but *murder*. The manifeſt aim of his Ethicks, as appears by the ſequel, was to perſuade the Prince either to murder the woman he had juſt married, or to give her up to be murdered by the *Romans*. Had the *Numidian* married half the women of *Cyrtha*, he would probably have eſcaped the lecture, provided *Sophoniſba* had not been of the number. But *Scipio* dreaded the power of the beautiful *Carthaginian* Dame over her new Huſband.

Appian (differing from *Livy*) tells us that *Scipio* at firſt only deſired *Maſiniſſa* to deliver up *Syphax*'s wife; that the Prince refuſing to comply, the General ſharply forbad him to think of keeping by force what of right belonged to the *Roman* people; and having commanded him to give up the prey, added, that then, if he pleaſed, he might petition for it. *App.* in *Punic.* l. 15.

Y. of *R.* 550. Bef. *J. C.* 202 249 Conſul-p.

alone in ſighs and groans, ſo loud as to be heard by the ſoldiers without the pavilion. At length he called a truſty ſlave, who had charge of the poiſon, which (after the manner of Kings) was kept ready againſt unforeſeen adverſities; and bid him, when he had prepared a potion, carry it to *Sophoniſba*, with this meſſage. "*Maſiniſſa* would gladly "have fulfilled the marriage engagement, the obligation of a huſband "to a wife; but ſince to do this is denied him by thoſe who have "the power to hinder it, he now performs his other promiſe, *that ſhe* "*ſhould not be delivered up alive to the* Romans. *Sophoniſba*, mindful of "her father, her country, and the two Kings, whoſe wife ſhe has been, "will conſult her own honour." When the miniſter of death came to the Queen, and with the meſſage preſented her the poiſon: "I "accept, *ſaid ſhe*, this marriage gift; nor is it unwelcome, if my "huſband could *indeed* do nothing kinder for his wife. This how-"ever tell him, *That I ſhould have died with more honour, if I had not* "*married at my funeral.*" She ſpoke theſe words with a reſolute countenance, took the cup with a ſteady hand, and drank it off. The news being brought to *Scipio*, he ſent for the *Numidian* Prince; and, leſt his diſtempered mind ſhould carry him to ſome action yet more deſperate, diſcourſed to him in friendly manner; now endeavouring to conſole him; then gently reproving him, for having expiated one act of temerity by another, and given a more tragical concluſion to the affair than was neceſſary. Next day the Pro-Conſul aſſembled the ſoldiers, mounted his tribunal, and, before them all, addreſſing himſelf to *Maſiniſſa*, ſtiled him King; and, when he had been laviſh in his praiſe, preſented him with a crown and cup of gold, a curule chair, an ivory ſcepter, an embroider'd robe, and a tunick wrought with palm branches. And theſe preſents he enhanced, by ſaying, that, "in a TRIUMPH, than which nothing "among the *Romans* was more magnificent, the triumphant victors had "no ſtatelier ornaments; and that *Maſiniſſa* was the only foreigner the "*Roman* people thought worthy of them." The King's affliction was ſoothed by theſe honours, and his mind raiſed from its depreſſion, to the hope of poſſeſſing all *Numidia*.

Liv. B. 30. c. 16.

The ſeaſon of the year being far advanced, *Scipio*, when he had ſent *Lælius*, with *Syphax*, and the reſt of the *Numidian* captives, to *Rome*, returned to his old poſt near *Tunis*. *Carthage*, greatly alarmed at the neighbourhood of the *Roman* army, and the loſs ſhe had ſuffered by the captivity of *Syphax*, began now to think of changing her meaſures, and of endeavouring to gain time, by a fraudulent treaty of peace, till *Hannibal* and *Mago* ſhould arrive from *Italy*. The Senate diſpatched to the Pro-Conſul thirty of its principal members; who caſt themſelves at his feet, threw the whole blame of the war upon the ambition of *Hannibal*, implored the clemency of the conqueror, and offered to accept any terms he ſhould impoſe. *Scipio* haughtily anſwered, That his intention in coming into *Africa* was not

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to make peace with the *Carthaginians*, but to conquer them, which he had now in a manner done. He added; *Yet to convince the world that* Rome *can put an end to wars, as well as begin them, with juſtice, I ſhall not refuſe you a peace on theſe conditions:* Y. of *R.* 550. Bef. *J. C.* 202. 249 Conſul-p.

You ſhall reſtore all priſoners, deſerters, and fugitive ſlaves;

Withdraw your troops from Italy, *and* Ciſalpine Gaul;

Make an abſolute ceſſion of Spain *to us;*

Yield up to us all the iſlands between Italy *and* Africa;

Give us all your long ſhips, except twenty;

Furniſh my army with five hundred thouſand modii of wheat, and three hundred thouſand of barley;

And pay us 5000 *talents.*

I allow you three days to conſider of theſe conditions; and if in that time you agree to them, you ſhall have a truce, till the return of the embaſſadors whom you ſhall ſend to Rome, *to conclude a peace there.*

As the buſineſs of the *Carthaginians* was only to gain time, they made no great difficulty of conſenting to *Scipio*'s demands: And, the better to impoſe upon him, they ſent a ſmall number of *Roman* captives and deſerters, to *Rome*, with their embaſſadors.

In the mean time, *Lælius* arrived at *Rome*, with *Syphax*, and the *Numidian* nobles taken in war. The Conſcript Fathers, upon his report of the wonderful ſucceſs of the *Roman* arms, decreed a four-days ſupplication to the Gods. As to *Syphax*, they ordered that he ſhould be confined a priſoner at *Alba*, (in the country of the *Marſi*:) They confirmed to *Maſiniſſa* the title of King, which *Scipio* had given him; and ſent him new preſents in the name of the Republic. *Liv.* B. 30. c. 17.

The campaign in *Bruttium* ſeems to have produced no remarkable action this ſummer. Several towns in that country ſurrendered to the Conſul *Servilius Cæpio*, who is alſo ſaid to have fought a battle with *Hannibal*, the ſucceſs uncertain. The other Conſul *Servilius Geminus* did nothing memorable either in *Hetruria* or *Gaul*, except that he recovered his father and uncle from the captivity in which they had been, for ſixteen years, among the *Boii*. He entered *Rome*, with one of them on his right hand, and the other on his left. But he was forced to petition the people to grant a decree, indemnifying him for having, contrary to law, executed the offices of Tribune of the Commons and Plebeian Ædile, in the life-time of his father, who had been a curule magiſtrate. His plea was, That he then knew not whether his father were alive or dead; and the people allowed it to be good. c. 18, 19.

Mago fell down upon *Inſubria*, and fought a battle with two *Roman* armies, under the conduct of the Pro-Conſul *Corn. Cethegus*, and the Prætor *Quintilius Varus*. The victory was obſtinately diſputed, till the *Carthaginian* General, by a wound which he received, was conſtrained to yield the day to the *Romans*. He decamped the night following, and retired

V. of *R.* 550 Bef. *J. C.* 202 249 Conſul-p

into *Liguria*. Hither came meſſengers from the Senate of *Carthage* with orders to him to return to *Africa* as ſoon as poſſible. Embarking all his troops, both *Ligurian* and *Spaniſh*, he ſet ſail immediately. Scarce had he doubled the iſland of *Sardinia* when he died of his wound; and a ſtorm diſperſing the fleet, many of the ſhips were taken by the *Romans*.

When *Hannibal* received the ſame orders, as his brother, he was ſcarce able to reſtrain his tears. "Now, *ſaid he*, the Senate openly and expreſsly recal me; but they have been dragging me away ever ſince they refuſed to ſend me ſupplies of men and money. The *Romans*, whom I have ſo often routed, have not vanquiſhed *Hannibal*. It is the *Carthaginian* Senate that, by detraction and envy, have overcome me [a]. Nor will *Scipio* exult more at my leaving *Italy*, than *Hanno*; who ſince he can no other way deſtroy my family, is reſolved to overwhelm it with the ruins of his country." However, as he had foreſeen what now happened, he had prepared his fleet for a voyage. Sending away the uſeleſs part of his ſoldiery into the towns of *Bruttium*, under pretence of guarding them, he embarked all the ſtrength of his army for *Africa* [b]. No man ever went into baniſhment from his own country, with greater reluctance, than *Hannibal* left the country of his enemies. When he was out at ſea, he often looked back on the coaſt, accuſing Gods and men, and himſelf (ſays *Livy*) for being diſappointed of his expected conqueſt.

The joy at *Rome*, on the news of his departure, was great, but not univerſal. Some of the Fathers thought it a diſhonour to the *Roman* name, that *Hannibal* was ſuffered to leave *Italy* with all his army, as quietly as if he had been ſetting out from his own country. They alſo feared the difficulties which *Scipio* would have to ſtruggle with; and *Fabius* encreaſed their terror, by exclaiming, *That the Republic was never in a more deplorable ſtate.* Others confided in the abilities of the Pro-Conſul, and thought it the greateſt of all advantages, to ſee *Italy* rid of her moſt dangerous and moſt implacable enemy: And the Senate, coming into this ſentiment, directed that public thankſgivings ſhould be offered to the Gods during five days.

Plutarch's life of *Fabius*.

Lælius, whom the Republic had juſt choſen Quæſtor to *Scipio*'s army, in the room of *Cato*, was upon his way to re-embark for *Africa*, when he received an order to return to *Rome:* For the embaſſadors from *Carthage* being arrived, the Conſcript Fathers thought it proper to have him preſent at ſo important a negotiation. The *Carthaginians* had

[a] *Plutarch* imputes this to the *good fortune* which conſtantly attended *Rome*. It was this good fortune (ſays he) which poured forth *Hannibal* like water, and waſted him in *Italy*, while his countrymen, through envy and civil diſcord, refuſed to ſend him ſupplies. *Plut. de Fortun. Roman.* S. 21.

[b] *Livy* reports, that *Hannibal* maſſacred, in the temple of *Juno Lacinia*, ſome of the *Italians*, who had fled thither for refuge, after refuſing to follow him into *Africa*.

their

their audience of the Senate in the temple of *Bellona*, without the walls of *Rome*. They ſpoke in much the ſame ſtrain as before to *Scipio*, throwing all the blame of the war upon *Hannibal*; and, in concluſion, deſired, *That the articles agreed on between* Rome *and* Carthage, *in the time of* C. Lutatius, (the cloſe of the firſt *Punic* war) *might continue in full force, and be the foundation of a laſting peace.* Upon this, ſome of the elder Senators, who obſerved that theſe *African* enbaſſadors were young men, examined them concerning the expedients employed to put an end to that war: And the latter not being able to give any tolerable account of the times of *Lutatius*, the Fathers began to ſuſpect that *Carthage* was not ſincere in the preſent affair. When they came to vote (after the embaſſadors had withdrawn) ſome were againſt coming to any determination without one of the Conſuls, who were both abſent; others adviſed the conſulting *Scipio*, previouſly to any concluſion; and others, fully perſuaded that *Carthage* was diſſembling, were for commanding the embaſſadors immediately out of *Italy*, as ſo many ſpies, and for directing *Scipio* to proſecute the war with vigour. *Lælius* joined in this opinion; and ſome writers ſay that it prevailed: But others, with more probability, affirm, that the peace was accepted on the foot upon which *Scipio* had propoſed it in *Africa*.

Y. of *R.* 556. Bef. *J. C.* 202. 249 Conſul-p.

Liv. B. 30. c. 23. *Polyb.* B. 15. c. 1.

Whilſt this affair employed the Senate, *Hannibal* was making the beſt of his way to *Carthage*. The Conſul *Servilius Cæpio* reſolving to follow him, left his province, and went into *Sicily*, to prepare for an expedition into *Africa*; but his deſign did not pleaſe the Conſcript Fathers: They thought he intended to rob *Scipio* of the honour of concluding the peace. A Dictator was therefore created, merely that there might be a magiſtrate in the Republic, who ſhould have an undiſputed authority to recal *Servilius*. The Conſul being recalled, obeyed, and returned to *Rome*.

About this time died in a very advanced [a] age the famous *Q. Fabius Cunctator*. He was certainly, ſays *Livy*, worthy of the name of *Maximus* which he bore; and his glory equalled that of any of his anceſtors. Prudence and circumſpection were what diſtinguiſhed him; not remarkable activity or an enterprizing genius. But it is a queſtion, whether his *cunctation* was the effect of his temper, or owing to the nature of the war he had to conduct. Be that as it will, his wiſe management, in a dangerous conjuncture, ſaved his country from ruin [b]: And the *Roman* people, ſenſible of their obligation to him, greatly honoured him while living; and, when he died, laid a tax upon themſelves to defray the expences of his funeral.

Liv. B. 30. c. 24.

[a] According to *Val. Max.* (B. 8. c. 13. ſ. 3.) *Fabius* was near an hundred years old when he died. If this were true, he muſt have been about eighty ſix, when he conducted the war againſt *Hannibal*, and about eighty nine in his laſt Conſulſhip.

[b] *Unus homo nobis cunctando reſtituit rem.*

While

Y. of *R.* 550. Bef. *J. C.* 202. 249 Conſul-p.

While the truce in *Africa* ſtill ſubſiſted, and before the embaſſadors were yet returned, an accident diſcovered the fraudulent deſigns of the *Carthaginians*. *Scipio* had thought it neceſſary to have a ſtrong ſea-armament, in order to terrify the enemy, and to remove the neceſſity of protecting his fleet, as formerly, with his land army; and he had therefore ſent for a reinforcement of ſhips, both from *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. The ſquadron from *Sardinia* arrived ſafe, but that from *Sicily* was diſperſed by a tempeſt, and many of the veſſels being driven near the port of *Carthage*, the *Carthaginians* ſeized and plundered them. *Scipio* highly incenſed at this proceeding, diſpatched *M. Bæbius*, with two other officers, to *Carthage*, to complain of the injuſtice, and demand ſatisfaction. Theſe envoys hardly eſcaped the fury of the populace: And even the Senate, being bent on war, agreed to ſend them back without an anſwer; ſuch dependance they had on *Hannibal*, who was daily expected: Nay, they gave orders (as ſome ſay) that the two galleys, appointed by them to convoy the *Quinqueremis*, on which the envoys were embarked, ſhould leave it at a certain time; and that ſome ſhips, kept in readineſs for that purpoſe, ſhould attack and ſink it. The *Quinqueremis* was accordingly deſerted by her convoy, near the mouth of the river *Bagrada*, and being ſoon after attacked by three *Carthaginian* galleys, was forced to run aground on the ſtrand; but the envoys eſcaped to the *Roman* camp.

Polyb. B. 15. c. 1. *Liv.* B. 30. c. 25.

The General ſo impatiently expected by the *African* Republic, at length drew near the coaſt. To diſcover the country, he ordered a ſailor to the maſt-top; who being aſked, what he ſaw, anſwered, *The ruins of a tomb, upon an eminence*. *Hannibal*, diſliking the omen, ſailed on; and landed his army at *Little Leptis*, a city between *Suſa* and *Adrumetum*.

CHAP. XXXVII.

SEVENTEENTH YEAR of the war.

An interview between Hannibal *and* Scipio.
The battle of Zama.
Scipio *enters into a treaty of peace with the* Carthaginians, *which is ratified the year following*.

Y. of *R.* 551. Bef. *J. C.* 201. 250 Conſul-p.

TIB. Claudius Nero, and *M. Servilius Pulex*, being choſen Conſuls at *Rome*, for the new year, it fell by lot to *Servilius* to conduct the army in *Hetruria*, and to *Claudius*, to command the fleet in *Africa*: But the latter, by a decree of both Senate and people, was to leave the direction of all affairs at land wholly to *Scipio*.

Liv. B. 30. c. 27.

Hannibal

Hannibal, having learnt, ſoon after his landing, that hoſtilities were renewed, took meaſures to ſtrengthen his army. Being in great want of horſe, he ſent to *Tychæus*, a friend of *Syphax*, and reputed to have the beſt in *Africa*; and of him obtained a body of two thouſand *Numidian* cavalry. On the other hand, *Scipio* purſued the war with an uncommon fury, kindled by the perfidiouſneſs of the *Carthaginians*. He took towns, not by capitulation, but aſſault, put the gariſons to the ſword, and made all the inhabitants paſs under the yoke. However, in the midſt of his reſentment he did not forget the laws of nations, *Bæbius*, who had been ſo ill treated, when ſent on an embaſſy to *Carthage*, had ſince arreſted the *Carthaginian* embaſſadors, on their arrival from *Italy*, in the port where the *Roman* fleet lay; and he thought that the injury he had ſuffered would be retaliated upon them by *Scipio*. But the Pro-Conſul did not conſider ſo much what *Carthage* deſerved, as what became a *Roman*. He commanded that the embaſſadors ſhould be well treated, and diſmiſſed. As he continued, nevertheleſs, to make dreadful havock in the *Carthaginian* territory, the Senate diſpatched orders to their General to advance and give him battle. *Hannibal* anſwered, that he would take the firſt opportunity that offered; and ſoon after, leaving his poſt at *Adrumetum*, drew near to *Zama*, a town in *Numidia Propria*, five days journey ſouth weſt of *Carthage*. From hence he ſent out ſpies, to diſcover the ſituation, and ſtrength of the *Romans*. Theſe ſpies were apprehended: But though it was then cuſtomary in all nations, to put ſuch men to death, *Scipio* gave direction to lead one of them into all the quarters of the camp, and ſhew him every thing he came to learn; which done, diſmiſſing both him and his companions, he bad them go to their General, and give him the account he expected from them. *Hannibal* is ſaid to have been ſtruck with this magnanimity and air of confidence, and to have been thereby induced to aſk an interview with the Pro-Conſul, in order to a peace. *Scipio* conſented, and, to meet him, advanced as far as *Nadagara*, a town on the confines of *Numidia*. The *Carthaginian* came and encamped within four miles of the *Romans*, not far from *Zama* [a].

Y. of *R.* 551. Bef. *C.* 201. 250 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* B. 25. c. 3.

App. in *Punic.* *Polyb.* B. 25. c. 3, 4.

There

[a] *Appian* tells us, that before this conference, *Hannibal*, being in great want of proviſions, ſent to *Maſiniſſa*, deſiring he would uſe his endeavours with *Scipio* to obtain a peace for the *Carthaginians*. *Scipio* conſented to renew the former treaty, upon condition reſtitution was made of the ſhips, men and effects of his diſperſed fleet, which had been ſeized, and that *Carthage* ſhould pay a thouſand talents as a fine. *Hannibal* accepted theſe terms, and the Senate of *Carthage* likewiſe agreed to them, but the populace would not give their conſent. They were jealous of their General and the Nobles, who they thought were deſirous of making a peace advantageous to *Rome*, that by her means they might govern the more deſpotically at home. And the people were ſo full of theſe imaginations, that having got notice at this time,

Y. of *R.* 551. Bef. *J. C.* 201 250 Conful-p.

There was between the two camps a large plain, entirely open, and where no ambuſh could be laid. This place being therefore choſen for the conference, the two Generals rode thither, eſcorted by an equal number of guards; from whom ſeparating, and each attended only by an interpreter, they met in the mid-way. Both remained for a while ſilent, viewing each other with mutual admiration. *Hannibal* at length ſpoke thus.

Liv. B. 30. c. 30. *Polyb.* B. 15. c. 6.

" Since fate has ſo ordained it, that I, who began the war, " and who have been ſo often on the point of ending it by a complete " conqueſt, ſhould now come, of my own motion, to aſk a peace, I am " glad that it is of you, *Scipio*, I have the fortune to aſk it. Nor will " this be among the leaſt of your glories, That *Hannibal*, victorious over " ſo many *Roman* Generals, ſubmitted at laſt to you.

" I could wiſh, that our fathers and we had confined our ambition " within the limits which nature ſeemed to have preſcribed to it; the " ſhores of *Africa*, and the ſhores of *Italy*. The Gods did not give us " that mind. On both ſides we have been ſo eager after foreign poſ- " ſeſſions, as to put our own to the hazard of war. *Rome* and *Carthage* " have had, each, in her turn, the enemy at her gates. But ſince " errors paſt may be more eaſily blamed than corrected, let it now be " the work of you and me, to put an end, if poſſible, to the obſtinate " contention. For my own part, my years, and the experience I have " had of the inſtability of fortune, incline me to leave nothing to her " determination which reaſon can decide. But much I fear, *Scipio*, " that your youth, your want of the like experience, your uninter- " rupted ſucceſs, may render you averſe from the thoughts of peace. " He whom fortune has never failed, rarely reflects upon her incon- " ſtancy. Yet without recurring to former examples, my own may " perhaps ſuffice to teach you moderation. I am that ſame *Hannibal* who, " after my victory at *Cannæ*, became maſter of the greateſt part of your " country, and deliberated with myſelf what fate I ſhould decree to " *Italy* and to *Rome*. And now—See the change! Here, in *Africa*, I " am come to treat with a *Roman*, for my own preſervation and my " country's. Such are the ſports of fortune. Is ſhe then to be " truſted, becauſe ſhe ſmiles? An advantageous peace is preferable " to the hope of victory. The one is in your own power, the other " at the pleaſure of the Gods. Should you prove victorious, it would

that *Aſdrubal*, whom they had ſuſpected of the ſame deſign, was returned to the city, they went in a tumultuous manner to ſeek him, in order to put him to death. He had fled to his father's tomb, and had there ended his days by poiſon. But the rage of the mutineers did not ceaſe at the ſight of his dead body. They dragged it out of the tomb, cut off the head, fixed it on a lance, and carried it through the ſtreets of *Carthage*. *App. Punic. c.* 20.

Thus far *Appian*; but neither *Livy* nor *Polybius* mention any thing of all this, and ſome parts of the ſtory are inconſiſtent with what thoſe authors relate.

" add little to your own glory, or the glory of your country; if van- Y. of *R.* 551.
" quiſhed, you loſe in one hour all the honour and reputation you Bef. *J.C.* 201.
" have been ſo many years acquiring. But what is my aim in all this? 250 Conſul p.
" That you ſhould content yourſelf with our ceſſion of *Spain*, *Sicily*,
" *Sardinia*, and all the iſlands between *Italy* and *Africa*. A peace on
" theſe conditions will, in my opinion, not only ſecure the future
" tranquillity of *Carthage*, but be ſufficiently glorious for you, and for
" the *Roman* name. And do not tell me, that ſome of our citizens
" dealt fraudulently with you in the late treaty. It is I, *Hannibal*, that
" now aſk a peace: I aſk it, becauſe I think it expedient for my
" country; and, thinking it expedient, I will inviolably maintain it."

SCIPIO anſwered: " I knew very well, *Hannibal*, that it was the
" hope of your return which emboldened the *Carthaginians* to break
" the truce with us, and to lay aſide all thoughts of a peace, when it
" was juſt upon the point of being concluded; and your preſent propoſal
" is a proof of it. You retrench from their conceſſions every thing
" but what we are, and have been long poſſeſſed of. But as it
" is your care, that your fellow citizens ſhould have the obligation to
" you of being eaſed from a great part of their burthen, ſo it ought to be
" mine, that they draw no advantage from their perfidiouſneſs.

" No body is more ſenſible than I am of the weakneſs of man, and
" the power of fortune, and that whatever we enterpriſe is ſubject to
" a thouſand chances. If, before the *Romans* paſſed into *Africa*, you
" had, of your own accord, quitted *Italy*, and made the offers you now
" make, I believe they would not have been rejected. But as you have
" been forced out of *Italy*, and we are maſters here of the open
" country, the ſituation of things is much altered. And, what is chiefly
" to be conſidered, the *Carthaginians* by the late treaty, which we en-
" tered into at their requeſt, were, over and above what you offer,
" to have delivered up their ſhips of war, reſtored to us our priſoners
" without ranſom, paid us five thouſand talents, and to have given
" hoſtages for the performance of all. The Senate accepted theſe con-
" ditions, but *Carthage* failed on her part; *Carthage* deceived us.
" What then is to be done? Are the *Carthaginians* to be releaſed from
" the moſt important articles of the treaty, as a reward of their breach
" of faith? No, certainly. If to the conditions before agreed upon,
" you had added ſome new article to our advantage, there would have
" been matter of reference to the *Roman* people; but when, inſtead of
" adding, you retrench, there is no room for deliberation. The *Car-*
" *thaginians* therefore muſt ſubmit to us at diſcretion, or muſt vanquiſh
" us in battle [b].

The

[b] According to *Livy*, *Scipio* propoſed to adviſe with his Council about granting peace, provided the *Carthaginians* would, beſide fulfilling the conditions of the late treaty,

Y. of *R.* 551. Bef. *C.* 201. 250 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* B. 15. c. 9. *& ſeq.*

The conference hereupon broke off, the two Generals returned each to his camp, and bid their ſoldiers prepare for battle; a battle wherein the *Carthaginians* were to fight for their own preſervation and the dominion of *Africa*; and the *Romans* for the empire of the whole world [c].

Early next morning *Scipio* led his troops into the plain, and drew them up after the *Roman* manner, except that he placed the cohorts of the *Principes* directly behind thoſe of the *Haſtati*, ſo as to leave ſufficient ſpace for the enemy's elephants to paſs through from front to rear. *C. Lælius* was poſted on the left wing with the *Italian* horſe, and *Maſiniſſa* with his *Numidians* on the right. The intervals of the firſt line *Scipio* filled up with his *Velites*, or light-armed troops, ordering them, upon a ſignal given, to begin the battle, and, in caſe they were repulſed, or broke by the elephants, to run back through the lanes before mentioned, and continue on their flight till they were got behind the *Triarii*. Thoſe that were wounded, or in danger of being overtaken, were to turn off to the right and left, through the ſpaces between the lines, and that way eſcape to the rear.

The army thus drawn up, *Scipio* went from rank to rank, urging his ſoldiers to conſider the conſequences of a defeat, and the rewards of victory: on the one hand, certain death or ſlavery, (for they had no town in *Africa* ſtrong enough to protect them,) on the other, not only a laſting ſuperiority over *Carthage*, but the empire of the reſt of the world.

Hannibal ranged all his elephants, to the number of above eighty, in one front. Behind theſe he placed his mercenaries, conſiſting of twelve thouſand men, *Ligurians*, *Gauls*, *Baleares* and *Mauritanians*.

treaty, agree to pay a fine for having ſeized the *Roman* ſhips, and violated their Embaſſadors, during the truce. The account in the text is taken from *Polybius*, who, being perſonally acquainted with *Maſiniſſa*, and intimate with the younger *Scipio* and his friend *Lælius*, is more to be depended on, than any other writer, on this ſubject.

[c] *Polybius* adds [B. 15. c. 11.] that, which ever party ſhould prove victorious in this battle, would not only become maſters of *Africa* and *Europe*, but of all the reſt of the known world. *Livy* [B. 30. c. 32.] is of the ſame opinion. This however could hardly be true of the *Carthaginians*; for had they proved victorious at *Zama*, they would not have been in ſo flouriſhing a condition, as in the beginning of the war; nor have had ſo good a proſpect of conquering the *Romans* as juſt after the battle of *Cannæ*, when *Hannibal* was maſter of the greater part of *Italy*. The *Carthaginians* were now driven out of *Spain*, had ſuſtained infinite loſſes, and been at a vaſt expence during the courſe of a ſeventeen years war. On the other hand, *Rome* had recovered the poſſeſſion of all *Italy*, had powerful armies on foot there, and ſtrong fleets at ſea; ſo that had *Scipio* been defeated, ſhe could eaſily tranſport more forces into *Africa*. And this ſuggeſts a reaſon why *Hannibal* did not decline a battle with the *Romans*, and endeavour to conſume their ſtrength, without fighting. He doubtleſs foreſaw, that they would daily grow ſtronger by continual ſupplies of men and money from *Italy*. Add to this, that the army which *Hannibal* now commanded ſeems to have been the laſt reſource of *Carthage*. The greater part of it had been raiſed with difficulty, and it would be no eaſy matter to find pay and proviſions for ſuch numerous forces, during any conſiderable time, the treaſury being exhauſted, and the country ruined.

The

The new levies of *Carthaginians* and other *Africans*, together with four thouſand *Macedonians*, under a General named *Sopater*, compoſed the ſecond line. And in the rear of all, at the diſtance of about a furlong, he poſted his *Italian* troops, in whom he chiefly confided. The *Carthaginian* horſe formed his right wing, the *Numidians* his left [d]. Y. of *R.* 551. Bef. *J. C.* 201. 250 Conſul-p.

He ordered the ſeveral leaders to exhort their troops, not to be diſcouraged by their own weakneſs, but to place the hope of victory in him and his *Italian* army; and particularly directed the captains of the *Carthaginians* to repreſent to them what would be the fate of their wives and children, if the event of this battle ſhould not prove ſucceſsful. The General himſelf, walking through the ranks of his *Italian* troops, called upon them to be mindful of the ſeventeen campaigns in which they had been fellow ſoldiers with him; and of that conſtant ſeries of victories, by which they had extinguiſhed in the *Romans* all hope of ever being conquerors. He urged them to remember, above all, the battles of the *Trebia*, *Thraſymenus* and *Cannæ*; with any of which the approaching battle was in no wiſe to be compared, either with reſpect to the bravery, or the number of the enemies. "The "*Romans* were yet unfoiled, and in the height of their ſtrength when "you firſt met them in the field; nevertheleſs you vanquiſhed them. "The ſoldiers now before us are either the children of the vanquiſhed, "or the remains of thoſe whom you have often put to flight in *Italy*. "Maintain therefore your General's glory and your own, and eſtabliſh "to yourſelves the name of *invincible*, by which you are become fa"mous throughout the world."

When the *Numidians* of the two armies had ſkirmiſhed a while, *Hannibal* ordered the managers of the elephants to drive them upon the enemy. Some of the beaſts, frightned at the noiſe of the trumpets and other inſtruments of war, which ſounded on all ſides, immediately ran back amongſt the *Numidians* of the *Carthaginian* left wing, and put them into confuſion, which *Maſiniſſa* taking advantage of, entirely routed them. Great deſtruction was made of the *Velites*, by the reſt of the elephants, till theſe alſo being terrified, ſome of them ran through the void ſpaces of the *Roman* army, which *Scipio* had left for that purpoſe; others, falling in among the cavalry of the enemy's right wing, gave *Lælius* the ſame opportunity againſt the *Carthaginian* horſe, as had been given to *Maſiniſſa* againſt the *Numidian*, and of which

[d] Neither *Polybius* nor *Livy* mention the number of forces *Hannibal* and *Scipio* had at *Zama*. *Appian* [in Punic. c. 22.] tells us, that *Hannibal* had near fifty thouſand men in the field, and *Scipio* twenty three thouſand foot, and fifteen hundred *Italian* horſe, ſix hundred *Numidian* horſe, under one *Lacumaces*, and a great body of cavalry, commanded by *Maſiniſſa*. But *Appian* gives a very romantic account of this battle, and differs widely from *Polybius* and *Livy*.

V. of *R.* 551. Bef *J.C.* 201. 250 Conſul-p.

the *Roman* did not fail to make the ſame uſe. After this the infantry of the foremoſt lines joined battle. *Hannibal*'s mercenaries had the advantage in the beginning of the conflict; but the *Roman Haſtati*, followed, and encouraged by the *Principes*, who exhorted them to fight manfully, and ſhewed themſelves ready to aſſiſt them, bravely ſuſtained the attack, and at length gained ground upon the enemy. The mercenaries, not being ſeaſonably ſupported by their ſecond line, and therefore thinking themſelves betrayed, they, in their retreat, fell furiouſly upon the *Africans*, ſo that theſe, the *Haſtati* coming up, were obliged to fight for ſome time both againſt their own mercenaries and the enemy. When the two *Carthaginian* lines had ceaſed their mutual rage, they joined their ſtrength; and, though now but a mere throng of men, broke the *Haſtati:* but then the *Principes* advancing to the aſſiſtance of the latter, reſtored the battle; and moſt of the *Africans* and mercenaries were here cut off. *Hannibal* did not advance to their relief, the *Roman Triarii* not having yet engaged, and the *Principes* being ſtill in good order: And leſt the routed *Africans* and mercenaries ſhould break the ranks of his *Italian* ſoldiers, he commanded theſe to preſent their ſpears at thoſe who fled to them for protection, which obliged the runaways to move off to the right and left.

The ground, over which the *Romans* muſt march before they could attack *Hannibal*, being ſtrewed with heaps of dead bodies and weapons, and being ſlippery with blood, *Scipio* feared that the order of his battalions would be broke, ſhould he paſs it haſtily. To avoid this miſchief, he commanded the *Haſtati* to give over the purſuit, and halt where they were, oppoſite to the enemies center: After which, having ſent all his wounded to the rear, he advanced leiſurely with the *Principes* and *Triarii*, and placed them on the wings of the *Haſtati*. Then followed a ſharp engagement, in which victory was long and eagerly diſputed. It would ſeem, that the *Romans*, though *ſuperior in number*, were once upon the point of loſing the day; for *Polybius* tells us, that *Maſiniſſa* and *Lælius* came very ſeaſonably, and as if ſent from Heaven, to their aſſiſtance. Theſe Generals being returned from the purſuit of the cavalry, fell ſuddenly upon the rear of *Hannibal*'s men, moſt of whom were cut off in their ranks; and of thoſe that fled, very few eſcaped the horſe, the country all around being a plain.

Liv. B. 30. c. 34.

Polyb. B. 15. c. 14.

There died of the *Carthaginians* in the fight above twenty thouſand, and almoſt the like number were taken priſoners. The loſs on the ſide of the *Romans* amounted to about two thouſand men. *Hannibal* eſcaped with a few horſe to *Adrumetum*,, having performed every thing in the engagement which could be expected from a great General. His army (ſays *Polybius*) could not have been more ſkilfully drawn up. For as the order of the *Roman* battalions makes it extremely difficult to break them, the *Carthaginian* wiſely placed his elephants

elephants in the front, that they might put the enemy in confuſion, before the armies ſhould engage. In his firſt line he placed the mercenaries, men bold and active, but not well diſciplined, that by their impetuoſity he might give a check to the ardour of the *Romans*. The *Africans* and *Carthaginians*, whoſe courage he doubted, he poſted in the middle between the mercenaries and his *Italian* ſoldiers, that they might be forced to fight, or, at leaſt, that the *Romans*, by ſlaughtering them, might fatigue themſelves, and blunt their weapons. Laſt of all, he drew up the troops he had diſciplined himſelf, and in whom he chiefly confided, at a good diſtance from his ſecond line, that they might not be broken by the rout of the *Africans* and mercenaries; and kept them in reſerve for a vigorous attack upon a tired and weakened enemy [e].

Y. of *R.* 551. Bef. *J.C.* 201. 250 Conſul-p.

The *Carthaginian* General was ſoon called from *Adrumetum* to *Carthage*, to aſſiſt the tottering Republic with his counſels. He declared, *That ſhe had no reſource, but in a peace*; and this, from the mouth of the warlike *Hannibal*, was deciſive. The *Carthaginians* therefore prepared to make new ſupplications to the conqueror; whilſt he, on the other hand, was conſidering how to make the beſt advantage of his victory. And having received a conſiderable reinforcement to his fleet, he went on board it, in order to appear before *Carthage*, giving inſtructions to *Cn. Octavius* to march the legions towards the ſame city. His intention was not to beſiege it, but only to ſtrike terror, and make the *Carthaginians* more eager for a peace; and the method he took had the deſired effect. A galley adorned with olive-branches came out to him, with twelve deputies, who ſpared neither ſubmiſſions, nor proſtrations, nor promiſes. *Scipio* would give no anſwer, but that they ſhould meet him at *Tunis*. He ordered his legions thither, ſailed back with his fleet to *Utica*, and from thence went to *Tunis* by land. Thirty of the *Carthaginian* Nobles repaired to him and humbly ſued for peace. *Scipio* ſeemed at firſt to neglect their ſubmiſſions; but at the bottom was as fond of concluding a treaty as they: For he knew that the Conſul *Nero* was equipping a fleet, with all expedition, to come into *Africa*, and rob him of the glory of finiſhing the war. The conditions on which he inſiſted with the *Carthaginians*, were as follow.

Livy, B. 30. c. 35.

[e] *Livy* reports [B. 30. c. 36.] that a few days after the battle of *Zama*, *Vermina* the ſon of *Syphax* came to the aſſiſtance of the *Carthaginians*, with an army of more horſe than foot: That *Scipio* ſent a part of his infantry and all the cavalry to encounter the *Numidian*: And that *Vermina* was routed, fifteen thouſand of his men ſlain, and twelve hundred taken priſoners. This ſtory is not very probable, for *Hannibal*, who was weak in cavalry, would doubtleſs have deferred fighting, had he known any thing of this approaching reinforcement, which he could not well be ignorant of, if it was within a few days march of him. *Polybius*, who, had there been any ground for this ſtory, would probably have mentioned it, ſays nothing of *Vermina*.

Y. of *R.* 551. Bef. *J. C.* 201. 250 Conſul. p. *Polyb.* B. 15. c. 18.

We permit the Carthaginians *to live according to their own laws and cuſtoms; and grant them all the cities and provinces they had in* Africa, *before the War. The* Romans *ſhall immediately abſtain from plundering them.*

Livy, B. 30. c. 37.

Carthage *ſhall deliver up to the* Romans, *all their deſerters, fugitive ſlaves, and priſoners of war;*

Surrender to Scipio, *all her ſhips of war, except ten* Triremes, *and all her Elephants trained up for war; and ſhe ſhall not hereafter tame any more of theſe animals;*

Enter into no war, either in Africa, *or out of* Africa, *without the conſent of the* Roman *people;*

Reſtore to Maſiniſſa *all that ſhe has uſurped from him, or his anceſtors, and ſhall make an alliance with him;*

Supply the Roman Legions *with corn, and pay their auxiliaries, till the return of the ambaſſadors whom ſhe ſhall ſend to* Rome, *to have the peace ratified there;*

* 1,937,500 *l.* *Pay to the* Romans *in the ſpace of fifty years, ten thouſand talents* of ſilver, at equal payments;*

Put into Scipio's *hands, an hundred ſuch hoſtages as he ſhall chuſe; the youngeſt of whom ſhall not be under fourteen, nor the oldeſt above thirty years of age.*

Neither the peace, nor even a truce, ſhall take place, till the Carthaginians *have reſtored to the* Romans, *the ſhips and effects taken from them during the former truce.*

Theſe were hard conditions; and upon the return and report of the ambaſſadors, *Giſco*, a man of diſtinction in the Republic, endeavoured in an aſſembly of the people, to diſſuade them from complying. *Hannibal*, fearing the influence his harangue might have, mounted the Roſtra, and drove the orator from it. And, perceiving that the people were angry at this his ſtrange procedure, he thus addreſſed himſelf to them: *I was but nine years old when I went from this place, and have now ſpent ſix and thirty years in arms. In that time I have learnt tolerably well the art of war. It is your buſineſs now to teach me the laws, cuſtoms, and civilities, which ought to be obſerved in your aſſemblies.* After this apology, he made a long diſcourſe on the neceſſity of concluding the treaty, though the conditions of it were heavy. The aſſembly acquieſced in the opinion of a General whoſe inclination to arms, and whoſe hatred to *Rome*, they knew, would never have ſuffered him to think of peace had he retained the leaſt hope of ſucceſs in war [a].

[a] Some authors ſay, that the *Carthaginian* General fled from the battle of *Zama* to the ſea coaſt, where, getting immediately on board a ſhip, he ſailed into *Aſia* to *Antiochus:* That *Scipio* demanded him of the *Carthaginians*, and was anſwered, he had left *Africa*. But others, better informed, tell us, that he continued ſome time in his own country, and was afterwards honoured with the chief magiſtracy in his Republic.

In

In purſuance of his advice, deputies were ſent to *Scipio*, who to the articles abovementioned added this, *That, till the concluſion of the treaty, the* Carthaginians *ſhould ſend no embaſſy to any ſtate but the* Roman; *and that they ſhould give him an account of all embaſſies that came to them from abroad.* Every thing being agreed on, *Carthage* ſent embaſſadors to *Rome*, to get the peace confirmed there; and the Pro-Conſul, to facilitate the negotiation, appointed three officers, of whom one was his brother *Lucius Scipio*, to accompany them. Y. of *R.* 551. Bef. *J. C.* 201. 250 Conſul p. *Livy*, B. 30. c. 38.

The Conſul *Nero*, who, on the renewal of hoſtilities in *Africa*, had, with the conſent of the Senate, prepared a fleet in order to paſs into that country, was long detained, by bad weather on the coaſt of *Italy*, and about *Corſica* and *Sardinia*. Afterwards, a ſtorm diſperſed his ſhips near *Sicily*, and ſhattered many of them; and while they were refitting his Conſulſhip expired.

Cn. Cornelius Lentulus and *P. Ælius Pætus* being choſen Conſuls, the Senate refuſed to determine any thing concerning their provinces, till the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors (now arrived at *Rome*) were firſt heard. But *Lentulus*, ambitious of the honour of finiſhing the war with *Carthage*, declared that he would ſuffer no affair to be brought before the Conſcript Fathers till they had decreed *Africa* for his province: His Collegue (a wiſe and modeſt man) declined any competition with *Scipio*. After the matter had been warmly debated in the Comitia, the people referred it to the Conſcript Fathers; who decreed, that the Conſul to whom the fleet ſhould fall by lot, ſhould ſail with it to *Sicily*, and from thence, in caſe of war, to *Africa*; but that *Scipio* ſhould have the ſole conduct of the land-forces there: And, in caſe of peace, that the *Roman People* ſhould determine whether the Conſul or *Scipio* ſhould conclude it, and who ſhould lead back the victorious army. Y. of *R.* 552. Bef. *J. C.* 200. 251 Conſul p.

After this, the Senate gave audience to the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors, who were all men of the firſt rank in their country: *Aſdrubal* (ſurnamed *Hædus*) was the chief of them; and as he had always oppoſed the *Barchine* faction and the rupture with *Rome*, he was the more favourably heard. In his ſpeech, he caſt the blame of the late war on the family of *Hamilcar*: Some things laid to the charge of the *Carthaginians* he endeavoured to excuſe; others he confeſſed, leſt by denying what was evident, he ſhould make it more difficult to obtain pardon: And when he had flattered the *Romans* on their wonted moderation in proſperity, he concluded with exhorting them to preſerve this character by their lenity to *Carthage*. The ſpeeches of his Collegues turned chiefly on the deplorable condition to which their country was reduced. When they had ended, one of the Senators aſked them, *What Gods will you invoke to witneſs the ſincerity of your Oaths? Aſdrubal* immediately anſwered, *The ſame who have ſo ſeverely puniſhed us for the breach of Oaths.* *Liv.* B 30. c. 42.

Y. of *R.* 552. Bef. *J. C.* 200. 251 Conſul p *App* in *Punic.* p. 31, 32.

In the debate which followed, it was urged, in favour of the peace, that *Scipio*, who beſt knew the ſtate of affairs in *Africa*, had given his opinion for it; that the *Romans* would have nothing to fear from *Carthage* for the future, ſince it would be eaſy to keep her low; that ſhe would be left, by the articles of the treaty, unarmed amidſt many nations greatly incenſed againſt her on account of the ſlavery ſhe had long kept them under; and would be narrowly watched by *Maſiniſſa*; that to raze the city would bring upon the *Romans* the hatred of all the world; and to give up the dominions of *Carthage* to *Maſiniſſa* would make him too powerful. *P. Cornelius Lentulus*, a relation of the Conſul, oppoſed this opinion, and maintained that ſuch had been the cruelty and faithleſſneſs of the *Carthaginians*, that to deſtroy them, would be to do an act agreeable both to Gods and men. The Senate however inclined to peace; but the Conſul *Lentulus* interpoſed his authority, and forbad the decree to be paſſed. Hereupon two Tribunes of the commons laid the affair before the people. The Comitia empowered the Senate to grant a peace to *Carthage*, and appointed *Scipio* to negotiate the treaty, and bring home the troops, The Fathers approving the plan of the peace, ſent, in company with the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors, ten deputies to aſſiſt *Scipio* in ſettling affairs in *Africa*.

Livy, B. 30. c. 43.

The *Carthaginians* firſt delivered up all the deſerters, and priſoners of war (amounting to 4000 men) and elephants. The *Latine* deſerters were, by *Scipio*'s order, beheaded, the *Roman*, crucified. Some of the elephants he ſent to *Rome*, and gave the reſt to *Maſiniſſa*. Then the *Carthaginian* galleys and ſmall ſhips (except ten triremes) to the number of 500 ſail, were given up to the Pro-Conſul, who burnt them at ſea, within ſight of *Carthage*. The only thing which remained, was the firſt payment of the tribute that was to be annual during fifty years. And now the covetous temper of theſe trading men remarkably ſhewed itſelf. When a tax was propoſed for raiſing the neceſſary ſum, they all burſt into tears, except *Hannibal*, who at their weeping burſt into laughter. This gave great offence; and *Aſdrubal Hædus* reproved him for it. *What! Does it become* you *to laugh?* You, *to inſult us on the miſeries you have brought upon us?* To which *Hannibal* made this anſwer: *Could you look into my heart, you would ſee, that my laughter, far from being the effect of mirth, proceeds from a mind almoſt diſtempered with grief: Neither is it ſo unſeaſonable and abſurd as your tears.* Then *you ſhould have wept, when our arms were taken from us, our ſhips burnt, and war forbidden us, even in* Africa. That *was the wound by which we fell. Do not flatter yourſelves, that the* Romans *have conſulted your quiet. No great city can be long in tranquillity. If it has not war abroad, it will find enemies at home. But it ſeems we are touched with public calamities only ſo far as they effect our private fortunes, and the loſs of our money is the chief thing we regret. When you ſaw* Carthage *diſarmed,*

diſarmed, and amidſt ſo many armed nations, expoſed naked and defence-leſs, none of you dropt a tear; but when a little money is to be paid, you weep and mourn, as if our country was going to its burial. You may quickly find (I fear it much) that theſe tears have been ſhed for the leaſt of your misfortunes. Y. of *R.* 552. Bef. *J. C.* 200. 251 Conſul-p.

SCIPIO, before his departure from *Africa*, with the conſent of the ten commiſſioners, ſettled *Maſiniſſa* in the poſſeſſion not only of his hereditary dominions, but of all the places conquered from *Syphax*; which poſſeſſion was afterwards confirmed by the Senate.

On the Pro-Conſul's return to *Italy*, both Senate and people unanimouſly concurred in decreeing him a triumph [a]; and the ſhow was more magnificent than any that had been yet ſeen at *Rome*.

He is ſaid to have been the firſt *Roman* General, that, for having conquered a country, was called after its name: Through the eſteem of his ſoldiers, the favour of the people, or the flattery of his friends (it is uncertain which) he acquired the ſurname of *AFRICANUS*. *Liv.* B. 30. c. 45.

[a] According to *Polybius*, *Syphax*, led in chains, was one of the ornaments of *Scipio*'s triumph; but *Livy* tells us, that the King died before *Scipio* made his triumphal proceſſion.

THE

Roman Hiſtory.

FIFTH BOOK.

From the End of the SECOND PUNIC WAR, in the Year of *Rome* 552, to the End of the THIRD, in 607, when *Carthage* was deſtroyed.

CHAP. I.

The occaſion and commencement of the war with King Philip *of* Macedon.

Philip *makes a fruitleſs attempt upon* Athens: *The* Achæans *reject his offers of aſſiſtance againſt the tyrant of* Lacedæmon.

Y. of *R.* 552. Bef. *J.C.* 200. Conſul p. 251

ROME, by her complete victory and triumph over the *Carthaginians*, was become terrible to all the nations around her; and not one of her neighbours, then in peace with her, appears to have had any diſpoſition to a rupture. Some pretence of juſtice, however, ſhe muſt always have for extending her dominion, and muſt not fail to be injured, or menaced, or, at leaſt, affronted by the King or the people of whatever country, in the Senate's plan of uſurpation, ſtood next to be invaded. Excellent reaſons would, doubtleſs, have been found for bending the main ſtrength of *Rome* againſt thoſe provinces of *Gaul* which lay between her *Italian* territories and *Spain*, had not the countries of the *Eaſt* preſented to the *Romans* a more alluring proſpect. *Macedon*, *Greece*, and *Aſia* would not only be richer prizes of victory, but, in all likelihood, of cheaper and eaſier acquiſition. To make any conſiderable enlargement of empire to the weſt, many battles muſt be fought, many nations, brave and warlike, and independent of each other, be ſucceſſively ſubdued, and *Italy* muſt bear almoſt the whole expence both of blood and treaſure; and during ſo tedious a war, the powers of the *Eaſt* might perhaps take the alarm, ſuſpend their mutual jealouſies and form a dangerous confederacy againſt an encroaching Republic, that ſeemed to ſet no bounds to her ambition. In attacking *Macedon* at *this* time, the Senate were ſure to be aſſiſted by their clients and allies the *Greeks*, who, they intended, ſhould ſupport the chief burden of the war, and who, they foreſaw, would, after the ruin of that monarchy, naturally fall, from being auxiliaries and allies, to be ſubjects of *Rome*; and the *Macedonian* power, that only barrier, being demoliſhed, the wealthy kingdoms of *Aſia* would lie

open to her invaſions at pleaſure. The firſt ſtep then towards compaſſing theſe vaſt deſigns was to find matter of quarrel with King *Philip*; and therefore, though it could not be well imagined, that he, who, even while *Hannibal* was in *Italy*, had gladly come to an accommodation with the Republic, would now, after ſhe had totally ſubdued the only formidable rival of her power, entertain thoughts of invading her dominions; yet this deſign, as we ſhall preſently ſee, muſt be confidently imputed to him; the ambitious views of the *Macedonian* muſt be timely prevented; and *Rome*, for her own ſecurity, muſt be obliged to act offenſively againſt ſo dangerous an enemy. Y. of *R.* 552. Bef. *J. C.* 200. 251 Conſul-p.

PHILIP was the ſon of *Demetrius* (great-grandſon of *Antigonus*, one of the Captains of *Alexander the Great*.) He ſucceeded, while under age, to the kingdom of *Macedon*, after the death of his uncle and tutor, *Antigonus Doſon*. (This *Antigonus*, who aſſumed the power and title of King, having been called to the aſſiſtance of the *Achæans*, in their war with *Cleomenes* King of *Sparta*, had driven him out of *Peloponneſus*, and made himſelf the protector of *Achaia* and the arbiter of *Greece*. He died very ſoon after the defeat of *Cleomenes*.) *Philip* had no ſooner mounted the throne of *Macedon*, than the *Ætolians*, deſpiſing his youth, invaded the territories of *Meſſene* without any juſt cauſe. The *Meſſenians* made their complaint to the *Achæans*, who readily undertook to aſſiſt them; and after finding themſelves not ſtrong enough, engaged *Philip* of *Macedon* in the ſame cauſe. On the other hand, the *Ætolians* entered into a league with the *Lacedæmonians*. In this war which was called the *ſocial war*, *Philip* and the *Achæans* had greatly the advantage; yet the *Macedonian* granted peace to the *Ætolians* and their allies, juſt after *Hannibal* had defeated the *Romans* at the lake *Thraſymenus*. For upon the news of this battle, *Demetrius* of *Pharos* *, who, being expelled his dominions by the *Romans*, had taken refuge in *Philip*'s court, perſuaded the King to ſettle his affairs in *Greece*, and, ſeizing the opportunity given him by the weak condition of *Rome*, invade *Italy*: In conſequence of which advice, the *Macedonian* ſoon after made a league with *Hannibal*†; but the *Romans* by engaging the * *Ætolians*, the *Lacedæmonians* and *Attalus* King of *Pergamus*, to join in a war againſt *Philip*, kept him employed in *Greece*, and hindered the execution of his deſigns upon *Italy*; as has been already related. *Polyb.* B. 4. c. 2. & ſeq. Id. B. 2. c. 69. Id. B. 4. c. 35. Id. B. 5. c. 101. * See p. 99. and 157. † See p. 183. * p. 213, 214. *Livy* B. 26. c. 24. and B. 27. c. 30. † p. 269.

After the King had obtained a † peace with *Rome*, he turned his thoughts how to enlarge his dominions to the eaſt, and ſecretly projected with *Antiochus the Great*, King of *Syria*, to ſhare between them the kingdom of *Egypt*, where *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, a child of five years old, had lately ſucceeded his father *Ptolemy Philopator*. *Philip* alſo made a league with *Pruſias* King of *Bithynia*, gave him his daughter in marriage, and at his deſire laid ſiege to *Cyus*, a *Greek* city on the borders of *Bithynia*, and which was then governed by an *Ætolian*, whom his countrymen had ſent to the *Cyanians*, to be their General. The *Rhodians* and *Ætolians* interceded for the *Polyb.* B. 15. c. 20. Id. B. 15. c. 21.

Y. of *R.* 552. Bef. *J.C.* 200 251 Conſul-p

the town; and *Philip*, by his embaſſadors promiſed the former to ſpare *Cyus* for their ſake. Nevertheleſs, while thoſe embaſſadors were making theſe aſſurances, the *Rhodians* received advice, that *Philip* had ſacked the town, and then given it up to his ſon-in-law.

Polyb. B. 16. c. 8.

This affront highly provoked them, and they perſuaded *Attalus*, King of *Pergamus*, then in fear for his own dominions, from the ambition of *Philip*, to unite his forces with theirs, and begin a war with the *Macedonian*.

Id. B. 16. c. 1.

The confederates attacked his fleet near the iſland *Chios*, and defeated it: But, they not purſuing the advantage of their victory, *Philip* gathered together his ſcattered ſhips, and made a deſcent upon *Aſia*.

Id. B. 16. c. 11.

There he took *Iaſſos*, *Bargyliæ* and ſeveral other towns, and penetrating as far as the territory of *Pergamus*, laid it waſte, not ſparing even the temples of the Gods, or the Sacred Groves.

Id. Excerpt. B. 16. c. 1406. and 1419.

The *Athenians* alſo had at this time a quarrel ſubſiſting with *Philip*, which began on the following occaſion. Two *Acarnanians* happening to be at *Athens*, when the myſteries of *Ceres* were celebrated, had, through ignorance of the laws, entered the temple of the Goddeſs, without being initiated into thoſe myſteries; and the *Athenians*, for this crime, had put them to death. The people of *Acarnania* made their complaint to the King, deſiring his leave and aſſiſtance to make war upon *Athens*. *Philip* granted both, and the *Acarnanians*, in conjunction with ſome *Macedonian* auxiliaries, made an irruption into *Attica*, and carried off a great deal of booty.

Liv. B. 31. c. 14.

Polyb. Legat. 3.

After the ſea-fight at *Chios*, the *Athenians* ſent an embaſſy to the King of *Pergamus*, congratulating him upon his victory, and inviting him to their town. *Attalus* accepted the invitation, and, having together with ſome *Rhodians*, landed at *Piræeus* *, the magiſtrates of *Athens*, the prieſts and the citizens, with their wives and children, went out to meet him, and paid him extraordinary honours: A new tribe being at this time added to the ten they had before, they called it *Attalis*, from his name: All the *Rhodians* they complimented with the freedom of the city; and at the King's perſuaſion and theirs, formally declared war againſt *Philip*.

* The port of *Athens*.

Liv. B. 30. c. 42.

The confederates then ſent deputies to *Rome*, to complain of the injuries done by the *Macedonian*, and of the progreſs he had made in *Aſia*. *Philip*, on the other hand, diſpatched embaſſadors to the Senate, juſtifying himſelf, and accuſing *Aurelius*, the *Roman* embaſſador in *Greece*, of having raiſed ſoldiers in that country, and of having, contrary to the treaty of peace, committed hoſtilities againſt his lieutenants: He alſo deſired, that *Sopater* and the *Macedonians*, who had ſerved as mercenaries in the *Carthaginian* army, and been taken priſoners at the battle of *Zama*, might be ſet at liberty. *M. Furius*, whom *Aurelius* had diſpatched from *Greece* to anſwer this charge, aſſerted, that the embaſſador had not gone out of the territories of the *Roman* allies, and had only endeavoured to hinder them from being pillaged by the *Macedonians*. *Furius* alſo informed the Senate, that *Sopater* was one of the King's courtiers, and had been

been ſent by him into *Africa*, with money and four thouſand men, to aſſiſt *Carthage*. The Conſcript Fathers approved of *Aurelius*'s conduct, refuſed to deliver up *Sopater* and the *Macedonians*, and threatned the King with a ſpeedy war if he proceeded in the courſe he had begun. Their anſwer to the deputies from *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* was, that *the Senate would take care of the affairs of* Aſia. Y. of *R.* 552. Bef. *J. C.* 200. 251 Conſul-p.

In conſequence of theſe ſeveral anſwers, they paſſed a decree, empowering the Conſul *Ælius* to name a General to ſail with a fleet of thirty eight galleys for *Macedon*; and *Lævinus* being choſen for the expedition, he ſailed thither without delay. On his arrival, *Aurelius* joined him; and, when they had conſulted together, they agreed to write to the Senate, That *Philip* had made mighty preparations for war, and that it would be neceſſary to ſend a greater force into *Greece* than was there at preſent. *Liv.* B. 31. c. 3.

Their letters did not arrive at *Rome* till new Conſuls had been choſen, *P. Sulpicius Galba*, and *C. Aurelius Cotta*, who on the ides of *March*, the day they entered upon office, made a report to the Senate of the ſtate of affairs in *Greece* and *Macedon*. The Conſcript Fathers ſuſpended their determination, till ſacrifices ſhould be offered to the Gods, and their will conſulted. After this they aſſembled: The letters from *Greece* were now arrived, and alſo a new deputation from the *Athenians*, demanding ſuccours againſt the King of *Macedon*, who threatned them with a ſiege; the Conſuls took this opportunity to declare, that the Gods accepted the ſacrifices, and that, by the report of the Aruſpices, the entrails of the victims portended to the Republic victories and triumphs and augmentation of dominion. The aſſembly paſſed a decree, *That thanks be returned to the* Athenians *for their fidelity*; *That the Conſuls immediately draw lots for their provinces, and that he, to whom* Macedon *falls, ſhall aſk the people's conſent to a war with* Philip. Y. of *R.* 553. Bef. *J. C.* 199. 252 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 31. c. 4.

Macedon fell to *Sulpicius*. He aſſembled the Comitia by centuries, and propoſed the war: but the motion was there rejected by a plurality of voices. For the commons of *Rome*, already exhauſted by the long and grievous war with *Hannibal*, had no inclination to begin a new one, that muſt, in all probability, be very burthenſom. And *Bæbius*, one of their Tribunes, revived the old complaint, That the Nobles, from views of ambition and private intereſt, were for adding war to war, that the people might never enjoy any repoſe. The Senate, nevertheleſs, did not deſiſt from their project. *Sulpicius* once more convened the people. To engage their conſent to the enterprize, he put them in mind *of the fatal conſequences which had followed upon their delaying to ſend ſuccours to the* Saguntines, *when threatned by* Hannibal, *as the* Athenians *were now by* Philip. *That their negligence in the former caſe had encouraged the* Carthaginian *to paſs the* Alps, *and invade* Italy; *that though* he *had been* five months *coming from* Spain, five days *would be*

Y. of *R.* 553. Bef. *J. C.* 199. 252 Conſul. p.

ſufficient to bring Philip *upon their coaſts*; *and, granting that the King and his* Macedonians *were not ſo much to be feared as* Hannibal *and the* Carthaginians, *yet certainly* Philip *was a more powerful Prince than* Pyrrhus, *who had led his victorious army almoſt to the walls of* Rome. He further reminded them, *That their preſent ſecurity was owing to* Scipio's *being ſuffered to tranſport his Legions into* Africa; *and, that it was undoubtedly good policy to keep hoſtilities at a diſtance, and make* war *only in an enemy's country.* The arguments of the Conſul prevailed, and the *Centuries* voted for *war.*

And now the chief concern of the Senate was to ſettle the ſeveral armies which were to act this year: No more than ſix Legions were raiſed in all. *Sulpicius* had leave to ſtrengthen the two Legions aſſigned him for the *Macedonian* war, by as many voluntiers as he could get from among the ſoldiers which *Scipio* had brought from *Africa*; but he was not to force any of them into the ſervice. The Conſul *Aurelius* alſo raiſed two Legions to march whitherſoever the wavering nations of *Italy* made his preſence neceſſary. And then the Prætorian armies were formed for the ſervice in *Ciſalpine Gaul*, *Bruttium*, *Sicily*, and *Sardinia.*

Juſtin, B. 30. c. 2. *Val. Max.* B. 6. c. 6. §. 1. *Liv.* B. 31. c. 9.

Embaſſadors arrived at this time from *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, King of *Egypt*, who, having eſcaped, in his minority, the wicked deſigns of his guardians, had (according to *Juſtin*) put himſelf under the protection of the *Romans*, and received from them *M. Lepidus* to be his guardian and defender againſt the threatned invaſions of the Kings of *Syria* and *Macedon*. *Ptolemy* inclined to ſend ſuccours to *Athens*, which *Philip* was marching to beſiege; but he durſt not undertake any thing till he had aſked the conſent of the *Roman* Republic. The Senate returned him thanks for the deference he had ſhewed them, and gave this anſwer to his ambaſſadors, *That* Rome *was reſolved to ſupport her allies*; *that ſhe would give* Ptolemy *notice when ſhe wanted his aſſiſtance*; *and that ſhe knew his kingdom to be a faithful and firm ſupport of the Republic.*

The Conſul *Sulpicius* was hindred from ſetting out for *Macedon* by ceremonies of religion. In the beginning of a new war, the *Romans* would have nothing cuſtomary of that kind neglected; the leaſt omiſſion of the uſual formalities being thought to affect the ſucceſs of the enterprize. It was judged proper, on this occaſion, that *Sulpicius* ſhould vow games in honour of *Jupiter*, and make him a preſent. Nevertheleſs it met with ſome oppoſition: For the Republic had not the ſum neceſſary for the expence of the games; and the *Pontifex Maximus* declared, *that the Gods did not care to be at uncertainties, that they were always for ready money*; *and that the ſum vowed muſt be ſet apart at the time of the vow.* However, this ſentence of the *Pontifex* was over-ruled by the *Pontifical* College, before whom *Sulpicius*, by order, laid the affair. They decreed, that the Senate ſhould be free

to

to determine the expence of the games, and the value of the preſent; and this was the firſt time that ever a vow was made of an indeterminate ſum; or, *that the Gods gave credit.* Y. of *R.* 553. Bef. *J. C.* 199. 252 Conſul-p.

A ſudden inſurrection of the *Gauls* detained *Sulpicius* ſome time longer at *Rome*. *Hamilcar*, whom *Mago* had left in *Italy*, was at the head of them. He ſeized *Placentia*, burnt the town, put moſt of the inhabitants to death, and advanced towards *Cremona:* The *Cremoneſe* ſhut their gates againſt him, ſtood a ſiege, and gave notice of their danger to *Furius Purpureo*, the *Roman* Prætor, who, in the neighbourhood of *Ariminum*, commanded five thouſand men of the allies. *Furius*, not having ſtrength ſufficient to contend with the enemy, wrote to the Senate, deſiring ſuccours, and acquainting them that the *Gauls* were forty thouſand ſtrong. The Fathers decreed, that either the Conſul *Aurelius* ſhould, at the head of ſome Legions he had ordered to rendezvous in *Hetruria*, go to the relief of *Cremona*; or, in caſe he declined the commiſſion, that thoſe Legions ſhould march to *Ariminum* without him, and be commanded in the expedition againſt the *Gauls* by *Furius*, who ſhould ſend his five thouſand men into *Hetruria*. *Aurelius* choſe to continue at *Rome*.

The Senate appointed alſo an embaſſy to *Carthage*, to complain of *Hamilcar*; and to require that he ſhould be recalled and given up to the *Romans*, together with ſome deſerters, who, according to the treaty, ought to have been given up before. The ſame ambaſſadors had inſtructions to go into *Numidia*, with preſents and a compliment to *Maſiniſſa*, on the recovery and enlargement of his dominions; and they were to ſignify to him, that as *Rome* was entering upon a new war with *Macedon*, it would be very acceptable, if he would ſend the Republic ſome ſquadrons of *Numidian* horſe.

Maſiniſſa was now in poſſeſſion of the capital, together with a great part of the kingdom of *Syphax*. *Vermina*, the ſon of that dethroned King, held the other part. In the low condition to which the victories of *Scipio* had reduced him, he could have no ſecurity againſt the ambition of *Maſiniſſa*, but in the protection of *Rome*. To the Senate therefore he ſent envoys to ſollicit a reconciliation. They endeavoured to excuſe what part he had acted in the war againſt the *Romans*; laid the blame upon the *Carthaginians*; reminded the Senate that *Maſiniſſa* had been the *enemy* of *Rome*, before he became her *friend*; aſſur'd them, that neither *Maſiniſſa*, nor any other would do more to deſerve the favour of the Republic than *Vermina*; and, in concluſion, begged he might receive from the Senate the title of King, and be admitted into their alliance and friendſhip. The Fathers anſwered, That *Syphax* had, without any juſt cauſe, renounced their friendſhip, and become their enemy; that *Vermina* ought to aſk a peace of the *Roman* people, before he aſpired to be ſtiled King by them; an honour which they con-

Y. of *R.* 553. Bef. *J. C.* 199. 252 Conſul. p.

fered only upon thoſe Princes, who had deſerved it by important ſervices. They added, that *Vermina* might have recourſe to the *Roman* ambaſſadors who were going into *Africa*; that they would be empowered to declare the conditions upon which the Republic would enter into a treaty with him; and that if he would have any alteration made in the terms they offered, he might again have recourſe to the Senate. Such was the haughtineſs which the *Romans* aſſumed, after the reduction of *Carthage*.

Liv. B. 31. c. 13.

At this time the public creditors, who had lent their money, on the promiſe of being reimburſed at three ſeveral payments, complained loudly for want of the laſt, which had been delayed beyond the time on account of the expences of the *Macedonian* war. The Senate, to do theſe creditors juſtice in the beſt manner they could, aſſigned over to them certain lands, which belonged to the public, and were within fifty miles of the city, at the rent of one *As per* acre, adding this condition, that when the State was able to pay, it ſhould be in the option of the creditors to keep the lands, or receive their money.

c. 26.

Philip of *Macedon* began the campaign long before the Conſul *Sulpicius* left *Rome*. The King diſpatched *Philocles* with 2000 foot and 200 horſe to lay waſte the lands of the *Athenians*; and, ordering *Heraclides* to *Maronea* with the fleet, he himſelf with the main of his army marched thither by land. Having eaſily made himſelf maſter of this town, afterwards of *Ænus*, and ſome other places, he over-ran the *Cherſoneſus*, and from thence croſſed the *Streights*, and ſat down before *Abydos*. *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, inſtead of oppoſing *Philip*, waſted their time in negotiations to bring the *Ætolians* and others of the *Greeks* into the new alliance. All the aſſiſtance they ſent to *Abydos* was 300 *Pergamenians* and one *Rhodian* galley. The inhabitants made a ſtout defence; and when *Philip*, after he had beat down a part of the wall, refuſed them their lives and liberty, they took a ſolemn oath to maſſacre their wives and children, ſet fire to the town, burn their effects, and die themſelves in the breach. Animated with this fury, they fought ſo deſperately, on the next aſſault made by *Philip*, that he loſt almoſt all hope of reducing them. But now the chiefs of the *Abydenians*, having time to reflect on their inhuman deſign, and thinking it a leſs evil to ſubmit to the King, than to imbrue their hands in the blood of ſo many women and children, ſent to him to beg mercy. Juſt at this time *M. Æmilius* arrived in *Philip*'s camp. He was the youngeſt of three ambaſſadors whom the *Romans* had ſent to *Antiochus* and *Ptolemy*, with orders to coaſt along *Greece* in their way to *Aſia*, and to come, if poſſible, to a conference with the King of *Macedon*. The ambaſſadors hearing at *Rhodes*, that *Philip* was beſieging *Abydos*, it was agreed amongſt them, that *Æmilius* ſhould go and confer with him. The *Roman* ſignified to the King, that the Senate requir'd of him, not to make war with any nation in *Greece*, not to meddle in

Polyb. B. 16. c. 15.

Ptolemy's

A MAP of MACEDON

Roman Miles of 5000 feet each
10 20 30 40 50
Stadia of 125 paces each
100 200 300 400

37 38 39 40 41 42 43

42 41 40

DALMATIA
UPPER MŒSIA
LOWER MŒSIA
DARDANIA
PÆONIA
THRACE
BESSICA
SINTICA
BISALTIA
EDONIS
ODOMANTI
MYGDONIA
ORBELIA
PARAXIA
CHALCIDICA
PIERIA
PELAGONIA
part of Pæonia
DEURIOPUS
of Pæonia
EORDÆA
ÆMATHIA
MACEDON
ILLYRIANS
EPIRUS
CHAONIA
THESPROTIA
THE IONIAN SEA
ÆGEAN SEA
The Strymonian Gulph
Gulph of Thermæ
Mount Hæmus
Mount Pangæi
Mount Orbelus
Mount Scardus
Mount Scomius
Mount Olympus
Mount Pæus
Mount Cerdylium
Lake Lychnidus
Lake Labeatis
Vicinianum
Vendonis
Enderum
Enderoduni
Salluntum
Birziquinum
Creheum
Chinna
Thermidava
Labeatæ
Scodra
Epicaria
Liminæum
Aeto Lissus
Lissus
Albanopolis
Dinda
Albani
Caviens
Dungli
Parthini
Apsalus
Almopi
Herma
Europus
Ulpianum
Ampusara
Scupi
Scordisci
Veianis
Deborus
Æstræi
Æstræum
Edessa or Ægeæ
Dausara
Bylazora
Astibus
Tristolus
Pelagonia
Europus on the Axius
Xylopolis
Tranupara
Lychni
Stobi
Heraclea Sintica
Scotusa
Gazorus
Pangæi
Doberæ
Syro-Peonii
Strymonii
Pergamum
Pieri
Dersæi
Abdera
Tirida
Thasus I.
Philippi col.
Neapolis
Ulpia Topiris
Amphipolis
Strymon R.
Argilus
Stagira
Acanthus
Thessalonica
Cassandria
Potidæa
Olophyxus
Acro-Athos
Palæstrium Cape
Uranopolis
Nymphæum Promont.
Ampelus Prom.
Derris
Halonnesus I.
Magnesia
Larissa
Pelinæum
Gomphi
Metropolis
Tricca
Pharsalus
Pheacia Afterwards Corcyra I.
Ottanus I.
Malthace I.
Cassiope
Buthrotum col.
Nicæa
Hellopia
Phalonia
Gyrtone
Mcandria
Elæa
Azorus
Tripolitis
Chumera
Syliones
Elymea
Beroea
Byrsæ
Pella
Edessa
Aulon
Stephana
Stephanopolis
Eordette
Eordea
Apolloma
Ustana
Candavia
Taulantii
Barbana R.
Drin R.
Genusus R.
Aous R.
Apsus R.
Celydnus R.
Haliacmon R.
Axius R.
Strymon R.
Nestus R.
Hebrus R.
Chidorus R.
Lydias R.
Thermaic Gulph
Strymonian Gulph
Ionian Sea
Ægean Sea

Ptolemy's affairs, and to give ſatisfaction for the injuries he had done to *Attalus* and the *Rhodians:* Adding, that, if he complied with theſe demands the peace might ſtill continue between *Rome* and him; if he did not, he muſt expect war. *Philip* began to excuſe himſelf, alledging, that the *Rhodians* had been the aggreſſors. *But what have the* Athenians *done?* (replied *Æmilius* interrupting him) *Wherein have the* Cyanians *or the people of* Abydos *offended? Have any of theſe been the aggreſſors?* To this the King anſwered, *There are three reaſons of your haughty behaviour, and for which I forgive it: You are a young man without experience, You are very handſom, and you are a* Roman. *I earneſtly wiſh that* Rome *may not violate the treaty; but if ſhe does, I ſhall, with the aſſiſtance of the Gods, defend myſelf.* This conference put an end to all thoughts of peace, and *Æmilius* was diſmiſſed. The chiefs of the *Abydenians* ſurrendered the city; but the multitude remembring the oath they had ſworn, a fit of rage ſeized them, and they fell to maſſacring their wives, their children, and themſelves. *Philip*, ſurprized at their madneſs, ordered proclamation to be made through the town, that all thoſe, who had a mind to hang themſelves, or cut their own throats, ſhould have three days time to do it. Y. of *R.* 553. Bef. *J.C.* 199. 252 Conſul-p.

Philip repaſſed the *Helleſpont*. *Sulpicius* was now wintering near *Apollonia*; he had come too late in the year to attempt any thing. Upon his arrival he ſent *Claudius Centho* to *Athens* with twenty galleys and ſome *Roman* legionaries to cover the *Athenian* territories from the ravages of *Philocles*. *Centho* not only put a ſtop to the hoſtilities of the *Macedonians*, but took revenge on the *Chalcidian* pirates for their robberies: He ſailed with the beſt part of his ſquadron, ſurprized *Chalcis* in the night, pillaged it, beat down the ſtatues of King *Philip*, burnt all his magazines, arſenals, and engines of war, and then returned with the ſpoil to *Athens*. The *Macedonian*, upon the firſt news of the taking of *Chalcis*, haſtened to that town, thinking to ſurprize the *Romans* there: But they were gone. Thence he marched with great expedition to *Athens*, in the hope of finding it unprepared for reſiſtance. The *Athenians* however had notice of his coming, and drew out their forces to fight him. *Philip*, pleaſed with an opportunity to ſhew his bravery before a multitude of people, who crouded on the walls to ſee the engagement, gave his men this ſhort exhortation, *Fix your eyes on me, and remember, that where the King is, there his troops ought to be.* Then falling upon the *Athenians* with incredible fury, he drove them into the town, and purſued them to the very gates. Next day the beſieged, ſtrengthened by a reinforcement of *Romans* and *Pergamenians*, appeared in order of battle before the walls; *Philip* thought proper to remove to a greater diſtance, and poſted himſelf at *Eleuſis*. In that neighbourhood he ſignally vented his rage, ſparing neither tombs nor temples, nor even the images of the Gods. After this, underſtanding that the diet of *Achaia* was aſſembled at *Argos*, to deliberate *Livy*, B. 31. c. 22.

Y. of *R.* 553. Bef. *J. C.* 199 252 Conſul. p.

rate upon a war with the tyrant *Nabis*, (who after the death of *Machanidas* had uſurped the *Lacedæmonian* throne) he haſtened thither, and offered his aſſiſtance to the *Achæans*, upon condition that they would furniſh gariſons for the cities of *Oreus*, *Chalcis*, and *Corinth*: But they perceiving that his views were to embroil them with the *Romans*, declined his offers. Whereupon he returned into *Attica*, renewed his devaſtations there, and then marched into *Bœotia*.

c. 21.

In *Italy*, the Prætor *Furius*, at the head of the army which the Conſul *Aurelius* ſhould have commanded, (had he not choſen rather to continue at *Rome*) defeated the *Gauls* in a pitched battle, near *Cremona*. Of forty thouſand of the enemy, ſcarce ſix thouſand eſcaped. *Aurelius*'s jealouſy was awakened by this ſucceſs. Vexed at having miſſed ſo favourable an opportunity of acquiring glory, he, to repair his loſs in ſome meaſure, put himſelf now at the head of his troops: But *Furius* had left him little to do. The victorious Prætor returned to *Rome*,

c. 48.

and in the abſence of the Conſul obtained a triumph, by a decree of the Senate, though contrary to the judgment of the oldeſt Senators; becauſe the army, with which he had conquered, had not fought under his *Auſpices*.

The ambaſſadors who had been ſent to *Carthage*, and into *Numidia*, were now returned. They had found no reaſon to be diſſatisfied with the *Carthaginians*, who, with regard to *Hamilcar*, had anſwered, that they would puniſh him the only way they could, which was by baniſhment and confiſcation of his effects. All the *Roman* deſerters they could find, they had delivered up; and had ſent to *Rome*, by way of preſent, two hundred thouſand modii of wheat, and as much to the *Roman* army in *Macedon*. *Maſiniſſa* offered the Republic a reinforcement of two thouſand horſe: The Senate accepted only of one thouſand; and theſe the King tranſported into *Macedon* at his own expence, ſending with them two hundred thouſand modii of wheat, and as many of barley. As for *Vermina*, he had ſubmitted himſelf to the conditions of peace which the ambaſſadors propoſed; and it is probable that he then aſſumed the title of King, over that part of *Maſæſylia* which *Maſiniſſa* had not conquered from *Syphax*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The Ætolians *decline taking part in the war. Some ſlight engagements between the* Romans *and* Macedonians. *The* Ætolians *declare for the* Romans. *The ridiculous behaviour of the* Athenians *with regard to* Philip. *The Conſul* Flamininus *lands in* Greece; *has a conference with* Philip; *forces his entrenchments; gains over the* Achæans *to the intereſt of* Rome: *Has another conference with* Philip. *The battle of* Cynocephalæ. *A peace concluded.*

THE Conſular *Faſces* were transferred to *L. Cornelius Lentulus* and *P. Villius Tappulus*. *Scipio Africanus* was choſen at the ſame time one of the Cenſors; and likewiſe declared Prince (or Preſident) of the Senate. The conduct of the war in *Italy* fell to *Lentulus*, the war of *Macedon* to *Villius*: But theſe two heads of the Republic, after the example of their predeceſſors, continued long at *Rome*, and did not go to their provinces till it was very late. *Sulpicius*, who from being Conſul was now become Pro-Conſul in *Greece*, came out of his winter-quarters, and encamped between *Apollonia* and *Dyrrhachium*, on the banks of the *Aſpus* a river of *Illyricum*. *Apuſtius*, whom he ſent out with a detachment to ravage the borders of *Macedon*, took ſeveral places by aſſault. Upon his return from this expedition, ſome petty Kings in the neighbourhood, who had been formerly in alliance with the *Romans*, came to offer their ſervices to the Pro-Conſul; amongſt theſe *Pleuratus*, King of the *Dardani* in *Illyricum*, *Bato* a ſovereign (probably) of a country near *Illyricum*, and *Amynander* King of the *Athamanes*, a people of *Epirus*.

A. of *R.* 554. B. f. *J. C.* 198. 253 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 32. c. 7. and B. 34 c. 44. B. 31. c. 27. c. 28.

The devaſtation made by the *Romans* in *Macedon* brought *Philip* from *Bœotia* to the defence of his own country. He took all the meaſures for that purpoſe which became an able General. As a diet of the *Ætolians* was now actually aſſembled at *Naupactus*, he ſent ambaſſadors to diſſuade them from joining his enemies. *Furius Purpureo* went thither on the part of the *Romans*; and ſome envoys from *Athens* repaired to the ſame place. *Damocritus*, Prætor of the *Ætolians*, preſided in the diet. The *Macedonian* ambaſſadors were firſt heard. Their ſpeeches were full of invectives againſt the *Romans*, whom they treated as *Barbarians* ambitious, perfidious and cruel; giving, as proofs of this charge, their proceedings at *Rhegium*, *Capua*, and *Tarentum*, their invaſion of *Sicily*, firſt under pretence of aſſiſting the people of *Meſſina*, afterwards

Y. of *R.* 554. Bef. *J. C.* 198. 253 Conſul-p. wards of delivering *Syracuſe* from the tyranny of *Carthage*: "What "has been the conſequence? *Rome* holds *Meſſina*, *Syracuſe*, and all "*Sicily* in ſubjection, and ſends her annual Governors into the iſland to "lord it over the natives: She would now make uſe of you, *Ætolians*, "to conquer *Philip*; but ſhould *he* be ruined, you yourſelves would ſoon "become a prey to the *Barbarians*, and, when the *Romans* are your "maſters, too late repent of having rejected the friendſhip of the King "of *Macedon*." The ambaſſadors concluded with preſſing the diet to continue firm to the treaty made with *Philip* a few years before. The *Athenians*, who ſpoke next, expatiated upon the inhumanity and unparallelled impiety of the *Macedonian*, who in his barbarous method of making war had violated even the ſepulchres of the dead, and the ſanctuaries of the Gods: And they exhorted the aſſembly *to join in the common cauſe of the two moſt formidable powers, that of* Heaven, *and that of* Rome. After this *Furius Purpureo* was heard. His ſpeech turned chiefly on a juſtification of the *Roman* conduct, with regard to the cities mentioned by the *Macedonians*. He inſiſted on the moderation and lenity of the republic in her conduct towards *Carthage*, and returned the reproaches of cruelty upon *Philip*; and laſtly, he adviſed the aſſembly to lay hold of the preſent opportunity of renewing their confederacy with *Rome*, unleſs they choſe rather to periſh with *Philip* than conquer with the *Romans*. The diet inclined to favour the *Roman* cauſe; but *Damocritus* ſuſpended their determination, by declaring, that nothing which related to peace or war could legally be determined out of a general diet, which this was not. The artful *Greek* made a merit afterwards, with his countrymen, of his addreſs in this affair, pretending that his deſign was only to gain time till by the progreſs of the war it ſhould appear which ſide was the ſtronger.

The King was now at *Demetrias* in *Theſſaly*. He gave the command of his fleet to *Heraclides*, with orders to guard the coaſt; and he marched himſelf with the land-army to meet the Pro-Conſul, who was advancing into the very heart of *Macedon*. Skirmiſhes ſoon happened between ſome flying ſquadrons. *Philip*, to encourage his troops, by ſhewing, that his regard for them extended beyond their death, would needs take particular care to have the ſlain brought to the camp, and funeral rites performed. But this had a quite contrary effect to what the King propoſed; the ſoldiers were terrified when they beheld the large and dreadful wounds made by the *Roman* ſabres in the bodies of their companions; for the ſwords, which the *Greeks* uſed, were chiefly for thruſting, and made but ſmall wounds.

Philip, having recalled a detachment he had ſent under his ſon *Perſes* and his Governors, to guard the paſſes of *Pelagonia*, and hinder *Pleuratus* and the *Dardani* from entering *Macedon*; his army was now conſiderable, conſiſting of twenty thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe; and he came and poſted himſelf within two hundred paces of

the *Roman* camp. The third day *Sulpicius* offered him battle; but the *Macedonian* judged it not proper to venture a deciſive action, till he had ſtudied the enemy, and their manner of fighting. To this end, he firſt detached a ſmall party to ſkirmiſh, and theſe being worſted, the next day he ſent out all his cavalry and light armed infantry, under *Anaxagoras*, and laid an ambuſh for the *Romans*, which they eſcaped, through the ill management of the *Macedonians*. In a third action, near *Octolophum*, whither *Sulpicius* had removed his camp, the King, purſuing too eagerly ſome advantage he gained in the beginning of the fight, had like to have loſt his life, as he did the battle. Y. of *R.* 554. Bef. *J.C.* 198. 253 Conſul-p.

This ill ſucceſs, and the intelligence *Philip* received, that *Pleuratus* King of the *Dardani* had entered *Macedon*, *in order to join the* Romans, made him leave his poſt; he decamped in the night, without the Pro-Conſul's perceiving it. *Sulpicius* after a few days purſued him, and forced his way into *Eordæa*, through ſome narrow paſſes, notwithſtanding the endeavours of the *Macedonian* to ſtop him. Having lived here a while upon free quarter, he returned to *Apollonia*, and there delivered up the army to the Conſul *Villius Tappulus*, who was arrived from *Rome*. *Liv.* B. 31. c. 38, 39.

At this time the *Veteran* ſoldiers who had ſerved under *Scipio*, and had entered the preſent ſervice as voluntiers, grew impatient to return to *Italy*, that they might enjoy ſome repoſe; and they demanded in a very mutinous manner to be diſmiſſed. The Conſul could not deny their requeſt to be reaſonable; but he reproved them for their manner of aſking, bid them return to their colours, and promiſed to write to the Senate to procure their diſcharge. The ſeaſon of the year, which was far advanced, would not ſuffer *Villius* to undertake any thing of moment this campaign. B. 32. c. 3.

While *Philip* found that he was no longer purſued by the *Romans*, and that the Conſul gave him time to breathe, he took advantage of the opportunity, and marched againſt the *Ætolians*, who at length had taken part with the *Romans*, and jointly with *Amynander* King of the *Athamanes*, made an irruption into *Macedon*. He defeated them, and forced them to retire into their own countries. *Anaxagoras*, whom he had detached againſt the *Dardani*, had the like ſucceſs. B. 31. c. 40.

As to ſea-affairs, *Apuſtius*, to whom the Pro-Conſul *Sulpicius* had given the command of the *Roman* fleet, had early in the year ſailed from *Corcyra*, joined the naval force of King *Attalus* off the coaſt of *Argolis*, and ſailed thence to the port *Piræeus*; which ſo elevated the *Athenians*, that they behaved themſelves in the moſt ridiculous manner. To expreſs their reſentments againſt the King of *Macedon*, they paſſed a decree to deſtroy the ſtatues of him and his anceſtors, which they had before worſhipped, break down their altars, and aboliſh the feſtivals, inſtituted to their honour; ordering that for the future, the prieſts ſhould, as often as they prayed for the *Athenians* and their allies, c. 44.

pronounce

Y. of *R.* 554. Bef. *J. C.* 198. 253 Conſul-p. pronounce curſes againſt *Philip*, his children, his kingdom, his ſea and land forces, and all the race and name of the *Macedonians*; and that the places where any thing had been written, or put up in honour of the King, ſhould be looked upon as impure and deteſtable. They added, that whatever mark of ignominy any body ſhould propoſe to lay upon *Philip*, the people of *Athens* ſhould conſent to it; and that it ſhould be lawful to kill any man who ſhould ſay or do any thing in honour of the King. *Thus*, ſays *Livy*, *the* Athenians *made war upon* Philip *by words and writings, in which their only ſtrength lay.* The united fleets having ſpent the ſummer in expeditions of no great importance on the coaſts of *Macedon*, *Theſſaly*, and *Eubœa*, in ſome of which they were aſſiſted by twenty *Rhodian* galleys under the command of *Ageſimbrotus*, returned about the autumnal æquinox to *Pyræeus*. *Apuſtius* left thirty of his ſhips there, and with the reſt ſailed to *Corcyra*, as *Attalus* did to *Aſia*, after ſome ſtay in *Attica* to celebrate the feaſt of *Ceres*.

Liv. B. 32. c. 4. *Philip* continued to keep the field; but after a fruitleſs attempt to take *Thaumacia* in *Theſſaly*, a ſtrong town ſituated on a rock, he returned to *Macedon*, to make preparations for the next campaign; and the Conſul *Villius* ſpent the winter in *Apollonia*.

The other Conſul *Lentulus*, who ſhould have led his army againſt the *Gauls*, did not ſtir from the city, until *Bæbius* the Prætor of *Gaul*, who had put himſelf at the head of the Conſular army, was defeated by the *Inſubrians*. He had raſhly entered their country, where being ſurrounded by the enemy, he loſt near ſeven thouſand of his men. Upon this news the Conſul haſtened to the camp, and diſmiſſed *Bæbius* with ignominy, but did nothing of moment in his province, being ſoon recalled to *Rome* to preſide at the Comitia for the great elections.

It was not cuſtomary to raiſe any perſon to the Conſulate till he had previouſly paſſed through the offices of Quæſtor, curule Ædile, and Prætor. Great oppoſition was therefore made by two Tribunes of the people to the proceeding of the Comitia for the grand elections, which were now held by *Lentulus*. Two of the candidates were *T. Quinctius Flamininus*, and *Sext. Ælius Pætus*, ſurnamed *Catus*. They had neither of them been in the Prætorſhip; and the former, who was but thirty years of age, had never been ſo much as Ædile. The affair at length devolved upon the Senate: As the Tribunes had only cuſtom and no law on their ſide, the Fathers decreed, that the centuries ſhould be free to chuſe the two candidates in queſtion; and they were accordingly elected Conſuls.

Y. of *R.* 555. Bef. *J. C.* 197. 254 Conſul p. The firſt buſineſs of theſe new magiſtrates was to introduce into the Senate the ambaſſadors of King *Attalus*. They came to complain of *Antiochus* King of *Syria*, who had invaded the territories of their maſter; and they requeſted that the *Romans* would either ſend ſome troops to guard his dominions, or allow *Attalus* to carry back his own fleet to defend them. *Antiochus* was ſecretly in league with *Philip*, and the Senate were

were not ignorant of it, but they thought it adviſable in the preſent conjuncture to diſſemble their reſentment: They anſwered therefore, that they were obliged to *Attalus* for the aſſiſtance of his fleet and his troops; but did not deſire to detain them longer than it was convenient for him: That the *Roman* Republic made uſe of what belonged to others, ſolely at the pleaſure of the owners, whom ſhe always conſidered as free to withdraw their aid, when they pleaſed: That ſhe could not ſend him help againſt *Antiochus* her friend and ally; but would diſpatch ambaſſadors to acquaint him, that as ſhe employed *Attalus*'s fleet and his troops againſt *Philip* their common enemy, it would be agreeable to her if *Antiochus* would put an end to the war with the King of *Pergamus*; and that it was but reaſonable, the friends and allies of *Rome* ſhould be at peace amongſt themſelves. Ambaſſadors were accordingly ſent; and *Antiochus* complied. Y. of *R.* 555. Bef. *J. C.* 197. 254 Conſul-p.

The war of *Macedon* fell by lot to *Flamininus*; that with the *Gauls* to *Ælius*.

Flamininus did not imitate the dilatory conduct of his predeceſſors. With eight thouſand foot, and eight hundred horſe, moſt of them choſen out of the troops which had ſerved under *Scipio*, he haſtened to *Brunduſium*, and from thence ſet ſail for *Corcyra*. *Philip* was now in great perplexity; in danger from powerful enemies who attack'd him by ſea and land, while he had reaſon to fear the inconſtancy of his allies, and the reſentment of his ſubjects. The *Macedonians* hated his government on account of his miniſter *Heraclides*. This man (ſays *Polybius*) a *Tarentine* by birth, of the dregs of the people, and abandoned to all manner of debauchery, was excellently formed by nature for miſchief. He had a ready invention, a great memory, and a wonderful talent for flattering the great. Baniſhed his own country on account of ſome traiterous practices, he had taken refuge in the *Macedonian* court, and there, inſinuating himſelf into the King's favour, had grown to ſuch a height of power, and made ſo bad an uſe of it, as to be one of the chief cauſes of the ruin of the kingdom. *Philip*, at this time, to ſooth his people, diſcarded, and impriſon'd his miniſter: What became of him afterwards hiſtory has not informed us. The *Macedonian* was obliged to give up ſome towns to the *Achæans*, in order to bind them to his intereſt in this dangerous conjuncture. Having made great preparations for war during the winter, he advanced with his army in the ſpring, and encamped near *Apollonia* on the river *Aous*, where it runs through a very narrow valley between two mountains, the one of which he ordered *Athenagoras* to take poſſeſſion of with the light armed troops, and poſted himſelf on the other with the remainder of his forces. The ſituation of his camp was ſo ſtrong, both by art and nature, that *Villius*, who had brought his legions within five miles of it, going in perſon to take a view of it, was terrified at the appearance *Polyb.* B. 13. c. 2.

Y. of *R.* 555. Bef. *J. C.* 197. 254 Conſul-p.

it made. He called a council of war to deliberate, whether it would not be better to march about and enter *Macedon* the ſame way that *Sulpicius* had gone laſt year, than to attempt forcing the King's entrenchments. The officers were divided in opinion, and during this indetermination *Flamininus* arrived and took upon him the command of the army.

And now a new council of war being held, it was reſolved to attack the *Macedonian* camp, leſt the *Romans*, by taking a long circuit, ſhould happen to want proviſions, and be forced to protract the war to a great length. But when the reſolution of the council ſhould have been put in execution, forty days were ſpent in fruitleſs contrivances how to ſurmount the difficulties; and this reſpite gave *Philip* hopes of procuring a treaty of peace. By the means of ſome chiefs of the *Epirot* nation he obtained an interview with the Conſul. *Flamininus* demanded nothing in favour of the *Romans:* But he required that *Philip* ſhould reſtore to the *Greeks* all the cities he poſſeſſed of theirs, and make ſatisfaction to all thoſe whoſe territories he had plundered. The King did not refuſe to ſurrender the cities which he himſelf had taken from the *Greeks*, but was unwilling to part with thoſe which his anceſtors had conquered; and he offered to ſubmit himſelf to the arbitration of neutral powers, who ſhould judge of the injuries the *Greeks* had ſuffered from him. The Conſul briſkly replied, That there was no need of ſuch an arbitration; that as he was the aggreſſor, he ought to repair all damages. *What cities then*, ſaid *Philip*, *would you have me reſtore? All* Theſſaly, anſwered the *Roman*. The King in anger replied, *What more*, Conſul, *could you have demanded, if you had conquered me?* This ſaid, he immediately broke off the conference, and went away.

Liv. B. 32. c. 10.

Plutarch's life of *Flamininus*.

The next morning hoſtilities began, but with little advantage to either ſide. After ſome days the Conſul detached a party of four thouſand foot, and three hundred horſe, under the guidance of a ſhepherd, whom *Charops*, one of the chiefs of the *Epirots*, had ſent to him for that purpoſe. This fellow knew all the paths and by-roads over the mountains; and he undertook to lead the detachment, (which was to march only by moon-light) in three nights time to the top of a mountain which over-looked the *Macedonian* camp. They had orders to give the ſignal by fires, when they had gained the poſt appointed them. The third day, *Flamininus* cauſed two thirds of his army to march up and aſſail the enemy's entrenchments. In the heat of the action, the detachment falling ſuddenly down, like a torrent from the mountain, on the *Macedonians*, put a ſpeedy end to the conflict. *Philip* was one of the firſt that fled. About five miles from his camp he ſtopped, upon a little hill, the ways to which being narrow and difficult, he thought he might ſafely wait there for his troops; which when he had got together, he retired with them into *Theſſaly*, having loſt only two thouſand men.

This

This defeat produced other ill consequences to *Philip*: The *Ætolians* and *Athamanes* encouraged by it, entered *Thessaly* on different sides, and made great havock and devastation in that unfortunate country. Y. of *R.* 555. Bef. *J. C.* 197. 254 Consul-p.

Flamininus, with his victorious legions, marched through *Epirus* in pursuit of the King, entered *Thessaly*, and took several fortresses garisoned by *Macedonians*. But *Atrax* a town upon the river *Peneus*, ten miles from *Larissa*, held out against him even after he had made a breach in the wall: The garison drew themselves up in a phalanx behind the breach, and bravely repulsed the *Romans*. *Flamininus* thinking it of consequence not to have his army affronted by a handful of men, and having ordered the place, where the wall had fallen, to be cleared of the rubbish, and a tower of a great height filled with soldiers to be mov'd thither, advanced, in person, with his legions to the attack: But the breach being narrow, and the *Macedonians* standing firm, all his efforts to enter proved vain, and he was constrained to raise the siege. *Philip* had retired to the famous vale of *Tempe*, from whence he sent succours to the cities in his interest. *Livy*, B. 32. c. 13. c. 15.

Whilst the Consul was thus employed in the northern part of *Thessaly*, his brother *L. Quinctius*, whom he had made admiral of the fleet, being joined near the island of *Andros* by *Attalus*'s fleet of twenty four ships from *Asia*, and that of the *Rhodians* consisting of twenty, laid siege to *Eretria* and *Carystus*, maritime cities of *Eubœa*, and when he had carried these places, entered the *Saronic* gulph, and appeared before *Cenchrea*, one of the ports of *Corinth*.

It was now time for the Consul to think in what part of *Greece* he should pass the winter. Neither *Ætolia* nor *Acarnania* had any maritime city which could furnish quarters for his troops, and had at the same time a haven large enough to contain all the store-ships necessary to supply the army with provisions. He chose therefore to winter in *Phocis*, a country not far from *Ætolia* and *Thessaly*, and where the city of *Anticyra* on the gulph of *Corinth* would be commodious both for his soldiers and his ships. Having turned his arms that way, *Anticyra* surrendered, after a slight defence. He took likewise *Ambrysas*, *Hyampolis* and *Daulis*; and whilst he lay before *Elatia*, he learnt that the *Achæans* had banished *Cycliades* the chief of the *Macedonian* faction among them, and chosen for their Prætor, *Aristænus*, a man well affected to *Rome*. The Consul therefore judged this a favourable opportunity to gain that nation to the interest of the Republic; in order to which he sent a deputation to them, with offers to put *Corinth* under the jurisdiction of *Achaia*, as it had formerly been. This was a tempting proposal, and the diet assembled to deliberate upon it. *Cleomedon* appeared there as ambassador from *Philip*, and pressed them to a neutrality; *L. Calpurnius* spoke on the part of the *Romans*; the envoys from King *Attalus*, the *Rhodians* and the *Athenians*, were likewise heard. Next day the assembly met c. 18.

Y. of *R.* 555. Bef. *J. C.* 197. 254 Conſul. P. *Liv.* B. 32. c. 21, 22.

again to debate the matter without admitting the foreign miniſters, but could not come to any reſolution; they feared both the *Romans* and *Philip*, and were under obligations to the latter; they had not even the courage to declare their ſentiments, though preſſed to it by *Ariſtænus* the Preſident: An univerſal ſilence reigned in the aſſembly. After ſome time *Ariſtænus* in a long harangue repreſented to them the ſituation of their affairs, and urged the neceſſity of their joining the *Romans*, who, he ſaid, were in a condition to force them to the compliance they had condeſcended to requeſt: But this diſcourſe did not bring the *Achæans* to any agreement among themſelves. The diſputes grew warm, even to mutual reproaches, and the ten [a] *Demiurgi* were equally divided. The diet ſat but one day longer, and the moſt part of this they ſpent in contention. In the end, one of the *Demiurgi*, of *Philip*'s party, was brought over to the *Roman* intereſt, by the prayers and threatnings of his father: The deputies from *Dymæ*, *Megalopolis*, and ſome of thoſe from *Argos*, ſeeing how the affair was like to be determined, roſe up, and left the aſſembly, for theſe three cities were under particular obligations to *Philip*. The reſt of *Achaia* made an alliance with the *Athenians*, *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, but deferred concluding a treaty with *Flamininus*, till the return of ſome ambaſſadors ſent to *Rome* to get it approved. Nevertheleſs the *Achæans*, for their own intereſt, immediately lent aſſiſtance to the *Romans* to reduce *Corinth*.

The city was attacked on the ſide of *Cenchrea* by *Quinctius*, at the gate of *Sicyon* by the *Achæans*, and on the ſide of the port *Lechæum* by *Attalus*. It was at firſt hoped by the confederates that a difference would ariſe between the gariſon and the inhabitants, and that they ſhould thereby become maſters of the place: But *Androſtenes*, who commanded the gariſon for *Philip*, had gained the affections of the *Corinthians*, and being powerfully ſupported by ſome *Roman* deſerters, who had ſerved in *Hannibal*'s army, and by a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men under *Philocles*, one of King *Philip*'s Generals, he obliged the beſiegers to drop their enterprize.

c. 25. After this, *Philocles* marched to *Argos*, where the *Achæan* diet had placed a commander named *Æneſidemus*, a man faithful to his truſt; but the inhabitants being in the intereſt of *Philip*, took arms, and obliged the Governor to capitulate. *Æneſidemus* obtained leave for the gariſon, conſiſting of five hundred men, to depart in ſafety, but he continued there himſelf, with a few of his friends. *Philocles* ſent to aſk him, *why he ſtaid, and what he intended to do?* To which he anſwered, *To die in the place committed to my care.* Hereupon *Philocles* ordered ſome *Thracians* to let fly their arrows at the *Achæan* and his friends: They were all ſlain.

[a] The ten *Demiurgi* ſeem to have been the chief magiſtrates of ten cities which, at this time, compoſed the *Achæan* ſtate. *Livy*, B. 38. c. 30.

Flamininus,

Flamininus, after he had taken *Elatia*, retired for the winter to *Anticyra*. V. of *R.* 555. Bef. *J. C.* 197. 254 Conſul-p.

The time of the elections at *Rome* now drew near, and *Ælius*, who had done no great matter in *Ciſalpine Gaul*, was called home to aſſemble the Centuries. They choſe *C. Cornelius Cethegus* and *Q. Minucius Rufus* Conſuls. It was thought fit at this time to increaſe the number of Prætors to ſix, by creating two new ones for the government of *Hither Spain* and *Further Spain*. The Conſuls being both ambitious of conducting the war in *Macedon*, were in great haſte to draw lots for that province: But this motion was oppoſed by two Tribunes of the Commons, who repreſented to the people the ill conſequences which might attend the recalling *Flamininus* from *Greece* in the midſt of his ſucceſſes. *Cornelius* and *Minucius* at length conſented to leave the matter to the determination of the Senate, if the Tribunes would do the ſame. Accordingly it was referred to the Conſcript Fathers, and they decreed, that *Flamininus* ſhould continue in his command till the people thought fit to recall him; they granted him alſo a recruit of five thouſand foot, three hundred horſe, and three thouſand ſeamen and rowers, and left him his brother *Quinctius* to conduct the fleet under his direction; *Sulpicius* and *Villius* were to ſerve in his army as his Lieutenants. As for the two Conſuls, they were both ordered into *Ciſalpine Gaul* againſt *Hamilcar*, who ſtill headed the revolt there. V. of *R.* 556. Bef. *J. C.* 196. 255 Conſul-p.

Flamininus, who knew nothing of what was doing at *Rome*, and had ſome apprehenſion of being recalled, was very deſirous of having it in his power, in that caſe, to conclude an honourable treaty with *Philip*, before any ſucceſſor could arrive to rob him of the glory: and therefore, though he at firſt pretended an unwillingneſs to grant an interview which the King demanded, he at length conſented to it, and it was agreed that the place of conference ſhould be on the ſea-coaſt, not far from *Nicæa*, a city on the *Maliac Gulph*. *Philip* came to this place by ſea, in one of his ſhips of war, attended by five ſmall veſſels; and he had on board with him his two ſecretaries. With *Flamininus*, who came on foot to the ſea-ſhore, were *Amynander* King of the *Athamanes*, *Dionyſodorus* ambaſſador from *Attalus*, *Ageſimbrotus* Admiral of the *Rhodian* fleet, *Phæneas* General of the *Ætolians*, and *Ariſtænus* and *Xenophon*, two deputies from the *Achæans*. *Philip* continued in the prow of his ſhip, which lay at anchor. *Why don't you come aſhore?* ſaid the Pro-Conſul, *we ſhall hear one another better. Which of us do you fear? The* Gods *alone I* fear, anſwered the King, *but there are with you ſome* men, *whom I cannot* truſt, *and leaſt of all the* Ætolians. *The danger is equal on both ſides*, replied *Flamininus*, *there is always ſome hazard in conferences with enemies. No*, ſaid *Philip*, *the danger is not equal: Were* Phæneas *dead, the* Ætolians *might eaſily chuſe another Prætor, but were I killed, the* Macedonians *could not ſo readily find another King.* *Polyb.* B. 17. c. 1. *Liv.* B. 32. c. 32.

Then

Y. of *R.* 556. Bef. *J. C.* 196. 255 Conſul-p. Then both parties remained ſilent for ſome time, the Pro-Conſul expecting, that as *Philip* had aſked the conference, he would ſpeak firſt. The King ſaid, it belonged to him who was to preſcribe the terms of peace to ſpeak firſt, not to him that was to accept them: To which *Flamininus* anſwered, "I ſhall tell you plainly the conditions, without "which no peace is to be hoped for. Reſtore to the *Romans* all the "places you have invaded in *Illyricum* ſince the laſt peace; ſurrender "up our deſerters; evacuate the cities you have taken from the *Egyptians* "ſince the deceaſe of King *Ptolemy Philopator*; ſatisfy all the juſt "pretenſions of our allies, and immediately leave *Greece*.

Then the miniſters of the King of *Pergamus*, and of the other allies, by the order of the Pro-Conſul, made ſeverally their demands. Some required *Philip* to reſtore cities, others ſhips, which he had taken; and others demanded of him to rebuild temples which he had demoliſhed. The deputies of *Achaia* would have *Corinth* and *Argos* reunited to the body of their ſtate. *Phæneas* and *Alexander* ſpoke on the part of the *Ætolians*. The former confidently inſiſted on the King's reſtoring all the places he had uſurped from them, and his entirely evacuating *Greece*. But *Alexander*, who was eſteemed a notable ſpeaker, went farther, and, addreſſing himſelf to the King, reproached him with carrying on the war in an ungenerous manner, and not like the Kings of *Macedon*, his predeceſſors, who uſed to meet their enemies in the open field, and there decide their differences by battle, ſparing the towns, that they might poſſeſs them as the reward of their victories. Whereas *Philip*'s method was, to avoid fighting, over-reach his enemies in conferences, pillage and burn towns, even thoſe of his allies, more of which he had deſtroyed in *Theſſaly*, the laſt year, than an enemy would have done. The King bringing his ſhip nearer the ſhore, replied: That *Alexander* had made a very theatrical harangue, and like an *Ætolian*; that no man would willingly do an injury to his allies; but that the circumſtances of affairs were ſometimes ſuch, as obliged thoſe that had the management of them to do things very much againſt their inclinations. He was going on, when *Phæneas* interrupted him, ſaying, That he trifled, and muſt either conquer in war, or ſubmit to the ſtrongeſt. *Philip* immediately anſwered, *That's clear, indeed, even to a blind Man.* *Phæneas* had weak eyes, and the King, who loved a jeſt, alluded to this infirmity. He then ridiculed the *Ætolians*, for aſſuming the airs of the *Romans*, and, like them, ordering the King of *Macedon* to quit *Greece*. He aſked them, what it was they meant by *Greece*; ſome of the *Ætolian* nations, he ſaid, were not *Greeks*. Would they give up theſe to him? Next he anſwered the ambaſſadors from *Pergamus* and *Rhodes*, and offered to reſtore the ſhips he had taken from them; yet adding, That it would be more equitable if *they* were required to reſtore *his* ſhips, ſince every one knew, that they were

were the aggreſſors in the war. He offered likewiſe to give up the country of *Paræa* to the *Rhodians:* And, as *Attalus* had inſiſted upon reparation of the damage he had done to the woods of *Nicephorium* and the grove of the temple of Venus, "Since Kings, *ſaid he*, muſt treat "of ſuch matters, I ſhall repair thoſe damages, the only way they "can be repaired; I ſhall ſend thither gardiners and trees, and be at "the expence of planting." In the end of the conference he deſired the parties would deliver him their ſeveral pretenſions in writing, and he promiſed to conſider them: *I am alone*, ſaid he, *I have none to aſſiſt me with their counſels:* To which the Pro-Conſul anſwered, *You deſerve to be alone, for you have deprived yourſelf of all your friends.* The King was ſtung with this reproach, but put on a forced ſmile. Mutual promiſes being given, that the conference ſhould be continued the next day in the ſame place, *Philip* retired with his ſhips, and *Flamininus* returned to his camp.

Y. of *R.* 556. Bef. *J. C.* 196. 255 Conſul. p. *Polyb.* L. 17. c. 7.

At the next meeting, the King deſired, that in order to cut off a thouſand frivolous diſputes, the conference might be between him and *Flamininus* only. This was agreed to, and then *Philip* came aſhore with two of his confidents, and went a little apart with the Pro-Conſul. The King offered to give up all he poſſeſſed in *Illyricum* to the *Romans*; *Pharſalus* and *Lariſſa* to the *Ætolians*, but refuſed to reſtore *Thebes* to them; he offered likewiſe to reſtore *Paræa* to the *Rhodians*, but reſerved *Jaſſos* and *Bargiliæ*; he promiſed to ſurrender *Argos* and *Corinth* to the *Achaians*, and to reſtore to King *Attalus* the ſhips and priſoners he had taken from him. But when *Flamininus*, upon his return to the deputies made this report, they all raiſed a great clamour. *Philip*, perceiving by the noiſe what oppoſition his propoſals were like to meet with, deſired a third interview the next day, at another place not far from *Nicæa*. They met accordingly; and then the King exhorted the deputies of the nations not to be averſe from a peace, and propoſed to refer all differences to the arbitration of the *Roman* Senate: The deputies at firſt oppoſed this motion, but it was at length agreed to, and commiſſioners were ſent to *Rome* from the King, the Pro-Conſul and all the confederates.

The commiſſioners of the allies were firſt heard in the Senate, and they inſiſted chiefly on the neceſſity of obliging *Philip* to give up *Demetrias* in *Theſſaly*, *Corinth* in *Achaia*, and *Chalcis* in *Eubœa:* Theſe three places he had called, *The Fetters of Greece.* What was urged on this head, raiſed ſuch ſtrong prejudices againſt *Philip*, that when one of his ambaſſadors was beginning a ſtudied harangue, the Senators interrupted him, and ſaid; *Tell us, will the King of* Macedon *give up* Corinth, Chalcis *and* Demetrias? The ambaſſadors, ſurprized at this queſtion, anſwered, that their maſter had given them no inſtructions as to that matter: Whereupon they were diſmiſſed, and a decree paſſed giving full powers

Y. of *R.* 556. Bef. *J. C.* 196. powers to *Flamininus* to purſue the war, or make peace, as he ſhould think proper.

255 Conſul p. *Philip*, finding his hopes fruſtrated, turned his thoughts wholly to the war; and as it was of great importance to him to preſerve *Argos*, and yet difficult to do it, becauſe it was in the heart of *Achaia*, he put *Nabis*, the tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, into poſſeſſion of that city, upon condition of its being reſtored to him in caſe he came off conqueror in the war. But the tyrant was no ſooner maſter of the place, than he plundered all the inhabitants, committed the moſt horrible cruelties, and, in order to preſerve his new poſſeſſion, entered into a treaty with *Flamininus* (who at his requeſt came from *Phocis* for that purpoſe) and furniſhed the Pro-Conſul with ſix hundred *Cretans* to act againſt *Philip*.

Liv. B. 32. c. 38.

c. 40. After this, *Nabis*, having extorted all the money he could from the men of *Argos*, brought his wife *Apega* thither to practiſe robbery upon the women. When they came to court, ſhe admired their jewels and rich clothes, and by uſing good words with ſome, and menaces with others, entirely ſtripped them of all their finery. Then the Tyrant leaving a gariſon in the place, returned to *Lacedæmon*. The Pro-Conſul ſpent the winter at *Anticyra*.

Early in the ſpring *Flamininus*, underſtanding that the general diet of *Bœotia* was ſummoned to meet at *Thebes*, left his quarters, and, under a guard of only one *Manipulus*, advanced towards that city, accompanied by King *Attalus*. The Pro-Conſul had ordered two thouſand *Haſtati* to follow him at ſome diſtance; theſe were hid by the hills about *Thebes*. *Antiphilus*, the Prætor of *Bœotia*, ſeeing the *Roman* General approach with ſo ſmall a guard, came out to meet him; and all the inhabitants, out of curioſity to ſee what paſt, ran either to the ramparts, or out of the gates, moſtly without arms. When they ſaw the two thouſand *Haſtati* appear, they thought themſelves betrayed, but diſſembled their uneaſineſs: *Flamininus* careſſed the *Bœotians*, and gave them leave to hold the diet, which had been appointed to meet the next day. *Attalus*, who was preſent at the aſſembly, ſpoke firſt, and with great vehemence urged them to engage in an alliance with the *Romans*. In the midſt of his harangue he was ſeized with an apoplectic fit, which took away his ſpeech, and he preſently after fell down; and though he was brought again to himſelf, he had loſt the uſe of ſome of his limbs. [His attendants, a few days after, put him on board a galley, which carried him to *Aſia*, where he died at ſeventy one years of age, leaving his crown to his eldeſt ſon *Eumenes*.] This accident did not break up the aſſembly; and as there was no room for debate upon *Attalus*'s motion, *Flamininus* being maſter of the town, the *Thebans* and all *Bœotia* entered into a confederacy with the Republic.

B. 33. c. 1. *Plut.* life of *Flamininus*.

Liv. B. 33. c. 21.

The Pro-Conſul having now no enemies behind him, marched into *Theſſaly*, in queſt of *Philip*, who had taken the field. In the neighbourhood

hood of *Pheræ*, a city of *Magneſia*, the two armies encamped near each other. But as the country all around was thick ſet with trees, and full of gardens and ruined walls, neither of the Generals thought the ground proper for a pitched battle, and they decamped as it were by conſent. *Philip* bent his march towards *Scotuſſa*, where he could have plenty of forage for his army; and *Flamininus*, ſuſpecting his deſign, haſtened towards the ſame town, in order to lay waſte the fields round it. The roads by which the two armies marched, being divided by a ridge of hills, they advanced as far as *Cynocephalæ* * without knowing any thing of each other. Here they came to a deciſive battle before either party was prepared for it. The day being foggy, ſome troops of *Roman* horſe, that had been detached to diſcover the enemy, fell in unawares with a detachment of *Macedonians*. A ſkirmiſh enſued. On both ſides, having ſent advice to their reſpective Generals of what had happened, they received ſucceſſive reinforcements. Various was the fortune of the conflict. Once the *Romans* would have been totally routed, if five hundred *Ætolian* horſe had not ſuſtained them, and gallantly oppoſed themſelves to the enemy's impetuoſity. *Flamininus*, the fog being at length diſperſed, put his whole army into the beſt order he could; and, with his left, advanced againſt the right of the *Macedonians*, which *Philip* had, by this time, formed into a deep Phalanx, on the aſcent of a hill. The Phalanx, by its weight, the excellency of its arms, and the advantage of the higher ground, entirely broke the *Roman* battalions that were before it. *Flamininus*, thinking all loſt on this ſide, joined his right, which had already made an impreſſion on the left of the enemy: For this left was not in the order of a Phalanx; the inequality of the ground would not ſuffer it: Nor, indeed, had the troops come up early enough to be put into any good order for battle: They were therefore ſoon routed. Among thoſe who purſued them, was a Legionary Tribune, who obſerving that *Philip*, with his victorious Phalanx, was ſtill preſſing after the left of the *Romans*, turned from the flying enemy, and, with twenty companies, fell upon the Phalanx in the rear. Such being the order of a Phalanx, that it cannot face about, nor the Phalangites fight ſingly, the hindmoſt ranks were ſlaughtered without making reſiſtance; others threw down their arms and fled: The foremoſt were charged in front, by the *Roman* Legionaries, whom they had routed; for theſe, having rallied, returned now to the fight. The King perceiving the day loſt, gathered about him as many of his *Macedonians* and *Thracians* as he could, and fled to *Tempe*. His army, before the battle, conſiſted of about twenty one thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, and that of the *Romans* was not much more numerous: Of the former eight thouſand men were killed and five thouſand taken priſoners: The *Romans* loſt only ſeven hundred. To add to the King's misfortune, his General *Androſtenes*, whom he had left in *Corinth* with ſix thouſand men, was

Y. of *R.* 556. Bef. *J. C.* 196. 255 Conſul-p.

Polyb. B. 17. c. 15.

* *The Dogs Heads*, hills ſo called.

Liv. B. 33. c. 14.

Y. of *R.* 556. Bef. *J.C.* 196. 255 Conſul-p.

defeated juſt at the ſame time, in *Achaia*, by *Nicoſtratus* Prætor of that nation.

The *Ætolians* by their vanity gave the Pro-Conſul great uneaſineſs. They had indeed bore a good part in the late battle of *Cynocephalæ*, but in their ſongs which they diſperſed over all *Greece* they aſſumed the chief glory of the ſucceſs to themſelves. *Flamininus* [a] took an opportunity to mortify their pride. Three envoys coming from *Philip*, under pretence of aſking a truce to bury the dead, but in reality to aſk a conference in order to a peace, the Pro-Conſul gave them an anſwer without conſulting the Chiefs of the *Ætolians*. Provoked at this affront, they ſpread a report, that he was bribed by the King, and was betraying the common cauſe; but in truth the *Roman* had very different motives for hearkening to *Philip*'s propoſals. *Antiochus*, ſtiled *the Great*, King of *Syria*, was preparing to come into *Europe* with an army, and *Flamininus* deſired to conclude a treaty with the *Macedonian* before the arrival of the *Syrian*. Calling therefore a council of the allies, he aſked them upon what terms they thought it might be proper to grant a Peace to *Philip*. *Amynander* King of the *Athamanes* declared, that he ſhould be pleaſed with any terms that would ſecure the liberty and tranquillity of *Greece*. But the *Ætolians* ſpoke with great warmth and haughtineſs. They ſaid, that the *Roman* General was doubtleſs very much in the right, when a peace was in queſtion, to conſult with thoſe who had been his companions in the war; but that he greatly deceived himſelf, if he imagined, the *Romans* could have a durable peace, or the *Greeks* aſſured liberty, without either killing *Philip* or dethroning him. The Pro-Conſul anſwered, that it was never the intention of the *Romans*, nor agreeable to their manners, to carry things to ſuch extremity; nor was it for the intereſt of *Greece* to ruin *Macedon*, which ſtood as a barrier againſt the irruptions of the *Thracians*, *Illyrians*, and other barbarous nations; and concluded with ſaying, that he would grant a peace to the King, but upon ſuch terms as ſhould not leave him in a condition to renew the war.

Polyb. Legat. 6.

Liv. B. 33. c. 12.

Philip, the next day, appeared at the congreſs, and prudently declared: *That he accepted the articles he had hitherto rejected, and referred all other matters to the arbitration of the* Rome *Senate*. Upon this a truce was granted him for four months to negotiate a peace at *Rome*; but *Flamininus*

[a] *Plutarch* has tranſmitted to us ſome verſes made by *Alcæus*, on this occaſion. They are in the form of an epitaph upon the *Theſſalians* ſlain at the battle of *Cynocephalæ*, and to this effect. "Paſſenger, on "this field lie, unpitied, and unburied, "thirty thouſand *Theſſalians*, vanquiſhed "in battle by the *Ætolians*, and the *Latines* "whom *Flamininus* led from the plains of "*Italy*. A mighty overthow to the *Theſſalians!* And the bold boaſtful *Philip* "fled ſwifter than the ſwift hinds." *Flamininus* is ſaid to have been vexed at this epitaph, becauſe it did not honour him enough, but *Philip* only laughed at it, and anſwered the poet in verſe, imitating his two firſt lines. "Paſſenger, Upon "this bleak hill ſtands, leafleſs and ſtript "of its bark, a very conſpicuous gibbet "for the poet *Alcæus*."

demanded

demanded his ſon *Demetrius*, and ſome other Lords of his court for hoſtages, and alſo two hundred talents; on condition nevertheleſs, that both the money and the hoſtages ſhould be reſtored if the peace did not take place. The *Macedonian* complied, diſpatched ambaſſadors to *Rome*, and retired into his own dominions. Y. of *R.* 556. Bef. *J.C.* 196. 255 Conſul-p.

IN *Italy*, *Cethegus*, who had marched againſt the *Inſubrians* and *Cænomani*, obtained a complete victory over them on the banks of the *Mincius*; thirty five thouſand of thoſe *Gauls* were ſlain in the action, and five thouſand ſeven hundred made priſoners, among theſe, *Hamilcar* the *Carthaginian*. *Minucius* the other Conſul had no opportunity of coming to a pitched battle with the *Ligurians* and *Boii*, againſt whom he commanded, but he over-ran their country and laid it waſte. B. 32. c. 30.

From *Spain*, the accounts at this time were not ſo favourable. In *the Hither Province* the Prætor *Sempronius Tuditanus* had been defeated by the *Spaniards*, and loſt his own life in the action; and in *Further Spain* ſeveral towns had been ſeized by two petty Kings. There was almoſt a general diſpoſition to ſhake off the *Roman* yoke. c. 25. c. 21.

WHEN the ambaſſadors from the King of *Macedon* arrived at *Rome* the Republic had juſt choſen new Conſuls, *L. Furius Purpureo*, and *M. Claudius Marcellus*. Theſe magiſtrates, finding that the Senate was going to aſſign *Italy* for the province of both, moved that one of them might have *Macedon*. *Marcellus* contended that a peace with *Philip* would not be durable, ſhould the army be withdrawn from *Greece*; and he made ſuch a ſtir in the Senate that he would perhaps have gained his point, if the Tribunes had not carried the affair before the Comitia: The tribes unanimouſly voted for a peace, and appointed *Flamininus* to act as General in *Macedon* till the treaty with the King ſhould be concluded, and for this laſt purpoſe ten commiſſioners were ſent thither, accompanied by *Philip*'s ambaſſadors. Y. of *R.* 557. Bef. *J.C.* 195. 256 Conſul-p.

The articles of the peace, between the *Roman* Republic and King *Philip*, as they were drawn up by the Senate, were as follow:

All the cities of the Greeks, *both in* Europe *and in* Aſia, *ſhall enjoy perfect liberty, and be governed only by their own laws.* c. 30.

Philip *ſhall, before the celebration of the* Iſthmian *games, evacuate all the* Greek *cities where he has gariſons*; *particularly* Euromus, Padaſia, Bargyliæ, Jaſſos, Thaſſos, Myrina, Abydos *and* Perinthus.

As to Cius *the Pro-Conſul ſhall notify the Intentions of the Senate to King* Pruſias.

Philip *ſhall reſtore to the* Romans *all their deſerters*;

Deliver up all his ſhips that have decks, except five, and one Hexaremis;

Never have above five thouſand men in pay; *never make uſe of elephants in his armies*; *nor wage war out of* Macedon, *without the conſent of the* Romans *.

* So ſays *Livy*: But we do not find that this article was obſerved; and *Polybius* does not mention it.

Y. of *R.* 557. Bef. *J. C.* 195 256 Conſul p.

He ſhall pay the republic a thouſand talents, one half immediately, and the other half in ten years, at ten equal payments.

Theſe articles being communicated to all the ſtates of *Greece*, were approved by all, except the *Ætolians*; who aſked the other *Greeks*, *Why they thought themſelves ſo much obliged to* Flamininus *for taking the chains off their legs and putting them about their necks?* For obſerving, that while other towns were particularly ſpecified, no mention was made of *Corinth*, *Chalcis* and *Demetrias*, they inſinuated that *Rome* had an intention to appropriate thoſe places to herſelf, and thereby become miſtreſs of *Greece:* A ſuſpicion not ill founded: The Senate had purpoſely avoided mentioning them, in order to leave it in the breaſt of *Flamininus* and the Council of ten, to keep them, or ſet them free. Some of the council were for putting ſtrong gariſons into thoſe cities, to guard them againſt *Antiochus:* But *Flamininus* oppoſed this motion, remonſtrating, that if the *Romans* would refute the calumnies of the *Ætolians*, and gain univerſal eſteem, they *muſt reſtore liberty to* ALL GREECE. It was therefore finally reſolved, that the *Romans* ſhould have poſſeſſion of *Chalcis*, *Demetrias* and the citadel of *Corinth*, only till the apprehenſions of *Antiochus*'s coming into *Europe* were over.

Plut. life of *Flamininus.*

LIBERTY to *GREECE* was ſoon after proclaimed by a herald in a vaſt aſſembly of the *Greeks*, met together from all parts to celebrate the *Iſthmian* games. Their amazement and joy upon this occaſion were inexpreſſibly great; they could never ſufficiently admire the diſintereſtedneſs of the *Romans*, who had propoſed to themſelves no other fruit from the labours and expences of the war, than the pleaſure of making other nations happy [a].

Liv. B. 33. c. 34.

The members of *the council of ten*, (now diſſolved) took each his diſtrict, to put the decree in execution. They reinſtated the allies of *Rome* in the poſſeſſion of all thoſe places which the *Macedonian* Kings had taken from them; ſo that *Philip* was confined within the ancient bounds of *Macedon*. The *Ætolians* were the only people, of the allies, diſſatisfied; they had been refuſed ſome towns which they thought they had a right to. They frequently complained, "that the conduct of the *Romans* "towards them was extremely changed ſince the victory over *Philip*, "though, without the help of the *Ætolians*, they could neither have "obtained that victory, nor even have come into *Greece*;" and in the end had recourſe to *Antiochus the Great*, King of *Syria*.

[a] Had *Rome* ſeized upon *Greece* at this time, it is probable ſhe could not have held it long. The *Greeks* always jealous of their liberty would have been eaſily ſtirred up to revolt by *Philip*; and a dangerous combination might ſoon have been formed againſt the Republic, by *Greece* and *Macedon*, in which the King of *Syria*, and ſeveral other *Aſiatic* Provinces, would in all likelihood have joined, to put a ſtop to the encroachments of *Rome*. Beſides, the *Romans* were now projecting a war with *Antiochus*, which the *Syrian* endeavoured to avoid; and the moſt plauſible pretext they could find for it, (as appears by a ſpeech of the *Rhodian* deputies in the Senate. *Liv.* B. 37. c. 54) was the freedom of the *Greek* colonies under his dominion. It was neceſſary therefore for the Republic to keep her word with the *Greeks* in *Europe*, that ſhe might be believed by thoſe in *Aſia*.

CHAP.

A MAP OF ASIA MINOR

THE EUXINE SEA

THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

THE CARPATHIAN SEA

SEA OF CILICIA

SEA OF SYRIA

THE AEGEAN SEA

THRACE

PROPONTIS

BITHYNIA

PAPHLAGONIA

GALATIA

PONTUS

LITTLE ARMENIA

GREAT ARMENIA

CAPPADOCIA

TROAS

MYSIA

LYDIA

PHRYGIA

LYCAONIA

CARIA

LYCIA

PISIDIA

PAMPHYLIA

ISAURIA

CILICIA

SYRIA

CYPRUS

CRETE I.

Rhodes I.

Carpathus I.

Lesbos I.

Cos I.

Icaria I.

Samos I.

Chius I.

The Thracian Bosphorus

Hellespont

Byzantium

Chalcedon

Nicomedia

Amastris

Sinope

Trapezus

Cerasus

Colchis

Amisus

Polemonium

Cotyora

Jasonium

Zigana

Thia

Elegia

Euphrates R.

Carvagis

Melitene

Arsanias R.

Chiaca

Anazarbus

Osdara

Dagusa

Zoparistus

Zimara

Analibe

Ariarathea

Arabissus

Cataonia

Iconium

Derbe

Lystra

Cybistra

Mopsuhene

Tarsus

Flaviopolis

Isaura

Mount Taurus

Gates of Syria

Issus

Myriandrus

Alexandria

Rosus

Seleucia

Antioch

Apamea

Laodicea

Amathunte

Paphos

Salamine

Idalia

Curias Prom.

Acamas Prom.

Dinaretum Prom.

Soloe

Macaria

Cerynia

Sacred or Chalcedonian Prom.

Phaselis

Olympus

Patara

Xanthus

Myra

Limyra

Aryandus

Telmessus

Halicarnassus

Cnidus

Cos

Miletus

Priene

Ephesus

Smyrna

Colophon

Sardis

Philadelphia

Thyatira

Pergamus

Adramyttium

Lectum Prom.

Tenedos I.

Alexandria

Troy

Abydos

Lampsacus

Parium

Proconnesus Isle

Cyzicus

Lesbos

Hellespont

Granicus R.

Aesepus R.

Scamander R.

Simois R.

Ida

Antandros

Perperene

Mytilene

Methymna

Gergithos

Dorylaeum

Nicaea

Prusias

Lake Apollonia

Apamea Col.

Lake Ascanius

Bithynium

Juliopolis

Pompeiopolis

Ancyra

Tectosaga

Germa Col.

Tolistobii

Cydissa

Vindia

Papyra

Mt. Olympus

Corbeus

Tavium

Comiaspa

Pardesene

Sibora

Agriane

Archelaus

Armara

Timosa

Tamisa

Sebaste

Nicopolis

Pontus Polemoniacus

Magnopolis

Sebastopolis

Neocesarea

Comana

Zela

Tibia

Draconta

Clotedarize

Domana

Satala

Suise

Themiscyra

Sidissa

Thermodon R.

Halys R.

Amnias R.

Iris R.

Lycus R.

Amasia

Mazaca

Caesarea

Armenia Minor

Sinnervas

Tomosa

Ochrae

Sacene

Armenia

Osiana

Nyssa

Sasima

Tyana

Artaxata

Mopsuestene

Lalasis

Gates of Cilicia

Taurus Mount

Cilicia

Isauria

Pisidia

Antioch Col.

Apollonia

Seleucia

Magnesia

Orthosia

Laodicea

Colossae

Metropolis

Apamea

Philomela

Eucarpia

Abrostola

Decimea

Synnada

Hermus

Smyrna

Ionia

Caria

Lydia

Phrygia

Lycaonia

Cadyna

Sabatre

Derbe

Iconium

Lystra

Derbe

Cybistra

Mopsuestene

Tarsus

Lalasis

Isauria

Cilicia

Pamphylia

Perga

Side

Attalia

Aspendus

Olbia

Coracesium

Selinus

Phaselis

Olympus

Sacred or Chalcedonian Prom.

CHAP. III.

Antiochus the Great *invades* Thrace.
A conference between Antiochus *and ſome* Roman *commiſſioners.*
M. Porcius Cato *choſen Conſul. He oppoſes the repeal of the* Oppian *law. He conducts the war in* Spain.
Hannibal *eſcapes from* Carthage *into* Syria.
Flamininus *makes war upon* Nabis, *Tyrant of* Lacedæmon, Nabis *ſubmits.*
Antiochus *courts the friendſhip of* Rome.
Hannibal *endeavours to draw* Carthage *into a new war with* Rome.

ANTIOCHUS the Great was one of thoſe Princes called *Seleucidæ*; the founder of which family was *Seleucus Nicator*, an officer in the army of *Alexander the Great*. *Seleucus* was ſucceeded, in the throne of *Syria*, by his ſon *Antiochus Soter*, and he by his ſon *Antiochus the God*. This God being poiſoned by his wife *Laodice*, was ſucceeded by his ſon *Seleucus Callinicus*, who left two ſons, *Antiochus Ceraunus*, and the *Antiochus* who now engages our attention. Y. of *R.* 557. Bef. *J. C.* 195. 256 Conſul-p. *Appian* in *Syriacis.* *Juſtin.* B. 27. c. 1.

He poſſeſſed all the countries of *Aſia* from the Eaſtern borders of *Media* to *Æolis* and *Ionia*; alſo *Cœle-Syria*, *Phœnicia*, *Judæa*, and all the coaſt of the *Mediterranean* quite to *Egypt*. His pretence for coming into *Europe* was to recover poſſeſſion of *Thrace*, which *Seleucus Nicator* had conquered from *Lyſimachus*, and he purpoſed to rebuild *Lyſimachia* formerly demoliſhed by the *Thracians*, and make it the capital of a kingdom, for one of his ſons.

Upon the news of the *Syrian*'s arrival, and of the enterprize he had in view, ſome of the *Roman* council of ten, who had diſperſed themſelves in *Greece*, haſtened to *Lyſimachia*, to diſſuade him from attempting any conqueſt in *Europe*. He received them at firſt with great politeneſs; but the *Romans* ſoon provoked his pride by thoſe airs which they aſſumed wherever they came. They told him, that his whole conduct ſince his leaving *Syria* diſpleaſed the Republic, that he ought to reſtore all the cities he had uſurped from *Ptolemy*, and that it was not ſufferable he ſhould poſſeſs thoſe he had taken from *Philip*, during his war with *Rome*, and which the *Romans*, as conquerors, had the ſole right to diſpoſe of. *What!* ſaid they, *ſhall the* Romans *have been at the expence of the war, and ſhall* Antiochus *reap all the advantages of it? But ſhould we connive at your conqueſts in* Aſia, *ſhall we therefore ſuffer you to invade* Europe? *Is not this a declaration of war againſt the* Roman *Senate and people? You may indeed deny it; but you might as well come into* Italy *and deny that you have any deſign againſt the Republic.* To this *Antiochus* anſwered, *Polyb.* B. 17. c. 31. *Liv.* B. 33. c. 39.

Y. of *R.* 557. Bef. *J. C.* 195. 256 Conſul-p. *I have long obſerved, That* Rome *is very attentive to the conqueſts I make, but never thinks of ſetting bounds to her own. Know, that you have as little right to examine what I do in* Aſia, *as I have to concern myſelf about what you do in* Italy. He then aſſerted the juſtice of his claim to *Thrace*, and to the towns he had taken from *Ptolemy* and *Philip*, alledging, that they had been all uſurped from his anceſtors. The conferences were interrupted by a report that *Ptolemy Epiphanes* was dead. *Antiochus* reckoning *Egypt* to be his own, haſtened aboard his fleet to ſail to that country and take poſſeſſion of it. But putting in at *Patara* in *Lycia*, he was there informed that *Ptolemy* was ſtill alive. After this, having narrowly eſcaped ſhipwreck near the mouth of the *Sarus* in *Cilicia*, he returned to *Antioch*, the capital of his dominions, and ſpent the winter there. He had left his ſon *Seleucus* at *Lyſimachia* with a land army to finiſh the rebuilding of the city, and defend it.

Valerius Ant. apud *Liv.* *Livy*, B. 33. c. 36, 42. IN *Italy* the two Conſuls *Marcellus* and *Furius*, had carried on the war with ſucceſs againſt the *Ciſalpine Gauls*, and had entirely deſtroyed two conſiderable armies of them [b].

Y. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J. C.* 194. 257 Conſul-p. AT the elections for the new year *M. Porcius Cato* and *L. Valerius Flaccus* were raiſed to the Conſulſhip. As the affairs of *Spain* grew very urgent, the Senate reſolved to ſend thither one of the Conſuls with an army. The conduct of it fell by lot to *Cato*.

Liv. B. 34. c. 1. While preparations were making for his departure, the *Roman* ladies took a ſtep, which was a perfect novelty in the Republic. About twenty years before, when *Hannibal* was ravaging *Italy*, and when the treaſury was very low, a *Tribune of the people* named *Oppius* had got a law paſſed, *That no woman ſhould wear above half an ounce of gold in ornaments; or wear purple; or ride in a chariot, either at* Rome, *or within a mile of it, unleſs ſhe were to aſſiſt at a public ſacrifice.* The ladies had conformed themſelves to this law in a time of general diſtreſs, but they thought it intolerable to be under the reſtraint of it now, when the Republic abounded with riches; and they made a great ſtir to get it repealed. The Conſulſhip of the auſtere *Cato* ſeemed a very improper time for moving this affair; but their paſſion for finery would brook no delay. They prevailed with *Valerius* and *Fundanius*, two of the Tribunes, to preſent their requeſt to the Comitia; and, contrary to cuſtom, ran thither themſelves: Neither the orders of their huſbands, nor the rules

[b] The *Pontifices* and *Augurs* who had paid no taxes during the late war, were now obliged to pay for all the years they had been deficient: But they were at the ſame time eaſed of one burthenſome part of their functions; for the *Romans* erected a new ſort of ſacerdotal college, under the name of *Epulones*, whoſe office was confined wholly to the care of the religious feaſts; the number of theſe prieſts in the beginning was only three, and all choſen out of *Plebeian* families. *Porcius Læcas* was one of the firſt three. This was he who when Tribune two years before got the famous *Porcian* law paſſed, which forbad, under very ſevere penalties, to whip or put to death a *Roman* citizen: But this privilege did not extend to the armies, where the Generals had an abſolute power of life and death.

of

of decency, nor public authority, could keep them at home. They beſet the ways which led to the Forum, and ſollicited the men as they paſſed, urging the juſtice of their pretenſions: They offered their petitions even to the Conſuls and Prætors. *Cato* was inexorable; he made a long harangue to the aſſembly in behalf of the law and againſt the women. "*Romans*, had each of us been careful to maintain over his "own wife the rightful authority of a huſband, we ſhould not have had "this trouble with the women in a body: But our prerogatives having, "by female tyranny, been overturned at home, are now alſo con- "temned and trampled upon in the Forum. I thought it had been a "fable, That, in a certain iſland, all the men were cut off by a conſpi- "racy of the women. But there is no miſchief of which that ſex is "not capable, if you allow them to hold, among themſelves, aſſem- "blies, private parties, and goſſippings.

Y. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J. C.* 194. 257 Conſul-p.

"I cannot determine with myſelf, whether the thing they aſk, or their "manner of aſking it, be the more pernicious. To us certainly it "would be very ſhameful, to have laws impoſed upon us by a ſeceſſion "of the women, as we had formerly by a ſeceſſion of the commons. I "could not help bluſhing when I came through ſuch a crowd of women "in my way to the Forum; and had it not been for the reſpect I bear "to the individuals, and that it might not be ſaid, they were publicly "rebuked by a Conſul, I would have aſked them, *What manners are "theſe, to run mobbing about the ſtreets, beſet the highways, and ſolicit "men that are not your huſbands? Could not each of you have aſked the "very thing in queſtion of your huſband at home? Are you leſs coy, are you "more free of your blandiſhments in public than in private? And to other "womens huſbands than to your own? Though even at home, if you "deſired modeſtly to confine your cares within your proper ſphere, you would "not think it decent for you to concern yourſelves about what laws are here "enacted or repealed.* Our anceſtors would not allow women to tranſact "even private affairs without a director; they were under the autho- "rity of fathers, brothers, huſbands: *We* are to ſuffer women (God de- "liver us!) to aſſume the government of the ſtate, aſſemble in the Fo- "rum, and vote in the Comitia! A curb for an untractable nature, an "untamed animal: Never imagine that women will of themſelves "ſet bounds to their liberty, if you do not. The reſtriction they are "under by the *Oppian* law is the leaſt of their grievances; they want "a liberty in all things without controul. And what will they not at- "tempt if they gain their preſent point? Recollect all the laws by "which our anceſtors have reſtrained the licentiouſneſs of women, and "ſubjected them to the men. By all theſe we can hardly keep them "within tolerable bounds: What then will be the caſe, if, by the re- "peal of one law after another, you put them upon an equality "with us? If once equal they will ſoon become ſuperior. But let "us hear the reaſon why the matrons thus flock into the ſtreets,

"and

A. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J.C.* 194. 257 Conſul p

" and ſcarce forbear mounting the roſtra to harangue the people. Is it " to redeem their fathers, their huſbands, their children, or their bro- " thers, from *Hannibal's chains?* This evil is now far, and may it " always be far from the Republic. But when it was preſent, you * See p. 173. " * forbad the women's appearing in public, to offer you even pious " petitions. Is it religion that has aſſembled them? Are they to re- " ceive the Goddeſs *Cybele* from *Phrygia?* Can the women aſſign, for " this ſedition of theirs, any pretence that will bear being mentioned? " We would ſhine, ſay they, in gold and purple: We would ride " through the city in our chariots, triumphing over the conquered law " and the ſuffrages of the citizens: We would have no bounds ſet to " our expences; no control upon our luxury.

" You have often, *Romans*, heard me complaining of the profuſe- " neſs both of the women and the men, not only of private men, but " even of the magiſtrates: And that the city is infected with two very " different vices, covetouſneſs and luxury; plagues which have been the " ruin of all great empires. The Republic becomes daily more flou- " riſhing: We have now paſſed into *Greece* and *Aſia*, countries full of " temptations to ungovernable appetites; and begin to handle the trea- " ſures of Kings: I am much afraid leſt theſe riches get a more abſo- " lute power over us than we have obtained over them.

" In the memory of our Fathers, *Pyrrhus*, by his ambaſſador *Cyneas*, " attempted to corrupt with bribes not only the men but the women. " There was then no *Oppian* law to reſtrain the luxury of women; yet " none of them yielded to the temptation. And what do you think " was the cauſe? The ſame which our anceſtors had for not making " any law relating to this matter: There was no luxury to be reſtrained. " Should ſome *Cyneas* now go about the city with his bribes, he would " find women enough ſtanding in every ſtreet, to receive them openly.

" There are ſome deſires which I can by no means account for. A " little ſhame or indignation may perhaps naturally ariſe at our being re- " ſtrained from what others are indulged in; but why ſhould it give " you uneaſineſs to be dreſſed in the ſame manner as every body elſe " *muſt* be dreſſed? It is indeed a very culpable ſhame to be aſhamed of " frugality or poverty: And, were it not, the law in the preſent caſe " has ſecured you from all reproach. You are not ſo richly dreſſed as " you could afford to be. Why? The law has forbid it. But, ſays a " very fine lady, with a great deal of money at command, *Truly I have* " no notion *of a law, that puts all people upon an equality. Why ſhould* " *not a* woman of diſtinction *be diſtinguiſhed by wearing gold and purple?* " *Muſt* people of nothing *have their* beggary *ſcreened by a law?—Romans*, " would you have an emulation of this kind prevail among your wives? " Would you ſee the richer coveting to have what none elſe can purchaſe? " And the poorer, for fear of being deſpiſed, making efforts in expence, " beyond their ability? She who once begins to bluſh for doing what

" ſhe

" ſhe ought, will quickly come to do, without bluſhing, what ſhe ought " not. What ſhe can purchaſe with her own money ſhe will; what " ſhe cannot purchaſe, ſhe will aſk of her huſband. Unhappy is the " huſband if he grants, more unhappy if he refuſes; for another will " give her what he denies.

" When your wives expences are no longer limited by law, you " yourſelves will never be able to ſet bounds to them. To imagine " that things will be upon the ſame footing as before the law was enact- " ed, is a vain thought. A wicked man ſhould never be accuſed, or " not abſolved; and luxury unmoleſted would have been more tolera- " ble than now, when, after being provoked, as a wild beaſt by chains, " it is let looſe again to range at pleaſure."

A. of *R.* 558. Bef *J.C* 194. 257 Conſul. p.

Two of the Tribunes, both of the *Junian* family, and both bearing the name of *Brutus*, ſeconded *Cato*, and ſpoke againſt the repeal. Then *Valerius*, who had undertaken to be the ladies advocate, roſe up. " If, *Romans*, our petition had been oppoſed by private perſons only, " I ſhould have waited in ſilence for your determination: But when " the Conſul, *M. Porcius*, a man, the dignity of whoſe office and " character, had he ſaid nothing, would alone be of great weight " in the oppoſition, has in a long and elaborate ſpeech inveighed againſt " our motion, I think it incumbent on me to make ſome anſwer. And " let me firſt of all obſerve: That the Conſul has ſpent more time in " bitterly reproving the women, than in giving reaſons why our petition " ſhould not be granted. That the ladies have preſumed publicly to " ſolicit you to repeal, in a time of peace and proſperity, a law made againſt " them during the war, and in a time of adverſity, he is pleaſed to " call *a mobbing*, *a ſedition*, and ſometimes *a ſeceſſion* of the women: " Hyperbolical words, merely to exaggerate the matter! for we know, " that *M. Cato*, always a weighty ſpeaker, is ſometimes a *ſevere* one " too; though doubtleſs a very good natured man. What is there " new in this proceeding of the women? Did they never appear in " public before? Look, *Marcus*, into your own book *de Originibus*; " you will there ſee that they have often appeared, and always for " the public good: Go back to the days of *Romulus*, to the bloody " conflict between the *Roman* and *Sabine* armies in the middle of the " Forum: Call to mind that critical period, when total deſtruction " hung over *Rome* from *Marcius Coriolanus* at the head of the *Volſcian* " legions; and many other occaſions where the women's appearing in " public has proved of public utility. What they have often done for " the common intereſt, ſhall we wonder if they now do, in an affair " which particularly concerns themſelves?

" As to the law in queſtion; Is it one of the ancient laws of the Kings, " or of the twelve tables; a law, without which our anceſtors thought " it impoſſible to preſerve decency among the women? No ſuch thing: " It is a law of about twenty years ſtanding, enacted in the Conſulſhip of

V. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J. C.* 194. 257 Conſul. p.

" *Q. Fabius* and *T. Sempronius:* And as, before it took place, the women behaved themſelves irreproachably for many ages, why muſt we ſuppoſe, that, upon the abrogation of it, they will abandon themſelves to luxury? That it was not made with a view to bridle their extravagance, the time when it was enacted is a ſufficient proof. *Hannibal* had gained a great victory at *Cannæ:* He was in poſſeſſion of *Tarentum*, *Arpi*, and *Capua*, and threatned even *Rome* with a ſiege: Our allies had revolted: We had no ſoldiers for the levies, no ſeamen for the fleet, no money in the treaſury: We were obliged to buy ſlaves to recruit our troops, the price to be paid at the end of the war: The publicans, upon a promiſe of being reimburſed at the ſame time, furniſhed corn and other neceſſaries for the army: Private people, at their own expence, ſupplied the fleet with ſailors and rowers: All orders of men lent their gold and ſilver to the public: The widows and orphans brought their money into the treaſury. Were the ladies at that time ſo taken up with dreſs and finery, that the *Oppian* law was wanted to reſtrain their luxury? Were not the ſacrifices to *Ceres* long deferred, becauſe the women were all in mourning? And did not the Senate, for that reaſon, confine the term of mourning to thirty days? Who does not ſee that the want and miſery of the city were the occaſion of this law, and that it was deſigned to continue no longer in force than the reaſon of it ſhould continue? The men of all ranks feel the effects of the happy change of public affairs; and ſhall the women not participate of the fruits of peace and tranquillity? Shall the men wear purple? Shall the prieſts, the magiſtrates, both of *Rome* and of the colonies, ſhall even our children wear it? Shall the dead be wrapt in purple? And ſhall your wives not be permitted to have a purple cloak? *You* are allowed to have purple in the furniture of your horſes. Shall your horſes be more ſumptuouſly adorned than your wives? And as to gold, why may not their trinkets be conſidered as a fund to ſupply the wants of the public on great emergencies? They have formerly ſo proved.

" *Cato* ſays, there will be no emulation, in point of dreſs, among the women of *Rome*, if they are all under the ſame reſtrictions. But what a ſpirit of envy and indignation will it raiſe in every *Roman* woman, when ſhe ſees thoſe ornaments, which ſhe is forbid to wear, allowed to the *Latine* women? Sees *them* ſhining in gold and purple, and riding in chariots through the ſtreets, while ſhe is obliged to follow on foot, as if the ſeat of the empire were in the cities of our allies, not in *Rome?* Such a diſtinction might be felt even by men: How extremely mortifying then muſt it be to female minds; which very ſmall matters are ſufficient to diſturb! They can have no magiſtracies, no ſacerdotal dignities, no triumphs, no ſpoils, nor trophies of war. Neatneſs, ornaments, elegant dreſs, theſe are the triumphs of women: In theſe they delight, in theſe they place their glory: Our anceſtors call'd

" theſe,

" theſe, *mundus muliebris, the world, the every thing of woman.* Are wo- Y. of *R.* 558.
" men to be always in mourning? What is a woman's mourning, but Bef. *J.C.* 194.
" her not wearing gold and purple? And by what does ſhe diſtinguiſh 257 Conſul-p.
" a day of public devotion and thankſgiving, from other days, but the
" finery of her dreſs? We are told, that *if you repeal the* Oppian
" *law, you will not, by your private authority, be able to reſtrain the*
" *women from any thing which that law forbids them to have; and*
" *that your daughters, wives and ſiſters will be leſs under your com-*
" *mand.* While fathers or huſbands are alive the ſubjection of women
" can never ceaſe; and they themſelves deteſt that liberty which is on-
" ly to be acquired by their becoming widows and orphans. They had
" rather have their dreſs regulated by *you* than by the *law.* And ought
" it not to be your choice to hold them under your guardianſhip and
" protection, rather than in ſlavery? To be ſtiled fathers and huſbands,
" rather than maſters?

" The Conſul, as I before obſerved, made uſe of ſome invidious
" expreſſions; *a ſedition, a ſeceſſion of the women:* As if they were juſt
" going to ſeize the *ſacred Mount*, or the *Aventine Hill*, as the commons
" heretofore did in their anger. No, *Romans*, their weakneſs muſt
" ſubmit to whatever you are pleaſed to determine: But the greater your
" power, the more moderate you ought to be in the uſe of it."

The debate laſted all the day, ſo that the putting the queſtion was deferred to the next. Then the women, more impetuous than ever, beſieged the houſes of the two *Brutus's*, the only *Tribunes of the people* in the oppoſition; and by irreſiſtible importunity forced them to yield. The Comitia, being thus at full liberty, repealed the *Oppian* law.

AND now a nobler career preſented itſelf to the auſtere *Cato* than a war with women. He ſet out for *Spain* with a Conſular army, embarked at *Luna* in *Hetruria*, and landed at *Rhoda* [now *Roſes*] in *Catalonia.* From thence he marched by land to *Emporiæ*, where he was met by the Pro-Conſul *Helvius*, who had juſt obtained a victory over the *Spaniards.*

To the Conſul came ambaſſadors from the King of the *Ilergetes*, a *Frontin. Strat.* nation well affected to the *Romans*, praying, that five thouſand men B. 4. c. 7. might be ſent to protect his kingdom, that was threatned, by the enemy, with a general devaſtation. *Cato*, perplexed at this demand, becauſe unwilling either to deſert his allies, or to divide his army, after a whole night's deliberation thought of this expedient. He told the ambaſſadors, he would riſk his own ſafety for the intereſt of their maſter; and accordingly gave orders for equipping ſome galleys to tranſport the ſuccours deſired. The rumour of theſe preparations being ſpread far, the enemy were ſeized with terror, and haſtily left the country of the *Ilergetes.* As for the detachment, it embarked, ſailed a little way, and then, under pretence of contrary winds, returned to the port from whence it had ſet out.

Y. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J. C.* 194. 257 Conſul-p

Cato's troops conſiſting for the moſt part of raw ſoldiers, it was neceſſary to take ſome pains to diſcipline them; and the more as they had to do with the *Spaniards*, naturally brave and reſolute, and, by their wars with the *Carthaginians* and *Romans*, much improved in the military art. The Conſul was juſt ſuch a General as his army wanted; a pattern of vigilance, ſobriety and indefatigable conſtancy in labour; his dreſs always plain, his proviſions the ſame with thoſe of the common ſoldiers.

When he had formed his army to his wiſhes, he took the field, and obtained a complete victory over the enemy. And in order to keep the *Spaniards* in obedience for the future, he made uſe of the following artifice. He wrote private letters to the Commanders of many of the fortified towns, ordering them to demoliſh their fortifications immediately, and threatning revenge, in caſe of diſobedience. Each of thoſe Commanders being ignorant of the orders ſent to the reſt, and dreading the Conſul's reſentment, they all, without delay, beat down their walls and towers; ſo that moſt of the towns in the hither province were diſmantled in one day. In ſhort, *Cato* ſettled *Spain* in ſuch tranquillity and order, that the Senate did not think it neceſſary to ſend a new Conſular army thither.

Livy, B. 33. c. 45. & ſeq.

ABOUT the time that *Cato* left *Rome* to go into *Spain*, letters came from *Carthage*, giving advice, that *Hannibal* was in ſecret intelligence with the King of *Syria*, and forming deſigns againſt the *Romans*. Theſe letters were ſent by the enemies of the *Barchine* faction, whom *Hannibal*, lately Prætor or chief magiſtrate of *Carthage*, had highly provoked, by ſome acts, agreeable to the people, and beneficial to the commonwealth. It had been the cuſtom for the judges to hold their offices for life. This gave them the chief ſway in the Republic; and they were tyrannical in the exerciſe of their authority. As the Quæſtors, after the expiration of their office, became judges of courſe, this proſpect of future greatneſs had ſo raiſed the pride of a certain Quæſtor (of the oppoſite faction) that he refuſed to appear on a ſummons ſent him by the Prætor. *Hannibal* reſenting the affront, cauſed ſome officers to ſeize the Quæſtor; and, bringing him before the aſſembly of the people, not only complained of his inſolence, but of the miſchief the State ſuffered by having perpetual judges; and he obtained a decree that the judges for the future ſhould be choſen annually.

Nor was this the only act for the public good, by which the Prætor encreaſed the number of his enemies among the nobles. Thoſe who had the management of the public money, had embezzled great part of it, ſo that there was not ſufficient to pay the *Romans* the ſtipulated tribute; and a new tax was going to be laid for this purpoſe. *Hannibal* prevented the oppreſſion: Making enquiry after the embezzled money, he found enough to pay the *Romans*, without the burden of a new impoſition. *Scipio*, knowing theſe things, is ſaid to have defended the

Carthaginian

Carthaginian in the Senate of *Rome*, urging that it was below the dignity of the *Roman* people to liſt themſelves amongſt *Hannibal*'s perſonal enemies, and take part in the factions of *Carthage*. The Conſcript Fathers, notwithſtanding *Scipio*'s remonſtrance, ſent thither *C. Servilius*, *M. Claudius Marcellus*, and *Q. Terentius Culleo*, to accuſe *Hannibal* in the Senate, of holding correſpondence with *Antiochus*. Theſe ambaſſadors, by the advice of *Hannibal*'s enemies, gave out, on their arrival, that they were come to adjuſt ſome differences between the *Carthaginians* and *Maſiniſſa*. *Hannibal*, nevertheleſs, had too much penetration not to ſee into the real deſigns of the *Romans*. On the day when he purpoſed to make his eſcape, having appeared in public, as was his daily cuſtom, he left *Carthage* about the duſk of the evening, in his town dreſs, accompanied by only two perſons, both ignorant of his determination. He had appointed horſes to be in readineſs at a certain place, whence riding all night, he came to a tower of his own by the ſea ſide. There he had a ſhip furniſhed with all things requiſite, as having long foreſeen the preſent neceſſity. Thus *Hannibal* took his leave of *Africa*, lamenting, ſays *Livy*, the misfortunes of his country more than his own. Paſſing over to the iſle of *Cercina*, he found there in the haven ſome merchant ſhips of *Carthage*. The maſters ſaluted him reſpectfully; and the chief among them enquiring whither he was bound, he anſwered, he was going ambaſſador to *Tyre*. He then invited all the merchants and maſters of ſhips to a ſacrifice; and it being hot weather, he would by all means hold his feaſt upon the ſhore; whither, becauſe there wanted ſhade, he deſired them to bring all their ſails and yards to be uſed inſtead of tents. They did ſo, and feaſted with him till it was late at night, and they fell aſleep. He then left them, and, putting to ſea, held on his courſe to *Tyre*. All the remainder of that night, and the day following he was ſure not to be purſued; for neither would the merchants be in haſte to ſend news of him to *Carthage*, as thinking he was gone ambaſſador from the ſtate; neither could they get away from *Cercina*, without ſome expence of time, in fitting their tackle. At *Carthage* the diſappearing of ſo great a man raiſed various conjectures. Some gueſſed rightly, that he was fled; but the greater part believed, that the *Romans* had made away with him. At length news came, that he had been ſeen in *Cercina*. The *Roman* ambaſſadors, having now no other buſineſs, accuſed him (with an ill grace) as an enemy to peace. They ſaid, it was well known, that he had heretofore ſtirred up King *Philip* to make war upon the *Romans*, and had lately by letters and emiſſaries been urging *Antiochus* to the like meaſures. They added, that if the *Carthaginians* would ſatisfy the people of *Rome*, they muſt make it appear, that theſe things were not done by their authority, or with their approbation. To this it was anſwered, that *Carthage* would do whatever the *Romans* ſhould think equitable. [It is probable, ſhe, at this time, paſſed ſentence of baniſhment againſt the moſt illuſtrious citizen ſhe could ever boaſt of.] *Hannibal*

A. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J. C.* 194. 257 Conſul p.

Y. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J. C.* 194. 257 Conſul p.

Hannibal coming to *Tyre*, the mother city of *Carthage*, was received and entertained in a manner ſuitable to the dignity of his character. From thence he went to *Antioch*; but made no ſtay there, the King being juſt gone to *Epheſus*. Thither he followed him, and found him wavering between peace and war.

Liv. B. 33. c. 43.

UPON the report of the plenipotentiaries who had concluded the peace with *Macedon*, the *Roman* Senate had judged it neceſſary that *Flamininus* ſhould continue Pro-Conſul in *Greece*. They now began to

c. 45.

make preparations for a war with *Antiochus*; and as there was reaſon to ſuſpect, that *Nabis*, the Tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, would ſide with the King,

B. 34. c. 22.

orders were ſent to the Pro-Conſul immediately to attack *Nabis*, if he thought it for the intereſt of the Republic. *Flamininus*, in execution of theſe orders, having convened a Diet at *Corinth*, at which deputies from all the *Greek* nations were preſent, propoſed to them the recovering *Argos* out of the hands of *Nabis*. He repreſented to the aſſembly, that in the war with *Philip*, which the *Romans* and *Greeks* had jointly carried on, they had each their motives apart; but in the enterprize which he now ſuggeſted, the *Romans* had no other intereſt than the honour of perfecting the liberty of *Greece*, which muſt be deemed incomplete, ſo long as the noble and ancient city of *Argos* remained under the domination of a tyrant. "But (ſaid he) it belongs to you to determine in "this affair; and if neither a concern for that city, nor the danger of "ſuch an example (the contagion of which may ſpread) has any weight "with you, we ſhall acquieſce." The *Athenian* deputy hereto made a very eloquent anſwer, and in terms as pleaſing as he could deviſe. He gave thanks to the *Romans* for what was paſt, and highly extolled the generoſity of their preſent propoſal, whereby, unrequeſted, they freely offered to continue that bounty which, at the earneſt deſire of their aſſociates, they had lately extended to all *Greece*. To this he added, that great pity it was to hear ſuch noble virtue and high deſerts ill ſpoken of by ſome, who took upon them to foretel what harm thoſe their benefactors meant to do hereafter, whereas gratitude would rather have required an acknowledgment of the benefits already received. Every one ſaw that theſe laſt words were directed againſt the *Ætolians*. Wherefore *Alexander*, the Prætor of that nation, riſing up, reproached the *Athenians*, that they, whoſe anceſtors uſed to be the foremoſt in the defence of the general liberty, were now fallen ſo low, as to betray the common cauſe by flattery and baſe compliances. He then inveighed againſt the *Achæans*, who, he ſaid, had been ſoldiers to *Philip* till they deſerted and ran away from his adverſity: That they had got *Corinth* for themſelves, and would now have a war undertaken for their ſakes, that they might be lords alſo of *Argos*; while the *Ætolians*, who firſt engaged in the war with *Philip*, and had always been friends to the *Romans*, were defrauded of ſome places which anciently and of right belonged to them. Neither did *Alexander* ſtop here. He accuſed the *Romans* of fraud in keeping

garisons in *Chalcis*, *Demetrias* and the citadel of *Corinth*, though they had always profeſſed, that *Greece* could never be in liberty while thoſe places were not free. " And what elſe (ſaid he) do they ſeek by a " war with *Nabis*, but a pretext to continue their armies in this country? " Let them withdraw their legions and evacuate *Greece*, which cannot in- " deed be free till their departure; and as to *Nabis*, the *Ætolians* will " undertake, if he do not voluntarily give up *Argos*, to compel him " by force of arms to ſubmit to the good pleaſure of all *Greece*, now at " unity." This boaſting of the *Ætolians* raiſed the indignation of the other *Greeks*, eſpecially the *Achæans*, who called them robbers, a race worſe than barbarian, that had nothing *Greek* but their language, as they had nothing human but their ſhape. *Flamininus* ſaid, he would have anſwered the *Ætolians* if there had been any occaſion for it; but that he was perfectly content with what he ſaw was the general opinion concerning the *Romans* and them. Y. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J. C.* 194. 257 Conſul-p.

In concluſion, the whole aſſembly, except the *Ætolians*, concurred in determining upon a war with *Nabis*, in caſe he refuſed to deliver up *Argos* to the *Achæans*.

When all things were ready for marching, ambaſſadors arrived from *Antiochus*, to propoſe a treaty of alliance with *Rome*. *Flamininus* anſwered, that they muſt addreſs themſelves to the *Roman* Senate; for the ten commiſſioners being abſent, he could ſay nothing to the matter. He then advanced towards *Argos*, expecting, according to ſome aſſurances that had been given him, that, upon his near approach, there would be an inſurrection in the town, by which he ſhould eaſily become maſter of it. Finding theſe hopes diſappointed, he reſolved, inſtead of beſieging that place, to march ſtrait to *Lacedæmon*, and cruſh the Tyrant at once. All preparations were made for this attempt; and his brother *Quinctius*, the Admiral of the *Roman* fleet, appeared off the *Lacedæmonian* coaſts with forty ſhips of war.

Nabis, ſtruck with terror at the approach of theſe ſea and land forces againſt him, augmented the number of his troops, fortified his capital, and maſſacred fourſcore of the principal men in it, whom he ſuſpected of diſaffection to him. *Flamininus* marched to the banks of the *Eurotas*, and from thence ravaged the country to the walls of *Lacedæmon*, while his brother *Quinctius*, after having reduced ſome towns on the ſea coaſt, laid ſiege to *Gythium*, a ſtrong city which might be called the port of *Lacedæmon*, and the repoſitory of all it's riches. Here he met with ſo vigorous a reſiſtance, that though he was joined by the *Rhodians* with eighteen galleys, and by King *Eumenes* with forty, he would have been forced to raiſe the ſiege, if the Pro-Conſul had not ſeaſonably come to his aſſiſtance with four thouſand men: Upon their appearance the beſieged immediately capitulated.

The ſurrendry of *Gythium* broke *Nabis*'s meaſures; he ſent to *Flamininus*, and aſked a conference in order to a peace. They met in a plain

Y. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J.C.* 194. 257 Conſul-p. plain which lay between *Lacedæmon* and the *Roman* camp. The King ſpoke firſt, and deſired to know "for what cauſe the *Romans* made "war upon him; for he was quite ignorant of it. It could not be "(he ſaid) on account of the tyranny and cruelty they charged him "with, he being the very ſame man now as when he and they became "friends and allies, and joined in the war againſt *Philip*: That *Flamininus then* called him King, not Tyrant. Neither could it be becauſe "he held *Argos*: for he was in poſſeſſion of that city when he made "a league with the *Romans*, and was *left* in poſſeſſion of it by the treaty. "In a word, he had done nothing ſince his alliance with *Rome* contrary "to his engagements." All this ſeems to have been very true: For the Pro-Conſul was reduced, in his anſwer, to deny that he had made any league with *Nabis*; arguing, *that it would have been quite improper and indecent for the* Romans, *when making war againſt* Philip *for the liberty of* Greece, *to contract a friendſhip with a Tyrant, the moſt outragious that ever was*; [from whence it followed, that no ſuch friendſhip had been contracted.] Nothing was done the firſt day towards a peace. The next, *Nabis* offered to give up *Argos*, and reſtore all the allies their deſerters; adding, that if the *Romans* had any other pretenſions, they ſhould be given him in writing, that he might conſult with his friends. To this *Flamininus* agreed; and going back to his camp, aſſembled the chiefs of the confederates. The greater part of them were for purſuing *Nabis* to the laſt extremities; but the Pro-Conſul wanted to finiſh matters with the Tyrant, that he might return to *Rome* with the glory of having completed the deliverance of all *Greece*; he was afraid leſt a ſucceſſor ſhould arrive and rob him of ſome part of that honour. However, finding the chiefs of the allies very obſtinate and importunate, he at length pretended to come into their opinion; but told them, that, as the ſiege would probably be long, great ſums of money, great ſtore of proviſions, and materials for engines of war would be needful; and preſſed them to ſend immediately to their reſpective cities for theſe neceſſaries, before the roads grew bad. This cooled their ardour for the ſiege: Knowing the difficulty they ſhould have to raiſe the ſums propoſed, without alienating the minds of their people from them by new taxes, they left the Pro-Conſul at full liberty to ſettle the terms of peace. He then ſent his demands in writing to *Nabis*. The Tyrant was not only to evacuate *Argos*, and give up all deſerters, but to ſurrender immediately to the *Romans* all the places he held in *Crete*: He was to have no more than two galleys, of ſixteen oars each, in his ſervice; build no cities nor caſtles in the territories of others, nor even in his own; give the Pro-Conſul five hoſtages, ſuch as he ſhould chuſe, of whom the Tyrant's own ſon ſhould be one; and laſtly, pay down a hundred talents, and thereafter fifty talents annually for eight years.

When

When the Tyrant had read the conditions to the *Lacedæmonians* assembled in the market-place, and asked them what answer he should give the Pro-Consul, the multitude cried out, *Give him no answer at all: Pursue the war.* These clamours were very agreeable to *Nabis*, and he prepared to sustain a siege. *Lacedæmon* was not entirely surrounded by a wall. *Lycurgus* would have no fortification to the city, but the bodies of the citizens. The *Spartan* tyrants afterwards raised walls, at certain distances, in those places where they were most wanted. The *Romans* attacked the town with fifty thousand men, and forced their way into it at the openings between the walls. *Nabis* was so terrified, that he thought only of making his escape: but his son-in-law *Pythagoras*, who had more presence of mind, causing the houses to be set on fire in all places where the *Romans* had entered, this obliged them to retire. Nevertheless, the Tyrant sent *Pythagoras* to the Pro-Consul, with an offer to submit to those conditions of peace which he had before rejected. *Flamininus* at first received the ambassador with scorn, and ordered him out of his tent; *Pythagoras* however, throwing himself at his feet, obtained by many intreaties what the other was very desirous to grant. As for *Argos*, the cause of the war, it had already recovered it's liberty; the *Argives* had taken arms, and driven the garison out of the town. V. of *R.* 558. Bef. *J. C.* 194. 257 Consul-p.

Notwithstanding that *Greece* was thus entirely quieted, the Pro-Consul continued there all the winter. He was honoured with the office of president at the *Nemæan* games, where, by his orders, a herald proclaimed liberty to *Argos*. The *Achæans*, though pleased to have that city reunited to their state, were yet somewhat dissatisfied to see *Lacedæmon* left in slavery. And as for the *Ætolians*, they (finding fault with the peace, as they had before found fault with the war) openly and loudly spoke of it in the harshest terms, that the *Lacedæmonians* were suffered to continue under the domination of *Nabis*, though their lawful King (*Agesipolis*) was in the *Roman* camp: and that while the noblest of their citizens, expelled by the Tyrant, must live in banishment, the *Roman* people made themselves *his* guards to support him in his tyranny.

AT *Rome*, *P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus* and *Ti. Sempronius Longus* were raised to the Consulate. *Scipio* had hoped either to succeed *Cato*, and finish the *Spanish* war, or to be sent to the *Levant* against the King of *Syria*; but the *Spaniards* were already quelled, and the Senate did not yet think it a proper season to commence a war with *Antiochus*. *Sempronius* made a campaign in *Gaul*, against the *Boii*. V. of *R.* 559. Bef. *J. C.* 193. 258 Consul-p. *Livy*, B. 34. c. 46.

Flamininus, proposing to return this summer to *Italy*, assembled at *Corinth* the chiefs of the *Greek* cities, and there recounted to them all that the Generals his predecessors, and he himself had done in *Greece*, from the time that the *Romans* first entered that country. Every thing he said was highly applauded till he came to mention the affair of *Nabis*. And though he alledged, in justification of his conduct, that he could

Y. of *R.* 559. Bef. *J. C.* 193. 258 Conſul. p. not deſtroy the Tyrant without ruining *Lacedæmon*, this did not ſatisfy the aſſembly. In concluſion he declared to them, that he was going to leave *Greece*, and would, before his departure, withdraw his gariſons from *Corinth*, *Chalcis* and *Demetrias*; by which it would be evident to all the world, that the *Ætolians* lied, when they ſaid, *the* Greeks *had only changed maſters, and that the* Romans *had driven* Philip *out of the country, that they themſelves might tyrannize there.* He exhorted the ſeveral ſtates to judge of their friends only by their actions; uſe their liberty with moderation; and preſerve concord among themſelves, as the beſt ſecurity againſt Kings and Tyrants. "When a ſtate (ſaid he) is divided, the weaker party, rather than ſub-"mit to their own countrymen, will call in the aſſiſtance of foreigners. "Be careful to maintain that liberty which ſtrangers have procured you, "and let not the *Romans* have cauſe to think that they have miſplaced "their benefits and their friendſhip." This diſcourſe (ſays *Livy*) which ſeemed to flow from a father-like affection, drew tears from the eyes of many of the aſſembly; and they exhorted one another to remember and regard *Flamininus*'s advice as the dictates of an oracle. In teſtimony of their gratitude, they ſought for all the *Romans* who were reduced to ſlavery in *Greece*, and delivered them up to him, to the number of twelve hundred: The greateſt part of theſe had been priſoners of war whom *Hannibal* had ſold. After this *Flamininus* returned to *Rome*, and was honoured with a triumph which laſted three days.

Y. of *R.* 560. Bef. *J. C.* 192. 259 Conſul. p. IN the beginning of the next year, when *L. Cornelius Merula* and *Q. Minucius Thermus* had the conſular faſces, ambaſſadors came to *Rome* from *Antiochus* and ſeveral Kings and ſtates of *Aſia* and *Greece*. They were all favourably heard by the Senate, except thoſe from the King of *Syria*. Upon a pretence, that the affair with him was intricate, his miniſters were referred to *Flamininus* and the ten commiſſioners, who together with him had ſettled the affairs of *Greece*. They came to a conference. *Menippus*, one of the two chiefs of the *Syrian* embaſſy, ſaid, he wondered what intricacy there could be in their propoſals, ſince all they aſk'd was a treaty of amity and alliance with *Rome*. He added, that there were three kinds of leagues; one between the victorious and the vanquiſhed; another between ſtates that had made war upon each other with equal advantage; and a third between ſuch as had never been enemies. That as a league with *Antiochus* muſt belong to this laſt kind, he was ſurpriſed the *Romans* would think of treating his maſter like a vanquiſhed Prince; and preſcribe to him what cities of *Aſia* he ſhould ſet at liberty, and from what cities he might exact tribute. To this *Flamininus* anſwered, that ſince *Menippus* went ſo diſtinctly to work, he would as diſtinctly tell him the conditions without which the *Romans* would have no treaty with the King of *Syria*. "*Antiochus* muſt either keep "out of *Europe*, or be content that the *Romans* intereſt themſelves in "protecting the cities of *Aſia*." *Hegeſianax*, the other chief of the embaſſy,

baſſy, replied, with indignation, that it was monſtrous to think of expelling *Antiochus* from the cities of *Thrace* and the *Cherſoneſus*, which his anceſtor *Seleucus* had with great glory conquered from *Lyſimachus*, and which the King himſelf had with no leſs glory recovered from the *Thracians*; that there was a wide difference, in point of juſtice, between the *Romans* deſpoiling him of his lawful poſſeſſions, and his requiring the *Romans* not to concern themſelves with *Aſia*, which had never been theirs: That *Antiochus* indeed deſired an alliance with *Rome*, but upon honourable, not diſgraceful conditions. To this *Flamininus*: "Since in the preſent affair "we are to conſider what is glorious (as indeed it ought to be the firſt, "if not the ſole conſideration with a people the moſt renown'd of any in "the world, and with ſo great a[a] King) Tell me; Which is more glorious, "to deſire the liberty of all the *Greek* cities whereſoever they are; or "to deſire to keep them under tribute and in ſlavery? If *Antiochus* judges "it for his glory, once more to enſlave the towns which his anceſtor con-"quered in war, but which neither his father nor his grandfather ever "poſſeſſed; the *Roman* people think it becoming their honour and ſteadi-"neſs, not to deſert the *Greeks*, whoſe patronage they have undertaken: "and as they have already delivered the *Greek* cities that were under the "domination of *Philip*, ſo they now intend to ſet at liberty thoſe that "are in ſubjection to *Antiochus*. Colonies were not ſent into *Æolis* and "*Ionia* to be held in ſlavery by Kings, but to propagate the race of the "*Greeks*, and ſpread that ancient nation over the world." The *Syrian* ambaſſadors anſwered, that they neither would nor could agree to any thing that tended to a diminution of their maſter's dominions.

Y. of *R.* 560. Bef. *J. C.* 192. 259 Conſul-p.

Next day, *Flamininus* having made a report of the affair to the Senate, in preſence of the ambaſſadors from *Greece* and *Aſia*, the Conſcript Fathers deſired the *Aſiatics* to tell their reſpective cities, that unleſs *Antiochus* quitted *Europe*, *Rome* would aſſert their liberty againſt him, with the ſame courage and the ſame fidelity, with which ſhe had defended the *European Greeks* againſt *Philip*. *Menippus* begged the Senate would not be haſty to paſs a decree which muſt ſet the whole world in arms; that they would take time themſelves, and allow the King time to conſider; that perhaps *Antiochus* might obtain ſome mitigation of the conditions, or yield ſome points for the ſake of peace. The Fathers agreed to defer the matter; and ſent to the King of *Syria* the ſame ambaſſadors who had been with him at *Lyſimachia*, *P. Sulpicius*, *P. Villius* and *P. Ælius*.

Scarce had theſe ſet out from *Rome*, when deputies arrived from *Carthage*, with accounts, that the *Syrian* was certainly preparing for war,

[a] All the provinces of *Aſia* from the eaſtern borders of *Media* to *Æolis* and *Ionia* were ſubject to *Antiochus*. He had lately made himſelf maſter of *Cælo-Syria*, *Phœnicia*, *Judæa* and *Samaria*, and in ſhort of all the country quite to *Egypt*. In *Europe* he held *Thrace* and the *Cherſoneſus*. He had three ſons old enough to ſucceed him in the throne, and four daughters marriageable, by whom he might procure formidable alliances.

Y. of *R.* 560. Bef. *J. C.* 192 259 Conſul p.

and that *Hannibal* excited him to it. The *Carthaginian* had indeed been very favourably received by *Antiochus*, who looked upon him as the ableſt counſellor he could have in a war againſt the *Romans*.

Juſtin. B. 31. c. 3, 5. *Liv.* B. 34. c. 60. *App.* in *Syr.* c. 90.

AS to the method of carrying on this enterprize, *Hannibal* was always of one and the ſame opinion. He aſſerted, that the *Romans* were invincible every where but in *Italy*. To attack them in that country was, he ſaid, like ſtopping a river at the fountain head. The arms of the *Italians* would then be turned againſt themſelves, and they overcome by their own ſtrength; which, were they left at liberty to employ abroad, no King nor nation would be a match for them. He added, that his own example furniſhed a proof of this; who, ſo long as he continued in *Italy*, was never vanquiſhed by the *Romans*, but that his fortune chang'd with the ſcene of action. He therefore adviſed *Antiochus* to truſt him with the command of an hundred galleys, ten thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe. With this fleet he propoſed to ſail firſt to *Africa*, in hopes the *Carthaginians* might be prevailed on to enter into a confederacy with the King. If they refuſed, he would nevertheleſs make a deſcent in ſome part of *Italy*, and there rekindle a war againſt the *Romans*. *Antiochus* approving this advice, *Hannibal*, to ſound his countrymen, ſent one *Ariſto*, a *Tyrian*, to *Carthage*; giving him private tokens to his friends, but no letters, leſt his buſineſs ſhould be diſcovered. The *Tyrian* however was ſuſpected, on account of his frequent viſits to thoſe of the *Barchine* faction; and was cited to appear before the Senate of *Carthage*. Some were for impriſoning him as a ſpy, but others repreſented the ill conſequences of ſuch a proceeding, when they had no evidence againſt the accuſed; it would be a diſcouragement to traders, the *Tyrians* might make repriſals, and all foreigners would take umbrage. Theſe conſiderations ſuſpended their reſolution, and in the mean time *Ariſto* made his eſcape. Before he went off, he uſed a policy to extricate *Hannibal*'s friends. In the duſk of the evening he ſtole into the hall, where public audiences were given, and over the preſident's ſeat, affixed a writing which contained theſe words; Ariſto *had no orders to treat with private perſons, but with the Senate of* Carthage. The ſtratagem ſucceeded, for it prevented an enquiry after any particular men as correſponding with *Hannibal*. However the *African* Republic thought it proper to ſend an embaſſy to *Rome*, to inform the Conſuls and Senate of what had happened, and at the ſame time to complain of ſome uſurpations of *Maſiniſſa* on the lands of *Carthage*. The King, taking advantage of *Hannibal*'s abſence, and of the new heats ariſen on his account, had invaded the fine maritime country called *Emporia*, in which the city of *Leptis* yielded the *Carthaginians* the tribute of a * talent a day; and knowing that they had ſent complaints of him to *Rome*, he diſpatched ambaſſadors thither, to vindicate himſelf. The Senate were prejudiced againſt the *Carthaginians*, becauſe they had neither put *Ariſto* nor his ſhip under arreſt, and had thereby afforded him means to eſcape. When their ambaſſadors came

Liv. B 43. c. 62.
* 193 *l.* 15 *s. Arbuthnot.*

came to be heard, they urged that *Emporia* was within the bounds ſet them by *Scipio Africanus*, and that *Maſiniſſa* himſelf had lately acknowledged their title to that country, by aſking their leave to paſs through it, in purſuit of a rebel, who had fled out of his kingdom to *Cyrene*. The *Numidian* ambaſſadors confidently anſwered, that the *Carthaginians* lied, as to the bounds marked out by *Scipio*. "If rights (ſaid they) are narrowly enquired into, what title have the *Carthaginians* to any land in "*Africa?* They are *ſtrangers* in that country, who [*about ſeven hundred "years ago*] had leave given them to build upon as much ground as "they could compaſs with an ox hide. Whatever they hold beyond "thoſe bounds has been acquired by force and injuſtice. As to the territory in queſtion, they cannot prove that they have continued poſſeſſed of it from the time that they firſt conquered it, or even for "any conſiderable time together. It was held ſometimes by the Kings "of *Numidia*; ſometimes by the *Carthaginians*; juſt as the fortune of "the frequent wars between them happened to decide." The ambaſſadors concluded with deſiring, that *Emporia* might be left on the ſame footing as it was before the *Carthaginians* were enemies to *Rome*, or the King of *Numidia* her friend; and that the *Romans* would not interfere in the diſpute. The Senate anſwered, that they would ſend commiſſioners into *Africa* to determine the affair on the ſpot. *Scipio Africanus*, *Cornelius Cethegus* and *Minucius Rufus*, being accordingly diſpatched thither, heard the matter diſcuſſed, but made no decree in favour of either party. Whether they acted thus of their own head, or by order of the Senate, is not ſo certain, ſays *Livy*, as it is, that they ſuited their conduct to the ſtate of affairs at home; otherwiſe *Scipio* alone could have ended the diſpute by a word. But *Polybius* tells us, that the *Romans* always gave ſentence againſt the *Carthaginians*, not becauſe theſe were always in the wrong, but becauſe it was the intereſt of the judges to give ſuch ſentence. As to the preſent diſpute, he ſays, *Maſiniſſa* had ſeized upon the lands of *Emporia*, but could not take the fortified towns; and that after many embaſſies to *Rome* from both parties, the *Carthaginians* were not only deprived of the lands and towns in queſtion, but obliged to pay 500 * talents for the profits they had received from thence, ſince the time that *Maſiniſſa* made his claim.

Y. of *R.* 560. Bef. *J. C.* 192. 259 Conſul-p.

Legat. 118.

* 96,875 l. *Arbuthnot.*

The *Roman* arms proſpered this year in *Spain*, under the Prætor *Scipio Naſica*; and in *Gaul* the Conſul *Merula* obtained a complete victory over the *Boii* near *Mutina*.

THERE never was a ſtronger competition for the Conſulſhip than now. Three Patricians and four Plebeians, all men of great note, profeſſed themſelves candidates. Of the former, *Scipio Naſica*, ſo famous for his virtue, and who had lately ſignalized himſelf in *Spain*, was ſupported by his couſin-german the *Great Scipio*; and *Quinctius*, the late ſucceſsful Admiral in *Greece*, was recommended by his brother *Flamininus*: The Plebeians were, *Lælius*, the friend of *Scipio Africanus*, *Cn. Domitius Ænobarbus*,

Y. of *R.* 560. Bef. *J. C.* 192. 259 Conſul p. *Ænobarbus*, *C. Livius Salinator*, and *Man. Acilius Glabrio*. It was natural to ſuppoſe, that the greateſt man in the Republic would gain the majority of ſuffrages in favour of thoſe he eſpouſed: yet, ſtrange as it may appear, *Flamininus* had a better intereſt than *Scipio*. *Scipio*'s glory was the greater, but it was therefore expoſed to greater envy. And as he had long reſided at *Rome*, the people familiarized to the ſight of him, had loſt much of their firſt admiration. Beſides they had already rewarded him with the Conſulſhip and Cenſorſhip, ſince his return from *Africa*. *Flamininus*, on the other hand, had of late been little ſeen at *Rome*; his victories and his triumph were recent; he ſolicited in behalf of a brother, his partner in the war, and had neither aſked nor obtained any favour ſince his return from *Greece*. *L. Quinctius* was declared Conſul with *Cn. Domitius Ænobarbus*, and the *Great Scipio* had the double mortification of not ſucceeding either for his couſin or his friend.

CHAP. IV.

The Ætolians *and* Nabis *raiſe commotions in* Greece.

Antiochus *determines on a war with* Rome. *He is jealous of* Hannibal.

Nabis *aſſaſſinated.*

Antiochus *lands in* Theſſaly; Flamininus *defeats his endeavour to bring the* Achæans *to a neutrality.* Hannibal's *advice to the King.*

Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul r. EVER ſince the departure of *Flamininus* from *Greece* the *Ætolians* had been endeavouring to raiſe up new enemies againſt *Rome*; though true policy would have made them cautious of giving the *Romans* any pretence of returning into that country. Having choſen one *Thoas*, a factious man, for their chief, they reſolved in a general diet of the nation to ſhake off their alliance with the Republic, and form a confederacy againſt her. To this end they diſpatched deputies to *Philip*, *Nabis* and *Antiochus*. The *Macedonian* and *Syrian* were not haſty in coming to a determination; but *Nabis* immediately took arms, and beſieged *Gythium*.

Joſeph. B. 12. c. 3. *App.* in *Syriac.* 88. The King of *Syria* about this time celebrated the nuptials of his daughter *Cleopatra* with *Ptolemy Epiphanes*; he married his ſecond daughter to *Ariarathes* King of *Cappadocia*; and offered his third to [b] *Eumenes* King

[b] The founder of the kingdom of *Pergamus* was one *Philetærus* an eunuch, who belonged to *Docimus* a *Macedonian* officer in the army of *Antigonus* the firſt. After the death of *Antigonus*, *Philetærus* accompanied his maſter, who went over to *Lyſimachus* King

King of *Pergamus*, in hopes to draw him thereby from the intereſt of *Rome*: But *Eumenes* rejected the propoſal, and choſe rather to adhere to the *Romans*, believing that, ſooner or later, they would be the conquerors, and well knowing that he muſt become a vaſſal to the *Syrian* if the latter ſhould prevail. Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p.

Early in the ſpring *Antiochus* marched from *Epheſus* to make war upon the *Piſidians*, and while he was engaged in this enterprize, *Villius*, the *Roman* ambaſſador, arrived at *Epheſus*. His collegue *Sulpicius* had fallen ſick by the way, and was left at *Pergamus*. *Scipio Africanus* accompanied *Villius*, and, according to ſome authors, was in the embaſſy. *Hannibal*, being then at *Epheſus*, the civilities that paſſed between him and the *Romans*, and the frequent [c] converſations he had with them, rendered him ſuſpected by *Antiochus*. *Villius* went to *Apamea*, and *Claudius* and *Acilius Ap. Liv.* B. 35. c. 14. *App.* in *Syr.* c. 90.

King of *Thrace*. *Lyſimachus* gave him the charge of his treaſures, which he had laid up in the caſtle of *Pergamus*. *Philetærus* was for ſome time faithful to his truſt, but dreading the intrigues of *Arſinoe* (the wife of *Lyſimachus*) who hated him, he offered the caſtle and the treaſures to *Seleucus Nicator*, then at war with *Lyſimachus*. The latter being ſlain in battle, and *Seleucus* dying ſoon after, *Philetærus* retained *Pergamus*, with the country round about it, and reigned there as king (though without the title) twenty years. He had two brothers, the eldeſt of whom had a ſon named *Eumenes*, and to him *Philetærus* left *Pergamus*. This *Eumenes*, by ſome victories he gained over the Kings of *Syria*, not only ſecured to himſelf the poſſeſſion of what his uncle had left him, but alſo made ſeveral new acquiſitions. When he had governed two and twenty years, he died of a debauch; leaving his dominions to *Attalus*, the ſon of *Attalus*, the youngeſt brother of *Philetærus*.

Attalus was greatly haraſſed by *Achæus*, who ſetting himſelf up as King againſt *Antiochus the Great*, reigned in the leſſer *Aſia*. *Achæus* invaded *Pergamus*, made himſelf maſter of the country, and beſieged *Attalus* in his capital. But he was delivered by the *Tectoſagæ*, a nation of the *Gauls*, whom he called out of *Thrace*, and recovered all he had loſt. When theſe *Gauls* had once got footing in *Aſia*, they laid the neighbouring countries under contribution, and at laſt would have forced *Attalus* to pay them tribute. Hereupon he took the field againſt them, defeated them in battle, and obliged them to confine themſelves within that province which from them took the name of *Galatia*. After his victory, *Attalus* aſſumed the title of King, and joined with the *Romans* and other allies in the war againſt *Philip* of *Macedon*, as has been before related. He was ſucceeded in the throne by his ſon the preſent *Eumenes*.

[c] It is reported, that *Scipio* one day aſked the *Carthaginian*, *Whom he thought the greateſt General? Hannibal* immediately declared for *Alexander*, becauſe with a ſmall body of men he had defeated very numerous armies, and had overrun a great part of the world. *And who do you think deſerves the ſecond place?* continued the *Roman*. *Pyrrhus*, replied the other: *He firſt taught the method of forming a camp to the beſt advantage. No body knew better how to chuſe ground, or poſt guards more properly. Beſides, he had the art of conciliating to him the affections of men; inſomuch, that the* Italian *nations choſe rather to be ſubject to him, though a foreigner and a King, than to the* Roman *people, who had ſo long held the principality in that country.* Thus *Scipio* was twice mortified; but ſtill he went on, *And whom do you place next to thoſe? Hannibal* named himſelf; at which *Scipio* ſmiled, and ſaid, *Where then would you have placed yourſelf if you had conquered me?* To which the *Carthaginian* readily replied, *Above* Alexander. *C. Acilius ap. Liv.* L. 35. c. 14.

Plutarch, in his life of *Pyrrhus*, makes *Hannibal* give *Pyrrhus* the firſt place, *Scipio* the ſecond, and himſelf the third, without mentioning *Alexander*; but in his life of *Flamininus*, *Hannibal* gives *Alexander* the firſt place, *Pyrrhus* the ſecond, and himſelf the third.

It

Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul. p. and there had an audience of the King. The *Roman* inſiſted upon the ſame terms which *Flamininus* had preſcribed to the *Syrian* ambaſſadors. The conference was warm, but not long; for the ſudden news which the King received, at this time, of his ſon *Antiochus*'s death put an end to it. A ſuſpicion prevailed, that the father, jealous of the young Prince's riſing merit, had cauſed him to be poiſoned; and though this ſuſpicion had no good foundation, it was neceſſary for the King to deſtroy it by the appearances of an extraordinary grief. He therefore, without concluding any thing, diſmiſſed *Villius*, who returned to *Pergamus*.

Livy, B. 35. c. 15.

Antiochus gave over all thoughts of the *Piſidian* war, and went to *Epheſus*; where, under pretence of deſiring ſolitude in his affliction, he ſhut himſelf up in his palace with his favourite, *Minio*. This courtier, who knew little of foreign affairs, but had great confidence in his own abilities, preſſed the King to ſend for the *Roman* ambaſſadors to *Epheſus*, and undertook ſo to manage the argument as to leave them nothing to ſay. *Antiochus*, wearied with fruitleſs conferences, and thinking that his mourning would be a good excuſe for treating with the *Romans* by his miniſter, approved the motion, and ſent for *Villius* and his Collegues. The amount of *Minio*'s logic was this: That his maſter had as good a title to the obedience of the *Eaſtern Greeks*, whom he or his anceſtors had conquered, as the *Romans* had to that of the *Weſtern Greeks* in *Italy* and *Sicily*. *Sulpicius* anſwered: That if the King had nothing better to offer for his cauſe, it was indeed but what modeſty required, that he ſhould chuſe to have his cauſe pleaded by any body rather than himſelf. "What ſimilitude (ſaid he) is there between the two caſes? Ever ſince our "conqueſt of the *Neapolitans*, *Tarentines*, and other *Italic Greeks*, our "tenure has been perpetual and uninterrupted; but can you ſay the "ſame of *Antiochus*'s dominion over the *Aſiatic Greeks?* Why, at your "rate of reaſoning we have been doing nothing in *Greece: Philip*'s "poſterity may one day reclaim the poſſeſſion of *Corinth*, *Chalcis* and "*Demetrias*. But what buſineſs have I to plead the cauſe of the *Greek* "cities of *Aſia?* their ambaſſadors are here; let us call them in." Theſe miniſters had been beforehand prepared and inſtructed by *Eumenes*, who was not without ſecret hopes, that he ſhould get whatever was taken from *Antiochus*. There was great plenty of ambaſſadors; who being admitted, fell to making their complaints and demands, ſome right, ſome wrong; it was nothing but a ſcene of altercation and wrangling

It is alſo related, that while *Hannibal* was at *Epheſus*, he went, upon the invitation of ſome of his acquaintance, to hear the lectures of a celebrated peripatetic philoſopher, named *Phormio*. The philoſopher, who was a moſt copious ſpeaker, entertained him, for ſeveral hours (knowing his profeſſion and character) with a diſcourſe on the duties of a General, and the whole extent of the military art. All the reſt of the audience were beyond meaſure delighted; and ſome of them aſked *Hannibal, What he thought of their philoſopher?* The *Carthaginian* frankly anſwered, that he had met with many a ſilly old fellow, but ſo very a dotard as this he had never ſeen before. *Cicer. de Orat. l.* 2. *c.* 18.

between them and *Minio*, neither party yielding any thing. The conference broke off; and the *Romans* returned home in all points as uncertain as they came. So writes *Livy*: But *Appian* reports, that the *Syrian* offered, as the price of an alliance with *Rome*, to reſtore all the *Aſiatic Greeks* to their freedom, except the *Æolians* and *Ionians*: A fruitleſs conceſſion, becauſe the *Romans* had not come with views of peace and amity, but only to inform themſelves of the true ſtate of affairs in *Aſia*. Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p. In *Syr.* §. 92.

Soon after the ambaſſadors were gone, *Antiochus* called a council of the chief officers of his army, as well foreigners as *Syrians*, to give their opinions concerning a war with the *Romans*. *Hannibal* only was not conſulted: His familiarity with *Scipio* and *Villius* had made the King jealous of him. In council every one declared vehemently for a war: Nay *Alexander* of *Acarnania*, who had formerly ſerved *Philip*, and was now in great favour with *Antiochus*, confidently promiſed the King victory, if he would paſs into *Greece*, and make that country the ſeat of the war. *Nabis* and the *Ætolians*, he ſaid, were already in arms; and *Philip* would take the field on the firſt ſounding of the *Syrian* trumpets. He added, that much depended upon expedition; and therefore begged the King would haſten his departure; and in the mean time ſend *Hannibal* into *Africa*, to cauſe a diverſion.

THE little regard, ſhewed to *Hannibal* ſince his familiar intercourſe with the *Roman* ambaſſadors, convinced him that the King had taken umbrage at that part of his conduct. At firſt the *Carthaginian* bore his diſgrace in ſilence; but now, thinking it adviſable to clear himſelf, he begged an audience of *Antiochus*. Being called into the Council, he directly aſked the King the reaſon of his diſpleaſure; and, when he had heard it, expreſſed himſelf in the following manner. *Livy*, B. 35. c. 19.

"I was ſcarce nine years old, when *Amilcar*, my father, at the "time of a ſolemn ſacrifice, led me to the altar, and made me "ſwear, that, to my laſt breath, I would be an irreconcileable enemy "to the *Roman* nation. Under *this Oath* I carried arms for ſix and "thirty years; it was *this* which made me leave my country, when "my country was in peace with *Rome*; it was *this* which brought "me like a baniſhed man into your dominions; and, under the con-"duct of the ſame oath (if you diſappoint my hopes) in whatever part of "the earth I can hear of ſtrength, wherever I can hear of arms, "thither will I fly, in ſearch of enemies to the *Romans*. If, therefore, "any of your courtiers would raiſe their credit with you, by defam-"ing me, they ſhould invent ſome other crime, than my friendſhip "to *Rome*. No; I hate the *Romans*, and am hated by them; and that "I ſpeak truth, I call the Gods to witneſs, and the manes of *Amilcar* "my father. Whenſoever you are in earneſt for a *Roman war*, reckon "*Hannibal* among your ſureſt friends; but if any thing conſtrain you "to peace, in *that* affair you muſt ſeek ſome other counſellor." This *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 11.

Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 35. c. 20.

diſcourſe reconciled the King to *Hannibal*, at leaſt for a time. The Council unanimouſly determined for war.

Rome, upon the return of her ambaſſadors, ſent a body of troops under the Prætor *Bæbius* to guard the eaſtern coaſt of *Italy*, and to be in readineſs to embark for the *Levant*, if there ſhould be occaſion. She ordered two fleets to be fitted out, one for *Sicily*, the other for *Greece*; whither ſhe alſo diſpatched *Flamininus* and three other Senators, in quality of ambaſſadors. When they arrived in that country, *Nabis* was yet engaged in the ſiege of *Gythium*. He frequently detached parties to make incurſions on the lands of the *Achæans*. Theſe, fearing to begin a war without the approbation of *Rome*, wrote to *Flamininus* for his conſent. He counſelled them to wait for the arrival of the *Roman* fleet, before they took arms. Nevertheleſs they held a general diet at *Sicyon* upon the affair; and the aſſembly, being divided in their ſentiments, deſired to know the opinion of *Philopœmen*, their preſident. He anſwered, "It is a wiſe inſtitution among us, that our "Prætors ſhall not declare their opinions when the aſſemblies are "deliberating about war. It is your province to determine what ſhall "be done; mine to execute your orders. And I will take all poſſible "care, that you ſhall not repent of your choice, whether it be peace "or war." Theſe words more powerfully inclined the diet to war, than if the Preſident had openly declared for it. War they decreed, and gave the conduct of it to *Philopœmen*.

The firſt enterprize of this brave man was to relieve *Gythium*: He ſet ſail for that port with what galleys he could get together; but being (as *Livy* ſays) a land-officer, and not uſed to ſea-affairs, he failed in his attempt. He was defeated within ſight of the place by the *Lacedæmonian* fleet. However, he ſoon retrieved his honour, by two victories,

c. 27. which his able conduct gave him over the tyrant at land.

Whilſt the *Achæans* carried on the war againſt the *Lacedæmonians*, the ambaſſadors from the *Roman* Republic were buſy in viſiting the chief cities of *Greece*. The inhabitants of *Demetrias* had been

c. 31. informed, that *Rome* intended to reſtore to *Philip* his ſon *Demetrius*, and to put the King again into poſſeſſion of their city, in order to prevent his joining with *Antiochus*; a rumour not altogether groundleſs. It was with ſome difficulty therefore, that *Flamininus* could pacify them. He went thence to the diet of *Ætolia*, where *Menippus*, ambaſſador from *Antiochus*, had been introduced by *Thoas*, one of the chief authors of the *Ætolian* defection. The *Roman* in vain endeavoured to diſſuade the aſſembly from calling the *Syrians* into *Europe*: they paſſed a decree, in his preſence, for inviting *Antiochus* to come and reſtore the liberty of *Greece*. *Flamininus* demanding a copy of the decree, was anſwered by *Damocritus* the Prætor, "We have affairs of "greater moment to diſpatch; we ſhall tell you the purport of it, on "the banks of the *Tiber*."

A Map of Epirus. Thessaly, And Achaia.

A MAP of PELOPONNESUS.

39
40
41
42
43
36
37
38
THE IONIAN SEA
THE GRECIAN SEA
THE CRETAN SEA
ÆGÆAN SEA
CEPHALENIA I
ZACYNTHOS I.
ACHAIA
ELIS
ARCADIA
MESSENIA
LACONIA
ARGOLIS
ATTICA
BOEOTIA
PHOCIS
LOCRIS
GULPH of CORINTH
GULPH CHELONITES
Strophades Islands
Gulph of Cyparissos
THE GULPH OF MESSENE
SARONIC GULPH
ARGOLIC GULPH
CYTHERA I
THE ISLAND OF CRETE
CYCLADES ISLANDS
EUBOEA ISLE
ANDROS
TENOS I
CIAI.
SYRUS
CYTHNOS I
SERIPHOS
PAROS I
SIPHNOS I
NAXOS I.
MELOS I.
SICINUS I.
IOS I.
THERA I.
Cape Caphareus
Cape Malea
Cape Minoa
Port of Jupiter Soter
Temple of Apollo
Cape and City of Tenarium
Cape Platanistus
Cape Chelonites
Pylos of Messenia
Sphagiæ Islands
Agritas Prom
Cape and Straight
Cape of Lecnum
Cape Colonna
Cape Sunium
Cape Scyllaeum
Cape Scyllaeum
Cape Malea
Cape Minoa
Cape Caphareus
Cape of Lecnum
Cape Sunium
Cape Colonna

After this the *Ætolians* took meaſures to ſeize three important cities; *Demetrias* in *Theſſaly*, [b] *Lacedæmon* in *Peloponneſus*, and *Chalcis* in *Eubœa*. *Diocles*, *Alexamenus* and *Thoas* were the perſons appointed for theſe expeditions. The firſt got poſſeſſion of *Demetrias*, through the treachery of one of the principal citizens. To ſurpriſe *Lacedæmon*, *Alexamenus*, with a thouſand foot, and ſome young horſemen, went thither, as carrying ſuccours to *Nabis*. The Tyrant received them without ſuſpicion: And their leader having inſinuated to him, that it would be for his honour to have his troops well diſciplin'd, and make a good appearance when *Antiochus* ſhould arrive, he every day drew them out and exerciſed them in a plain near the city. At one of theſe reviews *Alexamenus* aſſaſſinated him. Had the murderer harangued the *Lacedæmonian* ſoldiers during their firſt aſtoniſhment, it is probable they would have approved of the action; becauſe the Tyrant was hated: but the *Ætolians* haſtened to plunder the royal palace, and this giving the *Lacedæmonians* time to recover themſelves, they entered the city, maſſacred all the pillagers they met, and, among the reſt, the infamous *Alexamenus*. *Philopœmen* took advantage of this event, appear'd with a body of troops before the town, and perſuaded the inhabitants to reſume their liberty. Accordingly, *Lacedæmon* from being a monarchy became a Republic, and a part of the *Achaian* body.

Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 35. c. 34.

Plut. life of *Philopœmen*. *Livy*, B. 35. c. 37.

As for *Thoas*, he failed in his attempt upon *Chalcis*; the *Eubœans* were upon their guard, and adhered ſteadily to *Rome*. He went therefore ſtrait to *Antiochus*, and as by the falſe reports he had ſpread, in *Greece*, magnifying the King's ſtrength, he had drawn over many to his party; ſo now he deceived the King by what he told him of the diſpoſition of the *Greeks*. He aſſured him, that all *Greece* was in motion; that the people univerſally deſired and entreated his coming among them; and that his fleet would no ſooner appear on the coaſt, but the ſhore would be crowded with ſoldiers to offer him their ſervice. He added, that *Demetrias*, a town of great conſequence, being at preſent in the *Ætolian* intereſt, he might there commodiouſly land his troops. At the ſame time he endeavour'd to diſſuade the *Syrian* from dividing his naval force; "but c. 43.
"if a part of his fleet muſt be ſent to *Italy*, the conduct of it,
"he ſaid, ought to be given to any body, rather than to *Hannibal*.
"That he was an exile, and a *Carthaginian*, to whom fortune and
"his own reſtleſs diſpoſition would be daily ſuggeſting new projects.
"The very glory he had acquired in war, and for which he was courted,
"was too great for a lieutenant in the King's army; the King ought to
"be looked upon as the only General, the ſpring and director of all.
"Should *Hannibal* loſe a fleet, or an army, the loſs would be the ſame

[b] The *Ætolians*, in this enterprize upon *Lacedæmon*, ſeem to have been actuated by the apprehenſion of it's falling into the hands of the *Achæans*, rather than enmity to *Nabis*, who was at this time engaged in the ſame cauſe with them. And *Livy* tells us, the Tyrant was ſo hated by the *Lacedæmonians*, that there was reaſon to think they would attach themſelves to whoever ſhould deſtroy him.

Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J.C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p.

" as if any other had loſt it: but if ſucceſs attended his arms, *Hannibal*, " not *Antiochus*, would have all the glory. The King might have the " *Carthaginian* to attend him, and might hear his opinion: a cautious " uſe of his talents would be ſafe and profitable; but to truſt him with " the ſupreme direction of affairs, would be dangerous both to *Antio-* " *chus* and to *Hannibal*."

None are ſo prone to envy, ſays *Livy*, as thoſe of high rank and fortune, with low, little minds. The King immediately dropt all thoughts of ſending *Hannibal* into *Italy*, the only wiſe meaſure that had been propoſed in relation to this war. It being concluded that *Antiochus* ſhould paſs into *Greece*, he, before he ſet ſail, went with a frivolous pomp of ceremony to *Ilium*, and there ſacrificed to *Minerva*. This done, he took ſhipping, and landed at *Demetrias* with ten thouſand foot, five hundred horſe, and ſix elephants; an army hardly conſiderable enough to take poſſeſſion of *Greece*, had it been wholly unprovided of troops; much leſs to oppoſe the power of *Rome*.

As ſoon as the *Ætolians* heard of the King's landing, they aſſembled a diet at *Lamia*, in order to invite him, in form, to come to their aſſiſtance. The *Syrian*, knowing their deſign, was already on his way, when he received their invitation; and being, amidſt the acclamations of the multitude, introduced into the aſſembly, he began to excuſe his coming into *Greece* with an army ſo much inferior to what they had expected. " It was (he ſaid) a ſtrong evidence of his good will to them, " that upon the call of their ambaſſadors, he had haſted to their aid, " without waiting till any thing was ready, or even till the weather was " fit for ſailing. *He aſſured them*, he would in a ſhort time ſatisfy their " utmoſt expectations; that as ſoon as the ſeaſon would permit, they " ſhould ſee *Greece* full of men, arms, and horſes, and all the coaſt co- " vered with his ſhips. Neither would he ſpare any expence or labour, " or decline any danger, to remove the *Roman* yoke from their necks, " give *Greece* real liberty, and make the *Ætolians* the moſt conſiderable " of all her ſtates. When his forces ſhould arrive, all ſorts of proviſions " (he ſaid) would arrive with them. In the mean time, he hoped the " *Ætolians* would furniſh him with corn and other neceſſaries for the " troops he had brought."

This diſcourſe was heard with applauſe; and the diet paſſed a decree conſtituting *Antiochus* General of the *Ætolians*, and appointing him a council of thirty perſons to whom he might have recourſe on all occaſions. The firſt attempt he made, by their advice, was to gain over *Chalcis* in *Eubœa*; and as they imagined that much depended upon expedition, he haſted away with a thouſand *Syrians* and ſome *Ætolians*, croſſed the *Euripus*, and appeared before the gates of *Chalcis*. The *Ætolians*, in an amicable conference with the *Chalcidians*, endeavoured to perſuade them to enter into a treaty of friendſhip with *Antiochus* (without renouncing their alliance with *Rome*) and aſſured them, that the King was not come

come to make war upon *Greece*, but to deliver her from ſlavery. *Miſtio*, one of the chiefs of the *Chalcidians* anſwered, " That he " wondered what cities of *Greece* they were, to ſet which at liberty " *Antiochus* had left his kingdom, and come into *Europe*. For his part, " he knew of none that had either a *Roman* gariſon, or paid tribute to " *Rome*, or was obliged to do any thing contrary to it's own laws. The " *Chalcidians* therefore neither wanted a protector nor a gariſon; ſince by " the favour of the *Romans* they enjoyed both peace and liberty. They " were indeed far from deſpiſing the friendſhip of the King, or even of " the *Ætolians*; but deſired, the firſt inſtance of that friendſhip might be " their leaving the iſland immediately: For the *Chalcidians* were deter- " mined not only not to receive them within their walls, but to enter into " no alliance with them, without conſent of the *Romans*." The King, hereupon, thought proper to return to *Demetrias*, for he had not with him a ſufficient number of troops to take *Chalcis* by force. Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul. p.

Nor did he ſucceed better in his endeavours to bring the diet of *Achaia*, held at *Ægium*, to a neutrality. His miniſter there extravagantly magnified the *Syrian* power, and boaſted much of an innumerable multitude of horſemen, that were coming over the *Helleſpont* into *Europe*, ſome in complete armour, others ſo excellent archers that nothing was ſafe from their arrows, and who were ſureſt of hitting an enemy when they turned their backs upon him. And though theſe horſemen were ſufficient to trample down all the armies of *Europe* joined together in a body, yet the King would alſo bring into the field a numerous and terrible infantry; *Dahæ*, *Medes*, *Elimæans*, *Caduſians*, names ſcarce heard of before in *Greece*. He repreſented the fleet of *Antiochus* as ſo prodigiouſly great that all the ports of *Greece* could not contain it: " The ſquadrons of the right compoſed of *Sidonians* and *Tyrians*; thoſe on " the left, of *Aradians* and *Sidetæ* from *Pamphylia*; nations whoſe bravery " in naval engagements, and ſkill in maritime affairs had never been " equalled." He added, that " it would be ſuperfluous to reckon up " the warlike ſtores, or the ſums of money *Antiochus* had amaſſed: They " knew the kingdoms of *Aſia* had always abounded with gold. The " *Romans* therefore would not have to do with *Hannibal* or *Philip*, the " former only one of the chiefs of a ſingle city, and the latter confin- " ed within the narrow limits of *Macedon*: But with the great King " of all *Aſia* and a part of *Europe*. And that this King, though he " came from the extremity of the *Eaſt* to deliver *Greece* from ſlavery, " yet aſked nothing of the *Achæans* that was contrary to their treaty " with the *Romans*. He only deſired they would ſtand neuter, and " be quiet ſpectators of the war between him and *Rome*."

Archidamus, the *Ætolian* miniſter, exhorted the aſſembly to comply with this motion; nor did he ſtop here, but proceeded to inveigh againſt the *Romans* in general, and *Flamininus* in particular. He boaſted that the victory over *Philip* was entirely owing to the courage of the *Ætolians*,

Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p.

who alone were expoſed to danger, while the noble Commander of the *Romans* employed himſelf wholly in making vows and ſacrifices. To this *Flamininus*, who was preſent, anſwered, " *Archidamus* conſiders before whom, rather than to whom he ſpeaks. The bravery of the *Ætolians* is well known, in *Greece*, to ſhew itſelf more in councils and aſſemblies, than in the field. They little value therefore what the *Achæans* think, whom they cannot hope to impoſe upon; it is to the King's ambaſſador, and by him to the abſent King that *Archidamus* makes his boaſts. And now, if any one was ignorant before of what has made *Antiochus* and the *Ætolians* friends, he may learn it from the ſpeeches of their miniſters: By *lying* to each other, and bragging of that ſtrength they never had, they have puffed up one another with vain hopes. While the *Ætolians* talk loudly, that *Philip* was overcome by them, and the *Romans* protected by their valour, and that you and the other States of *Greece* will undoubtedly join them; the King on the other hand boaſts of his clouds of horſe and foot, his *Dahæ*, *Caduſians Aradians* and the reſt; and covers the ſeas with his prodigious fleets. This puts me in mind of an entertainment we once had at *Chalcis* at a friend's houſe, an honeſt man, and who underſtood good eating. It was in the beginning of *June*; and we therefore much admired how, in that ſeaſon of the year, he had procured ſuch variety of veniſon as we ſaw at his table: upon which my friend (not ſo vain as theſe orators) bid me not deceive myſelf; for that what I ſaw was nothing more than common pork: My cook, ſaid he, has indeed diſguiſed it, and given it different taſtes and different names; but all this variety of diſhes is made of one tame ſwine. 'Tis juſt ſo with regard to this pompous enumeration of the King's forces: They are all *Syrians*, by whatever ſtrange names they may be called; all one ſort of men; and for their ſervile diſpoſitions much fitter to be ſlaves than ſoldiers. And I wiſh, *Acheans*, I could but picture to you the great King in all his mightineſs and buſtle. You would ſee ſomething like two petty legions, incomplete, in his camp. You would behold him one while almoſt begging corn of the *Ætolians* to be meaſured out ſcantily to his ſoldiers; then borrowing money at uſe to pay them. You would ſee him hurrying from *Demetrias* to *Lamia*; from *Lamia* to *Chalcis* in *Eubœa*: Now ſtanding at the gates of *Chalcis*; and by and by, when denied entrance, and having only ſeen *Aulis* and the *Euripus*, returning to *Demetrias*. Indeed *Antiochus* did ill to believe the *Ætolians*; and the *Ætolians* were as much in the wrong to hearken to his vanity. Be not you therefore deceived, but rely on the faith of the *Romans*, which you have ſo often experienced. And as for the neutrality ſo much recommended to you, nothing can be more contray to your intereſts: for without gaining any honour, or even thanks from either ſide you would undoubtedly be the prize of the conqueror." The *Achæans* without heſitation declared for the *Romans*.

Antiochus

Antiochus and the *Ætolians* had ſent an embaſſy to the *Bœotians*, to court their alliance. Theſe returned anſwer: That when the King came into their country, they would conſider of what was proper to be done. Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p.

The *Athamanes* were brought over to *Antiochus* by means of *Philip* the brother of *Apamea*, *Amynander*'s wife. *Philip* deduced his pedigree from *Alexander the Great*, and pretended to be the true heir of *Macedon:* And the *Syrian*, encouraging his vanity made him hope that he ſhould one day poſſeſs that throne. *Liv.* B. 35. c. 47, 50.

After this, the King, hearing that *Eumenes* and the *Achæans* were ſending a gariſon into *Chalcis*, made what haſte he could to prevent them. He inſtantly ſent away *Menippus* with three thouſand men; and followed in perſon with the reſt of his army. *Menippus* intercepted and cut off a party of five hundred *Romans* that were marching to the defence of *Chalcis*; and though the *Pergamenians* and *Achæans* had entered the place the inhabitants opened the gates to *Antiochus:* after which he ſoon reduced the whole iſland of *Eubœa*. Thence he paſſed into *Bœotia*; and this country alſo renounced her confederacy with *Rome*, and ſubmitted to him. *Livy*, B. 36. c. 6.

Upon his return to *Chalcis* (which he made his chief place of reſidence) he, by letters, invited his friends and allies to meet him in council at *Demetrias*, in order to determine, whether it were proper to make any attempt upon *Theſſaly*. Some were for an expedition into that country immediately; ſome for deferring it till the ſpring; others adviſed only the ſending ambaſſadors thither. When *Hannibal*'s opinion came to be aſked, addreſſing himſelf to the King, he ſpoke to this effect. "Had I ever been conſulted ſince our arrival in *Greece*; had my opini-
" on been aſked, when you were conſidering how to act with regard to
" the *Eubœans*, *Achæans* and *Bœotians*, I ſhould have ſaid what I am
" now going to ſay, when the debate is concerning *Theſſaly*. Our firſt, our
" principal object ſhould be to gain over the King of *Macedon*. The
" *Eubœans*, the *Bœotians*, the *Theſſalians*, who have no ſtrength of
" their own, will always follow the dictates of their fears. Through
" fear they will now be on your ſide; and, as ſoon as the *Romans* come
" into *Greece*, turn again to them, pleading weakneſs as an excuſe for
" having ſubmitted to you. Of how much greater importance would
" it be to engage *Philip* in your cauſe, who, if he once eſpouſes it, muſt
" of neceſſity be ſteady; and whoſe friendſhip will bring us an ac-
" ceſſion of real ſtrength; a ſtrength that, not long ago, was of itſelf
" ſufficient to withſtand the whole power of the *Romans?* If I am aſked
" what reaſon I have to hope that *Philip* will join in the alliance, I an-
" ſwer: In the firſt place, his intereſt requires him ſo to do: and in the
" next, you *Ætolians* have always aſſerted he would. Your ambaſſador
" here, this ſame *Thoas*, when he was preſſing the King to ſail into
" *Greece*, employed, as one of his ſtrongeſt arguments, the raging anger
" of *Philip*, to find himſelf, under the colour of a peace, reduced to
" ſlavery.

Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J.C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p

" ſlavery. I remember, he compared the King's fury to that of a " wild beaſt chained or ſhut up, and ſtruggling to get looſe. If this " be true, let us break his chains and ſet him free, that he may turn " againſt the common enemy all that wrath which has been ſo long re- " ſtrained. But, if he will not be brought over to our cauſe, let us at " leaſt take care that he do not join our enemies. Your ſon *Seleucus* is at " *Lyſimachia* with an army: If he attacks *Macedon* on the ſide of *Thrace*, " this, by keeping *Philip* employed in the defence of his own dominions, " will hinder him from aſſiſting the *Romans*—Thus far with regard to " *Philip*. What my opinion is, in relation to the general plan of the war, " you have known from the beginning. Had I then been hearkened to, " the news at *Rome* would not now be, that *Chalcis* in *Eubœa* is taken, " and a caſtle upon the *Euripus* demoliſhed; but that *Hetruria*, *Liguria*, " and *Ciſalpine Gaul* are in a flame; and, what perhaps would ſtrike " more terror, that *Hannibal* is in *Italy*. Be that as it will, our preſent " ſituation, I think, requires, that you ſend immediately for all your ſea " and land forces, and proviſions neceſſary to maintain them; for they " cannot be ſupplied by this country. When your fleet arrives, it " ſhould be divided; one part of it ſtationed at *Corcyra* to prevent the " *Romans* landing in *Greece*, and the other ſent to that coaſt of *Italy*, " which looks towards *Sardinia* and *Africa*. It will alſo be expedient " that you in perſon march your land forces to the coaſt of *Illyricum*, " near *Epirus*. There you may preſide over all *Greece*, and keep the " *Romans* in awe by the fear of an invaſion: nay from thence may actually " paſs into *Italy*, if you ſhould think it proper. This is my opinion; " and if I ſhould not be thought the moſt ſkilful in managing other wars, " yet ſurely it will be granted, that I have learnt, both by good and " bad fortune, how to manage a war againſt the *Romans*. In the execution " of the advice I have given, I am ready to aſſiſt with faithfulneſs and " alacrity. But whatever reſolution you take, may the Gods grant you " ſucceſs." Such was the ſubſtance of *Hannibal*'s diſcourſe. His counſel was applauded, and not followed. Of all he had propoſed, the King did nothing, except ſending to *Aſia* for his fleet and land forces.

As to *Theſſaly*, it was determined to diſpatch ambaſſadors to the *Theſſalian* Diet held at *Lariſſa*: and the *Syrian* marched with his army to *Pheræ* in the ſame country. While he was there waiting to be joined by the *Athamanes* and the *Ætolians*, he ſent *Philip*, the brother in law of *Amynander*, with two thouſand men to *Cynocephalæ*, where the bones of the *Macedonians* ſlain in the battle when the King of *Macedon* was vanquiſhed by the *Romans*, ſtill lay unburied. *Antiochus* thought, that if this pretender procured them burial, he would thereby gain the affection of a people over whom he claimed the government. But this ſtep ſerved only to irritate the true King of *Macedon*. And he, who perhaps was hitherto undetermined, not only ſent advice to the *Roman* Prætor *M. Bæbius*, of the irruption of the *Syrians* into *Theſſaly*, but offered him the aſſiſtance of his forces.

The

The *Syrian*'s embaſſy to the *Theſſalians* having proved fruitleſs, he, with the help of the *Ætolians* and *Amynander*, reduced, by force of arms, *Pheræ*, *Scotuſſa*, *Cypra*, and the greateſt part of *Theſſaly*; and then laid ſiege to *Lariſſa*. *Bæbius*, now joined by *Philip*, ſent *Ap. Claudius* with a detachment to reinforce the garriſon. When *Claudius* came near the town, he poſted himſelf upon a hill within view of the *Syrians*, made his camp larger than his forces required, and lighted up more fires than were neceſſary. *Antiochus*, thinking the whole *Roman* army and King *Philip* were coming to the relief of *Lariſſa*, immediately raiſed the ſiege, under pretence that winter was at hand, retired to *Demetrias*, and from thence to *Chalcis*. Here he became enamoured, though paſt fifty years old, of the daughter of a *Chalcidian* named *Cleoptolemus*, in whoſe houſe he lodged. The diſproportion of her age and condition to thoſe of the King, made the father very averſe to the marriage, fearing ſhe would ſoon repent her advancement to ſo glittering a ſtation: But *Antiochus* at length obtained his conſent; and the nuptials were celebrated with royal magnificence. The King ſpent the reſt of the winter in feaſting and diverſions: His officers and ſoldiers, infected by his example, abandoned themſelves to idleneſs and debauchery.

Y. of *R.* 561. Bef. *J. C.* 191. 260 Conſul-p.

CHAP. V.

The Romans *declare war againſt* Antiochus.
The Conſul Acilius *lands in* Greece.
Antiochus *routed at* Thermopylæ. *He returns into* Aſia.
The Ætolians *aſk a peace with* Rome, *but will not ſubmit to the terms on which it is offered.*
Flamininus *takes the iſland of* Zacynthus *from the* Achæans, *and perſuades them, he does it for their good.*
The Syrians *are vanquiſhed at ſea.*
The conduct of the war againſt Antiochus *being given to* L. Scipio, *his brother* Africanus *aſſiſts him in quality of his lieutenant.*

WHILST *Antiochus* lay aſleep in pleaſures, the *Romans* were very watchful of their affairs in the *Levant*. Some late ſucceſſes of their arms had made all things quiet in *Spain* and *Italy*, which put them in a better condition to provide for a war in the *Eaſt*. They fitted out a hundred quinqueremes to ſcour the *Eaſtern* ſeas; and after the election of magiſtrates, and a regulation of the troops appointed to ſerve this year, formally declared war againſt *Antiochus*. The new Conſuls, *P. Cornelius Scipio Naſica*, and *M. Acilius Glabrio* drew lots for their provinces. *Greece* fell to the latter. When every thing was ready for

Y. of *R.* 562. Bef. *C. J.* 190. 261 Conſul p. *Liv.* B. 36. c. 2. c. 4.

A. of *R.* 562. Bef. *J. C.* 190. 261 Conſul-p.

his departure, ambaſſadors arrived from the Kings of *Egypt* and *Macedon* with offers of money, proviſions and troops. *Maſiniſſa* likewiſe would have contributed to the expences of the war, which the *Romans* were going to undertake. And as for the *Carthaginians*, they not only propoſed to make the Republic a preſent of wheat and barley, and to equip a fleet at their own expence for her ſervice, but offered, in ready money, the whole remainder of the tribute, which they were not obliged to pay but in the ſpace of nine years. Of all the offers made to the *Romans* at this time, they accepted only five hundred *Numidian* horſe and ſome elephants from *Maſiniſſa:* They would not receive any corn either from him or *Carthage*, without paying for it. *Acilius* ſet out for *Greece* in the month of *May*, accompanied by *L. Quinctius*, (the brother of *Flamininus*) whom the Republic had appointed to be his Lieutenant; and by the famous *Cato*, who now ſerved in no higher a ſtation than that of legionary Tribune.

Liv. B. 36. c. 14.

The Conſul landed his troops in *Greece*, to the number of ten thouſand foot *, two thouſand horſe, and fifteen elephants. He immediately ſent his infantry to *Lariſſa*; and with his cavalry marched to *Limnæa*, another city of *Theſſaly*, which the King of *Macedon* was beſieging. This place ſurrender'd to the Conſul at diſcretion. Thence he proceeded to *Pellinæum*, which *Bæbius* had inveſted; and this town alſo ſubmitted to him. Here was taken *Philip* the Pretender, whom the King of *Macedon* meeting, jeſtingly called him brother, and ordered him to be ſaluted King. *Acilius* ſent him in chains to *Rome*. Then the *Romans* and *Macedonians* ſeparated, to ſpread the terror of their arms in different parts. The King made himſelf maſter of all *Athamania*; *Amynander* retiring thence with his wife and children into *Epirus*. And as for the Conſul, he ſoon ſubdued all *Theſſaly*.

* *Appian* ſays 20000.

WHEN *Antiochus the Great* conſidered, that, inſtead of all the mighty things which had been promiſed him, he had got nothing, in *Greece*, but an agreeable winter-lodging, and his landlord's daughter to wife, he began to accuſe *Thoas* and the *Ætolians* of having deceived him; and to look upon *Hannibal* as a wiſe man and a prophet. He was now ſenſible of the raſhneſs of his enterprize: However, that it's failure of ſucceſs might not be imputed to any further negligence on his part, he ſent to the *Ætolians* to collect their whole ſtrength, and marched all his forces into their country in order to join them. The *Ætolian* chiefs had not been able to raiſe above four thouſand men; and theſe were moſtly their clients and vaſſals. Diſappointed of his expected aids from his allies, *Antiochus* ſeized the ſtreights of *Thermopylæ*, to hinder the *Romans* from entering *Ætolia* by the way of *Locris*. At this paſs, three hundred *Lacedæmonians*, under the command of *Leonidas*, had, for three whole days, ſtopped a million of men in the time of *Xerxes*. It was not above ſixty paces broad, and bounded on one ſide by the ſea, and a moraſs of deep mud, and on the other by mount *Oeta*, the extre-

mity of a chain of hills that divide *Greece* in two parts, almoſt in the ſame manner as the *Apennines* divide *Italy*. And as the King was not ignorant that, when *Xerxes* made his paſſage, it was by means of ſome troops that climb'd the mountains and fell down from thence upon the enemy, he, to prevent the *Romans*, detached two thouſand *Ætolians* to ſeize the ſummit of *Oeta*, call'd *Callidromos*, which overlook'd his camp. *Acilius* nevertheleſs forced the King in his entrenchments: for *Cato* being ſent with a detachment up the mountain in the night, diſlodged the *Ætolians*; and then pouring down upon the *Syrians*, while the Conſul attack'd them below, put a ſpeedy end to the diſpute: An exploit of which he was extravagantly vain, and the laſt military exploit of his life. He was ſent to *Rome* with the news of the victory. Y. of *R.* 562. Bef. *J. C.* 190. 261 Conſul-p.

Antiochus, in the action of *Thermopylæ*, and in his flight, loſt his whole army, except five hundred horſe, which eſcaped with him to *Elatia*, from whence they paſſed to *Chalcis*. The conqueror to make the beſt uſe of his advantage, marched into *Bœotia*. The inhabitants of ſeveral revolted cities came to meet him; and as he every where gave proofs of his clemency and moderation, the greateſt part of this country ſubmitted; and, preſently after, all *Eubœa:* for *Antiochus*, upon the approach of the *Roman* army, left *Chalcis*, embarked for *Aſia* with his new Queen, and retired to *Epheſus*. *Acilius* laid ſiege to *Heraclea*, at the foot of mount *Oeta*. The city being taken, after a ſtout reſiſtance of the *Ætolian* gariſon, the ſoldiers retired into the citadel. It was commanded by that *Damocritus*, who, when *Flamininus* aſked a copy of the decree whereby the *Ætolians* called *Antiochus* into *Greece*, had anſwered, he would give it him upon the banks of the *Tiber*. He ſurrendered at diſcretion.

Philip, in purſuance of an agreement between him and the *Roman* general, was at this time beſieging *Lamia*, a ſtrong town about ſeven miles from *Heraclea*. The place was on the point of ſurrendring, when the Conſul, having reduced *Heraclea*, ſent to the King to quit his enterprize; alledging, that it was but juſt, the *Roman* ſoldiers, who had conquered the *Ætolians* in battle, ſhould have the rewards of the victory. *Philip* with reluctance comply'd, and march'd away. The city, preſently after, opened her gates to *Acilius*.

A few days before *Heraclea* was taken, the *Ætolians*, aſſembled in council at *Hypata*, had ſent *Thoas* into *Aſia*, to preſs the *Syrian* to return with an army into *Europe:* But now they bent their thoughts wholly to a peace, and for that purpoſe diſpatched deputies; who preſented themſelves in a ſuppliant manner before the Conſul. *Phæneas*, their ſpeaker, having in a long harangue endeavour'd to move the compaſſion of the conqueror, at length concluded with ſaying, that "the *Ætolians* yielded "themſelves and their all to the [b] *Faith* of the people of *Rome*." "Do "you ſo?" ſaid *Acilius:* "Then deliver up to us *Amynander* and the

[b] *Polyb.* Legat. 13. ſays, they were deceived by the words Εις την πιστιν αυτων ιγχειρισαι, *fidei ſe permittere*, not knowing that they ſignified among the *Romans, to ſurrender at diſcretion.*

Y. of *R.* 562. Bef. *J. C.* 190. 261 Conſul p *Polyb.* Legat. 13.

" chiefs of the *Athamanes*, *Dicæarchus* the *Ætolian*, and *Menetus* the " *Epirot*, who made the city of *Naupactus* revolt from us." The Conſul had ſcarce finiſhed, when *Phæneas* anſwered, " We did not give ourſelves " up to ſervitude, but to your faith; and I am perſuaded, it is becauſe " you are unacquainted with the cuſtoms of the *Greeks*, that you enjoin " us things ſo contrary to them." *Acilius* haughtily replied, " You " little *Greeks!* Do you talk to me of your cuſtoms? of what is fit and " decent for me to do? You; who have ſurrendered yourſelves at " diſcretion, and whom I may lay in irons, if I pleaſe? Here, lictors, " bring chains for the necks of theſe men:" *Phæneas* and his Collegues, quite aſtoniſhed, repreſented to the Conſul, that, though they were very willing to obey his orders, yet they could not execute them without the conſent of the *Ætolian* diet. He was prevailed upon to grant them ten days truce, to bring him a poſitive anſwer from thence. The preliminaries on which the *Roman* General inſiſted, highly provok'd the council. While they were in great perplexity and doubt, what meaſures to take, one *Nicander*, an active man, who had gone from *Ætolia* to *Epheſus* and returned in twelve days, brought conſiderable ſums of money from *Antiochus*; and alſo certain advice, that the King was making mighty preparations for war. This determin'd the aſſembly to lay aſide the thoughts of peace. They drew all their forces to *Naupactus*, and reſolved to ſuſtain a ſiege there to the laſt extremity. *Acilius*, conſidering that by the reduction of this place he ſhould give the finiſhing ſtroke to the conqueſt of *Ætolia*, and quell for ever the moſt reſtleſs of the *Greek* nations, march'd thither and inveſted it.

Plutarch's life of *Flamininus*. *Liv.* B. 36. c. 31.

In the mean time *Flamininus*, who had reſided a good while at *Chalcis*, which he had ſaved from being ſacked, (when taken by *Acilius*) and where he was honoured even to adoration, went thence to ſettle a peace between the *Achæans* and the city of *Meſſene*; and he ſubjected the latter to the ſtates of *Achaia*. There was at this time a diſpute between the *Romans* and *Achæans* about *Zacynthus*, an iſland in the *Ionian* ſea. This iſland *Philip* of *Macedon* had given to *Amynander*, who made one *Hierocles*, of *Agrigentum*, governor of it. *Hierocles*, after the defeat of *Antiochus* at *Thermopylæ*, ſeeing that *Amynander* was driven out of *Athamania* by *Philip*, ſold *Zacynthus* to the *Achæans*; but *Flamininus* remonſtrated, in the diet of *Achaia*, that an iſland, which only the ſucceſs of the *Roman* arms had made to change it's maſters, belong'd of *Right* to the *Romans*. The aſſembly having referr'd the matter to his own honour, he thus anſwered: " If I thought that your poſſeſſing the " iſland in queſtion could be of any benefit to you, I would counſel the " Senate and people of *Rome* to let you hold it. But as a tortoiſe when " collected within it's ſhell is ſafe from all harm, and when it thruſts " out any part of itſelf, expoſes that part to be trod upon and wounded: " In like manner, you *Achæans*, who are encompaſſed with the ſea, may " ſafely unite, and united preſerve, all within the limits of *Peloponneſus*;

" but

" but if you tranſgreſs thoſe bounds, and make acquiſitions beyond them, Y. of *R.* 562.
" theſe members of your ſtate will be expoſed to inſults, by which the Bef. *J. C.* 190.
" whole body muſt be affected." The iſſue was, that the *Achæans* re- 261 Conſul-p.
linquiſhed their pretenſions to the iſland.

While the *Romans* were beſieging *Naupactus*, King *Philip* (who had *Liv.* B. 36.
obtained permiſſion from the Conſul to reduce the towns which had fallen c. 34.
off from their alliance with *Rome*) made himſelf maſter of *Demetrias*, extended his conqueſts in *Dolopia*, *Aperantia*, and *Perræbia*, (territories of *Theſſaly*, or bordering upon it) and was gradually recovering the many places which had been formerly taken from him by the *Romans*. *Flamininus*, not pleaſed with this progreſs of the *Macedonian*, whom he looked upon as a more dangerous enemy than the *Ætolians*, went to the camp before *Naupactus* to reprove *Acilius* for having conſented to the enterprizes of *Philip*. As the beſieged, who were now reduced to great extremity, had formerly experienced *Flamininus*'s clemency, they, upon the news of his arrival, ſent deputies to him, imploring his protection. He became their interceſſor with the Conſul, and obtained for them a ſuſpenſion of arms, till they could diſpatch ambaſſadors to *Rome*, to negotiate a peace there. The *Epirots* at the ſame time ſent thither, to excuſe ſome advances they had formerly made to *Antiochus*; and as it did not appear that they had committed any act of hoſtility againſt the republic, ſhe choſe rather to admit their apolgy, than draw new enemies upon herſelf. But the ambaſſadors of *Philip* were yet more favourably received than thoſe of *Epirus*. He begged leave to hang up, in the capitol, a crown of gold of an hundred pounds weight, in memory of the firſt advantage the *Romans* had gained over *Antiochus*. The Fathers readily accepted the King's preſent; and in return, reſtored to him his ſon *Demetrius*, then a hoſtage at *Rome*; promiſing at the ſame time, that, if he continued ſteady to the Republic in the proſecution of *Polyb.* Legat. 15.
the war, ſhe would remit the tribute he was engaged to pay her.

During theſe tranſactions, *Livius* the *Roman* Admiral was purſuing *Liv.* B. 36.
the war againſt *Antiochus* at ſea. The King, for ſome time after his re- c. 41.
turn to *Epheſus*, had imagined himſelf ſecure from any further hoſtilities on the part of *Rome*. He never dreamt that the *Romans* would follow him into *Aſia*; and was kept in this deluſion by the ignorance or flattery of his courtiers. *Hannibal* rouzed him out of his lethargy: He ſaid, there was more cauſe to wonder, that the *Romans* were not already in *Aſia*, than to doubt of their coming: That the King might be well aſſured, he would very ſoon have a war with them in *Aſia*, and for *Aſia*; and that, as *Rome* aſpired to univerſal empire, ſhe would infallibly ruin him, if he did not ruin her. *Antiochus*, thus awakened, went in perſon, with what ſhips he had ready, to *Cherſoneſus*, to gariſon the places in that country, and thereby make it difficult for the *Romans* to paſs into *Aſia* that way. At the ſame time he ordered *Polyxenidas* to equip the reſt of his fleet with all diligence. Upon the news of theſe naval preparations,

parations, *Livius* ſailed to the coaſt of *Aſia*, with a fleet of 105 deck'd ſhips, including the ſquadron of *Eumenes* King of *Pergamus*. *Polyxenidas* having got together a hundred, ſome ſay two hundred ſhips, came to an engagement with the enemy in the *Ionian* gulph. The *Romans* obtained the victory with the loſs of only one veſſel; the *Syrians* loſt twenty three.

About the time of this ſucceſs of the *Roman* arms in the *Levant*, the reduction of the *Boian Gauls* is ſaid to have been completed by the Conſul *Scipio Naſica*, and one half of their lands given to new colonies ſent thither from *Rome*.

Y. of *R.* 563. Bef. *J. C.* 189. 262 Conſul p. *Liv.* B. 37. c. 1. *Polyb.* Leg. 16. To *L. Cornelius Scipio*, the brother, and *C. Lælius*, the friend of the Great *Scipio*, were transferred the conſular faſces for the new year. They began the exerciſe of their office with introducing to the Senate the ambaſſadors from *Naupactus*. The Fathers required of the *Ætolians*, that they ſhould either ſubmit implicitely to the will of the Senate; or pay the Republic a thouſand *Talents*, and engage themſelves to be enemies to all the enemies of *Rome*. The ambaſſadors, knowing that the *Ætolians* had not a thouſand talents to give, and that they dreaded the ſeverity of the *Romans* too much to yield to them at diſcretion, could conſent to neither of theſe demands: Whereupon they were ordered to leave *Rome* that very day, and *Italy* in a fortnight.

Liv. B. 37. c. 1. The Senate had not yet aſſigned to the Conſuls their provinces. *Lælius*, who had a great intereſt in the aſſembly, and was perhaps the abler General, artfully propoſed to his Collegue, that, inſtead of drawing lots, they ſhould leave the matter to the determination of the Conſcript Fathers. *L. Scipio* knew not how to decline this offer; yet took time to conſider of it; and conſulted his brother. *Africanus*, without any heſitation, adviſed him to accept the propoſal; and when the Senate came to deliberate upon the affair, he, to their great ſurprize, offered to ſerve under his brother in quality of his lieutenant. There needed no further argument to make the Fathers immediately aſſign *Greece* to *L. Scipio*.

The two brothers embarked at *Brunduſium*, with thirteen thouſand foot and five hundred horſe, including auxiliaries and volunteers, and landed at *Apollonia*: from thence they marched through *Epirus* and *Theſſaly*, and at length arrived before *Amphiſſa*, the citadel of which *Acilius* was beſieging, having already taken the town. Hither came ſome deputies from the *Athenians*; to intercede with the Conſul for the *Ætolians*, now ſhut up in *Naupactus* by a blockade. *Lucius Scipio* was at firſt inexorable, notwithſtanding that his brother joined his mediation to that of the *Athenians*; yet in the end conſented to grant them a truce, that they might have an opportunity to try once more a negotiation with the Senate of *Rome*. *Acilius* having reſigned the command of his army to the Conſul, returned home.

Polyb. Leg. 17. *Liv.* B. 37. c. 7.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Philip *conducts the two* Scipios *through* Macedon *and* Thrace *to the* Helleſpont.
Antiochus *deſires to treat with the* Roman *Admiral.*
Hannibal *ſhut up in* Pamphylia *by the* Rhodians.
A ſea fight between the Romans *and* Syrians.
Antiochus *ſends propoſals of peace to* Scipio.
The battle of Magneſia.
Scipio *concludes a peace with* Antiochus.

ALL *Greece* being now quiet, the two *Scipios* were at full liberty to paſs into *Aſia*. In order to this, they judged that the ſafeſt way was to conduct their forces by land to the *Helleſpont*, and conſequently through *Macedon* and *Thrace*. However, before they ſet out, they had the precaution to diſpatch a young *Roman* to *Pella*, where *Philip* reſided at this time, to learn his real diſpoſitions, and whether the ſteps he had taken were like thoſe of a friend, or of an enemy. The King had prepared every thing to facilitate the march of the *Romans* through his dominions. He came in perſon to meet the *Scipios* on his frontiers, was extremely obliging in all his behaviour, and accompanied them as far as the *Helleſpont*. A. of *R.* 563. Bef. *J.C.* 189. 262 Conſul-p.

In the mean time, *Livius*, in conjunction with the *Pergamenian* fleet, took *Seſtos* and afterwards inveſted *Abydos*; but raiſed the ſiege upon the news that *Polyxenidas* had deſtroyed a *Rhodian* ſquadron. The *Roman* Admiral, ſoon after reſigned his command to the Prætor *Æmilius*, ſent from *Rome* to ſucceed him.

Antiochus was now full of buſineſs; and, turning his care from one thing to another, with a great deal of pains and aſſiduity brought almoſt nothing to paſs. He and his ſon *Seleucus* entered the territories of *Pergamus* on different ſides. *Seleucus* laid ſiege to the capital. This brought *Eumenes* to the defence of his own country; and he was quickly followed by *Æmilius*, and alſo by the *Rhodians*, who, ſince their laſt defeat, had equipt a new ſquadron. Upon the junction of theſe fleets, and the news of *Scipio*'s approach, *Antiochus*, fearing to be hard preſſed both by land and ſea, diſpatched an agent to *Æmilius* to propoſe a peace. The *Roman*, ambitious of the honour of finiſhing the war, readily hearkened to the motion; and the *Rhodians* were not averſe to it: but *Eumenes*, who had different views, prevailed to have this anſwer ſent to the King, That nothing could be concluded with regard to a peace, before the arrival of the Conſul. *Polyb.* Legat. 21.

The *Syrian*, after laying waſte the country of *Pergamus*, invaded *Troas*, took *Peræa*, and ſome other towns, and then retired to *Sardis*. His ſon *Seleucus*

Y. of *R.* 563. Bef. *J.C.* 189 262 Conſul-p

Seleucus was ſoon forced to quit the dominions of *Eumenes*, chiefly by the able conduct of *Diophanes*, a *Megalopolitan*, whom the *Achæans* had ſent with a thouſand men, to the relief of *Pergamus*.

After this the confederate fleets ſeparated: *Æmilius* ſtationed himſelf at *Samos*, to watch the fleet under *Polyxenidas*; and *Eumenes* ſailed to the *Helleſpont* to prepare every thing for *Scipio*'s paſſage into *Aſia*. *Eudamus* the *Rhodian* Admiral went to oppoſe *Hannibal*, who was bringing a reinforcement of ſhips from *Syria*. The two ſquadrons met off *Sida* in *Pamphylia*. In the engagement, the *Carthaginian* had the advantage on the left, where he in perſon commanded; but his right being vanquiſhed and forced to ſheer off, all the *Rhodian* ſhips jointly attacked him, put him to flight, and chaced him into a port of *Pamphylia*. *Eudamus* left *Chariclitus* with twenty ſhips to block him up there, and with the reſt joined the *Roman* fleet.

Corn. Nep. Life of *Hannibal.* *Liv.* B. 37. c. 23.

Polyb. Legat. 22. *Liv.* B. 37. c. 25.

On advice of this ill ſucceſs, *Antiochus* employ'd his endeavours to engage the aſſiſtance of *Pruſias* King of *Bithynia*: He repreſented to him by letters, That the views of the *Romans* were to deſtroy all monarchies, being determined to ſuffer, throughout the whole world, no empire but their own. "First *Philip* was ſubdued; then *Nabis*; "I am attacked the third: And, ſince *Eumenes* has yielded himſelf to "voluntary ſervitude, the fury of *Roman* ambition, when it has over-"turned my kingdom, will fall next upon yours; nor will it ever ceaſe "it's deſtructive progreſs, till it has born down all kingly power."

To efface the impreſſions made by theſe letters, *Scipio Africanus* wrote to *Pruſias*, aſſuring him, "that *Rome*, ſo far from being an enemy to "Kings, had made it her conſtant practice, with regard to the monarchs "in friendſhip with her, by every kind of honour to augment their "majeſty. The petty Kings in *Spain*, who had put themſelves under "her protection, ſhe had made great Kings. *Maſiniſſa* ſhe had not only "placed in his father's throne, but had given him the kingdom of *Syphax*; "ſo that he was now the moſt potent of all the *African* Kings; nay "equal in majeſty and power to any Monarch in the world. *Philip* "and *Nabis*, though conquered in war, had yet been left in poſſeſſion "of their dominions. *Rome* had reſtored to *Philip* his ſon (the pledge "of his fidelity) remitted to him the tribute he owed the Republic; "and ſuffered him to poſſeſs himſelf of ſome towns not belonging to "*Macedon*. He added, that *Nabis* would have been held in the ſame "conſideration by the Senate if his own madneſs firſt, and then the "fraudulent artifice of the *Ætolians*, had not undone him." This latter gave a check to the King's inclination to aſſiſt *Antiochus*. But *Æmilius*, the *Roman* admiral and ambaſſador to him from the Republic, abſolutely fixed him in a neutrality, by convincing him, not only that the *Romans* were more likely to be victorious than *Antiochus*, but that their friendſhip was more to be depended upon than his.

Antiochus, diſappointed of his hopes of aid from *Pruſias*, and having little confidence in his own land-forces, ordered *Polyxenidas* to bring to a battle, if poſſible, the *Roman* fleet, then lying at *Samos*. For tho' the King had no encouragement, from paſt trials to expect victory; yet, as the *Pergamenian* ſquadron and a part of the *Rhodian* were at this time ſeparated from the *Roman*, he had now a better chance to ſucceed than before; and he conſidered, that could he get the maſtery at ſea, he ſhould then be able to hinder the *Scipios* from invading his *Aſiatic* dominions. *Polyxenidas* encountered the *Roman* fleet, conſiſting of eighty ſhips, off *Myonneſus* in *Ionia*. He was totally vanquiſhed. Of eighty nine ſhips, his whole ſtrength, he loſt forty two; the reſt eſcaped to *Epheſus*. The King, when he heard of this misfortune, impatiently exclaimed, "that "ſome God diſconcerted his meaſures; every thing fell out contrary to "his expectation; his enemies were maſters of the ſea; *Hannibal* was "ſhut up in a port of *Pamphylia*; and *Philip* aſſiſted the *Romans* to paſs "into *Aſia*." In his fright, believing it impoſſible for him to defend places at a diſtance, he very unadviſedly withdrew the gariſon from *Lyſimachia*, which might have held out a great while againſt the Conſul's army and retarded his approach. He alſo evacuated *Abydos*, which commanded the *Helleſpont*, gathered all his forces about him at *Sardis*, and ſent into *Cappadocia* for aſſiſtance from his ſon-in-law King *Ariarathes*.

Y. of *R.* 563. Bef. *J.C.* 189. 262 Conſul-p.

App. in *Syr.* p. 105.

The Conſular army, attended by *Eumenes* and the *Rhodians*, paſſed the *Helleſpont* without oppoſition. Upon the firſt advice of their landing in *Aſia*, *Antiochus*, ſtruck with terror, immediately ſent propoſals of peace to *Scipio*, offering to quit his pretenſions in *Europe*, and likewiſe all the cities in *Aſia*, that were then in alliance with *Rome*; and to bear half the expence which the *Romans* had been at, in the war. The Conſul inſiſted on the King's paying the whole expence of the war, his confining himſelf within mount *Taurus*, (a chain of mountains which begins towards the Weſt of *Lycia*, and ſeparates *Cilicia* from Northern *Aſia*) and his compenſating *Eumenes* for the injuries he had ſuffered. The ambaſſador thinking theſe conditions intolerable, applied himſelf privately to *Scipio Africanus*, to whom he had particular inſtructions to make his court, offering him the reſtitution of his ſon (who by ſome accident had fallen into the hands of the *Syrians*) and even a partnerſhip with *Antiochus* in the empire, if he would be content without the title of King. *Africanus* gave this anſwer to the ambaſſador: "I am the leſs ſurprized, that you "are unacquainted with the character of the *Romans*, and of me, to "whom you are ſent; ſince I find you are ignorant of the fortune and "ſituation of him who ſends you. If your maſter imagined, that an "anxiety about the event of the war would engage us to make peace "with him, he ſhould by guarding *Lyſimachia* have kept us out of the "*Cherſoneſus*; or he ſhould have ſtopt us at the *Helleſpont*. But now, "after he has ſuffered us to paſs into *Aſia*, and thereby has received our "yoke, he ought to ſubmit to it patiently, and not pretend to treat

Polyb. Legat. 23.

Liv. B. 37. c. 36.

Y. of *R.* 563. Bef. *J. C.* 189. 262 Conſul-p.

" with us upon a foot of equality. For my own part, I ſhall eſteem the " King's reſtoring me my ſon, as the nobleſt preſent his munificence " can make me: his other offers my mind certainly will never need— " I pray the Gods, my fortune never may. If *Antiochus* will be con- " tented with my private acknowledgments for a perſonal favour, he " ſhall ever find me grateful: In my public capacity, I can neither give " him any thing, nor receive any thing from him. All I can at pre- " ſent do for his advantage is, to ſend him this honeſt advice: Let him " deſiſt from the war, and refuſe no conditions of peace."

Antiochus, believing that ſhould he be vanquiſhed, nothing worſe would be impoſed, than what the Conſul had required, turned his thoughts wholly to war. He aſſembled all his troops, and encamped them not far from *Thyatira* in *Lydia*. Soon after, hearing that *Scipio Africanus* was fallen ſick near *Elæa*, he generouſly ſent him his ſon, without ranſom. The joy of the *Roman*, on this occaſion, was ſo great, that it gave a turn to his diſtemper, and help'd to cure him. To the *Syrian* meſſengers he ſpoke thus: " Tell the King, I thank him; I can at preſent make him no other return, " except adviſing him not to hazard a battle till he hears that I am gone " to the *Roman* camp." *Antiochus*, in purſuance of this advice, [the meaning of which it is hard to gueſs] declined fighting, and retired to *Magneſia*. But the Conſul, ambitious perhaps of gaining a victory in the abſence of his brother, followed the *Syrian* ſo cloſe, and preſſed him ſo hard, that he could not, without diſcouraging his troops, avoid an engagement. The King's army conſiſted of ſeventy thouſand foot, and twelve thouſand horſe; the Conſul's of not above thirty thouſand men. They came to a battle near *Magneſia*; *Antiochus* loſt five and fifty thouſand men, including the priſoners; the *Romans* not more than three hundred foot and twenty five horſe. Though this victory was chiefly owing to the bravery and conduct of the King of *Pergamus* and his brother *Attalus*, yet *Lucius Scipio* had ſo entirely the honour of it, that he acquired the ſurname of *Aſiaticus*.

And now the King of *Syria*, eager to procure a peace upon any terms, ſent ambaſſadors to the *Roman* camp at *Sardis*, to make his ſubmiſſions. It was by *P. Scipio* they made their application to the General. A council, at their requeſt, being called to hear what they had to offer, the chief of them ſpoke to this effect. " Our commiſſion is not to " make propoſals, but to know of you, *Romans*, by what means the " King may expiate his fault, and obtain of his conquerors forgive- " neſs and peace. It has always been your practice, with a peculiar " greatneſs of mind, to pardon the Kings and nations you have van- " quiſhed; your preſent victory, which has made you Lords of the " world, certainly demands a more illuſtrious diſplay than ever of that " magnanimity. Your only care now, having no longer any conten- " tion with mortals, ſhould be to imitate the Gods, in tendering the " preſervation of human kind."

It

It had been previouſly determin'd by the Council, what anſwer ſhould be given to theſe ambaſſadors, and that *Africanus* ſhould give it. He is reported to have expreſſed himſelf in the following manner: " Of " things in the power of the Gods to give, they have beſtowed upon us " what they think proper: our courage and ſteadineſs, which depend " upon our own minds, have been the ſame in all fortunes. *Hannibal* " could tell you this, if you yourſelves did not know it by your own " experience. As ſoon as we croſſed the *Helleſpont*, before we ſaw the " King's camp, and when the event of the war was yet doubtful, we " inſiſted upon the ſame conditions of peace, with which we ſhall now " content ourſelves, after victory has declared for us. *Antiochus* ſhall " give up all his pretenſions in *Europe*; and in *Aſia*, confine himſelf " within mount *Taurus*: he ſhall pay us fifteen thouſand talents of " *Eubœa* *, for the expences of the war, five hundred down, two " thouſand five hundred when the Senate and people of *Rome* ſhall " have confirmed the treaty, and one thouſand annually for twelve " years; four hundred talents he ſhall pay to *Eumenes*, and alſo the " corn that was due to his father. And as the *Romans* can have no " peace where *Hannibal* is, we, above all, inſiſt upon his being delivered " up to us, together with *Thoas* the *Ætolian*, *Mnaſilochus* the *Acarnanian*, " *Philo* and *Eubulidas*, *Chalcidians*. For ſecurity of the peace we " demand twenty hoſtages whom we ſhall name. If *Antiochus* heſitates " to accept of theſe terms, let him reflect, that it is more difficult to " reduce a King from the height of power to a middle fortune, than " from this to caſt him down to the loweſt." The ambaſſadors had orders to refuſe no conditions; all were accepted, and the affair concluded: but *Hannibal* could not be delivered up; for, hearing of the King's defeat at *Magneſia*, he had eſcaped out of the *Syrian* dominions.

Y. of *R.* 563. Bef. *J.C.* 189. 262 Conſul-p.

* 2,906,250. *Arbuthnot.*

CHAP. VII.

A new commotion in Ætolia.
Eumenes *comes to* Rome, *to aſk the reward of his ſervices.*
The Rhodians *oppoſe his pretenſions.*
The Ætolians *obtain a peace.*
The Romans *carry the war into* Galatia.
The laws of Lycurgus *aboliſhed at* Lacedæmon.
The affairs of Aſia *ſettled by commiſſioners from* Rome.

WHILE the *Scipios* were thus ſettling peace in *Aſia*, the *Ætolians* diſpoſſeſſed *Philip* of the greateſt part of *Athamania*, reſtored it to it's rightful king *Amynander*, and made ſome other conqueſts on the *Macedonian*.

Polyb. Legat. 26. *Livy*, B. 38. c. 1. & ſeq.

Macedonian. *Rome*, upon an embaſſy from *Amynander*, confirmed him in the poſſeſſion of his dominions.

Y. of *R.* 564. Bef. *J. C.* 188. 263 Conſul-p. After the election of *M. Fulvius Nobilior*, and *Cn. Manlius Fulſo*, to the Conſulſhip, ambaſſadors came from *Ætolia* to negotiate a peace; but theſe, inſtead of addreſſing the Senate in the manner of ſuppliants, enumerated their ſervices to the Republic, and talked of their own courage in ſuch a ſtrain as ſeemed to reproach the *Romans* with the want of courage. The Senate hereupon directly aſked them, whether they would ſurrender at diſcretion; to which they not anſwering any thing, the Fathers ordered them out of the temple, and paſſed a decree, that they ſhould leave the city that very day, and *Italy* in a fortnight; adding, that if any ambaſſadors from *Ætolia* came to *Rome* for the future, without the conſent of the *Roman* commander in that country, they ſhould be treated as enemies.

Livy, B. 37. c. 52. & ſeq. *Polyb.* Legat. 25. Preſently after, *Aurelius Cotta*, a meſſenger, ſent by *Scipio* with the news of his ſucceſs, arrived at *Rome*; and with him came *Eumenes* King of *Pergamus*, the ambaſſadors from *Antiochus*, and ſome from *Rhodes*. When *Cotta* had imparted the news to the Senate, and, by their order, to the people aſſembled; and when, in conſequence of it, ſupplications and thankſgivings, as uſual, had been decreed, the Fathers gave audience to *Eumenes*. The King having in few words made his compliment of thanks for the ſuccour he had received from them againſt *Antiochus*, and congratulated them on their complete victory over the *Syrian*, added, with a ſeeming modeſty (no uncommon maſk of impudence) *As to my ſervices to the Republic, I had rather you ſhould hear them from your own Generals than from me.* Hereupon the Senate entreated him not to be ſo over modeſt, but to prevail upon himſelf to ſay what he thought it reaſonable the people of *Rome* ſhould do for him; aſſuring him, that the Fathers were diſpoſed to recompenſe his merit to the utmoſt of their power. To this *Eumenes:* "Had the option of a reward been given "me from any other quarter, I ſhould gladly have ſeized the preſent "opportunity of conſulting this moſt auguſt aſſembly: that thereby I "might avoid the danger of ſeeming to tranſgreſs the bounds of modeſty "and moderation in my deſires. Certainly then, ſince it is you who "are to beſtow the reward, it becomes me to leave it wholly to your "generoſity." Upon this a moſt extraordinary conteſt of civility aroſe; the Senate ſtill urging him to declare his wiſhes, and he as ſteadily perſiſting in his ſilence on that head. At length, to put an end to the diſpute, he withdrew. The Fathers nevertheleſs directed, that he ſhould be called in again, ſaying, "that it was abſurd to ſuppoſe the King "ignorant of what he hoped, or what he came to aſk; that he knew "*Aſia* much better than the Senate, and muſt know what countries lay "convenient for his own kingdom." *Eumenes* then ſaid; "I ſhould have "ſtill perſiſted in my ſilence, Conſcript Fathers, if I did not know that "the *Rhodian* ambaſſadors are to be preſently called in, and that, after "they

" they have been heard, I ſhall be under a neceſſity of ſpeaking. My
" preſent taſk is the more difficult; becauſe what they intend to requeſt
" will ſeem not only to have no view to my prejudice, but to have none
" to their own proper intereſt: for they will plead the cauſe of the *Greek*
" cities, and the juſtice of ſetting them at liberty. But if they obtain this,
" is it not evident, that they will alienate from us the affections, not only
" of the cities which ſhall be freed, but even of thoſe that are in our de-
" pendence, and have long paid us tribute? The *Rhodians*, on the other
" hand, having obliged the *Greeks* by ſo great a benefit, will under the
" name of allies, hold them in ſubjection. Such is the advantage they pro-
" poſe to themſelves, and yet they will diſclaim their having any views
" of intereſt. They will alledge, that what they ſue for is becoming your
" dignity to grant, and agreeable to your conſtant practice. But you,
" Fathers, are not to be impoſed upon by all this. You will not only
" avoid the injuſtice of depreſſing too much ſome of your allies, and
" beyond meaſure exalting others, but of putting thoſe who have born
" arms againſt you into a better condition than your friends and aſſoci-
" ates." Then, after a pompous enumeration of all the ſervices done by him or any of his family to the *Roman* name, ſervices which he ſet forth as unequalled by any thing which any ally of the Republic had ever performed, he thus proceeded: " But you aſk me, what it is
" that I requeſt. Since in obedience to you, Conſcript Fathers, I muſt
" ſpeak, I ſhall ſay: That if you have confined *Antiochus* within
" *Mount Taurus*, in the intention to keep for yourſelves all the country
" between that and the ſea, there is no nation whoſe neighbourhood I
" ſhould more covet, or think a greater ſecurity to my kingdom. But
" ſhould it be your reſolution to withdraw your armies out of that
" country, and relinquiſh it, I will venture to affirm, that none of your
" allies is more worthy to poſſeſs it than myſelf. But it is a glorious
" thing to free cities from ſlavery! I think ſo indeed, if they have
" committed no hoſtilities againſt you: but if they took part with
" *Antiochus*, how much more becoming your prudence and equity is it,
" to conſult the advantage of your well deſerving allies, than of your
" enemies?"

Y. of *R.* 564. Bef. *J. C.* 188. 263 Conſul-p.

It was viſible in the countenances of the Senators that they were much pleaſed with the King, and would reward him amply. When the *Rhodian* ambaſſadors came to be heard, the chief of them began by mentioning the long friendſhip of their ſtate with the Republic, and the ſervices it had done her in her wars with *Philip* and *Antiochus*. He then expreſſed a concern, that he was obliged to oppoſe the pretenſions and demands of *Eumenes*, a Prince who not only was a friend of *Rhodes*, but had deſerved ſo well of the *Romans* in the late war. " Our reſpect for the King
" is indeed the only thing which embarraſſes us; for, that conſideration
" apart, our cauſe is in no degree difficult for us to maintain, or for

Y. of *R.* 564. Bef. *J. C.* 188. 263 Conſul-p

" you to determine. Were the caſe ſuch, that you muſt either ſubject " free cities to the domination of *Eumenes*, or ſuffer *him* to go without " a ſufficient reward of his merit, the matter might perhaps admit of " doubt and deliberation. But fortune has well provided that you " ſhould not be reduced to that neceſſity. Your victory, by the " bounty of the Gods, is as rich, as it is glorious. Beſides the *Greek* " colonies, you are thereby become maſters of *Lycaonia*, the two " *Phrygias*, all *Piſidia*, the *Cherſoneſus*, and the bordering countries; " any *one* of which is vaſtly larger than the whole of *Eumenes*'s " kingdom. And ſhould you give all theſe to him, you would " make him equal to the greateſt monarchs. It is eaſy to enrich " your allies by the ſpoils of the war, without departing from your " own inſtitution. The cauſe you aſſigned for your wars with *Philip* " and *Antiochus* was the liberty of the *Greeks*. Let *Barbarians*, let " thoſe to whom a maſter's will has always been a law, have Kings; " ſince they delight in Kings: but let the *Aſiatic Greeks*, who have the " ſame ſpirit as the *Romans*, experience that regard for univerſal liber- " ty, which made you the deliverers of *Greece*. It may indeed be " ſaid that theſe *Greek* cities declared for *Antiochus*: And did not " many of the *Greek* nations in *Europe* enter into a league with *Philip*? " Yet you reſtored to theſe their laws and liberties: This is all we " aſk for the *Aſiatic Greeks*. Can you not refuſe to *Eumenes*'s covetous " ambition, what you denied to your own juſt revenge? In this and " all the wars you have had in *Greece* and *Aſia*, with what courage and " fidelity we have aſſiſted, we leave you to judge: In peace, we offer " you an advice, which if you purſue, the whole world will think the " uſe you make of your victory more glorious than the victory itſelf."

This diſcourſe ſeemed *Roman*, and did not fail to have it's effect on the Senate. They determined to ſend ten Commiſſioners into the *Levant* to ſettle all matters there; but at the ſame time pronounced in general, that *Lycaonia*, the two *Phrygias*, and the two *Myſias*, ſhould for the future be ſubject to *Eumenes*. *Lycia*, that part of *Caria* which was next to *Rhodes*, and the country lying towards *Piſidia* they adjudged to the *Rhodians*. In both theſe diſpoſitions were excepted the *Greek* cities which had paid tribute to *Antiochus*, and taken part with the *Romans* in the war. Theſe were to be free. As for the *Syrian* ambaſſadors, they had no buſineſs at *Rome*, but to get the peace approved; and this was done.

After diſpatching theſe affairs *Fulvius* and *Manlius* left the city. The firſt ſailed for *Greece*, to reduce the *Ætolians*; the ſecond to *Aſia*; whence, *Scipio*, having delivered up the command of the army to him, returned to *Rome*, and was there honoured with a triumph.

Liv. B. 38. c. 3.

Fulvius landed at *Apollonia*, and began his campaign by laying ſiege to *Ambracia*, a conſiderable city on the borders of *Epirus*. It was in the hands

hands of the *Ætolians*, and vigorouſly defended by them; but they at length capitulated. And then the *Ætolian* nation, with *Fulvius*'s leave, ſent to *Rome* to ſolicit a peace. The Senate at firſt would hardly hear the entreaties of their ambaſſadors. Some *Athenian* deputies who appeared in their behalf were more favourably received. Theſe had an eloquent man named *Damis* at their head. He confeſſed, that the *Romans* had reaſon to be angry with the *Ætolians*, who, for great benefits received, had not made a ſuitable return; but to charge this ingratitude upon the body of the nation, this, he ſaid, was contrary to reaſon and truth. "In "all ſtates the multitude are like the ſea. In it's natural ſituation the ſea is "always ſmooth and calm, and perfectly ſafe to thoſe who embark upon "it; but when it comes to be ruffled and agitated by impetuous winds "and ſtorms, nothing is more raging and terrible. Thus the *Ætolians*, "while in their natural ſtate, and uninfluenced from abroad, were "of all the *Greeks* the moſt tractable, and beſt inclined to the *Roman* "people; but when a boiſterous *Thoas* and a *Dicæarchus*, from *Aſia*, a "*Meneſtas* and a *Democritus*, in *Europe*, began to blow, then were the "multitude put into a commotion; they were hurried on to ſpeak and to "act in a manner unlike themſelves. To the authors then of theſe "miſchiefs and diſturbances, be inexorable, Conſcript Fathers; but ſpare "the multitude, and receive them again into favour. Let them now "owe their preſervation to your clemency. This added to all your "former benefits, will fix them for ever in affection and fidelity to *Rome*." The Senate granted the *Ætolians* a peace, but upon terms that put them in a worſe condition than any of the ſtates of *Greece*, though they had been the firſt that brought the *Romans* into that country.

Y. of *R.* 564. Bef. *J. C.* 188. 263 Conſul. p.

During theſe tranſactions, the Conſul *Manlius* in *Aſia* marched againſt the *Gallo-Greeks* (or *Galatians*) to take revenge for the aſſiſtance they had given *Antiochus* in the late war. They were originally *Gauls*, who, in the time of *Brennus*, after various adventures, paſſing through *Thrace* had entered *Aſia*, and ſettled in an inland country beyond *Caria* and *Phrygia*. The Conſul was aſſiſted in his long march by *Seleucus* the King of *Syria*'s ſon, and by *Attalus* the brother of *Eumenes*; and he drew conſiderable contributions from the petty Kings through whoſe countries he paſſed, and who came to pay him homage. The *Galatians* upon his approach forſook their towns and cities, and retired to the tops of high mountains with their effects and proviſions. He vanquiſhed the ſeveral nations of them (the *Toliſtoboii*, *Tectoſagi* and *Trocmi*) ſucceſſively, and reduced them to ſue for peace. He would not treat with them upon the ſpot, but made them ſend their deputies to *Epheſus*, whither he retired with his army; and thither likewiſe repaired the ambaſſadors of all the Princes of *Aſia* with preſents and ſubmiſſions.

c. 12. *Liv.* B. 38. c. 19.

Y. of *R.* 565. Bef. *J. C.* 187. 264 Conſul. p. *Liv.* B. 38. c. 35.

IN *Italy M. Valerius Meſſala*, one of the Conſuls choſen for the new year, was ordered to *Piſa* to watch the motions of the *Ligurians*, who had

Y. of *R.* 565. had committed ſome recent hoſtilities againſt the *Romans:* and *C. Livius*
Bef. *J. C.* 187. *Salinator*, the other Conſul, had *Gaul* decreed him for his province.
264 Conſul-p. *Fulvius* and *Manlius* were continued in their reſpective commands as Pro-Conſuls. *Q. Fabius Labeo*, the *Roman* Admiral, had at this time a triumph granted him for only recovering from the *Cretans* four thouſand *Roman* ſlaves; though he had fought no battle to reſcue them, and they had been delivered up to him, as ſoon as he appeared off the iſland with his fleet, and demanded them. By a *Cenſus* taken this year, the number of *Roman* citizens fit to bear arms, amounted to two hundred fifty eight thouſand three hundred and eight.

To return to the affairs of *Greece*, *Fulvius* had in his Conſulſhip taken poſſeſſion of the iſland of *Cephalenia*, which the *Romans* had reſerved to themſelves in their treaty with *Ætolia*, and which was a very convenient acquiſition, as opening a way, for their legions, into *Peloponneſus*; from which it was but about twenty four miles diſtant. Some
c. 30. differences now happening between the *Achæans* and *Lacedæmonians*, *Fulvius*, judging the matter to be of great importance, thought proper to refer it to the Senate. The Conſcript Fathers paſſed an ambiguous decree, which each party might interpret in it's own favour; and this occaſioned the two Republics to begin hoſtilities. *Philopæmen*, who commanded the *Achæans*, led his army to *Lacedæmon*, and by ſome acts of ſeverity, ſo terrified the *Lacedæmonians*, that they became ſervilely ſubmiſſive. At his command they demoliſhed their walls, renounced the laws of *Lycurgus*, which they had obſerved ſeven hundred years, and ſubjected themſelves to thoſe of *Achaia*.

Polyb. Legat. 35. *Livy*, B. 38. c. 38. Then ten commiſſioners appointed by the Republic to ſettle the affairs of *Aſia* landed at *Epheſus* with King *Eumenes*. From thence they went to *Apamea*, where the Pro-Conſul *Manlius* met them; and they all together put the laſt hand to the treaty with *Antiochus*. Beſides the articles formerly mentioned, it contained, that the King ſhould deliver up all his long ſhips; that for the future he ſhould have no more than ten armed galleys; that he ſhould not ſail beyond the promontory of *Calycadnus*, unleſs to carry to *Rome* ambaſſadors, hoſtages, or tribute; that he ſhould deliver up all his elephants, and never train any more of thoſe animals. Among the hoſtages demanded, the King's ſon, *Antiochus*, was one. Then they ſettled the bounds of the dominions of *Eumenes* and the *Rhodians*. *Lycia* and *Caria* to the river *Mæander*, except the town of *Telmiſſus*, were given to the latter; *Lyſimachia* with the *Cherſoneſus* in *Europe*, the two *Phrygia's*, both the *Myſias*, *Lycaonia*, with *Epheſus*, *Telmiſſus*, and other towns in *Aſia* to the former: The *Romans* reſerved no part of the conquered countries for themſelves. They were ſatisfied, for the preſent, with having extended the glory of their name and the terror of their arms, and with the immenſe ſpoils in gold, ſilver and rich moveables which they carried from *Aſia*.

When

When *Manlius* and his army had croſſed the *Helleſpont* in their way home, they were attacked by a body of ten thouſand *Thracians*, in a narrow paſs, in a wood, where the *Romans* could not form themſelves in order of battle. This danger eſcaped, yet with the loſs of great part of the ſpoil, they continued their march through *Theſſaly* and *Epirus*, and at length arrived at *Apollonia* where they were to embark; but the ſeaſon being now far advanced, the Pro-Conſul paſſed the winter there.

In the mean time *M. Æmilius Lepidus* and *C. Flaminius* having ſucceeded to the Conſulate, would fain have paſſed into *Greece* and *Aſia*; but, as theſe countries were now quiet [and had lately been pretty well plundered] the Senate inſiſted upon their going to thoſe places where the Republic had yet enemies to ſubdue; and obliged them both to march againſt the *Ligurians*. The Conſuls obeyed, and, by the ſucceſs they met with, pacified all between *Etruria* and the *Alps*. Y. of *R.* 566. Bef. *J. C.* 186. 265 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 38. c. 42.

At length *Manlius* arrived from *Apollonia*, and demanded a triumph of the Senate aſſembled in the temple of *Bellona*. His requeſt met with oppoſition from ſome of the ten commiſſioners, who had been ſent into *Aſia*. They objected, that he had not only undertaken his expedition againſt the *Galatians* without the orders of the Republic, but had carried on the war more like a robber than a *Roman* Conſul; and that his victories were too eaſy to merit any reward. They taxed him alſo with want of conduct, for ſuffering the *Thracians* to rob him in his return home [a]. *Manlius* pleaded, that the *Gauls* in *Aſia* having aſſiſted *Antiochus* were proper objects of the reſentment of the *Romans*; mentioned the battles he had won; and excuſed as well as he could his diſaſter in *Thrace*. After a long debate the aſſembly decree him a triumph. c. 45.

[a] *Livy* makes one of the accuſations againſt *Manlius* to have been his having formed a deſign to lead his army over mount *Taurus*, the *fatal boundary of the* Roman *empire*, as it was then called, on account of ſome verſes in the *Sybilline* oracles, threatning ſlaughter and deſtruction to thoſe *Roman* armies which ſhould paſs that limit.

CHAP. VIII.

Scipio Africanus *arraigned before the* Roman *people.*
Scipio Aſiaticus *arraigned and condemned.*

THE preſent year was made very remarkable by the public proſecution of two men, whoſe eminent ſervices to their country, it might naturally be thought, would have preſerved them from any open attacks upon their fame or fortune. *Scipio Africanus* and his brother *Aſiaticus* were ſucceſſively accuſed before the people of taking bribes from *Antiochus*, and embezzling the public money.

Y. of *R.* 566. Bef. *J. C.* 186 265 Conſul-p *Aul. Gell.* B. 4. c. 18.

At the inſtigation of *Cato*, as ſome authors report, two Tribunes, both of the name of *Petilius*, moved in the Senate, that *Africanus* might be obliged to give an account of all the money received from the King of *Syria*, and of the ſpoil taken in that war. *Scipio* riſing up and drawing a book out of his boſom, *In this*, ſaid he, *is contained an exact account of all you want to know; of all the money, and all the ſpoil.* "Read it aloud "then, *ſaid the Tribunes*, and let it afterwards be depoſited in the trea- "ſury." *No*, replied *Scipio*, that *I will not do. I ſhall not put ſuch an affront upon myſelf:* and inſtantly he tore the book to pieces before their eyes.

After this, a tribune named *M. Nævius* cited him to anſwer before the people to the accuſations above mentioned. The proſecution of this great man was variouſly judged of. Some thought it an inſtance of the moſt ſhameful ingratitude, and more deteſtable than that of the *Carthaginians* in baniſhing *Hannibal*. Others ſaid, that no citizen, how eminent ſoever, ought to be conſidered as above the laws, or too worthy to be accountable. "What man can ſafely be truſted with any thing, "not to ſay with the public adminiſtration, if he is not to be anſwer- "able for his conduct? Force can be no injuſtice againſt him who "will not endure a fair trial."

Liv. B. 38. c. 50. & ſeq.

Nævius had no direct proof of his charge. He ſupported it only by ſurmiſes and preſumptions. He took notice, that *Scipio*'s ſon had been reſtored to him by *Antiochus* without ranſom; adding, that the *Syrian* had paid court to him, as if peace or war with *Rome* depended upon him alone: that *Scipio* had acted more like a Dictator than a Lieutenant to his brother the Conſul; and had gone into *Aſia* with no other view, but to perſuade the *Greeks* and all the eaſtern nations (as he had formerly done the *Gauls*, *Spaniards*, *Sicilians*, and *Africans*) that one man was the pillar and ſupport of the *Roman* empire; that *Rome*, the miſtreſs of the world, lay in ſhelter under the ſhadow of *Scipio*, and that his nods had ſucceeded to the decrees of the Senate and the commands of the people. The Tribune alſo revived the old accuſations relating to his luxury at *Syracuſe*, and the affair of *Pleminius*. *Scipio* diſdained to anſwer. It happened to be the anniverſary of the battle of *Zama*. After ſaying ſomething in general of his merit and ſervices, he thus continued: *On this day*, Romans, *I conquered* Hannibal *and the* Carthaginians. *Ill would it become us to ſpend it in wranglings and contention. Let us not be ungrateful to the Gods. Let us leave this raſcal here, and go to the capitol; there to return thanks to the great* Jupiter, *for that victory and peace, which, beyond all expectation, I procured for the Republic.* Inſtantly the tribes began to move; and the whole aſſembly followed him, except the Tribune himſelf and the public crier.

Aul. Gell. B. 4. c. 18. ſays, that all agree that *Scipio* ſpoke theſe words.

Scipio, notwithſtanding this memorable triumph over his accuſer *Nævius*, was again cited by the two *Petiliuſes*, to anſwer to the ſame accuſations.

accuſations. It is not improbable that the tearing his accounts furniſhed his enemies with the chief advantage they had againſt him. He now gave way to the ſtorm, and retired to *Liternum*, not far from *Naples*. *L. Scipio* appeared for him, and ſaid, that he was ſick; an excuſe which did not ſatisfy his accuſers: they were going on to get him condemned by default, when ſome of the Tribunes, at the entreaty of *L. Scipio*, interpoſed, and obtained to have a new day named for the trial. *Tib. Sempronius Gracchus*, one of the Tribunes, who had been always an avowed enemy of the *Scipios*, but was a man of great probity, would not ſuffer his name to be added to thoſe of his collegues in the decree. He declared, that he not only thought *Scipio*'s excuſe ſufficient, but, if he came to *Rome* and aſked his aſſiſtance, would put an end to the proceſs. He added, "*P. Scipio* by his exploits, the honours conferred "on him by the Republic, the conſent of Gods and men, is raiſed "to ſuch a height that to make him ſtand as a criminal before the "*Roſtra*, and bear the reproaches and inſults of young men, is a greater "diſhonour to the *Roman* people than to *him*. Will no merit, no dig-"nities ever procure a ſanctuary for great men, where their old age, if "not revered, may at leaſt be inviolate?" This unexpected declaration from an old enemy of the *Scipios* had a great effect on the multitude, and even on the accuſers themſelves; who ſaid they would take time to conſider what was fit for them to do. The Senate preſently after aſſembled, and ordered thanks to be returned to *Tib. Gracchus* for having made his private reſentment give way to the public good. The proſecution was dropt. *Africanus*, without any deſire of returning to *Rome*, ſpent the remainder of his days at *Liternum*; and there, at his death, he ordered his body to be buried [a].

Y. of *R.* 566. Bef. *J. C.* 186. 265 Conſul p.

Scipio Aſiaticus ſtood his trial, and was condemned, together with one of his Lieutenants and his Quæſtor, as guilty all three of having defrauded the treaſury of great ſums of money, received by them in *Aſia* for the public account. The Lieutenant and the Quæſtor gave ſecurity to pay what was judged to be due from them; *Scipio* refuſed to give bail, ſtill inſiſting, that he had accounted for all he had received. They were going to lead him to priſon, when *Tib. Gracchus* interpoſed. He ſaid, he would not indeed hinder the proper officer from raiſing the money [b] out of *Scipio*'s effects, but would never ſuffer a *Roman* General

[a] It is not certainly known when he died, and *Livy*, who tells the ſtory of the trial more amply than it is related above, ſays, that authors ſo differ about the circumſtances of the proſecution, that he knows not what to believe. In theſe particulars however moſt of them agree; That *Scipio* was publicly proſecuted, that he tore his book of accounts, that he diſdained to anſwer at his trial, that he carried away the people to the capitol, that he was afterwards cited again, and that he then retired.

It is alſo uncertain which of the brothers was firſt proſecuted,

[b] *Livy* thinks it amounted to four millions of the ſmaller ſeſterces, which, according to *Arbuthnot*, make, of our money, 32291 *l.* 13 *s.* 4 *d.* and ſays, that *Val. Antias* muſt be miſtaken when he makes it amount to fifty times that ſum.

Y. of *R.* 566 Bef. *J. C.* 186. 265 Conſul-p *Aul. Gell.* B. 7. c. 19.

to be thrown into the ſame priſon in which the Generals of the enemy, taken by him in battle, had been confined. His effects being ſeized and appraiſed were not found to be of value ſufficient to pay the ſum in queſtion; nor was there any thing amongſt them which could be deemed to have been brought from *Aſia*. The friends and relations of *Aſiaticus* would, by preſents, have more than made up his loſs, but he refuſed to accept of any thing beyond bare neceſſaries. In return for the generous part *Gracchus* had acted, the *Scipios* gave him in marriage *Cornelia* the daughter of *Africanus*.

Y. of *R.* 567. Bef. *J. C.* 185. 266 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 39. c. 8. & ſeq.

The Conſulſhip of *Sp. Poſthumius Albinus* and *Q. Marcius Philippus* was chiefly ſpent in ſuppreſſing and puniſhing a monſtrous ſociety of debauchees, which had been formed at *Rome* under the name of *Bacchanalians*. In the end of the year *Marcius* was defeated by the *Ligurians* and loſt four thouſand of his men.

CHAP. IX.

The Roman *Senate ſend two commiſſions ſucceſſively into* Macedon *to take cognizance of* Philip's *proceedings. The Commiſſioners treat him hardly.*

The Romans *exerciſe a tyrannic power in* Achaia. Lycortas, *Prætor of the State, remonſtrates againſt it in vain; and the* Achæans *through fear ſubmit.*

Y. of *R.* 568. Bef. *J. C.* 184. 267 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 39. c. 24.

IN the beginning of the Conſulſhip of *Appius Claudius Pulcher* and *M. Sempronius Tuditanus*, three Commiſſioners, the chief of whom was *Q. Cæcilius Metellus*, were ſent into *Greece* to terminate certain diſputes of the King of *Macedon* with the King of *Pergamus* and ſome ſtates of *Greece*.

Philip, ſince his peace with *Rome*, had neglected nothing to ſtrengthen himſelf againſt a new war, whenever it ſhould be unavoidable. He had encreaſed his revenues by promoting trade, and by the profits of his mines, in which he employed a great number of men. To recruit his people, exhauſted by the late wars, he not only encouraged marriages and the bringing up of children, but tranſplanted into *Macedon* a great multitude of *Thracians*. Theſe being ſtrangers to the *Romans*, and therefore not intimidated by them, he ſettled them in ſome towns on the ſea coaſt, obliging the former inhabitants to remove into *Emathia* anciently called *Pæonia*. After the victory over *Antiochus* in *Greece*, the Conſul *Acilius* had permitted the *Macedonian* to make war upon *Amynander* and the *Athamanes*, and to lay ſiege to thoſe towns in *Theſſaly* and *Perrhæbia* which belonged to the *Ætolians*. *Philip* eaſily expelled *Amynander* and took ſeveral towns in *Theſſaly*, and *Perrhæbia*, and among the reſt *Demetrias*. He alſo ſeized upon ſome places in *Thrace*. The *Romans*, always jealous of his

Polyb. de Virt. & Vit. p. 1436. *Liv.* B. 40. c. 3.

his power, had conſtantly watch'd his motions and had given him ſeveral mortifications. By the treaty of peace concluded between him and *T. Flamininus*, it had been referred to the determination of the Senate, whether certain towns of *Macedon* which had revolted from the King, during the time of a truce with the *Romans*, ſhould be reſtored to him; and the Fathers had given ſentence againſt him. They had alſo confirmed *Amynander* in the poſſeſſion of great part of his dominions which the *Ætolians* had recovered from the *Macedonian*. And now *Amynander* claimed the reſt of his towns. The *Theſſalians* and *Perrhæbians* likewiſe demanded back theirs; alledging, that though *Philip* had taken them from the *Ætolians*, yet theſe had only uſurp'd them. Some of the complainants broke out into harſh invectives againſt the King; which he anſwered with heat and haughtineſs. The *Roman* Commiſſioners finiſhed the whole affair by a ſhort decree, That *Philip* ſhould withdraw his gariſons from all the places in queſtion, and confine himſelf, on that ſide, within the ancient bounds of the kingdom of *Macedon*.

Y. of *R.* 568. Bef. *J. C.* 184. 267 Conſul-p. *Livy*, B. 39. c. 23. c. 25. & ſeq.

Then they removed to *Theſſalonica*, to hear the complaints of the ambaſſadors from *Eumenes* King of *Pergamus*, who pretended that the cities of *Maronæa* and *Ænus*, now poſſeſſed by *Philip*, of right belonged to their maſter; becauſe by their nearneſs they ſeem'd appendages of *Cherſoneſus* and *Lyſimachia*, which he had received, by grant, from the Senate of *Rome*. The *Maronites* alſo complained, that their town had been ſeized by the *Macedonian*, and that his ſoldiers tyrannized in the place. *Philip* anſwered in a manner that was not expected. "It is not with the "*Maronites* and *Eumenes* only that I have a controverſy, but with you "alſo, *Romans*, from whom I have long obſerved that I can obtain no "juſtice. Some cities of *Macedon* had revolted from me during a truce; "I thought it but juſt that theſe ſhould be reſtored to me; not that "they would have made any great addition to my kingdom (for they "are but ſmall towns, and ſituated on the extremities of it) but ſuch "an example might have had very ill conſequences with regard to my "other ſubjects. Yet this you denied me. In the *Ætolian* war I was "deſired by the Conſul *Acilius* to beſiege *Lamia*. After many fatigues "and encounters, when I was upon the point of ſcaling the walls, and "taking the town, *Acilius* forced me to withdraw my troops. As ſome "compenſation for this injury, I was permitted to recover a few caſtles "(as they ſhould be called rather than towns) of *Theſſaly*, *Perrhæbia*, "and *Athamania*. Theſe *you* took from me a few days ago.

"*Eumenes*'s ambaſſadors juſt now mentioned it as a truth beyond all "diſpute, that it is more equitable to give what *Antiochus* formerly "held, to their maſter, than to me. I am quite of another opinion. "*Eumenes* could not have held his kingdom, not only if you had not "been victorious, but if you had not made war upon *Antiochus*. *Eu*"*menes* therefore is obliged to you not you to him. But ſo little was "any part of my kingdom in danger from the *Syrian*, that he voluntarily

Y. of *R.* 568. Bef. *J. C.* 184. 267 Conſul-p.

" rily offered me, as the price of an alliance, three thouſand talents, " fifty ſhips of war, and all the *Greek* cities which I had formerly held. " Theſe offers I rejected; nor did I diſſemble my being an enemy to " him, even before *Acilius* led your army into *Greece*. After the Con- " ſul's arrival, I conducted whatever part of the war he committed to " me; and when *Scipio* marched his forces by land to the *Helleſpont*, " I not only gave him a ſafe paſſage through my dominions, but made " good roads for him, built bridges, and ſupplied him with proviſions. " Not contented with this, I took the ſame care of his paſſage through " *Thrace*, where, beſides other things, I had to guard againſt his being " attacked by the *Barbarians*. For this my zeal, not to call it merit, " ought you not rather to have added ſomething to my kingdom, and " amplified it by your munificence, than (as you now do) to take from " me what I already poſſeſs, either in my own right, or by your favour? " The cities of *Macedon*, which you own to have been juſtly mine, " are not reſtored. *Eumenes* comes to ſpoil me, as he did *Antiochus*; " and to cover a moſt impudent falſhood, cites the decree of the ten " Commiſſioners, than which decree nothing can be a clearer confuta- " tion of his pretenſions. It is there indeed plainly and expreſly ſaid, " that the *Cherſoneſus* and *Lyſimachia* are given to *Eumenes*. But where " is there any mention made of *Ænos*, *Maronea* and the cities of *Thrace*? " What he did not dare ſo much as to aſk of the Commiſſioners, " ſhall he obtain from you, as in conſequence of a grant from them? " Upon what footing am I to be for the future? If you propoſe to " purſue me as an enemy, go on, as you have begun; but if you have " any regard for me as a King in friendſhip and alliance with you, I " beg you would not offer me ſo great an indignity."

The ambaſſadors are ſaid to have been moved with the King's diſcourſe; to which they made this perplexed anſwer. " If the cities in " queſtion have been given to *Eumenes* by the decree of the ten Com- " miſſioners, we will change nothing in that diſpoſition. If *Philip* has " taken them in war, he ſhall hold them as the reward of victory. " If neither of theſe be true, the cognizance of the affair ſhall be refer- " red to the Senate of *Rome*; and in the mean time *Philip* ſhall with- " draw his gariſons, that things may be upon an equal footing between " the two parties."

To this harſh treatment of *Philip* by the *Romans*, *Livy* imputes that war, which his ſon *Perſes* afterwards made againſt them, and which he received as it were by legacy from his father.

Y. of *R.* 569. Bef. *J. C.* 183. 268 Conſul-p.

The *Roman* Commiſſioners from *Macedon* went into *Achaia*, from whence, much diſſatisfied with the *Achæans*, they returned to *Rome* (where *P. Claudius Pulcher* and *L. Porcius Licinus* had been choſen Conſuls for the new year.) They gave an account of their negotiation to the Senate, and at the ſame time introduced the ambaſſadors of *Philip* and *Eumenes*, and alſo thoſe from the *Theſſalians*, *Lacedæmonians* and *Achæans*.

It

It was nothing but a repetition of the ſame complaints and ſame anſwers that had been made in *Greece*. The Senate appointed a new commiſſion, at the head of which was *Appius Claudius*, to go into *Macedon* and *Greece*, and examine whether the *Theſſalians* and *Perrhæbians* were put into poſſeſſion of thoſe towns which *Philip* had promiſed to deliver up to them; and to order him to evacuate *Ænos*, *Maronea*, and all the places he held on the ſea coaſt of *Thrace*. They were alſo directed to go into *Peloponneſus*, where the former Commiſſioners had not done any thing, becauſe it had been refuſed to convene a council to give them audience. Of this refuſal *Q. Cæcilius*, the head of that commiſſion, complained heavily. The ambaſſadors from *Lacedæmon* alſo made complaints of the *Achæans*; of which more hereafter. As to *Cæcilius*'s charge, the *Achæan* miniſters excuſed themſelves by citing a law which forbad ſummoning a Diet, unleſs on occaſion of peace or war, or when ambaſſadors came from the Senate with letters or written orders. That they might never more make this excuſe, the Senate gave them to underſtand, that as they, whenever they would, might have an audience of the Fathers at *Rome*, it was fitting that *Roman* ambaſſadors ſhould meet with the like reſpect in *Achaia*.

Y. of *R.* 569. Bef. *J. C.* 183. 268 Conſul p. *Liv.* B 39. c. 33.

Polyb. Legat. 41, 42.

When *Philip*, on the return of his ambaſſadors, had learnt from them, that he muſt abſolutely evacuate *Ænos* and *Maronea*, he took council of his paſſions, and remembring that the *Maronites* had behaved themſelves inſolently, when they pleaded againſt him for their liberty, he gave orders to *Onomaſtus*, his Lieutenant for the guard of the ſea coaſt, to take ſuch meaſures as might make them repent of their deſire of freedom. *Onomaſtus* employed *Caſſander*, one of the King's officers, who had long dwelt at *Maronea*, to let in a body of *Thracians* by night, that they might ſack the town and exerciſe in it all cruelties of war. This was done, but ſo reſented by the *Roman* ambaſſadors, who had better intelligence of theſe proceedings than could have been imagined, that they directly charged the King with the crime; which, they ſaid, was no leſs an inſult on the *Roman* people, who had undertaken the protection of the *Maronites*, than a cruelty to the innocent ſufferers. *Philip* denied his having had any ſhare in the bloody act, and laid it upon the *Maronites* themſelves; affirming that they in the heat of their factions and quarrels (ſome being inclinable to him, others to *Eumenes*,) had cut one another's throats. Nay he made no ſcruple to propoſe to the ambaſſadors to examine the *Maronites* themſelves; as well knowing, that they, terrified by the late execution of his vengeance, durſt not accuſe him; becauſe he would ſtill be in their neighbourhood, and the *Romans* not near enough to protect them. *Appius Claudius* anſwered, that it was needleſs to make enquiries about a thing already known; that he was well informed of what had been done, and by whom; and if the King would clear himſelf, he muſt ſend *Onomaſtus* and *Caſſander* to *Rome*, there to be examined

Polyb. Legat. 44. *Liv.* B. 39. c. 34.

Y. of *R.* 569. Bef. *J. C.* 183. 268 Conſul-p.

examined by the Senate. *Philip* at this changed colour and was confounded; yet recovering himſelf, he ſaid, that *Caſſander* ſhould be at their diſpoſition: but as to *Onomaſtus*, who had not been at *Maronea*, nor near it at the time of the ſlaughter, he refuſed to give him up. His true reaſon was, that he feared leſt a man, who had been much in his confidence, and whom he had employed in many ſuch execrable commiſſions, might reveal other ſecrets to the Senate beſides what regarded the *Maronites:* And that *Caſſander* might tell no tales, he took care to have him poiſoned in his way to *Italy*. The *Roman* ambaſſadors at their departure let the King plainly ſee that they were diſſatisfied with his conduct: He began to fear that he ſhould have a war to ſuſtain before he was ſufficiently prepared for it. To gain time, he reſolved to employ his younger ſon *Demetrius* as his ambaſſador to the Senate; with whom the young Prince had acquired much favour when he was a hoſtage in *Rome*.

Liv. B. 39. c. 36.

The ſame ambaſſadors who had been with *Philip*, made their progreſs through the reſt of *Greece*, and took cognizance of the complaints of ſome baniſhed *Lacedæmonians* againſt the *Achæans*, for having beat down the walls of *Lacedæmon*, ſlaughtered many of the citizens, and aboliſhed the laws of *Lycurgus*. To theſe accuſations *Lycortas* (the father of *Polybius* the hiſtorian) Prætor of *Achaia*, anſwered, That the complainants were *notoriouſly* the very men who had committed the murders they complained of: that as to throwing down the walls of *Lacedæmon*, it was perfectly agreeable to *Lycurgus*'s inſtitution, who had forbid his citizens all kinds of fortification: that the tyrants of *Lacedæmon*, who built thoſe walls, had in effect aboliſhed the ordinances of *Lycurgus*, governing the city by their own lawleſs will; and that the *Achæans*, not knowing any better laws than their own, had communicated them to the *Lacedæmonians*, whom they found in reality without laws or any tolerable polity, and had aſſociated to the other ſtates of *Peloponneſus*.

He concluded with words to this effect: "The *Achæans*, being "friends and faithful allies of *Rome*, think it ſtrange to ſee themſelves "thus compelled to give an account of their actions, as vaſſals and ſlaves "to the *Roman* people. If the voice of *Flamininus*'s * herald was not "an empty ſound, why might not we as well enquire about your proceedings at *Capua*, as you take cognizance of what we have done at "*Lacedæmon*. You will ſay, perhaps, that, by the league between us, "we are only in appearance free; in reality, ſubject to *Rome*. I am "ſenſible of it, *Appius*; and, if I muſt not, I will not be angry. But I beſeech you, whatever diſtance there be between the *Romans* and *Achæans*, let not us your allies be upon the ſame, not to ſay a worſe foot with "you than enemies; your enemies and ours. That the *Lacedæmonians* "might be upon an equality with us, we gave them our own laws, and "made

* See p. 324.

" made them a part of the *Achæan* body. The vanquiſhed, not content Y. of *R.* 569.
" with the laws and privileges which ſatisfy the victors, would have us Bef. *J. C.* 183.
" violate compacts that have been confirmed by the moſt ſolemn oaths. 268 Conſul-p.
" No, *Romans*, we honour you, and, if you will, we fear you too;
" but we reverence more, we dread more, the immortal Gods." *Appius* had little to reply, and was therefore very brief. Thinking it no time for gentle management, he only adviſed the Diet, " by a ready compliance " to merit favour, while they might, and not to wait till they were " compelled to obedience." The aſſembly heard this imperious language with inward rage; yet, fear prevailing, they only deſired that the *Romans* would themſelves make what change they pleaſed with regard to the *Lacedæmonians*, and not force the *Achæans*, by any act of their own, ſacrilegiouſly to break their oaths.

CHAP. X.

Cato *choſen Cenſor againſt the inclination of the nobles. His conduct in that office.*

THERE happened, this year, a remarkable ſtruggle, amongſt the great men of *Rome*, for the office of Cenſor. *Cato* being one of the candidates, the nobles, who not only envied him as a *new man*, but dreaded his ſeverity, ſet up againſt him ſeven powerful competitors. *Valerius Flaccus*, who had introduced him into public life, and had been his collegue in the conſulſhip, was a ninth candidate; and theſe two united their intereſts. On this occaſion *Cato*, far from employing ſoft words to the people, or giving hopes of gentleneſs and complaiſance in the execution of the office, loudly declared from the roſtra, with a threatning look and voice: " That the times required " firm and vigorous magiſtrates to put a ſtop to that growing luxury " which menaced the Republic with ruin; Cenſors, who would cut up " the evil by the roots, and reſtore the rigour of ancient diſcipline." It is to the honour of the people of *Rome*, that notwithſtanding theſe terrible intimations, they preferred him to all his competitors, who courted them by promiſes of a mild and eaſy adminiſtration: The Comitia alſo appointed his friend *Valerius* to be his collegue, without whom, he had declared, that he could not hope to compaſs the reformations he had in view. *Liv.* B. 39. c. 40. & ſeq. *Plut.* life of *Cato*.

Cato's merit upon the whole was ſuperior to that of any of the great men who ſtood againſt him. He was temperate, brave and indefatigable, frugal of the public money, and not to be corrupted. There is ſcarce any talent requiſite for public or private life which he had not received from nature, or by induſtry acquired. He was a great ſoldier, an able

Y. of *R.* 569. Bef. *J. C.* 183. 268 Conſul-p.

able ſtateſman, an eloquent orator, a learned hiſtorian, and very knowing in rural affairs. Yet with all theſe accompliſhments, he had great faults. His ambition being poiſoned with envy, diſturbed both his own peace and that of the whole city as long as he lived. Though he would not take bribes, he was unmerciful and unconſcionable in amaſſing wealth, by all ſuch methods as the law did not puniſh. It was one of his ſayings, according to *Plutarch*, that "the man the moſt to be admired, the moſt glorious, the moſt divine, was he, at whoſe death "it appeared by his accounts, that he had added more to his patrimony than the whole value of it."

The firſt act of *Cato* in his new office, was naming his collegue to be Prince of the Senate; after which the Cenſors ſtruck out of the liſt of the Senators the names of ſeven perſons; among whom was *Lucius*, the brother of *T. Flamininus*. *Lucius*, when Conſul and commanding in *Gaul*, had with his own hand murdered a *Boian* of diſtinction, a deſerter to the *Romans*; and he had committed this murder purely to gratify the curioſity of his pathic, a young *Carthaginian*, who, longing to ſee ſomebody die a violent death, had reproached the general for bringing him away from *Rome* juſt when there was going to be a fight of gladiators.

Titus Flamininus, full of indignation at the diſhonour done to his brother, brought the affair before the people; and inſiſted upon *Cato*'s giving the reaſon of his proceeding. The Cenſor related the ſtory; and, when *Lucius* denied the fact, put him to his oath: The accuſed refuſing to ſwear, was deemed guilty, and *Cato*'s cenſure approved. Yet he greatly hurt his own character when, at the review of the knights, he took away the horſe of *Scipio Aſiaticus*; this act being by every body aſcribed to a malicious deſire of inſulting the memory of *Africanus*.

But no part of the Cenſor's conduct ſeemed ſo cruel to the nobles and their wives, as the taxes he laid upon luxury in all it's branches; dreſs, houſhold furniture, womens toilets, chariots, ſlaves and equipage[a]. The people however in general were pleaſed with his regulations, inſomuch that they ordered a ſtatue to be[b] erected to his honour in the temple of *Health*, with an inſcription that mentioned nothing of his victories or triumph, but imported only, that by his wiſe ordinances in his cenſorſhip he had reformed the manners of the republic.

[a] Theſe articles were all taxed at three per cent. of the real value.

[b] *Plutarch* relates, that before this, upon ſome of *Cato*'s friends expreſſing to him their ſurpriſe, that while many perſons without merit or reputation had ſtatues, he had none; he anſwered, "I had much rather "it ſhould be aſked, why the people have "not erected a ſtatue to *Cato*, than why they "have."

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Complaints brought to Rome *from* Greece *and* Aſia *againſt* Philip *of* Macedon.

The Senate make a decree in relation to a diſpute between the Achæans *and* Lacedæmonians.

The death of Philopœmen.

The death of Hannibal.

WHEN it was univerſally known that the Conſcript Fathers would receive accuſations againſt the King of *Macedon*, from whatever quarter they ſhould come; the city, in a ſhort time, ſwarmed with ambaſſadors from the numerous ſtates of *Greece*. King *Eumenes*, who never wanted matter of invective againſt *Philip*, ſent miniſters to *Rome* without delay. And even ſome private men went thither with complaints of perſonal injuries. After the ſeveral complainants had delivered themſelves in the ſenate, it lay upon *Demetrius*, now ambaſſador from his father, to anſwer all. The Senators, conſidering his youth, and how unequal he was to the taſk of diſputing with ſo many artful wranglers; and obſerving alſo how much he was embarraſſed (as indeed were they themſelves) by the abundance and variety of the matters objected, aſked him, Whether his father had not furniſhed him with ſome notes to help his memory? and, he owning that he had a little book for that purpoſe, they deſired him to read aloud what it contained in relation to the points in queſtion. The truth was, they had no deſire to hear the ſon declaim, but to find out with certainty what the father thought and intended: And thus much the memorial diſcovered; That the King was exeſſively piqued: For up and down in it were ſcattered ſuch expreſſions as theſe: *Although* Cæcilius *and the other ambaſſadors did not deal fairly by me in this buſineſs——Although this was unjuſtly given againſt me——Notwithſtanding the ill treatment and the inſults I have undeſervedly met with on all hands*——

Q. FABIUS LABEO and M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, Conſuls. Y. of *R.* 570. Bef. *J. C.* 182. 269 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* Legat. 46. *Liv.* B. 39. c. 46.

Demetrius excuſed, as well as he could, whatever facts had given offence, and were not to be deny'd; promiſing an exact conformity for the future, to the good pleaſure of the Senate. The fathers anſwered: "That *Philip* "could not have done any thing more prudent, or more agreeable to "them, than ſending his ſon *Demetrius* to make his apology: That "they could overlook, forget, bear with many paſt provocations; and "believed they might confide in *Demetrius*'s promiſes: That though he "was returning into *Macedon*, his heart they knew, would remain with "them as a hoſtage; and that, as far as was conſiſtent with filial piety, "he would always be a friend to the *Roman* people: That out of regard

Y. of *R.* 570. Bef. *J.C.* 182 269 Conſul-p

" to him they would ſend ambaſſadors into *Macedon* to ſet to rights, in " an eaſy and amicable manner, whatever had been done amiſs; and for " their ſo doing, they would have *Philip* ſenſible, that he was indebted " to his ſon *Demetrius*."

The diſpute between the *Lacedæmonians* and the *Achæans* was the next affair that came under the deliberation of the Senate; and they pronounced a decree to the following effect: That thoſe of the *Lacedæmonians*, who had been ſentenced to death by the *Achæans*, had been unjuſtly condemned; and that the baniſhed ſhould be reſtored; but that *Lacedæmon* ſhould remain a member of the *Achæan* body.

Q. Marcius appointed ambaſſador to the court of *Macedon*, had orders to go alſo into *Peloponneſus*, not only to put in execution what was now decreed, but to take cognizance of ſome new commotions there, occaſioned by the *Meſſenians* breaking off from the *Achæan* aſſociation, and ſetting up for an independent ſtate. One *Dinocrates* was come to *Rome* to ſollicit their cauſe. This man having learnt that *T. Flamininus*, named ambaſſador to *Bithynia*, would in his way thither paſs through *Greece*, applied himſelf to him; who being an inveterate enemy of *Philopœmen*, was eaſily engaged in the intereſt of the *Meſſenians*. *Dinocrates* imagined he had now gained his point, and he accompanied the *Roman* to *Naupactus*: whence as ſoon as they landed, *Flamininus* wrote to the Prætor *Philopœmen* and other principal magiſtrates of *Achaia*, to convoke a Diet. The magiſtrates, knowing that *Flamininus* had no commiſſion from the Senate in relation to the affairs of *Greece*, returned anſwer, " That they would do as he deſired, if by letter, he would " ſignify what the buſineſs was which he had to lay before the aſſembly; " an intimation of it to the people, previous to their meeting, being " by the laws abſolutely neceſſary." The *Roman* not thinking it adviſable to put his buſineſs in writing, all the high expectations of *Dinocrates* and the *Meſſenians* fell to the ground.

Polyb. Legat. 47. & Excerp. ap. Valeſ.

Liv. B. 39. c. 49.

Soon after, *Philopœmen*, having levied ſuch forces as in haſte he could, marched againſt the *Meſſenians*, who, under the conduct of *Dinocrates*, had begun hoſtilities. In a ſkirmiſh which enſued, and while the *Achæan* General gallantly expoſed his perſon, to ſecure the retreat of his men, overpowered by numbers, he was, by the falling of his horſe, thrown to the ground, and taken priſoner. The enemy carried him bound to *Meſſene*[a], and there ſhortly after put him to death.

This

Liv. B. 39. c. 49, 50. *Plut.* life of *Philopœmen.*

a When *Philopœmen* was brought priſoner to *Meſſene*, the multitude, pitying the misfortune of ſo great a man, and remembring, with gratitude, ſome good offices he had formerly done their city, and alſo thinking that by his means an end might be put to the preſent war, univerſally inclined to ſpare him. But *Dinocrates* and his party, the authors of the revolt, and who had the government in their hands, hurried him out of ſight of the people, under pretence of aſking him ſome queſtions relating to the preſent ſtate of things. And not daring to truſt him in the cuſtody of any one man,

This year is ſaid by ſome authors to have been remarkable for the death of three moſt illuſtrious Generals, *Scipio*, *Philopœmen* and *Hannibal*. But *Livy* contends, that *Scipio* muſt have been dead at the [b] time when *Cato* entered on his cenſorſhip; becauſe this Cenſor named his collegue *Valerius* to be Preſident of the Senate, a dignity which *Scipio Africanus* had held for the three preceding *luſtra*, and of which he would not have been deprived during his life, without being expelled the Senate; and of ſuch expulſion there is not the leaſt hint in any author.

Y. of *R.* 570. Bef. *J. C.* 182. 269 Conſul-p.

As to *Hannibal*, it has been before obſerved, that *Antiochus* covenanted with the *Romans* to deliver him up, but was prevented by his flight into *Crete*; whence he afterwards went into *Bithynia*, to King *Pruſias*, and did him eminent ſervice in his wars. It has been alſo mentioned, that the Senate employed *Flamininus* on an embaſſy to *Pruſias*. The pretence for it was, to make him deſiſt from hoſtilities againſt the King of *Pergamus*; but it ſeems probable, that the chief buſineſs of *Flamininus* was to terrify the *Bithynian* into a baſe betraying of his *Carthaginian* gueſt[c]. *Pruſias*, if we may believe *Plutarch*, earneſtly entreated the *Roman* ambaſſador not to preſs him to ſo diſhonourable an action: But *Livy* tells us, that the cowardly King comply'd upon the firſt demand. *Hannibal*, well acquainted with *Pruſias*'s character, had in the caſtle of *Libyſſa*, where he reſided, formed certain ſubterraneous paſſages, whereby to make his eſcape in caſe of danger. Word being brought him, that the caſtle was ſurrounded by ſoldiers, he had recourſe to his paſſages. When he found that the iſſues of theſe were alſo beſet, he did not heſitate a moment in preferring death to captivity. Taking into his hand a [d] poiſon which he had long

Juſtin. B. 32. c. 4.

Plut. life of *Flamin.*

man, even for a night, they put him down, faſt bound, into a kind of vault or cavern, where they uſed to keep their treaſure in time of war, and the mouth of which they covered with a great ſtone moved by an engine. *Philopœmen*, now 70 years of age, juſt recovered from a long illneſs, and grievouſly wounded in the head by his fall when taken priſoner, lay in this place, without light and without air, while his enemies were debating what to do with him. The fear they had of his reſentment, ſhould he be ſet at liberty, made them determine to put him to death without delay; for which purpoſe they let down the executioner into the vault. *Philopœmen* was lying ſtretched upon his cloak, when ſeeing a man ſtanding by him with a lamp in one hand, and a cup of poiſon in the other, he with difficulty raiſed himſelf, and taking the cup, aſked him, *Whether he knew any thing of* Lycortas *and the* Megalopolitan *horſemen.* The executioner anſwering that they had almoſt all eſcaped; *It is well*, replied *Philopœmen*, *We are not every way unfortunate*; then without the leaſt mark of diſcompoſure, he drank off the poiſon, and laying himſelf down upon his cloak, ſoon after expired.

Divine honours were afterwards paid to him by his countrymen; and he was ſtiled, as *Plutarch* tells us, *The laſt of the* Greeks.

[b] *Cicero* [*de Senect.*] makes *Cato* ſay the ſame thing.

[c] *Valerius Antias* (ap. *Liv.* B. 39. c. 56.) ſays expreſsly, that *Flamininus*, *L. Scipio Aſiaticus*, and *P. Scipio Naſica*, were ſent ambaſſadors to *Pruſias* to procure the death of *Hannibal*.

[d] According to *Juvenal*, *Hannibal* kept this poiſon in a ring. *Juven. Sat.* 10.

kept

Y. of *R.* 570. Bef. *J. C.* 182. 269 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 39. c. 51.

kept ready againſt ſuch an exigence, he ſaid: *Let us deliver* Rome *from her perpetual fears and diſquiet, ſince ſhe has not patience to wait for the death of an old* [c] *man.* Flamininus's *victory over an enemy unarmed and betrayed will not do him much honour with poſterity.* Then having invoked the Gods to take vengeance upon *Pruſias* for his violation of hoſpitality, he ſwallowed the poiſon and died [f].

[c] He was about 65.

Rollin. Hiſt. Rom. Tom. 7. l. 24. §. 5.

[f] A late pious and learned author of a *Roman* Hiſtory after relating the death of *Hannibal* and *Scipio*, draws the characters of thoſe two celebrated Captains; compares them; and then leaves it to his reader to give the preference as he ſhall ſee cauſe. He enumerates the talents and qualities that make a complete General. 1. Extenſive genius to form and execute great deſigns. 2. Profound ſecrecy. 3. A thorough acquaintance with the characters of the Generals with whom he is to fight. 4. Attention to keep his troops under ſtrict diſcipline. 5. A plain, ſober, frugal, laborious manner of living. 6. Skill in an equal degree to employ force and ſtratagem. 7. Prudence to avoid hazarding his perſon without neceſſity. 8. Art and ability for conducting a battle. 9. The talents of ſpeaking well, and dexterouſly managing the minds of men.

Our author gives a ſummary of what the Hiſtorians have ſaid to the praiſe of both Commanders, in theſe reſpects; and, from the whole is inclined to think that *Hannibal* has the advantage. "There are however two difficulties which hinder him "from deciding: one drawn from the "characters of the Generals whom *Hannibal* vanquiſhed; the other, from the errors "he committed. May it not be ſaid, (con-"tinues our author) that thoſe victories "which have made *Hannibal* ſo famous, "were as much owing to the imprudence "and temerity of the *Roman* Generals, as "to his bravery and ſkill? When a *Fabius*, "and afterwards a *Scipio* was ſent againſt "him, the firſt ſtopt his progreſs at once, "the other conquered him."

I do not ſee why theſe difficulties ſhould check our author's inclination to declare in favour of the *Carthaginian*. That *Fabius* was not beaten by *Hannibal*, we cannot much wonder, when we remember how ſteadily the old man kept his reſolution never to fight with him. But from *Fabius*'s taking this method to put a ſtop to the victories of the enemy, may we not conclude that he knew no other, and thought *Hannibal* an over-match for him? And why does our author forget *Publius Scipio*, (*Africanus*'s father) a prudent and able General, whom *Hannibal* vanquiſhed at the *Ticin. Livy* relates ſome victories of *Hannibal* over the celebrated *Marcellus*; but neither *Marcellus*, nor any other General, ever vanquiſhed *Hannibal* before the battle of *Zama*, if we may believe *Polybius*, (B. 15. c. 16.) *Terentius Varro* indeed is repreſented as a headſtrong raſh man; but the battle of *Cannæ* was not loſt by his imprudence. The order in which he drew up his army is no where condemned; and Chevalier *Folard* thinks it excellent. And as to the conduct of the battle, *Æmilius Paullus*, a renowned Captain, a diſciple of *Fabius*, had a greater ſhare in it than his collegue. The imprudence with which *Varro* is taxed, was his venturing, againſt his Collegue's advice, with above 90,000 men, to encounter, in a plain field, an enemy who had only 50,000, but was ſuperior in horſe. And does not the very advice of *Æmilius*, and the charge of temerity on *Varro* for not following it, imply a confeſſion of *Hannibal*'s ſuperiority, in military ſkill, over *Æmilius*, as well as *Varro*? It ought likewiſe to be obſerved, that *Hannibal*'s infantry had gained the victory over the *Roman* infantry, before this latter ſuffered any thing from the *Carthaginian* cavalry. It was otherwiſe when *Scipio* gained the victory at *Zama*. His infantry would probably have been vanquiſhed but for his cavalry. *Hannibal* with only his third line of foot (his *Italian* army) maintained a long fight againſt *Scipio*'s three lines of foot, and ſeems to have had the advantage over them, when *Maſiniſſa* and *Lælius*, with the horſe, came to their aſſiſtance. *Polybius* indeed ſays, that *Hannibal*'s *Italian*

forces were equal in number to all *Scipio*'s infantry, but this is contradicted by *Livy*, and is not very credible. The authority of *Polybius*, who was an intimate friend of *Scipio Æmilianus*, is, I imagine, of but little weight, in matters where the glory of the *Scipios* is particularly concerned. His partiality and flattery to them are in many inſtances but too viſible.

The errors of which *Hannibal* is accuſed are, *his not marching to* Rome *immediately after his victory at* Cannæ, and *his ſuffering his troops to ruin themſelves by debauchery at* Capua.

Our author himſelf ſeems to believe, that the firſt was not really an error, [See what has been ſaid upon this head, p. 170. n. *g*.]

As to the ſecond charge, it is a manifeſt ſlander. The behaviour of *Hannibal* and of his troops, after they came out of their winter quarters at *Capua*, is a ſufficient proof that they had loſt nothing of their martial ſpirit [a]. If *Hannibal*'s ſoldiers were ſo unmanned as *Livy* would have us believe, why did not the *Romans* drive them out of *Italy?* How came the *Carthaginian* to be conqueror in every action, great and ſmall, as, *Polybius* ſays, he was [b]?

After ſpeaking of the errors imputed to the *Carthaginian*, our author adds, "As "for *Scipio* I do not know that any thing "like theſe was ever objected to him." He forgets that neglect of diſcipline was frequently objected to *Scipio* by *Fabius* and *Cato*; unjuſtly perhaps, but not more unjuſtly than it is objected to *Hannibal* by *Livy*.

Our author having conſidered both Generals with reſpect to their military qualities, adds to his diſcourſe a ſection with the title of MORAL AND CIVIL VIRTUES. And, "Here it is (ſays he) that *Scipio* tri- "umphs.——The reader will not be much "at a loſs in whoſe favour to declare; "eſpecially if he looks upon the ſhocking "portrait which *Livy* has left us of *Han-* "*nibal.*" But our author himſelf, after looking upon this portrait, judges that it does not reſemble the original; there being no mention, in *Polybius* or *Plutarch*, of that cruelty, perfidiouſneſs, and irreligion, with which *Livy* charges the *Carthaginian*. The reader may therefore be at a loſs in whoſe favour to decide, notwithſtanding any thing that *Livy* has ſaid, or any thing that our author has ſaid, or is going to ſay; for he declines making a parallel of theſe two Generals with regard to moral and civil virtues [the virtues of a good citizen.] "He will content himſelf, (he "ſays) with mentioning ſome of thoſe "which in *Scipio* ſhined the moſt." Whether theſe brightneſſes are ſuch as give our author cauſe to ſay, *C'eſt ici le triomphe de Scipion*, we ſhall preſently ſee.

He ranges the virtues in the following order.

I. *Generoſity, Liberality.*

He tells us, that *Scipio freely parted with his money*, and mentions his wonderful generoſity in reſtoring the *Spaniſh* hoſtages without ranſom.

Now we find that *Hannibal* had the very ſame virtues, or to ſpeak more properly, made uſe of the ſame policy. He parted with his money to purchaſe the friendſhip of the *Gauls*; and when, by his victories in *Italy*, he had taken great numbers of *Italians* priſoners; he ſet free, without ranſom, all that were not *Romans*.

II. *Gentleneſs, Benignity.*

We are told that *Scipio* treated his officers politely, that he praiſed and rewarded thoſe who had performed well.

From the words which *Livy* puts into [c] *Hannibal*'s mouth, juſt before the battle of the *Ticin*, there is reaſon to conclude that he acted in the like manner. Whether *Hannibal* would have been ſo gentle to mutineers, as *Scipio* was at the *Sucro* (and for which our author extols him) it is not eaſy to ſay: his temper having never been tried by a mutiny among his ſoldiers. Nor do I well conceive how *Scipio*, conſiſtently with common prudence, could, in his ſituation, have been more ſevere. He put to death all the ringleaders of the ſedition, thirty five in number.

But certainly our author is very unlucky in the inſtance he chuſes to give of *Scipio*'s *gentleneſs in reproof*. "His reprehenſions "were ſoftened by ſuch an air of affec- "tionate kindneſs as made them amiable. "The reproof he was obliged to give

[a] See p. 180 and 186. n. *q*. [b] B. 15. c. 11 and 16. [c] See p. 134.

"*Maſiniſſa*

" *Maſiniſſa*, who, blinded by his paſſion, " had married *Sophoniſba*, a declared ene- " my of the *Roman* people, is a perfect " pattern for imitation in the like delicate " circumſtances." Now the reader may remember, that this gentle amiable reproof, was accompanied with a broad hint, that *Maſiniſſa* muſt give up the woman he had married, and was paſſionately in love with, to be a ſlave to the *Romans*, and led in triumph before *Scipio*'s chariot [d].

III. *Juſtice.*

" It was by this virtue (ſays our author) " that *Scipio* rendered the *Roman* domina- " tion ſo gentle and agreeable to the allies " and the conquered nations, and made " himſelf ſo tenderly beloved by them, " that they conſidered him as their pro- " tector and father."

One would think that a writer ſo well acquainted with the hiſtory of thoſe times, meant this remark as raillery inſtead of panegyric. For could he really believe that either the *Spaniards* or the *Africans* found any pleaſure in wearing the *Roman* yoke? Or that the *Spaniards* had a high opinion of the juſtice of *Scipio*, who came among them under pretence of delivering them from ſubjection to *Carthage*, and then reduced them under the domination of *Rome*? The truth is, notwithſtanding all that is ſaid by the Hiſtorians of his juſtice, clemency, and benignity, he carried on the war in *Spain* not only with great injuſtice, but with great cruelty. The facts contradict the panegyrick [e].

As to *Scipio*'s ſhining juſtice in not violating the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors, who in their return to *Rome* accidentally fell into his hands, it is not worth taking notice of. But (not to mention the affair of *Pleminius*) there is a glaring inſtance of his injuſtice recorded by *Livy*, (B. 44. c. 62.) and which the reader may find in p. 341 of this hiſtory.

IV. *Greatneſs of Soul.*

In what did *Scipio* diſplay this virtue? Why truly in refuſing the title of King, which the *Spaniards* offered him; a refuſal which made them wonder. But the *Spaniards* did not know that every ſenator of *Rome* thought himſelf much above any of the petty Kings in *Spain*. Beſides, can it be reckoned a proof of ſingular magnanimity, that a man honoured in an extraordinary manner by his country, ſhould not, for any temptation, turn a rebel to it?

The other inſtance of *Scipio's greatneſs of ſoul*, many will perhaps think to be the greateſt blemiſh in his character; *his diſdaining to give an account of his conduct when legally ſummoned to do it.*

I cannot but think, that *Hannibal*, when he freed *Carthage* from the tyranny of the *perpetual judges*; and when, by obliging the nobles to account for the public money they had embezzled, he prevented an unneceſſary and oppreſſive tax from being impoſed on the people, made a better figure as a citizen and a commonwealths-man than *Scipio*, when he tore his book of accounts; or when he triumphed over the Tribune *Nævius*, by carrying away the multitude to the capitol, that they might beg of *Jupiter* (as *Livy* ſays) to grant them always leaders like *Scipio*. And when *Hannibal* goes into baniſhment [f], *lamenting the miſfortunes of his country more than his own*; he certainly ſhews greater magnanimity than the *Roman*, when flying from *Rome* to avoid a trial; or when ordering, at his death, that his body ſhould not be buried in his ungrateful country [g]: [ſo ungrateful as to aſk him what he had done with the public money.]

V. *Chaſtity.*

In proof of *Scipio*'s excelling in this virtue, we have the [h] ſermon he preached to *Maſiniſſa*, and the ſtory of the *Celtiberian* beauty [i]. As to the latter, I would not wiſh the reader to believe *Valerius Antias* [k], who reports that *Scipio* acted a quite contrary part to what is given him by *Livy* and *Polybius*. But if *Scipio* was chaſte, this gives him no right to triumph over *Hannibal*; for *Juſtin* tells us, that the *Carthaginian* was ſo continent, with regard to women, that nobody would have believed him to be an *African* [l].

VI. *Religion.*

Our author himſelf has had the charity to take *Hannibal*'s part, and to anſwer *Livy*'s indictment againſt him for irreligion. He cites *Hannibal*'s pilgrimage to *Gades*; a viſion which he verily believed came to him from the Gods, to foretel to him

[d] See p. 283. [e] See p. 256. [f] *Liv.* B. 33. c. 48. [g] *Liv.* B. 38. c. 53.
[h] See p. 283. [i] See p. 245. [k] *Ap. A. Gell.* L. 6. c. 8. [l] B. 32. c. 4.

him the ſucceſs of his enterprize; the godly expreſſions in the treaty between him and King *Philip*; his not robbing the temple of *Juno Lacinia*; and laſtly his invoking the Gods at the time of his death, to take vengeance on *Pruſias* for his breach of hoſpitality. All theſe together ſufficiently prove that *Hannibal* had religion.

As for *Scipio*, our author ſays, "he does "not know, whether this *Roman* had read "the *Cyropædia*, but that it is evident, "he imitated *Cyrus* in every thing, and "above all in religious worſhip. From "the time that he put on the manly gown, "that is from the age of ſeventeen, he "never began any buſineſs, public or pri-"vate, till he had firſt been at the capitol "to implore the help of *Jupiter*." Our author goes on, "What the religion was, "either of *Cyrus* or *Scipio*, is not here the "queſtion. We know very well that "their religion could not but be falſe. "But the example given to all Commanders "and all men, to begin and finiſh all their "actions with prayer and thankſgiving, is "for that reaſon the ſtronger. For what "would they not have *ſaid and done*, if "they, like us, had been illuminated with "the light of the true religion, and had "been ſo happy as to know the true God?"

Were I to anſwer this queſtion of our pious and learned author, I ſhould ſay that *Cyrus*, *Hannibal*, and *Scipio*, had they known the true God and the true religion, would probably have *ſaid and done* as the Chriſtian conquerors and deſtroyers of mankind have ſince ſaid and done. They would have uttered ſome prayers from time to time; and on certain occaſions have walked in proceſſions: they would have had chaplains, and offices of devotion, and religious ceremonies, and faſting days, and thankſgiving days, and, with all theſe, would have gone on plundering and ſlaughtering the innocent and weak, and glorioufly laying waſte the world. If they had not done theſe mighty miſchiefs, it is more than probable we ſhould have heard little of their virtues.

I FLATTER myſelf that the reader will be greatly edified by the zeal expreſſed, in the foregoing obſervations, for the ſupport of *Hannibal*'s moral character. But ſhould it be otherwiſe, I ſhall ſtill be content, if I may only be excuſed for not attempting to draw at large, the characters of thoſe ſhining heroes we meet with in the *Roman* ſtory. The truth is, I am unequal to the taſk of character-drawing; and were I not, I ſhould ſtill decline it, that I might not be charged with the affectation of a new kind of colouring. For I cannot, from the actions of the *Scipios*, *Marcellus*, *Flamininus*, *Æmilius Paullus*, *Mummius Achaicus*, and ſuch like worthies, form thoſe high ideas of their virtue, which their Panegyriſts, both ancient and modern, would have us entertain.

CHAP. XII.

The Roman *Senate temporize with regard to the* Achæans. Philip *lays a ſcheme to bring the* Baſtarnæ *into* Dardania. *His cruelty to his ſubjects.*

The malice of Perſes *to his brother* Demetrius; *and the conſequences of it.*

Y. of *R.* 571. Bef. *J. C.* 181. 270 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* Legat. 51.

Q. MARCIUS, the *Roman* ambaſſador, who had been ſent into *Macedon* and *Greece*, returned to *Rome* in the conſulſhip of *L. Æmilius Paullus* and *Cn. Bæbius Tamphilus*. With regard to the *Achæans* he reported, that he found them bent to keep the direction of affairs wholly in their own hands, and to refer nothing to the arbitration of the Senate; but added, that if their ambaſſadors, then at *Rome*, met with a cold reception, and if the leaſt intimation were given them, that their proceedings diſpleaſed the Conſcript Fathers, the *Lacedæmonians* would certainly follow the example of the *Meſſenians*; in which caſe the *Achæans* would ſoon grow ſubmiſſive, and moſt earneſtly implore the protection of *Rome*. When therefore the *Achæan* miniſters, in virtue of the treaty between *Rome* and *Achaia*, demanded "aſſiſtance "againſt the *Meſſenians*, or, if that could not be granted, that at leaſt "the ſending arms or proviſions from *Italy* to the enemy might be pro-"hibited," it was anſwered, *That ſhould the* Lacedæmonians, *or the* Corinthians, *or the* Argives *disjoin themſelves from the* Achæan *confederacy, the* Achæans *would have no reaſon to wonder if* Rome *looked upon it as a matter that no way concerned her.* But, notwithſtanding this declaration, when the Fathers learnt ſoon after, that *Lycortas*, the ſucceſſor of *Philopœmen*, had revenged his death, and reduced the *Meſſenians* to ſurrender at diſcretion, they graciouſly aſſured the ſame ambaſſadors, "that they had taken care, no arms nor proviſions ſhould be carried "from *Italy* to *Meſſene*."

Legat. 53.

This change of language to the *Achæans* upon the news of the unexpected ſucceſs of their arms, was perhaps owing to the near proſpect the *Romans* had of a war with the *Macedonian*; for *Marcius* reported to the Senate, that, though *Philip* had done all they had enjoined him; yet it was evident, from his manner of complying, that his obedience would laſt no longer than neceſſity forced him to it. Nor indeed was the ambaſſador in this miſtaken: for as *Philip* could not but ſee that the intention of the *Romans* was to poſſeſs themſelves of his kingdom, by means ſeemingly conſiſtent with their honour, if they could ſo contrive it, if not, by any means whatever; he turn'd all his thoughts to put himſelf in a condition to aſſert his independence. This was not eaſy to

to be effected. in the former war he had loſt much both of ſtrength and reputation: His ſubjects could not bear to hear of a new war with *Rome:* And there was neither King nor State in his neighbourhood that would venture to eſpouſe his cauſe againſt the *Romans*. He formed a ſcheme therefore to allure the *Baſtarnæ* (a robuſt and hardy people dwelling beyond the *Danube*) to leave their country and ſettle in *Dardania*; promiſing them, together with great rewards, his aſſiſtance to extirpate the natives; who (lying on the borders of *Macedon*) had taken every opportunity to give him diſturbance. And he was to purchaſe of ſome *Thracian* Princes a paſſage through their country for theſe *Barbarian* ſtrangers. It is ſaid, that beſides the ſtrengthening of *Macedon*, he had a further view in calling the *Baſtarnæ* to his aſſiſtance. He thought they might be uſefully employ'd even to invade *Italy*, marching through *Illyricum* and the countries upon the *Adriatic*. Some years paſſed before this project took any effect. In the mean time he applied himſelf very diligently to train his people to war, exerciſing them in ſome ſmall expeditions againſt the wild nations on the confines of his dominions.

Y. of *R.* 571. Bef. *J. C.* 181. 270 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 39. c. 35. B. 40. c. 5. and 57.

But theſe his counſels and proceedings were miſerably diſturbed by the calamities that fell upon him, both in his kingdom and in his own houſe. The multitude of people, which he had tranſplanted, much againſt their wills, into *Emathia* *, being extremely diſcontented with the change, uttered bitter execrations againſt him: And he became the deteſtation of all his ſubjects in general, when, the more effectually to ſecure himſelf againſt domeſtic enemies, he barbarouſly cauſed to be maſſacred the children of all thoſe whom he had at any time tyrannically put to death. *Polybius* aſcribes what afterwards happened to *Philip*, in his own family, to an eſpecial vengeance of Heaven poured on him for theſe cruelties.

Polyb. Excerp. ap. *Valeſ.* *Liv.* B. 40. c. 3.

* See p. 372.

It is hard [a] to ſay what the *Romans* intended by the extraordinary favour they ſhewed to *Demetrius*, the king's younger ſon. But certain it is, that their favour to him, and his mutual reſpect for them, made the father extremely jealous of him: A jealouſy that was increaſed by the partial regard the people in general had for *Demetrius*, to whom they thought themſelves indebted for the continuance of the peace with *Rome*,

Polyb. Legat. 50. *Livy*, B. 39. c. 53.

[a] The moſt probable conjecture ſeems to be, that the Conſcript Fathers, well acquainted with *Demetrius*, and knowing him to be a fool, thought him the fitter to be King of a country, which they intended to make their own. For, that he was a very weak youth ſeems evident from hence, that, while the King, ſuſpecting him of a warmer heart to the *Romans* than to him, put an ill conſtruction upon many of his actions, which perhaps were innocent (and particularly that aſſiduous court he paid to every ambaſſador from the ſenate) the Prince took no pains to deſtroy this impreſſion in his father's mind; but on the contrary was always admiring and commending whatever was *Roman*; carrying this folly ſo far, as to loſe all patience, if any body happened to ſay, that *Rome* (the worſt built city in the world) was ill contrived.

Y. of *R.* 571. Bef. *J. C.* 181. 270 Conſul-p. and who, they hoped and believed would, by means of the *Romans*, ſucceed *Philip* in the throne; and this their partiality to the younger ſon was yet more ſtrongly reſented by the elder than by the father. [b] *Perſes* not only conceived an implacable hatred to his brother, but formed a ſteady reſolution to compaſs his deſtruction. In this view he [c] accuſed *Demetrius* of an attempt to aſſaſſinate him; and even pretended to know, that he had undertaken this murder in the confidence that he ſhould be ſupported by the *Romans*. We are told, there was no ſolid proof of the charge. The King, however, having called ſome of his council to be his aſſeſſors, ſat in judgment to try the cauſe. *Livy* has given us at large the pleadings of the two Princes, or rather what they might have ſaid, if they had poſſeſſed his talents. When *Philip* had heard both his ſons, he told them, "That he would not judge between them upon "an hour's hearing of their altercations, but upon a future obſervation "of their life and manners, their words and actions."

Liv. B. 40. c. 8. & ſeq.

The King naturally inclined to his elder ſon, and was confirmed in that inclination by his hatred to the *Romans*; yet he had not ſo high an opinion of *Perſes*'s veracity, as not to doubt concerning what he had alledged againſt his brother. His doubts made him wretched; and he dreaded to have them removed; becauſe he could reap nothing but ſorrow from a diſcovery of the truth. Nevertheleſs ſuch diſcovery was expedient, in order to the regulation of his conduct in diſpoſing of his kingdom. Full of anxiety, he [in the conſulſhip of *P. Cornelius Cethegus* and *M. Bæbius Tamphilus*] ſent *Philocles* and *Apelles* to *Rome* with the

c. 20.

[b] *Perſes* is ſaid by ſome writers to have been *Philip*'s ſon by a concubine; in which reſpect *Demetrius* had the advantage of him, being indiſputably legitimate. But perhaps this is only a *Roman* tale.

[c] The occaſion of it was this. There had been, the day before, a general muſter and review of the army. It was cuſtomary for the troops, after they had been reviewed, to divide themſelves into two bodies, and come to a mock fight, in which the combatants made uſe of poles, inſtead of the uſual weapons. In the laſt fight between the two diviſions of the army, each being heated by more than ordinary eagerneſs for victory, as if they had been contending for the kingdom, ſome hurt was done. *Perſes*'s ſide at length recoiled. This vexed him, but his friends thought that a good uſe might be made of it. It might afford matter of complaint againſt *Demetrius*, as if the heat of his ambition had carried him beyond the rules of the ſport. Each of the brothers was that day to give an entertainment to his own companions, and each of them had ſpies in the other's houſe to obſerve what paſt. One of *Perſes*'s intelligencers behaved himſelf ſo uncautiouſly that he was diſcovered, and well beaten by four of *Demetrius*'s gueſts. *Demetrius* knew nothing of this. When grown warm and merry with wine, *Why ſhould not we go to my brother's*, ſaid he, *and join company with him? and if he is angry with us for what happened to day, we will put him into good humour again.* All approved the motion, except the four who had ſo roughly treated *Perſes*'s ſpy. Yet *Demetrius* would not ſuffer them to ſtay behind. Theſe to ſecure themſelves from being inſulted carried ſwords hid under their clothes: a precaution however not ſo ſecretly taken, but that *Perſes* had notice of it; who thereupon cauſed his doors to be ſhut; and, when *Demetrius* with his drunken companions arrived, ſpoke to them, from a window, in reproachful words, accuſing them of murderous intentions. *Liv.* B. 40. c. 6. & 7.

character

character of ambaſſadors to the Senate; but whoſe chief buſineſs was to learn, if poſſible, what had paſt in private between *Demetrius* and any of the great men there, eſpecially *T. Flamininus*; who not long before had, in a letter to the King, commended his prudence in ſending his younger ſon on the late embaſſy to *Rome*; and had counſelled him to ſend him thither again with a greater and more honourable retinue of *Macedonian* nobles. Theſe two ambaſſadors, whom *Philip* thought unbiaſſed to either of the brothers, but who were indeed wholly devoted to *Perſes*, returned, and brought to the King a letter, pretended to be written to him by *Flamininus*, whoſe ſeal they had counterfeited. In this letter, the writer, in behalf of *Demetrius*, whom he owned to be faulty, deprecated the King's anger; and preſſed him to believe, that whatever unwarrantable enterpriſes the young Prince, through ambition of a throne, might have formed, yet certainly he had projected nothing againſt the life of any one of his own blood. He added, that as for himſelf, he was not a man, that could be thought the adviſer of any impious undertaking whatſoever.

Y. of *R.* 572. Bef. *C.* *J.* 180. 271 Conſul-p.

Liv. B. 40. c. 23.

Philip had ſome months before diſcovered, by means of one *Didas*, Governor of *Pæonia*, who had worked himſelf into *Demetrius*'s confidence, that the young Prince intended to eſcape to *Rome*, imagining, he could no where elſe be in ſhelter from the ſuſpicions of his father and the malice of his brother. The pretended letter from *Flamininus*, added to this diſcovery, determined the King to put his ſon to death. Yet leſt to do it avowedly and openly ſhould give the alarm to the *Romans*, and raiſe a ſuſpicion of his having hoſtile intentions againſt the republic, he judged it beſt to have the criminal taken off ſilently, and by fraud. To *Didas* was committed the execution. A cup of poiſon, which he inſidiouſly gave the Prince, in the expectation that it would diſpatch him ſpeedily and quietly, not taking the deſired effect, but cauſing in him ſuch torment, as revealed the treachery, and made him loudly complain both of his father and *Didas*, this traitor ſent into his chamber a couple of ruffians, who, by ſmothering him, finiſhed the tragedy.

CHAP. XIII.

Tranſactions of the Romans *from the year* 572 *to* 578.

FROM the year 564, when the Conſul *Manlius* vanquiſhed and plundered the *Galatians**, to the year 582, in which began the ſecond *Macedonian* war, little was performed by the *Romans* in the way of arms, except the conqueſt of *Iſtria*. Indeed the wars againſt the *Ligurians* and *Spaniards* continued almoſt without any interruption; but in theſe there happened nothing very memorable.

* See p. 367.

At

Y. of *R.* 572. At *Rome*, in the preſent year [b] 572, one *Orchius*, a Tribune of the people, got a ſumptuary law paſſed, limiting the number of gueſts which any man ſhould be allowed to have at his table.

Macrob. Saturnal. L. 2. c. 13.

Y. of *R.* 573. The next year, *A. Poſthumius Albinus* and *C. Calpurnius Piſo* being Conſuls, was enacted the famous Villian law, regulating the ages requiſite for bearing the ſeveral magiſtracies. What theſe ages were is not agreed among the learned. Yet from *Cicero* (*Phil.* 5.) it would ſeem that the age for Quæſtor was 31, Curule Ædile 37, Prætor 40, Conſul 43.

Y. of *R.* 574. The year following was remarkable for having two brothers at the ſame time in the conſulſhip, *Q. Fulvius Flaccus* and *L. Manlius Acidinus Fulvianus*, the latter ſo called, becauſe adopted into the *Manlian* family.

Y. of *R.* 575. *A. Manlius Vulſo* (who had for his collegue *M. Junius Brutus*) led an army into *Iſtria*; the conqueſt of which country was compleated by the

Y. of *R.* 576. Conſul *C. Claudius Pulcher*, whoſe collegue *Tib. Sempronius Gracchus* ſuppreſſed a rebellion in *Sardinia*.

Y. of *R.* 577. To theſe ſucceeded *Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hiſpallus* and *Q. Petillius Spurinus*.

Liv. B. 41. c. 15. While the Senate were in debate concerning the troops to be raiſed for the ſervice of the year, *Cornelius*, who had been ſuddenly called out of

* A ſerjeant. the aſſembly by a * *viator*, returned, after ſome time, with a countenance full of trouble and conſternation. The Conſcript Fathers ſuſpending their deliberations, became all anxiety and attention. *Cornelius* then informed them, "That the liver of an ox (ſix years old) which he had "ſacrificed was all melted away in the boiler; that when the thing "was firſt told him he could not believe it; that he cauſed the water "to be poured out of the pot, and then ſaw the reſt of the entrails en-"tire; but, for the liver, it was all vaniſhed, no mortal could tell how."

The fathers, terrified by this prodigy, were yet more terrified when the other Conſul let them know, that of four oxen which he had ſucceſſively ſacrificed to *Jupiter*, not one had proved ſuch as could pleaſe him. Both the Conſuls received ſtrict orders to continue ſacrificing oxen, till the omens were good. It is reported (ſays *Livy*) that all the Deities were

* *Salus.* propitiated except the Goddeſs * *Health* or *Safety*; but that *Petilius* had no luck in ſacrificing to her. What followed? *Cornelius* coming down the hill of *Alba*, was ſeized with an apoplectic fit, loſt the uſe of ſome of his limbs, and ſoon after died at *Cumæ*, whither he had been conveyed for the benefit of the waters. *Petillius* conducted the war in *Liguria*:

* *Death.* The enemy being lodged upon a mountain called * *Letum*, the Conſul,

[b] In this year the books which King *Numa* had ordered to be buried with him, and of which mention has been made in *Vol.* I. *p.* 62. were accidentally found, and ordered to be burnt, by the ſenate, as containing doctrine pernicious to religion.

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in an harangue to his ſoldiers, told them, *ſe eo die Letum capturum eſſe*, that he ſhould that day take *Letum* (the enemy's poſt;) not attending, ſays *Livy*, to the ambiguity of the words, which alſo import, *that he ſhould that day catch his death:* And accordingly he was that day killed in a conflict with the enemy. The *Latin* hiſtorian adds, that upon ſo remarkable a fulfilling of the melancholy omen, the keeper of the ſacred chickens was heard to ſay, that ſomething had gone wrong even with them, at the taking the auſpices before the battle and that the Conſul knew it well enough. Y. of *R.* 577. Bef. *J. C.* 145. 276 Conſul-p.

In the place of *Cornelius*, *C. Valerius Lævinus* had been choſen, *Petillius* holding the comitia; but the ableſt divines and lawyers were of opinion, that ſince the ordinary Conſuls of that year had both periſhed, one by ſickneſs, the other by the ſword, the extraordinary, or ſubſtituted Conſul, could not hold the comitia for a new election of magiſtrates.

CHAP. XIV.

Perſes, *after the death of his father* Philip, *ſucceeds him in the throne.*

He renews the treaty with Rome, *and endeavours to gain the good will of the* Greeks.

The Romans *are jealous of his growing power.*

IN the Conſulſhip of *P. Mucius Scævola* and *M. Æmilius Lepidus*, certain ambaſſadors, who had been ſent by the Conſcript Fathers into *Macedon* [to ſeek a pretence for invading and conquering that country] returned to *Rome*. Their report, which was very ſhort, will be mentioned when the reader has firſt had an account of ſome changes in the ſtate of *Macedon* ſince it was laſt ſpoken of. Y. of *R.* 578. Bef. *J. C.* 174. 277 Conſul-p.

King *Philip* was dead. He had lived but two years after the murder of his ſon *Demetrius*, and had paſſed thoſe years in the extremeſt melancholy and wretchedneſs of mind. For *Perſes*, having got rid of his rival brother, paid no longer any reſpect to his father, but let himſelf be courted and worſhipped by the people, as if he were already on the throne. The old King was in a manner left deſolate, ſome expecting his death, and ſome ſcarce enduring the tedioufneſs of ſuch expectation. Thus neglected and deſerted, his thoughts ran frequently back to his ſon *Demetrius*; of whom he began now to regret the loſs, not without ſome ſuſpicion of foul play on the part of *Perſes* in relation to his brother. One man there was of his court, and but one, his couſin-german *Antigonus* (the ſon of his uncle *Echecrates*) that continued faithful to him. *Antigonus*, by his fidelity to *Philip*, had drawn upon himſelf the hatred of *Perſes*; and well foreſaw, how dangerous that hatred would *Livy*, B 40. c. 54. & ſeq.

Y. of *R.* 578. Bef. *J. C.* 174. 177 Conſul-p.

would be to him, if ever the Prince ſhould aſcend the throne. He no ſooner therefore obſerved the ſoftening of the King's mind at the remembrance of *Demetrius*, and how apt he was to the belief, that unfair practices had been uſed to compaſs that Prince's deſtruction, but he apply'd himſelf diligently to liſten to what people ſaid upon that ſubject, and induſtriouſly to bring the matter into diſcourſe, often joining with thoſe who complained of the raſhneſs of the King's act. He found that *Philocles* and *Apelles*, the ambaſſadors who had brought the pretended letter from *Flamininus*, lay under the ſuſpicion of fraud; and that it was commonly whiſpered in the palace, that *Xychus*, their ſecretary, had counterfeited the hand-writing and the ſeal of the *Roman*. *Antigonus* accidentally meeting this *Xychus*, laid hold of him, and brought him into the palace. There leaving him in cuſtody with ſome officers, he went to the King, and acquainted him, that he had found the man who could beſt ſatisfy him whether his ſon *Demetrius* had dy'd juſtly or by treachery. *Xychus* being examined in *Philip*'s preſence, and threatned with torture, after ſome little heſitation confeſſed the whole matter. *Philocles* was inſtantly ſeized. Some ſay, that being confronted with *Xychus* he owned the fact; others, that he bore the torture without confeſſing any thing. *Apelles*, then abſent from court upon ſome commiſſion, having notice of *Xychus*'s being arreſted, made his eſcape and fled into *Italy*[b]. As for *Perſes*, he was grown too powerful to be under any neceſſity of flying his country; he only took care to keep at a diſtance from his father; who deſpairing of ever being able to bring him to corporal puniſhment, bent his thoughts to hinder his ſucceſſion to the throne, and ſecure it to *Antigonus*. And this had he lived

[b] May not this circumſtance, joined with ſome others in the ſtory, juſtify a doubt, whether this pretended diſcovery of truth was not itſelf a fraud, contrived by *Antigonus*, who hoped by the ſucceſs of it to gain the kingdom? Was *Italy* a country where *Apelles*, if guilty of forging a letter from *Flamininus*, to the deſtruction of *Demetrius*, (a Prince ſo much in favour with the ſenate) could hope to find an aſylum? Yet though *Philip* demanded him, the *Romans* did not deliver him up, as appears from *Livy*, (*B.* 42. *c.* 5.) who alſo tells us, that *Philocles*, by ſome Hiſtorians, is ſaid to have denied the crime to the laſt, though confronted with *Xychus*, and put to the torture. Why may not the letter in queſtion have been genuine? *Livy*, who makes it a point to juſtify *Demetrius*, and load *Perſes*, (doubtleſs becauſe a victim deſtined by the *Romans* deſtruction) allows, not only that *Demetrius* was vain and inſolent, on account of the extraordinary regard the ſenate expreſſed for him, but that ſeveral months before *Apelles* and *Philocles* brought the letter from *Italy*, he had formed the deſign of withdrawing from his father's obedience, and eſcaping to his friends at *Rome*. Might not *Flamininus*, knowing this and perhaps ſome other unjuſtifiable practices of *Demetrius*, which had brought him under his father's diſpleaſure, write a letter to the King, to deprecate his anger, and diſſuade him from any meaſures too ſevere againſt the Prince: in which deprecation he might hope to ſucceed the more eaſily, by aſſuring *Philip*, that whatever wicked ſchemes of ambition the young man had formed, they could not take place, ſince they would have no countenance from *Rome?*

a little longer than he did, he would doubtleſs have effected. But in making a progreſs through his kingdom, for this very purpoſe, he fell ſick at *Amphipolis*, and died; [year of *Rome* 574.] His phyſician *Caligenes* concealed his death till *Perſes* arrived; to whom he had given notice of the king's condition, upon the firſt indication of the diſtemper's being mortal. *Antigonus* was not at *Amphipolis:* He had been ſent, much againſt his will, as ambaſſador from *Philip* to quicken the march of the *Baſtarnæ*, and was coming with *Cotto*, one of their leaders, to let the King know, that they had paſſed the *Danube* and were advancing; a prodigious multitude, with their wives and children. Not far from *Amphipolis* he heard a rumour of *Philip*'s death, and was ſoon after arreſted and ſlain by the order of *Perſes*, who had taken poſſeſſion of the kingdom.

A. of *R.* 578. Bef. *J. C.* 174. 277 Conſul p.

The more firmly to eſtabliſh himſelf, *Perſes* ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome* to get his title to the crown recognized by the Senate, and to renew the league that had been made between his father and the republic; both which requeſts he obtained. Nor did he neglect any thing which he thought might help to conciliate to him the good will of the *Greeks*, and his other neighbours. To ingratiate himſelf with his ſubjects, he recalled by edicts (publiſhed in the iſland of *Delos*, at *Delphi*, and in the temple of *Itonia Minerva*) all the *Macedonians* who had fled their country for debt, or had been baniſhed thence by the judges; promiſing them, not only impunity, but reſtitution of their eſtates, with the profits of them during their abſence. He remitted alſo all debts due to his exchequer, and releaſed all perſons that were in cuſtody either for treaſon, or the ſuſpicion of it. By ſuch actions of generoſity and clemency he made the *Greeks* univerſally conceive the higheſt hopes of him. Add to this, that in his perſon and in all his deportment there was a royal dignity; and having carefully ſhunned the vices of incontinence and intemperance, to which his father had been addicted, he had a ſtrength of body, that would enable him to ſuſtain the hardſhips of war, as well as the fatigues of civil government. Such, ſays *Polybius*, was *Perſes* in the beginning of his reign.

Polyb. Excerp. ex Lib. 26. ap. *Valeſ.*

The *Baſtarnæ* (as mentioned above) were upon their march to the country of *Dardania*, when *Philip*, who had invited them thither, died. This event embarraſſed them: For the *Thracians*, with whom *Philip* had ſettled the price of their paſſage, now diſputed it. A battle enſued, in which the *Thracians* had the worſt. Nevertheleſs we find that the whole multitude of the *Baſtarnæ*, except 30000, returned home, becauſe (if we may believe *Livy* and *P. Oroſius*) it was miraculouſly bad weather. The 30000 came on and entered *Dardania*; where we find them three years after. For the *Dardans* then ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome* to aſk help againſt thoſe invaders; adding, that they were yet leſs afraid of the *Baſtarnæ* than of *Perſes*, who was in league with them. This furniſhed the *Ro-*

Polyb. Legat. 62.

Y. of *R.* 578. Bef. *J. C.* 174. 277 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 41. c. 19.

mans with a pretext to viſit the King with ambaſſadors, who ſhould pry into his conduct and deſigns.

When theſe miniſters returned, the whole of their report amounted only to this; *that there was war in* Dardania. *Perſes*, apprehending ſome deſign againſt him, had appointed ambaſſadors to accompany the *Romans* in their journey home, and to aſſure the Conſcript Fathers, that he had not ſent for the *Baſtarnæ*, and that they did not act by his advice. The Senate anſwered, "that they neither accuſed the King "nor acquitted him of that fault; that they only admoniſhed him to "be very careful, religiouſly to obſerve the treaty between the repub-"lic and him."

Y. of *R.* 579. Bef. *J. C.* 173. 278 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 41. c. 22.

The following year, when the conſular faſces had been transferred to *Sp. Poſthumius Albinus* and *Q. Mucius Scævola*, ſome *Roman* ambaſſadors who had paſſed into *Africa* (it does not appear under what pretence of buſineſs) reported, at their return home, "that having gone firſt to "*Maſiniſſa* they had received much better accounts from him of what "had been doing at *Carthage*, than they afterwards got from the *Car-*"*thaginians* themſelves; that unqueſtionably ambaſſadors had been "there from *Perſes*, and admitted to audience by night in the temple "of *Æſculapius*; and that *Maſiniſſa* affirmed, what the *Carthaginians* "themſelves could not confidently deny, that they had ſent ambaſſa-"dors into *Macedon*." Hereupon the fathers reſolved, that they too would ſend ambaſſadors into *Macedon*; and accordingly three were ordered thither.

About this time the *Dolopians*, ſubjects of *Perſes*, refuſing (for what reaſon is unknown) to ſubmit to his authority, and appealing from their King to the *Romans*, he marched with an army, and by force ſpeedily reduced them to obedience. The *Romans* (as we ſhall ſee hereafter) would needs make this an act of preſumption in the King, and reſent it as if he had invaded ſome country of their *Italian* allies.

Perſes, after this expedition, made another, under the pretence of religion. He croſſed mount *Oeta*, and viſited the temple of *Apollo* at *Delphi*. His army being with him, the *Greeks* were at firſt much terrified at his ſudden appearance among them: but he ſtaid only three days at *Delphi*, and then, through *Phthiotis* and *Theſſaly*, returned into his own country, not having done the leaſt act of hoſtility in any place through which he had paſſed. With the cities in his way he had amicably treated in perſon; and to thoſe at a diſtance he had ſent ambaſſadors or letters, deſiring that the memory of all miſunderſtandings between his father and them might be buried with his father, ſince his own inclination was to live in amity with all his neighbours. The *Romans* would have been better pleaſed if the *Macedonian* had done ſome violences in his progreſs. Nor did they fail, for want of ſuch cauſe of quarrel, to make it a crime that he had acted the contrary part, and, by a friendly behaviour, courted the good-will of the *Greek* ſtates.

The

The King was more eſpecially ſolicitous to recover the friendſhip of the *Achæans* which his father had ſo far loſt, that by a ſolemn decree they had forbid any *Macedonian* to enter their territories. Whatever reaſons of policy the *Achæans* might have for the continuance of this decree during the war of *Philip* with the *Romans*, it ſeemed inhuman afterwards, and a nouriſhing of deadly hatred, without leaving means of reconciliation. It was beſides very prejudicial to them; their ſlaves daily running away, and taking refuge in *Macedon*, whence they knew they ſhould not be reclaimed; for though there was no decree forbidding the *Achæans* to enter that kingdom, yet the maſters of the ſlaves could not poſſibly think it ſafe for them to go thither. *Perſes* took advantage of this circumſtance: He apprehended all the run-aways, and, by a letter to the *Achæan* Diet, made a friendly offer to reſtore the fugitives; exhorting, at the ſame time, the magiſtrates to think of ſome effectual means to prevent the like eſcape for the future. *Xenarchus*, the Prætor, read to the Diet this letter; which the greater part heard with much pleaſure, and eſpecially thoſe who were going, contrary to all expectation, to recover their ſlaves. But *Callicrates*, a partizan of the *Romans*, and who, to raiſe himſelf by their favour, had caſt off all regard for his country, adviſed the aſſembly to be well aware of what they did; affirming, that the manifeſt aim of the King's civility was to make them break friendſhip with *Rome*, a friendſhip on which their all depended. "For I ſuppoſe, "*ſaid he*, you have no doubt but there will be a war between the *Ro*- "*mans* and *Perſes*. You know that *Philip* was making preparations for "a rupture. He ſlew his ſon for no other reaſon but his affection to "*Rome*. And what was the firſt thing that *Perſes* did after his coming "to the throne? He brought the *Baſtarnæ* into *Dardania*. It is true, "they are gone away again. Had they ſtaid, they would have been "worſe neighbours to the *Greeks* than the *Gauls* are to the *Aſiatics*. "But did their departure make *Perſes* give over all thoughts of the war? "No, If the truth may be ſpoken, he has already begun it; witneſs "his expedition againſt the *Dolopians*. And as for that extraordinary "journey to *Delphi*, and his wonderfully kind behaviour to the *Theſſali*- "*ans*, whom he hates; What do you think of all this? Was it any thing "more than an artifice to draw men over to his party? Every body un- "derſtands the meaning of his compliment to us. My advice is, that "we let things continue as they are, till we ſee whether the peace be- "tween *Rome* and *Macedon* will remain inviolate."

Y. of *R.* 579. Bef. *J. C.* 173. 278 Conſul-p.

Polyb. Legat. 58. & Excerp. ex L. 28. *Liv.* B. 41. c. 23.

To this, *Archo*, the Prætor's brother: "*Callicrates*, I ſee, has a mind to c. 24.
"make it difficult for thoſe who diſagree with him in opinion, to anſwer "him. Why elſe does he bring the *Romans* into the queſtion? I ob- "ſerve, that he is ſurpriſingly well inſtructed in the councils of foreign "courts. He knows every thing. He gives us an account of the moſt "ſecret tranſactions: He even devines what would have happened if

Y. of *R.* 579. Bef. *J. C.* 173. 278 Conſul-p.

" *Philip* had lived: He knows how it comes to paſs that *Perſes* inherits " the kingdom; what the *Macedonians* are meditating; and what the " *Romans* think: And upon all this knowledge he forms his opinion. " But now, as for us, who neither know why nor how *Demetrius* died, " nor what *Philip* if he had lived would have done; we ought, I think, " to govern ourſelves only by what we do know. And this we know: " That *Perſes* upon his acceſſion to the throne was acknowledged King " by the *Romans*; that they renewed their league with him; and that " they afterwards ſent to him ambaſſadors who were kindly received. " To me theſe things ſeem tokens of peace, and not of war: nor do " I ſee how the *Romans* can be offended, if, as we followed their ſteps " in making war, we follow them likewiſe in making peace. Why the " *Achæans* alone are to carry on an *inexpiable* war againſt the *Macedo-* " *nians*, I do not comprehend. Our neighbours are in commerce with " *Perſes*; and nothing more is propoſed for the *Achæans*: No league, " no alliance, nothing but ſuch a correſpondence as common humanity " requires; nothing therefore that can juſtly offend the *Romans*. Why " then all this ſtir? Why do we diſtinguiſh ourſelves from our neigh- " bours? Is it to make them ſuſpected and hated, by our flattering the " *Romans* more than they? Should there be a war, *Perſes* himſelf does " not doubt but we ſhall ſide with *Rome*. In a time of peace, enmity, " if not wholly laid aſide, ſhould at leaſt be ſuſpended." Thoſe who had been pleaſed with the King's letter, greatly applauded this diſcourſe: Yet the *Roman* faction found a pretence to get the debate adjourned. They alledged, that *Perſes*, having ſent only a letter, and not an ambaſſador, had failed in the ceremonial. It ſurely was not natural, conſidering upon what terms the two ſtates had been for ſome time, that he ſhould ſend a miniſter, before it could be known that a miniſter would be received; yet ſince this was made an objection, *Perſes*, to remove it, diſpatched an ambaſſador to them in form. But now, the dread of *Rome* prevailing in the council, he was refuſed audience; and for this the *Achæans* were ſoon after highly commended by the *Romans*; who thereby diſcovered their hatred to *Perſes*, though hitherto he had given them no provocation [a].

Livy, B. 42. c. 46.

Val. Max. B. 3. c. 5. & B. 4. c. 5.

[a] This year a ſon of *Scipio Africanus* ſtood candidate for the Prætorſhip, and would have loſt his election, if the competitor *Cicereius*, who had been his father's ſecretary, had not, out of reſpect for the family, deſiſted from his pretenſion, and even uſed his intereſt for *Scipio*. After he was choſen, and that it fell to his lot to be Prætor *Peregrinus*, his relations perſuaded him to renounce the exerciſe of that office, as utterly unfit for it: nor did he ſit to pronounce one decree. They alſo prevailed with him to lay aſide a ring he wore, whereon was the head of his father, whom he diſgraced by his incapacity; and the Cenſors this year ſtruck his name out of the liſt of the Senators. Nevertheleſs *Cicero* ſpeaks of this *Scipio* as of a man of parts, though of an infirm habit of body. *Cic. de Senect. c.* 11. *& Brut. c.* 19.

The ſtreets of *Rome*, by order of the Cenſors, were this year paved for the firſt time. *Liv.* B. 41. *c.* 27.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

The report of ſome Roman *ambaſſadors who had been ſent to* Perſes.

The Senate order a new embaſſy to him.

The cruelty of the Conſul Popillius *towards a petty nation of* Liguria.

Eumenes *comes to* Rome *to accuſe* Perſes *of deſigns againſt the Republic.*

The ambaſſadors from Perſes *are ill received by the Senate.*

He employs aſſaſſins to murder Eumenes; *and is accuſed of deſigning other murders by poiſon.*

The Carthaginians *ſend to* Rome *complaints of* Maſiniſſa's *uſurpations.*

Some Roman *ambaſſadors report the ill reception they had met with from* Perſes.

THE three ambaſſadors, ſent into *Macedon*, returned to *Rome* (in the beginning of the Conſulſhip of *L. Poſthumius Albinus* and *M. Popillius Lænas*) complaining, "that they had not been able to obtain an audience of the King; it having been ſometimes pretended, "that he was abſent, ſometimes that he was ſick, and both falſely:" They added, "that he was undoubtedly preparing for war, and would "ſoon take the field." The Senate, not long after this report, reſolved to trouble *Perſes* with five more ambaſſadors; at the head of whom was *C. Valerius:* and theſe were from *Macedon* to go to *Alexandria* to renew a league of friendſhip with *Ptolemy*. A. of *R.* 580. Bef. *J. C.* 172. 279 Conſul-p. *Livy*, B. 42. c. 2. c. 6.

POPILLIUS the Conſul, without orders from the Senate, and without any provocation, led an army againſt the *Statelliates*, a people of *Liguria*, and came to a battle with them before the gates of their town called *Caryſtum*. He ſlew 10000 of the enemy, and took 700 priſoners, with the loſs of 3000 of his men. The vanquiſhed, having collected their ſcattered troops, found, that the number of the citizens loſt was greater than of thoſe which remained. They ſurrendered therefore, without making any conditions; never imagining that the Conſul would treat them worſe than former generals had treated their priſoners. Yet *Popillius* not only plundered the town, but demoliſhed it, and ſold the inhabitants for ſlaves. Of this proceeding he ſent an account to the Conſcript Fathers; who, being highly offended with it, decreed, that, returning the money to the purchaſers, he ſhould reſtore to the captives their liberty and effects; and c. 7.

then

then quit the province. *Popillius* would not obey; but, having put his army into winter quarters at *Piſa*, came home in as great wrath, ſays *Livy*, with the Fathers, as he had expreſſed againſt the *Ligurians*.

Y. of *R.* 581. Bef. *J. C.* 171. 280 Conſul p. When the faſces had been transferr'd to *P. Ælius Ligus* and *C. Popillius Lænas* (both Plebeians) *Ælius*, at the inſtigation of the Senate, would have revived the affair of the injury done to the *Ligurians*; but was turned aſide from his purpoſe by his collegue, the delinquent's brother, who threatned to oppoſe him and to render null whatever he ſhould do in that proceſs [b]. The Senate hereupon became ſo angry with both, that, though the war againſt *Macedon* was juſt on the point of being declared, they abſolutely refuſed them the conduct of it, nor would even grant them a decree to levy ſoldiers for the war in *Liguria*.

Liv. B. 42. c. 5. *Polyb.* Legat. 74. About this time *Eumenes* King of *Pergamus* came to *Rome*. Beſides his hereditary quarrel with the *Macedonian*, he had a particular hatred to him, on account of the great progreſs he made in the eſteem and affection of the *Greeks*; while his own reputation among them was every day decreaſing: In proof of which, the *Achæans* had lately abrogated, as extravagant and illegal, certain honours that had been decreed him in their country. *Eumenes* had doubtleſs learnt the intentions of the *Romans* with regard to *Perſes*, and would therefore not be backward in making his court to the Senate upon ſuch an occaſion; hoping perhaps to be rewarded with ſome part of the *Macedonian* kingdom, as he had, for his ſervice againſt *Antiochus*, obtained a good ſhare of that Prince's dominions.

Liv. B. 42. c. 11. The Senate received the King with great honours: and though he had little to ſay which they knew not before, yet they liſtened to him with the utmoſt attention, pondering all his words, as if the weight of them were to turn the balance that before was equal. He introduced his diſcourſe with ſaying, "That the cauſe of his journey to "*Rome* was (beſides the deſire of viſiting thoſe Gods and men, by "whoſe favour he enjoyed that fortune which had left him nothing "to wiſh for) that he might in perſon warn the Senate to prevent the "deſigns of the *Macedonian*." He then ſpoke of the murder of *Demetrius*, a Prince always averſe from a *Roman* war; *Philip*'s invitation of the *Baſtarnæ*, by whoſe help he was to have invaded *Italy*: The expedition of *Perſes* againſt the *Dolopians*: The eſteem which the *Greek* and *Aſiatic* cities had for him: "I do not ſee, ſaid *Eumenes*, for what "merit, what munificence of his, ſo much reſpect is paid him; nor can "I certainly tell, whether this be owing to the good fortune of *Perſes*, "or (which I am loth to ſay) to a hatred of the *Romans*. He is "in great authority even with the *Aſiatic* Kings. *Seleucus*, the ſon "and ſucceſſor of *Antiochus the Great*, has given him his daughter

[b] We find that juſtice was afterwards done to the *Statelliates*, but that *Popillius*, though proſecuted, eſcaped puniſhment, by the artifice of the Prætor who was to try him. *Liv. B.* 42. *c.* 22.

"*Laodice*

" *Laodice* in marriage: Yet *Perſes* did not aſk her; *Seleucus* offered Y. of *R.* 581.
" her. *Pruſias* King of *Bithynia* has by earneſt entreaties obtained, Bef. *J. C.* 171.
" for a wife, the ſiſter of *Perſes*; and theſe marriages have been ſo- 280 Conſul. p.
" lemnized with congratulations and preſents from numberleſs am-
" baſſadors. The *Bœotians*, who never could be brought to make a
" league with *Philip*, have made one with his ſon. The *Achæan* coun-
" cil, if a few friends of *Rome* had not oppoſed it, would have let him
" into *Achaia*. At the ſame time, they were putting affronts upon me,
" to whom they are more obliged than can well be expreſſed. And who
" does not know, that the *Ætolians*, in their domeſtic feuds and ſeditions,
" had recourſe for aſſiſtance, not to the *Romans*, but to *Perſes*? And
" without the ſupport of theſe aſſociations and friendſhips abroad, he
" has ſtrength enough at home for the war; 30000 foot, 5000 horſe,
" corn for ten years, that he may not be driven to live by ſpoil, or take
" from his own ſubjects; money enough (not to ſpeak of his mines)
" to pay 10000 mercenaries for ten years; arms ſufficient for three
" ſuch armies as he has now on foot[c]; the *Thracians* near at hand to
" ſupply him with as many recruits as he ſhall require."

The King added, " I have not taken up theſe things, Conſcript Fa-
" thers, upon uncertain report, nor given an eaſy credit to them, as
" wiſhing them to be true of an enemy: But I bring you accounts of
" what, by a thorough enquiry, I have diſcovered as certainly, as if
" you had employed me to be your ſpy, and I had ſeen them with my
" own eyes."

Eumenes proceeded to accuſe *Perſes* of ſome facts which might either be denied or juſtified; as that he had procured the death of certain perſons, friends to the *Romans*; dethroned *Abrupolis*, a petty King of *Illyricum*, who had invaded *Macedon*; given aſſiſtance to the *Byzantines*, contrary to the treaty with *Rome*; made war upon the *Dolopians*; and led an army through *Theſſaly* and *Doris*.

He concluded thus: " Since you, Conſcript Fathers, have quietly and
" patiently born theſe things, and the *Macedonian* fees, that you have
" abandoned *Greece* to him, he is very ſure, that he ſhall meet with no
" army to oppoſe him, before he paſſes into *Italy*. How ſafe or how
" honourable for you this may be, you are the beſt judges. As for
" me, I ſhould have been aſhamed, if *Perſes* had got the ſtart of me,
" and had brought the war hither, before I had come to give you no-
" tice of the danger[d]."

[c] This army and theſe ſtores were left to *Perſes* by his father.

[d] Though *Livy* (*B.* 42. c 5.) ſays very fine things of *Eumenes* (in comparing him with *Perſes*) and tells us, that the cities, under his domination, were ſo happy that they would not change condition with any free cities; yet one cannot help thinking that, by this ſpeech, which he has put into the King's mouth, he intended to ſhew him in a ridiculous light.

In

Y. of *R.* 581. Bef. *J.C.* 171. 280 Conſul. p Sir *W. R.*

It would be very fooliſh to imagine that the Senate ſtood in fear of *Perſes*'s invading *Italy*. Nevertheleſs, as they always ſought plauſible pretences for their wars; and as they could find none at preſent, they took advantage of this viſit from *Eumenes* to make it believed, that he had given them ſome intelligence of the greateſt importance to their preſervation; and ſuch as would juſtify their attacking *Macedon*. To induce this belief, it was neceſſary to make a profound ſecret of all that the King had ſaid; becauſe it amounted to no more than what every body knew from the report of the *Roman* ambaſſadors. And had the Fathers, upon ſuch report, or tales invented by flatterers and ſpies, commenced a war againſt *Perſes*, the injuſtice and oppreſſion would have been manifeſt to all the world. But when the danger threatning them was ſo terrible, that ſuch a Prince as *Eumenes* came out of his own kingdom, as far as from *Aſia*, to bid them look to themſelves; who could blame them, if they took the ſpeedieſt meaſures for their own ſecurity? This imminent danger their affected ſecrecy would help to magnify in the imagination of the public. Not a word therefore of what the King had ſaid tranſpired. It was only known, for the preſent, that he had been in the ſenate houſe. The reſt, ſays *Livy*, did not come out till the war was over.

Livy, B. 42. c. 14.

After a few days, the Senate gave audience to *Perſes*'s ambaſſadors; but, being predetermined, would neither admit their defence, nor have regard to their deprecation. Whereupon *Harpalus*, chief of the embaſſy, ſaid, "The King earneſtly wiſhes, that you would believe him, "when he declares, That neither by words nor actions has he given "you any cauſe to look upon him as your enemy: but if he finds, that "you are ſeeking a pretence of quarrel with him, he will not want cou- "rage to defend himſelf. The chance of war is equal, and the event "uncertain."

The cities of *Greece* and *Aſia*, anxious to know what *Eumenes*'s journey to *Rome* and the *Macedonian* embaſſy would produce, had ſent deputies thither under various pretexts. The *Rhodians*, in particular, did not doubt but the King of *Pergamus* would give them a ſhare in whatever crimes he ſhould think proper to charge upon *Perſes*. *Satyrus*, chief of the embaſſy from *Rhodes*, uſed therefore all his intereſt with the Senators of his acquaintance to get an opportunity of being heard againſt *Eumenes:* which when he had obtained, he, with great acrimony, accuſed him not only of having ſtirred up the *Lycians*, their ſubjects, to a revolt, but of being more oppreſſive to *Aſia* than ever *Antiochus* had been. Such diſcourſe, though agreeable to the *Aſiatic* cities, (for they alſo favoured *Perſes*) was diſpleaſing to the Senate, and of no benefit to the *Rhodians*. The Fathers favoured *Eumenes* the more for the combination formed againſt him: they loaded him with honours and preſents.

Harpalus,

Harpalus, returning into *Macedon* with all poſſible diligence, told his maſter, that he had left the *Romans*, not indeed making preparations for war, but ſo ill diſpoſed, that unqueſtionably they would not defer it long. The King, fully convinced that he ſhould ſoon be attacked, laid a plot to begin the war, with ſpilling the blood of *Eumenes*, the man whom of all men he moſt hated. It was known that the *Pergamenian*, in returning home, would take *Delphi* in his way, intending a ſacrifice to *Apollo*. *Perſes*, for the aſſaſſination, employed a certain *Cretan* named *Evander* (General of his auxiliaries) and three *Macedonians* (men of experience in ſuch enterpriſes) who placing themſelves behind a ruined wall, that hung over a hollow way, ſo narrow, that only one could paſs at a time, there waited the coming of the King and his retinue. *Pantaleon*, an *Ætolian* chief, walked foremoſt; *Eumenes* followed: juſt as he came under the wall, the ruffians rolled down two ſtones of a huge ſize, one of which lighting on his head, the other on his ſhoulder, he was ſtruck to the ground; where a ſhower of ſmaller ſtones came pouring upon him and overwhelmed him. The aſſaſſins, imagining their buſineſs effected, made all haſte to get away; and one of them not being able to keep pace with the reſt, his companions ſlew him, to prevent a diſcovery. Y. of *R.* 581. Bef. *J. C.* 171. 280 Conſul-p.

Upon ſeeing the King fall, his attendants, except *Pantaleon*, had all fled away in a fright. Running now together again, they took him up ſenſeleſs; ſtill warm, however, and breathing. After a ſhort time he came to himſelf; and the next day they put him on board his ſhip, which conveyed him firſt to *Corinth*, and thence to the iſland of *Ægina*. Here he was cured, but, during his recovery, was kept ſo ſecretly, that fame, throughout all *Aſia*, confidently reported him dead. *Attalus* believ'd it ſooner than became the brotherly affection that had always remarkably ſubſiſted between them; for (as *Livy* adds) thinking himſelf now the undoubted inheritor of the kingdom, he *diſcourſed* with his brother's wife and the Governor of the citadel of *Pergamus*. Of this *Eumenes* had private information, yet, when he returned ſafe home, all the reproof which *Attalus* received from him, at their meeting, was a whiſper, *to forbear marrying the* Queen *till he were well aſſured of the* King*'s death*. *Plut.* in *Apophth.*

While the rumour of the *Pergamenian*'s being aſſaſſinated was yet freſh at *Rome*, *Valerius*, head of the laſt embaſſy into *Macedon* and *Greece*, returned home, and brought with him *Praxo*, a woman of great diſtinction at *Delphi*, to whom *Perſes* had, by letter, recommended the aſſaſſins, to be by her entertained. He produced alſo one *Rammius*, a citizen of *Brunduſium*, at whoſe houſe all the generals and *Roman* ambaſſadors, as well as the King's miniſters, uſed to lodge, in their journeys to and from *Italy*. This man declared, that being lately at the *Macedonian* court, he had been there tampered with to poiſon ſuch of his gueſts as the King ſhould occaſionally name to him. *Liv.* B. 42. c. 17.

Y. of *R.* 581. Bef. *J. C.* 171. 280 Conſul-p. Theſe ſtories, true or falſe, obtained eaſy belief at *Rome:* They ſerved to ſwell the account of *Perſes*'s crimes, and make appear more fully the juſtice and neceſſity of a *Macedonian* war. The Senate being diſſatisfied, for the reaſons formerly mentioned, with the preſent Conſuls, commiſſioned *Sicinnius*, the Prætor *Peregrinus*, to paſs with an army into *Epirus*, and there continue till a ſucceſſor ſhould arrive.

c. 23. ABOUT this time came ambaſſadors from the *Carthaginians* with a new complaint againſt *Maſiniſſa*. He had been encroaching upon them ever ſince their defeat at *Zama*. How he took from them the country of *Emporia* has been already mentioned *. This uſurpation was followed by another. *Gala*, the father of *Maſiniſſa*, had conquered ſome lands from the *Carthaginians*, which afterwards *Syphax* conquered from *Gala*, and reſtored to the firſt owners, out of love to his wife *Sophoniſba*, the daughter of *Aſdrubal*. Upon theſe lands the *Numidian* ſeized; and, by *Roman* arbitration, was permitted quietly to poſſeſs them: an injury which the *Carthaginians* had ſcarcely digeſted, when *Maſiniſſa* came upon them again, and took from them above 70 towns and caſtles without any colour of right. It was of this that the preſent ambaſſadors complained. They repreſented the grievous oppreſſion which *Carthage* laboured under by reaſon of thoſe articles in her treaty with the *Romans*, which reſtrained her from making war, out of her own territory, or againſt any confederate of *Rome*. "Now (ſaid they) although the "towns and caſtles lately ſeized by *Maſiniſſa* are unqueſtionably within "our territory, and therefore the driving him thence would be only "a defenſive war; yet, as he is a confederate of *Rome*, we fear even "to defend ourſelves againſt him, without your permiſſion. We beg "therefore, that *Carthage* may either have juſtice by arbitration, or be "ſuffered to defend herſelf by force of arms; or at leaſt (if favour muſt "prevail over truth) that you would be pleaſed to determine, once for "all, what part of her dominions ſhe ſhall give up to *Maſiniſſa*. If "none of theſe requeſts can be obtained, we then deſire, that you will "let us know in what we have offended, ſince the time that *Scipio* "granted us peace, and vouchſafe to puniſh us yourſelves in ſuch man-"ner as you ſhall think proper. It would be better for the *Carthagi-"nians*, and more agreeable to them, to live ſlaves to the *Romans* in "ſafety, than to be free, but continually expoſed to the oppreſſions of "*Maſiniſſa:* We had rather periſh at once than draw our breath at the "mercy of that *Numidian* hangman." This ſaid, the ambaſſadors threw themſelves proſtrate on the ground.

* See p. 340. *Livy* B. 40. c. 17. B. 42. c. 23.

Guluſſa, the ſon of *Maſiniſſa* being preſent, the Senate aſked him what anſwer he could make to theſe complaints. He ſaid, "That his "father had given him no inſtructions relating thereto; that neither "could he well have given any, the *Carthaginians* not having im-"parted to him the ſubject of their embaſſy, nor even their intention "of

" of ſending an embaſſy to *Rome*. It was indeed known, that they V. of *R.* 581.
" had of late held ſecret councils by night, in the temple of *Æſcula-* Bef. *J. C.* 171.
" *pius*, and diſpatched ambaſſadors to the Senate; for which reaſon his 280 Conſul-p.
" father had ſent him to entreat them not to give credit to the accuſa-
" tions of their common enemy, who hated *Maſiniſſa* for no other
" reaſon but his conſtant fidelity to the *Roman* people." The Senate replied, " That they had done, and would do, whatever they could
" to honour *Maſiniſſa*; but that juſtice muſt not give place to favour;
" and that it was not conſiſtent with their equity to countenance him
" in taking from the *Carthaginians* any lands, which by their treaty they
" were quietly to enjoy." With this mild reproof they diſmiſſed *Guluſſa*, making him the uſual preſents (as they did alſo to the *Carthaginians*) and bidding him tell his father that they expected he ſhould ſend ambaſſadors more fully inſtructed in this affair.

About the ſame time, three ambaſſadors, of which *Cn. Servilius* c. 25.
Cæpio was chief, returned from *Macedon* to *Rome*. They had been ſent to demand ſatisfaction for the wrongs which *Perſes* had done, (meaning thoſe pretended injuſtices about which *Eumenes* had harangued in the Senate) and, in caſe of refuſal, to renounce friendſhip with him in the name of the Republic. Their report was, " That they had ſeen
" mighty preparations for war in all the towns of *Macedon*; that they
" had long waited in vain for an audience of the King; and at length
" in deſpair of obtaining it, had ſet out to return home: that then
" they were called back, and introduced to him. That they put him in
" mind of the league made with his father, and renewed with himſelf:
" by which he was expreſsly reſtrained from making war out of his own
" Dominions[c]; or againſt any ſtate in alliance with *Rome*. That they

[c] In the form of the treaty between *Philip* and the *Romans*, as it is given by *Polybius*, we find no condition forbidding the King to make war abroad, without leave of the Republic. But *Livy* inſerts a clauſe to that effect.

It is likely (ſays Sir *W. R.**) that all the *Roman* confederates were included in this peace, whereby every one of the neighbours round about *Macedon*, entering ſhortly into league with *Rome*, did ſo bind the King's hands, that he could no more make war abroad, than if he had been reſtrained by plain covenant. And thus might that ſeem an article of the peace, which never was agreed upon, but only was inferred by conſequence. Now if the *Romans* would urge this point further, and ſay, that the *Macedonian* might not bear *defenſive* arms without their permiſſion; then had *Perſes* very juſt reaſon to find himſelf aggrieved. For ſince they had allowed his father, without control, to make war in *Thrace* (whilſt they themſelves were unacquainted with the *Thracians*) and elſewhere abroad, though he aſked not their licence; why ſhould they now interpret the bargain after another faſhion? Was it now become unlawful for him to chaſtiſe his own rebels; or to repay an *Illyrian* that invaded *Macedon*? by ſuch allegations *Perſes* maintained the right of his cauſe in very mild ſort when it was too late. At the preſent by diſclaiming the league as unjuſt [if after all, it be true that he did ſo] he miniſtered occaſion to the ambaſſadors to give him defiance.

* Hiſt. of the World, B. 5. c. 6. §. 5.

Y. of *R.* 581. Bef. *J. C.* 171. 280 Conſul-p. " had rehearſed to him all the facts ſpoken of by the King of *Perga-*
" *mus* (they themſelves having found them to be true;) that they had
" beſides, mentioned ſome private conferences he had held, for ſeveral
" days, in the iſland of *Samothrace*, with ambaſſadors from the cities
" of *Aſia*. And laſtly, that in the name of the Senate they had de-
" manded ſatisfaction for theſe injuries.

" Hereupon, ſaid they, the King broke out into a paſſion, fre-
" quently calling the *Romans* avaricious and proud, who thought it
" fitting that he ſhould regulate all his words and actions at the nod of
" their *daily* ambaſſadors, with whom they peſtered him, and who were
" no better than mere ſpies. After he had talked loudly and long in
" this ſtrain, he ordered us to come again the day following, when he
" would give us, he ſaid, an anſwer in writing. He did ſo; and it
" was to this effect. *That he had nothing to do with the treaty made with*
" *his father: that he had renewed it, not becauſe he approved of it, but*
" *becauſe, upon his firſt acceſſion to the kingdom, he was obliged to bear with*
" *every thing. That if the* Romans *would make a new treaty with him,*
" *it muſt be upon equal terms; and he would then conſider what his intereſt*
" *required; as they, he doubted not, would take care of theirs.* As ſoon
" as he had delivered us this writing, he flung away, and while they
" were making us withdraw, we declared, *That we renounced his friend-*
" *ſhip and alliance.* The King, in wrath, turned back, and raiſing his
" voice, ordered us to leave his kingdom in three days. We came
" away; having neither at our arrival, nor while we continued at his
" court, received any mark of hoſpitality or civility."

CHAP. XVI.

The ſecond *Macedonian* War.

FIRST YEAR of the War.

The diſpoſition of the Greek *and* Aſiatic *States at this time.*

The levies at Rome *for the war. The ſpeech of a Centurion on this occaſion.*

Perſes *ſues in vain to the Senate for peace.*

A conference between him and Marcius *a* Roman *ambaſſador in* Theſſaly.

The King makes another fruitleſs attempt to obtain peace.

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p. WHEN the people of *Rome*, upon a motion by the Conſuls, *P. Licinius Craſſus* and *C. Caſſius Longinus*, decreed war againſt *Perſes*, the Republic had few open enemies, and no real friends.

After

After the victory over *Antiochus*, although *Macedon*, *Pergamus*, the commonwealth of the *Achæans*, and all the other States of *Greece* were governed by the ſame laws and magiſtrates as before the *Romans* came among them, and made *alliances* with them; yet the people which *Rome* had ſubdued to *her* laws and magiſtrates, were not more really her vaſſals, than the Kings and nations which ſhe called her *allies*. For, by her ambaſſadors abroad, or the decrees of her Senate at home, ſhe exerciſed ſuch an empire over thoſe allies, that no laws made by them could take place, if ſhe interpoſed her will to the contrary. Nor was their election of magiſtrates ſo free as not to be influenced by the good pleaſure of the overbearing Republic. Add to this, that ſhe had aſſumed to herſelf the right of deciding all quarrels between her allies; and had made it a part of her policy not to ſuffer, without reproof, and ſometimes menaces, any of her friends to take arms, even in their own defence, before they had conſulted the oracle at *Rome*. Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul p.

This method of proceeding, whatever interpretation was put upon it by ſuch as were actuated by private intereſt or fear, could not but be very grating to all generous and free ſpirits. The *Greek* States began now univerſally to apprehend the evil which *Philopœmen* had foretold; the miſerable ſubjection to which *Greece* would be reduced by the *Roman* patronage. It was ſo evident both to theſe States and to the bordering Kings, or became ſoon ſo evident, that the view of *Rome* was to reduce *Macedon* to the condition of a *Roman* province, which would make her their near and moſt dangerous neighbour, that if we may believe *Polybius*, *Perſes*, for a very moderate ſum of money well applied, might have brought all thoſe States, and all or moſt of thoſe Kings, to have eſpouſed his cauſe[a]. Of this the Hiſtorian is ſo poſitive, that he ſays no wiſe man will diſpute it with him. And ſome events which happened in the courſe of the war, will ſhew this opinion not to have been ill founded. We ſhall find that even *Eumenes* had not always that anxiety for the welfare of *Rome* which he expreſſed in his late ſpeech to the Senate. At preſent however, not only he, but the Kings of *Syria*, *Egypt*, and *Cappadocia*, offered their aſſiſtance to the *Romans*. The laſt of the three ſent his ſon to be educated at *Rome*. *Pruſias*, King of *Bithynia*, though married to a ſiſter of *Perſes*, obſerved an exact neutrality: the *Greeks* durſt not refuſe their aid: *Carthage* was in ſlavery to *Rome*. *Maſiniſſa* lent his aſſiſtance: for he judged, ſays *Livy*, that ſhould the *Romans* prove conquerors, his affairs would remain in their preſent ſituation; ſhould they be vanquiſhed, he doubted not to become maſter of all *Africa*. On the other hand, *Perſes* had no aſſociate but *Cotys* King of the *Odryſians* in *Thrace*. *Gentius*, a King of *Illyricum*, was indeed ſuſpected at *Rome* of being in the *Macedonian* intereſt, but he had not yet openly declared for either ſide. Legat. 77. *Livy*, B. 42. c. 29.

[a] *Polybius* ſeems to ſpeak of the time when *Perſes*'s arms having proſpered for two years together, his affairs had a promiſing aſpect.

After-

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p. c. 35.

After the people of *Rome* had voted the war, the Conſcript Fathers regulated the levies for the year. They appointed *Sulpicius Galba*, the Prætor *Urbanus*, to raiſe four *Roman* legions, 15,000 foot, and 1200 horſe of the allies; the legions to be commanded by four Tribunes, choſen from among the Senators. This army was to be in readineſs to

c. 31. & ſeq.

march whither the Fathers ſhould direct. One of the Conſuls was to have, for the defence of *Italy*, two legions of 5000 foot and 200 horſe each; and of the allies 12000 foot and 600 horſe. To the Conſul, who ſhould go into *Macedon*, the Senate aſſigned two legions, of 6000 foot and 300 horſe each; and 16000 foot and 800 horſe of the *Italian* confederates. They granted him alſo the privilege of chuſing whom he pleaſed of the *Veteran* ſoldiers and Centurions, that were under fifty years old, though the law obliged no man above forty five to ſerve in the army. The people on this occaſion waved their right of naming a certain number of the legionary Tribunes, and left the choice of them to the Conſuls and Prætors.

Macedon fell by lot to *Licinius*, and *Italy* to *Caſſius*. They carried on the levies with extraordinary rigour; yet many preſented themſelves voluntarily to *Licinius*, knowing that the ſoldiers, who had ſerved in the firſt *Macedonian* war, and in the war againſt *Antiochus*, had returned home rich. But when his legionary Tribunes were appointing the Centurions, twenty three of thoſe who were called upon to ſerve, and who had been *Primipiles*, or firſt Centurions of the Triarii, refuſed to enliſt themſelves, and appealed to the Tribunes of the Commons. Two of the college would have referred the matter to the Conſuls, but the other eight were for taking cognizance of it themſelves, and righting the appellants if aggrieved. At the deſire of *Licinius* the affair was brought before the people. *M. Popillius*, who had been Conſul two years before, appeared as advocate for the Centurions. He ſaid, that the *Veterans* had ſerved the legal time, and were worn out with age and the fatigues of war; that nevertheleſs they did not refuſe to give the remainder of their ſtrength to the Republic; they only deſired that they might not be placed in a lower rank than what they had laſt held in the army. *Licinius* ordered the decree of the Senate to be read: it imported, that war ſhould be commenced againſt *Perſes*, and that as many as poſſible of the *Veteran* Centurions ſhould be enrolled for that war, exempting none under fifty years old. He then entreated the people that, in the preſent caſe of a war ſo near *Italy*, and againſt ſo powerful a King, they would not obſtruct the levies, nor hinder the Conſul from ſo placing every man as was moſt for the benefit of the Republic; or at leaſt that they would refer the matter to the Senate. *Licinius* having ended, one of the twenty three appellants aſked permiſſion of the Conſul and the Tribunes to ſpeak a few words to the people. This being granted, he ſaid, "My name, *Romans*, is *Sp. Liguſtinus*, I am of the *Cruſtu-*
"*minian* tribe, and of *Sabine* extraction. My father left me an acre of

" ground, and a little cottage, in which I was born and bred, and in " which I now dwell. As ſoon as I was of an age to marry, my father " gave me to wife his brother's daughter. I had no fortune with her, " but ſhe was free born, chaſte, and an excellent breeder; a richer man " would not deſire a better. We have ſix ſons and two daughters: " the girls are married; four of my ſons are men grown. I was liſted " a ſoldier for the firſt time in the Conſulſhip of *P. Sulpicius* and *C. Au-* " *relius:* I ſerved two years, a private man, in the army that went into " *Macedon* againſt King *Philip*. The third year *T. Quinctius Flamininus*, " in reward of my courage, made me a Centurion of the tenth *Order* " of the Haſtati [b]. *Philip* being vanquiſhed, we returned to *Rome*, and " were diſbanded. Preſently after I went a volunteer with the Conſul " *M. Porcius* into *Spain*. Thoſe who have ſerved under him and other " Generals well know, that there is not a more nice obſerver, or more " critical judge of military virtue than he. This General thought me " worthy of the poſt of firſt Centurion of the Haſtati. After this " I entered a volunteer in that army which was ſent againſt the " *Ætolians* and King *Antiochus*. I was then by *M. Acilius* made " firſt Centurion of the Principes. *Antiochus* being driven out of " *Greece*, and the *Ætolians* ſubdued, we were brought back into *Italy*; and

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p.

[b] We cannot have a tolerable notion of the CENTURIONS, without remembring, that every one of the thirty *Manipuli* in a legion was divided into two *Ordines* or ranks; and conſequently the three bodies of the *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* into twenty *Orders* a-piece, as into ten *Manipuli*. Now every *Manipulus* was allow'd two *Centurions*, or captains, one to each *Order* or *Century:* And to determine the point of priority between them, they were created at two different elections. The *Thirty* who were made firſt always took the precedency of their Fellows; and therefore commanded the right hand orders, as the others did the left.

The *Triarii* or *Pilani* [ſo called from their weapon, the *Pilum*] being eſteem'd the moſt honourable, had their CENTURIONS elected firſt; next to them the *Principes*, and afterwards the *Haſtati*; whence they were called *Primus & Secundus Pilus*, *Primus & Secundus Princeps*, *Primus & Secundus Haſtatus*; and ſo on.

Here it may be obſerved, That *Primi Ordines* is uſed ſometimes in hiſtorians, for the CENTURIONS of thoſe orders; and the ſame *Centurions* are ſometimes ſtyl'd *Principes Ordinum*, and *Principes Centurionum*.

We may take notice too, what a large field there lay for promotion; firſt through all the orders of the Haſtati, then quite through the Principes, and afterwards from the laſt order of the Triarii to the Primipilus, the moſt honourable of the Centurions, and who deſerves to be particularly deſcribed. This officer, beſides his name of *Primipilus*, went under the ſeveral titles of *Dux Legionis*, *Præfectus Legionis*, *Primus Centurionum*, and *Primus Centurio*; and was the firſt Centurion of the Triarii in every legion. He preſided over all the other Centurions, and generally gave the word of command by order of the Tribunes. Beſides this, he had the care of the eagle, or chief ſtandard of the legion: Hence *Aquilæ præeſſe* is to bear the dignity of *Primipilus*; and hence *Aquila* is taken by *Pliny* for the ſaid office. Nor was this ſtation only honourable, but very profitable too; for he had a ſpecial ſtipend allowed him, probably as much as a knight's eſtate; and when he left that charge, was reputed equal to the members of the Equeſtrian order, bearing the title of *Primipilarius*, in the ſame manner as thoſe, who had diſcharged the greateſt civil offices, were ſtiled ever after Conſulares, Cenſorii, *&c. Kennet. Anti.* B. 4. *c.* 7.

" here

V. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p

" here I ſerved in two campaigns, ſuch as the Legions then made every " year. Afterwards I ſerved twice in *Spain*; the firſt time under " *Fulvius Flaccus*; the ſecond under the Prætor *Tib. Sempronius Grac-* " *chus.* I was amongſt thoſe whom, for their bravery, *Flaccus* diſtin- " guiſhed by bringing them home to aſſiſt at his triumph; and I returned " into the ſame province at the deſire of *Tiberius Gracchus.* In the ſpace " of a few years I was four times firſt Centurion of the Triarii. I have " received 34 military rewards from my Generals; and among theſe " ſix Civic crowns. I have made two and twenty campaigns, and " am paſt fifty years old. But had I not ſerved my full time, and if " my age did not exempt me, yet, *P. Licinius*, as I can furniſh you " four ſoldiers inſtead of one, it is but reaſonable I ſhould be excuſed " from ſerving any more. But I ſay all this only to ſhew the juſtice of " my cauſe. So long as I am judged fit to bear arms, I ſhall never ſeek " to decline it. Let the Legionary Tribunes place me in the poſt for " which they think me proper. It ſhall be my care that no ſoldier in " the army ſurpaſs me in bravery: That this has always been my care, " the Generals under whom I have made my campaigns can teſtify. And " you, fellow ſoldiers, though you have appealed, and your appeal " be well founded, yet, as in your younger days you never did any " thing againſt the authority of the Magiſtrates and Senate; you will " now, I am perſuaded, think it right to let yourſelves be diſpoſed of as " they judge convenient; and eſteem every poſt honourable in which you " can contribute to the defence and preſervation of the Republic."

The Conſul, after highly praiſing *Liguſtinus*'s virtue, took him to the Senate-houſe, where he received the thanks of the Conſcript Fathers. And the Tribunes of the ſoldiers, as a reward of his merit, declared him firſt Centurion of the firſt legion. The other appellants, following his example, deſiſted from their appeal; ſo that the levies went on without farther oppoſition.

Beſides the forces abovementioned, as deſtined for *Macedon*, were granted, at the requeſt of *Licinius*, 2000 *Ligurians* and a certain number of *Cretan* archers. The Senate alſo aſked of *Maſiniſſa* a body of *Numidian* horſe and ſome elephants.

A. 36. About this time ambaſſadors came from *Perſes*. They were not allowed to enter the city, becauſe war had been already declared againſt their maſter. Being admitted to audience in the temple of *Bellona*, they ſaid, " That the King wondered why the *Romans* had tranſported an " army into his neighbourhood; that if the Senate could be prevailed " upon to recal it, he was ready, at their determination, to make ſa- " tisfaction for any injuries, they ſhould think, he had done to their " allies." The army the ambaſſadors ſpoke of was that under the Prætor *Cn. Sicinnius*, who with 5000 foot and 300 horſe lay encamped near *Apollonia*. *Sicinnius* had ſent *Sp. Carvilius* to *Rome* to confront the *Macedonian* miniſters in the Senate. When *Carvilius* had accuſed *Perſes* of

ſome uſurpations upon the neighbouring ſtates, and of ſeveral other facts which he pretended the king had done or was preparing to do; the ambaſſadors were aſked what they had to ſay in their maſter's juſtification. They anſwered, that they had no further commiſſion than what they had delivered: whereupon they were bid to tell the King, that if he had a mind to give ſatisfaction, he might treat with the Conſul *P. Licinius*, who would ſhortly be in *Macedon* with an army; but that it was to no purpoſe to think of ſending more ambaſſadors to the ſenate, for they would not be ſuffered to paſs through *Italy*. With this anſwer the Fathers diſmiſſed the *Macedonians*, and ordered them to leave *Italy* in eleven days. Shortly after, the Senate diſpatched five of their body, *L. Decimius*, *Q. Marcius Philippus*, *A. Atilius*, and two of the *Cornelian* family, to viſit *Greece* and the neighbouring countries. Attended by a thouſand ſoldiers they landed at *Corcyra*; whither letters came to them from *Perſes*, aſking, *for what reaſon the* Romans *had ſent forces into* Greece, *and were taking poſſeſſion of the towns?* They would return him no anſwer in writing, but told the meſſenger who brought the letters, *that what the* Romans *did was for the defence of the* Greek *cities*.

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p.

Liv. B. 42. c. 37.

And now the ambaſſadors ſeparating, *L. Decimius* repaired to *Gentius* of *Illyricum*, to perſuade him, if poſſible, to take part with the Republic in the war. He had no ſucceſs; and even fell under a ſuſpicion at his return to *Rome*, of having received bribes from the *Illyrian* King.

The *Cornelii* made a progreſs through *Peloponneſus*, exhorting the ſeveral ſtates of that country to aſſiſt *Rome* againſt *Perſes*, with the ſame alacrity and faithfulneſs as in the wars againſt *Philip* and *Antiochus*. Though the *Romans* employed gentle words and the ſoft ſtile of perſuaſion, the *Greeks* were now ſo well acquainted with *Roman* courteſy, that without heſitation they promiſed their ready aid[c]; for though not

[c] Sir *W. Raleigh* thinks that this ready compliance of the *Greeks* to the will of the *Romans* may juſtly be imputed to the timorous conduct of *Perſes*, who, as we have ſeen, no ſooner learnt that a ſmall body of *Roman* ſoldiers were landed in *Epirus*, than he ſued to the Senate for peace. "Since therefore it was known that a very "ſmall thing would ſerve to terrify him, "and conſequently that it would at all "times be in the power of the *Romans*, by "giving him any tolerable conditions of "peace, to take revenge at leiſure upon "thoſe who had aſſiſted him; little cauſe "was there why any ſhould adventure to "partake with him." May not the conduct of the *Macedonian*, which Sir *Walter* ſtiles timorous, have been the effect of juſt policy? For as the King ſaw plainly that the *Romans* were determined to attack him; could he do any thing wiſer, even in the view of defending himſelf in the beſt manner, than, by offers of ſatisfaction for injuries complained of, to make it evident to all the world, that the war was unneceſſary, and therefore unjuſt, on the part of the *Romans?* We ſhall find that he took great pains to convince all the neighbouring ſtates of this truth, that he might thereby induce them to ſide with him. It is to be obſerved, that no one part of *Perſes*'s conduct does in any degree ſuit with that violent and brutal behaviour which, by the report of *Servilius Cæpio* and his collegues *, he uſed towards them: There may be room therefore to doubt the truth of that report, at leaſt we may well ſuſpect that they gave him ſufficient provocation by their inſolent manner of treating him.

* See p. 403, 404.

Y. of *R.* 582 Bef *J.C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p

only the bulk of the people, but alſo the wiſeſt and beſt men, who had nothing in view but the good of their country, wiſhed ſucceſs to *Perſes*; yet doubtleſs fear got the better of their inclinations.

Q. Marcius and *A. Atilius* went into *Epirus*, *Ætolia* and *Theſſaly*, to fix the people of thoſe countries in the intereſt of *Rome*. While the two *Romans* were at *Lariſſa*, *Perſes* ſent to aſk an interview with *Marcius*. The ambaſſadors, according to their inſtructions, prefaced the requeſt with mentioning, that *Marcius*'s father had formerly been the gueſt and friend of king *Philip*. *Marcius* anſwered, *that he had often heard his father ſpeak of that friendſhip, and was far from having forgot it when he undertook his preſent commiſſion; and that as ſoon as poſſible, he and his collegue would meet the King at the river* Peneus, *near* Dium.

Perſes was much pleaſed with *Marcius*'s inſinuation, that he had come into *Greece* with a view to ſerve him, and began to entertain hope of an accommodation. Soon after, a day being appointed for the conference, they both came to the banks of the *Peneus*. The queſtion now was, which of them ſhould paſs the river. *Perſes* claimed the compliment, on account of his royal dignity; *Marcius* thought it due to the majeſty of the *Roman* name: beſides, the King had aſked the conference. The ambaſſador put an end to the diſpute by a dull jeſt, which his bearing the ſurname of *Philip* furniſhed him with; *Let the younger*, ſaid he, *come to the elder*; *the ſon to the father*. The King eaſily ſuffered himſelf to be perſuaded; but then he was for croſſing with all his retinue: To this *Marcius* objected, inſiſting, that he ſhould come with only three attendants, or elſe give hoſtages: Not that the *Roman* ſuſpected any treachery, ſays *Livy*, but that the deputies from the ſeveral cities (of whom there was a great concourſe at the interview) might ſee the ſuperiority of the Republic to the King of *Macedon*. *Perſes* gave hoſtages, and, with all his train of attendants, paſſed over to *Marcius*. They ſaluted each other, not as enemies meeting to parly, but like familiar friends. When both were ſeated, *Marcius*, after a ſhort pauſe, broke ſilence.

Liv. B. 42. c. 40.

" I believe you expect that I ſhould anſwer the letter you ſent to us at " *Corcyra*, in which you aſk, why we, who are ambaſſadors, come attend- " ed with ſoldiers, and put gariſons into ſeveral towns. Not to anſwer " your queſtion would perhaps look like pride; and the proper anſwer, " I fear, you may think too harſh. But ſince he who breaks a league " ſhould be made ſenſible of his error, either by words or by arms; I, " who had rather the commiſſion to make war againſt you, ſhould be " given to any body than to me, ſhall take upon me the diſagreeable taſk " of reproving my friend. The Senate think, that, ſince your acceſſion to " the throne, you have done but one thing which you ought to have done; " *the ſending ambaſſadors to renew the league:* And yet they judge that it " would have been better not to renew it, than to renew it, and after- " wards break it. *Abrupolis*, a friend and ally of the *Roman* people, " you have driven from his kingdom: The murderers of *Artetaurus*

" (of all the *Illyrian* Kings the moſt faithful to *Rome*) you received Y. of *R.* 582.
" into your protection; thereby ſhewing (to ſay nothing worſe) that Bef. *J. C.* 170.
" you rejoiced at the murder. You went with an army through *Theſſaly* 281 Conſul. p.
" and *Malæa* to *Delphi*, contrary to our treaty: In violation of the ſame
" treaty you ſent ſuccours to the *Byzantines*. You ſecretly made a
" league with the *Bœotians*, our allies, which you ought not to have
" done. *Everſa* and *Callicritus*, the *Theban* ambaſſadors, who were
" coming from us—I would rather *aſk*, who killed them, than accuſe
" any body of the crime. The inteſtine war in *Ætolia*, and the
" ſlaughter of the chief men there—By whom but your agents can
" theſe be ſuppoſed to have been effected? In perſon you invaded the
" *Dolopians*, oppreſſing them with the ravages of war. *Eumenes*, re-
" turning from *Rome* into his kingdom, was almoſt ſlain as a victim be-
" fore the altars at *Delphi*——I am loth to mention the perſon whom
" he accuſes. I know you have had an account, by letters from *Rome*,
" and by your ambaſſadors, of the diſcovery, which *Rammius* of
" *Brunduſium* made to us, of certain ſecret machinations. The only
" way to have avoided hearing theſe things from me, was, not to have
" aſked why the *Romans* ſend an army into *Macedon*, or why they
" gariſon the cities of their allies. My remembrance of the friendſhip
" between our fathers inclines me to lend a partial ear to what you can
" ſay in your juſtification; and I wiſh you may furniſh me with argu-
" ments to plead your cauſe in the Senate."

To this the King. " I have a cauſe unqueſtionably good if I had
" impartial judges; but I am to plead it before thoſe who are both my
" judges and accuſers. Of the things objected to me, ſome I have per-
" haps reaſon to glory in; ſome I need not be aſhamed to own; and
" others, as they are only aſſerted, not proved, they will be ſufficiently
" confuted by a bare denial. If I were this day to be try'd by your
" laws, what could the informer *Rammius*, or *Eumenes* alledge againſt
" me, that would not be deemed rather ſlander than truth? Had *Eu-*
" *menes*, who ſo heavily oppreſſes many private perſons, as well as ſtates,
" no enemy but me? And could I find no fitter inſtrument than *Ram-*
" *mius*, whom I had never ſeen before, and whom I was never to ſee
" again? You are pleaſed to call me to account for the murder of the
" two *Thebans* and *Artetarus*. The *Thebans*, every body knows, periſhed
" by ſhipwreck: As to the latter, What does the accuſation amount to?
" Why truly, that his murderers, when baniſhed, fled into my king-
" dom. Will you then grant yourſelves to be chargeable with all the
" crimes of thoſe exiles who take refuge in *Italy?* And how can a man
" be condemned to baniſhment, if there be no place to which he may be
" baniſhed? Yet, as to thoſe aſſaſſins, as ſoon as I underſtood from you
" that they were in *Macedon*, I ordered them to be ſought out, expelled,
" and forbid to return into my dominions. Theſe things are objected to
" me, as to a man arraigned before a court of juſtice; the reſt, as to a

Y. of *R.* 572. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p.

" King, and relates to the treaty between you and me. Was it any " breach of that treaty to defend myſelf againſt the invaſion of *Abru-* " *polis*, your ally? What could I do, when he laid waſte my territories " as far as *Amphipolis*, and carried off many of my ſubjects, with their " cattle and effects? Would you have had me ſit ſtill, and ſuffer him to " enter *Pella?* Come armed even into my palace? But, it ſeems, I ought " not to have vanquiſhed him, nor to have treated him as a vanquiſhed " enemy. How can he, an invader, complain of ſuffering what I, " whom he attacked, was expoſed to ſuffer? As to my reducing the *Do-* " *lopians* by force; Had not I a right to do it? Are they not my ſubjects? " Their country, is it not a part of my kingdom, aſſigned to my father by " your decree? Can any man think that I dealt ſeverely with rebels, " who took away the life of my lieutenant, *Euphranor*, their Governor, " by ſuch tortures, that death was the leaſt part of his ſufferings. " After viſiting *Lariſſa*, *Antrona* and *Pteleum*, in the neighbourhood " of which places I had many vows to pay, I went up to ſacrifice " at *Delphi*. This is made a crime; and, to aggravate this crime, " it is added, that I took my army with me; as if my view had been " to ſeize upon towns, and gariſon caſtles, as you now do. Call a " council of all the *Greek* cities by which I paſſed; and, if any one " can prove he has ſuſtained damage by my ſoldiers, I am willing it " ſhould be thought, that under the pretence of a ſacrifice I concealed " other deſigns. I ſent aſſiſtance to the *Ætolians* and *Byzantines*, and " made a league with the *Bœotians*. Theſe actions, of whatever " nature they be, my ambaſſadors have not only mentioned, but " often juſtified in your ſenate, where I met with ſome arbitrators not " ſo favourable to me as you, *Q. Marcius*, my paternal friend and " gueſt. Yet *Eumenes* had not then been at *Rome* with his accuſations; " nor by calumnies and miſconſtructions made me ſuſpected and hated: " He had not yet endeavoured to perſuade you, that, while the kingdom " of *Macedon* was ſafe, *Greece* could not be free, nor enjoy the advantages " you procured her. A complaint of this kind (and better founded) " you will ſoon hear; you will be told, that you have done nothing " by confining *Antiochus* within mount *Taurus*; that *Eumenes* is more " oppreſſive to *Aſia* than the *Syrian* ever was; and that your allies will " never be in quiet while there is a palace in *Pergamus*.

" All that you have objected, *Q. Marcius*, and all that I have an- " ſwered, will, I know, be conſtrued by the hearers according to their " diſpoſitions; nor is it of ſo much conſequence what I have done, or " with what views, as in what light you will ſee my actions. I am " conſcious to myſelf that I have not offended knowingly; and, if through " ignorance I have tranſgreſſed, your reprehenſion will be ſufficient to " make me correct what is amiſs. Aſſuredly I have done nothing " which cannot be remedied; nor for which you can think I deſerve to " be proſecuted by war. With little reaſon is your moderation and

" clemency

" clemency famous among the nations, if, for cauſes ſcarce worth com- Y. of *R.* 582.
" plaining of, you take arms againſt a King, who is your friend and Bef. *J. C.* 170.
" your ally." 281 Conſul-p.
Liv. B. 42.

Marcius affected to appear much ſatisfied with the King's diſcourſe, c. 43.
and adviſed him to ſend new ambaſſadors to *Rome*; that nothing might be omitted which could give the leaſt hope of an accommodation. To this end a truce ſeemed neceſſary, and though *Marcius*'s ſole view in granting the King a conference, was to draw him to aſk a truce; yet, when he did aſk it, the *Roman* raiſed mighty difficulties, complying at length (as he pretended) merely out of perſonal regard to the ſon of *Philip*. *Marcius* meant nothing by all this but to make *Perſes* loſe time, who being ready for action, might have done ſomething conſiderable, before the Conſul *Licinius* with his army could arrive in *Greece*.

After this interview the *Roman* ambaſſadors went into *Bœotia*, the c. 43. and 44.
people of which country had not long before, made a league with the *Polyb.* Legat.
Macedonian. Great diſſentions had ſince ariſen among them; ſome de- 63.
claring for the King, others for the *Romans*. The *Thebans*, and, after their example, all the other petty ſtates of *Bœotia* offered now to enter into an alliance with *Rome*. *Marcius* would not treat with them jointly, but oblig'd each city to ſend it's reſpective miniſter to *Rome* to treat ſeparately for itſelf. By thus dividing them into many independent ſtates, he weakened them all. They were never after united.

From *Bœotia Marcius* repaired to the Diet of the *Achæans* convened at *Argos*. He demanded of them a thouſand men to gariſon *Chalcis* till the *Roman* army ſhould come into *Greece*; which demand was inſtantly complied with.

About the ſame time *Rome* ſent deputies into the moſt conſiderable
iſlands of *Aſia*, to aſk aſſiſtance in the war againſt *Perſes*. The *Rhodians* *Polyb.* Legat.
diſtinguiſhed themſelves on this occaſion. They thought it neceſſary 64.
to efface the impreſſions, which their differences with *Eumenes*, and their complaiſance for *Perſes* in ſeveral inſtances, particularly in convoying his wife to him from *Aſia*, had made in the minds of the *Romans*. The deputies therefore no ſooner arrived, but they were ſhewed a fleet of galleys equipt for the ſervice of *Rome*, and ready to put to ſea: This mark of zeal had the deſired effect.

Perſes, in conſequence of what had paſſed between him and *Marcius*, *Polyb.* Legat.
diſpatched ambaſſadors to *Rome* to negotiate the treaty of peace, which 65.
he imagined to be already begun by that conference. At the ſame time, he, by circular letters to the neighbouring ſtates, gave an account of his converſation with the *Roman*: and this he did, not only to ſet forth the juſtice of his cauſe, but to learn how they ſtood affected. To the *Rhodians* he ſent ambaſſadors, exhorting them to ſtand neuter, and in caſe the *Romans* ſhould refuſe him a peace, to take upon them the office of mediators, an office which, he ſaid, more properly belonged to them

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *C. J.* 170. 281 Conſul-p.

than any others, as being the moſt powerful of the *Greek* ſtates, and not only zealous for their own liberty, but guardians of the liberty of all *Greece*. Theſe ambaſſadors met with a friendly reception, but were anſwered, "that the *Rhodians* deſired the King, not to aſk them to do "any thing which might be diſapproved by the *Romans*."

Livy, B. 42. c. 46. & ſeq.

The ſame ambaſſadors going thence into *Bœotia* ſucceeded little better in that country. Only *Coronea* and *Haliartus* came over to the King's intereſt, and ſent to him for gariſons to ſecure them againſt the *Thebans*, who ſtill adhered to the oppoſite intereſt. *Perſes* anſwered, that he could not ſend them gariſons, becauſe of his truce with *Rome*.

When *Marcius* and his collegue, at their return home, gave an account to the Senate of their negotiations, they boaſted much of having deceived *Perſes* into a truce, which hindered him from beginning the war with the advantages he was maſter of, and gained time to the *Romans* to finiſh their preparations. Nor did theſe able miniſters forget to mention their dexterity in ſo diſſolving the *Bœotian* league, that the ſtates of that country would never more be in a condition jointly to make an alliance with the *Macedonian*. *Livy* tells us, that ſome of the older Senators were far from being pleaſed with the craft and diſſimulation of the ambaſſadors. Be that as it will, the majority of the Fathers approving of what had been done, *Marcius* was again ſent into *Greece*, with a commiſſion to act there as he ſhould think moſt for the intereſt of the Republic.

The Senate, though determined to purſue the war againſt *Perſes*, yet, that it might not be too plain how much he had been deluded, granted audience to his ambaſſadors. But neither their excuſes nor their entreaties availed any thing: They were ordered to leave the city immediately, and *Italy* in thirty days. It is probable that the Fathers thought, they ſufficiently covered the deceit of *Marcius*, by admitting theſe ambaſſadors within the walls of the city, and allowing them ſo long a time for their departure out of *Italy*; whereas the former ambaſſadors from the King had been received without the walls, and had been allowed but eleven days for their departure.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

FIRST and SECOND Years of the War.

The Conſul Licinius *arrives with his army in* Theſſaly.
Perſes *having obtained ſome advantage over the* Romans, *makes new propoſals for peace, which are rejected.*
The Conſul declines a general battle.
M. Lucretius *robs King* Gentius *of his fleet.*
Hoſtilius, *the ſucceſſor of* Licinius, *in vain attempts to penetrate into* Macedon.
The management of ſome Roman *ambaſſadors in* Greece.
The Romans *receive kindly a groſs piece of flattery from a city of* Aſia.

PERSES was ſo effectually cheated by the arts of *Marcius*, that the Conſul *Licinius* arrived with his army at *Apollonia*, almoſt as ſoon as the *Macedonian* ambaſſadors got back to their Maſter at *Pella*. In a council held by the King, a few days before, ſome had adviſed him to purchaſe a peace of the *Romans*, though it ſhould coſt him not only a yearly tribute, but even a part of his dominions. The majority, however, being more magnanimous, and declaring for war: WAR *then let us have*, ſaid *Perſes*, *and the Gods grant us ſucceſs*. And now he ordered all his forces to be drawn together, and appointed their rendezvous at *Citium*, a town in *Macedon*; and thither with his courtiers and his guards he himſelf repaired. His forces conſiſted of 39000 foot and 4000 horſe: a more numerous army (ſays *Livy*) than any King of *Macedon* had ever brought into the field, except *Alexander the Great*. *Perſes*, in a ſpeech to his troops, recalled to their minds the glory of their anceſtors; expatiated on the injuſtice, treachery and inſolence of the *Romans*; and repreſented the goodneſs of his cauſe, and the ample proviſion he had made for the war. His harangue was frequently interrupted by the applauſes of the ſoldiers, and loud expreſſions of indignation and anger againſt the *Romans*. The aſſembly diſmiſſed, he gave audience to the deputies from the ſeveral towns of *Macedon*, which had ſent offers of money and proviſions, each according to it's ability: Having firſt thanked them, he anſwered, that he deſired nothing of them but carriages for his engines of war.

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 42. c. 50.

The *Macedonian* marched out of his own kingdom into *Theſſaly*, knowing that the *Romans* were to come that way to meet him. Some towns yielded to him without reſiſtance; others he took by force. *Elatia* and *Gonni*,

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p. *Gonni*, places of great importance, becauſe ſtanding in the entrance of the Streight of *Tempe*, opened their gates upon the firſt ſummons. Having well fortified this paſs, he advanced to *Sycurium* ſituated at the foot of mount *Oſſa*, where pitching his camp, he reſolved to wait the coming of the enemy.

Liv. B. 42. c. 55. From *Apollonia* *Licinius* marched his army through *Athamania* to *Gomphi* in *Theſſaly:* For it was only through *Theſſaly*, that they could penetrate into *Macedon*; unleſs they would run the hazard of being ſtarved in the mountains of *Daſſaretia*. At *Gomphi* the Conſul ſtaid ſome days to refreſh his troops, much fatigued by the rough and difficult roads [b] through which they had paſſed. On advice that the *Macedonians* were ravaging the eaſtern part of *Theſſaly*, he advanced towards *Lariſſa*, and encamped by the river *Peneus*.

About this time *Eumenes* arrived at *Chalcis* with his brothers *Attalus* and *Athenæus*. The laſt ſtayed in this place with 2000 foot to ſtrengthen the gariſon: *Eumenes* and *Attalus*, with 4000 foot and 1000 horſe join'd the Conſul; as did alſo ſome other auxiliaries, but in ſmall numbers.

c. 57. To draw the *Romans* to a good diſtance from their camp, and fight them with advantage, *Perſes* ſent out ſome detachments to ravage the territory of *Pheræ*, a city in alliance with *Rome*. The Conſul however did not ſtir; which encouraged the *Macedonian* to think of inſulting him in his entrenchments. At ten o'clock in the morning the King, with his whole army, appeared within a mile of the enemy. Here he made his infantry halt, and went forward with his cavalry and light-arm'd troops. Perceiving ſoon after a ſmall party of *Romans* coming towards him, he detached about an equal number to ſkirmiſh with them. The action proved of little importance, and it was hard to ſay which ſide had the victory. *Perſes* returned to *Sycurium*. Next day he led his army again within ſight of the enemy's lines; and there being no convenient watering in the march, which was of twelve miles length, in a duſty road, he brought water with him in carts, that his men might not be both weary and thirſty when they came to fight. The *Romans* kept cloſe within their trenches, ſo that no action followed. *Perſes* repeated this movement for ſeveral days together, in hopes that

[b] *Livy* ſays, that the *Romans* were exceedingly rejoiced when they arrived at *Gomphi*, as thinking that they had eſcaped a very great danger; for had *Perſes*, with his army ranged in good order for battle, advanced and met them, while they were yet weary and ſtruggling with the difficulties of the way, they would probably have ſuffer'd a great overthrow. And Sir *Walter Raleigh* blames *Perſes* for not having brought his army to defend the paſs of *Aous*, where his father *Philip* formerly ſtopt the *Roman* legions for a conſiderable time. But may it not be queſtioned, whether *Perſes* could eaſily have done either of theſe things? For at this time, the *Theſſalians* (through whoſe country he muſt have marched, to poſt himſelf at the paſs of *Aous*, or to attack the *Romans* in *Athamania*) were his enemies; whereas in the former war, *Philip* was maſter of *Theſſaly*.

the

the *Roman* cavalry would be detached to fall upon his rear-guard, and that then, ſuddenly facing about, he might attack them at a conſiderable diſtance from their camp; in which caſe, as he was ſuperior in horſe and light-armed foot, he doubted not of victory. Diſappointed of this hope, he came and poſted himſelf ſeven miles nearer the enemy; and the next day, having, at ſun riſing, drawn up his infantry in the ſame place as before, he led all his cavalry and light-armed troops within leſs than half a mile of the *Roman* entrenchments. His coming at ſuch an unuſual hour filled the camp with tumult; and though, the troops he brought with him being unfit to aſſail trenches, the Conſul had no apprehenſion of ſuch an attempt, yet, to check the King's pride, he ſent out to battle all his horſe, light-arm'd infantry, and auxiliaries; he himſelf remaining in the camp with his legions in readineſs for action. The honour of this morning was entirely the King's. With the loſs of only 20 horſe and 40 foot, he ſlew about 2000 of the *Roman* infantry and 200 of their horſe; and took the like number of horſe priſoners. Upon the firſt news of his victory the captains of his phalanx led it to him, though unſent for, that he might attack the enemy's camp. But ſucceſs in ſuch an enterprize was an object too great for the hopes of *Perſes*. *Evander*, the *Cretan*, who, probably, from the King's irreſolution, inferr'd the byaſs of his thoughts, adviſed him not raſhly to hazard all, in an unneceſſary enterprize; adding, that the advantage he had already gained would either procure him honourable conditions of peace, or at leaſt many aſſociates in the war. There needed no more to make *Perſes* lead back his army to the camp.

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J.C.* 170. 281 Conſul. p.

Plut. life of *P. Æmil.* and *Liv.* B. 42. c. 59.

In the mean time the *Romans* were fearing what the *Macedonian* durſt not hope. *Eumenes* adviſed the Conſul to diſlodge by night, and remove to the other ſide of the river *Peneus:* And *Licinius*, though aſhamed to avow his fear, yet followed the advice, ſince reaſon ſo required.

Next day *Perſes* advanced with his army, to provoke the enemy once more to battle. When he perceived them ſafely entrenched on the other ſide of the river, he became ſenſible (ſays *Livy*) of the error he had committed the day before, in not purſuing his victory; and of the greater error he had been guilty of, by his inaction in the night; becauſe his light armed troops alone would have been ſufficient to deſtroy a great part of the enemy in their paſſage of the river.

On the other hand the *Romans*, though now no longer uneaſy with the apprehenſion of being ſuddenly attacked, were grievouſly mortify'd by the loſs they had ſuſtained, eſpecially of their reputation. In a council of war every one threw the blame from himſelf upon the *Ætolians:* Five of the chief men among theſe had been obſerved to be the firſt who turned their backs: The *Theſſalians*, who had made a good retreat, were praiſed, and rewarded with military honours and preſents.

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p.

Perſes, having loſt the opportunity of gaining another victory, endeavoured to draw ſome new advantage from that which he had gained, by extolling it in a pompous harangue to his ſoldiers, and by perſuading them, that it was a ſure prognoſtic of a happy iſſue of the war. They all heard him with delight. Thoſe who had been in the action grew braver from the praiſe; and the *Phalangites*, from the hope of meriting the like glory. Next day the King made a march, and pitched his camp upon a riſing ground near *Mopſium*, between *Tempe* and *Lariſſa*. This motion probably obliged the *Romans* to diſlodge. They removed to a ſtronger poſt, ſtill keeping on the banks of the *Peneus*. Hither *Miſagenes*, the ſon of *Maſiniſſa*, brought them a reinforcement of 1000 horſe, as many foot, and 22 elephants.

Although *Perſes* had ſeemed, as if he meant to preſs hard upon the *Romans*, he was yet eaſily perſuaded to lay hold of the favourable opportunity, which ſome of his courtiers thought he now had, by his late victory [a], of obtaining peace. He ſent to the Conſul an offer of ſubmitting to the ſame conditions which had been impoſed on his father *Philip*. The conſtancy of the *Romans* ſhewed itſelf remarkably on this occaſion. They unanimouſly agreed, in council, to return the harſheſt anſwer poſſible: *That* Perſes *muſt ſurrender himſelf and his kingdom to the* Romans *at diſcretion, or expect no peace.* Some of the King's counſellors, provoked by the *Roman* pride, adviſed him, never more to think of an accommodation. *Perſes* could not reliſh this advice. He thought that the *Romans* would not have acted in ſo haughty a manner, but from a well grounded confidence in their ſuperiority of ſtrength. Once more therefore he ſent to *Licinius*; and now offered a larger tribute than had been paid by *Philip*. Finding that peace could not be purchaſed with money, he retired to *Sycurium*; for what reaſon is not ſaid.

Polyb. Legat. 69.

During theſe tranſactions, *C. Lucretius*, the *Roman* Admiral, was beſieging *Haliartus* in *Bœotia*. He had ſailed from *Italy* with only 45 quinqueremes; but this fleet was now much augmented by the dexterous management of his brother *Marcus*, whom he had ſent before him, with orders to get what ſhips he could from the *Italian* allies, ſail with them to *Cephallenia*, and there wait his arrival. *Marcus* in his way had ſtopt at *Dyrrachium*, where finding in the haven 76 veſſels, of which 54 belonged to King *Gentius*, the reſt to the *Dyrrachians* and *Iſſæans*, he took them all away with him, pretending to believe that they had been fitted out for the ſervice of the *Romans*, though, in truth, *Gentius* had not yet declared himſelf for either party.

Liv. B. 42. c. 48.

Haliartus, after a vigorous defence, was taken by aſſault, ſacked and razed. From thence the Prætor marched his forces to *Thebes*, which

c. 63.

[a] "Over great (ſays Sir *W. R.*) was the "folly of the King in hoping then for "peace; and, in ſuing for it, even when "he had the victory, what elſe did he, "than proclaim to all who were inclined "to take part with him, that neither good "nor bad fortune would keep him from "yielding to the *Romans*, whenever they "would be pleaſed to accept of him?

opened

opened her gates to him upon the firſt ſummons. He put the government of the town into the hands of the Partizans of *Rome*; and all who had favoured the King of *Macedon* he ſold for ſlaves. After theſe exploits in *Bœotia* he returned to his ſhips. Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p.

Perſes, at *Sycurium*, heard that the *Romans*, having haſtily gathered in the corn from the fields around them, were cutting off the ears with ſickles before the doors of their tents, ſo that the camp was full of heaps of ſtraw. This ſuggeſted to him the hope of being able to burn their camp; and his men having provided themſelves with torches, and all things proper for the purpoſe, he ſet out in the middle of the night, that he might fall upon the enemy at day break. But the alarm being taken in good time, he failed in this enterprize. Once more he offered the enemy battle; which they declining, he again brought his army to *Mopſium*, becauſe *Sycurium* was at too great a diſtance from the *Romans*, and becauſe of the difficulty, before-mentioned, of getting water in the way. From *Mopſium* he advanced with 2000 foot and 1000 horſe, fell upon ſome parties of the enemy while they were buſy in reaping, and took 600 priſoners, and 1000 carts, moſt of them loaded. Not content with this ſucceſs, he attacked a body of 800 *Romans*, that had been ſtationed to guard the reapers. The Conſul, upon notice of the danger his men were in, haſtened with the beſt part of his army to their relief. *Perſes* faced the *Roman* Legions, and ſent orders to his Phalanx to advance; very unadviſedly (ſays *Livy*) becauſe, the great number of carts he had ſent off being in the way, the Phalanx could not poſſibly come time enough to his aſſiſtance. He was now overpowered by numbers, and forced to retire, with the loſs of 300 foot and 24 of his horſe-guards. A few days after this misfortune, the winter approaching, he retired into *Macedon* [b].

On the King's departure, *Licinius* went ſtrait to *Gonni*, hoping to have taken it, and thereby to have got an entrance into *Tempe*. But finding the enterprize too difficult, he turned off into *Perrhæbia*, where he reduced ſeveral towns. Thence he went to *Lariſſa* in *Theſſaly*, which he alſo made himſelf maſter of; the *Macedonian* gariſon having deſerted it. How this place or *Demetrias* (which it is ſaid the Conſul had thoughts of beſieging) fell into the hands of the *Macedonians* is no where related; nor is it eaſy to gueſs; unleſs perhaps *Perſes*, after his victory, did greater acts than we find recorded; and conquered ſome part of *Theſſaly*. The accounts of what happened in *Greece* about this time are very imperfect.

Licinius, having diſmiſſed all his allies except the *Achæans*, quartered his army for the winter in *Theſſaly* and *Bœotia*, into which latter Country

[b] *Plutarch* reports, that *Perſes* ſurpriſed the *Roman* fleet this year at *Oreum*; took four quinqueremes, and twenty ſhips of burthen, and ſunk many others loaded with corn. *Life of Æmil.*

Y. of *R.* 582. Bef. *J. C.* 170. 281 Conſul-p. *Livy*, B. 43. c. 1.

he himſelf went, at the requeſt of the *Thebans*, who were diſtreſſed by their neighbours, the people of *Coronæa*.

The Conſul had, in the ſummer, ſent one of his Lieutenants, with a body of troops, into *Illyricum*. This man reduced two opulent towns to ſurrender, and granted the inhabitants their effects; hoping by an appearance of clemency, to engage another town of great ſtrength, in the neighbourhood, to ſubmit to him. But finding that this town would neither yield to his virtue, nor to his arms, he returned and pillaged the two which he had before ſpared.

Caſſius, the other Conſul, whoſe lot confined him to *Gaul*, where there was little to do, had, from a ſpirit of emulation, attempted to make his way into *Macedon* through *Illyricum*. The Senate in all haſte recalled him, being much diſpleaſed that he ſhould dare, without orders, to undertake ſo dangerous a march through many ſtrange Countries, and thereby ſhew the people of thoſe Countries a way into *Italy*.

Perſes was not idle during the winter. He had lately diſmiſſed, with large preſents, his ally, *Cotys*, King of the *Odryſians* in *Thrace*, to go to the defence of his own country, invaded by ſome of his *Thracian* neighbours, in conjunction with a body of *Pergamenians*. The *Macedonian* now marched to his aſſiſtance, and defeated the invaders.

Polyb. Excerp. L. 27. *Liv.* B. 43. c. 18.

About the ſame time *Epirus*, or a great part of it, revolted to *Perſes* from the *Romans*; a revolution brought about by one *Cephalus*, on occaſion of an inteſtine diſcord.

Y. of *R.* 583. Bef. *J. C.* 169. 282 Conſul-p. *Plut.*

AT *Rome*, the Comitia raiſed to the Conſulſhip *A. Hoſtilius Mancinus* and *A. Atilius Serranus*; and gave *Hortenſius* the command of the fleet. To *Hoſtilius* fell the province of *Macedon*. Little progreſs was made in the war during his year. He twice unſucceſsfully attempted to penetrate into *Macedon*; once by the way of *Elimæa*, where *Perſes* defeated him in battle; and then by the *Cambunian* mountains. After this the King marched againſt the *Dardanians*, cut in pieces their army, conſiſting of 10,000 men, ravaged their country, and carried off a great booty.

In the mean time *Appius Claudius*, whom the Conſul had detached with an army of 4000 men, and who by levies among the confederates had doubled this army, entered *Illyricum*. Thinking to have taken *Uſcana* (a town on the confines of that country and *Macedon*) by the promiſed treachery of the *Cretan* gariſon that defended it, he fell into a ſnare: for advancing, in careleſs order, to the gates of the town, both the gariſon and the inhabitants ſallied out upon him on a ſudden, and attacked him ſo vigorouſly, that not above a fourth part of his whole army eſcaped the ſlaughter. Yet this town ſhortly after became *Roman*, by what means is no where ſaid. But we are told, that *Perſes* recovered it in the winter, he having then leiſure to lead his forces into *Illyricum*, the only ſide on which his kingdom was expoſed: For *Cotys* ſecured it on the ſide of *Thrace*; *Cephalus* on that of *Epirus*; *Perſes* himſelf had lately

Liv. B. 43. c. 10.

c. 18.

lately quelled the *Dardanians*; and the ſnows made the mountains of *Theſſaly* impaſſable to the *Romans*. After reducing *Uſcana* and the neighbouring towns, where he took many priſoners, and among the reſt 4000 *Romans*, he made a painful expedition into *Ætolia*. He had been promiſed admiſſion into *Stratus*, the ſtrongeſt city in that country. Of this hope though he were diſappointed, by the prevalence of the *Roman* faction in the place, yet in his return home he got poſſeſſion of *Aperantia*, and ſoon after received the agreeable news that *Clevas*, one of his Lieutenants, had gained a new and entire victory over *Appius Claudius*. Y. of *R.* 583. Bef. *J. C.* 169. 282 Conſul-p.

As for *Hortenſius*, the *Roman* Admiral, he performed nothing but againſt the allies of the Republic, whom he cruelly oppreſſed, as his predeceſſor *Lucretius*[c] had alſo done. The heavy complaints brought to *Rome* againſt theſe two Admirals, and ſome other *Roman* commanders, put the Senate under a neceſſity of paſſing a decree, *That no man ſhould be obliged to pay obedience to a* Roman *magiſtrate impoſing any burthen for the preſent war, unleſs he could produce an order from the Senate for ſuch impoſition.* c. 17.

The *Greeks* were at this time indirectly menaced by certain ambaſſadors from *Rome* (*C. Popillius Lenas* and *Cn. Octavius*) who travelled through all the cities of *Peloponneſus*, and, while they cried up the great clemency and indulgence of the Senate, ſo conſpicuous in the decree before-mentioned, gave to underſtand, that they very well knew how every one was inclined; who among them were zealous for the *Roman* cauſe, and who were lukewarm. Theſe ambaſſadors would have accuſed by name, in the diet of *Achaia*, *Lycortas* and his ſon *Polybius* as men ill affected to *Rome*, and waiting only for an opportunity to raiſe diſturbances. But becauſe no colour of truth could be found to countenance ſuch a charge, or perhaps becauſe the *Roman* affairs had not greatly proſpered of late in *Greece*, it was thought better for the preſent to forbear the proſecution, and give gentle words, as if all were well. They acted much the ſame part in *Ætolia* and *Acarnania*; uſing ſoft words even to thoſe whom they ſuſpected of being in the *Macedonian* intereſt; and deſiſting from ſome demands, becauſe they found them diſagreeable to the people. *Polyb.* Leg. 74. Id. Leg. 74. and 75.

" Among the great number of embaſſies that came to *Rome* about " this time, either to ſeek redreſs of injuries, or to offer their ſervices, " it is note worthy, that from *Alabanda*, a town of the *Leſſer Aſia*, " there was preſented unto the Senate, and well accepted, a moſt baſe " piece of flattery. Theſe *Alabanders* brought 300 horſemens targets " and a crown of gold to beſtow upon *Jupiter* in the capitol. But " having a deſire to gratify the *Romans* with ſome exquiſite token of Sir *W. Raleigh* from *Livy*. B. 43. c. 6.

[c] *Lucretius* was afterwards accuſed of this, and condemned in a great fine, by the unanimous ſuffrages of all the tribes.

" their

Y. of *R.* 583. Bef. *J. C.* 169. 282 Conſul p.

" their dutiful obedience, wherein they would be ſingular; and be-
" ing not able to reach unto any great performance, they built a temple
" unto the town *Rome*, and appointed anniverſary games to be ce-
" lebrated among them in honour of that Goddeſs. Now who can
" wonder at the arrogant folly of *Alexander*, *Antigonus*, *Ptolemy*, and
" the like vain men, that would be thought Gods; or at the ſhameful
" flattery of ſuch as beſtowed upon men, and not the moſt virtuous of
" men, divine honours; when he ſees a town of houſes, wherein pow-
" erful men dwell, worſhipped as a Goddeſs; and receiving (without
" ſcorn of the givers, or ſhame of the preſent) the title of Deity, at
" the gift of ſuch a raſcal city as *Alabanda* [d] *?*"

[d] In the Conſulſhip of *Cato* the elder, *Smyrna* paid the ſame compliment to *Rome*. *Tacit. An.* 4. c. 37.

CHAP. XVIII.

THIRD YEAR of the War.

The Roman *army under the command of the Conſul* Q. Marcius Philippus *penetrates into* Macedon.

The extravagant conduct of Perſes.

The imprudence of Marcius.

Polybius, *ſent ambaſſador from the* Achæans *to* Marcius, *conducts himſelf with great diſcretion.*

AFTER the war againſt *Perſes* had laſted two years, he was in a better condition to ſuſtain it than at the beginning. He had not only hindered the *Romans* hitherto from entering his country, but had enlarged his borders on the *Illyrian* ſide. And his continual ſucceſs had much encreaſed the reputation of his arms. On the other hand, the Conſuls *Licinius* and *Hoſtilius* had ſucceſſively waſted their time in fruitleſs attempts to force a paſſage into *Macedon*, defacing the glorious enterprize of conqueſt by many loſſes received. Nor was it only by the caſualties of war, that the army became greatly diminiſhed, but by the facility of the military Tribunes, or perhaps of *Hoſtilius* himſelf (for they laid the blame each upon the other) in licenſing the ſoldiers to go home. The Admirals of the Republic had ſo demeaned themſelves, as to make many of the towns, which had declared for *Rome*, weary of the alliance. And all theſe things together occaſioned, for a time, a general diſcouragement [a] among the *Romans*.

[a] *Livy* reports, that on advice of the bad ſucceſs of the war in *Macedon*, the Prætor, by order of the Senate, publiſhed an edict, commanding all the Senators in *Italy* (who were not abſent on affairs of the Republic) to repair to *Rome*; and forbidding thoſe who were in the city to go above a mile from it. B. 43. *c.* 11.

TO *Hoſtilius* ſucceeded *Q. Marcius Philippus*, who with *Cn. Servilius Cæpio* had been elected to the Conſulſhip for the new year. *Marcius*, with a large reinforcement, which he had brought from *Italy*, joined the army at *Pharſalus*. Purpoſing to proſecute the war with vigour, he preſently after his arrival conſulted the guides concerning the beſt way to penetrate into *Macedon*. Some adviſed him to go by the way of *Pythium*; ſome by the *Cambunian* mountains, where *Hoſtilius* had attempted a paſſage the laſt year; and others by the ſide of the lake *Aſcuris*. The Conſul would determine nothing, till he ſhould come to the place where the road, he was now in, branched out into three roads, which led to thoſe paſſes. In the mean time *Perſes* heard of the enemy's approach, and being uncertain what way they would take, diſtributed his own forces to the defence of all places, which might give entrance, or permit aſcent. When *Marcius* was come to the three roads before mentioned, and had heard the opinion of his council, he determined to proceed by that road which led by the lake [b] *Aſcuris*; and accordingly ſent before him 4000 foot to ſeize the moſt convenient poſts in the way. Two days was this detachment embarraſſed in overcomning the difficulty of only fifteen miles. After marching ſeven miles further they poſſeſſed themſelves of a ſafe piece of ground, from whence they had ſight of a body of 12000 *Macedonians*, which, under the command of *Hippias*, the King had appointed to defend that paſs. *Marcius*, having received notice of the ſituation of his detachment, haſtened to join it. *Hippias*, not in the leaſt diſmayed at his appearance, met him and fought with him, two or three days ſucceſſively, each returning to his own camp at night, with little loſs on either ſide. Theſe conflicts being on the narrow ridge of a mountain, where but a ſmall number could march in front, few men were employ'd; all the reſt were ſpectators. It was impoſſible for *Marcius* to get forwards, yet both ſhameful and dangerous to return. H[illegible]erefore took the only courſe remaining. Part of his men he left with *Popillius*, to amuſe the enemy, whilſt he himſelf with the reſt fetched a compaſs, ſeeking a paſſage by ways that had never been trodden, and being compelled to make paths, where nature ſeemed to have intended that none ſhould be. So ſteep he found the deſcent of the mountain, that his men, for the moſt part, rolled themſelves down, not daring to truſt their feet. And when they had gone or tumbled four miles of this troubleſom journey, they deſired nothing more earneſtly than that they might be allowed to creep back again, if poſſible, by the way they had come. To add to the other difficulties, the elephants, through fear, recoiled from the precipices, caſt their Governors, and made ſuch terrible

Y. of *R.* 581. Bef. *J. C.* 168. 283 Conſul-p.

Liv. B. 44. c. 2. & ſeq.

[b] Geographers are not agreed where to place the lake of *Aſcuris*; but the ſituation of it may be conjectured from hence, that when *Marcius* was got to the top of the hill which overlooked it, he could ſee *Phila*, *Dium*, and all the ſea coaſt. This hill was twelve miles from *Dium*.

noiſes,,

Y. of *R.* 584. Bef. *J.C.* 163. 283 Conſul-p. noiſes, as affrighted the horſes: So that they cauſed among the troops a confuſion almoſt as great, as if an enemy had broke in upon them by ſurprize. Shift however was made to let down the huge beaſts by a kind of bridge, of which the one end was joined to the edge of the cliff, the other ſuſtained by two poſts faſtned in the ground below. Theſe bridges were covered with turf, that the beaſts might not fear to go upon them. When an elephant had got ſome way upon one of theſe bridges, the poſts upholding it were cut; which made him ſlide down to the next bridge, that began where the firſt ended. In like manner he was conveyed to the third, and ſo onward to the bottom of the deſcent.

After ſeven miles, the army came to a plain, and there reſted a whole day, waiting for *Popillius*, who probably ſtole away in the night; for had the enemy followed him, and ſet upon him from the higher ground, (which doubtleſs they would have done, had they known of his motion) he muſt infallibly have been cut off.

The third and fourth days marches were like the firſt; only that cuſtom, and the nearneſs to their journey's end, without meeting an enemy, animated the ſoldiers, more chearfully to endure the fatigue. The fourth day they encamped in the fields near *Heracleum*, about midway between *Tempe* and *Dium*, where the King had poſted himſelf with the main of his army.

Perſes ſeems now to have been ſtruck with fear beyond comprehenſion, and to have entirely loſt his reaſon: for, could he have ſeen his own advantages, nothing had been more eaſy for him than to make the *Roman* General repent of his adventurous march. *Marcius* had indeed avoided the Streight of *Tempe*[c], and got beyond it; but he was incloſed between that Streight and *Dium*[d]; neither of which could he have forced, had the *Macedonians* defended them: So that he and his army muſt have periſhed for want of proviſions, unleſs he could have gone back the way he came; a thing impracticable, conſidering that the enemy, being now aware of the path he had made, would have fallen upon him from the tops of the hills, of which they were maſters. There was no fourth way. Yet the cowardice of *Perſes* gave a colour of prudence to the raſhneſs of the Conſul: for the King no ſooner heard that the enemy were come over the moun-

[c] *Tempe* was a valley five miles in length, and very narrow; bounded on one ſide by mount *Olympus* and on the other by mount *Oſſa*; between which, and through the middle of the valley, ran the river *Peneus*. The road lay on the ſide of a frightful precipice, along the river, and was ſo narrow, ſays *Livy*, that a loaded mule had ſcarce room to paſs. To defend this ſtreight, *Perſes* had poſted a detachment at *Gonni*, in the entrance of the valley; another farther on at *Condylon*, an impregnable fortreſs; a third at a place called *Characa*; and a fourth in the road itſelf, and where the valley was narroweſt.

[d] *Dium* ſtood at the foot of mount *Olympus*, on the ſide towards *Theſſaly*, and about a mile from the ſea; of which mile, the river *Baphyrus*, becoming there a lake, took up the one half; the reſt was ſuch as might be eaſily fortified.

tains

tains to *Heracleum*, but, crying out, *that he was vanquiſhed without fighting*, he took from *Dium* what valuable things he could carry away in haſte, abandoned the town, and retired with his army to *Pydna*. In the ſame vehemency of amazement he ſent ſtrict commands to burn, without delay, his naval ſtores at *Theſſalonica*, and to throw his treaſures, that were at *Pella*, into the ſea; as if the *Romans* were juſt at the gates of thoſe two cities, and going to take poſſeſſion. *Nicias*, who received the order to drown the treaſure, performed it as expeditiouſly as he could; yet not ſo deſperately, but that, when the King regretted the loſs, the greater part was recovered by diving. As to the naval ſtores, *Andronicus*, who had charge to ſet fire to them, deferred the execution, foreſeeing that repentance might follow. Whether *Nicias*, for his abſolute and blind obedience, or *Andronicus*, for his prudent forethought, merited the greater commendation, it lay in the King's breaſt to determine. The reward of their ſervice was this: *Perſes*, growing aſhamed of his mad cowardice, cauſed them both to be ſlain. Thoſe poor men alſo, who had fetch'd his treaſure out of the ſea, were recompenſed after the ſame manner; that ſo there might be no witneſs of the King's frantic fear.

Y. of *R.* 584. Bef. *J.C.* 168. 273 Conſul-p. Sir *W. R.*

To fill up the meaſure of his folly, he withdrew his gariſons from *Tempe*, and called *Hippias* away from the paſs of *Aſcuris*, as alſo *Aſclepiodorus*, from the guard of another paſs; and theſe men he openly reproached, as if they, and not he, had *betrayed to the enemy the gates and bars of Macedon*.

Marcius took *Dium* without reſiſtance, and from thence went forwards into the country; but, after three days, was compelled, by want of proviſions[e], to return. His fleet, which he had ordered to ſteer along the coaſt, came to him at this time; but had left the ſtoreſhips behind at *Magneſia*. Luckily for him, *Lucretius*, one of his lieutenants, whom he had employed to ſeize the fortreſſes of *Tempe* (abandoned by the *Macedonians*) found there plenty of corn; of which good fortune he gave the Conſul notice. The ſooner to get this corn, *Marcius* quitted *Dium*, and went to *Phila*[f], to meet the convoy that was coming to him; by which fooliſh journey he loſt not only that important place, but his reputation. For he was now thought a coward, or, at leaſt, an unſkilful General; ſince he thus retreated, when it moſt imported him to have puſhed forward.

Livy, B. 44. c. 7.

The imprudence of *Marcius* brought the King to ſee his own error. To correct it in the beſt manner he could, he quickly repoſſeſſed himſelf of *Dium*, and repaired it's fortifications, having found it diſmantled by

[e] It is likely, that the greater part of his ſtores (for he had taken a month's proviſion with him from *Pharſalus*) was loſt among the mountains; otherwiſe he could not have been in ſuch diſtreſs, as, without any oppoſition from the enemy, to be forced to quit his enterprize.

[f] A town between *Dium* and *Tempe*.

Y. of *R.* 584. Bef. *J. C.* 168. 283 Conſul p. Sir *W. R.*

the *Romans*. This done, he encamped ſtrongly behind the River *Enipeus*. Leſs diligence, more early employ'd, would have been enough to have gained him ample revenge upon *Marcius*, who had formerly deceived him by an idle hope of peace. And even his recovering and fortifying *Dium*, and his poſting himſelf on the *Enipeus*, made it impracticable for the Conſul to do any thing towards the conqueſt of *Macedon* in all the continuance of his office. He took indeed *Heracleum*, and made a feint as if he would have driven the King further off, and retaken *Dium*; but he had nothing ſo great either in his intention or hope, his chief care being to provide winter quarters. In order to facilitate the conveyance of proviſions from *Theſſaly* to *Heracleum*, he cauſed the roads to be cleared, and magazines to be erected in the moſt convenient places. He alſo ſent the admiral to make attempts upon the maritime towns, *Theſſalonica*, *Caſſandrea*, *Demetrias*, and others: but though this commander was aſſiſted by *Eumenes* with twenty ſhips of war, and had five from King *Pruſias*, he met with no ſucceſs in any one of thoſe enterpriſes, but loſt a conſiderable number of men.

As *Marcius* acquired little honour by this campaign, ſo he ſhewed himſelf very unwilling that *Appius Claudius*, who commanded on the ſide of *Illyricum*, ſhould acquire more. At the time when *Perſes*, by the ſucceſs of his arms againſt *Hoſtilius*, had gained great reputation, *Archo*, *Lycortas*, and the patriots among the *Achæans*, judged it for the good of the nation to aſſiſt the *Romans*, in their adverſity, whom, in their proſperity, they were never prone to flatter. *Archo* therefore propoſed a decree, which paſſed, "That the *Achæans* ſhould ſend their whole "ſtrength into *Theſſaly*, and ſhare all dangers with the *Romans*." *Polybius* and others were appointed ambaſſadors to *Marcius*, to acquaint him with this decree, and to know his pleaſure. Finding the Conſul buſy in ſeeking a paſſage into *Macedon*, they went along with the army, but mentioned nothing of their commiſſion till he was got to *Heracleum*. Then *Polybius* preſented the decree; at the ſame time ſetting forth how invariably obedient the *Achæans* had been, during the courſe of this war, to every command of the *Romans*. *Marcius* in very ſtrong terms expreſſed his ſatisfaction in the proofs of their good will; but ſaid, that he now needed no aſſiſtance. Inſtantly *Polybius* diſpatched his collegues home to report the Conſul's anſwer, ſtaying himſelf behind in the camp. After a while, *Marcius* had advice, that *Appius Claudius* deſired of the *Achæans* 5000 men, to be ſent him into *Epirus*. There could be no room to doubt but *Appius* had need of theſe men, and might, with ſuch an acceſſion of ſtrength, do ſignal ſervice, by obliging *Perſes* to divide his forces. Nevertheleſs *Marcius* deſired *Polybius* to return into *Achaia*, and take eſpecial care that no ſuch aid were ſent to *Appius*: The *Achæans*, he ſaid, ought not to be burden'd with an expence to furniſh troops that were not wanted. Away went *Polybius*, muſing, and unable to reſolve whether

Polyb. Legat. 78.

whether the Conſul's earneſtneſs in this affair proceeded from affection to the *Achæans*, or from envy towards *Appius*. And when the matter came to be debated in the *Achæan* diet, *Polybius* was in a new perplexity; the iſſue nearly concerning himſelf and thoſe of his party. For ſhould he neglect what the Conſul had given him in charge, he was ſure to incur his reſentment; and, on the other hand, he conſidered, that words ſpoken by *Marcius* to him in private would prove no good warrant to the *Achæans* for refuſing aſſiſtance to *Appius*. In this dilemma therefore he had recourſe to the decree of the Senate, which exempted all their allies from the neceſſity of ſubmitting to any impoſition from a *Roman* commander, unleſs the ſame impoſition were authoriſed by expreſs order of the Conſcript Fathers. *Appius* having no ſuch warrant, the Diet referred his demand to the Conſul, by whom they knew it would be oppoſed. And thus *Polybius*, by his artful management, ſaved to the *Achæans* above 120 * talents[g].

Y. of *R.* 584. Bef. *C.* 168. 283 Conſul-p.

* 23250. *l. Arbuthnot.*

[g] This year was paſſed at *Rome* the famous Voconian law, ſo called from *Q. Voconius*, the Tribune who propoſed it. The law enacted, that no woman ſhould be left heireſs to an eſtate; and that no *Cenſus* ſhould, by his will, give above a fourth part of what he was worth to a woman. By a *Cenſus* is meant a perſon rated high in the Cenſor's books.

The ſame year a difference happened between the Cenſors, *T. Sempronius Gracchus* and *C. Claudius Pulcher*, about the freedmen. Theſe, that they might have the leſs ſway in elections, had been confined to the four city tribes; and *Gracchus* now propoſed to deprive the greateſt part of them entirely of the right of ſuffrage. But *Claudius* inſiſted that this was illegal; and that though a Cenſor might remove a man from one tribe to another (which was the full meaning of *tribu movere*) yet he could remove no man, much leſs a whole order of men, from all the five and thirty tribes. It was at length agreed, that all the freedmen ſhould be incorporated in one of the city tribes; and it fell by lot to the Eſquiline tribe to receive them. *Liv. B.* 45. *c.* 15.

CHAP. XIX.

FOURTH YEAR of the War.

L. Æmilius Paullus *choſen Conſul at* Rome.

The report of ſome commiſſaries with regard to the ſtate of the war in Macedon.

A negotiation between King Perſes *and King* Eumenes; *each believing the other to be a knave, they come to no agreement.*

King Perſes *cheats King* Gentius.

The baſe and fooliſh conduct of the Macedonian *towards the* Baſtarnæ.

PLUTARCH reports that the people of *Rome*, weary of the long continuance of the *Macedonian* war, [in which, through the cowardice, or inſufficiency of their Generals, they had got nothing hitherto

but diſhonour,] caſt their eyes upon *L. Æmilius Paullus*, as a Captain, from whoſe courage and abilities they might hope a ſpeedy and fortunate iſſue to that enterpriſe.

This man, the ſon of that *Æmilius Paullus*, who periſhed at the battle of *Cannæ*, had been Conſul in the year 571, and had then conducted the war againſt the *Ligurians* with ſo much ſucceſs, as to deſerve the honour of a triumph. He was now near ſixty years of age, but in full ſtrength both of body and mind. Some time before this, the people had refuſed him a ſecond Conſulſhip when he ſtood candidate for it: but in the preſent exigency they raiſed him to that dignity, even againſt his inclinations; and aſſigned him the province of *Macedon*, without ſuffering him to draw lots with his collegue *C. Licinius Craſſus* [a].

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J.C.* 167. 284 Conſul. p.

Æmilius would propoſe nothing to the Senate concerning his Province, till by Commiſſaries, ſent thither to view the ſtate of things, the ſtrength and condition both of the *Roman* and *Macedonian* forces were perfectly known.

Livy B. 44. c. 20.

The Commiſſaries at their return reported, "That the army had penetrated into *Macedon*, but with greater danger than benefit: that "the two camps lay near each other, the river *Enipeus* between "them: that the King avoided a battle, and the *Romans* had not "ſtrength to force him to it: that the *Macedonians* were 30,000 ſtrong: "that *Marcius* wanted proviſions; the *Roman* Admiral, men; and, for "thoſe few that he had, wanted both money and clothes: that *Appius* "*Claudius* and his army, on the frontier of *Illyricum*, were ſo far from "being in a condition to invade *Macedon*, that they lay expoſed to the "danger of being cut off, if not ſpeedily reinforced: that *Eumenes* and "his fleet had juſt appeared, and then gone away; no body could tell "why: that he was wavering in his friendſhip to *Rome*, but his brother "*Attalus* unqueſtionably ſteady."

Liv. B. 44. c. 13.

Valerius Antias reports that *Eumenes* coming to aſſiſt *Marcius*, in the ſame friendly manner as he had aſſiſted the former Conſuls, was not treated with the diſtinction he had expected; and thereupon returned home in anger, refuſing, though requeſted, to leave behind him his *Gallo-Greek* horſe. Whether this were truly ſo, or whether the *Pergamenian* began, when too late, to apprehend, leſt the fire, which he himſelf had helped to kindle, would ſoon take hold of his own kingdom, it is certain that about this time he grew cold in his behaviour to the *Romans*. *Perſes* took encouragement from it to ſound him; and, finding him tractable, made an attempt to diſengage him from the intereſt of *Rome*. The ambaſſadors whom he ſent to *Pergamus* on this buſineſs, (but under colour of negotiating an exchange of priſoners) were alſo commiſſioned to go to *Antiochus Epiphanes*, King of *Syria*, then at war with

Polyb. Legat. 85.
Liv. B. 44. c. 24.

[a] *Livy* ſays nothing of *Æmilius*'s reluctance to accept of the Conſulſhip; and tells us, that the province of *Macedon* fell to him by lot.

Ptolemy

Ptolemy of *Egypt*. Theſe Miniſters had orders to repreſent to *Eumenes*, Y. of *R*. 585. Bef. *J. C*. 167. 284 Conſul-p.
" That there could be no real friendſhip between a King and a free
" ſtate: that the *Romans* had an equal enmity to all Kings, though
" they uſed the help of one King againſt another: that they had op-
" preſſed *Philip* by the help of *Attalus*; *Antiochus the Great* by the
" help of *Philip* and *Eumenes*; and now made uſe of the forces of *Eumenes*
" and *Pruſias* to ruin *Perſes*." They were to exhort the *Pergamenian* to conſider, " that the kingdom of *Macedon* once deſtroyed, his own could
" be no longer ſafe; and that the *Romans* already began to look with a
" better eye upon *Pruſias* than upon him." In like manner they were to admoniſh *Antiochus* " not to expect any good concluſion of his war
" with the *Egyptian*, ſo long as the *Romans* could make him deſiſt from
" the proſecution of it, by a bare declaration of their will and pleaſure."
And laſtly they were to requeſt, of both *Antiochus* and *Eumenes*, " that they
" would either, by negotiation, engage the Republic to make peace
" with the *Macedonian*; or, in caſe ſhe perſiſted in ſo unjuſt a war,
" turn their arms againſt her, as againſt the common enemy of all
" Kings." What anſwer the *Syrian* gave is not recorded. *Eumenes* having perceived that the *Romans* themſelves were weary of ſo tedious and difficult a war, and thinking it not unlikely that a peace would ſoon be concluded, whether he uſed his mediation or not, conceived a project of drawing ſome pecuniary advantage to himſelf from the preſent ſituation of things. He offered *Perſes*, for a 1000 talents, to ſtand neuter; for 1500, to procure him a peace; and, in either bargain, not only to pledge his word, but to give hoſtages. The *Macedonian* approved very much the article of hoſtages; and readily agreed with *Eumenes*, that they ſhould be ſent to *Crete*. But as to paying the money, here he ſtuck. He was willing to be at ſome expence for a peace with *Rome*; but did not care to pay for it before he had it. Till the peace ſhould be concluded, he would needs depoſite the money in the temple of *Samothrace*. As this iſland belonged to *Perſes*, *Eumenes* thought the money would be no nearer to him there, than if it remained in *Pella*; and therefore inſiſted upon having at leaſt a part of it in hand. Thus the two Kings, (ſays *Livy*) in vain attempted to over-reach one another, and got nothing but infamy for their labour.

Appian. fragment. L. 9.

After the like manner acted *Perſes* with *Gentius* of *Illyricum*; with whom he had been treating before, and who had anſwered him in plain terms, that without money he could not ſtir. The *Macedonian* was very backward at that time to diminiſh his treaſures; but, when the *Romans* had got poſſeſſion of *Tempe*, he agreed to pay 300 talents, which *Gentius* demanded as the price of his friendſhip; and hoſtages were to be delivered on both ſides for performance of covenants. *Gentius* ſent his hoſtages, in company with ſome ambaſſadors, to the *Macedonian* camp, where *Perſes* ratified the treaty by oath, and delivered his

Polyb. Leg. 76, 77.

Id. Legat. 85.

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J. C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p.

his hoſtages in preſence of the troops, that they, being witneſſes of this tranſaction, might be encouraged by ſuch an acceſſion of ſtrength to their party. Ambaſſadors were preſently after ſent from both Kings to *Rhodes*, to engage that Republic in the confederacy. The *Rhodians* anſwered, *That they had already reſolved to bring about a peace; to which they exhorted the Kings to raiſe no unneceſſary obſtacles.* The favourers of *Perſes* having become the prevailing party at *Rhodes*, ambaſſadors had been ſent from thence to *Rome*, to preſs the Senate to ceaſe the proſecution of the war. What reception theſe Miniſters met with we ſhall ſee hereafter.

Polyb. Legat. 87.

Id. Legat. 85.

Sir *W. R.*

Pantauchus the *Macedonian* ambaſſador had remained with *Gentius*, daily urging him to begin the war, eſpecially by ſea, while the *Romans* were unprovided of a naval ſtrength. Ten talents of the promiſed money came, as earneſt of the reſt that was following. More followed indeed, and ſealed up with the *Illyrian* ſeal, but carried by *Macedonians*, and not too faſt. Before this money reached the borders of *Illyricum*, *Gentius* had laid hands on two *Roman* ambaſſadors, under the pretence of their being ſpies, and thrown them into priſon; which *Perſes* no ſooner heard than he recalled his treaſure bearers [b], and ſent them with their load to *Pella:* for now the *Illyrian* muſt of neceſſity make war with the *Romans*, whether he were hired to it or not.

Plut. life of *Æmil.* *Liv.* B. 44. c. 27. *Appian* in fragment.

There came about the ſame time, from the other ſide of the *Danube*, to the aid of *Perſes*, 10000 horſe and 10000 foot of the *Gauls*, called by *Plutarch Baſtarnæ*. The King, having advice of their arrival on the frontiers, ſent a meſſenger with ſome inconſiderable preſents to the chiefs, whom he invited to come to him, and promiſed to gratify with rich rewards. *Clondicus*, the General, immediately aſked, whether *Perſes* had ſent money for the ſoldiers, who according to the bargain, were to have part of their pay in hand. To this the meſſenger making no anſwer, *Why then*, ſaid *Clondicus*, *tell thy maſter that the* Gauls *will not ſtir one foot farther, till they have money and hoſtages.* Upon the report of this anſwer, the King took counſel; if it might be called taking counſel, to deliver his own opinion before men ſo wiſe that they would not contradict him. He made an invective againſt the ſavage manners and perfidiouſneſs of the *Gauls*; "who came in ſuch numbers as could not but be dangerous to him and to his kingdom. Five thouſand horſe (he ſaid) would be as many as he ſhould have occaſion for; and not enough to give him cauſe to fear them." Doubtleſs there wanted not employment for the whole army of *Gauls*; ſince, without any danger to the Kingdom, they might have been ſent, by the

Plut. life of *Æmil.* *Liv.* B. 44. c. 26.

[b] *Polybius*, who tells us, that *Perſes* ratify'd by oath the treaty with *Gentius*, that he gave hoſtages to the *Illyrian* ambaſſadors for the performance of covenants, and that he ſent thoſe, who had come to take charge of the ſtipulated money, to *Pella*, there to receive it, ſays nothing of *Gentius*'s being cheated of that money.

way

way of *Perrhæbia*, into *Theſſaly*, where ravaging the country, they would have conſtrained the *Romans* to abandon *Tempe*, even for want of proviſions. This and much more might have been done; but *Perſes* was a better guardian of his money than of his kingdom. In concluſion, *Antigonus*, one of his nobles, and the ſame meſſenger who had been with the *Gauls* before, was ſent again, to let them know the King's mind. He did his errand: upon which followed a great murmuring of thoſe many thouſands that had been drawn ſo far from their own country to no purpoſe. *Clondicus* aſked him, *Whether he had brought the money with him to pay thoſe* 5000 *whom the King would take into his ſervice.* And when it was perceived, that *Antigonus*, for want of an anſwer, had recourſe to ſhifting excuſes, the *Gauls*, without delay, marched back towards the *Danube*, pillaging and waſting that part of *Thrace* through which they paſſed. Yet, barbarians as they were, they ſuffered the meſſenger of fraud to eſcape unhurt, which was more than he could well have expected. Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J. C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p.

Thus acted *Perſes*, like a careful treaſurer for the *Romans*, and as if he meant, ſays *Livy*, to preſerve his money for them, without diminiſhing the ſum [c].

[c] *Dio Caſſius* imputes this parſimonious conduct of *Perſes*, to a confidence in his own ſtrength, not doubting but that he ſhould be able, without the aſſiſtance of allies, to drive the *Romans* out of *Greece*. *Dio Caſ. ap. Valeſ.* p. 611.

CHAP. XX.

Gentius *of* Illyricum *conquered by the Prætor* Anicius.
Æmilius Paullus *arrives in* Macedon, *and drives the enemy from the banks of the* Enipeus.
Perſes *defeated at the battle of* Pydna.
He takes refuge in the iſland of Samothrace.
All Macedon *ſubmits to the* Romans; *and the King ſurrenders himſelf to* Octavius, *the* Roman *Admiral, who ſends him priſoner to the Conſul.*

UPON the report before-mentioned of the Commiſſaries, returned from *Macedon*, the Senate ordered into that country a large ſupply of men; but *Æmilius* was to have, in his army, only two *Roman* Legions, of 6000 foot, and 300 horſe each; and of the *Italian* allies 12000 foot, and 1200 horſe. What ſoldiers remained after compleating theſe numbers, were to be diſpoſed of in gariſon, if fit for ſervice; if unfit, they were to be diſcharged. Yet, according to *Plutarch*, *Æmilius* had in *Macedon* 100,000 men under his command. *Cn. Octavius* the Admiral of *Liv.* B 44. c. 21.

Y. of *R.* 585 Bef. *J. C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p.

of the fleet had 5000 recruits granted him. And to the Prætor *L. Anicius*, appointed to ſucceed *Appius Claudius* in *Illyricum*, was allotted an army of 20400 foot and 1400 horſe.

The Conſul, before his departure from *Rome*, made an harangue to the people. The ſubſtance of it was a reproof for the liberty they took, while ignorant of the true ſtate of things, to cenſure the conduct of their Generals. He ſaid: "That, if any of them thought themſelves "wiſe enough to manage this war, he deſired their company into *Ma-*"*cedon*, to aſſiſt him with their advice; that he had ſhips, horſes, tents, "and proviſions ready at their ſervice: But if they did not care to "exchange the eaſe and indolence of a town life for the fatigues of "war, they would do well to reſtrain their tongues; for he ſhould "not govern his actions by their caprice; nor have regard to any "councils but ſuch as were given him in the camp."

In the beginning of *April*, *Æmilius* the Conſul, *Octavius* the Admiral, and *Anicius* the Prætor, ſet out for their reſpective provinces.

App. in *Illyr.*

The ſucceſs of *Anicius* in *Illyricum* was as rapid as fortunate. He brought the war to a concluſion in thirty days, and before they knew at *Rome* that he had begun it. *Gentius*, after ſome loſs at ſea, and the ready ſubmiſſion of ſome of his towns to the *Romans*, ſhut himſelf up in *Scodra*, his capital, with all his army, conſiſting of 15000 men. This place being very defenſible by nature, and ſo ſtrongly gariſoned, and the King there in perſon, it could not poſſibly have been taken in a ſhort time, had the defenders of it kept within their walls. But they would needs ſally out and fight; in this ſeeming rather paſſionate than couragious, for they were preſently routed: and though they loſt but 200 men, yet ſuch was their fright and amazement, that *Gentius* thought it adviſable to aſk of the Prætor a truce, in order, as he ſaid, to deliberate concerning the ſtate of his affairs. Three days being granted him, he employed this time in enquiring after his brother *Caravantius*, whom he had commiſſioned to raiſe forces, and who was reported to be approaching to his reſcue. Finding the rumour groundleſs, and having aſked and obtained of the Prætor permiſſion to come to him, he threw himſelf at his feet, lamented with tears his paſt folly, and yielded himſelf, together with his wife and children, at diſcretion: After which the whole kingdom preſently ſubmitted. *Anicius* diſpatched *Perperna* (one of the ambaſſadors whom *Gentius* had impriſoned) with the news of all theſe events to *Rome*.

Liv. B. 44. c. 31.

Liv. B. 45. c. 41. *Plut.* life of *Æmil.* *App.* in fragment. *Liv.* B. 44. c. 32.

ÆMILIUS PAULLUS, having ſet ſail from *Brunduſium* at break of day, arrived at *Corcyra* before night. Thence in five days he reached *Delphi*; where he ſacrificed to *Apollo*. In five days more he joined the army at *Phila*, not far from the *Enipeus*.

Perſes, after taking the beſt meaſures he could to hinder a deſcent from the *Roman* fleet on the coaſt, ſpared no labour to fortify his bank of the

the *Enipeus*; ſo that the Conſul had little hope to force him in his camp, and enter *Macedon* that way [a]. On enquiry he learnt, that there was a paſſage over mount *Olympus*, and by *Pythium*; the road not bad, but blocked up by a body of troops which the King had placed there. To force this guard, *Æmilius* choſe out 5000 men, whom he committed to the conduct of *Scipio Naſica*, his ſon-in-law, and *Q. Fabius*, his own ſon by nature, but adopted into the *Fabian* family. In order to conceal the deſign, they took the way to *Heracleum*, as if they were going to embark on board the fleet. From *Heracleum* they directed their march to *Pythium*, dividing the journey ſo as to arrive there the third day before it was light. In the mornings of thoſe two days, when they were paſſing the mountain, *Æmilius*, that he might fix the King's attention on ſomething preſent, detached a part of his *velites* to attack the advanced guard of the *Macedonians*. The channel of the *Enipeus*, which received in winter a great fall of waters from the mountains, was exceedingly deep and broad, and the ground of it ſuch, as though at preſent it lay almoſt quite dry, yet it afforded no good footing for heavy arm'd troops. It was for this reaſon *Æmilius* employed only his *velites*, of whom the King's light arm'd ſoldiers had the advantage in a diſtant fight, though the *Romans* were better arm'd for cloſe engagement. The engines from the towers, which *Perſes* had raiſed on his own bank, play'd alſo upon the *Romans*, and did conſiderable execution. Yet *Æmilius* renewed his aſſault the ſecond day; when he ſuffered yet a greater loſs than the firſt. The third day he made a motion as if he meant to attempt a paſſage over the river nearer the ſea. In the mean time, the King's camp became, on a ſudden, full of tumult and confuſion. *Scipio* and *Fabius*, (according to *Polybius*) had ſurprized the *Macedonian* guard upon the mountain aſleep and ſlain moſt of them; the reſt with all ſpeed fled to the army, with the news, that the *Romans* had paſſed the mountain, and were at their backs. The King inſtantly broke up his camp, and made a haſty retreat to *Pydna* [b]. Thus was a paſſage once more opened into *Macedon*; an advantage which *Æmilius* did not, like his predeceſſor *Marcius*, neglect to improve.

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J. C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p.

Polyb. ap. *Plut.*

[a] About this time the Conſul introduced ſome new regulations in the *Roman* diſcipline. The word of command uſed to be given aloud at the head of the legions to all the ſoldiers, but *Æmilius* now ordered the Tribune of the neareſt legion to give it in a low voice to his Primipile, who was to tranſmit it to the next Centurion, and thus it was to be conveyed from one to another, till it had gone through the whole army. And whereas it had been the cuſtom for the guards to ſtand from morning to night in their poſts, without being relieved; the Conſul altered this method, ordering them to be changed at noon. And becauſe they often fell aſleep, leaning upon their ſhields, he commanded that for the future they ſhould go upon guard without a ſhield. *Liv.* B. 44. *c.* 23.

[b] This account differs in ſome circumſtances from *Plutarch*'s.

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef *J.C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p. *Plut.* life of *Æmil.*

Perſes could not determine for a while what courſe to take; whether to diſtribute his troops into the fortified towns, and ſo to protract the war; or to put all at once to the hazard of a battle. Seeing his men in good heart, and eager to fight, he at length reſolved to venture a general action. He choſe therefore a place near the walls of *Pydna*, commodious for the Phalanx, and on each ſide of which were ſome high grounds, fit for the archers and light armed troops. A river covered the whole front; and this river, though ſhallow, and of little breadth, muſt in ſome meaſure break the order of the *Romans* in advancing to him. It was not long before the enemy appeared. He offered them battle; which the *Roman* ſoldiers would gladly have accepted the inſtant they arrived: But *Æmilius*, knowing that they were fatigued with their march, did not think it adviſeable to come to an engagement till they had taken ſome reſt. Yet, that he might ſeemingly yield to the ardour of his men, he began to draw them up as for battle, directing the Tribunes to repair each to his poſt. As the day advanced, and the ſun grew hotter, the countenances of the ſoldiers appeared leſs animated, their voices ſunk, and ſome of the men were ſeen leaning on their ſhields and javelins for wearineſs. The Conſul hereupon ordered a camp to be marked out. His chief officers, though diſſatisfied with this change, (as they thought it) of his deſign, yet remained ſilent. But young *Scipio*, whoſe late ſucceſs on mount *Olympus* gave him confidence, took the liberty to remonſtrate, begging him not to loſe his opportunity by delay. *Æmilius* told him, he ſpoke like a young man, and bad him have patience. This ſaid, he commanded the troops in the front of his army to remain in their order, while thoſe in the rear formed a camp and entrenched it: which finiſhed, the whole army at leiſure fell back into it, without any confuſion or moleſtation from the enemy.

Liv. B. 44. c. 36.

The next day many in each army blamed their Generals for not having fought the day before. *Perſes* excuſed himſelf by the backwardneſs of the enemy, who did not advance, but kept upon ground very inconvenient for the Phalanx. On the other ſide the Conſul, who had his reaſons before-mentioned, communicated them to thoſe about him.

Sir *W. R.*

In the evening of that day (which, by the *Roman* account, was the third of *September*) *C. Sulpicius Gallus*, a legionary Tribune, foretold to *Æmilius*, and, with his approbation, to the army, an eclipſe of the moon which would happen the ſame night; admoniſhing the ſoldiers not to be terrified, it being a natural event, which might be known long before the time. The *Romans* (according to their cuſtom) while the eclipſe laſted, beat pans of braſs and baſons, as we do in following a ſwarm of bees; thinking that thereby they helped the moon in her labour. On the other ſide the *Macedonians* howled and made a great noiſe, and this doubtleſs becauſe it was their cuſtom, and not becauſe they were frightened at the eclipſe, as with a prodigy that foreboded any miſchief to them;

them; ſince it did not in the leaſt diminiſh their ardour for the fight. *Æmilius*, though not ſo ignorant concerning this phænomenon as to imagine it any thing ſupernatural, yet, being very religious, could not refrain from doing his duty to the moon, and, by a ſacrifice of eleven young bulls, as ſoon as ſhe ſhone out bright again, congratulating with her on her delivery. And early the next morning, when he had given the ſignal to prepare for battle, he ſacrificed to *Hercules* twenty oxen ſucceſſively, before any good omens could be found in the entrails. At length, in the belly of the one and twentieth ox, was found a promiſe of victory to the *Romans*, but conditionally [c] that they acted only on the defenſive.

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J. C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p. *Plut.* life of *Æmil.*

About three in the afternoon, when there was no likelihood of a battle, *Perſes* keeping his ground, and *Æmilius* having ſent abroad a part of his men for wood and forage, an accident brought that to paſs, of which neither of the Generals ſeemed very deſirous. A horſe belonging to a *Roman* broke looſe, and ran into the river, whither two or three of the ſoldiers followed him: eight hundred *Thracians* lay on the further bank, whence two of them ran into the water to draw this horſe over to their own ſide. Theſe fell to blows with the *Romans*, as in a private quarrel, and one of the *Thracians* was ſlain. Some of his countrymen haſted to revenge their fellow's death, and followed over the river thoſe that had ſlain him. Hereupon aſſiſtance came in on each part, till the number grew ſuch as made it paſt a fray, and cauſed the Generals of both armies to be anxious about the event. *Perſes* and *Æmilius* drew up their men in order of battle; and, to elevate their courage, employ'd all the arguments which the importance of the occaſion ſuggeſted. But the King having finiſhed his oration, and ordered his men to the charge, withdrew himſelf into *Pydna*; there to offer ſacrifice to *Hercules:* as if *Hercules*, ſays *Plutarch*, could like the ſacrifice of a coward; or would grant victory to him that would not fight [d]

Liv. B. 44. c. 40.

It

[c] Sir *W. R.* pleaſantly ſays, "that *Hercules* was a *Greek*, and partial, as nearer "in alliance to the *Macedonian* than the "*Roman*. That therefore it had been better to call upon the new Goddeſs lately "canonized at *Alabanda*, or upon *Romulus*, "or (if a God of older date were more authentick) upon *Mars*, the father of *Romulus*, to whom belonged the guidance "of military affairs, and who therefore "would have limited his favour with no "injunctions contrary to the rules of war."

One of the moſt diſtinguiſhing parts of *Æmilius*'s character was circumſpection and caution, which he had inherited from his father, a diſciple of *Fabius Cunctator*. And though Sir *W. R.* blames *Æmilius* on this occaſion, *as vainly conſuming a great part of the day*, in the ſacrifices abovementioned; yet, conſidering the advantage which *Perſes* had of the ground, it is not improbable, that the Conſul had better reaſons than any he found in the ox's belly, for deſiring that the King ſhould quit his poſt, and be the aſſailant. *Plutarch* ſpeaks of the morning ſun being full in the faces of the *Romans*, as a reaſon for *Æmilius*'s deferring the battle till the afternoon. But it appears from *Livy*, that the Conſul had no intention to fight, even when the ſun favoured him.

[d] One *Poſidonius* (an hiſtorian quoted by *Plutarch*) ſays, that he was preſent at this

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J.C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p.

It is impoſſible to form any ſatisfactory notion of this battle, in it's detail, from the imperfect accounts of it in *Livy* and *Plutarch*. We read that the *Macedonian* cavalry quickly fled out of the field; that nevertheleſs the Phalanx preſſed on ſo reſolutely as to bear down all that oppoſed it, inſomuch that *Æmilius* was aſtoniſhed and terrified, and rent his clothes for grief. What gave him the victory was the difficulty, not to ſay the impoſſibility, of the Phalanx's preſerving its order for any conſiderable time. For while ſome of the *Roman* battalions preſſed hard upon one part of it, and others recoiled from it, it was neceſſary, if the *Macedonians* would follow thoſe that gave ground, that ſome files ſhould advance beyond the reſt. *Æmilius* when he ſaw the front of the enemy's battle become unequal (by reaſon of the unequal reſiſtance which they met with) and the ranks in ſome places open, divided his men into ſmall battalions, ordering them to throw themſelves into the void ſpaces, and charge the Phalangites in flank. The long pikes of the *Macedonians* by this means became uſeleſs: and, with only their weak ſwords and targets, they were by no means a match for the *Roman* Legionaries, who had ſtrong ſwords, and whoſe ſhields covered them almoſt from head to foot. There ſoon followed a total rout of the *Macedonian* Infantry. More than 20000 of them are ſaid to be ſlain, and 5000 taken priſoners. It is alſo ſaid that the *Romans* did not loſe above a hundred men; a tale not very conſiſtent with what is related of the exploits of the *Macedonian* Phalanx.

Plut. life of *Æmil.*

Perſes fled from *Pydna* towards *Pella*, attended by a great number of his horſe. Some of the foot which had eſcaped from the ſlaughter overtook the King and his company in a wood, where they fell to railing at the horſemen, calling them cowards, traitors, and other ſuch names, till at length they came to blows [e]. The King, fearing leſt they ſhould turn their wrath againſt him, ſuddenly left the high road. A few followed him: the reſt diſperſed themſelves, and went every one whither his inclinations guided him. Of thoſe that kept with their King the number began in a ſhort time to leſſen: for he fell to deviſing upon whom to lay the blame of that day's misfortune; which cauſed thoſe that knew his nature to ſhrink away from him under various pretences. At his coming to *Pella* about midnight, he found his pages, and *Eudus* [f] the Governor of the town, ready to attend him; but of his great men that

Sir *W. R.*

Liv. B. 44. c. 43.

battle, and reports, that *Perſes*, though hurt the day before in the leg by a kick of a horſe, did nevertheleſs, and contrary to the preſſing inſtances of his friends, lead his phalanx to the charge, and that he continued at their head till he was wounded in the ſide by a javelin.

[e] *Livy* ſays nothing of the foot having overtaken the horſemen, or of the quarrel between them; or that the King blamed any body for the loſs of the battle.

[f] *Plutarch* ſays, that *Perſes* ſtabbed with his own hand this *Eudus*, and one *Edeus*, for telling him of his faults, and giving him advice with too much freedom.

had

had eſcaped from the battle, though he often ſent for them, not one would come near him. Fearing leſt they, who had the boldneſs to diſobey his ſummons would dare ſomething worſe, he ſtole out of *Pella* before morning. There went with him only *Evander* (the *Cretan* formerly employed to kill *Eumenes* at *Delphi*) and two other companions of his flight from *Pydna*. The third day after the battle *Perſes* came to *Amphipolis*, where having ſeveral times attempted to make a ſpeech to the people, and having as often been hindered by his tears from proceeding, he appointed *Evander* to ſpeak in his name what he himſelf had intended to ſay. The *Amphipolitans*, upon the firſt rumour of the King's defeat, had emptied their town of 2000 *Thracians* that lay there in gariſon, ſending them out, under colour of an expedition that was to make them rich, and then ſhutting the gates after them. And now to rid themſelves of the King, ſome of the citizens cried out while *Evander* was ſpeaking, *Hence*; *depart*; *muſt we be ruined upon your account?* *Perſes* therefore put his family, his treaſures, and 500 *Cretans*, on board ſome veſſels which were in the river *Strymon*, and embarking with them followed the courſe of the ſtream. Theſe *Cretans* are ſaid to have repaired to him, not out of any affection to his perſon, or his cauſe, but to his money, of which they hoped to ſhare[g]. The King knowing their wiſhes and views, cauſed ſome gold and ſilver cups and vaſes, to the value of fifty talents *, to be laid on the ſhore, as a booty for which they might ſcramble. He would not make the diſtribution himſelf for fear of diſobliging ſome of them. When the *Cretans* had loaded themſelves with theſe riches, the little fleet ſailed to *Galepſos*, a maritime town between the mouths of the *Strymon* and the *Hebrus*. But now *Perſes*, repenting of his liberality, pretended to the *Cretans*, that among the cups and vaſes there had been put, by miſtake, ſome which *Alexander the Great* had made uſe of; for whoſe memory he had ſo high a reſpect, that it grieved him, he ſaid, to part with the leaſt thing that had belonged to that Hero; and he offered to redeem them with more than they were intrinſically worth. Many of the *Cretans*, impoſed upon by this declaration, brought back their urns and vaſes. The King paſſed into *Samothrace*, and ſpoke no more of the money. By this baſe artifice he recovered about thirty talents[h].

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J. C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p.

* 9687 l. 10s. *Arbuthnot.*

Plut. life of *Æmil.*

Samothrace was an iſland conſecrated to *Cybele* the mother of the Gods. According to tradition ſhe had formerly dwelt in it, on which account it was held ſacred by all nations. *Perſes*, hoping that the *Romans* would not profane this ſanctuary by ſtaining it with his blood, choſe to retire thither with his family and the remains of his dear treaſure (which

[g] This may be true, yet it ſeems natural, that, without this allurement, they ſhould adhere to *Evander*, their countryman and General, who continued about the King.

[h] *Livy* makes no mention of this cheat.

ſtill

Y. of *R.* 585 Bef. *J. C.* 167 284 Conſul-p. * 387500 l. *Arbuthnot.*

ſtill amounted to about * 2000 talents) and he took up his habitation in a place adjoining to the temple of *Caſtor* and *Pollux*.

It is ſomewhat ſingular, that a King whoſe arms had proſpered for three years together, ſhould, after the loſs of only one battle, be ſo deſerted by all his ſubjects, and reduced to ſuch miſerable ſhifts: And it renders credible, in ſome degree, what the hiſtorians have related of his monſtrous falſhood, avarice and puſillanimity, in the latter part of his reign. The whole kingdom fell into the power of *Æmilius* in a few days after his victory. *Hippias*, who had kept the paſs near the lake *Aſcuris* againſt *Marcius*; *Pantauchus*, who had been ſent ambaſſador to *Gentius*; and *Milo*, another of the King's principal officers, were the firſt that came in, yielding themſelves and the town of *Beræa*, whither they had retired out of the battle. With meſſages to the like effect came others from *Theſſalonica*, from *Pella*, and moſt of the towns of *Macedon*, within two days. *Pydna* held out a day or two longer. About 6000 ſoldiers of divers nations having fled out of the battle into that town, this confuſed rabble of ſtrangers hindered the townſmen from coming immediately to any determination. *Milo* and *Pantauchus*, by the direction of *Æmilius*, went thither to parly with the commander of the gariſon. It was agreed, that the ſoldiers ſhould yield themſelves priſoners of war, and that the *Roman* army ſhould have the plunder of the city. After this, *Æmilius* marched to *Pella*, where, of the King's treaſure, he found no more than 300 talents [*Livy* ſhould have ſaid, 290;] the ſame of which the *Macedonian* had lately defrauded *Gentius*.

Liv. B. 44. c. 45, 46.

The report that *Perſes* had taken refuge in *Samothrace*, was ſoon confirmed by his own letters to the Conſul. He had ſent theſe letters by perſons of ſuch mean condition, that *Æmilius* is ſaid to have wept with compaſſion for a King ſo fallen as to have no ſervants of better rank to employ in this commiſſion. But though *Perſes* had written in the ſtile of a ſuppliant, and not of a King, yet, becauſe the inſcription of his epiſtle was, *King* Perſes *to the Conſul* Paullus, his folly, ſays *Livy*, in retaining the title of King, when he had loſt his kingdom, extinguiſhed all the Conſul's pity, ſo that he would return him no anſwer either by word or writing. The *Macedonian* now felt the whole weight of his calamity, he wrote again, omitting the word King in the ſuperſcription, and deſiring *Æmilius* to ſend to him ſome perſons with whom he might confer about his preſent condition. Three went to him from the Conſul, but effected nothing; they inſiſting, that *Perſes* ſhould yield himſelf at diſcretion; and he refuſing to part with the title of King. It was perhaps the hope of being able to compound with his enemies, and purchaſe of them the permiſſion to live in quiet, and retain the title of King, that had made him ſo carefully preſerve his treaſures, and retire with them to *Samothrace:* imagining that the *Romans* would neither violate a ſanctuary, nor yet neglect the riches in his poſſeſſion.

B. 45. c. 4. & ſeq.

Preſently

Preſently after arrived at that iſland, with the *Roman* fleet, *C. Octavius*, who had been ordered thither by the Conſul. *Octavius* endeavoured, as well by threats as by fair words, to make the King leave his retreat. All proving ineffectual, a young *Roman*, named *Atilius*, moved a queſtion to the *Samothracians*; *How they came to pollute their iſland (which they held to be ſacred) by receiving, even into their ſanctuary, a man ſtained with the blood of King* Eumenes, *whom he wounded and endeavoured to murder, in the holy precincts of the temple at* Delphi? As they were now abſolutely in the power of the *Romans*, this queſtion cauſed no ſmall perplexity and fear. They ſignified to the King, that *Evander*, who lived with him, was accuſed of a ſacrilegious crime, of which he muſt either clear himſelf, upon a fair trial; or, if through guilt he durſt not ſtand a trial, muſt ceaſe to profane a holy place, and leave it immediately. The King himſelf was not charged in this meſſage; yet, what would that avail him, if the inſtrument of the fact, being brought into judgment, ſhould impeach the author? *Perſes* therefore exhorted the *Cretan*, by no means to ſtand a trial, in which neither favour nor juſtice could be expected; adding, that the beſt thing he could do was bravely to kill himſelf. *Evander* ſeemed to approve the advice; but ſaid, he had rather die by poiſon than the ſword; and, under colour of preparing poiſon, he prepared to eſcape. The King, ſuſpecting his intention, found means to get him murdered; and then, to avoid the charge of having polluted the holy place, he bribed the chief magiſtrate of *Samothrace* to publiſh, that the *Cretan* had killed himſelf. This monſtrous proceeding of *Perſes*, towards ſo conſtant a follower of his fortunes, drove almoſt every body from him, except his wife, his children, and his pages. Thus deſerted, he turned his thoughts to make an eſcape, and fly with his treaſures to King *Cotys* of *Thrace*, his good friend and ally. *Oroandes*, a *Cretan*, who lay at *Samothrace* with one ſhip, was eaſily perſuaded to undertake the affair. The dear treaſure (as much of it as could be ſo conveyed) *Perſes* cauſed ſecretly to be carried on board by night: After which, having got out at a window, with his wife and his elder ſon *Philip*[i], they paſſed through a garden, and over a wall, and thence to the ſea-ſide. No ſhip was there. *Oroandes* had ſailed away with the money. *Perſes* wandered ſome time on the ſhore, undetermined what courſe to take. It grew towards day: Fearing therefore to be diſcovered and intercepted, he made all haſte back to his aſylum.

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J.C.* 167. 284 Conſul-p.

Octavius publiſhed a proclamation, importing, That all the *Macedonians*, who yet attended their maſter in *Samothrace*, ſhould have their lives and liberty, with whatever eſtate or effects they had, either in the iſland, or in *Macedon*, provided they immediately yielded them-

[i] This elder ſon is ſaid by *Livy* to have been the King's brother by nature, and his ſon only by adoption.

Y. of *R.* 585 Bef. *C.J.* 167 284 Conſul-p

ſelves to the *Romans*. Hereupon the pages, who were the ſons of the chief nobles, and who had hitherto conſtantly kept with the King, ſurrendered themſelves to the Prætor. *Ion* alſo, a *Theſſalonian*, to whom *Perſes* had committed the care of his younger children, delivered them up. Laſtly, the King, now deſtitute of all ſupport, and accuſing the Gods of *Samothrace*, that had no better protected him, gave himſelf up, with his ſon *Philip*, to *Octavius*, who ſent them away to *Æmilius:* and thus the *Roman* victory was compleat [k].

Perſes entered the camp in a mourning habit; and when he came into the Conſul's tent, would have thrown himſelf at his feet; a behaviour ſo baſe and abject, that *Æmilius* thought it diſhonoured his victory. Having made the King ſit down, he expoſtulated with him, in gentle words, on his having, *ſo* [l] *unjuſtly* and with *ſo hoſtile a mind*, made war upon the *Romans*. To this a Prince of more ſpirit would not have wanted an anſwer. *Perſes* ſaid nothing. The Conſul went on, "However "theſe things have happened, whether through miſtake, to which "every man is liable, or by chance, or by the inevitable decrees of "fate; take courage: The clemency of the *Roman* people, which ſo "many Kings and nations have experienced in adverſity, affords you, not "only a hope, but almoſt an aſſurance of Life." He then gave the King in cuſtody to *Ælius Tubero*, who was the Conſul's ſon-in-law.

Thus ended the *Macedonian* war (which had laſted four years) and with it the *Macedonian* monarchy, after it had continued in ſplendor 193 years, reckoning only from *Philip* the father of *Alexander the Great* [m].

Liv. B. 45. c. 41. *Plut.* Life of *Paull. Appian.* fragm.

[k] *Æmilius Paullus* is (by *Livy* and others) made to boaſt in a ſpeech to the people, that he finiſhed the war againſt *Perſes* in *fifteen days*. This is abſolutely unintelligible, unleſs he reckons from the battle of *Pydna*, or the action upon the *Enipeus:* for no circumſtances of the whole ſtory are better, if ſo well, authorized, than his leaving *Rome* the firſt of *April* to go to the army, his arrival in the camp the eleventh day after ſailing from *Brunduſium*, and his fighting the battle of *Pydna* on the fourth of *September*.

Petavius ſays it is evident, from the eclipſe which happen'd the night before this battle, that it was fought in the year before Chriſt 168. *Rationar. Temp. P.* II. *B.* 2. *c.* 14.

[l] So outragious an inſult upon wretchedneſs, as *Æmilius* is guilty of, in this *lying* expoſtulation, is hardly to be parallel'd.

[m] The *Roman* State, by the entire conqueſt of *Macedon*, became exalted to the pitch of an irreſiſtible Power. Sir *Walter Raleigh*, finiſhing that part, which he has left us of the *Hiſtory of the World*, with this conqueſt, makes uſe of a beautiful ſimilitude to expreſs the proſperous condition and high fortune of the *Romans* at that period, and likewiſe the future fate, the decline, and total ruin of their empire.

"By this which we have already ſet "down, is ſeen the beginning and end of "the three firſt monarchies of the world.— "That of ROME which made the fourth, "was alſo at this time almoſt at the higheſt. "We have left it flouriſhing in the middle "of the field, having rooted up or cut "down all that kept it from the eyes and "admiration of the world. But after ſome "continuance, it ſhall begin to loſe the "beauty it had; the ſtorms of ambition "ſhall beat her great boughs and branches "one againſt another; her leaves ſhall fall "off, her limbs wither, and a rabble of "barbarous nations enter the field and "cut her down." Sir *W. R. in fine.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

The ill reception of the Rhodian *ambaſſadors at* Rome.
Antiochus Epiphanes *haughtily treated by a* Roman *ambaſſador.*
Compliments to the Senate from Antiochus, *the* Ptolemys *of* Egypt *and* Maſiniſſa.
The Prætor Anicius *reduces the* Epirots; *and, in conjunction with five Commiſſioners from* Rome, *ſettles the government of* Illyricum.
Æmilius Paullus, *aſſiſted by ten Commiſſioners, ſettles the affairs of* Macedon.
Their conduct with regard to the Ætolians, Achæans *and other* Greeks.
Æmilius *frames a body of laws for the* Macedonians. *His cruelty to the* Epirots. *He with difficulty obtains a triumph at* Rome.
The death of Perſes.
The Romans *reſtore to* Cotys *his captive ſon.*

IT is needleſs to ſay any thing of the joy at *Rome* upon the news of the victory at *Pydna*. The *Romans* began now to look with a haughty and menacing eye, upon all thoſe of their allies whoſe behaviour had diſpleaſed them during the war of *Macedon*. Y. of *R*. 585. B. f. *J. C*. 167. 284 Conſul p.

The Republic of *Rhodes* (as was before * obſerved) had arrogantly undertaken to put an end to the war between *Perſes* and the *Romans*. At what time ſoever her ambaſſadors came to *Rome* on this affair (for the time is uncertain) they had not their audience till after the news of *Æmilius*'s victory [a]. The Senate, who knew upon what buſineſs theſe Miniſters had been ſent, maliciouſly called for them now, and bid them perform their commiſſion. *Ageſipolis*, chief of the embaſſy, ſaid, "That "they had come in the view of mediating a peace, believing, that the "war was extremely burthenſom to the *Greeks* in general, and, on ac- * See p. 430. *Liv*. B. 45. c. 3. *Polyb*. Legat. 88.

[a] *Livy* having before related (B. 44. c. 14.) that theſe very ambaſſadors had been admitted to audience in the conſulſhip of *Marcius*, and had then ſpoken arrogantly and in threatning terms to the ſenate, now tells us, that, according to ſome authors, theſe miniſters had no audience till after the battle of *Pydna*. That this laſt account is true, may be gathered from *Polybius*, who had a ſhare in the tranſactions of thoſe times. He tells us, that the *Rhodians* indeed ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome*, in the Conſulſhip of *Marcius*; but that their buſineſs was to *renew their friendſhip* with the *Romans*, to vindicate *Rhodes* from the charge of diſaffection to *Rome*, and to aſk leave to export a certain quantity of corn from *Sicily* He adds, that they were very graciouſly received, and civilly diſmiſſed. *Legat*. 80. 86 88. and 93.

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J. C.* 167. 284 Conſul. p.

"count of the expences that attended it, even to the *Romans* themſelves. But ſince it was now brought to that concluſion, which the *Rhodians* had always wiſhed, they congratulated with the Senate and people of *Rome* on ſo happy an event." To which the Fathers anſwered, "That the *Rhodians* had not ſent this embaſſy, from any regard to the welfare of *Greece*, or from affection to the *Roman* people; but for the ſervice of *Perſes*. For, had they ſtudied the good of *Greece*, they would have offered their mediation, when *Perſes* had his camp in *Theſſaly*, and, for two years together, ravaged the lands of the *Greeks*. But as the mediating ſcheme was not thought of till the *Roman* army had entered *Macedon*, and *Perſes* had ſmall hopes to eſcape, it plainly ſhewed, that the only view of the *Rhodian* Republic was, as much as in her lay, to reſcue the *Macedonian* out of his danger. Her ambaſſadors therefore had no title to be received by the Senate as friends, or to expect a friendly anſwer."

How exceſſively the *Roman* pride was ſwelled by their conqueſt of *Macedon*, we have a remarkable proof in what paſt, about this time, between their ambaſſador and the King of *Syria*.

Strabo. B. 16. p. 744.

After the death of *Antiochus* ſurnamed *the Great* (who was killed by the people of *Elymais*, for plundering the temple of *Jupiter Belus* in their country) his ſon, *Seleucus Philopator*, ſucceeded him in the throne. *Seleucus* ſent for his younger brother *Antiochus*, who had been a hoſtage at *Rome*, ever ſince the concluſion of the peace between his father and the Republic; and gave in exchange for him his own ſon *Demetrius*. Before *Antiochus* arrived in *Syria*, *Seleucus* was poiſoned, and the kingdom uſurped by *Heliodorus*, the treaſurer. Nevertheleſs, by the aſſiſtance of *Eumenes*, King of *Pergamus*, *Antiochus* expelled the Uſurper, and ſeated himſelf in the throne, aſſuming the ſurname of *Epiphanes* [or the Illuſtrious.] He entered into a war againſt his nephew *Ptolemy Philometor*, King of *Egypt*, about *Cœle-Syria* and *Paleſtine*; vanquiſhed the *Egyptians* in two battles; and took *Philometor* priſoner. Hereupon the *Alexandrians* declared *Ptolemy Euergetes* or *Phyſcon*, King, in the room of his elder brother. The *Syrian*, under pretence of reſtoring the latter to his kingdom, renewed the war againſt the *Ægyptians*, defeated them in a ſea fight, took *Peluſium*, and laid ſiege to *Alexandria*, where *Phyſcon* had ſhut himſelf up with his ſiſter *Cleopatra*. Theſe applied to the Senate for relief; and the Conſcript Fathers, not thinking it for the intereſt of the Republic, that *Antiochus* ſhould annex *Egypt* to his dominions, diſpatched ambaſſadors to put an end to the war between the two Kings. *C. Popillius Lænas*, *C. Decimius* and *C. Hoſtilius*, the perſons commiſſioned on this affair, had orders to addreſs themſelves firſt to *Antiochus*, and then to *Ptolemy*, ſignifying to each, that if he perſiſted in carrying on the war, the people of *Rome* would hold him for their enemy. In the mean time, as the *Syrian* found it difficult to reduce *Alexandria*, in it's preſent

App. in *Syriac.* p. 116.

Polyb. Legat. 72. & 82. *Hieronym.* in *Dan.* c. 11. ap. *Prideaux.*

Liv. B. 44. c. 19.

Liv. B. 45. c. 11.

preſent ſtrength, and hoped that he ſhould ſucceed better in his deſigns when the brothers were weakened by the continuation of the war between themſelves, he returned home; leaving *Philometor* in poſſeſſion of *Memphis* and all *Egypt*, except *Alexandria* and *Peluſium*. This laſt town he kept in his own hands, that he might enter the country when he pleaſed. The brothers perceived the ambitious views of the *Syrian*; to diſappoint which they came to an accommodation, by the good offices of their ſiſter *Cleopatra*, and agreed to reign jointly. *Antiochus*, vexed to ſee his projects diſconcerted, reſolved now to make war upon both the brothers. In purſuance of this reſolution, he ſent a fleet to *Cyprus*, and marched with his land army towards *Egypt*. At his coming to *Rhinocolura*, ambaſſadors met him from *Ptolemy* the elder, to entreat him that he would not deſtroy his own work; but ſuffer their maſter quietly to wear the crown he owed to his friendſhip. The *Syrian* anſwered, that he would neither draw off his fleet nor his army, unleſs *Cyprus*, *Peluſium*, and all the land on that branch of the *Nile* where *Peluſium* ſtood, were yielded to him in perpetuity. Theſe conditions being rejected, *Antiochus* by force of arms ſubdued all *Egypt*, except *Alexandria*. He was on his march to beſiege this city, and within four miles of it, when the *Roman* ambaſſadors (who, having paſſed through *Greece* and *Aſia*, had been ſeveral months in their journey) came up to him. The *Syrian*, while a hoſtage at *Rome*, had contracted a friendſhip with *Popillius*, the chief of the embaſſy, and therefore immediately offered him his hand. But the *Roman*, inſtead of accepting the civility, put into the King's hand a writing, which contained the Senate's decree; and bid him read that. *Antiochus* read it; and then ſaid, *He would conſult with his friends*. Inſtantly *Popillius*, with a vine twig, drew a circle round the King: *Your anſwer*, ſaid the ambaſſador, *before you go out of this circle*. *Antiochus* [c], ſtunned at the imperiouſneſs of the command, heſitated for ſome moments; after which he replied, *The Senate ſhall be obeyed*. He would hardly have been ſo ſubmiſſive (ſays *Polybius*) had he not received advice of *Æmilius*'s victory over *Perſes*. And it may be worth obſerving, that this haughty *Popillius* was the man who, when the *Roman* affairs went ill in *Macedon*, employed ſuch ſoft and gentle words to the *Achæans* and *Ætolians*. Nor did *Antiochus*, during that war, pay any regard to the mediation of the *Romans*, who had ſent ambaſſadors to terminate the war between him and *Ptolemy*. But times were changed; and the *Syrian* now moſt obſequiouſly withdrew his fleet and army, and went back into his own country.

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef. *J. C.* 167. 284 Conſul. p.

Polyb. Legat. 92.

Legat. 91.

Popillius and his collegues having ſent away *Antiochus*, and eſtabliſhed a peace between the two *Ptolemys*, left *Egypt*, and returned to *Rome*.

Liv. B. 45. c. 12.

[c] It was this *Antiochus* who pillaged *Jeruſalem*, filled the ſtreets with dead bodies and the temple with profanations. A memorable event which the prophet *Daniel** had foretold.

* Dan. ix. 31.

† 1 *Maccab.* c. i. *Joſeph. Antiq.* B. 12.

Y. of *R.* 585. Bef *J. C* 167. 284 Conſul-p They were followed thither by ambaſſadors from *Syria* and *Egypt*. The *Syrians*, on the part of their King, aſſured the Conſcript Fathers, "That he preferred a peace, that was agreeable to the Senate, before "any victory; than he had obeyed the orders of their ambaſſadors, as "if they had been the commands of the Gods; that he congratulated "the *Romans* on their victory over *Perſes*; and that, had they required "it of him, he would have zealouſly aſſiſted them in the war." The Senate anſwered, "That *Antiochus* had done well in obeying the am-"baſſadors, and that his conduct herein was very agreeable to the Re-"public." Then the *Ægyptian* miniſters, and, after them *Maſgaba*, the ſon of *Maſiniſſa*, had audience of the Fathers. Their ſpeeches were ſuch as if they had vy'd one with another, which ſhould flatter the *Romans* moſt. The *Egyptians* ſaid, "That the two Kings "and *Cleopatra* thought themſelves more indebted to the Senate and "people of *Rome*, than to their parents, or even the immortal Gods." And as for *Maſgaba*, he truly, on the part of his father, (having firſt reckoned all the horſe, foot, elephants, and corn, he had ſent into *Macedon* in four years paſt) "was overwhelmed with confuſion on "two accounts; the one, that the Senate, to have theſe ſupplies, had "employed a requeſt, and not a command; the other, that they had ſent "money for the corn." He added, "*Maſiniſſa* never forgets that "he owes his kingdom and all its augmentations to you: He indeed, "by your favour, enjoys the revenues of it, but always conſiders you "as the Proprietors and Lords of *Numidia*. This, at my departure, "he inſtructed me to ſay. Having afterwards heard of your victory "over *Perſes*, he diſpatched ſome horſemen after me, to bid me aſſure "you that he was overjoyed at your ſucceſs; and beg that you would "permit him to come to *Rome*, if he ſhould not be troubleſom, and "offer, in thankſgiving, a ſacrifice to *Jupiter* in the capitol." The ſub-ſtance of the Senate's anſwer was, "That the *Romans* had done *Ma-"ſiniſſa* the favours he mentioned; that he had deſerved them; "and that he was a very grateful and a very honeſt man. As to his "journey, they ſaid, it would be ſufficient if he thanked God at home; "his ſon might do it for him at *Rome*."

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p. *Liv.* B. 45. c. 16. *Q. Ælius Pætus* and *M. Junius Pennus* were raiſed to the Conſulate. But the Senate continued *Æmilius* in his command in *Macedon*, as Pro-conſul; and *Anicius* and *Octavius* in their reſpective provinces as Pro-prætors. They alſo appointed ten Commiſſioners to regulate the affairs of *Macedon*, and five to ſettle thoſe of *Illyricum*, in concert with the two Generals.

c. 26. *Anicius*, before theſe Commiſſioners arrived, marched with part of his army into *Epirus*. All the country immediately ſubmitted to him, except four towns, *Paſſaron*, *Tecmon*, *Phylax*, and *Horreum*; and not one of theſe ſtood a ſiege. Two men, *Antinous* and *Theodotus*, who in concert

concert with *Cephalus*, had brought about the defection of the *Epirots*, and who deſpaired of pardon, would have perſuaded the inhabitants of *Paſſeron* to hold out againſt the *Romans*, and prefer death to ſlavery: But the council of a certain young citizen of rank, who adviſed them to open their gates, had more weight with the multitude. *Antinous* and his friend, ſeeing themſelves thus deſerted, ruſhed out of the town, attacked a *Roman* guard, and there found the death they ſought. *Cephalus*, who had engaged the people of *Tecmon* to ſhut their gates, being alſo ſlain, both theſe towns ſurrendered to the Proprætor; and their example was ſoon followed by *Phylax* and *Horreum*. Y. of R. 586. Bef. J. C. 166. 285 Conſul-p.

The reduction of *Epirus* being thus compleated, *Anicius* diſtributed his troops into winter quarters, and returned to *Scodra* in *Illyricum*. Here he found the five commiſſioners from *Rome*; with whom having conſulted, he called an aſſembly of the principal men of the country, and, in conformity to a decree of the Conſcript Fathers, declared, "That the Senate and people of *Rome* granted liberty to the *Illyrians*: "That the *Roman* gariſons ſhould be withdrawn from all the towns, "fortreſſes and caſtles in the country: That thoſe of the *Illyrian* towns "which, before or during the war with *Gentius*, had come over to the "*Romans*, ſhould be exempted from all taxes: the reſt pay but a moie-"ty of what they had uſed to pay to their Kings." *Illyricum* was then divided into three parts, independent of each other.

During theſe tranſactions *Æmilius* was making a tour of pleaſure, and viſiting all the famous cities of *Greece*: He would not, any where, inquire into the diſpoſitions of the inhabitants with regard to *Perſes*, that he might give them no alarm. Soon after his return from this excurſion, he proceeded to buſineſs; the ten commiſſioners, who were to aſſiſt him in ſettling the affairs of *Macedon*, being arrived. He had ordered c. 29. ten of the principal men out of each city of the kingdom, to attend him on a certain day at *Amphipolis*, bringing with them all the public regiſters, and the King's money. When this day came, he aſcended the tribunal with the *Roman* commiſſioners, and, having cauſed ſilence to be made, pronounced, in *Latin*, to the aſſembly, what had been determined by the Senate of *Rome* and the council preſent, in relation to *Macedon*. The Prætor *Octavius* afterwards explained to them the whole in *Greek*. It was to this effect. "All the *Macedonians* ſhall be free, and "enjoy their cities, lands and [b] laws, and create annual Magiſtrates. "They ſhall pay to the *Roman* Republic half the tribute they former-"ly paid their Kings. *Macedon* ſhall be divided into four cantons, of

[b] When *Livy* ſays *Laws*, he muſt mean the *By-Laws* of the ſeveral cities or communities; for we find that *Æmilius* made a body of laws for the government of the whole: If it be not rather true that, in promiſing them that they ſhould retain their own laws, he acted, as in other parts of his conduct, without the leaſt regard to truth or humanity.

"which

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J.C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p

"which *Amphipolis*, *Pella*, *Theſſalonica* and *Pelagonia* ſhall be the capi-
"tals. In theſe chief cities ſhall be held the particular Diets of each
"canton; and there the Magiſtrates ſhall be elected, and the tribute
"money paid. No perſon ſhall be ſuffered to marry, or to purchaſe
"lands, or houſes, out of his own canton. No *Macedonian* ſhall be
"ſuffered to work in gold or ſilver mines; but they may in thoſe of
"copper and iron."

The article of chuſing their own Magiſtrates, and that of paying but half their former tribute, were ſome conſolation to the *Macedonians*; but did not compenſate them for ſeparating the members of the national body, and thereby depriving each member of all aſſiſtance from the reſt. *Livy* ſays, the *Macedonians* themſelves were not aware how contemptible each part became by this diviſion.

c. 28. *Æmilius*, in his return from his tour of pleaſure, had been met by a crowd of *Ætolians* in mourning, who came to make heavy complaints to him. *Lyciſcus* and *Tiſippus*, two of their countrymen, whom their credit with the *Romans* rendered all-powerful in *Ætolia*, had, with a body of ſoldiers, lent them by *Bæbius*, ſurrounded the Diet, and maſſacred 550 of the principal men of the nation, baniſhed others, and given the eſtates, both of the murdered and the exiled, to their acccuſers[d]. The Proconſul had deferred his anſwer to theſe complainants, and bid them meet him at *Amphipolis*. He now, in conjunction with the Commiſſioners, examined into the affair. But the only enquiry was, Who had favoured *Perſes*, and who the *Romans*; not who had done, or who had ſuffered wrong. The murderers were conſequently acquitted of all injuſtice, and the baniſhment of the exiles confirmed. Only *Bæbius* was condemned for having employed *Roman* ſoldiers in the maſſacre.

c. 31.

Sir *W. R.* Whatever might be ſaid to palliate the cruelty of the *Roman* proceedings, in regard to thoſe nations that had been conquered by them, certainly their behaviour towards the *Greeks*, that were not ſubjects to *Rome*, could deſerve no better name than mere tyranny and ſhameleſs perjury. The *Greeks*, during the war, had been divided into three parties, which we may call by the names of the *Romaniſts*, the *Perſeites*, and the *Patriots*; which laſt had nothing at heart but the preſervation of the laws and liberty of their country. The two former may properly be ſtiled factions; becauſe, as *Livy* tells us, they acted upon views only of private intereſt. Since the defeat of *Perſes*, the *Romaniſts* had every where got poſſeſſion of all offices and honours; and theſe men employed their credit with the *Romans* to ruin both the *Patriots* and the *Perſeites*. Coming in great numbers to *Æmilius*, they gave information

[d] *Lyciſcus* had been inſtrumental in diſappointing *Perſes* of his hopes, when, during the war, he made a journey into *Ætolia*, as has been mentioned, p. 421; and the men on whom this maſſacre was committed, were probably thoſe who had invited *Perſes* thither.

againſt

againſt the open and ſecret enemies of *Rome*; by the latter, meaning the Patriots. The Proconſul, by his mandates, ſummoned, from *Ætolia*, *Acarnania*, *Epirus* and *Bœotia*, all thoſe whoſe names had been given in to him; and ordered them to follow him to *Rome*, there to be tried. A. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p.

With regard to the *Achæans*, *Æmilius*, and the other ten Tyrants, proceeded with more form. *Callicrates*, that traitor to his country before-mentioned, had given in a liſt of all thoſe of his countrymen whom he had a mind to deſtroy; but it was not judged adviſeable to ſummon theſe by letter; becauſe the *Achæans*, having more ſpirit than the other *Greeks*, might poſſibly not obey; and perhaps they might maſſacre *Callicrates* and his adherents. Beſides, though the Commiſſioners had, among the King of *Macedon*'s papers, found letters from the leading men of the other States; yet they had found none from any *Achæan*. They deputed therefore two of their own body, *C. Claudius* and *Cn. Domitius*, to negotiate with the *Achæan* diet. One of theſe deputies, having firſt complained in the aſſembly, that ſome of the chief among them had, with money and other means, befriended *Perſes*, modeſtly deſired, that all ſuch men might be condemned to death: whom, after ſentence given, he would name to them. *After ſentence given* (cried out the whole aſſembly) What juſtice is this? Name them firſt, and let them anſwer. If they cannot clear themſelves we ſhall quickly condemn them. Then ſaid the *Roman* impudently, *All your Prætors, as many as have led your armies, are guilty of this crime.* If this be true, anſwered *Xeno*, (a man of temper, and confident in his innocence) then have I alſo been a friend to *Perſes*; for I have commanded the *Achæan* army. But if any one accuſe me, I am ready to anſwer him, either here immediately, or before the Senate at *Rome*. The *Roman*, laying hold of theſe words, replied, *You ſay right: that will be the beſt way. Do you, with all the reſt, clear yourſelves at* Rome *before the Senate.* Then, by an edict, he ordered above a thouſand of the principal *Achæans*, there named, to be carried to *Rome:* a proceeding unprecedented, and more tyrannical than any thing done by *Philip* of *Macedon*, or his ſon *Alexander the Great*. Thoſe Princes, all powerful as they were, never thought of ſummoning their enemies, among the *Greeks*, to come to *Macedon* to be tried; but left the judgment of ſuch matters to the Council of the *Amphyctions*. See page 395. *Pauſan.* in *Achaic.* c. 10.

This may be juſtly termed the captivity of *Greece*, ſo many of the worthieſt men being torn from their native homes, for no other cauſe but their love to their country, and for being *Grecians* in *Greece*; though the *Romans* held it the greateſt of crimes for a member of their Republic not to be a *Roman*. At the coming of the accuſed to *Rome*, the Senate without hearing them, and under pretence that they had been already condemned by their own countrymen, diſperſed them into ſeveral cities of *Hetruria*, there to be held in cuſtody. Frequent embaſſies were Sir *W. R.* *Polyb.* Legat. 105. 137.

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p. were ſent from *Achaia* to remonſtrate to the Senate that theſe men had not been condemned by the *Achæans*; and to beg that the Fathers would either take cognizance of the cauſe themſelves, or ſend the captives to be tried at home; where ſtrict juſtice ſhould be done. The Senate anſwered, *That they thought it not for the intereſt of* Achaia *that thoſe men ſhould return thither*. Neither could any ſollicitation of the *Achæans*, who never ceaſed to importune the Senate for the liberty of their countrymen, prevail, till after ſeventeen years, when ſcarce 300 of them were enlarged; of whom *Polybius* [e] the hiſtorian was one. All the reſt had either died in confinement; or, for attempting to eſcape, had ſuffered death as malefactors.

Liv. B. 45. c. 32. To return to *Æmilius*. After *Claudius* and *Domitius* had performed their commiſſion in *Achaia*, the Proconſul convened a ſecond general aſſembly of the *Macedonians*; and gave them a body of new laws for their better government: laws ſo wiſe, and ſo judiciouſly contrived, ſays *Livy*, that time and experience found nothing to correct in them. And the more effectually to ſecure the peace of the government, he ordered that all the chief nobles, all thoſe who had been Generals of armies, Commanders of fleets and gariſons, or had been employed in embaſſies, or in any miniſtry under the King, ſhould, on pain of death, with their children (thoſe above fifteen years of age) leave *Macedon* and go into *Italy*. Theſe men accuſtomed to luxury and expence, to make ſervile court to the King, and to inſult their inferiors, would, he thought, be impatient of that equality, which laws and liberty introduced.

After this the Proconſul celebrated games at *Amphipolis*, and made ſumptuous feaſts for his friends; that is to ſay, for thoſe who had betrayed the liberty of their country to the *Romans*. One part of the ſhew was burning, in a great heap, all ſuch of the *Macedonian* weapons as he did not think worth carrying to *Rome:* another was expoſing to view all the ſtatues, paintings, and rich moveables, of which he had plundered the King's palaces; doubtleſs a moſt agreeable ſight to the *Macedonian* ſpectators. All theſe magnificent ſpoils he gave in charge to *Octavius* the Admiral; and, having exhorted the *Macedonians* to make a good uſe of the liberty granted them by the *Romans*, and preſerve union among themſelves; and having diſpatched his ſon *Fabius* and *Scipio Naſica* to ravage the country of the *Illyrians*, who had aſſiſted *Perſes*, [and to whom *Anicius*, by order of the Senate, had granted pardon and liberty *] he ſet out for *Epirus*.

* See p. 445.

The Senate being deſirous to preſerve entire the *Macedonian* treaſure, and yet to gratify the ſoldiers of *Æmilius*, had ſent orders that all the towns of *Epirus*, which had favoured *Perſes*, ſhould be given up to be plundered by the army. To uſe the words of a great hiſtorian, "This

Sir *W. R.*

[e] *Polybius* had not been ſent into *Hetruria*; *Scipio* and *Fabius*, the ſons of *Æmilius*, having obtained leave for him to ſtay at *Rome*. *Polyb. Excerp. B.* 31.

" was a barbarous and horrible cruelty; as alſo it was performed by " *Æmilius* with miſchievous ſubtilty." Being come to *Paſſaron*, he, by letter, communicated to *Anicius*, who lay encamped not far off, what was going to be done, that he might not be alarmed at the execution. He then diſpatched, into the ſeveral towns, certain Centurions, who were to pretend commiſſion from him to withdraw the gariſons, that the *Epirots* might be free like the *Macedonians*. The ſame officers had alſo inſtructions to ſend to him ten of the principal inhabitants of each town. To theſe, when they came, he gave ſtrict command to ſee, that all the gold and ſilver, both in the temples and private houſes, were, on a certain day, carried into the market places of the reſpective towns; and (according to *Appian*) aſſured them, that, on their punctual obedience to this command, thoſe towns ſhould have a full pardon of all paſt faults. Under pretence of aſſiſting theſe collectors in their buſineſs, and of furniſhing a guard to take charge of the money, he ſent with them ſome cohorts; contriving it ſo, that theſe cohorts ſhould arrive at the reſpective towns at one and the ſame time. On the day appointed, and to the places appointed, the gold and ſilver was all brought, and delivered to the *Roman* officers; who then, purſuant to their inſtructions, gave the ſignal for the ſoldiers to pillage the houſes and ſeize the inhabitants. Seventy towns were ſacked in one day, and 150,000 perſons made ſlaves [f]. The walls of theſe places were afterwards demoliſhed.

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p.

Livy, B. 45. c. 34.

" It may be granted," (ſays Sir *W. R.*) " That ſome of the *Epirots* " deſerved puniſhment, as having favoured *Perſes*. But ſince they " among this people that were thought guilty of this offence, yea, or " but coldly affected to the *Romans*, had been already ſent into *Italy*, " there to receive their due; and ſince this nation, in general, was not " only at the preſent in good obedience, but had, even in this war, " done good ſervice to the *Romans*, I hold this act ſo wicked [g], that I " ſhould not believe it, had any one writer delivered the contrary."

After

[f] When the booty came to be divided, the ſhare of each foot ſoldier amounted, according to *Livy*, to 6*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.* and of each horſeman, to 12*l.* 18*s.* 4*d.* of our money. But according to the text of *Plutarch*, as we have it, each man's ſhare came to no more than about 7*s.* It would ſeem, that neither of theſe reckonings can be true, if we ſuppoſe the ſlaves to have been ſold for the benefit of the ſoldiery.

[g] *Polybius*, who was an intimate friend of *Scipio*, the ſon of *Æmilius*, reports, that the Proconſul, with regard to what has been above related of the *Ætolians* and *Achæans*, did not approve of the calumnies brought by *Lyciſcus* and *Callicrates* againſt their reſpective countrymen. And *Plutarch* tells us, that in this treatment of the *Epirots*, *Æmilius* acted contrary to his natural temper, which was gentle and humane: But he does not ſay, that *Æmilius* wept for the miſeries of this wretched people, as he did (when the ſhabby ambaſſadors came to him) for the humiliation of a King, whom the ſame Hiſtorian repreſents as the moſt cowardly, avaricious, perfidious, cruel, ignominious tyrant that ever diſgraced a throne. *Æmilius* is reported to have

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J.C.* 166. 285 Conſul. p.

After this exploit, *Æmilius* marched to *Oricum*, where being rejoined by *Naſica* and *Fabius*, he embarked with his whole army, and arrived ſafe in *Italy*. *Anicius*, and *Octavius*, with the fleet, followed him a few days after. The Senate decreed triumphs to all three. But the triumph of *Æmilius* was oppoſed, in the aſſembly of the people, by his own ſoldiers, who complained of his exceſſive ſeverity in diſcipline, and of his injuſtice in withholding from them the ſpoils of *Macedon*. *Servius Galba*, a Tribune of the ſecond Legion, and a perſonal enemy of the General, harangued for four hours againſt him. The queſtion was not put till the ſecond day; when, the Comitium being thronged with ſoldiers, the firſt Tribes that gave their ſuffrages refuſed the triumph. Hereupon the principal Senators cried out, It was a ſhame to deny *Æmilius* an honour he had ſo well deſerved; and that, at this rate, Generals would become ſubject to the caprice and covetouſneſs of their ſoldiers. *M. Servilius*, a man of conſular dignity, and, if we may believe *Plutarch*, of ſuch proweſs that he had ſlain twenty three enemies in ſingle combat, prevailed with the Tribunes of the Commons, to call back the Tribes which had already voted, and make them give their ſuffrages anew. The ſame conſular, with permiſſion of the Tribunes, made a long ſpeech of expoſtulation to the people, and with ſuch effect, that the Tribes unanimouſly decreed a triumph to *Æmilius*.

The number and excellence of the ſtatues and paintings, the coſtly vaſes, the rich arms, the great quantities of gold and ſilver expoſed to view in this triumph, made it more pompous [h] than any that had preceded

have been diſintereſted, inſomuch, that notwithſtanding the great opportunities he had of amaſſing wealth, he died but moderately rich: It may be ſo. *Cicero* ſays, a diſregard of wealth was the virtue of thoſe times: But whatever virtues *Æmilius* poſſeſſed, it is very manifeſt, that the *Roman* Senate never had an abler miniſter of execrable fraud and cruelty.

[h] Mr. *Kennet*, from *Plutarch*, gives us the following deſcription of *Æmilius*'s triumph.

"The people erected ſcaffolds in the Forum and Circus, and all the other parts of "the city, where they could beſt behold "the pomp. The ſpectators were clad in "white garments; all the temples were "open and full of garlands and perfumes; "the ways cleared and cleanſed by a great "many officers and tipſtaffs, that drove "away ſuch as thronged the paſſage, or "ſtraggled up and down. This triumph "laſted three days: On the firſt, which "was ſcarce long enough for the ſight, "were to be ſeen, the ſtatues, pictures and "images of an extraordinary bigneſs, which "were taken from the enemy, drawn upon "250 chariots. On the ſecond was carried, "in a great many wains, the faireſt and the "richeſt armour of the *Macedonians*, both "of braſs and ſteel, all newly furbiſhed "and glittering; which, although piled "up with the greateſt art and order, yet "ſeemed to be tumbled on heaps careleſly "and by chance: Helmets were thrown "on ſhields, coats of mail upon greaves, "*Cretan* targets, and *Thracian* bucklers, and quivers of arrows lay huddled "among the horſes bits; and through "theſe appeared the points of naked "ſwords, intermixed with long ſpears. "All theſe arms were tied together with "ſuch a juſt liberty, that they knocked "againſt one another as they were drawn "along, and made a harſh and terrible "noiſe; ſo that the very ſpoils of the conquered

preceded it[1]. What rendered it yet more glorious, was the perſon of ſo conſiderable a monarch, as the King of *Macedon*, led in chains before the chariot of the Victor. *Perſes* had earneſtly begged of *Æmilius* to ſpare

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p.

" quered could not be beheld without " dread. After theſe waggons loaden with " armour, there followed 3000 men, who " carried the ſilver that was coined, in " 750 veſſels, each of which weighed three " talents, and was carried by four men. " Others brought ſilver bowls, and gob- " lets, and cups, all diſpoſed in ſuch or- " der as to make the beſt ſhow, and all " valuable, as well for their bigneſs, as the " thickneſs of their engraved work. On " the third day, early in the morning, firſt " came the trumpeters, who did not ſound " as they were wont in a proceſſion, or ſo- " lemn entry, but ſuch a charge as the " *Romans* uſe when they encourage their " ſoldiers to fight. Next followed young " men girt about with girdles, curiouſly " wrought, who led to the ſacrifice 120 " ſtall'd oxen, with their horns gilded, and " their heads adorned with ribbons and " garlands; and with theſe were boys that " carried platters of ſilver and gold. After " this was brought the gold coin, which " was divided into veſſels that weighed " three talents, like to thoſe that contained " the ſilver; they were in number four- " ſcore wanting three. Theſe were fol- " lowed by thoſe that brought the conſe- " crated bowl, which *Æmilius* cauſed to " be made, that weighed ten talents, and " was all beſet with precious ſtones: Then " were expoſed to view the cups of *Anti-* " *gonus* and *Seleucus*, and ſuch as were " made after the faſhion invented by *The-* " *ricles*, and all the gold plate that was " uſed at *Perſes*'s table. Next to theſe " came *Perſes*'s chariot, in the which his " armour was placed, and on that his " diadem. And, after a little intermiſſion, " the King's children were led captives, " and with them a train of nurſes, maſters, " and governors, who all wept, and " ſtretched forth their hands to the ſpecta- " tors, and taught the little infants to beg " and intreat their compaſſion. There " were two ſons and a daughter, who, by " reaſon of their tender age, were altoge- " ther inſenſible of the greatneſs of their " miſery; which inſenſibility of their con- " dition rendered it much more deplora- " ble; inſomuch that *Perſes* himſelf was " ſcarce regarded as he went along, whilſt " pity had fixed the eyes of the *Romans* " upon the infants, and many of them " could not forbear tears: All beheld the " fight with a mixture of ſorrow and joy, " until the children were paſt. After his " children and their attendants, came *Per-* " *ſes* himſelf, clad all in black, and wearing " ſlippers, after the faſhion of his country: " He looked like one altogether aſtoniſhed " and deprived of reaſon, through the " greatneſs of his misfortunes. Next fol- " lowed a great company of his friends, " whoſe countenances were disfigured with " grief, and who teſtified, to all that be- " held them, by their tears, and their con- " tinual looking upon *Perſes*, that it was " his hard fortune they ſo much lamented, " and that they were regardleſs of their " own.——After theſe were carried 400 " crowns all made of gold, and ſent from " the cities, by their reſpective ambaſſa- " dors, to *Æmilius*, as a reward due to " his valour. Then he himſelf came ſeated " on a chariot magnificently adorned (a " man worthy to be beheld, even without " theſe enſigns of power) he was clad in " a garment of purple interwoven with " gold, and held out a lawrel-branch in " his right hand. All the army, in like " manner, with boughs of lawrel in their " hands, and divided into bands and com- " panies, followed the chariot of their " commander, ſome ſinging odes (accord- " ing to the uſual cuſtom) mingled with " raillery; others ſongs of triumph, and " the praiſes of *Æmilius*'s deeds, who was " admired and accounted happy by all " men, yet unenvy'd by every one that " was good." *Kennet. Antiq. P.* II. B. 4. *c.* 16.

[1] Authors are not agreed about the ſum *Æmilius* brought into the treaſury. *Valerius Antias* reckons this ſum at (*millies ducenties*) 120 millions of little ſeſterces *. *Livy* thinks, from the number of waggons employ'd to carry

* 968,750 l. *Arbuthnot.*

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J.C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p. *Cic.* in *Verr.* 5. 30.

ſpare him this indignity; and had received for anſwer, *That what he aſked was in his own power.*

It was the cuſtom, that, when the triumphant Conqueror turned his chariot up towards the capitol, he commanded the captives to be led to priſon, and there put to death; that ſo the glory of the victor, and the miſery of the vanquiſhed, might be, in the ſame moment, at the utmoſt.

* See p. 440 *Plut.* & *Diod. Sic.* ap. *Phot.*

But as *Æmilius* had * encouraged *Perſes* to an almoſt certain hope of life, from the known clemency of the *Romans* to conquered Kings and nations; this King was only thrown into the common goal at *Alba* [in the country of the *Marſi.*] " He was afterwards[k], at the interceſſion of " *Æmilius*, removed to a more commodious habitation; where, accord- " ing to moſt authors, he ſtarved himſelf, but, according to ſome, the " ſoldiers who had him in cuſtody deſtroyed him, by not ſuffering him " to ſleep." Thus writes *Plutarch. Mithridates*, in a letter to *Arſaces*, King of *Parthia*, ſays, " that the *Romans*, after many battles, " between them and *Perſes* with various ſucceſs, entered into a treaty " with him; and though, upon the altars of *Samothrace*, they pledged " the *Roman* faith for the ſafety of his perſon; yet did theſe ſubtle " deceivers, theſe inventors of the arts of perfidy, put an end to the " life of that Prince, by depriving him of the neceſſary refreſhment of " ſleep."

Diod. Sicul. in fragm. *Salluſt.* fragm. L. 4.

The Kings daughter and one of his ſons died ſoon; it is uncertain how: his other ſon earned his living by following the trade of a working toyman; but was afterwards preferred to be a writing clerk in one of the offices at *Rome*. In ſuch poverty ended the Royal houſe of *Macedon*, about 160 years after the death of that monarch, to whoſe ambition this whole earth ſeemed too narrow.

Livy, B. 45. c. 40. *Plut.* life of *Æmil.*

Æmilius Paullus, in the height of his glory, had the mortification to loſe two ſons; the one five days before his triumph, the other three days after it: A loſs which he bore wiſely, telling the people (when, according to cuſtom, he gave them an account of his ſervices) that, in the courſe of human things, great proſperities, ſuch as they had lately experienced, being uſually followed by great adverſity, he had prayed to the Gods, that the calamities, to be apprehended, might fall upon

carry it, that it muſt have been much more. *Velleius Paterc.* values it at (*bis millies centies*) 210 millions of little ſeſterces †; and *Pliny* at (*bis millies trecenties*) 230 millions of the ſame ſpecies ‡. *Cicero* (*de Offic. L.* 2. *c.* 22.) tells us, that *Æmilius* brought ſo much money from *Macedon*, that the *Roman* people were no more taxed from that time. And *Plutarch* (*in Æmil.*) ſays, that they were not taxed till the Conſulſhip of *Hirtius* and *Panſa*, *i. e.* the year after *Julius Cæſar* was killed, and of *Rome* 710. But this immunity from taxes was no doubt chiefly owing to the great tribute paid by the provinces, and the immenſe ſums brought into the treaſury, at ſeveral times, by *Roman* Generals.

† 1,695,312 l. 10 s. *Arbuthn.*

‡ 1,856,770 l. 16 s. 8 d.

[k] *Livy* ſpeaks, as if *Perſes*, by the Senate's direction, was decently lodged and entertained, even at his firſt going to *Alba*. B. 45. *c.* 42.

him,

him, rather than on the public: That his triumph having been immediately preceded by the funeral of one of his ſons, and cloſely followed by that of another (ſo that, of four ſons, not one remained to perpetuate his houſe and name; his two elder having paſſed by adoption into other families) he hoped, the Gods, ſatisfy'd with his private misfortune, would ſpare the commonwealth, and continue to make it flouriſh in all proſperity. A. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul p.

The triumph of *Æmilius* was ſoon followed by thoſe of *Octavius*, Admiral of the fleet, and *Anicius*, the conqueror of *Illyricum*. In the latter appeared King *Gentius* with his wife and children, and many of the *Illyrian* Nobles: But *Octavius* had neither captives in his proceſſion, nor ſpoils to adorn his ſhew.

Among the priſoners taken in the *Macedonian* war, was a ſon of *Cotys*, King of the *Odryſians* in *Thrace*. *Cotys* ſent ambaſſadors to apologize for his having aided the enemies of *Rome*. He alledged, in excuſe, that he had been forced to give hoſtages to *Perſes*; and he offered a ranſom for his ſon, and for thoſe hoſtages now in the hands of the *Romans*. The fathers anſwered, "That they had not forgot the ancient friendſhip between the Republic and the *Thracian* Kings his anceſtors: That his having given hoſtages was the accuſation, and would never ſerve for a defence; ſince *Perſes* could at no time be very formidable to the *Thracians*; leaſt of all, when engaged in a war againſt the *Romans*: That though *Cotys* had preferred the friendſhip of the *Macedonian* King to that of *Rome*, yet they would leſs conſider his demerit than what became their own dignity: That they would ſend back his ſon and the hoſtages: And that the gifts, beſtowed by the *Roman* people, were always free; becauſe they preferred the gratitude of the receivers to any compenſation whatſoever." *Livy*, B. 45. c. 42.

The *Romans* having compaſſed all their views in that part of the world, it was much for their intereſt, that *Cotys* ſhould ceaſe to be their enemy; who might otherwiſe have diſturbed their new ſettlement: And it coſt them very little to make this parade of beneficence and magnanimity. *Polyb.* Legat. 96.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Attalus, *who comes from his brother* Eumenes *to congratulate the* Romans *on their victory, diſobliges the Senate, by declining their favours.*

The Rhodians *harſhly treated by the* Romans.

The ſervile flattery of King Pruſias *to the Senate.*

They refuſe to receive a viſit from Eumenes *King of* Pergamus.

V. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul p. *Liv.* B. 45. c. 19. *Polyb.* Legat. 93.

OF the many ambaſſadors that came to *Rome* from Kings and States, after the victory over *Perſes*, *Attalus*, and the *Rhodian* Miniſters engaged the attention and curioſity of the public more than all the reſt. *Attalus* came from his brother *Eumenes* to congratulate the *Romans*; and to aſk their aſſiſtance, or countenance at leaſt, againſt the *Gallo Greeks*, who moleſted him. The Senators in general entertained the ambaſſador in a friendly manner; and ſome of the moſt conſiderable privately incited him to requeſt of the Senate a part of his brother's kingdom for himſelf; aſſuring him that it would be granted. *Attalus*, not diſliking the motion, promiſed to do as he was adviſed. But *Stratius* a phyſician (whom *Eumenes*, ſuſpecting what might happen, had ſent to watch *Attalus*'s conduct) repreſented to him, That, by the unanimity between his brother and him, he already reigned in *Pergamus*, and had every thing of a King but the title; that *Eumenes* was infirm, could not live long, and had no heirs but him. [For the King of *Pergamus* had not yet owned that ſon who reigned after him.] By ſuch arguments, *Attalus*, though with difficulty, was prevailed upon to bridle his mad ambition. In his ſpeech therefore to the Senate, he only congratulated the *Romans* on their victory over *Perſes*; deſired that they would, by their authority, reſtrain the *Gallo Greeks* from making incurſions into *Pergamus*; and, in reward of his ſervices in the late war, grant him *Ænos* and *Maronea*. Theſe cities of *Thrace* had been formerly conquered by *Philip* the father of *Perſes*, and had ſince been diſputed with him by *Eumenes*. The Senate, imagining that *Attalus* deſigned to take another opportunity to aſk a part of his brother's kingdom, not only granted him what he now aſked, but, in their preſents to him as ambaſſador, ſhewed ſingular magnificence. *Attalus* would not underſtand their meaning, but left *Rome*, ſatisfied with what he had already obtained. This ſo highly diſpleaſed the Fathers that, while he was yet in *Italy*, they paſſed a decree, declaring *Ænos* and *Maronea* free cities. As to the *Gallo Greeks*, the Senate diſpatched an embaſſy to order them to keep within their own bounds; doubtleſs not caring that they ſhould make a conqueſt of *Pergamus*.

The

The *Rhodians* had lately ſent two embaſſies to *Rome*; the one cloſe after the other; the firſt occaſioned by the rough anſwer before mentioned, that was given to *Ageſipolis*; the ſecond, by the haughty and tyrannical behaviour of *Popillius* and his Collegues at *Rhodes*. Theſe *Roman* ambaſſadors, in their way to *Antiochus Epiphanes*, had landed at *Loryma* in *Caria*. Thither came to them the principal men of the *Rhodians*, earneſtly entreating them "to viſit *Rhodes*" (which was but twenty miles diſtant) "it greatly concerning the ſafety and honour of the city, that "they, by informing themſelves, upon the ſpot, of the ſtate of things, "ſhould be able to report the truth to the Senate." The *Romans* were not, without great difficulty, prevailed upon to ſtop their voyage. And, when they came to *Rhodes*, it was neceſſary to uſe preſſing inſtances before they would condeſcend to honour, with their preſence, an aſſembly of the people. And this honour did not ceaſe the terror of the *Rhodians*, by the manner in which *Popillius* delivered himſelf. His diſcourſe was nothing but reproaches, uttered in the tone of an angry accuſer, and with a ſtern, menacing countenance. But *C. Decimius*, another of the ambaſſadors, ſpoke with more moderation, ſays *Livy*; yet he mentioned all the faults of which he could poſſibly accuſe the *Rhodians*; and theſe faults amounted to no more than that they had made decrees, flattering *Perſes*, and ſent embaſſies of which they had reaſon to be aſhamed and repent: "Nevertheleſs he would by no means have "theſe crimes imputed to the body of the people, but to ſome turbu"lent citizens, on whom alone the puniſhment ought to fall." In ſhort he was ſo moderate, as to deſire, that only all thoſe who had ſhewed themſelves favourers of *Perſes*, by attempting to bring about a peace, ſhould be put to death. The multitude, glad to have the blame removed from themſelves, applauded the diſcourſe; and inſtantly paſſed a decree, condemning to death all who ſhould be convicted of having done or ſaid any thing for *Perſes*, and againſt the *Romans*. Of thoſe whom this decree affected, ſome had left the city before *Popillius* arrived; others killed themſelves; the reſt were executed.

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p.

Liv. B. 45. c. 10.

Such abſolute ſubmiſſion to the will of the *Romans*, one would naturally think, ſhould have procured the *Rhodian* ambaſſadors a ready and a favourable audience of the Senate. Yet they were not only refuſed a hearing, but the Conſul, by order of the Fathers, ſignified to them, that they ſhould not be entertained as ambaſſadors from a ſtate in friendſhip with *Rome*. More than this, *Juventius Thalna*, the Prætor *Peregrinus*, moved the people to declare war againſt *Rhodes*. Hereupon the ambaſſadors went about, in mourning habits, ſolliciting with tears the favour of the principal citizens. And now two of the Tribunes took the part of this diſtreſſed people; and, having made the Prætor come down from the roſtra, ſuffered two of the *Rhodian* embaſſadors, *Philophron* and *Aſtymedes*, to take his place, and, one after another, harangue the aſſembly. They received ſuch

B. 45. c. 20. *Polyb.* Legat. 93.

Y. of *R.* 585 Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p. ſuch an anſwer as freed them from the apprehenſion of a war. At length the Senate alſo admitted them to audience. *Aſtymedes* humbly confeſſed before the Fathers the folly of his Republic, in the late ſteps ſhe had taken with regard to the war between *Rome* and *Macedon*; yet he hoped that her former ſervices would be remembered, and make her faults be overlooked: and in concluſion declared, that if *Rome* ſhould reſolve upon a war againſt the *Rhodians*, they were determined not to defend themſelves.

The ambaſſadors then proſtrated themſelves on the ground, holding out olive branches to the Conſcript Fathers. All thoſe of the Senators who had commanded in *Macedon* as Conſuls, Prætors, or Lieutenants, declaimed with heat againſt the *Rhodians*. *Cato* ſpoke in their behalf. There remain only ſome fragments of his ſpeech, preſerved by *A. Gellius*. They are to this effect. *Aul. Gell.* B. 7. c. 3.

" I am very apprehenſive, Conſcript " Fathers, leſt, intoxicated with our preſent great proſperity, we ſhould " be hurried into ſome reſolutions that will, in the end, overthrow it. " Let us not be too haſty; but take time to come to ourſelves.——

" I believe indeed that the *Rhodians* did wiſh, that *Perſes* might not " be conquered by us; and I believe alſo, that many other States and " Nations wiſhed the ſame. Some of them, perhaps, not out of ill will " to us, but fear for themſelves; leſt, if there ſhould be no power re- " maining to check us, and keep us in awe, we ſhould become their " abſolute lords and maſters. Yet the *Rhodians* never openly aſſiſted " *Perſes*. Do but conſider with how much more precaution we act " with regard to our private affairs. There is not one of us, who does " not ſet himſelf to oppoſe, with all his might, whatever he thinks is " doing againſt his intereſt. Yet the *Rhodians* in the like caſe were " quiet and paſſive.——

" Their bittereſt accuſers have not charged them with any thing worſe " than an inclination to be our enemies. And is there any law that " makes inclinations penal? Is there any one of us that would care to " be ſubject to ſuch a law? For my part, I would not. Who has not " wiſhed to have more land than the laws allow? Yet no body is pu- " niſhed for this. Does any man think of rewarding another, for having " had an inclination to perform a good action, which he did not perform? " And ſhall we think of puniſhing the *Rhodians*, becauſe they are ſaid to " have had an inclination to do ſome ill, which however they did not " do?——

" But it is ſaid the *Rhodians* are proud. Be it ſo. What is that to " us? Are we angry becauſe there is, in the world, a people prouder " than we?"

Cato's diſcourſe had probably ſome effect, and the weight of his character more; but it would ſeem (from *Cæſar*'s ſpeech in *Salluſt*) that what chiefly moved the Senate to drop entirely the deſign of attacking *Rhodes*,

Rhodes, was the apprehenſion, leſt it ſhould be thought, that, not revenge, but covetouſneſs, the deſire of plundering that wealthy city, was their motive to the war. They returned however a very harſh anſwer, *That they would not treat the* Rhodians *either as friends or as enemies.* The Fathers ſoon after declared *Lycia* and *Caria* free; provinces which they had given to the *Rhodians* for their ſervices in the war againſt *Antiochus the Great.* And, not long after, they were ordered to evacuate the cities of *Caunus* and *Stratonicea*, which produced a yearly revenue of 120 talents: The firſt they had bought of *Ptolemy*'s Generals for 200 talents; the other had, for ſignal ſervices, been given them by *Antiochus* and *Seleucus.* The *Rhodians* not only ſubmitted to every thing, but decreed the *Romans* a preſent of a crown of gold of great value; which they ſent to *Rome* by their Admiral *Theodotus.* This Miniſter had orders to ſolicit the Senate, that *Rhodes* might be admitted into *an alliance* with the Republic[c]; a favour which in a hundred and forty years, that ſhe had been in *friendſhip* with the *Romans*, ſhe had never before aſked, or even coveted. For it had been the ſteady policy of the *Rhodians* to keep themſelves free from all ſuch engagements as might hinder them from giving their aſſiſtance, whenever they pleaſed, to any King or State that wanted it. *Rhodes* therefore was much courted by all her neighbours; and drew advantage to herſelf both from their hopes and from their fears. A year or more paſſed before the Senate condeſcended to grant the *Rhodians* that alliance which neceſſity now urged them to requeſt.

Y. of *R.* 586. Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p.

Polyb. Legat. 99. & 104.

Polyb. Legat. 93.

See p. 441.

BUT, of all the worſhippers of the *Roman* Senate, there was none ſo devout as *Pruſias* King of *Bithynia.* He had long been in this devotion. Whenever any ambaſſadors came to him from the Republic, he uſed to go out to meet them with his head ſhaved, and wearing a cap, habit, and ſandals, like thoſe which the ſlaves at *Rome* put on when they were emancipated. In this dreſs, ſaluting the ambaſſadors, *You ſee*, ſaid he, *one of your freed men, ready to obey all your commands, and to conform himſelf to all your cuſtoms.* And now when he came to congratulate the *Romans* on the ſucceſs of their arms, ſtooping down, with both hands on the ground, at the entrance of the Senate-houſe, he kiſſed the threſhold of the door, and began his addreſs to the Fathers in theſe words, *Hail, Senators, ye Gods, my Saviours*—The reſt of the ſpeech was ſuitable to the beginning, and ſuch as, *Polybius* ſays, he ſhould be aſhamed to repeat; who adds, that the Senate were the more gracious to the King for the meanneſs of his behaviour. They granted him every thing he aſked: A renewal of the league between him and *Rome:* Leave to diſcharge a vow he had made to ſacrifice ten oxen to *Jupiter* in the capitol, and one to Fortune at *Prænеſte*, in thankſ-

Polyb. ap. *Livy*, B. 45. c. 44. *Polyb.* Legat. 97.

[c] The *Rhodians* appointed their Admiral to negotiate this affair at *Rome*, he alone being legally qualified to act in it without a decree of the people; and ſuch decree they choſe not to have, becauſe it would make the ignominy the greater, in caſe the alliance were refuſed. *Polyb. Legat.* 93. *Liv.* B. 45. *c.* 25.

Y. of *R.* 586 Bef. *J. C.* 166. 285 Conſul-p

giving for the *Roman* victory: And a certain territory which, as the King pretended, the *Romans* had conquered from *Antiochus*, and which, they not having ſince given it to any body, the *Gallo Greeks* had ſeized. But this laſt grant was made conditionally, that, upon examination, they ſhould find, what the King had ſaid, to be true. The Senate alſo promiſed to continue their care of his ſon, who had been educated at *Rome*. And when the *Bithynian* was to ſet out on his return home, they appointed *Scipio* to attend him, pay his charges on the road, and never leave him till he had ſeen him ſafe on board his ſhip at *Brunduſium*, from whence twenty galleys were to convoy him to a fleet, of which the Fathers had made him a preſent.

Polyb. Legat. 97.

ABOUT the time that *Pruſias* left *Italy*, the Senate received notice that King *Eumenes* was coming. As they had an immoveable hatred to the *Pergamenian*, and yet were unwilling to publiſh it, this advice embarraſſed them. Should they give him an opportunity of ſpeaking in defence of his conduct, they muſt return him an anſwer: To give him a favourable anſwer would be, not only contrary to their inclination, but to good policy; and openly to proclaim their hatred to him would derogate from their reputation of prudence and diſcernment, they having treated this unfaithful Prince as one of their beſt friends and allies. To avoid both theſe inconveniences, they paſſed a decree, *forbidding all Kings to come to* Rome. And when they heard that *Eumenes* was landed at *Brunduſium*, they ſent a Quæſtor to notify to him this decree, and enquire whether he had any thing to aſk of the Senate. If he had not, the Quæſtor was to deſire him to leave *Italy* as ſoon as poſſible. The King ſaid he had nothing to aſk; and, without entering into farther converſation with the *Roman*, returned to his ſhips, and ſailed home.

CHAP. XXIII.

Complaints brought to the Senate from Aſia *againſt King* Eumenes. *He is inſulted by a* Roman *ambaſſador.*

On the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, *the Senate commiſſion ſome of their body to go into* Syria, *and do miſchief there.*

Octavius, *the chief of the commiſſion, is aſſaſſinated.*

Demetrius, *the nephew of* Antiochus Epiphanes, *eſcapes from* Rome *into* Syria, *and makes himſelf King.*

The Senate determine a diſpute between two competitors for the kingdom of Cappadocia.

LIVY's hiſtory of *Rome*, from the time that King *Pruſias* made his viſit to the Senate, is loſt; a loſs not richly ſupply'd by *Plutarch*, *Appian*, the tribe of Abridgers, and the Collectors of Fragments; nor

nor conſequently by the elegant and ingenious patchwork of *Freinſhemius*. Of the year 587 (if this be not the date of the decree that ſtopp'd *Eumenes*'s journey) the moſt important events, recorded, are theſe: That the Conſuls *C. Sulpicius Gallus* and *M. Claudius Marcellus* obtained ſome advantage in the endleſs war againſt the *Gauls* and *Ligurians* [a]; and that a kite catched a weaſel behind the ſtatue of *Jupiter* in the capitol, and dropt it among the Conſcript Fathers, aſſembled in that temple: a dreadful omen, which it was thought neceſſary to avert by expiations. Y. of *R.* 587. Bef *J. C.* 165. 286 Conſul-p. *Liv. Epit.* B. 46. *Jul. Obſeq.* c. 71.

IN the ſucceeding Conſulſhip of *T. Manlius Torquatus* and *Cn. Octavius Nepos*, ambaſſadors came to *Rome* from *Pruſias*, complaining of ſome irrruptions which *Eumenes* had made into the kingdom of *Bithynia*; and accuſing him of having entered into a league with *Antiochus* againſt the *Romans*. His neighbours alſo, the *Galatians*, ſent complaints of his encroachments. This people the Senate ſupported underhand, without declaring openly againſt the *Pergamenian*. For though *Tiberius Gracchus*, deceived by the artful behaviour of the Kings of *Syria* and *Pergamus*, to whom he had been appointed ambaſſador, made a favourable report of their diſpoſitions; yet the Senate continued to ſuſpect them of ſome miſchievous machinations. *Eumenes* diſpatched his two brothers, *Attalus* and *Athenæus*, to apologize for every thing in his conduct which had given umbrage to the *Romans*. The Fathers received thoſe ambaſſadors graciouſly, and diſmiſſed them with honours and preſents. Nevertheleſs they ſent new commiſſioners into *Aſia*, *C. Sulpicius* and *M. Sergius*, to examine things to the bottom, and learn the real intentions of *Eumenes* and *Antiochus*. Y. of *R.* 588. Bef *J. C.* 164. 287 Conſul-p. *Liv. Epit.* B. 46. *Polyb.* Legat. 104. Id. Leg. 105. Id. Leg. 106.

Sulpicius, being a vain man, would needs make a figure by inſulting *Eumenes*; in whoſe dominions he no ſooner arrived, than he ordered proclamations to be made in the principal towns, inviting all, who had any cauſe of complaint againſt the King, to repair to *Sardis*. There the ambaſſador erected his tribunal of inquiſition; and during ten days, gave full ſcope to the *Pergamenians* to ſay whatever they thought fit againſt their ſovereign. However, for any thing that appears to the contrary, all this buſtle came to nothing. Y. of *R.* 589 * Bef. *J. C.* 163. 288 Conſul p. *Polyb.* Excerp. L. 31.

IN the following year, when *Tib. Sempronius Gracchus* and *M. Juventius Thalna* were Conſuls, died *Antiochus Epiphanes*, King of *Syria*; and was ſucceeded in the throne by his ſon *Antiochus Eupator*, a minor, only nine years old, and under the guardianſhip of *Lyſias*. Y. of *R.* 590. Bef. *J. C.* 162. 289 Conſul-p. *Liv. Epit.* B. 46.

This *Lyſias* had commanded the *Syrian* troops againſt the *Jews*, and having been defeated ſeveral times by *Judas Maccabæus*, had made peace with them, granting them the free exerciſe of their religion and laws. Nevertheleſs *Judas*, to ſecure the continuance of this peace, ap- 2 *Maccab.* c. xi.

* *T. Manlius Torquatus* and *Q. Caſſius Longinus*, Conſuls.

[a] The Capitoline Marbles give the Conſuls a triumph. *Cicero* ſpeaks with great contempt of the triumphs granted for victories in *Liguria*, calling them *Caſtellani triumphi*, triumphs for taking a caſtle. *In Brut. c.* 73.

Y. of *R.* 590. Bef. *J. C.* 162. 289 Conſul-p. ply'd himſelf to *Manlius* and *Memmius*, two *Roman* deputies then going to *Antioch*, and received a favourable anſwer from them.

Polyb. Legat. 107. When the news of *Epiphanes*'s death came to *Rome*, *Demetrius* (the ſon of *Seleucus*, the late King's elder brother) who had been 12 years a hoſtage there, aſked permiſſion of the Senate to return home; that he might take poſſeſſion of the kingdom. The Fathers refuſed his requeſt; thinking it more for their intereſt to have a child upon the *Syrian* throne. They diſpatched *Cn. Octavius* [b] and two others to aſſume the adminiſtration of the government. And to theſe they gave inſtructions to burn all the decked ſhips, diſable the elephants, and, in a word, weaken as much as poſſible the forces of the kingdom.

New Conſuls were choſen at *Rome*, *P. Cornelius Scipio Naſica* and *C. Marcius Figulus*. But theſe Magiſtrates, upon the diſcovery of ſome

Y. of *R.* 591. Bef. *J. C.* 161. 290 Conſul-p. defect in the ceremonies of their inauguration, abdicated; and *P. Cornelius Lentulus* and *Cn. Domitius Ænobarbus* took their place.

Polyb. Leg. 108. *Octavius*, in his journey, paſſed through *Cappadocia*, where King *Ariarathes* offered him an army, to eſcort him into *Syria*, and to keep the people of that country in awe while he performed his commiſſion. But he, confiding in the majeſty of the *Roman* name, diſdained all other

App. in *Syr.* p. 117. protection. At *Laodicea*, he began to put the orders of the Senate in execution; burning the ſhips and diſabling the elephants. His pretence was the treaty, made with *Antiochus the Great*, in which it had been ſtipulated, that the *Syrians* ſhould not have above a certain number of ſhips of war, nor tame any elephants. This deſpotic manner of pro-

Cic. Phil. 9. c. 2. *Polyb.* Legat. 114. ceeding highly exaſperated the people; and one *Leptines*, ſuppoſed to be hired by *Lyſias*, aſſaſſinated *Octavius* in the *Gymnaſium*. *Lyſias* ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome* to aſſure the Senate, that the fact had not been committed by the King's authority. The Fathers returned no anſwer.

Theſe events encouraged *Demetrius* to think of addreſſing the Senate once more for permiſſion to go into *Syria*. He ſent for his friend *Polybius*, then at *Rome*, to conſult with him upon this matter. *Polybius* adviſed him "to avoid ſtriking his foot twice againſt the ſame ſtone; "to place his hope in himſelf; and to dare ſomething worthy of a "King;" hinting, "that the preſent ſtate of things afforded him "ſufficient opportunities." The Prince underſtood his friend's meaning, but ſaid nothing. Opening himſelf afterwards to an intimate acquaintance named *Apollonius*, (a ſimple man, who conſidered only the juſtice of the caſe, and the abſurdity of retaining *Demetrius* as a pledge of his competitor's fidelity) he was by him counſelled to make a ſecond application to the Senate. He did ſo, and met with a ſecond refuſal; the ſame reaſons ſubſiſting which had been the ground of the firſt. About this time came from *Syria* one *Diodorus*, who had formerly been

[b] He had been Conſul ſome years before, and was the firſt of his family who obtained that dignity. *Cic. Phil.* 9. 4.

employed

employed in the education of the young Prince. *Demetrius*, from the accounts which this man brought of the ſtate of things in that country, concluded, that there wanted little more than his appearance there, to get him the poſſeſſion of the throne. He reſolved therefore to attempt an eſcape from *Italy*; the very thing which *Polybius* had hinted to him, and to which he was now inſtigated by *Diodorus*. Before the Prince took any meaſures for the execution of his purpoſe, he aſked the advice and aſſiſtance of *Polybius*; who, not caring to act in the affair himſelf, engaged his friend *Menithyllus* (ambaſſador at *Rome* from *Ptolemy Philometor*) to provide a ſhip and every thing neceſſary for the deſign. *Demetrius* having left the city, under pretence of a hunting match, embarked at *Oſtia* in a *Carthaginian* veſſel bound for *Tyre*. The Senate had no information of his flight till four or five days after he had ſet ſail, when it was too late to think of ſtopping him. But they deputed *Tib. Gracchus* and two more to follow him into *Syria*, and watch his motions. A. of *R.* 591. Bef. *J. C.* 161. 290 Conſul-p.

Demetrius landed in *Lycia*, from whence he wrote a reſpectful letter to the Conſcript Fathers, importing, that he had no deſign againſt his uncle's ſon *Antiochus Eupator*, but againſt *Lyſias*, and to revenge the death of *Octavius*. From *Lycia* he ſailed to *Tripolis* in *Syria*, where he gave out that he was ſent by the *Roman* Senate to take poſſeſſion of the kingdom. This occaſioned a general deſertion from *Eupator*, who with his tutor *Lyſias* being ſeized by the ſoldiers, in order to be delivered up to *Demetrius*, he refuſed to ſee them, and commanded both to be put to death. A. of *R.* 592.* Bef. *J. C.* 160. 291 Conſul-p. *Zonar.* B. 9. c. 25. 1 *Macc.* c. 7. *Juſtin.* B. 34. c. 3.

After this, the new King delivered the *Babylonians* from the tyranny of *Timarchus* and *Heraclides*. Theſe brothers had been great favourites of *Antiochus Epiphanes*, who had made the firſt Governor, and the other treaſurer of that province. *Demetrius* put *Timarchus* to death, and drove *Heraclides* into baniſhment, for which actions the people of *Babylon* gave him the ſurname of *Soter* [i. e. *Saviour*] which he ever after retained. *App.* in *Syr.* p. 118.

Notwithſtanding all this ſucceſs, being ſenſible that the favour of the *Roman* Senate was neceſſary to his firm eſtabliſhment on the throne, he made application to *Tib. Gracchus*, then in *Cappadocia*, by his means to get himſelf recognized King by the *Romans*. *Gracchus* promiſed him his good offices; and *Demetrius*, to ſmooth the way for his advocate, ſent an embaſſy to *Rome* with a rich preſent of a crown of gold. At the ſame time he delivered up to the vengeance of the *Roman* people, not only *Leptines* the murderer of *Octavius*, but a certain Grammarian nam- *Polyb.* Legat. 120.

* *M. Valerius Meſſala* and *C. Fannius Strabo*, Conſuls. The *Fannian* law, ſo called from *Fannius*, the propoſer of it, was paſſed this year, enacting, That no man's daily expences for his own eating and drinking ſhould exceed ten aſſes, *i. e.* ſeven pence three farthings. The ſenate alſo paſſed a decree for baniſhing from *Rome* the philoſophers and rhetoricians, as a miſchievous, peſtilent ſet of men.

edi

Y. of *R.* 592 Bef. *J.C.* 160 291 Conſul p *Polyb.* Legat. 122.

ed *Iſocrates*, who, in an oration to the multitude, had juſtified and commended the act. *Leptines* had begged of *Demetrius* not to proceed to any extremities againſt the *Laodiceans*, on account of the aſſaſſination, but to ſend him to *Rome*, where (he ſaid) he would convince the Senate that what he had done was with the good pleaſure of the Gods. As this man went chearfully and of his own accord, and, during the whole voyage, continued ſurprizingly gay, he was brought from *Syria* to *Rome* without fetters. At his arrival, he frankly owned the fact to every body that aſked him about it, always adding, that he was ſure, the Senate would do him no hurt. His confidence aroſe from the mean opinion he had of himſelf and his orator: ſacrifices too inſignificant, in his judgment, to be accepted by the *Romans* in ſatisfaction for the offence. But the Grammarian (with whom *Polybius* is extremely angry, for his meddling with politics) fully apprized of his own importance, ran ſtark mad with fear. *Leptines* judged rightly: the Senate would not, for two ſuch victims, preclude themſelves from calling the *Syrians* to account, when it ſhould be thought convenient. However, they did not reject the King's gold: In return they ſent him this anſwer, "That he might "depend upon their favour, provided he took care to be as ſubmiſſive "to their orders, as he had formerly been."

Y. of *R.* 593. Bef. *J.C.* 159 292 Conſul-p. 1 *Macc.* c. 8. B. 36. c. 3.

THE year following (*L. Anicius Gallus* and *M. Cornelius Cethegus* being Conſuls) was concluded a treaty between the *Romans* and the *Jews*, in the time of *Judas Maccabæus*, who had ſent an embaſſy to *Rome* to aſk protection againſt *Demetrius*. *Juſtin* tells us, that the *Jews* were the firſt of the Oriental nations that received liberty by gift from the *Romans*; who, he adds, were very liberal of what was not their own; for the *Jews*, according to him, had revolted from the *Syrians*. The Senate wrote to *Demetrius* in theſe terms, as we find them in the firſt book of the *Maccabees*: *Wherefore haſt thou made thy yoke heavy upon our friends and confederates the* Jews? *If therefore they complain any more againſt thee we will do them juſtice, and fight with thee by ſea and by land*[a].

1 *Macc.* c. 8.

We have hardly any thing for the years of *Rome* 594 * and 595 †, but the names of the Conſuls.

Y. of *R.* 596 Bef. *J.C.* 156 295 Conſul-p. *Juſtin*, B. 35. c. 1. *App.* in *Syr.* p. 118.

IN the year 596 (the Conſulſhip of *Sex. Julius Cæſar* and *L. Aurelius Oreſtes*) *Ariarathes* King of *Cappadocia* came to *Rome* for protection. *Demetrius*, partly to revenge himſelf on this Prince for refuſing to marry his ſiſter, and partly to earn a hundred talents, had driven him from his

[b] *Æmilius Paullus* died this year. Father *Catrou* obſerves, that this *Roman* ſeems to have wanted nothing but the knowledge of the true religion (the religion of the *Jews*) and the graces, by God, annexed to it, to render his virtues meritorious: That, in this reſpect, *Judas Maccabæus*, who died about the ſame time, had greatly the advantage of him. *Gratia efficax per ſe* would doubtleſs have made *Æmilius* a Saint; but I queſtion whether any *Grace*, that required the *ſimultaneous operation*, would have been effectual.

* *Cn. Cornelius Dolabella* and *M. Fulvius Nobilior*, Conſuls.

† *M. Æmilius Lepidus* and *C. Popillius Lænas*, Conſuls.

throne,

throne, and placed upon it *Holophernes*, a ſuppoſititious ſon of the late *Cappadocian* King. *Ariarathes* pleaded his own cauſe before the Senate; and ſome ambaſſadors from *Holophernes* defended that of their maſter. Theſe aſſerted that *Holophernes* was the elder brother of *Ariarathes*, by the ſame father and mother; though the mother, out of partiality to her younger ſon, had perſuaded her huſband into a belief, that the elder was neither his ſon nor hers. It ſeems, this mother (who was a daughter of *Antiochus the Great*) thinking herſelf barren, becauſe ſhe had been ſeveral years married without having children, had impoſed upon the King her huſband two ſons, of whom this *Holophernes* was one. She afterwards bore a ſon, the *Ariarathes* now in queſtion, and then repented of the cheat ſhe had put upon the King, and diſcovered it to him. The ſuppoſititious ſons were ſent away, that they might be no obſtacle to the ſucceſſion of *Ariarathes* to the throne.

Y. of *R.* 596. Bef. *J.C.* 156. 295 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* Legat. 126. *Diod. Sicul.* ap. *Phot.*

The Senate, having heard both parties, ordered *Cappadocia* to be ſhared between the two competitors, following, in this, one of the ſteady maxims of the *Roman* policy, which was, to divide the ſtrength of kingdoms.

App. in *Syr.* 118.

CHAP. XXIV.

Cato *is ſent into* Africa *to terminate a diſpute between the* Carthaginians *and the King of* Numidia. Cato's *report at his return.*
War againſt the Dalmatians.
An embaſſy to the Senate from the Athenians.
King Pruſias *grows mutinous.*
The Roman *armies paſs the* Alps *for the firſt time.*
New quarrels between the Ptolemy's *of* Egypt.
Demetrius *vanquiſhed and ſlain by his competitor* Alexander Balas, *an impoſtor countenanced by the* Romans.

MASINISSA had laid claim to a country, which *Appian* calls *Tiſca*, belonging to the *Carthaginians*; and theſe made their complaints at *Rome* of this new encroachment. The Fathers, though always reſolved to favour the *Numidian* in his quarrels with *Carthage*, yet, to preſerve an appearance of juſtice, and probably to get exact information of the ſtrength and condition of the city, diſpatched *Cato*, with other deputies, into *Africa*, to take cognizance of the matter in diſpute. On their arrival, *Maſiniſſa* declared himſelf very willing to ſubmit the conteſt to their arbitration; for he thought the *Romans* his ſure friends: But the *Carthaginians* refuſed; alledging, *That the treaty concluded with* Scipio Africanus, *did not want amending*; *and that nothing more was requiſite*

App in *Punic.* P. 37.

Y. of *R.* 596. Bef. *J. C.* 156. 295 Conſul-p.

quiſite than that each party ſhould ſtrictly obſerve the articles of that convention. Cato, on his return to *Rome*, reported, that *Carthage* was grown exceſſively rich and populous; and he warmly exhorted the Senate to deſtroy a city and republic, which while they ſubſiſted, *Rome* could never be ſafe. Having brought from *Africa* ſome very large figs, he ſhewed them to the Conſcript Fathers, in one of the lappets of his gown: *The country*, ſaid he, *where this fine fruit grows, is but a three days voyage from* Rome. We are told, that from this time he never ſpoke in the Senate, upon any ſubject, without concluding with theſe words, *I am alſo of opinion that* Carthage *ſhould be deſtroyed. Scipio Naſica*, a man of great weight and authority among the Fathers, ſteadily and ſtrenuouſly oppoſed him in this particular. He always ended his ſpeeches (according to *Plutarch*) with theſe words, *I am alſo of opinion that* Carthage *ſhould not be deſtroyed.* It is probable, ſays the ſame Hiſtorian, that *Naſica* ſeeing the people's pride and inſolence grown, by their victories, to ſuch a height, that they could hardly be reſtrained by the Senate, within any bounds; and knowing their power to be ſuch, that they could force the Republic into whatever meaſures their caprice dictated, he was for preſerving *Carthage*, as a curb to check their audaciouſneſs: for he thought that the *Carthaginians* were too weak to ſubdue the *Romans*, but yet too ſtrong to be deſpiſed by them. *Cato* on the other hand judged, that, for a people debauched by proſperity, nothing was more to be feared than a rival State, always powerful, and now, from its misfortunes, grown wiſe and circumſpect. He held it neceſſary to remove all dangers that could be apprehended from *without*, when the Republic had, *within*, ſo many diſtempers threatning her deſtruction [a].

Plut. life of *Cato.*

Y. of *R.* 597. Bef. *J. C.* 155. 296 Conſul-p. *App.* in *Illyr.* *Polyb.* Legat. 125. *Liv.* Epit: B. 47.

IN the Conſulſhip of *C. Marcius Figulus* and *L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus*, the Republic commenced a war againſt the *Dalmatians*, who had made incurſions into *Illyricum*, and rudely treated ſome *Roman* ambaſſadors that had been ſent to them the laſt year. This ill treatment, *Polybius* tells us, was only the pretence for the war: That the Senate being deſirous to give the ſoldiers ſome exerciſe, and having neglected, ever ſince the times of *Demetrius Pharius*, that part of *Illyricum* now invaded, it was from theſe motives they ordered the expedition againſt the *Dalmatians*. *Marcius* conducted the war with various ſucceſs [b]; but the

[a] This year upon examination was found in the treaſury 16810 pondo of gold, which reckoned in the decuple proportion, is 455971 *l.* 5 *s.* Of ſilver 22070 pondo, 59864 *l.* 17 *s.* 6 *d.* And of coined money ſexagies bis & 85400 H. S. 50741 *l.* 10 *s.* 2½ *d.* which in all comes to 566577 *l.* 12 *s.* 8½ *d.* *Arbuthn.* p. 191. *ex Plin. L.* 33. *c.* 3.

[b] According to *Pighius*, were paſſed, this year, the *Ælian* and *Fuſian* laws, which *Cicero* calls the walls and bulwarks of peace and tranquillity. The firſt forbad acting any thing with the people while the augurs and proper magiſtrates were obſerving the heavens, and taking the auſpices. The *Fuſian* law made it unlawful to act any thing with the people on the days called *faſti*;

the next year *P. Cornelius Scipio Naſica* finiſhed it by ſubduing the invaders. His Collegue in the Conſulſhip, *C. Claudius Marcellus*, gained over the *Ligurians* a victory, which procured him the honour of a triumph. Y. of *R.* 598. Bef. *J. C.* 154. 297 Conſul-p.

THE *ATHENIANS*, this year, ſent an embaſſy to *Rome*, begging to be diſcharged from a fine of 500 talents, which the *Sicyonians* had condemned them to pay for having ravaged the lands of the *Oropians*. Theſe had, in the firſt inſtance, made complaint to the *Romans*; and the Senate had referred the conſideration of the matter to the *Sicyonians*. *Carneades*, an Academic Philoſopher, *Diogenes* a Stoic, and *Critolaus* a Peripatetic, all three famous for eloquence, each for a different kind, were the ambaſſadors from *Athens*. *Cicero* ſays of *Carneades*, that he never advanced any thing which he did not prove; nor ever oppoſed an argument which he did not overthrow. Multitudes of the *Roman* youth flocking about theſe *Athenians* to hear their diſcourſes, this greatly diſturbed the ſpirit of *Cato*, who, according to *Plutarch*, was an implacable enemy to philoſophy, and uſed to call *Socrates* a babbler. *Cato* adviſed the Senate to give the ambaſſadors an anſwer in all haſte, that they might return to their ſchools, there to tutor, as they pleaſed, the children of the *Greeks*; leaving the *Roman* children to attend to the laws and the magiſtrates, their only maſters, before the arrival of theſe eloquent Philoſophers. The Senate complied with his humour, and diſmiſſed the ambaſſadors, having firſt reduced the fine, impoſed on the *Athenians*, to a hundred talents. *Plut.* life of *Cato*. *Aul. Gell.* B. 7. c. 14. De Orat. L. 2. c. 38. *Pauſan.* in *Achaic.* c. xi.

PRUSIAS, that religious worſhipper of the Conſcript Fathers, had, by this time, loſt much of his devotional regard for thoſe his Gods. On the death of *Eumenes*, the *Bithynian* had, without leave, invaded the kingdom of *Pergamus*, of which *Attalus* was regent; his nephew and pupil, *Attalus* the ſon of *Eumenes*, being a minor. *Rome* ſent ambaſſador after ambaſſador to *Pruſias*, commanding him to ceaſe his hoſtilities, but all in vain. She at length ſent ten ambaſſadors together to him, but neither did theſe ſucceed. However, when he found that the Senate would in earneſt commence a war againſt him, and engage all her allies in the *Eaſt* to do the ſame, this terrified him into an abſolute ſubmiſſion. He was condemned to make good all the damages he had done; to give *Attalus* twenty ſhips of war; and to pay him five hundred talents in twenty years. *Polyb.* Legat. 128. Id. Legat. 129. Id. Legat. 133. Id. Legat. 135. Id. Legat. 136.

IN the Conſulſhip of *Q. Opimius* and *L. Poſthumius Albinus*, the *Roman* armies for the firſt time paſſed the *Alps*. It was to make war againſt the *Oxybii* and the *Deciatæ*, people originally of *Liguria*, but at this time inhabiting the country along the ſea coaſt, in the neighbourhood of *Nicæa* * and *Antipolis*. They had attacked thoſe towns, which Y. of *R.* 599. Bef. *J. C.* 153. 298 Conſul-p. *Polyb.* Legat. 131. * *Nice* and *Antibes*.

feſti; that is, on ſuch days as the courts were open, and the Prætors ſat to hear cauſes. Theſe two laws *P. Clodius* got repealed in his tribuneſhip, in the year 695.

Y. of *R.* 599 Bef. *J. C.* 153. 298 Conſul-p *Polyb.* Legat. 134.

belonging to the people of *Maſſilia* [*Marſeilles*] theſe ſent a complaint of it to the Senate. An embaſſy from *Rome* to the invaders having no ſucceſs, *Opimius* led an army againſt them, and ſubdued them. He gave the greater part of the conquered country to the *Maſſilienſes*; to whom alſo he obliged the vanquiſhed to ſend hoſtages.

While *Opimius* was carrying on this war, *Ptolemy Phyſcon* came to *Rome*. The Senate had been often peſtered with the quarrels of the two *Ptolemys* of *Egypt*. After the accommodation between them, confirmed, in the year 585, by *Popillius* the *Roman* ambaſſador, *Phyſcon* (a monſter of wickedneſs) had driven his elder brother *Philometor* from the throne. The latter coming to *Rome* for protection, the *Romans* reſtored him to the poſſeſſion of all the dominions of *Egypt*, except *Cyrenaica*, which they adjudged to *Phyſcon*; who not content with this diviſion came afterwards to *Rome* to requeſt that the iſland of *Cyprus* might be added to his ſhare. The Senate, thinking it for the intereſt of the Republic to make a more equal, and leſs equitable diviſion of the kingdom, granted the iſland to the petitioner, and appointed ſome Commiſſioners to put him in poſſeſſion of it. *Philometor* refuſed to acquieſce in this decree; and the people of *Cyrene*, hating *Phyſcon* for his cruelty, took arms againſt him, and defeated him in battle. His brother was thought to have incited the *Cyrenians* to this rebellion. An attempt being afterwards made to aſſaſſinate *Phyſcon*, who received ſeveral wounds, he now came to *Rome*, and accuſed his brother of having hired the aſſaſſins. As *Philometor*[c] had the reputation of great virtue and benignity, it was very unlikely he ſhould give the leaſt countenance to ſuch a fact; yet the Senate were ſo prepoſſeſſed by what *Phyſcon* had ſaid, [or rather ſo much offended with *Philometor* for not having obeyed their decree in relation to *Cyprus*] that they would not liſten to any thing his ambaſſadors had to offer in his defence; but ordered them inſtantly to leave *Rome*. The Fathers ſent five Commiſſioners with *Phyſcon* to put him in poſſeſſion of *Cyprus*; and wrote to their *Greek* and *Aſiatic* allies, giving them leave to aſſiſt the *Egyptian*. *Phyſcon*, having by this means got together an army, landed in *Cyprus*, where being attacked and vanquiſhed by *Philometor*, he took refuge in *Lapithus*, a city of that iſland. Thither the conqueror followed him, and there took him priſoner. *Philometor* uſed his victory with great moderation: ſo far from taking away his brother's life, he reſtored to him his dominions, added ſome other territories to them in lieu of *Cyprus*, and promiſed him his daughter in marriage. Thus ended the war between the

See p. 443.

Liv. Epit. B. 45.

Polyb. Legat. 113.

Ib. Leg. 115.

Ib. Leg. 132.

[c] *Polybius* ſays of him that he was a Prince of great clemency and good nature; that he never put any of his nobles to death, nor ſo much as one citizen of *Alexandria*; and though his brother had often provoked him, he as often pardoned him, and even treated him with great generoſity. *Excerpt. de Virt. & Vit. in fin.*

two

two brothers; at leaſt we hear no more of it. The *Romans* ſeem not to have interpoſed to hinder the accommodation.

ABOUT this time the Tribunes of the people at *Rome* did an act of juſtice which gained them great honour. *L. Cotta*, one of their college, refuſed to pay his debts; believing himſelf ſafe in an office which made his perſon inviolable. But the reſt of the Tribunes, thinking it ſhameful that the majeſty of the people ſhould be made a ſcreen for private perfidy, threatned to take the cauſe of his creditors into their hands, if he did not pay them, or give ſecurity. *Val. Max.* L. 6. c. 5. § 4.

EVER ſince the year 531 it had been cuſtomary for the Conſuls to enter upon their office on the Ides of *March* (the 15th) but this year the neceſſity of ſending a Conſul without delay into *Spain*, which was in great commotion, made the *Romans* hold their aſſembly for the elections ſome months before the uſual time. *Q. Fulvius Nobilior* and *T. Annius Luſcus* entered on the Conſulſhip the firſt of *January*; which from hence forward was always the day for the two chief Magiſtrates to take poſſeſſion of the faſces. The events of the war in *Spain* will be hereafter mentioned. A. of *R.* 600. Bef. *J. C.* 152. 299 Conſul-p. *Liv. Epit.* B. 47.

In this year *Attalus*, the ſon of *Eumenes*, the late King of *Pergamus*, came to *Rome*, to recommend himſelf to the favour of the Senate, and was kindly received and treated with honour. *Polyb.* Legat. 140.

Alſo *Demetrius Soter* ſent his ſon *Demetrius* to *Rome*; but the Senate conſidering him only as a boy, and not making thoſe preparations for his reception which he thought ſuitable to his dignity, he in diſguſt returned home. It has been mentioned that *Demetrius* baniſhed *Heraclides*, the treaſurer of *Babylon*, for his oppreſſion of the people. This exile, to be revenged, ſet up, againſt the King, a man of obſcure birth named *Balas*, pretending that he was the ſon of *Antiochus Epiphanes*. The Kings of *Egypt*, *Pergamus* and *Cappadocia*, out of hatred to *Demetrius*, ſupported the impoſtor; and *Laodice*, the daughter of *Epiphanes*, joined in the fraud. *Heraclides* was now at *Rome:* He had brought with him *Balas* (who took the name of *Alexander*) and alſo *Laodice* to give a better colour to the matter. He preſented them both to the Conſcript Fathers, whoſe aſſiſtance he implored to place the young Prince on the throne of *Syria*. The Senate readily paſſed a decree in his favour. *Liv. Epit.* B. 52. *App.* in *Syr.* p. 131. *Juſtin.* B. 35. c. 1.

And, in the following Conſulſhip of *M. Claudius Marcellus* and *L. Valerius Flaccus*, *Alexander Balas* appeared in *Syria* with a formidable army, conſiſting chiefly of the troops which the Kings of *Egypt*, *Pergamus* and *Cappadocia* had furniſhed him with, at the ſolicitation of the *Romans*. He was alſo joined by *Jonathan Maccabæus* with the forces of *Judæa*. In a pitched battle the army of *Demetrius* being routed, he loſt both his kingdom and his life. A. of *R.* 601. Bef. *J. C.* 151. 300 Conſul p. 1 *Macc.* c. 10. *Joſeph.* Antiq. B. 13. c. 5.

CHAP. XXV.

The Carthaginians *are reduced very low in a war with* Maſiniſſa. Rome *reſolves to ſeize the opportunity, of their diſtreſs to cruſh them entirely.*

App. in *Pun.* p. 38. Y. of *R.* 602.† Bef. *J. C.* 150. 301 Conſul. p.

THERE ſeems to have been a party at *Carthage* who were for yielding any thing to *Maſiniſſa* rather than come to an open rupture with him. Forty of theſe the people baniſhed, and bound themſelves by oath never to recal them. The exiles repaired to *Maſiniſſa*, who ſent two of his ſons, *Guluſſa* and *Micipſa*, to ſolicit their reſtoration. Againſt theſe ambaſſadors the *Carthaginians* ſhut their gates; and *Guluſſa* in his return was attacked by ſurprize, and ſome of his followers ſlain [a]. Hereupon *Maſiniſſa* came at the head of a great army, and beſieged a town called *Oroſcopa*, belonging to the *Carthaginians*, who ſent againſt him, under *Aſdrubal*, an army of 25000 foot and 400 horſe. Two of the King's Generals with 6000 horſe went over to *Aſdrubal*, who encouraged by this acceſſion of ſtrength, drew near to the enemy, and in ſeveral ſhirmiſhes had the advantage. The King pretending fear, retired before the *Carthaginians*, and by degrees drew them to a place where the ground favoured him. A general battle enſued. The *Numidians* had the advantage, but not a deciſive victory. *Scipio Æmilianus*, who had been ſent by the Conſul *Lucullus* from *Spain* to aſk ſome elephants of *Maſiniſſa*, was, from the top of a hill, a ſpectator of the action. He often declared afterwards, that, of all the battles he had ſeen (and he had ſeen many) none had ever given him ſo exquiſite a delight: for it was the only time, when, without any danger to himſelf, he had beheld a hundred thouſand men engaged in fight. He added, that ſuch a ſight had never been enjoyed by any one before him, except *Jupiter* and *Neptune* in the *Trojan* war.

Y. of *R.* 603.* Bef. *J. C.* 149. 302 Conſul p.

App. in *Pun.* p. 40.

Appian relates, that *Scipio*, at the deſire of the *Carthaginians*, took upon him the office of a mediator between them and *Maſiniſſa*; that they offered to yield the territory in diſpute; to pay 200 talents

[a] The epitomizer of *Livy* (B. 49.) reckoning up the cauſes of the *Romans* declaring war againſt the *Carthaginians*, mentions their not admitting *Guluſſa* into their town, but ſays nothing of their deſign to aſſaſſinate him.

† *L. Licinius Lucullus* and *A. Poſthumius Albinus*, Conſuls.

* *T. Quinctius Flamininus* and *M. Acilius Balbus*, Conſuls.

This year the ſenate, at the motion of *Scipio Naſica*, ordered a theatre for plays (which, by the direction of the Cenſors, was building at the public expence) to be demoliſhed, and forbad the uſe of ſeats or benches at the public ſhews in *Rome* and within a mile of it. *Val. Max.* B. 2. *c.* 4. §. 2.

down,

down, and 800 more in a certain time; but that *Maſiniſſa* demanding further, to have the deſerters delivered up to him, this was refuſed. *Scipio* returned into *Spain* with his elephants, and *Maſiniſſa* purſued the war. He inveſted the enemy in their camp upon a hill, where they could receive neither proviſions nor reinforcements. At this juncture arrived ambaſſadors from *Rome*. Their pretended buſineſs was to make peace between the contending parties; but they had private orders to encourage *Maſiniſſa* to purſue the war, if they found he had the advantage; otherwiſe, to put an end to it. Accordingly when they ſaw how matters went, they ſuffered the King to puſh his enemies to the utmoſt extremity. The *Carthaginians* held out, till great numbers of them periſhed by famine and peſtilence. Compelled by neceſſity they at laſt yielded to all the conditions of peace impoſed by the *Numidian*. They conſented to give up the deſerters, reſtore the exiles, notwithſtanding their oath to the contrary, and pay 5000 talents in fifty years. *Maſiniſſa* alſo made them paſs under the yoke unarmed, and in their tunics only. It is ſaid that *Guluſſa*, to be revenged for the ill treatment he had formerly met with from the *Carthaginians*, detached after the multitude a body of *Numidian* horſe, who fell upon them when they had neither arms to defend themſelves, nor ſtrength to fly: of the whole number very few eſcaped to *Carthage*.

Y. of *R.* 603. Bef. *J. C.* 149. 302 Conſul-p.

AND NOW the *Romans*, taking advantage of the prodigious loſs the *Carthaginians* had ſuſtained, prepared in all haſte for war, yet without declaring their deſign. *Carthage* ſuſpecting it, and that the pretence for it would be her having taken arms againſt *Maſiniſſa*, the ally of *Rome*, proclaimed, by a public herald, *Aſdrubal*, and the other authors of the war, guilty of treaſon againſt the State. They alſo ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome*, who accuſed *Maſiniſſa* and their own Generals, laying upon them the whole blame of the hoſtilities. *Why then*, ſaid one of the Senate to the ambaſſadors, *were you not more early in your ſentence againſt the authors of the war?* To this being at a loſs for an anſwer, they aſked, *Upon what terms* Carthage, *if judged faulty, might be forgiven:* The Fathers replied, *She muſt ſatisfy the* Romans. On the return of theſe Miniſters home, the *Carthaginians* ſent a new embaſſy to deſire a clear and full declaration of the *means* by which the *Romans* might be ſatisfied. All the anſwer that could be obtained was, *That the* Carthaginians *knew the means very well:* an anſwer which, when reported, threw the city into great perplexity and conſternation. Their terror was much increaſed by the ſudden defection of *Utica*, the moſt conſiderable place in their dependence, next to their capital. The people of *Utica* had ſent deputies to make an abſolute ſurrendry of themſelves, their city, and their territory to the people of *Rome*. This event furniſhing the *Romans* with a convenient port for landing their forces, and a place of arms within eight miles of *Carthage*, they deferred no longer a declaration of war.

Y. of *R.* 603. Bef. *C. J.* 149 302 Conſul p.

war in form. The reaſons aſſigned for it were, that *Carthage*, contrary to her covenants with *Rome*, had fitted out a fleet, had gone beyond her limits to attack the King of *Numidia*, a friend and ally of the *Roman* people, and laſtly had refuſed to let *Guluſſa*, the ſon of *Maſiniſſa*, enter within her gates, though conducted by *Roman* ambaſſadors. But *Velleius Paterculus* tells us, that the cauſe of this war was mere jealouſy of the power of *Carthage*, and not any offence by her committed [b].

Liv. Epit. B. 49.

[b] This year, according to *Pighius* (V. 2. p. 442.) a law was enacted, that no man ſhould be twice Conſul. *Cato* ſpoke in favour of the law. It was conſtantly obſerved till the days of *Marius*, except in the caſe of *Scipio Æmilianus*.

CHAP. XXVI.

Third PUNIC WAR.

FIRST and SECOND YEARS of the WAR.

The Carthaginians, *after extraordinary ſubmiſſions, vainly employed to divert the war, reſolve to defend themſelves; which they do with ſurprizing activity and courage.*

Y. of *R.* 604. Bef. *J. C.* 148. 303 Conſul p.

THE conduct of the war in *Africa* was aſſigned to the new Conſuls *L. Marcius Cenſorinus* and *M. Manilius*, who had ſtrict orders, not to put an end to it, but with the deſtruction [a] of the city of *Carthage*. *Cenſorinus* commanded the fleet, and *Manilius* the army. The fleet was conſiderable, and had on board 80,000 foot, and about 4000 horſe. Setting ſail they arrived at *Lylibæum* in *Sicily*, and there ſtopped. *Carthage* did not yet know what had been reſolved at *Rome*; but, upon the obſcure anſwer brought from thence by her laſt ambaſſadors, had ſent others with full powers to do whatever they ſhould judge neceſſary; and even, if circumſtances required it, to declare, that the *Carthaginians* ſurrendered themſelves, and all that was theirs, to the *Romans* at diſcretion. They had never, in their former wars, entertained a thought of humbling themſelves to this degree of ſubmiſſion. And they were ſenſible that even this would now appear the leſs meritorious, as the people of *Utica* had prevented them, by a more early example of the like dedition.

App. in *Punic.* p. 42.

Polyb. Legat. 142.

[a] *Florus*, after telling us, that *Cato* always voted for deſtroying *Carthage*, and *Naſica* for preſerving it, gravely adds, That the Senate choſe the *middle* way, which was, *to remove the town out of it's place*. B. 2. c. 15.

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The ambaſſadors finding, on their arrival at *Rome*, not only that war had been declared, but that the army was actually gone for *Sicily*, judged, that they had no time to deliberate: Being therefore admitted to audience, they made the abſolute ſurrendry, according to their inſtructions. It was anſwered; That becauſe they had taken the right reſolution, the Senate granted them their liberty, laws, territories, and all the effects belonging either to the public or to private perſons, on condition that in thirty days, they ſent three hundred hoſtages, of their nobleſt youth, to the Conſuls at *Lilybæum*; and further performed what the Conſuls ſhould command. The ambaſſadors felt an extreme joy at hearing what the Senate granted; but this joy was inſtantly damped by the latter proviſo. They returned to *Carthage*, and reported the anſwer and orders of the *Roman* Senate. The ſilence of the Conſcript Fathers, with reſpect to the towns belonging to the *Carthaginians*, gave them extreme diſquiet. However it was neceſſary to obey, nor had they any hope to mollify their enemies but by the readineſs of this obedience. Without delay therefore they ſent the hoſtages to *Lylibæum*. Whereupon it was ſignified to the deputies who had brought them, that the Conſuls would let *Carthage* know their further pleaſure when they came to *Utica*. Thither they ſailed with all their forces.

A. of *R.* 604. Bef. *J. C.* 148. 303 Conſul-p.

Diod. Sicul. ap. *Fulv. Urſin.*

Polyb. Legat. 142.

App. p. 44.

It is eaſy to judge of the conſternation of the *Carthaginians*, when, after the ſubmiſſions they had made, they learnt the arrival of ſo terrible an army in their neighbourhood. They in all haſte deputed ſome perſons to expoſtulate with the Conſuls. "What have we done," ſaid theſe ambaſſadors, "to provoke you to this ſudden invaſion of our "country with ſo mighty an army? Have we not faithfully paid you "the tribute? Have we built any ſhips of war? Have we tamed any "elephants? If you are diſpleaſed with the defenſive war we have "made againſt *Maſiniſſa*, conſider how patiently we endured his en"croachments, till he reſolved to ſet no bounds to his avarice and cru"elty? But ſuppoſing it a fault to have defended our territories againſt "the *Numidian*, have we not ſince made an abſolute ſurrendry of our"ſelves and our country to the *Roman* people? Have we not with rea"dineſs given the hoſtages you demanded? And does not the decree "of your Senate expreſly promiſe, that on condition of our delivering "thoſe hoſtages, *Carthage* ſhall remain free, governed by her own laws, "and retaining her preſent poſſeſſions?" *Cenſorinus* anſwered, "You "have forgot one part of the Senate's decree, that part which requires "your obedience to the orders of the Conſuls. And we told you in *Sicily* "that we would ſignify to you theſe orders when we came to *Utica*. "You have done very well with regard to the hoſtages; but if you "ſincerely deſire peace, what occaſion have you for arms? Bring to us "all your arms; as well thoſe of private perſons as thoſe belonging to "the public." The deputies begged, he would conſider what muſt become

V. of *R.* 604. Bef. *J. C.* 148. 303 Conſul p.

become of *Carthage*, if he entirely diſarmed her, eſpecially at a time when *Aſdrubal*, in revenge for having been condemned to death, had formed an army againſt her of 20,000 men. *Cenſorinus* replied, that the Senate and people of *Rome* would provide againſt that danger.

The *Carthaginians* without fraud delivered up all their arms, 200,000 ſuits of armour, an infinite number of ſpears and javelins, and 2000 *Catapultæ*, engines for throwing darts and ſtones. The long train of carriages which brought theſe to the *Roman* Camp, was followed by the moſt venerable of the *Carthaginian* Prieſts and Senators, in the hope, that this appearance would excite the compaſſion of the *Romans*. When theſe deputies were come before the tribunal of the Conſuls, *Cenſorinus* roſe up, and with a formal gravity ſaid, "I cannot but praiſe, *Carthaginians*, the ready obedience you have ſhewn in ſending us the hoſtages we required; and in now giving up your arms. Many words are uſeleſs when neceſſity urges. You will have fortitude to bear what the Senate further commands. Yield up your city to us. Tranſplant yourſelves to whatever part of your territory you like beſt, provided it be ten miles from the ſea. For we are determined to demoliſh *Carthage*."

At the ſound of theſe words the *Carthaginians* all broke out into lamentable cries; they became even frantic with grief, rage, and deſpair; they threw themſelves on the ground, beating the earth with their foreheads, and tearing their clothes, and even their fleſh: they invoked the Gods, avengers of violated faith, and, in the bittereſt terms, reproached and reviled the *Romans*. The Conſuls calmly waited till the ſtorm of paſſion was over, knowing, ſays *Appian*, that mighty calamities at firſt create, in thoſe who are ſtruck with them, a boldneſs, which neceſſity in a ſhort time ſubdues. And thus it happened to the *Carthaginians:* When they had, in the manner above deſcribed, diſcharged their firſt fury and indignation, they lay ſilent and motionleſs, as if they had been dead. After a while, coming to themſelves, and to a more perfect feeling of their diſtreſs, they, inſtead of angry words, fell to wailings and humble entreaties. *Hanno*, ſurnamed *Gilla*, endeavoured in a long ſpeech, to move the compaſſion of the Conſuls, and, in concluſion, earneſtly begged, that they would, at leaſt, allow the *Carthaginians* time, to make application to the Senate of *Rome*. The Conſuls, inflexible, would neither recede from their ſentence, nor conſent to ſuſpend the execution of it. *Be gone*, ſaid they to the ſuppliants, *Hitherto you are ambaſſadors*. The Lictors were making them withdraw, when they, foreſeeing the tumult that would be raiſed at *Carthage* by the anſwer they were to carry thither, begged leave, once more to ſpeak. This granted, they ſaid: "We are ſenſible of the neceſſity of obeying. You will not ſuffer us to ſend ambaſſadors to *Rome:* nor will our people ſuffer us to return to you; we ſhall be torn to pieces before we have fully delivered our meſſage. We beg therefore, not for

" for our own ſakes, who are prepared for the worſt that can happen, " but for the ſake of the people of *Carthage*, you would ſend your fleet " thither; that our fellow citizens, while they hear your commands " from us, ſeeing you ready to execute them yourſelves, may be in- " duced, if poſſible, to ſubmit to their calamity. Hard indeed is that " neceſſity which thus forces us to call for your fleet againſt our " country." *Cenſorinus* ſo far complied with this requeſt as to go with twenty ſhips, and hover upon the coaſt near *Carthage*. Some of the deputies, in their journey towards the city, ſtole aſide, and diſappeared; the reſt in ſilence held on their way. The people, in crowds upon the walls, were looking impatiently for their return: many ran out to meet them, and, perceiving an exceſſive ſadneſs in their countenances, eagerly enquired the cauſe. No body gave any anſwer. Much difficulty had the deputies, when they came to the city, to get through the preſs that choaked up the gate, and all the way to the Senate-houſe. Here being at length arrived, and having entered the aſſembly, one of them reported the Conſuls command. The univerſal cry, which it inſtantly raiſed within doors, was anſwered by a louder and more doleful noiſe from the multitude without, though they knew not yet the certainty of the evil they apprehended. The Speaker continuing his diſcourſe to inform the Senate of the arguments that had been employed to move compaſſion, the Senators, through an earneſt deſire to know the event, became once more ſilent and attentive; and their ſtillneſs cauſed the like abroad. But, when it was underſtood, that the Conſuls, inexorably cruel, refuſed even to reſpite the execution of their ſentence, till an embaſſy could go to *Rome*, and return, the aſſembly again burſt out in cries and lamentations; which the multitude hearing, and no longer doubting of the intolerable calamity, furiouſly broke into the Senate-houſe, reviling and inſulting all thoſe who had counſelled their giving hoſtages, and delivering up their arms. The whole city became a ſcene of the moſt deſperate grief, and the wildeſt rage; and the deſolation and frantic wailings of the mothers, whoſe ſons had been torn from them for hoſtages, and who ran raving about the ſtreets, aſſaulting thoſe whom they accuſed of robbing them of their children, did not a little heighten the circumſtances of the diſtreſs, the uproar and the confuſion.

Y. of *R.* 604. Bef. *J. C.* 148. 303 Conſul p.

However, amidſt this multitude of diſtracted people, there were ſome who, leſs tranſported with paſſion, had the preſence of mind to ſhut and ſecure the gates of the city, and to gather upon the ramparts great heaps of ſtones, which might ſerve inſtead of other weapons. The ſame day, the Senate decreed war; proclaimed liberty, by a public crier, to the ſlaves; enrolled them in the militia; ſent to *Aſdrubal* whom they had condemned, and who, with an army of 20,000 men, was not far off, praying him to forget the injury they

App. in *Pun.* p. 54.

Y. of *R.* 604. Bef. *J. C.* 148 303 Conſul p.

they had been forced to do him, and employ his troops for the defence of his country, in this her extreme danger; and laſtly appointed another *Aſdrubal*, a grandſon of *Maſiniſſa* (by one of his daughters) to command in *Carthage*. Theſe meaſures taken, they ordered a new deputation to the Conſuls, to aſk a truce of thirty days, that they might have time to ſend ambaſſadors to *Rome*; which being denied, it was reſolved unanimouſly, that they would preſerve their city, or die defending it. Inſtantly the temples and other ſpacious buildings were converted into work-houſes, where men and women, old and young, employed themſelves, by day and by night, in fabricating arms. That no time might be loſt, whilſt ſome eat or ſlept, others took their places; and the work never ceaſed. They every day made 140 bucklers, 300 ſwords, 500 javelins and lances, and a 1000 darts for the *Catapultæ*. Of theſe machines they formed as many as they could; and, becauſe there was a ſcarcity of materials to make cords for them, the women cut off their hair to ſupply that want.

Strabo B. 17. p. 832.

Flor. B. 2. c. 15.

App. p. 55.

In the mean time the Conſuls, from a perſuaſion that an unarmed multitude would not think of ſuſtaining a ſiege, or, if they did, that the town would eaſily be taken, made no haſte to march thither. Finding at length how matters went, they advanced to the place. Their chief care was to ſecure proviſions, which they could get only from *Utica*, *Leptis*, *Adrumetum*, and two other towns: *Aſdrubal* held the reſt of *Africa*, and plentifully ſupplied *Carthage*. *Maſiniſſa* did not offer the Conſuls any aſſiſtance. He thought himſelf ill uſed by the *Romans*, in that, after he had brought *Carthage* ſo low, they came to take advantage of his victory, without ſo much as imparting to him their deſign. When therefore, to try him, they ſent to aſk his aid, he anſwered, he would give it when he ſaw it was wanted. Shortly after he ſent an offer of his aid; but then the Conſuls anſwered, that, when they wanted it, they would aſk it.

CARTHAGE, which is ſaid to have been twenty three miles in circuit, and to have contained 700,000 ſouls, was ſituated within a large gulph or bay, on a Peninſula forty five miles in compaſs, and joined to the continent by an iſthmus, or neck of land, three miles broad. The city ſeems to have been divided into three principal parts, *Cothon* (ſometimes call'd the Port) *Megara* and *Byrſa*. The laſt, two miles in compaſs, was the citadel; it ſtood on the iſthmus, and on that very ſpot of ground which *Dido* purchaſed of the *Africans*. On the South ſide, towards the continent, the city was defended by three walls, each thirty cubits high, and ſtrengthened with towers riſing two ſtories above the height of the walls. Along and between theſe walls were barracks [a] for 20000 foot, 4000

[a] *Appian* makes theſe barracks, including not only the lodgings for the troops, but the ſtables and granaries for the horſes and elephants, to have been *in* the walls, which ſeems improbable, as it muſt have ruined the ſtrength of the fortification.

horſe,

horſe, and 300 elephants. Whether the harbour of *Carthage* was on the Eaſt or the Weſt of the Peninſula, is uncertain. *Appian* places it on the Weſt: but there are paſſages in *Polybius* from which one ſhould naturally conclude that it was on the Eaſt; and ſo *Cellarius* believes. We find it divided into two ports, having both but one and the ſame entrance from the ſea; and this entrance only ſeventy foot broad, ſo that it could be ſhut up with iron chains. The inner port was for the ſhips of war, and in the midſt of it ſtood an iſland, natural or artificial, where was the arſenal; and where the admiral reſided. The outer port belonged to the merchants. Y. of *R.* 604. Bef. *J. C.* 148. 303 Conſul-p.

It will not be attempted here to give a ſatisfactory account of the operations of the ſiege of *Carthage*, or to explain all that *Appian* ſays of it: A plan of the place is wanting; nor is it eaſy to form one from that author's deſcription. What we find clear and diſtinct is, in ſubſtance, to the following effect. That the Conſuls attempted to ſcale the walls in two places, believing they had need of nothing more than ladders to become maſters of the town: that, to their aſtoniſhment, they found the beſieged well armed and reſolute; and that being twice repulſed, they applied themſelves to make the preparations for a regular ſiege, which would not ſoon be finiſhed: that afterwards *Cenſorinus* made a breach in the wall, but notwithſtanding all his efforts to enter the place, was driven back with conſiderable loſs, and would have ſuſtained a greater, if *Scipio Æmilianus*, then a legionary Tribune, had not covered his retreat: that the *Carthaginians* made fireſhips of ſome old rotten barks, and, the wind blowing favourably, let them drive upon the *Roman* fleet, which was thereby almoſt totally conſumed: that *Cenſorinus*, after this diſaſter, returned to *Rome* to preſide at the elections. We read alſo that his collegue *Manilius* continued the war with no better ſucceſs, and would have loſt the greater part of his army in a raſh enterprize, againſt *Aſdrubal* in the field, had it not been for the bravery and conduct of *Æmilianus*, who with 300 horſe ſuſtained the charge of all *Aſdrubal*'s forces, and covered the legions, while they paſſed a river in their retreat before the enemy. By theſe and many other glorious actions, during this unfortunate campaign, *Æmilianus* eſtabliſhed himſelf in ſo high a reputation of courage and ability, that *Cato*, a great niggard of praiſe, is ſaid to have applied to him a verſe of *Homer* in the *Odyſſey*, where the Poet, comparing *Tireſias* with the other Ghoſts in the *Elyſian* field, ſays, *He alone has underſtanding, the reſt are but ſhadows* [c]. *App.* in *Pun.* p. 57. & ſeq. *Plut.* life of *Cato*.

[c] Οἱῳ πέπνυλαι; τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι.
Hom. Odyſſ. L. 10.
To whom *Perſephone*, entire and whole,
Gave to retain th' unſeparated ſoul:
The reſt are forms of empty æther made,
Impaſſive ſemblance, and a fleeting ſhade.
Odyſſey. B. 10. *l.* 584.

Y. of *R.* 605. Bef. *J. C.* 147. 304 Conſul-p.

At *Rome* were choſen to the Conſulſhip *Sp. Poſthumius Albinus Magnus* and *L. Calpurnius Piſo Cæſonius*. The conduct of the war in *Africa* fell to the latter. While *Manilius* in quality of Proconſul continued to act there, *Himilco Phamæas*, General of *Aſdrubal*'s cavalry, came over to the *Romans*, out of pure eſteem (as it is ſaid) for *Scipio Æmilianus*. The *African* brought with him 2200 horſe, very opportunely, when the Proconſul, having led his army into a dangerous ſituation, was greatly at a loſs how to make a retreat.

App. in *Pun.* p. 65.

App. in *Pun.* p. 63. *Polyb.* Excerp. ap. *Valeſ.* *Diod. Sicul.* ap. *Phot.* *Liv. Epit.* B. 50.

A LITTLE before this died *Maſiniſſa*; the beſt, and moſt fortunate King, (ſays *Polybius*) of his time: fortunate in a healthy and vigorous conſtitution, inſomuch that no labours of war were too great for his ſtrength; and, though ninety years old at his death, he left a ſon but four years of age: fortunate in his friendſhip with the *Romans*, which procured him an extenſive dominion: fortunate in the concord which reigned among his children, and prevented all inteſtine commotions and ſeditions. His great merit (not to ſpeak of his courage and activity) was his introducing huſbandry into *Numidia*, and ſhewing his ſubjects that the ſoil, which they thought barren, was capable of bringing forth all kinds of fruits, and in as great plenty as any other country. Thus uſeful and beneficent to his own people, he was a very bad neighbour, as the reader muſt have obſerved.

App. loc. cit. & *Zonar.* T. 2.

We are told that, on his death bed, *Maſiniſſa* ſent for *Scipio Æmilianus* to conſult with him about diſpoſing of his dominions; that he expired before *Scipio* arrived, but had commanded his ſons to acquieſce in whatever diviſion the *Roman* ſhould make of the kingdom: that *Scipio*, having, purſuant to the intention of the deceaſed, provided handſomly for the baſtard children, decreed that each of the three legitimate ſons ſhould bear the title of King; that *Micipſa*, being the eldeſt and of a pacifick temper, ſhould reſide in the palace of *Cirtha*, and be treaſurer; that, the ſecond, *Guluſſa*, a military man, ſhould be Generaliſſimo; and that *Manaſtabal*, the youngeſt, who had been accuſtomed to hear cauſes, ſhould be Lord Chief Juſtice: and thus each King had the two other Kings for his Miniſters [d].

The

[d] There is a paſſage in *Salluſt* which ſeems to contradict the whole of this ſtory. His words are theſe: *Imperii vitæque ejus* [*Maſiniſſa*] *finis idem fuit.* Dein *Micipſa filius regnum* ſolus *obtinuit*, *Manaſtabale & Guluſſa fratribus morbo abſumptis.* Bell. Jugurth. c. 5. which words are in the new tranſlation of that hiſtorian render'd thus: "When death put an end to his [*Maſiniſſa*'s] reign, his ſon *Micipſa* ſucceeded him: *at that time* his *only ſon*, as his other two, *Manaſtabal* and *Guluſſa*, had been carry'd off by diſtempers." Perhaps the word *Dein* ſhould be render'd, *Some time after*; and then the meaning of the paſſage will be this: "Some time after the death of *Maſiniſſa*, *Micipſa* reigned alone; his brothers [and partners in the government] *Manaſtabal* and *Guluſſa*, having been carry'd off by diſtempers."

That *Micipſa* was not the *only ſon* of *Maſiniſſa* that ſurviv'd him, we have the authority

The Conſul *Calpurnius*, and *Mancinus* (who commanded a new fleet) came into *Africa* in the beginning of the ſpring, but performed nothing to their honour. They did not ſo much as attempt to take *Carthage*, or even to moleſt *Aſdrubal*, but applied themſelves to reduce *Clypea* and *Hippogreta* on the *African* coaſt, attacking them, both by ſea and land, without ſucceſs. After which they retired with the army and fleet to *Utica*, and ſpent the winter there. Y. of *R.* 605. Bef. *J. C.* 147. 304 Conſul-p. *App.* in *Punic.* p. 66. & ſeq.

In the mean time the *Carthaginians*, gathering new courage from the ſpiritleſs behaviour of their enemies, began to look abroad for allies. They not only ſent into *Numidia*, and to the free ſtates of *Mauritania*, but even into *Macedon*. About a year before, one *Andriſcus*, a man of the dregs of the people, had given himſelf out to be the ſon of *Perſes*, aſſumed the name of *Philip*, and, being aſſiſted by the *Thracians*, had, partly by force of arms, and partly by perſuaſion, engaged the *Macedonians* to recognize him for their King. Not content with this, he invaded *Theſſaly*. *Scipio Naſica*, with the aſſiſtance of the *Achæans*, and other *Greek* allies, drove him from that country: but the Prætor *Juventius Thalna*, who ſucceeded *Naſica*, and brought an army with him from *Italy*, loſt the greater part of his troops, and his own life, in a raſh enterprize to force his way through ſome narrow paſſes into *Macedon:* after which *Andriſcus* eaſily recovered that part of *Theſſaly* he had been forced by *Naſica* to abandon. The *Carthaginians* thinking that this Uſurper was grown powerful enough to make an uſeful diverſion, ſent ambaſſadors to encourage him to a vigorous proſecution of the war, promiſing to ſupply him both with money and ſhips. The hiſtorians have not told us what anſwer *Andriſcus* returned to the *Carthaginians*. Whatever it were, it proved of no ſervice either to him or them. For *Q. Cæcilius Metellus*, who ſucceeded *Thalna* in the command of the *Roman* forces, defeated the uſurper in two pitched battles; the firſt in *Macedon*, the ſecond in *Thrace*, where one of the petty Kings, to whom he fled for refuge, delivered him up to the *Romans*. This impoſtor was no ſooner cruſhed, than another ſtarted up, who called himſelf *Alexander*; and he likewiſe pretended to be a ſon of *Perſes*. *Metellus* eaſily drove him out of the country into *Dardania*. *Liv.* Epit. B. 49. *Zonar.* T. 2. *Liv.* Epit. B. 50. *Zonar.* *Flor.* B. 2. c. 14. *Zonar.* T. 2.

thority of *Polybius*, the epitome of *Livy*, *Appian* and *Zonaras*. And it is very unlikely that *Salluſt* would contradict a fact related by *Polybius*, in which the latter could not be deceived. Now *Polybius*, who was with *Scipio* at the ſiege of *Carthage*, ſpeaks of *Guluſſa*, *King of the Numidians*, as preſent at the ſame ſiege in the third year of the war. *Guluſſa*'s title of *King* implies that *Maſiniſſa* was dead; and *Appian* relates his death as happening two years before. Beſides, *Polybius* expreſsly ſays that *Maſiniſſa* left five ſons, of which one was but four years old; and that, three days after the King's death, *Scipio* arrived at *Cirtha*, where he ſettled all things with great prudence; for which good office on his part there would have been no occaſion, if the kingdom had fallen intirely to one only ſon and heir.

CHAP.